La Politica del Buen Amigo: Mexican- Latin American Relations during the Presidency of Lazaro Cardenas, 1934-1940

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Authors Kiddle, Amelia Marie

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO: MEXICAN-LATIN AMERICAN REALTIONS DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF LÁZARO CÁRDENAS, 1934-1940

by

Amelia Marie Kiddle

______Copyright © Amelia Marie Kiddle 2010

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2010

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Amelia Marie Kiddle entitled La Política del Buen Amigo: Mexican-Latin American Relations during the Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940 and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

______Date: 05/03/2010 William H. Beezley

______Date: 05/03/2010 Kevin Gosner

______Date: 05/03/2010 Bert J. Barickman

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.

______Date: 05/03/2010 Dissertation Director: William H. Beezley

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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED: Amelia Marie Kiddle

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The multi-country archival approach I employed in researching this dissertation made it an expensive proposition, and I am grateful for the Foreign Government Award I received from the Canadian Bureau for International Education, which provided funding from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a year in the Mexican archives. In addition to the pre-dissertation research funding I received from the Tinker Foundation, and the University of Arizona Department of History and Social and Behavioral Sciences Research Institute, the latter two also provided timely assistance to support my forays into the Cuban, Guatemalan, UK, US national archives. The Manuscript Society provided essential funding for my research in the Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The Herbert Taylor Barnes Foundation provided invaluable financial support throughout the course of my graduate studies, and I am especially grateful for the assistance it has provided.

My committee members have been a constant source of encouragement throughout the research and writing of my dissertation. My advisor Bill Beezley’s good ideas, boundless energy, and constant faith in this project have been a source of inspiration. Bert Barickman shared his brilliance and friendship, as well as excellent, exhaustive, (and exhausting) guidance in Brazil. Kevin Gosner provided steady guidance and a voice of reason. David Ortiz shared his knowledge of Spanish history and his comments on these chapters over drinks at The Shanty. Walter Brem has been a fount of archival information and restaurant recommendations. In Mexico, I benefited from Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’s continued interest in my progress, Guillermo Palacios’s guidance and mentorship, Carmen Nava Nava’s knowledge and enthusiasm, and Cecilia Zuleta’s friendship and collaboration. I am grateful for the assistance of more archivists and librarians than I could possibly name here, but special mention must go to Alejandro Padilla Nieto and the staff of the Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada. I am also glad to have shared my time in the archives with such good friends; I thank Amanda López, Steve Neufeld, Ryan Kashanipour, María Muñoz, Sophia Koutsoyannis, Claudia Carretta, Erika Hosselkus, Joseph Lenti, and Steve Andes, for their interest in my work, and for being such great fun. The constant support I received from my family made the trials and tribulations of graduate school bearable, and even enjoyable. My parents, David and Elizabeth Kiddle, have had more faith in me than I could ever have hoped. My sister Jennie’s love and humour always helped me put things into perspective. Most of all, my husband Jonathan Jucker—my travelling companion, copy editor, and best friend—has been an invaluable partner in this long journey. Thank you.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………….6

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………….7

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………...8

CHAPTER ONE. LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO IN LATIN AMERICA………..19

CHAPTER TWO. LA MINISTRO AND EL DUELISTA: GENDER AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN LATIN AMERICA…………………………………..43

CHAPTER THREE. REPÚBLICAS ROJAS: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA………………………….92

CHAPTER FOUR. SELLING THE OIL EXPROPRIATION OF 1938………………140

CHAPTER FIVE. A TALE OF TWO CONFERENCES: THE III CONFERENCIA INTERAMERICANA DE EDUCACIÓN AND THE PRIMER CONGRESO INDIGENISTA INTERAMERICANO……………………………………..…186

CONCLUSION. THE VOYAGE OF THE DURANGO: FINAL THOUGHTS ON LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO………………………………………………..263

APPENDIX A. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY, 1934-1940…………….………………………………………….297

APPENDIX B. DIPLOMATS POSTED TO LATIN AMERICA, 1934-1940…..…….301

REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………....304

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Annual Budget (Projected and Actual) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs…34

Figure 1.2 Annual Budget for Salaries and Other Expenses in the Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Service, and the Consular Service, 1934-40……………………………35

Figure 2.1 Ambassadors and Ministers’ Years of Birth…………………………………48

Figure 2.2 Ambassadors and Ministers’ States of Origin………………………………..50

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ABSTRACT

Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) did more than any other president to fulfil the goals of the

Mexican Revolution of 1910, by nationalizing the oil industry, establishing rural schools,

distributing an unprecedented amount of land to peasants, and encouraging the

organization of workers. To gain international support for this domestic reform programme, the Cárdenas government promoted these accomplishments to other Latin

American nations. I argue that Cárdenas attempted to attain a leadership position in

inter-American relations by virtue of his pursuit of social and economic justice in

domestic and foreign policy. I investigate the Cárdenas government’s projection of a

Revolutionary image of Mexico and evaluate its reception in Latin America. In doing so,

this dissertation expands the analysis of foreign policy to show that Mexico’s relations

with its Latin American neighbours were instrumental in shaping its foreign relations. I argue that the intersections between culture and diplomacy were central to this process.

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INTRODUCTION

Demonstrators rallying for domestic political reforms in Uruguay in 1938 carried

placards bearing the image of Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas. Catholic Action

groups in Chile had held masses in 1935 to protest his government’s persecution of

Catholics and the threat this allegedly posed to Catholicism in Latin America. Clearly,

the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas held broad significance for Latin Americans during

the ideologically polarised decade of the 1930s. Cárdenas spearheaded a reform

programme that garnered both acclaim and censure in the region. This dissertation

examines Mexico’s relations with the rest of Latin America during the Cárdenas presidency (1934-1940) and weighs his government’s efforts to lead the region on the

basis of the ideas contained in its domestic political reform programme.

Generally considered to have been the most Revolutionary of the presidents who

followed the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Cárdenas’s domestic political programme has

received significant attention in the literature.1 Patterns of land tenure in the countryside

had remained largely unchanged until Cárdenas undertook a large-scale agrarian reform

programme, distributing an unprecedented amount of land to campesinos (rural workers).

He is also famous for the 1938 expropriation of US and Anglo-Dutch oil companies

1 The literature on cardenismo is vast: see especially Alan Knight, “Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?” Journal of Latin American Studies 26:1 (Feb., 1996): 73-107; Adolfo Gilly, El cardenismo, una utopia mexicana (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1994); Marjorie Becker, Setting the Virgin on Fire: Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán Peasants, and the Redemption of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Adrian Bantjes, As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican Revolution (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1998); Ben W. Fallaw, Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of Reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001); Luis González y González, Los artífices del cardenismo. Historia de la Revolución Mexicana. Vol. 14. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979); Arnaldo Córdova, La pólitica de masas del cardenismo (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1974); Nora Hamilton, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). 9

operating in Mexico, which resulted in the establishment of the national oil industry,

PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos). The expropriation had resulted from a protracted labour

dispute between workers and the foreign oil companies. Cárdenas championed the

organisation of workers in the CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores de México) and

rural workers in the CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina) during his presidency.

To encourage their involvement in the political life of the nation, he restructured the

official party that had been established in 1929 (the Partido Nacional Revolucionario)—

which would later be reorganised again to become the PRI (Partido Revolucionario

Institucional). Scholarly criticism of Cárdenas stems in part from the fact that in

restructuring the ruling party he laid the groundwork for the seventy-year hegemony of

the PRI. Nevertheless, post-revisionist works on his presidency stress that this was an

unintended consequence of his reforms.

The domestic aspects of the Cárdenas presidency have been well-researched, but

there is only one major study of his government’s foreign policy, which deals with

Mexico’s relations with the United States and Europe, not Latin America.2 I argue that

by examining Mexico’s Política del Buen Amigo or “Good Friend Policy” toward Latin

America—the country’s answer to the US Good Neighbor Policy—and analysing social

and cultural aspects of Mexico’s foreign policy, new understandings of Mexican foreign

relations and their significance for the formation of Mexican national identity emerge.

Studies of Mexican foreign policy have most often focused on the nation’s bilateral

2 Friedrich E. Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998). 10

relations with the United States.3 Although this tendency began to change with the inclusion of European sources, the discussion of relations with Latin America remains limited.4 Few studies of the period have examined these relations, and those that have tend to be political histories.5 Cultural history, while bringing new approaches to bear on diplomatic history, has tended to refocus attention on US-Mexican relations.6 This

3 See, for example, John J. Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute: The Expropriation of American-Owned Rural Land in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); María Emilia Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Stephen R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico, 1938-1954 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1995); Gilbert M. Joseph, Revolution from Without: Yucatan, Mexico, and the United States, 1880-1924 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Lorenzo Meyer, México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1968). Works on Mexico’s relations with Spain, which will be discussed in Chapter Three, constitute an important exception to this trend. 4 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Lorenzo Meyer, Su Majestad Británica contra la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1991); Daniela Spenser, The Impossible Triangle: Mexico, Soviet Russia, and the United States in the 1920s (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Denis Rolland, Vichy et la France Libre au Mexique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1990); Rob Van Vuurde, Los Países Bajos, el petróleo y la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950 (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, 1997). 5 Exceptions to the relative dearth of scholarship on Mexican-Latin American relations include: Jürgen Buchenau, In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central America Policy, 1876-1930 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996); Fabián Herrera León, La política mexicana en la Sociedad de Naciones ante la Guerra del Chaco y el Conflicto de Leticia, 1932-1935 (Mexico City: SRE, 2009), and the works of Pablo Yankelevich, La revolución mexicana en América Latina: Intereses políticos e itinerarios intelectuales (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2003); Miradas australes. Propaganda, cabildeo y proyección de la Revolución Mexicana en el Río de la Plata, 1910-1930 (Mexico City: INEHRM, 1997); La Diplomacia Imaginaria: Argentina y la Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1916 (Mexico City: SRE, 1994). Indicative of new interest in the field is the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores’s excellent new Colección Latinoamericana, which includes Guillermo Palacios, Intimidades, conflictos y reconciliaciones: México y Brasil 1822-1993 (Mexico City: SRE, 2001); Salvador Morales, Relaciones interferidas: México y el Caríbe, 1813-1982 (Mexico City: SRE, 2002); Mónica Toussaint Ribot, et al, Vecindad y Diplomacia: Centroamérica en la política exterior mexicana, 1821-1988 (Mexico City: SRE, 2001); Salvador Méndez Reyes, et al, Bajo el manto del libertador: Relaciones de México con Colombia, Panamá y Venezuela, 1921-2000 (Mexico City: SRE, 2004); Rubén Ruíz Guerra, Mas allá de la diplomacia: Relaciones de México con Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú, 1821-1994 (Mexico City: SRE, 2007); and María Cecilia Zuleta, Los extremos de Hispanoamérica: Relaciones, conflictos y armonías entre México y el Cono Sur, 1821-1990 (Mexico City: SRE, 2008). 6 See, for example, Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, (eds.), Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Julio Moreno, Yankee Don’t Go Home!: Mexican Nationalism, American Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Helen Delpar, The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United States and Mexico, 1920-1935 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992). 11

dissertation examines the ways in which self-representation as a Revolutionary nation

affected the nature of Mexico’s relations with the rest of Latin America, the definition of

the national patrimony, and the legacy of the Mexican Revolution. I argue that the

intersections between culture and diplomacy were central to this process.

In order to achieve this reinterpretation, this dissertation draws on Latin American

archival and periodical sources in addition to the Mexican sources that document the

formulation of La Política del Buen Amigo. The polarisation of international politics during the 1930s meant that a range of reactions characterised Latin American reception of the Cárdenas government’s foreign policy initiatives, as well as the image of the nation and its Revolution that members of the Foreign Service promoted in the region. Analysis of these diverse reactions, though not exhaustive, distinguishes this study and enables greater understanding of both the patterns and distinguishing features of these complex

responses. The different reception given Cárdenas’s initiatives by Mexico’s two closest

neighbours, Cuba and Guatemala, demonstrate the diversity of these reactions as well as

the differences between domestic political processes among Latin American countries at

the time. While the government of Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, which was characteristic

of the so-called Liberal dictatorships that dominated Central America in this period, was

openly hostile to the Revolutionary government of Mexico, the Cuban government,

which after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado in 1933 had embarked

upon a period of social reform under the influence of General Fulgencio Batista, was

cautiously sympathetic to the Cárdenas government. In the Southern Cone, the

reactionary presidents of Argentina’s “Infamous Decade” were wary of the influence of 12

Mexico’s Leftist politics, as well as its competition for leadership of the region. Whereas

the Chilean reaction initially mirrored that of Argentina during the early years of the

Cárdenas presidency when the Liberal oligarchic regime of Arturo Alessandri held sway,

the 1938 election of Popular Front candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda ensured that Mexico’s initiatives would thereafter be received much more warmly. Against the background of the Great Depression, Latin American governments struggled to find solutions to the

rising demands of urban and rural workers and the unravelling of the export-oriented

economic and political regimes that had dominated the region since the late nineteenth

century. The Cárdenas government’s policies presented to the region a possible way

forward, but the diverse reactions of Latin American governments depended upon

domestic political ideologies that held sway in each country. As the product of

negotiation among diverse interest groups in Mexico and within Latin America, Mexico’s

relations with the region were characterised by the ideological polarisation of the times.

In his relations with Latin America, Cárdenas cultivated the same charismatic

personal image that characterised his populist political style in domestic politics.7

Members of the Mexican Foreign Service held up this image of the Mexican president in the region, also promoting the populist politics he employed as a solution to Latin

America’s political, economic, and social ills. But more than promoting the image of

Cárdenas himself, they advanced the understanding of the Revolutionary ideals he

7 Alan Knight, “Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 30:2 (May, 1998): 223-248. Jorge Basurto, “Populismo y movilización de masas en México durante el régimen cardenista,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 3:4 (Oct.-Dec. 1969): 853-92; Michael L. Conniff, ed. Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1999); Amelia M. Kiddle and María L.O. Muñoz, (eds.), Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010). 13

personified. The success of this domestic policy hinged on his government’s freedom to

pursue domestic reform without fear of foreign intervention in its internal affairs. The

principle of non-intervention had long been one of the pillars of Mexican foreign policy.

Its emphasis during the Cárdenas era reflects his government’s need to secure its reform

program, ensuring that it remained a viable alternative for other Latin American

countries. In seeking increased friendly relations with Latin America and promoting

understanding of the government’s Revolutionary programme in the region, the Cárdenas

government was in effect both encouraging its adoption in Latin America and

safeguarding its achievements in Mexico by garnering support for the idea that his

government should be free to implement policies that represented a legitimate solution to

the pressing demands of the times.

In advancing understanding of Revolutionary Mexico in Latin America, the

Cárdenas government made extensive use of cultural diplomacy. In doing so, it constructed an image of the nation for Latin American consumption that both reflected and contributed to the definition of Mexican national identity, culture, and patrimony.8

The rise of the Nation State and its designation in international affairs on the basis of distinct cultural identities after the end of the First World War, and the establishment of the League of Nations, necessitated the definition of national cultures. The canonisation of national cultural patrimony therefore owed as much to this international exigency as processes of identity formation within national boundaries. The construction and

8 On the construction of Mexican national identity see, for example, William H. Beezley, Mexican National Identity: Memory, Innuendo, and Popular Culture (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2008); Ricardo Pérez Montfort, Estampas de nacionalismo popular mexicano (Mexico City: CIESAS, 2003); Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis, (eds.), The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 14

presentation of a distinct national culture on the international stage legitimised governments’ efforts to ensure their freedom to pursue the sovereign development of the nation. The dissemination of Mexican national culture abroad supported the Cárdenas government’s calls for respect for the principle of non-intervention in international affairs. Cultural relations formed an essential part of the government’s foreign policy, and the image of the nation that emerged in diplomats’ promotion of Mexican national culture reflected the negotiation of foreign and domestic interests, both in the formulation and reception of Mexican foreign policy, in this process.

Dissertation Structure

Culture is central to the understanding of Mexican relations with Latin America during the Cárdenas presidency, both in terms of the cultural production of the

Revolution and the elements of national culture disseminated in the region, and as the set of ideas and values that shaped collective action and intent in Mexican foreign relations.

In the chapters that follow, I examine popular, symbolic, and print culture from the period, as well as the culture of diplomacy and how ideas of revolution, gender, and nationalism shaped Mexico’s relations with Latin America.

Chapter One examines the articulation of the Política del Buen Amigo, its formulation and implementation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Previous works have shown that a reorganisation of the Foreign Ministry between 1920 and 1940 created a professional and effective organisation dedicated to the promotion of Mexico’s interests abroad. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs withdrew most of its highest- 15

ranking diplomats from the Latin America when faced with financial crisis in 1937.

Budgetary constraints, combined with the fact that, despite the advent of the Política del

Buen Amigo, relations with Latin America were not a diplomatic priority when compared to the importance of Mexico’s relations with the Great Powers, meant that diplomats posted to Latin America operated with less oversight than their counterparts in the political and cultural capitals of the world. Members of the Foreign Service used this relative autonomy to adopt creative diplomatic strategies for the strengthening of

Mexico’s relations with Latin America, often under the direct supervision of President

Cárdenas, who maintained an active interest in the direction of Mexico’s foreign policy in the region.

Chapter Two is an analysis of ideas of gender in the Mexican Foreign Service. A collective biography of the diplomats who served in Latin America during the Cárdenas period details the origin, education, and career of the diplomats posted to the region, and reconstructs their shared understanding of the Revolution and its potential applicability to the rest of Latin America. Through the analysis of two exceptional cases that demonstrate the role of gender in Mexican foreign relations—the appointment of Palma

Guillén as the first female head of mission in Latin America and an incident that caused

Bernardo Reyes, Mexico’s chargé d’affaires in Paraguay, to challenge a detractor of the

Revolution to a duel—this chapter demonstrates existence of a culture of Revolutionary masculinity that pervaded the Foreign Service and affected Mexico’s relations with Latin

America and the reception of the Cárdenas government’s foreign policy initiatives. 16

Chapter Three demonstrates the connections between the material and moral

support the Cárdenas government provided the Republic during the Spanish Civil War and his government’s Latin American policy. Paying rapt attention to the news coming out of Spain and Mexico, Leftist intellectual figures, pro-Republican Spanish immigrants, and students and workers groups eulogised the Cárdenas government’s position. Often working in tandem, intellectuals and activists raised money for Republican causes and

publicised what they believed were the twin causes of Mexico and Spain. Conversely, the

predominantly conservative governments of the region and organisations of the Right

reacted with apprehension; as well as censuring the activities of Leftists—Mexican

diplomats included—they were concerned mainly for the maintenance of the conservative

status quo within their own countries. As a result, the reception met by the Cárdenas

government’s initiatives served as a proxy for commentary on domestic politics in Latin

America, and Mexico’s Spanish policy affected not only its diplomatic relations with

Latin American governments, but the politics of an entire region polarised by the

ideological politics of the 1930s.

Chapter Four analyses Latin American reception of the Cárdenas government’s

oil expropriation of 1938. President Cárdenas’s announcement created the circumstances

for one of the most important tests of the diplomacy of Mexico’s representatives in Latin

America. Henceforth, much of their time, energy, and resources would be devoted to

supporting the president’s oil policy and justifying his decisions. These efforts entailed

“selling” the expropriation in two inter-related ways: first, through propaganda efforts in

the region; and second, through attempts to create a market in Latin America for the 17

newly-nationalised oil industry. The expropriation was particularly contentious because

it portended to some the rise of a workers’ republic, but more importantly it was

exemplary of the Cárdenas government’s approach to state intervention in the economy

which appealed to economic nationalists in the region who were reeling from the effects of the disintegration of the export-oriented model of Latin American development.

Chapter Five investigates the Cárdenas government use of inter-American meetings as propaganda tools in promoting its leadership of the region. The government lobbied hard to host these conferences in the belief that they were excellent opportunities to promote the accomplishments of the Revolution. Paying particular attention to the

Third Inter-American Meeting on Education (III CIE), held at Mexico City in 1937, and the First Inter-American Congress of Indigenistas (PCII), held at Pátzcuaro in 1940, this chapter examines the lengthy planning process of each event, the specific activities that surrounded the conferences, and the perceptions of the Latin American delegates who attended them. Although inter-American conferences on education, child welfare, and indigenous issues have been the focus of studies that have examined their place in the evolution of Latin American ideas regarding social welfare and indigenismo (the movement for the incorporation of marginalised indigenous populations into the nation in

Latin America), analysis of the planning of these events results in new interpretations of both the meetings themselves and their usefulness in the Cárdenas government’s pursuit of a leadership role in Latin America.

Finally, the Conclusion examines the 1940 voyage to South America of a five-

hundred-person artistic, military, commercial, and athletic mission of goodwill. This 18

special embassy, which travelled to Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Panama and Bolivia aboard the

Durango, epitomised the Cárdenas government’s cultural relations with Latin America,

and the image of the nation it presented to the region. The carefully-chosen members of

this mission represented the standardisation of Mexican culture, the country’s growing

industrial strength, its folkloric dances and typical music, the youth and vigour of its military and naval cadets and athletes, and most importantly, its Revolutionary legacy.

The special embassy both superseded and reflected Mexican diplomats’ regular diplomatic activities in the region, connecting their everyday promotion of the understanding of Revolutionary Mexico to this extraordinary and memorable event, thereby positively influencing the reception of Mexican foreign policy initiatives and the sympathy that its domestic political policies found in Latin America. Although Mexico’s

Política del Buen Amigo met with mixed results, depending on the political ideologies that held sway in Latin America and the negotiation of local and international interests,

Mexico’s cultural relations with Latin American advanced the Cárdenas government’s goal to secure its domestic achievements through the cultivation of international support

for its right to pursue its reform programme.

19

CHAPTER ONE. LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO IN LATIN AMERICA

The governing principle of the Mexican government’s foreign policy is the Política del Buen Amigo. This policy bears a great purpose, one which corresponds to sincere friendship and a profound interest in sharing the triumphs and concerns of friendly nations. It also fundamentally symbolises the proposition, as laid out by international ethics, of non- intervention—neither directly nor indirectly—in the internal affairs of other nations, observed in letter and spirit; and demonstrates utmost respect for their ways of life and internal organisation.9

La Política del Buen Amigo guided Mexican relations with Latin America during

the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). Although this foreign policy originally

applied to his government’s relations with all of the countries with which Mexico had diplomatic relations, it soon came to be associated primarily with the country’s relations with its neighbours in the Western Hemisphere and Latin America in particular. This relates to the fact that the policy’s name was an obvious play on that of Franklin Delano

Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy for Latin America, announced during the US

President’s inaugural address in 1933. La Política del Buen Amigo was first articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Relations in 1935.10 It stated that more than just a good

neighbour, Mexico aimed to be a good friend, seeking to establish cordial relations with

other countries and uphold the principle of non-intervention that had characterised

Mexican diplomacy since the proclamation of the Estrada Doctrine in 1930.11

Nevertheless, during the Cárdenas sexenio (six-year term) the policy’s emphasis on

9 Eduardo Hay, quoted in “Política del ‘Buen Amigo,’” El Nacional, (Mexico City) April 27, 1936. 10 “Política Internacional de México,” El Universal (Mexico City), September 7, 1935. 11 On the Estrada Doctrine see, Genaro Estrada, La doctrina Estrada (Mexico City: Publicaciones del Instituto Americano de Derecho y Legislación Comparada, 1930). 20

diplomatic recognition eventually gave way to a focus upon the principles of mutual

understanding that Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay described above as a “profound

interest in sharing spiritually with friendly nations in their triumphs and concerns.”12 In

this pursuit of mutual understanding, cultural relations came to play an increasingly

significant role in the elaboration of Mexico’s foreign policy towards Latin America.

Upon his inauguration, Cárdenas appointed former president Emilio Portes Gil

Minister of Foreign Affairs. A strong supporter of Jefe Máximo Plutarco Elías Calles,

Portes Gil resigned from his position in June 1935 and took up the presidency of the

Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) following president Cárdenas’s break with

Calles. The long-serving Fernando González Roa, whom Cárdenas had initially

appointed Ambassador to Guatemala, declined to accept the cabinet position when it was

offered due to ill-health (although not before some of his international collaborators sent messages of congratulations).13 Cárdenas decided to leave the position vacant for the

time being, but it was widely held in diplomatic circles that Portes Gil maintained control

of the Ministry behind the scenes through the undersecretary he had appointed, José

Ángel Ceniceros.14 Ceniceros assumed the role of Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,

and it was he who made the first pronouncement on the Good Friend Policy that

September. John H. MacVeagh, second secretary of the US Embassy in Mexico,

reported to the State Department that through this pronouncement the international

12 Eduardo Hay, quoted in “Política del ‘Buen Amigo,’” El Nacional, April 27, 1936. 13 Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto (MRECIC), Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529, Expediente 1, telegram from Saavedra Lamas to González Roa, June 19, 1935. 14 Argentina, MRECIC, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529, Expediente 1, Ambassador Leviller to Saavedra Lamas, June 18, 1935. 21

community had been advised that Mexico’s object was to “maintain a close and continuous contact with the countries of the American Continent, seeking with them the peaceful solution of our common problems.”15 The Chilean and Guatemalan representatives in Mexico also reported Cenciceros’s announcement to their Ministries.16

Although the Acting Foreign Minister first announced the policy, its clear articulation awaited the appointment of Eduardo Hay as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hay took up the position in December 1935—one year after Cárdenas entered office—and remained Foreign Minister for the duration of the sexenio.17 Hay took power on

December 2 at a ceremony attended by the diplomatic corps. The new minister stated that he expected that his efforts would be aided by Ceniceros, who had agreed to stay on as undersecretary.18 Nevertheless, the two men did not see eye to eye on a number of foreign policy issues and clashed over Portes Gil’s (and hence Calles’s) continued influence over Ceniceros and the Ministry. Guatemalan Ambassador to Mexico Manuel

Echevarría y Vidaurre discussed in his reports the conflict between the two men, which apparently broke out over their differences of opinion regarding Mexico’s participation in

15 United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59 (RG 59), Box 4109, 712.00/45, MacVeagh to Hull, September 7, 1935. 16 Chile, Archivo Nacional de la Administración (ANA), Fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), Volúmen 3551, Bianchi to Ministro, September 8, 1935; For the Foreign Minister’s acknowledgement of the receipt of such a report, see Guatemala, Archivo General de Centro América (AGCA), Fondo Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4393, Expediente 93332, Skinner Klée to Salazar, September 14, 1935. 17 The Argentinian chargé d’affaires reports the appointment to his government in Argentina, MRECIC, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529, Expediente 1, Calvo to Saavedra Lamas, December 1, 1935. Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs Skinner Klée asked Ambassador Echevarría y Vidaurre to congratulate Hay on his behalf, and was sceptical of the Ambassador’s warning that Hay and Ceniceros were bound to clash over Portes Gil’s influence. Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4393, Expediente 93332, Skinner Klée to Echevarría y Vidaurre, December 5, 1935; Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4393, Expediente 93332, Skinner Klée to Echevarría y Vidaurre, December 11, 1935. 18 “Toma de posesión del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Ingeniero Eduardo Hay,” Noticiero Semanal 1: 48 (December 6, 1935), 2. 22

the League of Nations, but according to El Hombre Libre, soon led to a screaming match.19 As Ceniceros stormed out of the building by one door to meet with Portes Gil,

Cárdenas’s long-time friend and Minister of Communications and Public Works

Francisco Múgica, who was known as one of the leaders of the radical wing of the PNR, entered through another. This turned out to be symbolic of the changing balance of

power in the Ministry of Foreign relations and the increased influence of Cárdenas and

his collaborators over foreign affairs. On May 13, Ramón Beteta was appointed

Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, replacing Ceniceros, who had resigned from the

position on April 30. Beteta was widely acknowledged to be a close friend of the

president: US Ambassador Josephus Daniels wrote that “he is believed to be closer to the

President than any other officials of the present administration with the exception of

Licenciado Rodríguez, the President’s private secretary, and possibly General Múgica,

Minister of Communications.”20 Beteta and Cárdenas would remain intimate friends

throughout the presidency: in 1940 Chile’s new Ambassador to Mexico Manuel Hidalgo

reported that Beteta was one of Cárdenas’s most trusted advisors and that his words could

be considered a faithful expression of the president’s thinking on most matters.21 This turn-over in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1935-36 enabled the removal of the influences of the Jefe Máximo from the chancellery and the pursuit of a foreign policy that reflected the Cárdenas government’s priorities.

19 Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, B99-23-1 Legajo 6250, Echevarría y Vicaurre to Minister José González Campo, April 27, 1936; “Portes Gil y sus amigos están siendo nulificados paulatinamente,” El Hombre Libre (Mexico City), April 27, 1936. 20 United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930-1939, Record Group 59, Reel 5, 812.00/30370, Daniels to Hull, May 13, 1936. 21 Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, February 20, 1940. 23

The break between Hay and Ceniceros coincided with Hay’s first pronouncements

on the theme of the Política del Buen Amigo. At a ceremony welcoming Panama’s

visiting Minister of Foreign Trade, José Isaac Fábrega, Hay announced that the

Government held as the standard of its foreign relations the Good Friend Policy.22 This reception occurred shortly before Pan-American Day, April 14, thereby beginning the process whereby the Política del Buen Amigo became increasingly linked to Mexico’s relations with Latin America, as opposed to the rest of the world. Guatemala’s

Ambassador, Manuel Echevarría y Vidaurre, who served as dean of the diplomatic corps, had attended the ceremony. When invited to prepare remarks for the weekly broadcast of the Ministry in which members of the diplomatic corps gave addresses to the country via the Ministry’s own radio network XECR, he decided to speak on the topic of Hay’s recent policy pronouncement.23 He wrote to his Minister of Foreign Affairs that in doing

so, he aimed to make it known publicly that the Guatemalan government had taken note

of the policy, especially as it related to Mexico’s commitment not to intervene in the

affairs of other countries. Guatemala had long objected to the Mexican government’s

proclivity for intervening in Central American affairs in support of rebel groups aiming to

topple dictatorial regimes in the region.24 As Echevarría y Vidaurre had anticipated, his

words met some criticism among those Central American and Cuban exiles and their

Mexican supporters who were working towards the overthrow of regimes in their home

22 United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, Reel 5, 812.00/30368, Daniels to Hull, “Resumé of conditions in Mexico during April, 1936.” 23 Guatemala, AGCA, Signatura B99-23-1 Legajo 6260, Echevarría y Vidaurre to González Campo, April 27, 1936. 24 See Jürgen Buchenau, In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central America Policy, 1876-1930 (Tuscaloosa: Unversity of Alabama Press, 1996). 24

countries, but he was nevertheless pleased that he had had the opportunity to voice the

position of the Guatemalan government over Mexican airwaves.25

The Ministry kept up the practice of inviting members of the diplomatic corps to

speak on its newly-inaugurated radio station on Sunday evenings from six to seven

o’clock throughout the Cárdenas era, and these early broadcasts set the tone for the style

that they would take. Ambassador Echeverría y Vidaurre’s speech was followed by a

cultural program featuring soprano Carmen Aguilar y Voos and the Orquesta Marimba de

los Hermanos Marín, after which Oficial Mayor Ernesto Hidalgo responded to the guest’s

remarks by praising the ambassador and further explaining the bases of Mexico’s foreign policy.26 On this occasion the musical numbers played were Mexican, but in the future

the Ministry would often take pains to present a musical tribute to the invited diplomat’s

home country. As in this case, these cultural presentations served as vehicles through

which diplomats could publicly (albeit mildly) voice their government’s responses to

Mexican foreign policy initiatives. Echeverría y Viduarre’s response to the

pronouncement of the Política del Buen Amigo was characteristic of his government’s

concerns regarding the potential “exportation” of revolution from Mexico during these

years. By participating in the radio programme, the Guatemalan Ambassador

nevertheless contributed to the sought-after creation of mutual understanding among

nations that underlay the policy. The Ministry’s use of new media such as radio was important to the creation of this mutual understanding, just as more traditional forms of

25 Guatemala, AGCA, Signatura B99-23-1 Legajo 6260, Echevarría y Vidaurre to González Campo, April 28, 1936. Also see the editorial by Rafael Helodoro Valle, who Echevarría said was one of the firm supporters of these exile groups. “El ‘Buen Amigo’” Ultimas Noticias de Excélsior (Mexico City), April 27, 1936. 26 “Política del ‘Buen Amigo,’” El Nacional, April 27, 1936. 25

propaganda and a whole host of diplomatic tools played an essential role in the

implementation of Mexico’s foreign policy goals.

References to the Política del Buen Amigo are most frequent in Foreign Minister

Hay’s speeches celebrating the anniversary of Pan-American Day.27 Nevertheless, the

term enjoyed wide currency and became the accepted description of Mexico’s Latin

American policy. Alfonso Cienfuegos y Camus wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

to describe the presentation of his credentials as the new Ambassador to Guatemala in

October 1936. Of his meeting with President Ubico, Cienfuegos y Camus said that he

had discussed Cárdenas’s desire for improved relations Guatemala and explicitly stated

that he had described the bases of his government’s Good Friend Policy.28 In February

1938, President Cárdenas discussed the Política del Buen Amigo in a speech he gave

welcoming Cuba’s new Ambassador to Mexico, José Manuel Carbonell.29 Although

Cárdenas had not coined the term for his government’s Latin American policy, in the

years to come he came to employ it as a true description of his attitudes towards the

region. Likewise, within Latin American countries, the term became so recognised that

government officials and journalists alike used it in their analyses of the Mexican

government’s relations with the region as a whole, and their own countries in particular.

When news reached Managua that chargé d’affaires Pablo Campos Ortiz had been

27 See Eduardo Hay, Discursos pronunciados en su carácter de secretario de relaciones exteriores (1936- 1940) (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1940). 28 Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente 24-22-43, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, October 20, 1936. 29 Mexico, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 22-21-137, February 7, 1938. Also see Lázaro Cárdenas, Palabras y documentos públicos (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979). 26

transferred to Santiago, the newspaper Novedades wrote that the departing diplomat had

been a true “good friend” to Nicaragua.30

Although in its original conception La Política del Buen Amigo’s reference to the

principle of non-intervention primarily dealt with Mexico’s policy of diplomatic

recognition, Latin American diplomats and governments were quick to interpret it to

mean that Mexico would refrain from meddling in their internal affairs, a tendency

which, according to Miguel Cruchaga Ossa (Chile’s chargé d’affaires in Mexico City in

1938), was “habitual and frequent.”31 Cruchaga Ossa cited incidents that had occurred in

Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador, as well as his own

country. He warned the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to forget that Mexican

diplomats were committed to spreading Marxist propaganda. A test of La Política del

Buen Amigo had occurred in 1936 when, in what appeared to many to be a contradiction

of the Estrada Doctrine, the Mexican government initially withdrew its diplomatic

representative from Nicaragua when National Guard leader and soon-to-be-dictator

Anastasio Somoza forced President Sacasa to resign: the Mexican government and its

representatives had clearly been in favour of the ousted Liberal president. For Novedades

to declare Campos Ortiz to have been such a good friend of the country in 1938, he must

have been extremely careful in his efforts to increase understanding within Nicaragua of

Mexico’s revolutionary process and government while refraining from interfering in the

internal politics of the nation to which he was accredited.

30 “Buenos Amigos,” Novedades (Managua), March 1, 1938. Clipping found in Campos Ortiz’s personnel file, Mexico, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 8-4-1 (III). 31 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Cruchaga Ossa to Ministro, June 14, 1938. 27

Because the generally Conservative governments of Latin America harboured

deep concerns about the Mexican government’s perceived desire to export revolution to

the region through its diplomatic representatives, the second aspect of the Política del

Buen Amigo—regarding the creation of mutual understanding among friendly nations—

took centre stage in the application of the policy in Latin America. The Cárdenas

government aimed to make its Revolution understood in the region, thereby diminishing

the fears that Mexican diplomats were Communist agents and increasing the likelihood

that the governments of the region would support Cárdenas’s domestic and international

policies.

Friedrich Schuler has written convincingly about the professionalisation of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1920 and 1940. He demonstrates that by the

Cárdenas era, the Foreign Ministry “had become an effective and valuable information-

gathering tool that provided Mexican administrations with eyes and ears in the political

and economic centers of the world.”32 While this is certainly true of the missions at

Berlin, London, Paris, and Washington that he discusses, it does not necessarily reflect diplomatic practice in Latin America. Although the restructuring of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs increased the level of professionalism among Mexican diplomats

throughout the world, representatives in Latin America maintained a measure of independence that resulted precisely from the fact that they were not in the political and economic centres of the world. Despite the advent of the Política del Buen Amigo,

relations with Latin America were generally not as high a priority and the Ministry’s

32 Friedrich E. Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosvelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 17. 28

management of the diplomats there was not as heavy-handed as a result. Although the

relative autonomy of diplomats in the region had some positive results, unfortunately it

also meant that during critical junctures such as the Cárdenas government’s oil

expropriation of March 18, 1938, this arm of the Foreign Service was not as strong as it

might have been.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the heads of all of its embassies and

legations to write monthly reports detailing the major domestic political events and

international relations of the countries to which they were appointed, including analysis

of how these developments affected their relations with Mexico. These reports varied in

quality and length depending on the individual initiative of the representative in charge.

While a few analyses reached nearly one hundred pages in length and included hundreds

of newspaper clippings, others were cursory reports that barely scratched the surface of

the major political, economic, social, and cultural developments of the day. The reports

of Carlos A. Baumbach, who served as chargé d’affaires in Peru in 1938, were

particularly exhaustive.33 He was rivalled by Minister Vicente Estrada Cajigal, whose

June 1938 report from Panama numbered 42 pages and included 131 newspaper clippings.34 By contrast, the report corresponding to April 1938 from the chargé

d’affaires in Costa Rica, Romeo Ortega, was six pages in length and accompanied by

only ten newspaper clippings.35 In January 1938, the chargé d’affaires in Uruguay,

Salvador Pardo Bolland, sent a seven-page report to the Ministry and was appropriately

33 See AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-4-1 (9 partes). 34 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-4-3 (I), Estrada Cajigal to Hay, August 6, 1938. 35 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-1, Romeo Ortega to Hay, May 4, 1938. 29

chastised for its inadequacy.36 Nevertheless, Anselmo Mena, then head of the

Diplomatic Department, excused him on the grounds that the chargé d’affaires had only

recently arrived in Montevideo. He commended him for having sent a report at all, given

that recent appointees were usually excused from the requirement to submit a monthly report for the first two months of their posting.37 The uneven quality of these monthly reports caused the Ministry to have uneven information on the status of Mexican-Latin

American relations.

The reporting requirements of the Ministry were not taken very seriously, even by

some senior heads of mission. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs José Manuel Puig

Casauranc had been the moving force behind the reorganisation of the Ministry between

1932 and 1934.38 At the beginning of the Cárdenas presidency he was named

Ambassador to Argentina, where he presented his credentials on May 21, 1935 [For a list of diplomatic appointments see Appendix A and Appendix B]. Until his arrival, the monthly reports from Argentina had been excellent, following closely the conventions established during Puig’s own tenure as Minister. Thereafter, the Ministry received only one monthly report from Buenos Aires, that of October 1935. Moreover, it was not in the customary format; it arrived as a 21-page letter without the subheadings that were meant to facilitate its analysis and distribution to other interested branches of the government.39

Puig stayed in Argentina until May 1936, when he moved to Brazil and took over the

Embassy there from Alfonso Reyes, who switched with him and returned to Argentina,

36 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-6, Salvador Pardo Bolland to Hay, January 31, 1938. 37 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-6, Mena to Bolland, March 12, 1938. 38 Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 13-15. 39 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-26-21. 30

where he had previously served as ambassador at the beginning of the decade. After

presenting his credentials on July 22, 1936 Reyes neglected to send monthly reports for

the rest of the year and the beginning of the next. In May, Undersecretary of Foreign

Affairs Ramón Beteta wrote to Reyes to bring his attention to the fact that, further to the

instructions contained in a circular letter sent to all missions on August 14, 1936

describing the reporting requirements of the Ministry, and despite the fact that the

Ambassador’s supplementary reports were very useful, it was essential to the functioning

of the Ministry that he send monthly reports in the proper format.40 Reyes quickly

replied that he had forwarded reports for April and May and would continue to comply

with the instructions of the Ministry in this regard.41

One representative who received a similar letter in September 1938 actually

refused to comply with the Ministry’s directives.42 Octavio Reyes Spíndola had been

serving as chargé d’affaires in Cuba since the withdrawal of Ambassador Alfonso

Cravioto at the beginning of the year. He acknowledged that he had not sent a monthly

report since taking charge of the embassy, but believed that he was justified in not having

done so because of the “intense and continuous” labour he had engaged in since his

arrival. In the past six months, he had resolved crises relating to the Manuel Arnus (a

Spanish ship commandeered by the Cuban government) and the oil taker Amolco,

organized the Homenaje México of June 12, 1938, negotiated a new commercial treaty, attended to Mexico’s special goodwill embassy to Cuba, conducted an intense radio and

40 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-12, Beteta to Reyes, May 6, 1937. 41 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-12, Reyes to Beteta, June 10, 1937. 42 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Mena to Reyes Spíndola, September 27, 1938. 31

newspaper campaign, and organised the Cuban naval and military mission to Mexico.43

He had informed the Ministry on all of these matters, and had sent weekly reports to

Cárdenas, at President’s own suggestion.44 Although he said he would take Mena’s

instructions under advisement, his subsequent reports corresponding to October and

November were only nine and four pages in length respectively and they did not conform

to the proper format.45 In March of 1939 Mena again wrote to Reyes Spíndola to

reprimand him for the lack of monthly reports from Cuba,46 apparently to no avail, as it was not until well after arrival of the new ambassador, Rubén Romero, in June that the

Ministry once again began to receive regular monthly reports from Havana.47

Alfonso Reyes regularly sent monthly reports from Argentina until his recall at

the end of 1937, as promised. Nevertheless, after his return to Mexico City, reporting

was once again interrupted, this time because of a lack of personnel. The chargé

d’affaires left in charge of the embassy, Salvador Martínez Mercado, forwarded reports

for January and February of 1938, but the latter was received very late, and Mena

mentioned this in his acknowledgement of its receipt.48 Martínez Mercado responded

that he had been unwell, and that the diplomatic, consular, and social demands were too

much for him given that he only had the assistance of two staff members.49 Pablo

Campos Ortiz, who had been appointed chargé d’affaires to Chile at the beginning of

43 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Reyes Spíndola to Mena, October 12, 1938. 44 Ibid. 45 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, November 8, 1938; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, December 14, 1938. 46 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5, Mena to Reyes Spíndola, March 23, 1939. 47 Romero’s reports for 1939 are also found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-5. 48 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-19, Mena to Martínez Mercado, May 3, 1938. 49 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-19, Martínez Mercado to Mena, June 27, 1938. 32

1938 following the withdrawal of Ambassador Manuel Pérez Treviño, complained of

similar difficulties. In response to a letter from Mena that chastised him for the fact that

the Ministry had not received a monthly report from the embassy in Santiago since

January, Campos Ortiz wrote that this was a direct result of the fact that the embassy staff

had been “reduced to the minimum.”50 In his previous postings, he explained, diplomatic

missions had always had four staff members in addition to the head of the legation. Since

taking over the Embassy in April, he had been “entirely alone.” Although he had sent various supplementary reports to the Ministry, it had been “absolutely impossible” to

submit regular monthly reports. The arrival of a new staff member earlier in the month

would, he hoped, enable him to begin to comply with the Ministry’s directives. The

excellent report corresponding to January 1938 that Campos Ortiz had sent to the

Ministry from his previous posting in Managua confirms his suggestion that whereas he had been in the habit of sending complete monthly reports in the past, the measures of economy that had led the Ministry to withdraw so many of its diplomatic representatives from Latin America were making it impossible for him to meet the Ministry’s expectations.51

Campos Ortiz and Martínez Mercado’s complaints related to the drastic changes

to the budget for diplomatic representation that were decided upon at the end of 1937 and

instituted at the beginning of 1938. The economic crisis of 1937 necessitated deep cuts to

50 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-13, Campos Ortiz to Mena, November 16, 1938. 51 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-2-2, Campos Ortiz to Hay, February 13, 1938. Following Campos Ortiz’s departure from Nicaragua, the Ministry did not receive another monthly report from Managua for the rest of the year. 33

the budget at all levels of government.52 The success of many of the Cárdenas

government’s early reforms and infrastructure projects were predicated upon the

expansion of the economy, but when the market for credit dried up and the leveraged

agricultural harvests of redistributed lands did not meet their expected yields, economic

crisis resulted.53 Granted, the reduced budget for diplomatic representation was only one

of a myriad austerity measures that went into effect at the beginning of the year, but the

uneven application of these measures within the Ministry is significant [Figure 1.1]. The

Cárdenas government’s decision to expropriate the US and Anglo-Dutch oil interests in

Mexico on March 18, 1938 was a daring but calculated risk that, along with the economic

skill of Minister of Hacienda Eduardo Suárez, saved the country from economic

collapse.54 For it to succeed, a major propaganda campaign was needed, but

unfortunately this became necessary at a time when the Foreign Service was least able to

meet the challenge. Only enthusiasm, tireless effort, and genuine commitment to the

survival of the Cárdenas government would help its members to overcome this shortage

of manpower.

52 For a broad view of the Cárdenas government’s fiscal policy see, James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 53 Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 63-66, 71-74, 80-9. 54 Ibid., Chapter 5. 34

Figure 1.1 Annual Budget (Projected and Actual) for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Budget 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Projected– 2.406,083.04 2.428,416.00 2.634,888.00 2.487.162.80 2.127,850.40 2.223.372.00 2.249,652.00

Salaries Actual– 2.501,878.72 2.436,886.00 2.65,157.00 2.361,576.30 2.251,832.40 2.220,587.00 2,281,233.00 Salaries Projected– 2.093,916.38 1.810,942.00 2.165,112.00 2.208,639.20 2.222,149.40 2.126,628.00 1.975.348.00

Expenses Actual– 2.232,460.78 2.141,197.53 2.831,854.04 2.899,647.52 2.659,061.02 2.600,161.17 2.515,585.12

Expenses Projected– 4.499.999.42 4.239,358.00 4.800,000.00 4.695,802.00 4.350,000.00 4350,000.00 4225,000.00 Total Actual– 4.734,339.50 4.578,083.53 5.488.011.04 5.261,223.82 4.910,893.42 4.820,7548.17 4.796,818.12

Total

* Source: Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.

The general budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained fairly stable

throughout Cárdenas’s sexenio [Figure 1.1]. Although the projected budget for the

Ministry as a whole shrank from 4.499.999.42 pesos in 1934 to 4225,000.00 in 1940,

actual expenditures increased slightly from 4.734,339.50 to 4.796,818.12. However, the

Ministry’s budget came to represent a decreasing percentage of the Cárdenas

government’s overall spending.55 The budget for 1938 shows a definite decrease from

previous years, but it is followed by a gradual recovery in spending on both salaries and

other expenses in 1939 and 1940. The most drastic change occurred in the uneven

application of these austerity measures within the Ministry in 1938 [Figure 1.2].

55 This is reflected in Wilkie’s analysis of administrative expenditures. Wilkie, Federal Expenditure, 120- 126. 35

Figure 1.2. Annual Budget for Salaries and Other Expenses in the Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Service, and the Consular Service, 1934-40*

Budget 1934- 1935- 1936- 1937- 1938- 1939- 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Ministry– 726,689.97 810,871.43 878,279.85 761,396.95 687,691.46 712,270.40 Salaries Ministry– 817,126,54 616, 922,742.74 946,288.35 667,330.80 471,711.59 Expenses 012.55

Embassies 821,779.17 839,263.98 845.341.38 653,138.23 425,125.00 529,623.67 and Legations– Salaries Embassies 670,906.17 759,278.80 826.455.36 743,817.57 618,866.38 679,634.75 and Legations– Expenses Consulates– 831,540.73 817,725.00 813,815.00 773,971.50 799,570.00 796.047.50 Salaries Consulates– 546,285.20 625,498.02 612.672.61 566,700.86 540,340.90 547,711.14 Expenses

* Source: Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

The budget for the salaries of diplomats posted abroad shrank to only 425,125.00

pesos, proportionally a far greater cut than those received by either the staff members at

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico City or the consular staff. In short, the

Ministry “was recalling Mexican ambassadors and ministers worldwide, replacing them

with lower-paid chargés d’affaires.”56 At the end of 1937, many ambassadors and ministers received notice that they were being called home to Mexico City and placed on disponibilidad (availability), which meant that they were being suspended without pay with the possibility that they might be re-appointed at a later date when economic conditions improved. The decision to recall these high-ranking members of the Foreign

56 Schuler, Between Hitler and Roosevelt, 87. 36

Service had important consequences for the quality of Mexico’s diplomatic

representation abroad, especially in Latin America. Staff members whose portfolios were

deemed essential to the recovery of the economy, those in the “political and economic

centers of the world,” were not recalled to Mexico: Ambassador Francisco Castillo

Nájera, the mastermind behind US-Mexican relations, stayed in Washington, DC;

Minister Juan F. Azcárate Pino remained in Berlin busily attempting to negotiate

commercial agreements; Minister Primo Villa Michel stayed in London until Cárdenas

broke relations with Great Britain because of the oil controversy. Only the legation in

Paris had its minister, Adalberto Tejeda, recalled and replaced with a chargé d’affaires.

In Latin America, on the other hand, the exodus of well-qualified personnel was swift and nearly complete. This is not to suggest that many chargés d’affaires (generally experienced career diplomats) were not able representatives of Mexican interests abroad, but they lacked the standing of ambassadors and ministers. Furthermore, as Pablo

Campos Ortiz complained, they simply did not have the manpower to keep up with the normal day-to-day operations of their missions and deal with the extraordinary responsibilities that followed the oil expropriation. Moreover, the mass withdrawal of high-ranking diplomatic representatives ruffled some feathers in Latin America.

Many of the practices of diplomacy are based upon the principle of reciprocity,

and the economically-motivated decision to withdraw Cárdenas’s ambassadors and

ministers from Latin America created some ill-will. In December of 1937, Alfonso

Reyes wrote from Buenos Aires to say that a newspaper article had recently appeared in a

local newspaper reporting on the reorganisation of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign 37

Affairs because of the 1938 budget.57 He was afraid it would look quite suspicious that

both he and the Minister to Uruguay would both be announcing their departure for

vacations in Mexico on the same day. Moreover, he questioned the judgement of

recalling him prior to the inauguration of the new Argentine president Roberto Ortiz in

February. He feared that if a Mexican ambassador were not present, the Argentines

might take offence and make reprisals.58 Despite this warning, he left Argentina at the

beginning of January. After taking advantage of his “availability” to take a trip to New

York, Reyes returned to Mexico only to be met with the foreign relations emergency

posed by the oil expropriation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon realised the error in having withdrawn such a seasoned and well-regarded ambassador. Reyes was rather hastily given a special mission to South America to negotiate the sale of Mexican oil.

His arrival in Brazil, where he had been posted from 1930-1936, was met with great enthusiasm.59 His mission surely contributed to the eventual sale of oil to South

America, which helped to guarantee the success of the expropriation. Had he and his colleagues not been withdrawn shortly before Cárdenas’s March 18, 1938 announcement, it is likely that both the propaganda campaign and sale of oil to Latin America would have been more effective.

In November 1937 the Chilean Ambassador to Mexico, Manuel Bianchi, reported

on the reorganization of the Ministry to his government. He speculated that the true motivation for the changes was not economy, but rather politics. The Cárdenas

57 Noticias Gráficas (Buenos Aires), November 6, 1937. 58 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV), Reyes to Hay, December 14, 1937. 59 “Alfonso Reyes e sua missão,” O Imparcial (Rio de Janeiro), June 11, 1938; “A revolução no Mexico através ás [sic.] impressoes da embaixador Alfonso Reyes,” O Jornal (Rio de Janeiro), June 11, 1938; Intercambio Comercial Mexicano-Brasileiro,” A Noite (Rio de Janeiro), June 10, 1938. 38

government, he suggested, wanted to be sure that only persons of “absolute confidence”

remained in the Foreign Service.60 There were, he had heard, several ambassadors and ministers who did not hold with the revolutionary government’s policies and programmes and others who had personal differences with the president. He believed the

administrative shake-up was actually a cover designed to remove these detractors from

the Foreign Service. Bianchi mentioned specifically Alfonso Reyes, Rubén Romero,

Vicente Veloz, Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus, and then Ambassador to Chile, General

Manuel Pérez Treviño, who had also run as pre-candidate for the PNR nomination for the

presidency in 1933.61 It is certainly possible that political concerns were involved in this

decision, but it seems that Bianchi was merely reporting rumours. Ambassador Reyes

was fairly apolitical, which may have been interpreted as his not being “addicted” to the

personality of Cárdenas, but the fact that Reyes was re-appointed to South America with

a special mission less than six months later suggests that he did, in fact, have the

confidence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the president. Similarly, Vicente Veloz

returned to Mexico on disponibilidad, but was soon made Jefe del Ceremonial at the

Ministry in Mexico City. 62 Furthermore, the tenor of Ambassador Bianchi’s reports

changed in the New Year. When discussing the government’s decision to withdraw

Ambassador Pérez Treviño, he commented that the staff of the Ministry had made it clear to him that the recall of ambassadors and ministers was a financial measure. He said he had heard that ambassadors to only five countries would remain in their current posts,

60 Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1587 B, Bianchi to Ministro, November 26, 1937. 61 Ibid. 62 See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 23-1-78. 39

and even Mexico’s Minister to Great Britain would be recalled as soon as the oil

controversy were resolved.63 Foreign Minister Hay had reminded Ambassador Bianchi

that the Chilean government had found it necessary to take similar measures in 1931 and

1932, and said he hoped that the Chilean government would understand the economic necessity and not withdraw Bianchi as a result. Instead of recalling Bianchi, the Chilean

government gave him a temporary commission as Chile’s representative to the Chaco

Peace Conference at Buenos Aires, during which time he would maintain his status as

Ambassador to Mexico, but a chargé d’affaires would be left in charge of the office.64

Several other governments withdrew their representatives from Mexico.65 After his return

to Mexico at the end of the year, Bianchi wrote to report that the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs would once again fill these vacant positions at the beginning of 1939.66 He said

that Cárdenas had initially believed diplomacy to be “decorative, of little use, and against

the leftist tendency of his government,” but had soon realised his mistake. Mexican

diplomatic representation was left in the hands of persons of “inferior category,” and after

the oil expropriation, when the country was the object of harsh attacks abroad, they were

unable to adequately defend the government’s decision because they did not have

sufficient authority or prestige.67 Of course, by the end of 1938, the economy had also

recovered to such an extent that the Cárdenas government could once again afford to

63 Had it not been for Cárdenas’s decision to recall Primo Villa Michel because of the offences of the British government, he might have been recalled anyway. Chile, MRE, AGH, Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to Ministro José Ramón Gutiérrez, March 12, 1938. 64 On the Chaco Peace Conference, see Leslie B. Rout Jr., The Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970). 65 Chile, MRE, AGH, Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to Ministro José Ramón Gutiérrez, March 26, 1938. 66 The Argentine chargé d’affaires also reported home that these empty positions were to be refilled in the New Year. Argentina, MRECIC, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3983, Expediente 5, Ricardo J. Siri to Minister José María Cantilo, October 22, 1938. 67 Chile, MRE, AGH, Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to Ministro, December 26, 1938. 40

appoint diplomats abroad. However, given the uneven implementation of the austerity

measures outlined above, it seems that Ambassador Bianchi’s analysis had some truth to

it. Moreover, the new appointments that were made at the beginning of January mainly

seem to have been, if not “addicts” to the personality of Cárdenas, at least supportive of

the Revolution and the president’s social reform programme. Contrary to what Bianchi

wrote, however, an examination of the practices of the Ministry shows that this was

generally the case throughout this period. Members of the Foreign Service were

evaluated and promoted with reference to the extent to which they believed in the goals

of the Revolution.

When Minister to Bolivia Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz wrote to the Ministry to

evaluate the performance of Third Secretary Oscar Crespo y de la Serna in La Paz at the beginning of 1937, his report was positively glowing.68 Crespo followed his father’s

legacy in the Foreign Service: he was born in the Mexican legation at Havana in 1901,

where his father served as the first Minister to the newly-independent nation of Cuba. He

earned a degree in engineering in Vienna during another of his father’s postings and

eventually joined the diplomatic ranks after his father’s death.69 Rosenzweig did not

mention these credentials in his report, focusing instead on his capacity, preparation,

conduct, and “political ideas,” which he said were of the Left. Rosenzweig estimated that

Crespo was a “vehement defender” of the Mexican Revolution.70 As a strong

collaborator of the Revolution, Rosenzweig would have thought this a great compliment,

68 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-10, Rosenzweig to Hay, January 2, 1937. 69 See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-10. 70 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-10, Rosenzweig to Hay, January 2, 1937. 41

but it was also important information to be included in his performance review. The

personal convictions of diplomats were the subject of debate and could determine

diplomatic appointments. For example, in February 1936 Ambassador Alfonso

Cienfuegos y Camus wrote in a confidential memorandum from Santiago that he was

displeased with the news that First Secretary Fernández de la Regata had re-entered diplomatic service and been posted to Chile, where he had previously been accredited prior to the Ambassador’s arrival.71 Not only had the Cienfuegos y Camus heard that

Fernández was a notorious dipsomaniac, but even worse, he was a practicing Catholic

who had established contacts with important members of the Roman Catholic Church in

Chile. By the time the Ambassador wrote the Ministry it was too late; Fernández was scheduled to arrive only a few days later, and he did take up his position there despite the

ambassador’s protests. Nevertheless, Cienfuegos y Camus’s concerns demonstrate that,

in addition to political ideas, religious beliefs were the subject of scrutiny by diplomats’

superiors and peers. Although the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Latin

America at the beginning of 1938 seems to have been a matter of economic necessity, not

political and ideological expediency, the political and religious ideas of diplomats were

expected to mirror those of the Revolutionary government they represented.

Although irregular information gathering and uneven diplomatic representation

during budget crises resulted from the fact that Latin America did not have the same

diplomatic priority as the United States and Europe, this lack of oversight also gave

diplomats considerable flexibility in their efforts to improve Mexico’s relations with the

71 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 24-22-43 (I), Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, February 29, 1936. 42

region. Their activities were not as closely managed as they might have been, and they used this freedom from supervision to be fairly creative in their diplomacy. Several of the ambassadors and ministers corresponded directly with President Cárdenas regarding their ideas for the implementation of his policies towards Latin America and subsequently pursued these plans with relatively little input from the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. This demonstrates that these members of the Foreign Service were allies of

Cárdenas and strong supporters of his domestic and international policies, but it also

demonstrates a certain amount of disregard for the authority of the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, which was particularly true during the tenure of General Hay. In fact, Hay

appears to have had relatively little influence and sway, even within his own Ministry.

Eduardo Suárez, who became Secretary of Hacienda in the same cabinet shuffle that saw

Hay promoted to Minister, suggested that although Cárdenas was sure of Hay’s loyalty,

he did not have the same level of confidence in his abilities.72 This would certainly have been a factor in determining the extent of Cárdenas’s personal management of the

Foreign Relations portfolio, and the extent to which his representatives preferred to correspond directly with the president, instead of a Minister in whose abilities they did not trust.73 As a result, although Hay frequently made pronouncements regarding La

Política del Buen Amigo in diplomatic ceremonies, Cárdenas and his allies in the

Ministry played an essential role in determining its shape and character.

72 Eduardo Suárez, Comentarios y Recuerdos, 1926-1946 (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1977), 221. 73 This dynamic also occurred in Mexican representation at the League of Nations. See Amelia M. Kiddle, “Mexican Participation in the League of Nations during the Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940” (Master’s thesis, University of Chicago, 2003). 43

CHAPTER TWO. LA MINISTRO AND EL DUELISTA: GENDER AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN LATIN AMERICA

According to customary diplomatic practice, the ministers and ambassadors appointed during the presidency of Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934) tendered their resignations in the fall of 1934 before the inauguration of President Lázaro Cárdenas.

This gave the new president and his Foreign Minister, Emilio Portes Gil, the flexibility to

carefully choose Mexico’s representatives to Latin America, appointing new

representatives who shared Cárdenas’s priorities. A few of these letters of resignation

were not accepted by the president, who asked those diplomats to continue in their

appointed locations. In the case of Basilio Vadillo Ortega, Minister to Uruguay, the

decision may have been political. Vadillo had been one of the founders of the PNR in

1929, but he was soon forced out and given a diplomatic appointment because he was at

odds with Jefe Máximo Plutarco Elías Calles.74 When he resigned from his post in 1934,

he hoped that he might be able to return to Mexico and find a new position in the

Cárdenas government. Vadillo did not get along with Portes Gil, who was an ardent

callista, and after learning that his resignation had not been accepted, he asked for three

months’ vacation during which time he hoped to secure a new position in Mexico City,

but he was ultimately unsuccessful and returned to Montevideo.75 Perhaps he would have

been more successful in obtaining a position in Mexico City after Cárdenas’s break with

74 Pablo Serrano Álvarez, Basilio Vadillo Ortega: itinerario y desencuentro con la Revolución Mexicana, 1885-1935 (Mexico City: INEHRM, 2000), 369. 75 Ibid., 415-416. 44

Calles, but Vadillo was already back in Uruguay when the crisis erupted in June 1935 and

he died in Montevideo in July.76

Other ministers seem to have remained in place more because of convenience

than political concerns. For example, Minister José Pérez Gil y Ortiz had only presented

his credentials in Haiti (a post of relatively little importance) on November 16, 1934; it

would have seemed a terrible waste of resources to move him so soon.77 Both politics and convenience would continue to play a role in the choice of diplomatic representatives to Latin American countries throughout the Cárdenas presidency, but it is nevertheless true that many of these representatives were chosen because they were supporters of

Cárdenas who would ably represent his government’s interests abroad. Even Vadillo had proven, in his three years as minister to Uruguay that he was active in creating understanding of the Revolution and its goals, and he may well have also been retained for this reason.78 A June 1935 interview he gave to La Mañana in Montevideo suggests

that he was committed to the Cárdenas government’s reform programme.79 It is therefore

possible to analyse the characteristics of the ambassadors and ministers chosen to

represent the government’s interests in the region during this period and make

conclusions regarding both Cárdenas’s priorities and the culture of its diplomacy in Latin

America.

76 See his personnel file, Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente 36-2-17. 77 See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-7-6. José Vázquez Schiaffino, who served as Minister to Honduras from 1934-1936 also falls into this category. AHGE, SRE, Expedientes LE 1006 and LE 1007. 78 See Agustín Vaca, “Basilio Vadillo,” in Aporte diplomático de Jalisco (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1988), 143-271. 79 Serrano Álvarez, Basilio Vadillo, 419. 45

Between 1934 and 1940, thirty members of the Foreign Service were appointed to

head diplomatic missions in Latin American countries for varying periods. Acting as

either ministers or ambassadors, they were from far-flung parts of Mexico and had

diverse educational experiences and career paths. Nevertheless, they represent a

generation that shared the experience of both the combative and reconstructive phases of

the Revolution. Although sometimes embroiled in power struggles among Revolutionary

leaders or critical of specific aspects of government’s programmes, they believed in the

social goals of the Revolution and their transformative potential for Mexico and Latin

America. They worked to promote the Revolution’s accomplishments in Latin America

and present Cárdenas as a leader in the region. Moreover, Cárdenas expressed his

political programme through the appointments he made: as well as seasoned diplomats,

this group included celebrated authors, educators, engineers, and doctors, all of whose

expertise represented some of the president’s highest hopes for reform.

Cárdenas made some of his diplomatic and political priorities particularly evident in the appointment of new ambassadors and ministers, as can be seen with the appointment of Fernando González Roa as ambassador to Guatemala at the beginning of

1935. González Roa, a high-ranking diplomat, had served as ambassador to the United

States during the Rodríguez presidency, and his appointment indicated the importance

Cárdenas gave throughout his presidency to strengthening traditionally tense relations with Guatemala.80 His appointment seemed to bode well for the future. Guatemalans

were honoured that Cárdenas would choose as Ambassador someone who had previously

80 See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 29-1-14. 46

occupied the highest position in the Foreign Service: in an interview with the chargé d’affaires of the embassy there, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister said that the appointment was viewed as a “distinction and an honour for Guatemala.”81 Usually

hostile to Mexico, the Guatemalan daily Nuestro Diario pronounced it to be an

announcement of brotherhood and harmony between the two nations.82 The chargé

d’affaires believed that the choice would influence the resolution of issues that plagued

the two countries’ relations.83 While González Roa’s appointment represented one of

Cárdenas’s diplomatic priorities, his commitment to a domestic political goal—that of

women’s equality—was evident in the appointment of Latin America’s first female head

of mission, Palma Guillén. Like González Roa’s, her appointment to Colombia in

January of 1935 received extensive commentary by government officials and the press.

As a landmark in Mexican and Latin American history, the announcement received

substantial attention both domestically and abroad. The selection indicated that the

Cárdenas government would support the extension of suffrage to women and the broader

participation of women in national and international life. Nevertheless, it will become clear that Guillén’s tenure in Colombia was fraught with difficulties. She met the ire of the conservative Catholic press, which objected both to the fact that she was a woman and to her representation of the Cárdenas government’s anti-clericalism.

Although Guillén exhibited in many ways the characteristics held by other

members of the Foreign Service posted to Latin America, her sex was one crucial

81 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 29-1-14, Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto to Portes Gil, January 28, 1935. 82 Federico Hernández de León “Guatemala y Mexico,” Nuestro Diario (Guatemala City), January 26, 1935. 83 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 29-1-14, Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto to Portes Gil, January 28, 1935. 47

difference. She had contributed to the Revolutionary reconstruction that followed the combative phase of the Revolution through her work with the Ministry of Public

Education. Her gender excluded her from the culture of Revolutionary masculinity that pervaded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though several male members had not participated militarily in the Revolution. Men who had not fought could still participate in the construction of these cultural norms by other means, as the chargé d’affaires in

Paraguay, Bernardo Reyes, did when he challenged a detractor of the Revolution to a duel in 1936. His challenge is indicative of the patterns of behaviour that male diplomats established through their representation of Mexico and promotion of the Cárdenas government’s reform programme and achievements in Latin America.

Prosopography

The Ambassadors and Ministers appointed to Latin America during the Cárdenas presidency formed a fairly diverse group, but shared some common characteristics. First, and most important, the majority of the ambassadors and ministers were veterans of the

Revolution. Despite the political differences that resulted from their allegiance to different Revolutionary factions, this shared experience gave them a fairly cohesive understanding of the Revolution’s meanings and goals. The median year of birth for these thirty individuals was 1889 [Figure 2.1]. Although a few were born as early as 1880 and

1881, these represented the elder statesmen of the Foreign Service and included Fernando

González Roa (b. 1880), who had been head of the Constitutionalist Army (Primer Jefe del Ejército Constitucionalista), and former editor of El Universal Félix Palavicini (b. 48

1881), who was an early supporter of Madero. A minority born near the turn of the century may still have participated, as many youths did, in the Revolution. Even one of the youngest, Vicente Estrada Cajigal (b. 1898), had fought, reaching the rank of colonel in the Constitutionalist Army. This provides one explanation for the fact that so many of these diplomats came from the provinces outside of Mexico City.”84

Figure 2.1 Ambassadors and Ministers’ Years of Birth*

3

2

Number 1

0 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899

Year

* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 25- 7-9, 42-25-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13- 290, 26-25-6, 4-29-12, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 35- 6-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 36-2-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10

Twenty of the country’s thirty-six political jurisdictions were represented by these ambassadors and ministers [Figure 2.2]. Hailing from states as distant from the centre of power in Mexico City as Coahuila (Manuel Pérez Treviño) and Yucatán (Miguel Alonzo

84 Thomas Benjamin and Mark Wasserman, eds., Provinces of the Revolution: Essays on Regional Mexican History, 1910-1929 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990). 49

Romero), many had joined the Revolution in their communities of origin or participated

in the Revolutionary reconstruction of their states and, gaining prominence through these

efforts, moved to the Federal District (DF). Surprisingly, given the political importance

of the Sonoran Triangle and the División del Norte, only one of these diplomats hailed

from Sonora (Manuel Y. de Negri), and none from Chihuahua. In contrast, Jalisco—a

state radicalised by the strength of Catholic resistance—sent Juan Mauel Álvarez del

Castillo, Basilio Vadillo, José Vázquez Schiaffino, Vicente Veloz González, and Primo

Villa Michel; Michoacán supplied Salvador Martínez Mercado, Luis Padilla Nervo, José

Pérez Gil y Ortiz, and Rubén Romero. Michoacán, one of the cradles of Revolutionary

reform and the home state of President Cárdenas, and Jalisco were also extremely

populous states. Similarly, Félix Palavicini, and José Domingo Ramírez Garrido hailed

from Tabasco, one of the primary “laboratories of the Revolution,” (Garrido was the

cousin of the radical Governor of Tabasco, Tomás Garrido Canabal).85 Also notable is

the fact that only two, Octavio Reyes Spíndola and Palma Guillén, came from the DF. As

Roderic Ai Camp has shown, in subsequent years the educational institutions of the DF

served as important recruiting sites for a new generation of power-brokers.86 Instead of

the National Preparatory School or the Facultad de Derecho at the UNAM (Universidad

Nacional Autónoma de México), these diplomats came mainly from outside Mexico City:

relationships were forged in the theatre of battle, not the lecture theatre.

85 Carlos R. Martínez Assad, El laboratorio de la Revolución: el Tabasco garridista (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1979). 86 Roderic Ai Camp, Mexico’s Leaders: Their Education and Recruitment (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980). Also see Roderic Ai Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 50

Figure 2.2 Ambassadors and Ministers’ States of Origin*

6

5

4

3 Number

2

1

0 DIF SIN HID JAL MIC NLE TAB YUC ZAC PUE VER CHP GUA OAX SON COA GRO MEX CAM MOR State

* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 25- 7-9, 42-25-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13- 290, 26-25-6, 4-29-12, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 35- 6-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 36-2-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10

Although they did not share a common educational experience, the diplomats were, like the next generation of federal bureaucrats, well educated. Only two lacked 51

postsecondary education: Rubén Romero, who had only completed primary school, but

later taught as a Professor of Literature at the Universidad de Michoacán,87 and Ramón P. de Negri, who had only completed secondary school, describing himself as a tradesman and farmer on his entrance questionnaire, but by the beginning of the Cárdenas presidency, he had served twenty years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and become an experienced career diplomat.88 Otherwise, all of the ministers and ambassadors posted to

Latin America had post-secondary experience in their home states, in the DF, or overseas.

Almost one third had studied abroad, whether as the recipients of scholarships from the government, like Palma Guillén, or with the support of their families. In the US, they attended universities such as St. Mary’s College of California, the Catholic University of the Americas, Washington and Jefferson College, George Washington University, and

Columbia. Two studied at the London School of Economics and several studied at universities in France including the Sorbonne and the Université de Bordeaux. The fact that several of those who had studied abroad listed more than one international university on their curricula suggests that they took advantage of opportunities presented by their diplomatic or consular postings to further their educations in the countries to which they were appointed by the Ministry. For example, when Octavio Reyes Spíndola entered the

Ministry in 1922, his entrance questionnaire stated that he did not have a professional title, but by the time he was named Ambassador to Chile in 1939 he had studied in the

US and France to obtain the title of licenciado.89 Their educational experiences within

87 See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-6-30. 88 See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-14-25. 89 See his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7. 52

Mexico were similarly broad. Among the institutions outside Mexico City, they attended the Escuela Oficial de Jurisprudencia in Guadalajara, the Universidad de San Nicolás de

Hidalgo in Michoacán, the Colegio del Estado de Guanajuato, the Escuela de

Jurisprudencia de Michoacán, the Instituto Juárez de Villahermosa, the Escuela

Farmaceutico in Guadalajara, and the Escuela Normal in Colima.

The diversity in the ambassadors and ministers’ alma maters also provides an

indication of the range of professions they exercised before (and after) their membership

in the Foreign Service. Although twelve held law degrees, this represents less than half of

the total. Among the five engineers and four doctors, Félix Palavicini was originally

trained as an engineer at the Instituto Juárez in Villahermosa before he found his vocation

as a journalist, and José Manuel Puig Casauranc was trained as a medical doctor at the

Escuela Nacional de Medicina, but was later inducted into the Academia Mexicana de la

Lengua, in addition to having served as Foreign Minister. Several others had degrees as

normal school teachers and later became professors. José Domingo Ramírez Garrido

served as a professor and director of the Colegio Militar, and Moisés Sáenz became a

professor of applied anthropology and a specialist in rural education. Although all but

five had held positions in the Foreign Ministry before the beginning of the Cárdenas era,

most could not be considered career diplomats. They moved in and out of the diplomatic

service over the years, serving in other ministries (such as Public Education), as state

representatives in the Congress or the Senate, and even as governors of their home states,

like Raymundo Enríquez Cruz (Chiapas), Manuel Pérez Treviño (Coahuila), Basilio 53

Vadillo (Jalisco), and Vicente Estrada Cajigal, the first Governor of Morelos following its

re-establishment after it was dissolved by Victoriano Huerta.

One of the most distinguished professions among members of the Foreign Service

has traditionally been that of writer. The appointment of writers and other intellectuals as

Ambassadors formed a long-established pattern in Mexican (and Latin American)

diplomatic history.90 This served as an informal subsidy for cultural production, but also enabled the government to show off its literary greats to the world and enhance its prestige. Cárdenas’s predecessors had practiced this, and the appointments that took place during his presidency followed this model. The most distinguished authors among these diplomats were novelist Rubén Romero, poet Alfonso Cravioto, and literary master

Alfonso Reyes. The Chilean Ambassador to Mexico opined that Rubén Romero ranked second only to Mariano Azuela, the best novelist of the Revolution.91 He published his

first novel, Apuntes de un lugareño, while working at the consulate in Barcelona, and his

1938 novel La vida inútil de Pito Pérez achieved great popularity.92 Alfonso Cravioto’s

poetry, especially El alma nueva de las cosas viejas, poesías and the posthumously-

published Cantos de Anáhuac, earned him accolades throughout the Americas.93 As a

noted orator, he frequently spoke on the topic of Mexican literature.94 Alfonso Reyes was

90 See Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, ed., Escritores en la diplomacia mexicana 3 vols. (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998, 2002). 91 Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico Diplomático (AGHD), Fondo Histórico,Volúmen 1658, Bianchi to Ministro, December 26, 1938. 92 José Rubén Romero, Apuntes de un lugareño (Barcelona: Imprenta Núñez, 1933); José Rubén Romero, La vida inútil de Pito Pérez 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1938). 93 Alfonso Cravioto, El alma nueva de las cosas viejas, poesías (Mexico City: Ediciones México Moderno, 1921); Alfonso Cravioto, Anáhuac y otros poemas (Mexico City: Nueva Voz, 1969). 94 Diccionario Porrúa, 6th ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1995), 994. Alfonso Cravioto, Aventuras Intelectuales a través de los números. Plática sustentada en la Instutución Hispanocubana de Cultura de La Habana, el día 12 de septiembre de 1937 (Havana: Institución Hispanocubana de Cultura, 1937); 54

prolific during his years in Spain, where he published Visión de Anáhuac in 1917. He

found it difficult to balance the work of a diplomat with his literary interests,95 but

intermittently published the literary magazine Monterrey while he was Ambassador to

Brazil and Argentina.96 His Las vísperas de España, published while he was Ambassador

to Argentina, was a triumph that was particularly warmly received by supporters of the

Spanish Republic.97 Gabriela Mistral later led a campaign to award him the Nobel Prize for literature in 1945, but perhaps because he is often described as a “writer’s writer,” lacking the popular appeal of Mistral or Pablo Neruda, it failed. Nevertheless, he is considered one of the most important Latin American authors of the twentieth century.98

In addition to these three great men of letters, many of the other ambassadors and

ministers posted to Latin America had literary pretensions. All but twelve of the thirty

became published authors, either during their postings or later. Salvador Guzmán was a

playwright,99 and Miguel Alonzo Romero wrote several books on travel, based mainly on

his experiences abroad with the diplomatic service, two of which he published while

Minister to Venezuela.100 Several wrote their memoirs, usually based on their

Alfonso Cravioto, Día de la Américas. Discursos pronnciados en la Recepción Oficial de la Secretaría de Estado de la República de Cuba, por los Excelentísmos Señores, Doctor Juan J. Remos, Secretario de Estado y Licenciado Alfonso Cravioto, Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Decano del Cuerpo Diplomático Americano acreditado en Cuba (Havana: Sociedad Colombista Panamericana, 1937). 95 When Reyes was transferred back to Argentina, Gabriela Mistral said that “Me da mala espina ese regreso a Buenos Aires donde le dejan escribir poco y le desvían con la horrible vida social. Me inquieta y me duele.” Luis Vargas Saavedra, Tan de usted: epistolario de Gabriela Mistral con Alfonso Reyes (Santiago: Universidad Católica, 1991), 109. Mistral to Reyes, July 14, 1937. 96 Alfonso Reyes, Monterrey (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1980). 97 Alfonso Reyes, Las vísperas de España (Buenos Aires: Sur, 1937). 98 See Obras completas de Alfonso Reyes 26 vols. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1955-). 99 Salvador R. Guzmán, El enemigo: comedia de costumbres populares (Mexico City, 1931). 100 Miguel Alonzo Romero, Algunos aspectos de la vida del Japón (Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1936); Miguel Alonzo Romero, Caricatura de un recorrido por la India (Caracas: Editorial Elite, 1937). 55

experiences in the Revolution.101 Especially interesting are those works they produced on domestic social issues such as education and indigenous issues. The most prominent diplomat involved in the resolution of indigenous issues in Mexico was Moisés Sáenz, who also conducted studies of the indigenous populations in Ecuador and Peru and had

an instrumental role in organising the Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano.102

Romeo Ortega and José Manuel Puig Casauranc also gave speeches on the topic.103 Puig

Casauranc’s address, given while he was Minister of Education, dealt with policies for the indigenous population. Education became one of the most frequent topics of the ambassadors and ministers’ published works. 104 Whether explaining and analysing the separation of Church and State in education or the goals and achievements of rural education initiatives, this aspect of the Revolutionary government’s reform programme greatly interested these authors and gave them considerable pride. Their writings also dealt with agrarian questions and labour reforms.105 Although they expressed critiques of some aspects of the government’s project, on the whole these works demonstrate their strong commitment to the social Revolutionary goals of Cárdenas and his predecessors.

101 See, for example, Félix Palavicini, Mi vida Revolucionaria (Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1937). 102 Moisés Sáenz, Sobre el indio ecuatoriano y su incorporación al medio nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933); Moisés Sáenz, Sobre el indio peruano y su incorporación al medio nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933). 103 José Manuel Puig Casauranc, El problema de la educación de la raza indígena: plática del Secretario de Educación Pública Dr. J.M.Puig Casauranc, ante el segundo Congreso de Directores Federales de Educación, el 28 de mayo de 1926 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1926); Romeo Ortega Castillo de Lerín, Breves Consideraciones sobre la Población Indígena en México. Trabajo presentado por el señor Licenciado Romeo Ortega, Ministro de México, ante la Sociedad de Geografía e Historia de Costa Rica 2nd ed. (San José: Sociedad de Geografía e Historia de Costa Rica, 1941). 104 See, for example, José Manuel Puig Casauranc, La cuestión religiosa en relación con la educación pública en México (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928); Moisés Sáenz, La educación rural en México (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1928). 105 Fernando González Roa and José Covarrubias, El problema rural de México (Mexico City: Secretaría de la Hacienda, 1917); Fernando González Roa, El aspecto agrario de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos, 1919); Ramón P. De Negri, Consideraciones sobre el Código del trabajo: como producto de la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: n.p., 1929). 56

The picture that emerges of these ambassadors and ministers depicts a generation

that, while diverse, had shared a great deal since the outbreak of the Revolution in 1910.

Many had fought with Madero and the Constitutionalists, and all had participated in the

Revolutionary reconstruction of the country that began when the fighting began to wind down. Their diverse regional origins, educations, career paths, and experiences abroad had broadened their horizons and enabled them to put into international context the importance of the government’s social Revolutionary programme, and its potential applicability to the Latin American countries in which they served. Although

occasionally critical of their government, and sometimes embroiled in petty political

struggles, they supported agrarian reform, education, the organisation of labour, and the

important role of culture in the transformation of society. They were loyal to Cárdenas

and his view of the Revolution

La Ministro, Palma Guillén

Palma Guillén became, in January 1935, the first woman appointed by a Latin

American government to the rank of Minister in the Foreign Service. A Professor of

Psychology and Literature at the UNAM, Guillén had contributed to the evolution of

education policy since the 1920s. She had studied at the Sorbonne and worked in a

technical capacity on a series of international commissions related to intellectual

cooperation in Europe.106 She exhibited many of the characteristics that defined the

generation of ambassadors and ministers who served in Latin America in this period, with

106 See Palma Guillén’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (3 partes). 57

the crucial difference being her sex. A landmark in Latin American history, Guillén’s

appointment often serves as evidence of the Cárdenas government’s support for women’s

participation in domestic and international affairs.107 Moreover, as Gabriela Cano has

argued, the appointment played a central role in the battle for women’s suffrage.108

Although originally destined for Venezuela, in the diplomatic shuffling that occurred after President Cárdenas took office, he soon decided that she would be appointed to

Colombia.109 In many ways, the change was logical. Whereas Mexico had tense relations with Venezuela, the Revolutionary government of Cárdenas had much in common with the Liberal government of Alfonso López Pumarejo in Colombia which impelled the two newly-elected presidents to pursue closer relations. As a result, the Cárdenas government chose to use the good relations between the two countries to make a statement regarding

Mexico’s commitment to the equality of women through the appointment of Guillén.

Nevertheless, Colombia was a deeply Catholic country (more so than Venezuela) and its church leaders severely criticised Mexican anticlericalism. The appointment of a female

diplomat went against conservative Catholic norms and was likely to meet resistance.

Cárdenas specifically chose Guillén as the first female Minister among several other

107 See, for example, Jocelyn Olcott, Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 162. On the women’s movement and suffrage in Mexico also see, Gabriela Cano, “Revolución, femenismo y ciudadanía en México (1915-1940),” in Historia de las mujeres en Occidente, ed. Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot (Madrid: Taurus, 1993), 685-695; Enriqueta Tuñon, ¡Por fin…ya podremos elegir y ser electas! El sufragio femenino en México, 1935-1953 (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 2002); Esperanza Tuñón Pablos, Mujeres que se organizan: El Frente Único Pro-derechos de la Mujer,1935-1938 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1992); Anna Macías, Against All Odds: The Feminist Movement in Mexico to 1940 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982); Ward M. Morton, Woman Suffrage in Mexico (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962). 108 Gabriela Cano, “Una ciudadanía igualitaria: El presidente Lázaro Cárdenas y el sufragio femenino,” Desdeldiez (1995): 85-86. 109 For the telegrams exchanged regarding possible appointment to Venezuela see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Foreign Minister Emilio Portes Gil to chargé d’affaires Mariano Armendáriz del Castillo, January 8, 1935; Armendáriz to Portes Gil, January 18, 1935. 58

contenders for the honour precisely because she did not follow the extremism of Calles

and remained a practicing Catholic.110 Nevertheless, as a diplomat, she represented the

Cárdenas government, which always endorsed Revolutionary policies in regards to women’s rights, religion, and education. After she served in Colombia for just over a

year, the Ministry transferred Guillén to Denmark. As the first female ambassador in

Latin America, she did not have the glowing success Cárdenas and the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs had hoped. The ambiguous results of her mission resulted from both her

sex and her status as a representative of the Cárdenas government’s Revolutionary

policies.

Guillén’s appointment elicited great interest in diplomatic circles at the time. The

Argentine chargé d’affaires to Mexico commented on it to his government,111 and a US

military intelligence report analysed her credentials, noting she was regarded as the most

prominent female intellectual in the nation.112 Although a few other women served in

junior positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Josefina Arguelles, posted as

Third Secretary to the Mexican Embassy in Cuba, Guillén held the highest

appointment.113 It came at a time when the employment of female diplomats had not yet

been accepted in Latin America (or anywhere else for that matter). The Brazilian

110 Cano, “Una ciudadanía igualitaria,” 75-7. 111 Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto (MRECIC), Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3529-39, Expediente 5, Adolfo N. Calvo to Foreign Minister Carlos Saavedra Llamas, February 11, 1935. 112 United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, Record Group 165 (RG 165), Reel IX, Document 0147, G-2 Report: Diplomatic and Consular Services-Appointments, M.B. Pattin, May 29, 1935. 113 Josefina Arguelles’s case is interesting because she was recalled from Cuba in 1936 after having been jailed twice in Havana because she was allegedly serving as a conduit for information between Cuban exiles in Mexico and members of the opposition in Havana. See the report pertaining to her arrest in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-1, and her personnel file AHGE, SRE, Expediente 24-23-53. 59

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), which studied the issue closely throughout the

1930s, saw that an increasing number of women received appointments at the rank of

third secretary, and in an Itamaraty memorandum argued that this practice should be

halted before these women began clamouring for promotions to higher diplomatic posts.

Few countries appointed women as ambassadors, and in many others receiving a female

ambassador would not be socially acceptable because of cultural norms. Women, it

concluded, were not suited to diplomatic careers.114 Following the reorganization of the

Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1938, the Federação Brasileira pelo Progresso

Feminino charged that women’s exclusion from diplomatic careers violated the

Constitution of 1937.115 Although Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha conceded in a letter

to President Getúlio Vargas that the policy did ignore the constitution, he stated that it

reflected both experience and the best interests of the diplomatic and consular service.116

Oddly, women gained the vote in 1932 in Brazil, though excluded from positions held by

Mexican women, while the latter could not vote until 1953.117 One other Latin American

country employed a famous female representative: Chile had appointed the celebrated

author Gabriela Mistral to a series of diplomatic posts (although not as Minister)

following her first experience abroad as a consultant to José Vasconcelos’s Ministry of

114 Brazil, Arquivo Nacional (AN), Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, 1930-1945, Lata 118, “Admissão das mulheres nos corpos diplomatico e consular,” n.d. [1933-1935?]. 115 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 120, Bertha Lutz to Getúlio Vargas, December 17, 1938. 116 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 120, Aranha to Vargas, January 16, 1939. 117 Susan K. Besse, Restructuring Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender Inequality in Brazil, 1914- 1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Branca Moreira Alves, Ideologia e feminismo: A luta da mulher pelo voto no Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980); and June Edith Hahner, Emancipating the Female Sex: The Struggle for Women’s Rights in Brazil, 1850-1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990). 60

Public Education in 1922. The Brazilian memorandum listed her as an example, but

mistakenly dismissed her as a cultural ambassador who did not exercise diplomatic

functions.118 Despite her renown, even Mistral did not receive approbation from Brazil or other countries. In 1939, Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala Salvador Martínez de

Alva reported that the Chilean government could not obtain “agreement” from the

Guatemalan government regarding the appointment of Mistral to Guatemala. The Ubico régime did not welcome female diplomats, but Martínez de Alva also suspected this might have been a convenient excuse.119 Mistral had been to Guatemala in 1931 and

Martínez de Alva suggested that the government considered her comportment

unacceptable because officials charged she had a tendency to be rather loose-lipped when

she drank a lot, which, he insinuated, was often.120 As a woman, her appointment was

undesirable in itself, but her unladylike behaviour did not warrant her acceptance in

conservative Guatemalan society. Moreover, rumours about her lesbianism swirled in

diplomatic circles, rumours that involved Palma Guillén. Guillén’s appointment

demonstrates that Mexico took the lead in the issue of women’s participation in the diplomatic and consular service in Latin America, but her posting raised questions regarding sexuality and gender in the Foreign Service.

118 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, “Admissão das mulheres nos corpos diplomatico e consular,” n.d. [1933-1935?]. 119 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-12-11 (II), “Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de junio de 1939,” Martínez de Alva to Hay, July 11, 1939, p. 50. 120 For information on Gabriela Mistral’s time in Guatemala with Palma Guillén in 1931, see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13, Eduardo Hay to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 17, 1931. 61

Palma Guillén remains a most enigmatic figure.121 Her relationship with Gabriela

Mistral has been a source of controversy. Although often described as having been

Mistral’s secretary, in her prologue to the Mexican edition of Mistral’s Lecturas para

mujeres she rejects this characterisation of their relationship by identifying Mistral’s

secretary as Eloísa Jaso.122 The two women are widely presumed by scholars to have

been lovers. They became companions after Gabriela Mistral first arrived in Mexico in

1922 at the invitation of Vasconcelos, travelled together for years thereafter, and co-

parented Mistral’s adopted child Juan Miguel Godoy.123 The extent to which members of

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognised their relationship remains unclear. In the

initial correspondence regarding her appointment, evidence of some concern regarding

Guillén’s marital status exists. After first inquiring about her interest in the position, the

Ministry then sent a second telegram to the Mexican Embassy in Madrid (where Guillén resided with Mistral at the time) asking about the rumour that she might shortly marry a

Spaniard.124 In response to the Embassy’s inquiry, Guillén responded that she had

decided not to marry at this time.125 Eventually, Guillén did marry the prominent Catalan intellectual Luis Nicolau d’Olwer, who served for a time after the Spanish Civil War as

Ambassador of the Spanish Republican Government in Exile in Mexico. This question regarding her marital status may have been related to the concern expressed in the

121 Licia Fiol-Matta, A Queer Mother for the Nation: The State and Gabriela Mistral (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 105. 122 Gabriela Mistral, Lecturas para mujeres: Gabriela Mistral, 1922-1924, ed. Palma Guillén de Nicolau, 3rd ed. (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1971), x. 123 Very few letters between Guillén and Mistral have survived, but some have been published. See Magda Arce and Gastón Von dem Bussche, Proyecto Preservación y Difusión del Legado literario de Gabriela Mistral (Santiago: Organization of American States, 1993) and Luis Vargas Saavedra, El otro suicida de Gabriela Mistral (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1985). 124 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), telegram from the Portes Gil toArmendáriz, January 24, 1935. 125 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), telegram from Armendáriz to Portes Gil, February 5, 1935. 62

Brazilian memorandum about the suitability of women for diplomatic careers: because

they were subject to their husbands, married women faced conflicts between the authority

of their government and their husbands and could not be trusted to faithfully perform

their duties on behalf of the government.126 This problem would have been compounded

by her impending marriage to a foreigner who would put the interests of his own nation ahead of those of Mexico. Alternately, this correspondence could be evidence of rumours regarding her sexual orientation, especially her response that for the moment she did not intend to marry.127 This wording left open the possibility that she would, at some point in the future, marry Nicolau, thus allaying possible fears of her lesbianism. Questions regarding Palma Guillén’s sexuality cloud the issue of her performance as Minister to

Colombia. On the one hand, if the extent of her relationship with Gabriela Mistral was known, the reaction to her may have been a response to her lesbian relationship. On the other hand, the poor treatment she received may simply have been the reaction of conservative Catholics to a representative of the Mexican Revolution and its anticlericalism, especially the socialist education programme.

The actual or rumoured details of her relationship with Mistral notwithstanding,

Guillén had superb qualifications to be named Mexico’s first female Minister. Given her

education credentials, her appointment was of particular interest in those circles. Even

before her arrival, the Rector of the Faculty of Education at the National University of

Colombia, Rafael Bernal Jiménez, wrote to the Mexican chargé d’affaires, Raymundo

126 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, “Admissão das mulheres nos corpos diplomatico e consular,” n.d. [1933-1935?]. 127 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), telegram from Armendáriz to Portes Gil, February 5, 1935. 63

Cuervo Sánchez, to congratulate Mexico on the appointment of such an important representative in the field of education.128 Furthermore, she was honoured by the Free

University in Bogotá with an honorary doctorate on the same day that she presented her

credentials to President López.129 Mistral introduced Guillén’s accomplishments to the

Colombian Republic in a glowing article that appeared in the newspaper El Tiempo,

owned and operated by her close friend Eduardo Santos (who was destined to become the

next Liberal President of Colombia, after López Pumarejo).130 Several other newspapers printed articles concerning her appointment and did interviews with the new Minister upon her arrival.131

Those in favour of Catholic education in Colombia saw her appointment rather

differently. The Catholic Social Action group prepared a silent protest against Mexico to

coincide with the presentation of her credentials, but their plan to disrupt the ceremony

failed because numerous workers’ and students’ groups placed themselves in front of the

National Palace and shouted ¡Vivas! to Guillén and the Mexican Revolution.132 Her

appointment caused significant controversy in educational circles on opposing sides of

the domestic political debate around President Alfonso López’s proposed changes to the

128 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Cuervo Sánchez to Portes Gil, February 8, 1935. 129 “La señorita Palma Guillén presentó ayer credenciales,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), April 27, 1935. 130 Gabriela Mistral, “Palma Guillén,” El Tiempo, April 7, 1935. Santos was one of Mistral’s confidants, and it is possible that this is one of the reasons Guillén was posted to Colombia. See Otto Morales Benítez (ed.), Gabriela Mistral: su prosa y poesía en Colombia 3 vols. (Bogotá: Convenio Andrés Bello, 2000). 131 Marzia de Lusignan, “Palma Guillén,” El País (Bogotá), April 5, 1935; “El Ministro,” Relator (Cali) April 6, 1935; “La señorita Guillén va a Belalcazar,” El Espectador (Bogotá), April 6, 1935; “Grata Visita” Relator, April 7, 1935; “Saludo a Palma Guillén,” El Tiempo, April 7, 1935; “Doña Palma Guillén, quien llegó ayer a la ciudad, habla para ‘El Diario Nacional,’” El Diario Nacional (Bogotá), April 8, 1935; “Palma Guillén,” El País, April 8, 1935; “Lllegó anoche la señorita Guillén a nuestra ciudad,” El País, April 8, 1935; “Cordial recibimiento se hizo a Palma Guillén a su llegada a la capital,” El Tiempo, April 8, 1935. 132 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Guillén to Portes Gil, May 3, 1935; “Los Manzanillos vitorearon a doña Palma Guillén,” El País, April 27, 1935. 64

Colombian education system.133 These reforms, as Palma Guillén pointed out in a report

to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, took as their inspiration Mexican educational

reforms.134 Shortly after her arrival in Bogotá, Guillén received notification that Cecilio

Zuleta and Manuel Sánchez, school inspectors from Pereira in the department of Caldas, planned a three-month voyage to Mexico with the goal of studying the Revolution’s socialist education movement, as the only example in the hemisphere.135 Guillén actively

encouraged their educational mission by writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ask

that the Ministry of Public Education provide them with every assistance, going so far as

to suggest that they pay their train fare within Mexico so that they could travel more

easily throughout the republic witnessing educational advances in both urban and rural

areas. The Revolution provided a similar example in the area of organised labour, and

Jorge Eliécer Gaitán affirmed in the Congress on August 2, 1934 that the Revolution’s

spirit should be brought to Colombia.136 Nevertheless, as an educator, Palma Guillén’s proximity to the socialist education policy meant that she would be particularly associated with this aspect of the Revolutionary programme.

Following President Cárdenas’s inauguration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent

telegrams on December 13, 1934 instructing all the government’s representatives in Latin

America to report on the reception of the religious question in Mexico in those

133 On the history of education in twentieth-century Colombia, see, as a starting point, Aline Helg, Civiliser le peuple et former les élites (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1984). 134 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Guillén to Hay, June 25, 1936. 135 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-233-2, Guillén to Portes Gil, June 18, 1935. 136 Reported in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 34-7-15 (III), Oscar E. Duplán to Emilio Portes Gil, August 10, 1934. 65

countries.137 Then Minister to Colombia Oscar E. Duplán reported that, although there had been major protests against Mexican anticlericalism during the Cristero Rebellion, of late the Colombian press had abstained from commenting on those Church-state relations.138 Less than six months later, this had begun to change in response to López’s attacks on the Church. Palma Guillén reported at the end of April that the conservative newspaper El País had published a protest from the Colombian Damas Católicas

(Association of Catholic Women) against the Minister.139 Apparently alarmed by reports of religious intolerance in Mexico and Palma Guillén’s statements in the Colombian press regarding feminism, socialist education, and religion, the Damas Católicas demanded that she refrain from interfering in Colombian Church-state relations. Reporters from El

Diario Nacional and El Espectador came to the legation to interview her, which gave her an opportunity to clarify her position, but El País continued to print new lists of Catholic women who had joined the protest.140 On April 25, Guillén wrote to the editor of El País to explain that she had only responded to reporters’ questions regarding the religious question and did not intend to influence Colombia, but her tactic failed to prevent the newspaper’s continued attack against her and Mexico. The editor stated that regardless of whether she uttered her words in response to questions posed by reporters, the comments caused alarm among Colombian Catholics, who continued to be worried about Mexico’s

137 Although references to the religious question are found throughout the monthly reports from Mexico’s representatives in this period, the discrete set of documents that relates explicitly to this question begins with Argentina, III-307-22, and includes most countries through Venezuela. 138 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-307-15, Duplán to Portes Gil, December 15, 1934. 139 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-307-15, Guillén to Portes Gil, April 27, 1935; “La señorita Palma Guillén debe respetar a Colombia,” El País, April 12, 1935. Also see “El Asunto religioso en Mejico,” El Espectador, April 8, 1935. 140 “La diplomática mexicana replica a las damas católicas de Bogotá,” El Diario Nacional, April 13, 1935. 66

supposedly pernicious influence.141 The usual diplomatic tactic of requesting the

correction or retraction of an article deemed offensive to Mexico did not work, but rather

fanned the flames of Catholic rancour towards the Minister.

During the following year, Guillén withstood continued attacks against her

character and that of the Mexican Revolution. Minister Guillén certainly had her

supporters; the Departmental Assemblies of Cundinamarca, Tolima, Pasto, Santander,

and Caldas all passed resolutions expressing their support for her diplomatic mission.142

However, after commenting favourably on these resolutions, the students of one class at the Instituto de San Barnarda, a school run by the Church, were expelled on June 10,

1935. The newspaper El Espectador argued that this was a clear demonstration of why the Church should not be involved in education and expressed the hope that the Ministry of Education would soon intervene decisively in the matter.143 Despite the fact that

Guillén had friends in high places in the Liberal government, she continued to serve as the punching bag for the right-wing press. In early 1935, Gabriela Mistral wrote to her friend and fellow author, Alfonso Reyes (then posted as Mexico’s Ambassador to Brazil), about Guillén’s appointment: “Palmita left a month ago […] I know she will do a wonderful job, that they will esteem her and love her, if only she would love them a little.”144 Mistral worried that one of her great failures was that she had been unable to

inspire a love of the Americas in Guillén, who had spent so much time in Europe. Her

141 “Una aclaración de la señora Palma Guillén,” El País, April 26, 1935; “Una declaración de la legación de México,” El Tiempo, April 26, 1935. 142 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (III), Guillén to Portes Gil, June 5, 1935; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (III), Guillén to Portes Gil, June 12; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (III), Guillén to Portes Gil, June 7, 1935. 143 “Un procedimiento incalificable,” El Espectador, June 11, 1935. 144 Vargas Saavedra, Tan de usted, 102. Mistral to Reyes, March 3, 1935. 67

experience in Colombia would hardly have won her over. Mistral was even more candid

when she described Guillén’s posting—“a turbid, violent, and medieval rain of

insidiousness from the clergy, who have had the good graces to declare her a Communist, an atheist, an advocate of divorce, and other nasty comments”— to their mutual friend in

Argentina, Victoria Ocampo. She explained that, contrary to what was being said about her, Guillén was a Catholic, and that she never engaged in politics.145 The Janus-faced

nature of Colombian society must have been difficult to bear, and on March 10, 1936

Guillén requested removal to her beloved Europe.146 Although President Cárdenas agreed

to the transfer right away, she remained in Colombia until August, when she finally left

for Copenhagen.

The final months of her posting were similarly filled with disagreeable run-ins

with the press. In June, Colombia’s most prominent Conservative, Laureano Gómez,

published in his recently-founded newspaper El Siglo an article that had originally appeared in Mexico City’s El Universal, which repeated a rumour that the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs had begun an investigation into Guillén’s unsatisfactory performance in

Colombia.147 It charged that because she was overly friendly with President López, she had been accused by several newspapers in Bogotá of intervening in internal affairs by

exerting undue influence over him. In her report regarding the incident, Guillén stated

that the Liberal paper El Tiempo had “spontaneously” published an editorial in her

145 Elizabeth Horan and Doris Meyer, eds. and trans., This America of Ours: The Letters of Gabriela Mistral and Victoria Ocampo (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 33. Mistral to Ocampo, March 14, 1935. 146 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), memorandum of letter from Guillén, March 10, 1936. 147 “Actuación de la srta. Ministro de México en Bogotá” El Siglo (Bogotá), June 23, 1936. On El Siglo see, Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Notes on the Latin American Press” Review of the Foreign Press, 1939-1945: Latin American Memoranda 1:1 (February 29, 1940): 7. 68

defence, which claimed that the accusation was completely false.148 The attacks from

these “ultraconservative” groups, it stated, were directed not towards her irreproachable

character, but toward the government she represented with the utmost dignity and

decorum. These unfair articles did not respect her position as a foreign diplomat or the

fact that she was a woman, dignified in every respect. “For certain newspapers, every

weapon with which it is possible to fence with the Mexican regime is permissible.”149

Her reputation had become another weapon in the domestic political battle waged between Liberals and Conservatives; the Revolutionary example she provided provoked conservative criticism of the Mexican government. Guillén seems not to have bothered to ask for a retraction from El Siglo. Although Eduardo Santos’s paper defended her, and she received a sympathetic letter of support from the Colombian Minister of Foreign

Relations,150 she left Bogotá on August 18, 1936.151

Palma Guillén’s mission to Colombia was not an abject failure. Between April

1935 and August 1936 she endeared herself to a large part of the Colombian population,

especially intellectuals, workers, and students, and encouraged better relations between

the Mexican and Colombian governments.152 Nevertheless, after her departure, a member

of the Mexican colony in Colombia wrote to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs to applaud her removal. J.A. Tamayo said that as an original supporter of Francisco Madero, he would thank the government to name a “real interpreter” of the Revolution to

148 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-4 (I), Guillén to Hay, June 25, 1936. 149 “La legación de México y doña Palma Guillén,” El Tiempo, June 24, 1936. 150 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), Jorge Soto del Corral to Guillén, June 25, 1936. 151 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), telegram from Cuervo Sánchez to Hay, August 18, 1936. 152 For Guillén’s many accomplishments, see the monthly reports she wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1935 and 1936. AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-26-28; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-17. 69

Bogotá.153 His complaints about her “vacillations” suggest that he may have been critical of her diplomatic skill. Nevertheless, Tamayo’s constant references to his participation in the Revolution suggest that he was requesting that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fill the post in Colombia with someone who, like he, had participated in the Revolution, or at least with someone who understood the Revolution from his perspective—a male perspective. This letter and Guillén’s apparent failure in Colombia therefore necessitates a discussion not just of the performance of the first female Minister in Latin America, but of masculinity in the Foreign Service, and in particular, ideas of Revolutionary masculinity that pervaded its diplomacy.

El Duelista, Bernardo Reyes

At a dance held at the Brazilian Legation at Asunción, Paraguay on the night of

November 14, 1936, Captain Camilo Pérez Uribe, a veteran of the Chaco War and the

younger brother of Paraguay’s Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, allegedly “uttered

calumnies” against all things Mexican, especially its president and Revolution and

Bernardo Reyes, the chargé d’affaires at Asunción. He called Mexico a Communist

country and accused Reyes of interfering in the internal affairs of Paraguay.154 Pérez

Uribe had allegedly called Reyes a derogatory name as the chargé d’affaires passed by

his group of friends at the party. When Reyes asked that he explain himself, the captain

153 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-25-4 (I), J.A.Tamayo to Hay, August 18, 1936. 154 The parties involved published their correspondence regarding the incident in El Día (Asunción) and La Hora (Asunción). These were translated and forwarded to the US Secretary of State by Glenn A. Abbey of the US Legation in Asunción. See United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59 (RG 59), Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to Nestor Martínez Fetes and Rocque Gaona, 17 November, 1936. 70

claimed that the epithet had not been directed at him. He then declared that he knew

Reyes’s family, and among them only the chargé d’affaires was a Leftist and a

degenerate.155 After a further exchange of words, the outraged Reyes issued a formal

challenge to Pérez Uribe, who laughed and said that he would meet him on any field, despite that fact that there was no cause for a duel. Over the course of the next week, their dispute played out in the press and in the capital.

Reyes’s challenge seems rather anachronistic, given that duelling is more

commonly associated with eighteenth-century French aristocrats than twentieth-century

Mexican diplomats.156 Nevertheless, it demonstrates a code of honour and a particular

version of Revolutionary masculinity that predominated in the Mexican Foreign Service.

Although this code seems at odds with the Cárdenas government’s promotion of the greater participation of women in national (and international) life, the two positions co- existed somewhat uneasily among the members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were posted to Latin America. The place of duelling in Mexican and broader Latin

American history has received recent attention in the historiography and authors have

155 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to the Editor of El Día, November 20, 1936. 156 For general histories of duelling, especially in the more familiar European context, see Barbara Holland, Gentlemen’s Blood: A History of Dueling From Swords at Dawn to Pistols at Dusk (New York: Bloomsbury, 2003); Pieter Spierenburg, ed., Men and Violence: Gender, Honor, and Rituals in Modern Europe and America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998); Kevin McAleer, Dueling: The Cult of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Robert A. Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel, trans. Anthony Williams (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); James Kelly, That Damn’d Thing Called Honour: Duelling in Ireland, 1570-1860 (Cork: Cork University Press, 1995); François Billaçois, The Duel: Its Rise and Fall in Early Modern France, trans. Trista Selous (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Victor Gordon Kiernan, The Duel in European History: Honor and the Reign of Aristocracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 71

examined both the juridical and socio-cultural norms that governed the practice.157

Analysis of attitudes towards duelling among Mexican diplomats and the events in

Asunción in particular reveals the role of gender in diplomats’ promotion of the Mexican

Revolution and the Cárdenas government abroad.

The morning after the dance at the Brazilian Legation, Reyes’s seconds, Captain

Néstor Martínez Fretes and Rocque Gaona, visited Camilo Pérez Uribe, who then designated as seconds Major Oscar Echeguren Staunch and Linneo Insfrán. The four men met to consider the gentlemanly question. Reyes’s seconds hoped that Pérez Uribe would retract his statements, thereby giving satisfaction to Reyes so that a duel would not be called, but the captain’s seconds maintained that Pérez Uribe had nothing to retract, as he had only stated his opinion of the Mexican government and categorically denied injuring

Reyes’s honour.158 The seconds believed the matter closed, but Reyes was not satisfied,

and his representatives met those of Pérez Uribe again the following day. Because the two positions seemed irreconcilable, the seconds convoked a Tribunal of Honour,

composed of Major Basiliano Caballero Irala on behalf of Reyes, Colonel Francisco

Caballero Alvarez on behalf of Pérez Uribe, and Dr. Diógenes R. Ortúzar as a neutral.159

After concluding that, according to witnesses to the incident at the Brazilian Legation, there was no proof that Pérez Uribe had insulted Reyes or Mexico, the Tribunal of

157 See the articles by Sandra Gayol, David Parker, and Pablo Piccato in Anuario IEHS 14 (1999). 158 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Néstor Martínez Fetes and Rocque Gaona to Bernardo Reyes, November 15, 1936. 159 On the emergence of Tribunals of Honour in Latin American duelling see David S. Parker, “Law, Honor, and Impunity in Spanish America: The Debate over Dueling, 1870-1920,” Law and History Review 19:2 (Summer, 2001): 338-40. 72

Honour declared that there were no grounds for a duel.160 Considering the case resolved,

Bernardo Reyes gave the letter his seconds sent him advising of the matter’s resolution

and a response to the editor of the newspaper of El Día, a periodical he knew to be

sympathetic to his activities in Paraguay,161 who published them under the heading

“Incident Solved” on November 18, 1936.

Instead of concluding this matter, the publication of the letters merely stoked the

fires of the conflict and precipitated the duel that the parties’ representatives had

attempted to prevent. In the published letter to his seconds, Reyes quoted from a code of

honour compiled by Escipion A. Perretto, which stipulated that satisfaction even greater than a retraction came from the denial of an offence.162 A debate of semantics followed

when Pérez Uribe wrote a response, which appeared in El Día, in which he accused

Reyes of exhibitionism and objected to the insinuation that he had retracted his

comments. He reiterated that he had expressed his personal opinion concerning the

communist orientation of the Mexican government, an opinion he maintained. He added

that the Paraguayan Military’s code contained no mention of a negation being tantamount

to retraction. He pointed to his uniform and his service to the nation in the Chaco War as

160 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Basiliano Caballero Irala, Francisco Caballero Alvarez, and Dr. Diógenes R. Ortúzar to Néstor Martínez Fretes, Rocque Gaona, Oscar Echeguren Staunch and Linneo Insfrán, November 16, 1936. 161 See the clippings Reyes forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-311-11, especially the editorial, “La Diplomacia de México,” El Día (Asunción), August 9, 1936. 162 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to Néstor Martínez Fretes and Rocque Gaona, November 17, 1936. 73

proof of his honour and declared that if Reyes were not satisfied with the results of the

tribunal, he was prepared to meet him on the field of honour.163

Reyes issued a response the following day in which the full details of the incident,

which until then had not been published, were outlined. He declared that although

retraction was grammatically impossible, for one could not revoke a statement when one

denied having said anything, the effect of a negation was nevertheless the same.164 At the same time, Reyes appointed two new seconds, Major Juan Martincich and Dr. Silvio

Lofruscio, to demand from Pérez Uribe a full retraction of his letter to the editor, or in its absence a settlement by arms.

When a retraction was not forthcoming, the representatives of Reyes and Pérez

Uribe chose sabres to first blood at dawn. They appointed a duel director, surgeons, and

witnesses. The parties arrived at Campo Grande outside Asunción shortly after 4 am the

next day. Now a barrio of Asunción, at the time Campo Grande was a rural area near the

capital. The police arrived and broke up the duel. Duelling was illegal in Paraguay, as it

was in most of Latin America at this time (with the exception of Uruguay), and the

officials therefore dutifully attempted to prevent this criminal act.165 Some unkind people

suggested that Reyes had alerted the police to the location in order to avoid coming to any harm, but his subsequent actions suggest that he was intent on defending his

163 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Pérez Uribe to The Editor of El Día, November 19, 1936. 164 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to The Editor of El Día, November 20, 1936. 165 Whether they would, or could effectively intervene, on the other hand, was not a given. On the enforcement of proscriptions against duelling see Parker, “Law, Honor, and Impunity,” 331-338. 74

honour.166 After retreating to the capital, the seconds set a new time and place: 11 am at

Asunción’s main stadium. One of Pérez Uribe’s seconds did not arrive at the appointed

hour because he attempted divert the police, but the remaining participants witnessed

Reyes and Pérez Uribe take their places on the field. After the duel director, Major

Gregorio Fariña Sánchez, made one last attempt at reconciliation and explained the rules

to the two men, and just as the adversaries were about to draw their sabres, the Chief of

Police arrived. Reyes offered to give up his diplomatic immunity, if that would influence

him to allow the duel to proceed. When told that duelling was a crime regardless of his

status as a diplomat, Reyes suggested, over the objections of his seconds, that the chief

call President Rafael Franco and ask for an exception to the law. The police finally left,

having convinced the seconds that a duel would not be allowed to take place, and the duel

director again attempted reconciliation. Pérez Uribe responded that although he would

not retract his comments concerning the Mexican government’s communism, he would promise to avoid future insults to Reyes. This did not satisfy the chargé d’affaires, who suggested that they leave the country in order to fight the duel outside Paraguay’s jurisdiction. When this was deemed impracticable, he suggested that it take place in the

Legation, stressing the extraterritoriality of diplomatic missions. This proposal too was rejected as unfeasible, given the constant surveillance of the duellists by the police, who would undoubtedly prevent Pérez Uribe from entering the Mexican Legation. After exhausting Reyes’s ideas, the seconds discussed the matter and agreed that both men had done their utmost to carry out the duel, constantly conducting themselves according to

166 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Glenn A. Abbey to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, November 25, 1936. 75

codes of honour. As a result, they decided to consider the duel as “effected” by the opponents attempts to realise it. They further resolved that a complete summary of the

affair of honour would be published, without any comment whatsoever by either of the

parties, in the press.167

The conflict between Reyes and Pérez Uribe was of great interest in Asunción,

where the young chargé d’affaires had been posted since 1935. Mexican Minister to

Paraguay Alfonso Rosenzweig Díaz resided in La Paz, where he was also appointed, and

Reyes had been in charge of the Legation in his absence since the early days of the

Cárdenas presidency.168 Reyes had initiated a particularly active propaganda campaign in

favour of Cárdenas’s government, and he consistently promoted the Revolution as an

example for Paraguayan leftists to follow. In this manner, his activities mirrored those of

the Ministers and Ambassadors posted throughout Latin America. Although Reyes was a

unique character, his actions nevertheless demonstrated the code of Revolutionary masculinity among members of the Foreign Service.

The grandson and namesake of Porfirian general and governor of Nuevo Léon

Bernardo Reyes, he was the eldest son of Rodolfo Reyes, a conservative professor of law.

Before the Revolution, Rodolfo had been a student at Lucien Mérignac’s Escuela

Magistral de Esgrima y Gimnasia in Mexico City.169 Although the young Bernardo did

167 This summary, composed and published by the seconds, served as the outline of events discussed in this paragraph. United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, La Hora (Asunción), November 25, 1936. 168 Unfortunately, I was unable to locate Bernardo Reyes’s personnel file. See Rosenzweig Díaz’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-22-1. 169 Ángel Escudero, El duelo en México. Recopilación de los desafíos habidos en nuestra república, precedidos de la historia de la esgrima en México y de los duelos más famosos verificados en el mundo desde los juicios de dios hasta nuestros días, prologue by Artemio de Valle-Arizpe (Mexico City: Imprenta Mundial, 1936).p. 46. 76

not follow his father’s political convictions, he may have learned a thing or two from him

about duelling. The elder Bernardo, who had died during the Decena Trágica (the Tragic

Ten Days of rebellion against President Madero), and Rodolfo had been among the

primary conspirators against the government of Francisco Madero, along with Félix Díaz

and Victoriano Huerta.170 Rodolfo had initially collaborated with the Huerta regime, but

was imprisoned at the end of 1913 and exiled in 1914. Rodolfo and his son Bernardo,

only eleven years old, departed Veracruz bound for Spain that February.171 The father

remained in Spain for the next forty years, eventually becoming an ardent supporter of

Franco.172 Alfonso Reyes, Rodolfo’s brother and just fifteen years older than his nephew

Bernardo, had left for Europe in 1913 to work at the Mexican Legation in Paris. After the

triumph of Venustiano Carranza, Alfonso lost his post and moved to Spain, where he endured his exile until his burgeoning literary reputation and friendship with José

Vaconcelos eventually enabled his reintegration into the Mexican Foreign Service in

1920. This caused a rupture in the family, because Rodolfo remained opposed to the

Revolutionary government.173 When the young Bernardo Reyes entered the Foreign

Service, his decision must have caused even worse resentment. Nevertheless, Bernardo

took up his first diplomatic post as third secretary of the Mexican Legation in Costa Rica

in 1925.174 He dedicated himself to his work, climbing the ranks of the Foreign Service in

fairly short order until becoming chargé d’affaires at Asunción in 1935, and then at Lima

170 Diccionario Porrúa, 2942-3. 171 Rodolfo Reyes, De mi vida, v. 2 (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1929), 254. 172 Mario Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Turner Publications, 2004), 36-37, 112, 121-122. 173 Javier Garciadiego, “Alfonso Reyes: cosmopolitismo diplomático y universalismo literario,” in Escritores en la diplomacia mexicana (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998), 197. 174 Diccionario Porrúa, 2941. 77

in 1937, where in the absence of Moisés Sáenz he also took over Spanish representation

in Peru during the Spanish Civil War when the incumbent proved to be working on

behalf of Franco.175

Despite his dedication to both his profession and the principles and aims of the

Revolution, he nevertheless remained suspect in the eyes of many because of his family’s history of anti-Revolutionary activity. During the budget crisis of early 1938, Bernardo

Reyes, like his uncle Alfonso and several other Ambassadors and Ministers posted to

Latin America, was ordered home on disponibilidad. It seems that Bernardo’s recall was

politically motivated. Upon returning to Mexico City, he requested an audience with

President Cárdenas that does not appear to have been granted.176 The matter he hoped to

raise in the meeting is made clear in a letter Alfonso Reyes sent to Cárdenas shortly

thereafter, asking that his nephew be re-instated in his position at the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs.177 He said that Eduardo Hay and Ramón Beteta had stated orally and in writing that Bernardo had been recalled on the direct orders of Cárdenas because he was the son of Rodolfo Reyes, and therefore politically suspect. Whereas all of the other diplomats

who had been placed on disponibilidad as a cost-saving measure held the ranks of

Ambassador or Minister, thus necessitating the continued service as chargés d’affaires of

more junior members of the Foreign Service, Reyes was recalled despite the fact that he

was only paid at the rank of First Secretary. In an attached memorandum, Alfonso Reyes

detailed his nephew’s extensive activities in defence of the Revolution, and provided a

175 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-8. 176 Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Ramo Presidentes, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (LCR), Caja 34, Expediente 111/2433. Telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Cárdenas, May 3, 1938. 177 AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Alfonso Reyes to Cárdenas, May 17, 1938. 78

list of references who could attest to his “genuine socialism” and “sincere leftism.”178

Alfonso Reyes’s defence of his nephew’s Revolutionary activities must have been sufficiently persuasive, as the young Bernardo was taken off disponibilidad and posted to

France shortly thereafter.179 Both Alfonso and Bernardo sent Cárdenas letters of

thanks.180 The prejudices he knew existed against his father among members of the

Revolutionary bureaucracy were quite likely yet another reason that a diplomatic career was as appealing to Bernardo as it had been to his Uncle Alfonso.

During his first post in Costa Rica, Bernardo demonstrated that he had inherited a

literary bent from his uncle. The young diplomat’s first play, entitled ¡¡Mentira!!...,

debuted in San José on August 12, 1926.181 Apparently deserving of no less than twenty-

seven curtain calls, it was very well received by the Costa Rican press.182 Showcasing his

progressive social views, the play, set in Spain, told the story of an aristocratic family

whose only daughter Luisa falls in love with a good but common man. When it becomes

apparent that she has become a “ruined” woman, her father, steeped in tradition, disowns

her. Older brother Gerardo, a corrupt conservative politician, suggests that he challenge

her suitor to a duel to defend her honour. Brother Antonio, a social-climbing priest who

ministers only to the rich, suggests the convent. Only her brother Fernando, a bohemian

anarchist with non-traditional views of society, suggests that she should marry the man

178 AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Memorandum by Alfonso Reyes, May 17, 1938. 179 Diccionario Porrúa, 2941. 180 AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Alfonso Reyes to Cárdenas, June 21, 1938; AGN, LCR, Caja 34, Expediente 111/2433, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Cárdenas, May 25, 1938. 181 Bernardo Reyes, ¡¡Mentira!!... (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1928). 182 “Visión de verdad,” Nueva Prensa (San José), August 13, 1926. Several warm reviews are reprinted in the above publication. 79

she loves. Fernando dismisses duelling as a barbarous anachronism.183 Luisa’s parents

later forgive her and Fernando when it becomes clear, on their fiftieth wedding

anniversary, that while Gerardo and Antonio are only interested in inheriting their

parents’ fortune, Luisa and Fernando love and respect them.

The social lessons of the play were immediately apparent to reviewers,184 who

commented on the author’s socialism and saw in Fernando’s character a true

representation of the author’s beliefs.185 Reyes’s socialist views did not undermine the

masculine aura of the play: several reviewers commented on Reyes’s “manly style,”186 and another said that his verbal audacity was reminiscent of the skill of an accomplished duellist.187 Reyes’s masculinity was evident in the vehemence and “virility” with which

he upheld the principles of social justice,188 rather than traditional ideas regarding women’s subjection to familial honour. While Reyes condemned duelling in defence of feminine virtue, his subsequent use of the institution in Paraguay for the defence of his own honour and that of the Revolution seems consistent with his early ideas of

Revolutionary masculinity. ¡¡Mentira!!... was also performed in Bogotá in 1927 during his next diplomatic posting,189 and he reportedly wrote and directed one other play,190 but

thereafter seems to have devoted his considerable literary talents to the composition of

discourses on national history, politics, and culture prepared for foreign audiences to

183 Reyes, ¡¡Mentira!!..., 50. 184 “La obra de Bernardo Reyes,” Diario de Costa Rica (San José), August 25, 1926. 185 “¡Mentira!,” La Tribuna (San José), August 18, 1926. 186 “Visión de verdad,” Nueva Prensa, August 13, 1926. 187 Pío Tamayo, “Algunos juicios críticos sobre ¡Mentira!,” El Mundo (San José), August 12, 1926. 188 Ibid. 189 “El Estreno de Anoche,” El Espectador (Bogotá), March 3, 1927; Paco Miro, “Crónica de teatro. El estreno de Mentira,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), March 4, 1927. 190 AGN, LCR, Caja 1223, Expediente 702.2/9790, Memorandum by Alfonso Reyes, May 17, 1938. 80

promote and defend the Mexican Revolution during his various diplomatic

appointments.191

Bernardo Reyes would certainly have been offended by Pérez Uribe’s jibe about

his family situation at the dance at the Brazilian Legation. Made in such a public venue,

at a social gathering of his social and diplomatic peers, the barb would have stung.192

Taken together with the charge that the Mexican government, and Reyes himself, was

Communist, the captain’s insults threatened Reyes’s Revolutionary masculinity. Reyes

did not base his masculine ideal upon the defence of female virtue, but on the defence of

the social project of which he felt himself a part. Since arriving in Paraguay, Reyes had

reported that the Mexican Revolution was under attack in the conservative Catholic press,

and among members of the conservative elite who were critical of the alleged persecution

of Catholics in Mexico.193 These attacks had only increased since the outbreak of the

Spanish Civil War a few months previous.194 In this tense atmosphere, Pérez Uribe’s

insults must have caused him to reach the breaking point, leading him to seek to defend

his honour and that of the Revolution by issuing a formal challenge. Although he could

not convince Pérez Uribe to change his personal opinion regarding the character of the

Mexican government, or make him understand the differences among leftist regimes,195

191 Diccionario Porrúa, 2942. 192 As Pablo Piccato points out, the majority of the duels discussed by Escudero in El duelo en México occurred because of offences that took place at public functions, such as the theatre or a ball. Pablo Piccato, “Politics and the Technology of Honor: Dueling in Turn-of-the-Century Mexico,” Journal of Social History 33:2 (Winter, 1999): 334. 193 Reyes’s reports on the so-called religious question in AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-311-11. 194 On Reyes’s defence of Mexico’s position in the Spanish Civil War see Chapter Three. 195 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Bernardo Reyes to The Editor of El Día, November 20, 1936. 81

he could defend the Revolution, and his commitment to it, possibly to the death, in a duel.

Duelling could prove that he was not the “degenerate” Pérez Uribe had claimed.

In his prologue to the 1936 compendium, El duelo en México, former diplomat and member of the Academia Mexicana de la Lengua Artemio de Valle-Arizpe wrote that

Ángel Escudero’s book painted a picture of a bygone era.196 Although the number of duels taking place each year had decreased steadily since the Porfiriato, the practice still maintained an important role in diplomats’ conception of Revolutionary masculinity, which Valle-Arizpe should have recognised. In his analysis of the “technology of honor” in turn-of-the-century Mexico, Pablo Piccato argues that although the decline of duelling coincided with the changing role of political violence in society during the combative phase of the Revolution, it was nevertheless central to the creation of a modern public sphere and the virility of national ruling groups.197 This version of masculinity played a central role in the promotion of the Revolution abroad and helps to explain the ambiguous position of women in the Foreign Service.

Duelling swords and pistols served as particularly effective instruments in shaping public opinion. David Parker has demonstrated the importance of the press in Latin

American duelling: most of the duels that took place in early twentieth-century Uruguay played themselves out in, and generally resulted from, conflicts that were voiced in the press.198 The debate in which Bernardo Reyes and Camilo Pérez Uribe engaged in the

196 Escudero, El duelo en México. 197 Piccato, “Politics and the Technology of Honor,” 331-3, 345-6. 198 Parker, “Law, Honor, and Impunity,” 319; David S. Parker, “‘Gentlemanly Responsibility’ and ‘Insults of a Woman’: Dueling and the Unwritten Rules of Public Life in Uruguay, 1860-1920,” in Gender, Sexuality, and Power in Latin America since Independence, ed. William E. French and Katherine Elaine Bliss (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 109-132. 82

pages of El Día gains significance in this regard. So too does Pérez Uribe’s charge that

by first publishing a report of the incident in the press, Bernardo Reyes was, in his

characteristic manner, resorting to crude “exhibitionism.”199 Rather than a character flaw,

engaging in this type of public display was exactly what was expected of Cárdenas’s

diplomats in Latin America. This behaviour was characteristic of the way in which

members of the Foreign Service demonstrated their Revolutionary masculinity. Shortly

after arriving in Asunción, Reyes had written the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquiring to

what extent he should publicise the bases of the socialist education programme contained

in the six-year plan in the face of the campaign against Mexico in the conservative

Catholic press.200 Luis Garrido, then head of the Diplomatic Department, responded that determining the advisability of a vocal propaganda campaign was Reyes’s own responsibility and up to his judgement.201 Reyes and his counterparts throughout Latin

America were generally left to their own devices in creating positive propaganda and

defending the attitudes and policies of the Cárdenas government in the countries to which

they were appointed. Reyes and most of his colleagues took to these directives with gusto

and published myriad articles about the Revolution and its tenets in the press. One of the most popular strategies they employed was the retraction. When an article denigrating

Mexico appeared in the press, more often than not the ranking Mexican diplomat in the country would immediately write a letter to the editor of the newspaper in which it appeared, explaining the offending article’s errors. They usually gained a retraction from

199 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Pérez Uribe to The Editor of El Día, November 19, 1936. 200 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-311-11, Bernaro Reyes to SRE, September 1, 1936. 201 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-311-11, Garrido to Bernardo Reyes, September 23, 1936. 83

the editor and a host of articles about the incident in the press. As the old adage has it,

there is no such thing as bad publicity, and as a result of this tactic members of the public

became better informed about the Revolutionary government and its programmes. The

retraction provided a tool by which Mexican diplomats attempted to shape public opinion

and was intimately tied to the ideas of Revolutionary masculinity and the practice of

duelling.

By publishing the news of the resolution of the incident that took place at the

Brazilian Legation, Bernardo Reyes was following a practice that had deep roots in both

Mexican journalism and diplomacy. One of the most prominent duellists eulogised in

Escudero’s tome is Rafael Reyes Spíndola, the Oaxacan editor of the newspaper El

Universal, founded in 1888, and El Imparcial, founded in 1896.202 In nineteenth-century

character, the founder of modern journalism was prone to challenging his detractors to

meet him on the field of honour.203 Reyes Spíndola’s son Octavio, who also considered

himself a journalist, joined the Foreign Service in 1922.204 By the Cárdenas era, he was

considered by foreign correspondent Betty Kirk to be the “Red Knight of the Foreign

Office”—the diplomat who did the most to promote the Revolution in Latin America.205

In 1939, Cárdenas appointed him Ambassador to Chile following the election of Popular

Front candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda, but until then, much like Reyes, he had served as

202 Diccionario Porrúa, 2943. On his contribution to the foundation of modern journalism in Mexico see, Clara Guadalupe García, El Imparcial: primer periódico moderno de México (Mexico City: Centro de Estdios Históricos del Porfiriato, 2003); Antonio Saborit, El mundo ilustrado de Rafael Reyes Spíndola (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios de Historia de México, 2003). 203 See, for example, Rafael Reyes Spíndola vs. José Ferrel. Escudero, El duelo en México, 175. 204 See Octavio Reyes Spíndola’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7. 205 Betty Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front: The Battle of Europe versus America (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942), 200. The reference to Kirk’s impressions of Reyes Spíndola was found in, Roderic Ai Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1981 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982), 251. 84

chargé d’affaires to several Latin American countries, including Panama, Nicaragua, and

Cuba, where he gained a reputation for demanding retractions of articles he deemed denigrating toward the Revolution. Even more significant in this regard was the duel

Escudero recounted between General José Domingo Ramírez Garrido and José Rivero

that took place in Cuba in 1926.206 One of Lucien Mérignac’s disciples at the Escuela

Magistral de Esgrima y Gimnasia, José Domingo Ramírez Garrido, a personal friend of

Escudero’s and a fellow professor at the school, fled to Cuba after the de la Huerta rebellion.207 On May 3, 1926, the newspaper El Diario de la Marina published an article denigrating the Mexican Revolution and its generals. Incensed, Ramírez Garrido immediately named as seconds Manuel Márquez Sterling and Miguel A. Riva, who visited the offices of the prominent Cuban daily and met with its editor José Rivero to explain that the offended General demanded satisfaction. Fortunately, as Escudero recounts, the editor realised the error of his ways, and promised to print a retraction in the following day’s paper.208 A contest of arms did not result. The Revolutionary was able to use the procedures outlined in duelling codes to defend his honour, that of the

Revolution, and of the military. This demonstrates the underlying point of all retractions demanded of newspaper editors by Mexican diplomats. According to the gentlemanly code of honour, a demand for a retraction was tantamount to a challenge.

When a critic of the Revolution, or its representatives, uttered a statement

believed to be harmful to Mexico, the diplomats who asked for satisfaction were drawing

206 Escudero, El duelo en México, 261-262. 207 Jesús Ezequiel de Dios, José Domingo, el idealista (Villahermosa: Instituto de Cultura de Tabasco, 1989). 208 Escudero, El duelo en México, 261-262. 85

on their ideas of Revolutionary masculinity, which reflected their attitudes towards

duelling. Mexican diplomats learned this behaviour through their participation in the

Revolution, as well as in the Escuela Magistral de Esgrima y Gimnasia and from their

fathers. Although Reyes and his adversary referred to two alternate printed codes of

honour, Reyes challenged Pérez Uribe on common terms. The parties’ use of different

codes highlights the multiplicity of definitions of honour, even among men who clearly accepted the institution’s validity.209 Nevertheless, they sought common ground by

defining what they meant by honour in the press through their references to the military.

In the letters they published, both adversaries heaped praise on the uniform Pérez Uribe

wore and the Paraguayan military’s honourable participation in the Chaco War. Reyes’s

rhetoric suggests that he was attempting to draw a comparison between the honourable

nature of the Mexican and Paraguayan militaries, where duelling was an acknowledged

and codified masculine practice.210 Given the prevalence of men who had participated in

the Revolution among Cárdenas’s diplomats in Latin America, this appeal to the uniform

was particularly characteristic of the ideas of Revolutionary masculinity prevalent in the

Foreign Service. Fourteen of the thirty diplomats posted to Latin America during the

Cárdenas presidency played identifiable military roles in the combative phase of the

Revolution. Although handed down to Reyes from father to son, the practice of duelling

209 Sandra Gayol discusses the multiplicity of definitions of honour invoked by opposing social actors in her analysis of the role of duelling in late-nineteenth-century Argentina. See “Honor Moderno”: The Significance of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Argentina,” Hispanic American Historical Review 84:3 (2004): 485. On honour in Paraguay see, Juan Vicente Soto Estigarribia, Delito contra el honor: Calumnia, difamación e injuria (Aunción: Editora Litocolor, 2005). 210 On duelling in the Porfirian military see, Stephen Neufeld, “Servants of the Nation: The Military in the Making of Modern Mexico, 1876-1911,” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2009). 86

and the attitudes that surrounded it were accepted among his fellow members of the

Foreign Service.

The code of honour upon which diplomats’ actions were based helps to explain

the apparent paradox between the Cárdenas government’s promotion of the advancement

of women and the exclusionary practice of Revolutionary masculinity that pervaded the

Foreign Service. As one of three generals appointed as representatives to Latin America during the Cárdenas era, José Domingo Ramírez Garrido successfully used the code of honour to extract an apology from the editor of the Diario de la Marina in 1926. His first diplomatic appointment was as Minister to Colombia, where he replaced Palma Guillén in 1937. After arriving in Bogotá, Ramírez Garrido consistently demanded retractions of

denigrating articles that appeared in the very same papers that had attacked La Ministro

during her tenure in the Andes. When accused of interfering in the internal affairs of

Colombia by Laureano Gómez’s El Siglo for holding a meeting of prominent leftists at

the Mexican Legation following Mexico’s oil expropriation, Ramírez Garrido went on

the offensive. He demanded a retraction and secured the support of the Colombian

Foreign Minister for his actions. A storm of coverage explaining the rationale behind the

oil expropriation and the legal bases of President Cárdenas’s decision followed in the

press.211 Ramírez Garrido secured greater coverage of Mexican events, influencing

public opinion regarding the expropriation—one of the primary goals of diplomats posted to Latin America during the Cárdenas presidency. He did so by employing the code of honour that had served him well in Cuba eleven years earlier: he denounced false reports

211 For further discussion of this incident, and the Colombian reaction to the Mexican oil expropriation, see Chapter Four. 87

and demanded satisfaction as though he were issuing a challenge to a duel. Ramírez

Garrido used this tactic throughout his tenure as Minister to Colombia. Palma Guillén did

not. Although she was maligned in the conservative press and portrayed as a radical

communist, despite her Catholicism, unlike her male colleagues she did not make

extensive use of the tactic of retraction. When attacked, her protector and friend Eduardo

Santos came to her defence in El Tiempo. She did not—could not—employ the

gentlemanly code of honour, and inherent threat of violence, that underlay the actions of

her male colleagues. The implications of demanding a retraction, because they were

rooted in the practice of duelling that had special significance for members of the

Mexican military and the sons of the students of Lucien Mérignac, effectively prevented

her from employing the same tactics as her male colleagues.

Conclusion

President Cárdenas, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, and many members of the

Foreign Serivice who were posted to Latin America were committed to the advancement

of women in society, but diplomatic practice, underwritten by the cultural code of honour

that was based on Revolutionary masculinity, nevertheless limited women’s participation

in Cárdenas’s diplomatic project. Before challenging the director of the Diario de la

Marina to a duel in Cuba in 1926 and his appointment to Colombia in 1937, Ramírez

Garrido published a small book in 1918 entitled Al margen del feminismo.212 As Director

212 José Domingo Ramírez Garrido, Al margen del feminismo (Mérida: Talleres Pluma y Lápiz, 1918). This book is available through the Women in History microfilm collection (Woodbridge, Conn.: Research Publications, 1975), no. 7696. 88

of the Department of Public Education in the Yucatán under Governor Salvador

Alvarado, Ramírez Garrido was involved in both Mexico’s First Pedagogical Congress, held in Mérida in September 1915, and the First Feminist Congress of Mexico, held in

Mérida in 1916.213 His 1918 study reflects his involvement with the cause of women’s

rights in the Yucatán and his firm conviction that women should get the vote.214 In it, he compares women’s exclusion from contemporary politics to the exclusion from national political life of the indigenous masses during the Porfiriato and argued that just as the

Revolution had concerned itself with the “elevation” of indigenous groups, so too should it fulfil the social Revolutionary goal of equality for women. Ramírez Garrido was a feminist who would undoubtedly have chafed at the suggestion that his attitudes and behaviour may have effectively limited women’s participation in the Foreign Service.

Nor was he the only representative in Latin America to hold strong views in favour of the equality of women. For example, Minister to Bolivia and Paraguay (1935-1938) and

Panama (1938-1941), Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, included a chapter on women’s contributions to the independence movement in his magnum opus, Mexicanidad de

México.215 Clearly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its male representatives did not

213 On the First Pedagogical Congress see, Stephanie J. Smith “Educating the Mothers of the Nation: The Project of Revolutionary Education in Yucatán,” in The Women’s Revolution in Mexico, 1910-1953, ed. Stephanie Mitchell and Patience A. Schell (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 41. On the First Feminist Congress see, Stephanie J. Smith, Gender and the Mexican Revolution: Yucatán Women and the Realities of Patriarchy (Chaptel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 29-32. On women and the Revolution in the Yucatán also see, by the same author, “‘If Love Enslaves…Love Be Damned!’: Divorce and Revolutionary State Formation in Yucatán,” in Sex in Revolution: Gender, Politics, and Power in Modern Mexico, ed. Jocelyn Olcott, Mary Kay Vaughan, and Gabriela Cano (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 99-111; “Salvador Alvarado of Yucatán: Revolutionary Reforms, Revolutionary Women,” in State Governors in the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1952: Portraits in Conflict, Courage and Corruption, ed. Jürgen Buchenau and William H. Beezley (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 43-57. 214 Ramírez Garrido, Al margen del feminismo, Chapter 7. 215 Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, Mexicanidad de México v. 3 (Oxford: Dolphin, 1959), 421-424. 89

purposely act to restrict opportunities for women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or

impede the success of Palma Guillén’s posting in Colombia. Nevertheless, the culture of

Revolutionary masculinity that underlay their actions worked to do just this. In his

analysis of the apparent paradox of the expansion of opportunities for women in

Uruguayan society and the importance of duelling, David Parker concluded that because

Uruguayans could not imagine women as duellists, they could not imagine them as

participants in national politics.216 Unable to guarantee, by threat of a duel, a challenge to

her character or that of the Mexican Revolution, Palma Guillén could not effectively defend herself as Reyes had done in Paraguay. Latin American diplomats throughout the region defended their countries vehemently, often employing the retraction as a diplomatic tool; Mexico’s culture of Revolutionary masculinity made its representatives particularly adept at this practice, but as a woman Guillén was excluded from its effective use. As a result, her much-lauded appointment to Colombia, the Latin American country that at the time had seemed most likely to accept her, ended in failure, and she was transferred to Denmark, where a different cultural context prevailed.

Far from “crude exhibitionism,” Bernardo Reyes’s challenge to Camilo Pérez

Uribe and his publication of the incident that took place at the Brazilian Legation in the

Paraguayan press had indeed been characteristic of his diplomatic style.217 Moreover, his

actions, although apparently exceptional, were actually broadly representative of the

ideas of Revolutionary masculinity that were held by members of the Foreign Service

216 Parker, “‘Gentlemanly Responsibility,’”126. 217 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Pérez Uribe to The Editor of El Día, November 19, 1936. 90

posted to Latin America in these years. Reyes and his colleagues defended the virtue of the Revolution. Drawing on gentlemanly codes of honour, they shaped public opinion using newspapers as skilfully as a duellist uses his sword. Revolutionary masculinity characterised their attitudes towards the promotion of the Revolution abroad, and as a result, Reyes’s otherwise anachronistic call to arms provides considerable insight in to the practice of diplomacy during the Cárdenas era. Although women’s participation in the

Foreign Service, like women’s suffrage, was actively encouraged by the Cárdenas government and promoted by the high-profile appointment of Palma Guillén, the culture of diplomatic practice worked against her.

The generation of ambassadors and ministers who served in Latin America during the Cárdenas presidency were shaped by their experience of the Revolution and their participation in the Revolutionary reconstruction that followed. Although diverse in their educational experiences, places of origin, and career paths, they shared a belief in the social goals of the Revolution and their potential applicability to the countries to which they were posted. They promoted Cárdenas’s achievements and presented Mexico as an example for other countries to follow, especially in the fields of labour organisation, agrarian reform, indigenismo, and education. They also supported the Cárdenas government’s commitment to the greater participation of women in national and international life, but somewhat paradoxically the same shared experiences that made them a cohesive group and led them to support the Revolution and its tenets engendered in them a culture of Revolutionary masculinity that, in practice, undermined the position of women in the Foreign Service. The propaganda campaigns they led and activities they 91

performed as representatives of Mexico and the Revolution should be understood as gendered acts. Although this is most clear in the incidents described in this chapter, it is also true of the major campaigns they launched in support of the expropriation of British,

Dutch, and US oil companies in March 1938, Cárdenas’s position on the Spanish Civil

War, and Mexico’s leadership in inter-American conferences.

92

CHAPTER THREE. REPÚBLICAS ROJAS: THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND MEXICAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

España, nuevo Méjico; Méjico, nueva España; Iguales han sufrido por una misma gloria; La República Roja, roja como la entraña, Que palpita en las grandes jornadas de la Historia.

Spain, new Mexico; Mexico, new Spain Together they have suffered for the same glory; The Red Republic, red like a heard, That beats in the great annals of History .218

After the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, Chile’s Ambassador to

Mexico reported that “the general commentary among the members of the diplomatic

corps was that it seemed strange that Cárdenas would boast of his support for the

government of Azaña at a time when all of the European Great Powers have agreed to

maintain strict neutrality in the Spanish conflict.”219 Latin American diplomats continued

to be surprised by the depths of Mexico’s support for the Spanish Republic during the bloody war in Spain and the dictatorship that followed. When Franco finally defeated the

Republic in 1939, only the Mexican government refused to recognise his victory, and only after the dictator’s death in 1975 did the Mexican government re-establish relations with Spain.220 Cárdenas’s position on the Spanish Civil War became one of the most

218 Pablo Hannibal Vela, “Méjico y España.” Poem found in Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente III-767-10. 219 Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1505, Bianchi to Ministro, September 1, 1936. 220 Mexico continued to recognise the Republican government in exile, although it would later establish limited commercial relations with the Franco dictatorship. Clara E. Lida (ed.), Mexico y España en el primer franquismo, 1939-1950: Rupturas formales, relaciones oficiosas (Mexico City: El Colegio de 93

recognised features of the government’s foreign policy during his sexenio; the two causes

became inextricably linked.

In the 1937 poem “Méjico y España,” which Ecuadorian writer Pablo Hannibal

Vela dedicated to Presidents Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Azaña, the causes of Spain

and Mexico appear as one. A noted poet and journalist who had run for president in 1932, his sympathies were laid bare in the poem he wrote about Mexico’s support of the

Spanish Republic.221 He was not alone in linking the two countries’ fates. Latin

Americans on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum identified Mexico with the Spanish Republican cause throughout the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath. With each pronouncement Cárdenas and his diplomats made on the world stage, this identification deepened. Throughout the region, members of the Left and the Right

differentiated themselves on the basis of whether they sympathised with the military

insurgency of Franco or the Republican government of Spain.

Mexican Ambassador to Argentina Alfonso Reyes reported from Buenos Aires in

August 1936 that the Spanish Civil War had quickly become a domestic question in

Argentina.222 The Right, Reyes explained, aimed to present the insurgents as the

inheritors of Christian civilization and the government as the harbingers of Ibero-

México, 2001); Lorenzo Meyer, El cactus y el olivo: relaciones hispano mexicanas en el siglo XX (Mexico City: Oceano, 2001). 221 The poem also appeared in the book of poetry Vela published the following year, Arca Sonora (Quito: Talleres Gráficos de Educación, 1938). This volume includes poems entitled “Ave España” (dedicated to Gabriela Mistral), “Pan” (dedicated to the campesinos and workers of Ecuador), and “Estudiantes de América” (dedicated to the Ecuadorian activist and indigenista Gonzalo Oleas), which provide further indication of his ideas about Spain and its relationship to the Americas. 222 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, August 27, 1936. Also see Sandra McGee Deutsch, Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 94

America’s communist future.223 Drawing on the long history of hispanismo, they

associated the Spanish Republic, like the Mexican Revolution, with anti-clericalism and

an attack on the conservative social values that they believed bound Spain and its former

colonies in the Americas together.224 They became inseparable, like two halves of a

beating Red heart. By contrast, following the establishment of the Second Republic in

Spain, members of the Latin American Left hoped that the motherland need no longer

represent the forces that aimed to maintain the conservative status quo. Just as they had

seen the Mexican Revolution as a source of hope, in Spain’s experiment in democracy

they saw a new and “glorious” way forward for their own societies.225 By loudly

supporting the beleaguered Spanish government during the war, Cárdenas tied Mexico

more firmly to these ideals, until they seemed almost indivisible to most Latin Americans

and their governments. As a result, Cárdenas’s Spanish policy profoundly influenced his

government’s relations with Latin America.

This chapter evaluates the role that this central aspect of Mexico’s foreign policy

played in shaping the Cárdenas government’s relations with Latin America. The sources

and evolution of Cárdenas’s support of the Spanish Republic, and his acceptance of tens

223 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, August 27, 1936. 224 Ricardo Pérez Montfort, Hispanismo y Falange: Los sueños imperiales de la derecha española (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1992); Breve antología de documentos hispanistas, 1931-1948 (Mexico City: CIESAS, 1990); and “Notas sobre el falangismo en México (1930-1940),” in Facismo y antifascismo en América Latina y México, eds. Brígida Von Mentz, Ricardo Pérez Montfort and Verena Radkau (México City: CIESAS, 1984); Fredrick B. Pike, Hispanismo, 1898-1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971). 225 On the reception of the Mexican Revolution in Latin America, and the Rio de la Plata region in particular, see Pablo Yanklevich, La revolución mexicana en América Latina: Intereses políticos e itinerarios intelectuales (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2003); Miradas australes. Propaganda, cabildeo y proyección de la Revolución Mexicana en el Río de la Plata, 1910-1930 (Mexico City: INEHRM, 1997); La Diplomacia Imaginaria: Argentina y la Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1916 (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1994). 95

of thousands of Spanish Republican exiles, have been examined in detail elsewhere.226

Instead of treading these well-worn paths, this chapter explores unexamined aspects of this diplomacy by demonstrating the connections between Cárdenas’s Spanish and Latin

American policies. Even in the widely-known case of Republican refugees, the Latin

American dimensions of this policy have received little attention in the literature. By analysing the issues that Cárdenas’s support for the Republic brought to the fore from this angle, the resonance it had throughout the region becomes apparent. This is particularly true in the enthusiasm with which many intellectual figures took up the causes of Spain, and the activities of the hundreds (perhaps thousands) of local organisations that leftist

Spaniards who had immigrated to Latin America before the war, and their allies, founded in these years.227 Paying rapt attention to the news coming out of Spain and Mexico, they eulogised the Cárdenas government’s position in verse and song and chanted slogans in meeting halls and the streets. Often working in tandem, intellectuals and activists raised money for Republican causes and publicised the twin causes of Mexico and Spain.

Conversely, Latin American members of the Spanish Falange and other organisations of

226Mario Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid: Turner Publications, 2004); José Antonio Matesanz, Las raíces del exilio: México antes la Guerra Civil Española, 1936-1939 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1999); Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), México y España: solidaridad y asilo político, 1936-1942. Mexico: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1990; T.G. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981); Lynn Hollingsworth Leverty, “The Spanish Question in Mexico: Lázaro Cárdenas and the Spanish Republicans,” (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1983); Lois Elwyn Smith, Mexico and the Spanish Republicans (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955); Patricia Fagen, Exiles and Citizens: Spanish Republicans in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973); Clara Lida, Inmigración y exilio: Reflexiones sobre el caso español (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores/El Colegio de México, 1997). 227 The president of the Comité Nacional Pro Defensa de la República Democrática Española wrote to Mexico’s Minister to Uruguay following Uruguay’s recognition of Franco to thank the Mexican government for opening its doors to the Republican refugees. He stated that the committee represented more than 250 humanitarian aid organisations. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Edmundo Castillo to Manuel Y. De Negri, March 22, 1939. Although there would have been fewer such organisations in smaller countries or those with smaller numbers of Spanish immigrants, there may have been thousands of humanitarian aid organisations throughout Latin America. 96

the Right were alarmed by these initiatives and organised their own demonstrations in

defence of Christian civilization. The overwhelmingly conservative governments of the

region also reacted with apprehension, but as well as censuring the activities of leftists—

Mexican diplomats included—they were concerned mainly for the maintenance of the peace and their own positions within the conservative status quo, and they sometimes suppressed the activities of the Right. Under these circumstances, the reception met by renowned authors’ writings and initiatives could serve as a proxy for commentary on domestic politics in Latin America. In this way, Mexico’s Spanish policy affected not only its diplomatic relations with Latin American governments, but the politics of the entire region.

Because of the Franco regime’s iron-clad control of the Spanish archives, the

historiography of the Spanish Civil War was long divided between nationalist

interpretations and accounts based on foreign documentation generally sympathetic to the

Republican cause.228 In recent years there has been effervescence in the literature as a

new generation of scholars has undertaken detailed regional analyses of the conflict using

newly-accessible national and local sources.229 The established line of investigation into

228 Paul Preston, “War of Words” in Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939, ed. Paul Preston (London: Methuen & Co., 1984): 1-13. Nationalist tracts often presented the rebellion as part of a crusade to save Spanish civilization. Joaquín Arrarás, Historia de la cruzada española, 8 vols. (Madrid: Ediciones españolas, 1939-1943). Foreign works, on the other hand, tended to be wrapped up in the analysis of Communist involvement in the conflict. Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Couterrevolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). Also see Pierre Broué and Emile Témime, The Revolution and Civil War in Spain, translated by Tony White (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972); Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977); Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). 229 George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert (eds.), Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931- 1939 (London: Longman, 1995); Adrian Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860-1934 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987) 97

the international reactions of the war has also surged forward through recently-gained access to Spanish and Soviet archives,230 as well as the application of new theoretical perspectives such as gender analysis.231 However, these studies generally tend to deal separately with international diplomacy surrounding the conflict,232 foreign intellectuals’

support for the Republic,233 and the international labour movement.234 This chapter demonstrates that, at least in the Mexican and broader Latin American cases, the diplomatic, intellectual, and social responses to the Spanish Civil War were intimately related.235

Latin American reactions to the Mexican government’s Spanish policy ebbed and flowed according to the course of the conflict in Spain. Significant moments in the history of the Spanish Civil War framed perceptions of Cárdenas’s unflagging support for the Republic.236 During the early days of the conflict, when international newswires buzzed with reports of the retributive killings of Spanish clerics, the Mexican

230 In particular, Gerald Howson demystified Soviet aid to the Republic in Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (London: John Murray, 1998). 231 Laurence Brown, “‘Pour Aider Nos Frères d’Espagne’: Humanitarian Aid, French Women, and Popular Mobilization during the Front Populaire,” French Politics, Culture & Society, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 30-48; Angela Jackson, British Women and the Spanish Civil War (London: Routledge, 2002). 232 Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Enrique Moradiellos, “The Allies and the Spanish Civil War,” in Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, eds. Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston (London: Routledge, 1999): 96- 126; Enrique Moradiellos, La perfidia del Albión: El gobierno británico y la guerra civil española (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1996); Dominic Tierney, FDR and the Spanish Civil War (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 233 Frederick R. Benson, Writers in Arms: The Literary Impact of the Spanish Civil War (New York: New York University Press, 1967). 234 Tom Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Lewis A. Mates, The Spanish Civil War and the British Left (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 235 Tom Buchanan also attempts such a synthesis in Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 236 For brief overviews of the Spanish Civil War see Helen Graham, The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Paul Preston, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War (London: Fontana, 1996). 98

government’s defence of the Republic was hard to swallow for many in overwhelmingly

Catholic Latin America. Nevertheless, the execution of Federico García Lorca in Granada

by Franco’s forces foreshadowed for many intellectuals the repression and devastation

that would meet Republican supporters in Franco’s Spain.237 The insurgents’ quick

advance through the south in the fall of 1936 convinced many international observers that

the Republic was doomed, but the destruction inflicted upon Guernica in April 1937 and

the rebels’ subsequent aerial bombing of open cities drew some supporters to the

beleaguered Republican cause. The increasing prominence of Communists in the

Republican war effort simply confirmed the fears of conservative critics of Mexico and

the Republic, but the plight of the displaced civilian population that moved across the

peninsula made Mexico’s humanitarian defence of the Republic more palatable in

international circles as the war wore on. International aid organisations, intellectuals, and

even some governments praised Mexican assistance to these helpless victims of war.

Nevertheless, each movement of refugees signified another town taken by the rebel

forces and the insurgents’ increasing strength. Franco split the Republican zone in two

when he reached Vinaroz in April 1938, and by November of that year the loyalist army

retreated from the Battle of Ebro after the British and French governments’ appeasement of Hitler at Munich had demonstrated to the Republicans that they would never abandon the policy of Non-Intervention. Britain and France recognised the Franco regime in

February of 1939 after the fall of Barcelona that January, and the Latin American

governments that had not already recognised his regime because of ideological affinity

237 Michael Richards, A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936- 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 99

soon followed the Great Powers’ diplomatic suit. That the Mexican government remained

intransigent in its continued recognition of the Republican government in exile seemed

laudable to some, but in diplomatic circles, where it hampered the rescue of Mexican

nationals who remained in Spain and the Republican refugees who had crossed the

Pyrenees to France, it bemused. To the chagrin of conservative Mexicans and the relief of

Latin American governments that did not want “Red” Spanish migrants stirring up

trouble in their own countries, Mexico eventually welcomed approximately 30,000

Republican refugees—the most lasting proof of the Cárdenas government’s Spanish

policy.238 During the course of the war, foreign public opinion evolved in response to the

events unfolding in Spain, and as a result the initiatives that intellectuals, activists, and

the Mexican government devised to respond to these changing conditions met with

varying responses.

Latin American reactions to the Spanish Civil War, their own governments’

responses to the conflict, and Mexico’s Spanish policy cause a shifting of locations. The

geographical focus moves from Mexico City to Spain, and to the capital cities of Latin

America, shifting from Mexican embassies and legations in Latin America and Europe to

the hallways of the League of Nations and Latin American embassies and legations in

Mexico, demonstrating that these became contested spaces with the expression of the

varied reactions to the conflict. From literary salons and concert halls to meeting halls,

the streets, and even the living rooms where radio listeners keenly tuned in for news of

the war and Mexico’s reaction to it, the reactions of intellectuals and workers were

238 Fagen, Exiles and Citizens, 39. 100

likewise formed and debated in many arenas. The Mexican sale of arms to the Republic,

Latin American governments’ decisions of whether and when to recognise the ultimately

successful Franco rebellion, Cárdenas’s condemnation of the rebels’ use of aerial

bombardments of civilian targets, and the Mexican decision to help the youngest victims

of the civil war and then to throw its doors open to thousands of Republican refugees

were all scrutinised in Latin America by members of both the Right and the Left, who saw in these decisions potential reverberations in their own countries.

Mexican Bullets

In August and September of 1936, Bernardo Reyes, Mexico’s chargé d’affaires in

Asunción, Paraguay, reported on the increasingly hostile attitude of the Paraguayan press

towards Mexico. Catholic newspapers and weeklies attacked the Cárdenas government,

claiming that Mexico was intervening in the recently-commenced Spanish Civil War in

clear contravention of the Estrada Doctrine and the Política del Buen Amigo.239 The

attacks became so vehement that in September, Paraguayan President Rafael Franco

closed the Catholic daily newspaper Rumbos because of its “injurious” articles on the

Mexican sale of arms to Republican Spain.240 Rafael Franco had come to power as head

of the Partido Revolucionario Febrerista earlier that year, and US Minister to Paraguay,

Findley B. Howard, commented that prior to the overthrow of the Liberal government of

Eusebio Ayala, the young Bernardo Reyes’s description of his nation’s Revolutionary

doctrines and procedures became so pointed that Paraguayan authorities considered

239 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, August 23, 1936. 240 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, September 19, 1936. 101

requesting his recall. Apparently, Rafael Franco’s insurrection, in part attributable to the

effects of the Revolutionary propaganda disseminated by Reyes, prevented this action.241

The Argentine Minister to Paraguay, Rodolfo Freyre, was a critic of Reyes’s activities,

claiming in a confidential letter to Argentine President Agustín P. Justo that the Mexican

Minister was a notorious Communist, who aided his Paraguayan “coreligionaries” in

indoctrinating and mobilising the youth of that country.242

Grandson of the Porfirian Governor of the State of Nuevo León, nephew of the

renowned writer and diplomat Alfonso Reyes, and the eldest son of Rodolfo Reyes (who

was in exile in Spain), the young Bernardo took after his distinguished uncle rather than

his more conservative grandfather and father.243 He was intensely active in Asunción,

founding the Asociación Cultural Paraguay-México, the Asociación de Prensa

Revolucionaria, and the Asociación Amigos de la Revolución Mexicana. He made radio

broadcasts, and distributed propaganda to workers’ and students’ groups. Minister

Howard reported these activities at first with amusement, but then amazement.244

Bernardo Reyes became associated in diplomatic circles and the popular mind with the new Rafael Franco government, and Cárdenas’s position on the Spanish Civil War gave

Paraguayan opposition groups an avenue by which to criticise both the Mexican envoy

and the Leftist policies he represented, as well as the Rafael Franco regime itself.

241 United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59 (RG 59), Box 4110, 712.34/2, Howard to Secretary of State, May 14, 1936. 242 Argentina, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Sala VII, Fondo Agustín P. Justo, Volúmen 3253, Expediente 1936, Rodolfo Freyre to Justo, August 27, 1936. 243 Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil, 36-37, 112, 121-122. Rodolfo Reyes became an ardent franquista, a thorn in the side of the Mexican Embassy until the end of the Spanish Civil War, and eventually a member of the intelligentsia in Franco’s Spain. 244 United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/2, Howard to Secretary of State, May 14, 1936. He was truly amazed by Bernardo Reyes’s challenge of Camilo Pérez Uribe to a duel (see Chapter Two). 102

Following the establishment by the Spanish Republic of the First Basque

Autonomous Government in Bilbao in October, reports reached the Americas that

Republican supporters in the city had scheduled the Paraguayan Consul for execution following the discovery of correspondence with the insurgents in the diplomatic pouch.245 Reyes immediately cabled the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs from

Asunción to ask that the Mexican Consul in Bilbao intercede on behalf of his ill-fated

Paraguayan counterpart and ask the Republicans for clemency.246 These efforts were in

vain, and Consul Martínez Arias was executed on November 20, precipitating a storm of

controversy in Asunción.

Despite the Mexican attempt to save the consul, its association with the

Republican cause was such that it too met the ire of Paraguayans. Reyes reported that reactionary forces in Paraguay claimed that because the Mexican government had sold arms to Spain, it was in effect Mexican bullets that had killed him.247 These opposition groups planned a protest against Mexico and its Spanish policy and Leftist groups planned to answer this attack on Mexico with counter-protests. Reyes feared the duelling protests would lead to violence between the opposing forces in the streets of Asunción.248

Mexican Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay counselled him to do everything in his power to prevent both of the protests from occurring. He suggested that Reyes attempt to convince

245 The Austrian Consul was similarly charged. New York Times, November 21, 1936, 2. Also see, “Claim 2 Consuls Slain as Rebel Spies in Spain,” Chicago Daily Tribune, November 30, 1936, 1. 246 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, November 18, 1936. 247 T.G. Powell describes a similar rhetorical link in Portugal, from whence Daniel Cosío Villegas sent home a political cartoon showing “a hydrophobic-looking Spanish ‘Red’ murdering several non- combatants with a gun marked ‘from Mexico.’” T.G. Powell, “Mexico,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936- 39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, eds. Mark Falcoff and Fredrick B. Pike (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 62. 248 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, November 25, 1936. 103

the Paraguayan government that, aside from harming Mexico’s reputation, the demonstrations might lead to the intensification of fascism in Asunción, and that suspending the acts would be in Paraguay’s interest, more than in that of Mexico itself.249

The mobilisations were accordingly suppressed by Rafael Franco’s government, which

Reyes reported maintained the utmost admiration for President Cárdenas, and was categorically against allowing any attacks against Mexico.250

Prevented from demonstrating against the Cárdenas government in the streets, the

Paraguayan opposition took their case to the press. The vitriolic articles they produced even reached Argentina, where a number of Paraguayan exiles, including the ousted

President Ayala, had fled after the February uprising. The attacks met ready reception in

Catholic newspapers of Buenos Aires such as Crisol, and Ambassador Alfonso Reyes was forced to defend both his nephew and Mexico’s Spanish policy in the Argentinean press.251 Both nephew and uncle periodically rectified articles that appeared in the two nations’ newspapers, and the Paraguayan Foreign Ministry continued to support Bernardo

Reyes’s position. Nevertheless, subsequent reports from US Minister Howard suggest that the young chargé d’affaires’s activities, and the policies he represented, continued to serve as a lightning rod in Asunción.252

The Paraguayan case provides an indication of the extent to which the Spanish

Civil War and Mexico’s support for the Spanish Republic became a part of the political

249 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, telegram from Hay to Bernardo Reyes, November 26, 1936. 250 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, telegram from Bernardo Reyes to Hay, November 18, 1936. 251 For examples from Crisol (Buenos Aires) and Ahora (Buenos Aires), see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III- 766-3; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10. 252 See United States, NARA, RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/3, Howard to Secretary of State, October 29, 1936; RG 59, Box 4110, 712.34/4, Howard to Secretary of State, November 25, 1936. 104

landscape of Latin America, shaping Mexico’s relations with governments and

individuals in the region.253 Members of the Left and the Right clearly associated the

Republican cause with the Mexican Revolution and Cárdenas, and the actions of his

diplomats served to enhance these popular links. The Paraguayan example also

demonstrates how these issues crossed national boundaries in the region. With the

influence of the media, events in one place could easily affect domestic political opinion in a neighbouring country. It is within this context that the government’s diplomacy

surrounding the Spanish Civil War must be seen. One of Cárdenas’s principal goals in

supporting the Spanish Republic and loudly imploring the rest of the international

community to do the same was to enshrine in the international system the principle of

non-intervention. This would help his own cause if domestic political opponents

attempted a comparable uprising in Mexico.254 The story of his government’s relations

with Latin America sheds light on one of the ways he and his diplomats attempted to

achieve this—by garnering support from Latin America and Latin Americans.

Attack of the Exiles

While Mexican diplomacy was assailed verbally in Paraguay, in a startling

counter-example that underscores the shifting locations of Latin American reactions to

the Spanish Civil War, the diplomatic missions of Guatemala and El Salvador in the

253 For more on the Paraguayan reaction to the Spanish Civil War and the participation of Paraguayans in the conflict, see Víctor M. Martínez and Tomás Vera, Milicianos paraguayos en la España republicana y en la lucha contra la ocupación nazi de Francia (Asunción: QR Producciónes Gráficas, 2002). 254 Ojeda Revah, México y la Guerra Civil, 23. 105

Mexican capital were physically assaulted.255 The Liberal regimes Shortly after midnight on November 11, 1936, four Salvadoran students in Mexico City—Pedro Geoffrey Rivas,

Ricardo Jiménez Castillo, Julio Fausto Fernández, and Antonio Afura—and a Cuban student named Antonio Mirán Dopicio boarded a taxi at the corner of Calle Cuba and Av.

Brasil heading for Av. Berlín, the location of the Salvadoran legation. While the taxi driver waited for them at the corner, the young men threw an explosive through the window of the legation at Berlin 19. Rather than allow them back in his taxi, Desiderio

Rivera Vásquez delayed their escape until the police arrived to investigate, whereupon the four Salvadoran men were arrested for the crime. Half an hour later, the Guatemalan

Embassy at Salamanca 55 was also attacked by a group of men who arrived by car and threw an explosive through the window. In this case the vandals sped away, delaying their capture. Neither assault caused extensive damage, but the staffs of the diplomatic missions (and the rest of the diplomatic corps) were shaken by the incidents. Octavio

Reyes Spíndola, in his capacity as Head of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived at the missions in the middle of the night to assure Salvadoran Minister Antonio

Álvarez Vidaurre and Guatemalan Ambassador Manuel Echeverría y Viduarre that the attacks were being taken seriously by the Mexican government, which would prosecute the perpetrators of the attacks to the full extent of the law, and Mexican Foreign Minister

Hay visited the diplomatic missions the following day to reiterate this message. Reports of the incidents quickly filled the pages of newspapers throughout Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador and the initial flurry of coverage was extended when, on November 18,

255 The following summary is based upon the reports and relevant newspaper clippings contained in AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-333-8. 106

the police arrested a Guatemalan exile named Luis Sánchez Romero and charged him

with the attack on his country’s embassy.

The first newspaper articles on the attacks reported that the Salvadoran

perpetrators had confessed that they committed the crime to protest their government’s

recognition of Franco’s rebel government at Burgos.256 The dictatorial regimes of

Maximiliano Hernández Martínez and Jorge Ubico had wasted no time in recognising the

Spanish insurgency, drawing the ire of Leftist citizens of El Salvador and Guatemala who

had already fled the repression of their native countries and immigrated to Mexico as

political refugees. Reactions to this incident from the Guatemalan and Salvadoran press, as well as the diplomatic corps, are indicative of transnational Latin American reactions

to the Spanish conflict and the Mexican government’s position on the war.

The majority of the newspaper articles that appeared in the Salvadoran press

immediately after the attacks on the missions were based on information supplied by the

Mexican Minister to El Salvador (also accredited to Nicaragua), Manuel Y. De Negri,

who had flown to San Salvador with copies of Mexican newspaper articles on the

events.257 The Salvadoran papers gave full coverage of the story as it unfolded and

openly discussed the fact that the young men arrested for the crime purported to be

making a political statement about their government’s recognition of Franco. In his

telegram to the Salvadoran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister Antonio Álvarez

256 “Detalles completos de los atentados a las legaciones de El Salvador y Guatemala,” Diario Latino (San Salvador), November 14, 1936. 257 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-333-8, De Negri to Hay, November 17, 1936. 107

Vidaurre stated that all of the men were communists,258 and the newspapers revealed that

two of the four Salvadoran youths had recently been in Spain and carried safe conduct

documents issued by the Generalitat de Catalunya.259 Guatemalan Ambassador Manuel

Echeverría y Viduarre initially assumed that the four Salvadoran youths had also been

responsible for the attack on the Guatemalan Embassy, going so far as to say that he

believed neither Mexicans nor Guatemalans could have been responsible for the act; the

Mexican people had demonstrated nothing but sympathy for his country, and although some of the Guatemalans resident in Mexico were estranged from their government, they

were all honourable.260 Beginning November 12, Guatemalan newspapers ran United

Press stories on the attacks, the perpetrators of which, it was reported, were all members

of the Frente Popular Español.261 El Liberal Progresista editorialised that the attacks

served as a warning that, if they failed in Spain (as appeared imminent), communist

agitators would attempt to implant their ideas in Latin America.262 El Imparcial published an article that originally appeared in Excélsior that stated that the Salvadoran youths were members of a foreign organisation called the Federación Anarquista Ibérica, which counted no less than 200 members in Mexico, and called for the expulsion of

258 “Los Edificios De La Embajada De Guatemala Y De La Legación De El Salvador En México Sufrieron Atentados,” La Prensa (San Salvador), November 14, 1936, 1. 259 “Detalles completos de los atentados a las legaciones de El Salvador y Guatemala,” Diario Latino, November 14, 1936; “El Atentado Anarquista,” Diario Nuevo (San Salvador), November 14, 1936. 260 “Detalles completos de los atentados a las legaciones de El Salvador y Guatemala,” Diario Latino, November 14, 1936; “Primeros Detalles Gráficos del Atentado Contra la Embajada de Guatemala y el Salvador,” El Imparcial (Guatemala City), November 16, 1936, 1. 261 “Nuestra Embajada y la Legación Salvadoreña en México, Sufren Atropello,” El Liberal Progresista (Guatemala City), November 12, 1936. 262 “Lamentable Incidente en México,” El Liberal Progresista, November 12, 1936. 108

foreign agitators from the country.263 Upon the arrest of the José Luis Sánchez Romero,

the Guatemalan papers immediately began impugning his character. Although he too had

confessed to attacking the mission to protest the recognition of Franco by his

government, this was not highlighted by the Guatemalan press, which after delving into

public records, portrayed him as a common criminal who had stolen from and abused his

grandmother. El Imparcial concluded that he had fled his dishonourable life in

Guatemala for Mexico, where he was now passing himself off as a persecuted idealist.264

Although it was reported that Sánchez Romero claimed to have suffered persecution in

Guatemala because he was a communist and a member of an organisation called the

Unión de las Repúblicas Centroamericanas,265 the papers seemed to delight instead in

recounting his alleged relationship with a prostitute named Blanca Clondesa, whom he

had abandoned at a brothel in Guatemala when he quit the country.266

Although the Salvadoran newspapers also published photographs and were

critical of the perpetrators of the damage to their country’s legation, the Guatemalan press

clearly outdid them in their discrediting José Luis Sánchez Romero. Government control

of the media in Guatemala was particularly tight, and the newspapers were considered by

Mexican representatives there to be government mouthpieces.267 It was essential to the

Ubico regime that they discredit Sánchez Romero and, by association, his cause. The

263 “Extranjeros perniciosos en México, Un editorial de Excelsior sobre el atentado contra la embajada,” El Imparcial, November 20, 1936. Also see the editorial from El Universal (Mexico City), which was published in Guatemala under the title “Extranjeros Perniciosos,” El Imparcial, November 21, 1936. 264 “Complicado en el atentado a la embajada,” El Imparcial, November 23, 1936. 265 “Como fue atrapado en México el terrorista Sánchez Baten,” El Imparcial, November 25, 1936. 266 “Personalidad delincuente de Sánchez Romero,” Nuestro Diario (Guatemala City), November 23, 1936, 9. 267 AHGE, SRE, Archivo de la Embajada de México en Guatemala (AEMGUA), Legajo 13, Expediente 6, Eduardo Espinosa to Emilio Portes Gil, January 4, 1935. 109

implication was that only social degenerates would question the dictator’s decision to

recognise the equally tyrannical Franco regime at Burgos. In the wake of the incident,

Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus had reported to the

Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Guatemalan coverage of the attack had not

been unfriendly towards the Cárdenas government.268 Nevertheless, by linking the cause

of the Republic with anti-social behaviour, the articles would have served to further

discredit the Mexican government’s Spanish policy in the neighbouring country.

Foreign Minister Hay emphasised in his comments to the press, and in his official

communications with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan foreign ministries and missions,

that none of the perpetrators were Mexican citizens, and that he was pained by the fact

that individuals to whom the Mexican government had extended its hospitality would

abuse it by perpetrating these crimes against the diplomatic missions of friendly

nations.269 His statement suggests that he was trying to shift the blame for the incidents

onto the foreign governments that had been attacked and absolve the Mexican

government of responsibility for the actions of the unruly political émigrés who, it might be implied, were responding to the reactionary policies of their own governments. The members of the diplomatic corps, on the other hand, felt that regardless of the men’s political motives or their governments’ policies, the perpetrators had to be severely

268 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-333-8, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, November 30, 1936. 269 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-333-8, telegram from Hay to Salvadoran Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Araujo, November 12, 1936; “Hubo un atentado contra a Legación salvadoreña en México,” Diario Nuevo, November 14, 1936; “Secretario de RR.EE. de México lamenta el atentado contra la Legación Salvadoreña,” El Diario de Hoy (San Salvador), November 14, 1936; “Mensaje del Ministro de Relaciones de México Sr. Hay,” Diario Latino, November 14, 1936; “El Gobierno de México Manifiesta Su Sentimiento Por el Atentado a Las Legaciones de Guatemala y El Salv.”, Patria (San Salvador), November 14, 1936. 110

punished to prevent future attacks on foreign missions, and believed the Mexican government had not prosecuted the men to the full extent of the law as Reyes Spíndola had promised Echeverría y Vidaurre and Álvarez Vidaurre in the wee hours of the morning on November 11. Chilean Ambassador to Mexico, Manuel Bianchi, was outraged when, days after their arrest, the convicted men were fined 500 pesos and released from jail.270 He suggested to the dean of the diplomatic corps, who happened to

be Guatemalan Ambassador Echeverría y Vidaurre, that they meet to discuss the

“impunity” they believed the attackers had received in the Mexican courts. Presenting a

united front, the diplomatic corps nominated US Ambassador Josephus Daniels to present

their concerns to Foreign Minister Hay.271 A month later, Bianchi reported that the

presiding judge in the case, David Pastrana Jaime, who had made comments to the press

to the effect that the attack on the Salvadoran Legation had been “a symbolic act,” was

transferred to Baja California, apparently on the direct orders of President Cárdenas.

Nevertheless, the perpetrators remained on the streets of Mexico City, and Bianchi stated

that Foreign Minister Hay had suspended meetings with members of the diplomatic corps

for two weeks in a demonstration of his displeasure at its members’ intervention in the

matter.272

The Mexican judge’s comments to the press suggest that he may have

sympathised with the men who had attempted to set fire to the Salvadoran Legation and

the Guatemalan Embassy to protest their governments’ recognition of Franco, and his

270 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1505, Bianchi to Ministro, November 28, 1936. 271 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1505, Copia del acta de la sesión celebrada por el curpo diplomático el día veinticuatro de noviembre de mil novecientos treinta y seis. 272 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1505, Bianchi to Ministro, December 19, 1936. 111

statements legitimised their violent form of protest. The members of the diplomatic corps, on the other hand, were concerned with the rule of law in the city and their own safety.

By exiling the judge to Baja California, Cárdenas demonstrated his support for the diplomatic representatives resident in Mexico, but Hay’s pettiness suggests that he would brook no criticism of the Foreign Ministry’s handling of the affair. Implicit in his refusal to meet with diplomatic representatives was Hay’s agreement with the judge that the

“symbolic acts” of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan exiles were a result of their own governments’ misguided policies; his condemnation of the Spanish policies of Jorge

Ubico and Maximiliano Hernández Martínez was understood in his reaction.

The attacks on the Salvadoran Legation and the Guatemalan Embassy and the responses they met in the press of El Salvador and Guatemala, the Mexican government, and the Mexican diplomatic corps demonstrate the range of reactions the Spanish Civil

War prompted in Latin America. That Central American exiles in Mexico City would attack their own diplomatic missions to protest their governments’ recognition of Franco with near impunity, creating conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic corps, suggests the transnational reverberations of Cárdenas’s policies. While the violent reactions of these “degenerate” émigrés only strengthened the Guatemalan and

Salvadoran governments’ belief in the righteousness of their attitudes towards the

Spanish conflict and further isolated the Mexican government from its neighbours, it bound more tightly the causes of Spain and Mexico in the popular and diplomatic mind.

Furthermore, the incident demonstrates that diplomatic missions were spaces of 112

contestation, where the Latin American reactions to Mexican diplomacy would continue play out throughout the Spanish Civil War.

Representing the Republic

Spanish Republican organisations sometimes met at Mexican embassies and

legations in Latin America, thereby presenting their conservative critics with further evidence of the communist conspiracies they imagined. As Bernardo Reyes and other

Mexican diplomats discovered, they walked a fine between supporting the legitimately

constituted government of Spain and its allies and risking accusations of interference in

the internal affairs of the countries to which they were accredited. In their official

capacities, members of the Mexican Foreign Service did all they could to support the

Republican government, often taking charge of the archives of Spanish embassies and

legations. Following the outbreak of hostilities, many Spanish diplomats who were

sympathetic to the insurgency resigned in order to show their support, while others

remained in their posts and undermined the government they ostensibly represented. As a

result, the Republican government asked Mexican diplomats to represent Spanish

interests, sometimes for extended periods, in Panama, Peru, and several other Latin

American countries.273 In February 1937, Ambassador Alfonso Reyes telegraphed

273 Mexican diplomatic reports indicate that “traitorous” Spanish diplomats operated in Panama and Peru, among other locations. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-6; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-8. On the Peruvian reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Thomas M. Davies, Jr., “Peru,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 203-244; Willy Pinto Gamboa, Sobre fascismo y literatura: La Guerra Civil española en La Prensa, El Comercio y La Crónica, 1936-1939 (Lima: Editorial Cibeles, 1983); Gerold Gino Bauman, Extranjeros en la Guerra Civil Española: los peruanos (Lima: Industrial Gráfica, 1979). 113

Foreign Minister Hay to inform him that the Spanish Ambassador in Buenos Aires had

asked him to request that the Mexican government take charge of the archives of the

Spanish legation at Montevideo, Uruguay.274 Since the Uruguayan government’s

September 22, 1936 suspension of relations with the Republican government following

the violent deaths of the sisters of Uruguay’s Vice-consul in Madrid,275 the legation’s

archives had been in the charge of “fascist diplomats.”276 The Republicans intended to

send a representative loyal to their cause to Montevideo and wanted to prevent the

archives from going directly from fascist to loyalist hands, and proposed that Mexico’s

Minister Luis Padilla Nervo transfer the documents from one group to the other.277

Assured of Mexican diplomats’ support, this was the type of delicate diplomatic mission the Republican government entrusted to its closest allies, but in fact Padilla Nervo’s

assignment became much greater: he and his successors at Montevideo represented

Spanish interests there until the Uruguayan government’s recognition of Franco in

February 1939.278

Like their government, members of the Spanish colony in Latin America also

believed that the Mexican government should represent their interests when their own

274 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-766-3, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, 19 February, 1937. 275 Both the Mexican chargé d’affaires in Montevideo, Antonio Méndez Fernández, and the Uruguayan Minister to Mexico, Hugo V. de Pena, informed Foreign Minister Hay of the suspension of relations. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Méndez to Hay, 22 September, 1936; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III- 769-1, de Pena to Hay, September 30, 1936. By contrast, eight Colombian nationals were killed by Republicans in October 1936, but the Liberal government of Alfonso López Pumarejo did not break relations with the Republican government, undoubtedly because it was much more sympathetic to the Republic than its Uruguayan counterpart. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-4. On the Colombian reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see David Bushnell, “Colombia,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 159-202. 276 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-766-3, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, 19 February, 1937. 277 Luis Padilla Nervo went on to become Foreign Minister during the presidency of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958). For his personnel file see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-6. 278 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Minister Manuel Y. De Negri to Hay, March 5, 1939. 114

diplomats failed them. In November 1936, several members of the Spanish colony in San

José, Costa Rica presented themselves confidentially at the Mexican legation, following

the resignation of Spain’s Minister Gonzalo de Ojeda y Brooke, to ask chargé d’affaires

Salvador Martínez de Alva to take over their representation.279 Although Martínez de

Alva did not take over Spanish interests in the country, it is significant that these members of the Frente Popular Español would immediately think to ask the Mexican legation for assistance. When Antonio de la Villa Gutiérrez arrived in October 1937 to take up the post of Consul General in San José at the direction of the Republican government, the Costa Rican government did not accept his credentials, preferring to recognise neither the Republic nor the insurgency, thereby maintaining “strict neutrality” in the conflict and calm in the Spanish colony in San José.280 As a result, the Mexican

legation became an unofficial representative of Republican interests in the country.281 On

April 14, 1937, the Anniversary of the Second Spanish Republic, another group of

Spanish Leftists visited Martínez de Alva, this time to express their gratitude for Mexican

Minister to the League of Nations Isidro Fabela’s defence of the Spanish Republic in that

forum.282 Fabela’s note to the Non-Intervention Committee was reprinted in newspapers throughout the world, and it elicited substantial comment in the Latin American press.283

279 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Martínez de Alva to Hay, November 4, 1936. 280 “El Gobierno no reconocerá las letras patentes ni extendera el exequatur al nuevo Consul General del Gobierno de Valencia,” Diario de Costa Rica (San José), October 26, 1937. 281 On the Costa Rican reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Angel María Ríos Esparíz, Costa Rica y la Guerra Civil Española (San José: Editorial Porvenir, 1997). 282 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Martínez de Alva to Hay, April 15, 1937. 283 Also in celebration of Fabela’s pronouncement, the Comité de Amigos de México en el Uruguay was formed at a meeting of the Círculo Republicano Español in Montevideo. “Amigos de Mejico en el Uruguay,” La Tarde (Montevideo) May 4, 1937. On Isidro Fabela and Mexico’s defence of Spain in the League of Nations, see Isidro Fabela, Cartas al Presidente Cárdenas (Mexico City: Altamira, 1947); Isidro Fabela, La Política Internacional del Presidente Cárdenas 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1975); 115

On this occasion, Martínez de Alva offered the Spaniards cocktails and talked with them

for several hours. Given the space devoted in the press to Fabela’s pronouncements, there

may have been a shared sense of excitement at this social gathering, where the like-

minded expatriates celebrated the cause that brought them together. Nevertheless, when

members of the Spanish colony next met at the Mexican legation in December 1938, the war seemed almost lost. As winter approached, their thoughts turned to providing relief

to the civilian population, and they aimed to organise a fundraising campaign. Before

allowing them to hold the meeting at the legation, the new chargé d’affaires, Romeo

Ortega, was careful to ask permission of the Costa Rican President, who sent a delegate

to watch over the proceedings, presumably to ensure that the Mexican representative was

not stepping outside the bounds of diplomatic protocol.284 After Franco’s victory in April

1939, the Grupo Pro-República Española of San José gave Ortega a letter thanking

President Cárdenas for his “exemplary and tireless aid to Spain.”285 The Mexican

government’s assistance had not prevented the fall of the legally constituted government

of Spain; Cárdenas’s representatives throughout Latin America shared with the Spanish

colony the triumphs and the eventual defeat of the Republic.

By associating themselves so closely with Leftist members of the Spanish colony,

Mexican representatives often opened themselves up to criticism in conservative circles

and in the press. Not all were as careful or as diplomatic as Romeo Ortega. In Venezuela,

the conservative regime of Eleazar López Contreras had requested the recall of chargé

Fedro Guillén, Fabela y su tiempo (Mexico City: UNAM, 1989); Fernando Serrano Migallón (ed.), Con certera visión: Isidro Fabela y su tiempo (Mexico City: FCE, 2000); Fernando Serrano Migallón, Isidro Fabela y la diplomacia mexicana (Mexico City: SEP, 1981). 284 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Ortega to Hay, December 8, 1938. 285 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-5, Isidro Perera and Ricardo Nimo to Cárdenas, May 15, 1939. 116

d’affaires José Rendón y Ponce after he published a letter in April 1938 that criticised the

Venezuelan government for both recognising Franco and inviting his representative to a celebration in honour of Simón Bolívar. Although his ejection was related more to the

Venezuelan government’s reaction to Mexico’s oil expropriation, the representative’s incautious public condemnation of Venezuela’s Spanish policy assured his prompt removal.286

Most diplomats knew better than to openly criticise the governments to which

they were accredited, but it was often difficult to draw the line between supporting the

Spanish Republic and running the risk of being accused of interference in internal affairs,

especially given the polarising effect the Civil War had on Latin American society. In

July 1937, Mexico’s representative in Managua, Nicaragua, Pablo Campos Ortiz, was

instructed not to distribute pro-Republican propaganda, including the book No pasarán,

without the prior authorisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The book’s authorship

is not mentioned, but given the date, it may have been by Octavio Paz, Upton Sinclair, or

another pro-Republican author.287 This may have been overly cautious, but his

predecessor, Carlos Baumbach, had been transferred to Santiago after the Nicaraguan

government complained about his distribution of “Leftist” propaganda in the capital,

which he claimed had all been supplied to him by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

Mexico, but which the Nicaraguans nevertheless found objectionable.288 The propaganda

286 See Chapter Four. November 20, 1937 marked the founding in Venezuela of the Sociedad de Amigos de España y México. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-2. 287 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-768-5, SRE to Campos Ortiz, July 9, 1937. 288 Upton Sinclair, ¡No pasarán! (They Shall Not Pass): A Story of the Battle of Madrid (Mexico City: Editorial Masas, 1937); Octavio Paz, ¡No pasaran! (Mexico City: Simbad, 1936). See Baumbach’s 117

distributed by Baumbach and other diplomats usually included pamphlets and books on the Mexican Revolution, its ideological bases, and its accomplishments, as well as information on the Cárdenas government’s defence of Spain.289 As Bernardo Reyes had discovered in Paraguay, these were tracts thought in some circles to spread revolution in

Latin America. Moreover, because domestic political groups differentiated themselves on the basis of their positions on the Spanish Civil War, non-Spanish members of pro-

Republican groups sometimes spoke out against their governments at their meetings.

Mexican diplomats could not be seen to be encouraging criticism of the governments to which they were accredited, and on the instruction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs they often had to decline invitations to these festivals, banquets, and meetings. Padilla Nervo reported from Montevideo in August 1937 that at a thousand-strong ceremony of the

Comité de Comerciantes e Industriales Pro Ayuda al Gobierno Democrático Español, which he had declined to attend, invited speakers who were members of the Uruguayan opposition had criticised the Uruguayan government.290 For Padilla, this underscored the importance of maintaining some distance from pro-Republican groups, despite his obvious sympathy for their cause and, he implies, the Uruguayan opposition. As Alfonso

Reyes had predicted, the Spanish question soon became a matter of domestic politics, not only in Argentina, but throughout the region.

personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-3-1 (III), Baumbach to Hay, December 8, 1936. Baumbach’s radio broadcasts, entitled “Noche Mexicana,” were also suppressed. 289 See for example the first issue in the Cuadernos Populares series, México y la Guerra de España (Mexico City: Verdad de España, n.d. [1938?]). Reproduction of original in the University of California, San Diego Library, Spanish Civil War Collection, microfilm reel 23, item 935. 290 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-769-1, Padilla Nervo to Hay, August 19, 1937. Padilla Nervo’s report includes related newspaper clippings and a copy of a memorandum by a member of the Spanish legation in Montevideo who attended the event. 118

Culture as Politics

By praising the Spanish Republic—or Mexico’s efforts to support it—domestic

political groups in countries with more conservative governments were in effect

criticising their own governments. These conflicts were often played out in both elite and

popular culture during this period. In everything from elite book launches to sensationalist radio plays, Latin American reactions to Mexico’s Spanish policy were at issue. After attending Alberto Vaccarezza’s play Lo que pasó a Reynoso at the National

Theatre in Buenos Aires in the company of the Spanish Ambassador to Argentina,291

Alfonso Reyes feared repercussions when, during his ovation, the playwright thanked in the same breath both former President and Radical Party leader Marcelo T. de Alvear and

Reyes for their attendance. Associating his name with that of the head of the Argentine opposition might give the impression of his support for Alvear and lead to accusations of his interference in domestic politics.292 No wonder, then, that Reyes avoided mixing too

much in society; even when attending cultural events that fed his intellectual pursuits he

ran the risk of embroiling himself in domestic Argentine concerns. In his memorandum

on the heads of foreign missions at Buenos Aires for 1937, British Ambassador Sir

Esmond Ovey described Reyes as an amicable individual who rarely attended official

entertainments because of his studious nature. As for Reyes’s politics, Ovey said that he

was not sure: “I should imagine that his communism, if it exists, is rather of an

intellectual than violent character.” 293

291 The Argentine poet and playwright’s production was later adapted for the screen (directed by Leopoldo Torres Ríos, 1937 and directed by Leopoldo Torres Ríos, 1955). 292 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, July 13, 1936. 293 United Kingdom, National Archives, Foreign Office (FO) 371/21412, Ovey to Eden, February 3, 1938. 119

Ambassador Reyes certainly wished the demands of the Foreign Service were

fewer, in order that he might dedicate himself more completely to literature, but he also

avoided some events for political reasons; Reyes was prevented from attending several

meetings on Spanish themes and conferences organised in favour of Mexico during 1936.

In one example, the Alianza de Intelectuales Antifascistas para la Defensa de la Cultura paid homage to Cárdenas’s Spanish policy at the Teatro Rivera Indarte in Córdoba on

November 20, 1936. Reyes was concerned that the invited speakers—including prominent individuals such as former Ecuadorean president José María Velasco Ibarra,

Benito Marianetti, José Peco, Arturo Orzábal Quintana, Deodoro Roca, Reginaldo

Manubens Calvet, Gregorio Bermann, Juan Lazarte, Sergio Bagú, and José María

Lunazzi—would openly criticise the Justo government, so in order to avoid prejudicing

Mexico’s relations with Argentina he declined to attend, using as a plausible excuse his preparations for the upcoming Conferencia Interamericana para la Consolidación de la

Paz.294 Even if the event did not include any overt attacks against the government, he

reasoned, it in itself could be taken as a critique of the Justo regime. Although the police did not close down the huge meeting, Reyes’s fears were confirmed when Gregorio

Bermann, a tenured professor of psychiatry in the Faculty of Medicine at Córdoba, was

fired after helping to organise the event.295 This followed the expulsion of Professors

Orzábal Quintana and Aníbal Ponce for their participation in an event commemorating

294 AHGE, SRE, Archivo de la Embajada Mexicana en Argentina (AEMARG), Legajo 46, Expediente 4, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, November 4, 1936; AHGE, SRE, AEMARG, Legajo 46, Expediente 4, Hay to Alfonso Reyes, November 17, 1936. For clippings from Córdoba and Buenos Aires on the event, see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10. 295 AHGE, SRE, AEMARG, Legajo 46, Expediente 4, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, December 22, 1936. “Desde las Sacristías de San Ignacio se Mueve la Campaña Reaccionaria,” Crítica (Buenos Aires), December 21, 1936. For clippings see AHGE, SRE, III-766-3. 120

the death of García Lorca.296 The police in the capital subsequently prohibited all public

meetings in favour of Spain and Mexico.297 Even the organisers of the proposed

Argentine-Mexican Cultural Institute decided to delay the commencement of their

activities for fear of reprisals.298

Eventually, however, Alfonso Reyes’s own intellectual pursuits provided the

Spanish community with an opportunity to tie the Mexican ambassador to their cause.

Upon the publication of Reyes’s book Las vísperas de España by Victoria Ocampo’s press SUR in 1937, the Spanish colony in Buenos Aires organised a great celebration of his work.299 Many Spanish expatriate organisations joined together to form a special organising committee for the banquet they held in his honour on December 26, 1937 at

the Salón Casablanca.300 Attended by an audience of nearly three thousand—including

representatives of Argentina’s Congress, intelligentsia, labour movement, and press—the celebration, presided over by Spain’s chargé d’affaires Felipe Jiménez de Asúa and

Consul General Manuel Blasco Garzón, was a huge success. Although Las vísperas de

España dealt with Reyes’s experiences in Spain from 1914-1924 and did not specifically address the Spanish Civil War, his sympathies were clear in the names of the people he

296 AHGE, SRE, III-766-3, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, October 30, 1936. 297 “Se prohibe todo homenaje a España y a Méjico en la República Argentina,” La Nueva España (Buenos Aires), November 28, 1936. 298 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-10, Alfonso Reyes to Hay, November 13, 1936. 299 Alfonso Reyes, Las vísperas de España (Buenos Aires: SUR, 1937). Also see Hector Perea (ed.) España en la obra de Alfonso Reyes (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1990). 300 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV). Publicity for the event dated December 1937 found in Alfonso Reyes’s personnel file states that it was organised by the Comisión Organizadora del Homenaje al Sr. Embajador de México Dr. Alfonso Reyes, which comprised the following organisations: Centro Republicano Español, Amigos de la República Española, Casa Catalá, Federación de Sociedades Gallegas, Agrupación Vasca Amigos República Española, Patronato Español de Ayuda a Víctimas Antifascistas, Sociedad Regional Valenciana “El Micalet”, Agrupación Asturiana de Ayuda al Gobierno Leal, Agrupación Portuguesa de Amigos de la República Española, Círculo Extremeño, Agrupación Soriana, Agrupación Leonesa, Casa de Galicia. 121

acknowledged in the preface: Manuel Azaña, Enrique Díez-Canedo, Juan Ramón

Jiménez, and others. Reyes said that the publication of his book was merely a “a grand explosion of love, enthusiasm, gratitude, and applause for Mexico’s international conduct.” His arrival and his speech met with ¡Vivas! to Mexico from the entire auditorium.301 Although he may have put the banquet in this light out of modesty (or to please Foreign Minister Hay), the suppressed homages to Spain and Mexico of the previous year suggest that Buenos Aires’s leftists had found a way around these bans by lauding Alfonso Reyes’s writing. Moreover, it seems that the banquet had the desired effect of celebrating Mexico’s support of the Spanish Republic, thereby contrasting it to the attitude of the Argentine government and implicitly criticising the conservative regime.302 Only four blocks away, a pro-fascist banquet was being held in honour of

Franco’s representative in Buenos Aires, Eugenio Montes, the conservative Catholic

Spanish writer who had helped found the Falange. Mounted police and forty additional officers on foot were stationed outside the Casablanca to ensure that the duelling literary events did not disturb the peace.303 Although hostilities did not break out, the politically-

301 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV), Alfonso Reyes to Hay, December 27, 1937. Several newspaper clippings accompany this report. 302 On the Argentine reaction to the Civil War, see Mark Falcoff, “Argentina,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 291-348; Academy of Sciences of the USSR, “Argentina,” in International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic, 1936-1939, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 31-39; Beatriz J. Figallo, Diplomáticos y marinos argentinos durante la crisis española: los asilos de la Guerra Civil (Buenos Aires: Histórica, 2007); Beatriz J. Figallo, La Argentina ante la Guerra Civil Española: el asilo diplomático y el asilo naval (Rosario: Pontifica Universidad Católica Argentina, 1996); Ernesto Goldar, Los argentinos y la guerra civil española (Buenos Aires: Editorial Contrapunto, 1986); Víctor Trifone and Gustavo Svarzman, La repercusión de la guerra civil española en la Argentina (1936- 1939) (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1993); Dora Schwarzstein, “Actores sociales y política inmigratoria en la Argentina. La llegada de los republicanos españoles,” Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos 12:37 (Dec., 1997): 423-445; Dora Schwarzstein, Entre Franco y Peron: Memoria e Identidad del Exilio Republicano Española en Argentina (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001). 303 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70 (IV), Alfonso Reyes to Hay, December 27, 1937. 122

charged atmosphere created by the celebration of Alfonso Reyes’s work demonstrates the

extent to which the homage was indeed a proxy for the commemoration of the Spanish

Republic, and the role that Reyes, as a representative of the Cárdenas government, had

played in supporting it.304 By extension, the participants also criticised outgoing

President Justo’s hostility to the Republic and the ideas that it and the Mexican

Revolution stood for.

Although the example of the reception given in honour of the publication of Las

vísperas de España is particularly salient, the Republic’s supporters did not confine

themselves to the use of literature in promoting their cause and celebrating Mexico’s

support. Intellectuals and activists also used a broad range of media, including radio, to

get their message across to working people throughout the Americas. President Cárdenas

had condemned Nationalist aerial bombardments of civilian populations in his address to

the first congress of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM), held in

Mexico City in February of 1938.305 He called upon the workers of the world to unite in

their condemnation of these atrocities and his words were reprinted in newspapers and

broadcast on radios throughout the region. Sympathetic intellectuals, including Cuba’s

Nicolás Guillén and Alejo Carpentier, immediately cabled their support of Cárdenas’s

304 See Victor Díaz Arciniega (ed.), Misión diplomática, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2001); Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), Alfonso Reyes y el llanto de España en Buenos Aires (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998); Eduardo Robledo Rincón, Alfonso Reyes en Argentina (Buenos Aires: Embajada de México, 1998); María Cecilia Zuleta Miranda, “Alfonso Reyes y las relaciones México-Argentina: proyectos y realidades, 1926-1936,” Historia Mexicana XLV:4 (1996): 867-904. Also see Fred P. Ellison (ed.), Alfonso Reyes en Brasil (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 2000); Francisco Valdés Teviño, La diplomacia mexicana: cancilleres y embajadores de Nuevo León (Monterrey: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, 2001). 305 “Discurso del Presidente de la República ante el Primer Congreso Nacional de la Confederación de Trabajadores de México. México, D.F., 24 de febrero de 1938,” Palabras y Documentos Públicos de Lázaro Cárdenas vol. 1 (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1978), 277-281. 123

pronouncement, and the reactions of organised labour throughout the region were also

particularly strong.306 One of the reasons that this support reached such heights, despite

Latin American governments’ disinclination to support Cárdenas’s statement, was the

dissemination of the message in popular culture.

Many governments were reticent to support Cárdenas’s declaration because of his

call for the unification of Latin American workers. The Ministry of Foreign Relations

forwarded copies of the speech to Ambassadors and Ministers in Latin America with

instructions that it be given “maximum publicity” in each country.307 In Guatemala,

owing to government control of the press, Ambassador Cienfuegos y Camus had great

difficulty fulfilling this request. He met with Guatemalan Foreign Minister Skinner Klée

to obtain his permission to publish the speech, but the Minister refused. Although the

government and the citizenry as a whole were opposed to attacks on civilian populations,

he reasoned that encouraging Guatemalan workers as a group to censure the aerial

bombardments might “provoke class war” by elevating one sector of society against

others. Guatemala did not have a significant working class such as that of Mexico, he

reminded the Ambassador; its workers did not have the same needs or importance to

society.308 Workers in similarly unindustrialised Nicaragua, on the other hand,

306 Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo Presidentes, Fondo LCR (AGN, LCR), Caja 456, Expediente 433/178, telegram to Cárdenas from members of the Liga de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios (LEAR) then resident in Paris, February 26, 1938. 307 AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 11, Expediente 1, telegram from Hay to Cienfuegos y Camus, February 24, 1938. 308 AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 11, Expediente 1, memorandum by Skinner Klée, February 28, 1938. 124

immediately supported Cárdenas’s proposal following its publication in their country.309

They offered their unqualified cooperation to Mexican workers, declaring that in a time of such brutality and universal catastrophe, Cárdenas’s declaration filled them with pride.310 When faced with official intransigence, supporters of Cárdenas and the Republic

disseminated the message among workers and other members of the public as best they

could, securing space in the publications of workers and the Spanish colony when they

could not get printed in large daily newspapers. Another innovative strategy they

employed, at least in one interesting case, was radio drama.

. The Mexican Minister in La Paz, Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, forwarded a copy

of a Bolivian radio play written both to laud and publicise Cárdenas’s condemnation of

aerial bombardments to the foreign ministry.311 Written by René Carrasco Bustillo, the

play told a fictional story of a Spanish family’s experience of the bombardment of their

small town in Spain. As the grandfather of the family and his cronies listened to

Cárdenas’s speech to the CTM over Spanish radio and discussed politics, Nationalist bombers approached the town. The mother of the family was out doing the shopping and was caught in the street during the bombardment. In an emotional portrayal of the

Spanish tragedy, the grandfather and the woman’s four children cry in anguish when they see her lifeless body on the sidewalk as they run for the town’s bomb shelter. The play

309 “El discurso trascendental del Presidente Cárdenas,” La Prensa (Managua), February 27, 1938; “Propone El Presidente Cárdenas Un Congreso Mundial De Trabajadores,” Novedades (Managua), February 26, 1938; “Grandes Voces del Día,” La Noticia (Managua), February 26, 1938. 310 AGN, LCR, Caja 456, Expediente 433/178, Nacional Sindicalismo Nicaragüence to Cárdenas, February 28, 1938. 311 AGN, LCR, Caja 458, Expediente 433/280. Ernesto Hidalgo forwarded a copy of the play, which had been received by the Mexican Legation in Bolivia, to the Office of the President on June 1, 1938. 125

ends with the question “In times such as these, what civilised man will not join in

President Cárdenas’s humanitarian protest?”

Highly pathetic in tone and rather sensationalist in nature, the radio play aimed to entertain. Its message also rang clear and true, and on March 7, 1938, the Confederación

Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia and the Bolivian Partido Obrero resolved to support

Cárdenas’s declaration. When he forwarded a copy of the resolution to President

Cárdenas, the secretary of the Bolivian legation in Mexico, Carlos Dorado Chopitea, informed him that Mexico’s voice could be heard by all of Latin America.312

Re-broadcasts of Cárdenas’s speech, and Carrasco Bustillo’s radio play were examples of how new media could disseminate the news so that it reached workers and other members of the public who might not have attended a literary event such as that offered in honour of Alfonso Reyes. At both ends of the cultural spectrum, supporters of the Republic and Mexico deployed culture in their battle to defend the loyalist government of Spain. Intellectuals and activists’ efforts in this regard also influenced the diplomatic stage as workers helped keep the issue of aerial bombardments on the agenda.

Cárdenas condemned aerial bombardments again at the inauguration of the September

1938 Congreso Internacional Contra La Guerra,313 and at the VIII Pan American

Conference held in Lima, Peru, the Mexican government proposed a Convention Relating to the Prohibition of Aerial Bombardments. Prior to the meeting, and in order to make sure the convention would pass, Mexican diplomats throughout the region were charged

312 AGN, LCR, Caja 458, Expediente 433/280, Carlos Dorado Chopitea to Cárdenas, April 26, 1938. 313 “Discurso del Presidente de la República en el Acto de Inauguración del Congreso Internacional Contra la Guerra. México, D.F., 10 de septiembre de 1938,” Palabras y Documentos Públicos, 321-326. 126

with the responsibility of sounding out the governments to which they were accredited.

The Mexican chargé d’affaires in Santiago solicited and received the unwavering support

of the Chilean government.314 In this way, the efforts of diplomats dovetailed with those

of activists and workers who had kept this humanitarian issue on the agenda through the

use of the culture.

Niños de España

The classic example of Mexico’s humanitarian aid in the Civil War is certainly

Cárdenas’s celebrated acceptance of tens of thousands of Spanish Republican refugees.

Although the emphasis has been on the intellectual contributions that the more prominent refugees made to Mexican society,315 this policy also had a significant effect on Mexico’s

relations with Latin America, particularly as it related to Mexico’s reputation among

intellectuals, Leftists, and Spanish immigrants in the region. The coordinated effort to

find asylum for thousands of Republicans had roots in Mexico’s earlier acceptance of

Spaniards fleeing their war-torn society, including the famous niños de Morelia, and by

the end of the war the Mexican government played an established role in co-ordinating

the evacuation of refugees that raised its reputation among sympathetic individuals and

groups throughout the region.

314 Chile, MRE, AGHD, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1698 A, Memorandum No. E 9/173. 315 Sebastiaan Faber, Exile and Cultural Hegemony: Spanish Intellectuals in Mexico, 1939-1975 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002). See especially the literature on the founding of the Casa de España en México, which became El Colegio de México. Clara E. Lida, José Antonio Matesanz, Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, La Casa de España y el Colegio de México: memoria, 1938-2000 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2000); Clara E. Lida and José Antonio Matsanz, El Colegio de México: una hazaña cultural, 1940-1962 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1990); Clara E. Lida, La Casa de España en México (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1988). 127

Gabriela Mistral expressed admiration of the Cárdenas government’s humanitarian assistance to Spain. The illustrious Chilean author, who went on to win the

Nobel Prize in literature in 1945, was heart-broken by what she deemed “the shameful deafness” of both Latin American and European governments toward the tragedy taking place in Spain.316 Mistral, “the teacher from the Valley of Elqui,” began her career as an

educator and wrote extensively on this theme, as well as composing poetry and lullabies for children.317 She wrote that the Mexican government’s assistance to victims of the

Civil War “soothed her American conscience,” and was thankful that Daniel Cosío

Villegas, then Mexico’s Minister to Portugal, had arranged for ten Spanish teachers to leave for Mexico.318 She wished her own country were as generous, and was particularly concerned about the fate of the many children affected by the conflict.319 After the fall of

Bilbao in June 1937, Mistral wrote to celebrated Argentine author Victoria Ocampo to

propose that SUR, the press Ocampo had recently founded, publish the manuscript of

verse she had just completed.320 Mistral explained that she wanted the proceeds of the

316 Reprinted in Elizabeth Horan and Doris Meyer (eds.), This America of Ours: The Letters of Gabriela Mistral and Victoria Ocampo (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 45. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria Ocampo, July or early August, 1937. 317 Marie-Lise Gazarian-Gautier, Gabriela Mistral: La maestra de Elqui (Buenos Aires: Crespillo, 1973), translated as Gabriela Mistral, the teacher from the Valley of Elqui (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1975). Gabriela Mistral’s Ternura (Madrid: Saturnino Calleja, 1924) is the most famous example of her writing for children. 318 Horan and Meyer, This America of Ours, 44. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria Ocampo, January 24, 1937. Although Mistral does not mention Cosío Villegas by name in this passage, it seems clear that he is the “friendly minister” to whom she referred. She is even more explicit in her praise of Cosío Villegas in her letters to Alfonso Reyes. Luis Vargas Saavedra (ed.), Tan de usted: epistolario de Gabriela Mistral con Alfonso Reyes (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1991). Also see Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), Daniel Cosío Villegas y su misión en Portugal, 1936-1937 (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998); Enrique Krauze, Daniel Cosío Villegas, una biografía intelectual (Mexico City: Tusquets, 2001); Daniel Cosío Villegas, Memorias (Mexico City: Joaquín Mortiz, 1976). 319 On the Chilean reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Paul W. Drake, “Chile,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 245-290. 320 Horan and Meyer, This America of Ours, 48. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria Ocampo, August 4, 1937. 128

book to go to the Basque refugee children in the Residencia Pedralbes in Barcelona.

Scathing in her critique of the indifference with which Latin America met the plight of

these children, Mistral aimed to do her own small part to help them.

Our America, blinded by political fanaticism, has crossed its arms. Except Mexico, which has accepted 6,000 and is going to receive more. My Basque Chile, Hispanophile Peru, and the rest of our people have pretended to not know what’s going on.321

Although she would have preferred for the children to be able to stay in Spain, the social

dislocations of the war were tremendous, and after the book’s publication in 1938, she

wrote to Ocampo that, although she had intended the proceeds for a Spanish orphanage,

she believed the money had to go to those children wandering in the Pyrenees.”322 The fall of Barcelona in January 1939 had forced the children to move once again.

The book of poems Gabriela Mistral published with SUR in 1938 was Tala, a collection that is clearly rooted in the experiences she had travelling in the Americas and

Europe.323 In the front matter, Mistral acknowledges the shame she felt on behalf of the

passive Latin American governments that refused to aid in the plight of the Spanish

children who had been “scattered to the four winds.” She confessed shame at the inaction

of the Latin American nations.324 Coming from the moral den mother of Latin America,

this was strong criticism indeed. By contrast, Mistral dedicates the book to Mexico. She

had begun her journeys there in 1922 at the invitation of Minister of Education José

321 Ibid. 322 Horan and Meyer, This America of Ours, 88. Gabriela Mistral to Victoria Ocampo, early February 1939. 323 I thank Gordon Brotherston, who suggested Tala to me as source for this chapter. Gabriela Mistral, Tala (Buenos Aires: SUR, 1938). 324 Ibid. 129

Vasconcelos, and the influence the country and its Revolutionary process had on her is

most appreciable in the poem “El maíz,” but references to Mexico and its pre-Hispanic

past pervade the American section of the collection.325 Mistral was clearly moved by the

example Mexico had set for the rest of Latin America, and her words surely touched her

many readers, particularly her ardent followers in Latin American educational circles

who, like her, were concerned for the youngest victims of fascist aggression in Spain.

Mistral’s decision to use the profits from Tala to help Spanish children in this way was undoubtedly influenced by the example Cárdenas had set by welcoming the niños de

Morelia to Mexico. These homeless and orphaned children arrived in Veracruz in June of

1937, two months before Mistral wrote to propose that Ocampo publish Tala.326 The

Latin American press’s celebration of the arrival of nearly five hundred Spanish children in Mexico and the welcome they received in President Cárdenas’s home state of

Michoacán is evidence of the positive propaganda such humanitarian initiatives created.

Before arriving at Veracruz, Mexique, the ship that carried the children, docked in

Havana, where it met with a huge demonstration of support for the Republic and for

Mexico’s Spanish policy. In his monthly report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

325 See Guillermo Lagos Carmona (ed.) Gabriela Mistral en México (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1945); Luis Mario Schneider, Gabriela Mistral: itinerario veracruzano (Xalapa: Biblioteca Universidad Veracruzana, 1991); and Puebla y otras acuarelas Mexicanas (Puebla: Secretaría de Cultura: Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, 2002). Tala also includes “Mar Caribe” about Puerto Rico, and “Dos himnos a don Eduardo Santos” entitled “Sol del trópico” and “Cordillera.” Mistral was a correspondent for many Latin American newspapers, including Eduardo Santos’s El Tiempo. Santos was one of Mistral’s confidants, and it is likely that this is one of the reasons that her long-time friend and companion Palma Guillén was posted to Colombia at the beginning of 1935 (see Chapter Two). Santos was elected and inaugurated as President of Colombia while Tala was in production. See Otto Morales Benítez (ed.), Gabriela Mistral: su prosa y poesía en Colombia 3 vols. (Bogotá: Convenio Andrés Bello, 2000). 326 Dolores Pla Brugat, Los niños de Morelia: Un estudio sobre los primeros refugiados españoles en México 2nd ed. (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1999); Elena Jackson Albarrán, “Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen, 1920-1940” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2008), 267- 283. 130

Mexican Ambassador to Cuba Alfonso Cravioto said that the local radio station La Voz

de las Antillas organised a collection for the Spanish children. The Cuban government

prohibited the disembarkation of the children to protect them from the masses of people

who had gathered to welcome them, but civil and military authorities sent numerous gifts aboard, and La Voz de las Antillas entrusted Cravioto with a truck-load full of provisions

and a cheque for four hundred dollars, which he delivered to the head of the expedition in

the presence of the Spanish chargé d’affaires in Cuba.327 The comments in the Cuban

press were also overwhelmingly positive. When José Ignacio Rivero Alonso, the Second

Conde del Rivero and director of Havana’s most important newspaper, El Diario de la

Marina, ran an editorial criticising the Mexican gesture as an example of “Bolshevik”

propaganda, claiming that the children were orphans of non-combatant and Nationalist

parents who had been murdered in Madrid by the Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists

who now used them in their publicity stunt, the rest of the country’s dailies jumped to

Mexico’s defence.328 Cravioto wrote to the paper asking for a retraction, and although he received one that stated that the Diario de la Marina had nothing but sympathy for the

Spanish children and Mexico’s noble gesture, the controversy signals that members of the

Right attributed Mexico’s support for the Republic to Communism.329 Nevertheless,

sympathetic Cuban papers continued to report on the journey of the niños de Morelia after their brief stop at the port of Havana, feeding the public’s interest in their welfare.330

Ceferino Cago González, a worker from Cayo Mambí in the Province of Oriente, sent a

327 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Cravioto to Hay, July 3, 1937. This report includes clippings on the niños de Morelia from Cuban newspapers. 328 “Insidia Bolsheviki,” Diario de la Marina (Havana), June 4, 1937. 329 “La inmunda propaganda roja y los huerfanitos españoles,” Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1937. 330 See for example, “¡Bendito sea México!,” Federación (Santa Clara), June 26, 1937. 131

lottery ticket to the Embassy in the hope that if it paid out the winnings could contribute

to the children’s maintenance in Morelia.331 At a lecture Eugenio Tena Ruiz of the

Mexican Embassy gave at the Centro Republicano Español, the diplomat returned a cheque for two thousand dollars its members had given the Embassy to send to Mexico because, as Tena explained, the Mexican government had already committed to provide for the children, but there were thousands of orphans still in Spain who needed their assistance.332 The Mexican initiative was so well received that the Asociación Auxilio al

Niño del Pueblo Español was formed in Havana in November of 1937, with the express aim of following the Mexican example and bringing a similar group of children to Cuba.

The Association gave up this goal after the outbreak of war in Europe, but continued

raising money to provide humanitarian assistance to Spanish children thereafter.333 Just as the Cárdenas government’s actions had influenced Gabriela Mistral, they encouraged groups of Leftists and Spanish immigrants in Cuba and throughout the Americas to organise on behalf of the defenceless children who suffered because of the Civil War.334

The membership of the Cuban Asociación Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español

overlapped significantly with that of another group, the Amigos del Pueblo Mexicano,

and several prominent members of Cuban society, including Emilio Roig de Leuschering,

who published the literary magazine Social and corresponded with Mexican intellectuals

331 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Cravioto to Hay, July 3, 1937. 332 Ibid. 333 The committee’s articles of association were filed with the Cuban government that November. Cuba, Archivo Nacional Cubano (ANC), Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00209, Expediente 004948. 334 On the Cuban reaction to the Civil War, see Alistair Hennessy, “Cuba,” in The Spanish Civil War, 1936- 39: American Hemispheric Perspectives, 101-158; Academy of Sciences of the USSR, “Cuba,” in International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic, 1936-1939. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975. 132

such as Alfonso Reyes, were members.335 In his virulent attack against the Mexico in the case of the niños de Morelia, Conde del Rivero had charged that the Comité de Auxilio al

Niño del Pueblo Español excluded from its definition of the pueblo all non-Marxists and anarchists.336 The conflict between pro-Republican groups and organisations of the Right became so intense in the Cuban capital that both the Centro Republicano Español and the

Falange Española, which comprised Havana’s franquistas, were suppressed by presidential decree in December 1937.337 Rivero would have known that the Comité de

Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español, as well as the Centro Republicano Español and other

Leftist organisations, shared membership with the Mexican cultural society, confirming his suspicions regarding the Mexican government’s “Bolshevist” tendencies. This pattern played out time and again in the rest of Latin America, where the connections between the Mexican government’s Spanish policy, the writings of prominent authors, and the activities of citizens groups were equally clear. These links encouraged far-reaching

335 Fernando Ortíz and Eddy Chibás were also members of the Asociación Auxilio al Niño del Pueblo Español. On the incorporation of the Amigos del Pueblo Mexicano, of which Cuban Minister of Education Salvador Massip was also a member, see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00331, Expediente 009782. Also see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-29-1 (I), Cravioto to Hay, 2 April 1936. Ironically, in this report Cravioto also informed the department of a recent trip Rivero took to Mexico and the series of “enthusiastic” articles he wrote for the Diario de la Marina, and called him “an excellent friend of our country.” For the Círculo Republicano Español see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00302, Expedientes 8761-8763. For the Ateneo Socialista Español see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00250, Expediente 006740. For the Amigos de la República Española see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00278, Expediente 007805. For Roig’s correspondence with Alfonso Reyes see Cuba, Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana, Fondo Emilio Roig de Leuchsering, Legajo 472, Expediente 109 – Alfonso Reyes (México). 336 “La inmunda propaganda roja y los huerfanitos españoles,” Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1937. 337 Cuba, ANC, Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00302, Expedientes 8761-8763. Presidential decree No. 3411, December 3, 1937. The Brazilian government also closed Spanish Republican centres in Rio de Janeiro in November 1937, but this may have been part of Getúlio Vargas’s far-reaching crack-down on foreign organisations. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-3, Ambassador José Rubén Romero González to Hay, November 30, 1937. On the Brazilian reaction to the Spanish Civil War, see Ismara Izepe de Souza, Inventário DEOPS, Módulo IV, espanhóis. República Espanhola: uma modelo a ser evitado (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial São Paulo, 2001); José Gay da Cunha, Um brasileiro na guerra espanhola (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria do Globo, 1946). 133

support for the Spanish Republic and Mexico’s Revolutionary government among Leftist

intellectuals and citizens of the Americas, and drew the hostility of the Right.

Conclusion

After returning to Mexico City at the beginning of 1938 upon the conclusion of

his diplomatic post in Argentina, Alfonso Reyes became the first president of the Casa de

España en México, which Daniel Cosío Villegas founded to house the exiled Spanish

Republican academics that he hoped would go on to contribute so much to Mexico’s

intellectual development.338 Reyes played the male equivalent of Gabriela Mistral’s role as mother in absentia; they fulfilled these functions for the writers, teachers, students, workers, and Republican exiles of Latin America. When Gabriela Mistral’s Chile eventually uncrossed its arms and opened them to Spanish Republican exiles, it was a result of the diplomatic efforts of Pablo Neruda: a boat-load of refugees aboard the

Winnipeg found asylum in the native land of these two Latin American Nobel Prize laureates. Ultimately, the Latin American reactions to the Mexican Spanish policy changed not only in response to the course of the war in Spain, but also in relation to

developments in the domestic political conditions of each country.

The mass migration of Republican exiles was co-ordinated with the help of

representatives from several other Latin American countries, and the Mexican

338 Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), Ayuda a los republicanos españoles: correspondencia entre AlfonsoReyes y José Puche, 1939-1940 (Mexico City: El Colegio Nacional, 2004); Alberto Enríquez Perea (ed.), Alfonso Reyes en la Casa de España en México (1939 y 1940) (Mexico City: El Colegio Nacional, 2005). Alfonso Reyes published two volumes of Spanish literary criticism in these years. Alfonso Reyes, Capítulos de literatura española 1a serie (Mexico City: La Casa de España en México, 1939); Alfonso Reyes, Capítulos de literatura española 2a serie (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1945). 134

government made overtures to each of them, asking that they too accept refugees from

Spain.339 Not surprisingly, some governments rejected Cárdenas’s calls for help in

resettling the refugees. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Guatemala explained why his

country would not accept Spanish Republican refugees or aid the Mexican government in

pressuring Roosevelt to provide for their transportation to Mexico in November 1940.

Ubico did not oppose humanitarian assistance per se; he only declined to support this

particular initiative regarding the Republican refugees because it might harm his relations

with the United States, or create a “labour problem” in his own country.340 This last

comment had paramount importance because it indicated that domestic political

considerations regarding the organisation of labour—that forces on the Latin American

Right identified with the Spanish Republic and the Mexican Revolution—continued to

influence Mexico’s relations with the region after the conclusion of the Civil War and

until the end of the Cárdenas presidency in December 1940. The Republican refugees

were considered by conservatives to be “Red Spaniards” who would agitate workers in

the region. Cárdenas’s adversaries within Mexico voiced the same concerns, but the clamouring of conservative critics did not move the president. These fears did prevent many Latin American governments from joining his cause, except in cases where the

Spaniards’ labour was desperately needed, or when governments accepted Spanish

339 On Guatemala’s rejection of the proposal, see AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 12, Expediente 1, Martínez de Alva to Hay, June 25, 1940. The response from most governments in the region was rather tepid, and despite the notable exceptions of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela, where some Republicans emigrated, the vast majority settled in Mexico. Fagen, Exiles and Citizens, 39. 340 AHGE, SRE, AEMGUA, Legajo 12, Expediente 1, Gorostiza to Hay, November 22, 1940. 135

Republican exiles in pursuit of blanquismo.341 In the case of Chile, the evolution of domestic politics influenced a change in policy towards the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath.

The Mexican chargé d’affaires in Santiago, Pablo Campos Ortiz, reported to Hay

in March of 1939 that the Chilean Foreign Minister Abraham Ortega had assured him that

Chile would be “the last of the last” to recognise Franco.342 Ortega even consulted with

Campos Ortiz about whether it might be possible for Chile and Mexico to issue a joint

recognition of the defacto Spanish government; intransigent, the Cárdenas government

refused.343 The Chileans resolved to recognise Franco on April 5.344 One of the main reasons the Chilean government took this action was because seventeen Republicans had taken refuge in the Chilean embassy in Madrid and the Ministry of Foreign Relations had thought it would be easier to guarantee their safety if they established official relations

with Franco. These hopes soon turned out to be unfounded; the government at Burgos

rejected Chilean claims to the rights of asylum and refused to concede agreement for a

new Chilean representative to the Spanish government until they emptied their

embassy—an action that would have led to the near certain deaths of the refugees who

341 Blanquismo, or the desire to “whiten” the population with an influx of Spanish immigrants, apparently motivated the Dominican Republic’s Trujillo dictatorship, and caused the Panamanian government to express interest in the Republican refugees. Powell, “Mexico,” 85. 342 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Campos Ortiz to Hay, March 8, 1939. The Cuban government had initially stated that it would never recognise Franco either, and on February 10, 1939 Col. Fulgencio Batista made a statement to that effect in the Mexican Congress, during his 1939 visit to Mexico. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-172-25. Nevertheless, Cuba recognised Franco before Chile. See the Informes Políticos Suplementarios of the Mexican Embassy in Havana for 1939, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-13-4 and AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-6. For the Cuban government’s justification see the Libro Gris it published upon recognising Franco. 343 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 1, 1938. 344 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 6, 1938. 136

had claimed asylum.345 In the days following the outbreak of the military insurgency, the

Chilean embassy had harboured multitudes of Nationalist sympathisers, and neither

Ortega, the Chilean press, nor the diplomatic corps could believe that the Franco government would not guarantee the Republicans’ safe passage in return. Although

Ortega confidentially told the new Mexican Ambassador to Chile, Octavio Reyes

Spíndola, that he had resolved to break relations with Spain,346 Franco beat him to the punch, ostensibly to protest insults to the Spanish government that were spoken at a rally of the Frente Popular in July.347 Nevertheless, Latin American support for Chile on the issue was nearly unanimous, and the Franco regime finally backed down in October

1940, freeing the refugees and renewing relations with Chile.348

Three months previous to the normalisation of Chilean-Spanish relations, Pablo

Neruda had arrived in the Mexican capital. Neruda had been stationed in Spain during the

Civil War, where he had been involved in the Liga de Escritores y Artistas

Revolucionarias (LEAR) to which many Leftist Spaniards and Latin Americans had belonged. Neruda had befriended García Lorca and other prominent intellectuals and his support for the Republic following the outbreak of the war is evident in his 1937 volume

España en el corazón. Neruda returned to Chile in 1937, but after the 1938 election which swept Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the Frente Popular to power, the new president sent him to France where he was responsible for the Chilean government’s effort to aid the Republican refugees. Aguirre Cerda’s policy towards Spain differed markedly from

345 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, memorandum by Ortega, May 27, 1939. 346 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-767-7, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, August 9, 1939. 347 Drake, “Chile,” 275. 348 See AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2400-17. 137

that of his predecessor Arturo Alessandri, and the Radical Party president counted

Gabriela Mistral as a personal friend. Second only to the Mexican government’s dramatic

efforts on behalf of Republican refugees, the voyage of the Winnipeg, by which 2,000

émigrés escaped the hardships of exile in France, has obtained mythic status in the

history of Spanish Republican exile in the Americas.349 Relations between Mexico and

Chile had warmed considerably since Aguirre Cerda’s election, and it is not surprising that Neruda’s next diplomatic post was as Consul General to Mexico, an appointment he held between 1940 and 1943.350 The position was not only intellectually enriching for

Neruda, who benefited from his associations with Mexican intellectuals and muralists and

the Spanish exiles at the Casa de España,351 but it also provided him further opportunity

to work with Mexican officials in forming a more united response to the Republican

defeat. It is possible that the Franco government had broken relations with Aguirre

Cerda’s government in an attempt to isolate Chile and Mexico from their Latin American

neighbours,352 but his actions actually had the opposite effect, legitimising Chilean—and by association Mexican—attitudes towards his government. Chile and Mexico’s

acceptance of Republican refugees gained favour in diplomatic, intellectual, and popular

circles as a result.

349 On the voyage of the Winnipeg see, Chile, Archivo Nacional de la Administración, Fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Volúmen 4179. 350 Alfonso Reyes mentioned in a letter to Gabriela Mistral that he and Neruda remembered her often. Vargas Saavedra, Tan de Usted, 128. Reyes to Mistral, October 11, 1940. On Neruda’s time in Mexico, see Fundación Pablo Neruda, Cuadernos “México en el Corazón,” no. 39 (1999); Manuel Lerín, Neruda y México (Mexico City: B. Costa y Amic, 1973); Hugo Méndez-Ramírez, Nueruda’s Ekphrastic Experience: Mural Art and Canto general (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1999); Vicente Quirate (ed.), Pablo Neruda en el corazón de México (Mexico City: UNAM, 2006). 351 On Neruda’s assistance to Davíd Alfaro Siqueiros following his attempted assassination of Leon Trotsky, see MRE, AGHD, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1918 A. 352 Drake, “Chile,” 276. 138

The Montevideo newspaper Uruguay published on March 4, 1937 an image representing the material and moral support Cárdenas’s Mexico offered the Spanish

Republican government during the Spanish Civil War. Standing on either side of the

Atlantic, a sombrero and serape-clad Mexican campesino offers his hand to a Spanish worker. Published under the heading “De América Llega,” it leaves open to interpretation what it was that was arriving from México…bullets, international volunteers, or perhaps boats to take to safety the victims of the war. The stereotypical picture of the campesino may have made the image of Mexico recognisable to South American audiences, but it caricatures and hence simplifies the complex methods by which the Mexican government supported the Republic. Nevertheless, that such an image would even appear in a

Uruguayan newspaper, long after the country had suspended relations with the

Republican government over the atrocities committed behind its lines after the beginning of the military insurgency, speaks to one of the ways in which the Cárdenas government sought to aid the loyalist government of Spain. Mexican diplomats worked to keep the cause alive for Spanish expatriates and Latin American Leftists during and after the

Spanish Civil War. Working together in diplomatic missions, cultural associations, and meeting halls throughout the region they employed a variety of media in furthering their aims. And although the Latin American reaction to the conflict, and Mexico’s response to it, varied over time in accordance with events on the military front in Spain and the political battlefield in Latin America, their efforts had a lasting effect on those who had participated in the effort. The Cárdenas government became firmly tied to the Spanish

Republican cause in the region, which influenced the way that people throughout Latin 139

America responded to the Mexican government and the Revolutionary goals and programmes it promoted as solutions to Latin America’s ills.

140

CHAPTER FOUR. SELLING THE OIL EXPROPRIATION OF 1938

By nationalising the oil industry, Cárdenas has reaffirmed, once again, his position as the true leader of the workers of the American continent. I am sure that, as has already occurred in Chile, the revolutionary organisations of South America are parading the image of our president in the streets, in spite of dictatorships that there prevail, to the cry of: “Cárdenas, precursor of the American Social Revolution!”353

Following a protracted labour conflict between Mexico’s petroleum workers and the US and Anglo-Dutch oil companies then operating in Mexico, President Lázaro

Cárdenas decreed the expropriation of these companies’ interests and created the national oil industry on March 18, 1938. Representatives of the expropriated companies immediately called foul and demanded the return of their properties. Cárdenas refused, instead offering indemnification. A national “redemption” campaign galvanised

Cárdenas’s supporters, even bringing some traditional adversaries such as the Catholic

Church into the fold. In the weeks and months that followed, the US government eventually recognised Mexico’s right to expropriation, much to the chagrin of Standard

Oil. Relations with Great Britain were, on the other hand, broken off by the Cárdenas government in May 1938 in response to His Majesty’s government’s intransigence. Faced with a boycott of Mexican petroleum products organised by the expropriated companies and enforced by US and British diplomats around the world, the newly-established

Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) fought to sell its oil in international markets so that it

353 Alberto Morales Jiménez, quoted in “El magisterio aplaude y apoya la política del Sr. Presidente,” El Nacional (Mexico City), March 23, 1938, 8. 141

could, in turn, finance the indemnification for which the expropriated companies clamoured.

Cárdenas’s announcement of the expropriation was greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm by workers, students, and members of Leftist political parties as far away as the southern cone: the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile forwarded their congratulations to President Cárdenas on March 22. Three days later, the Chilean Partido

Socialista wrote to Cárdenas, stating that his decision carried transcendent importance for all of Latin America. On March 29, a delegation from the Federación de Estudiantes de

Chile presented Mexican chargé d’affaires Pablo Campos Ortiz with letters of support for the president and the Federación de Estudiantes de México.354 In the days and months that followed, these sectors of the Chilean population continued to laud the Mexican example, both through acts of solidarity organised to commemorate the expropriation and within the context of their own struggles. Students marched carrying images of the

Mexican president, workers shouted ¡Vivas! to Cárdenas at rallies, and, during his campaign for leadership of Chile’s Frente Popular, Socialist Party leader Marmaduke

Grove stated that the party should adopt solutions to Chile’s problems based on examples provided by the Mexican Revolution.355 The newly-formed Asociación Amigos de

México paid homage to Mexico on March 30, attended by workers, students, politicians, and diplomats. When over a thousand people gathered on April 13 to commemorate the anniversary of the Spanish Republic, the ovations for Cárdenas were so long and loud

354 Copies of these letters from the Chilean Confederation of Workers, the Socialist Party, and the Federation of Chilean students are found in Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente LE 557. 355 “El pueblo conquistará hoy el poder municipal” Claridad (Santiago), April 3, 1938, 1-2. 142

that Campos Ortiz thought they could only have been superseded in Mexico itself. More

than sympathy, he believed that the intense and spontaneous response of the Chilean

people demonstrated a real enthusiasm for the Mexican cause that was not limited to the

popular classes.356 In the midst of an electoral campaign that ended with President Arturo

Alessandri unseated by the Leftist Popular Front coalition, the Chilean reaction to the

expropriation was particularly strong, and indicative of the overwhelmingly positive

response of popular groups throughout the Americas.

During the latter part of Cárdenas’s presidency, the expropriation and its

associated events served as a lightning rod for debates regarding the legitimacy of the

Cárdenas presidency’s claim to leadership in Latin America. Throughout the region—

which shared Mexico’s long history of economic exploitation, first at the hands of Iberian

colonisation and then through the economic imperialism of Great Britain and the US—

Mexico’s oil expropriation seemed to offer hope that Latin American nations could

reclaim their resources for the benefit their peoples. While workers, students, and

political parties hoped that it was the harbinger of social revolution, economic

nationalists saw Cárdenas’s action as an important and possibly exemplary act.

Conservatives and business interests challenged this broad consensus and declared the illegality of the expropriation, echoing the fury of the expropriated oil companies.

The oil expropriation received a great deal of attention in the press of the time,

and in its aftermath became the focus of longer works in English and Spanish either

condemning or defending Cárdenas’s act. Although some of these early works were

356 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 566, Campos Ortiz to Ramón Beteta, April 20, 1938. 143

propaganda efforts by either the expropriated oil interests or the Mexican government,357 the literature soon began to include less propagandistic accounts.358 Merrill Rippy, in the

front matter of Oil and the Mexican Revolution, quoted one of the perpetrators of the

early propagandistic tracts: Evelyn Waugh had gone to Mexico commissioned by Clive

Pearson (son of Weetman Pearson, Lord Cowdray) to complete a damning study of the

expropriation. He wrote that the expropriation may be examined through the analysis of

the conflicting propaganda issued by the two sides of the dispute.359 Although Waugh claimed to have used this method of analysis in composing his own propagandistic work, a subsequent generation of authors instead used his study, as well as those of the Mexican government and the Standard Oil Company, as evidence of the attitudes and behaviours

357 See for example, William E. McMahon, Two Strikes and Out (Garden City: Country Life Press Corporation, 1939), which was written by the head of the legal department of the Huasteca Petroleum Company. Standard Oil published The Present Status of the Mexican Oil “Expropriations” (New York: Standard Oil Company, 1940), which was countered by the defence of the expropriation produced by the Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP), La verdad sobre la expropiación de los bienes delas empresas petroleras [published in English as The True Facts About the Expropriation of the Oil Companies’ Properties in Mexico] (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1940). Standard Oil then responded with The Reply to Mexico (New York: Standard Oil Company, 1940). These works appeared along with a host of pamphlets and brochures with such titles as “The Illegality of the Executive Expropriation Decree of March 18, 1938.” The Mexican government also published in English and Spanish several speeches made in defence of the expropriation. See “The Mexican People and the Oil Companies,” from the 1938 speech delivered by Alejandro Carrillo at University of Virgina. Related to these are works by the former director of the PEMEX, Jesús Silva Herzog: Mexican expropriation (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938); Petróleo mexicano, historia de un problema (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1941); México y su petróleo, una lección para América (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1959).; La expropiación del petróleo en México (Mexico City: Cuadernos Americanos, 1963). 358 Harlow S. Person, Mexican Oil: Symbol of Recent Trends in International Relations (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1942). 359 Evelyn Waugh, Robbery under Law: The Mexican Object-Lesson (London: Chapman and Hall, 1939). Quoted in Merrill Rippy, Oil and the Mexican Revolution (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), v. This volume was first published in Spanish as “El petróleo y la revolución mexicana,” Problemas agrícolas e industriales de Méico 6:3 (Jul.-Sep., 1954). It was re-issued by the Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana in 2003. The 1954 edition included a translation of Waugh’s quotation. 144

of the actors.360 With time, even the laudatory publications PEMEX edited to commemorate successive anniversaries of the expropriation became more academic and less like nationalistic tracts.361 The subject of Mexico’s oil industry before and after expropriation became the object of study, and it is in this context that important works examining the international aspects of the expropriation emerged. The first, and standard, treatment of US-Mexican relations surrounding the oil expropriation was that of Lorenzo

Meyer, who later added a study of Mexican relations with Great Britain.362 Recent works have expanded the discussion of the international dimension of the oil expropriation, but most have followed Meyer’s tendency to focus upon Mexico’s relations with Great

Britain and the United States.363 Friedrich Schuler made a significant contribution to the literature by demonstrating the deftness with which the Mexican Foreign Service

360 See for example, Francisco Alonso González, Historia y petróleo: México en su lucha por la independencia económico. El problema del petróleo (Mexico City: Ediciones “El Caballito”, 1972); Miguel Alemán Valez, La Verdad del Petróleo en México 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Biografías Gandesa, 1977); José Domingo Lavín, Petróleo: Pasado, presente y futuro de una industria mexicana (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976). For an early example on the development of the oil industry after the expropriation see, J. Richard Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 1938-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956). 361 In 1958, PEMEX issued Los veinte años de la industria petrolera nacional: Informes del 18 de Marzo, 1938-1958, among other publications. To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the expropriation, PEMEX issued no less than twenty-five publications, including both original historical works and reprints. See for example, Lourdes Celis Salgado, La Inustria Petrolera en México. Una Crónica. 3 vols. (Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988). They also published the colouring book El Petróleo (Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988). 362 Lorenzo Meyer, México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917-1942 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1968); Su Majestad Británica contra la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950: El fin de un imperio informal (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1991). Also see, Lorenzo Meyer and Isidro Morales, Petróleo y nación (1900-1987). La política petrolera en México (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1990). 363 Catherine E. Jayne, Oil, War, and Anglo-American Relations: American and British Reactions to Mexico’s Expropriation of Foreign Oil Properties, 1937-1941 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000); Clayton R. Koppes, “The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil: A Reinterpretation,” The Journal of American History 69:1 (Jun., 1982): 62-81; María Emilia Paz Salinas, “La expropiación petrolera y el contexto internacional,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 50:3 (Jul.-Sep., 1988): 75-96; and for the period after the expropriation, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 145

responded to the boycott by exploiting the Italian, German, and Japanese oil markets.364

Nevertheless, there remains little comment in the literature on either the reception of the expropriation in Latin America or the Mexican attempt to open this market to expropriated oil.

In recent years, the development of Mexico’s oil industry has received renewed interest from historians.365 Some have studied the topic from entirely new perspectives, notably Myrna Santiago, whose environmental focus enabled her to re-examine the origins of the expropriation and the meaning it held for oil workers.366 Similarly, analysing the international dimensions of the expropriation from a different perspective sheds new light on these aspects of the expropriation. By examining the decree of March

1938 with reference to attempts to sell the expropriation to and in Latin America, the multiple meanings the oil controversy come into focus. Moreover, an analysis of the

Mexican press shows that these Latin American reactions in turn influenced domestic understandings of the expropriation.

364 Friedrich Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997). Also significant are those studies that examine the place of the expropriation in Mexico’s relations with France and the Netherlands: Denis Rolland, Vichy et la France Libre au Mexique (Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 1990); Rob van Vuurde, Los Países Bajos, el petróleo y la Revolución Mexicana, 1900-1950 (Amsterdam, Thela Publishers, 1997). 365 Jonathan C. Brown, Oil and Revolution in Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Ana María Serna, “Oil, revolution, and agrarian society in northern Veracruz: Manuel Peláez and rural life in the “Golden Lane”, 1910-1928” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2004); Joel Álvarez de la Borda, Los orígenes de la industria petrolera en México, 1900-1925 (Mexico City: PEMEX, 2005). Articles in the Boletín of the Archivo Histórico de Petróleos Mexicanos, also provide some indication of where the scholarship may be headed, and they also demonstrate the wealth of documentation available in this under- utilized archive. My thanks go to the director, Alberto García López for giving me a full run of the Boletín, and to the helpful staff who facilitated my research there. 366 Myrna Santiago, The Ecology of Oil: Environment, Labor, and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1938 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 7. 146

President Cárdenas’s announcement created the circumstances for one of the most important tests of the diplomacy of Mexico’s representatives in Latin America.

Henceforth, much of their time, energy, and resources would be devoted to supporting the president’s oil policy and justifying his decisions to their host governments. These efforts entailed selling the expropriation in two inter-related ways: first, through propaganda efforts in the region, and second, through attempts to create a market in Latin America for the newly-nationalized oil industry. This chapter analyses their attempts to explain the expropriation, first by examining the reception it received in the Latin American press; second, by discussing the reaction of Latin American governments and some of the difficult situations created by diplomats’ attempts to promote the expropriation; and third, by arguing that one of the strongest ways Latin American governments could support

Cárdenas’s decision was by purchasing “expropriated” oil. In some cases, oil contracts were indeed politically motivated, but in others the decision to purchase Mexican oil was made for economic reasons. In the latter, the effectiveness of the agents responsible for selling oil in the region made the crucial difference as to whether an expansion of the

Latin American market for oil would support the development of the industry Cárdenas created following the expropriation decree. Finally, the chapter examines the reflection of these Latin American reactions in the Mexican press and argues that Latin America’s response influenced domestic reception of the expropriation, creating points of unity among divergent factions on both ends of the political spectrum.

Selling the Expropriation to Latin America 147

The network of international newswires, radio broadcasts, and telegraph services

throughout the region ensured that news of the expropriation, announced the evening of

March 18, spread very quickly. Some Latin American papers carried stories on the events

as early as March 19. That day, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduardo Hay cabled

Mexico’s representatives abroad the full text of the expropriation decree and President

Cárdenas’s message to the nation, with instructions to publicise them as much as

possible, thereby launching the propaganda campaign in favour of Mexico’s oil

expropriation.367

Assisted by the recently-created (and short-lived) Departamento Autónomo de

Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP), Mexican diplomats waged a battle that varied in difficulty

according to the political climate of the countries to which they were posted. While some efforts were eagerly encouraged, as in Chile, elsewhere they were met with ambivalence or outright hostility. In general, students, workers, and politicians on the Left supported

Mexican diplomats in their propagandistic endeavours, but governments were much more

reticent, at times suppressing expressions of support of the expropriation,368 and in the

extreme example of Venezuela, requesting the recall of Mexico’s representative for his

alleged interference in the internal affairs of the nation.

The telegrams that Mexico’s representatives received March 19 were

characteristic of the propaganda strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: whenever

367 Some Latin American newspapers had carried articles on the dispute between the oil workers and the soon-to-be expropriated companies, but the expropriation nevertheless came as a huge surprise. See “Trabajadores mexicanos piden apoyo para su lucha contra las empresas petroleras” El Frente Popular (Santiago), March 16, 1938, 4. 368 See for example, AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 557, Martínez Mercado to Hay, June 14, 1938, on the cancellation by Argentine authorities of a conference organised by the magazine Correspondencia Indoamericana in Buenos Aires. 148

Cárdenas made a major pronouncement on the expropriation or an exchange of notes

occurred between Cárdenas and the US and British governments, diplomats were

expected to secure publication of these documents, in their entirety, in the major

newspapers of the countries to which they were accredited. This was also true of

Cárdenas’s other major policy pronouncements. In several cases, the expropriation decree

appeared alongside an article that printed Cárdenas’s strong condemnation of the March

12 German annexation of Austria, giving his foreign and domestic policies congruence.

Although coverage of the expropriation in the Mexican, English, and US press has

been analysed in detail by Alicia G. de Backal, there exists no comparable study of the

Latin American press.369 A thorough survey of the reports and clippings forwarded to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Mexican diplomats in the region, as well as full runs of

several newspapers of identified importance in the region, indicates that on balance the

reaction was overwhelmingly positive. Editorialists for papers of diverse political

viewpoints from Costa Rica to Argentina mused on the transcendent importance of the

expropriation,370 while—as might be expected—Catholic weeklies and conservative

papers such as Crisol condemned it as an example of Mexican communism.371

Censorship of the press in some countries meant that diplomats were not free to editorialise on the expropriation and sometimes had difficulty getting fair treatment of

369 Alicia G. de Backal, La expropiación petrolera vista por la prensa mexicana, norteamericana e inglesa (1936-1940) (Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988). 370 “A México y al Presidente Cárdenas les daremos siempre nuestro apoyo moral,” Diario de Costa Rica (San José), March 29, 1938; “Méjico Está Señalando a América el Camino de su Independencia Económica,” Fastrás (Buenos Aires), March 21, 1938. 371 “Actividades comunistas en México,” Crisol (Guatemala City), May 8, 1938; “Técnicas comunistas en México,” Crisol, June 19, 1938. This Guatemalan paper was linked to the paper of the same name in Buenos Aires, providing evidence of the network of Catholic conservative opponents to the Cárdenas regime in Latin America. 149

Mexican news. For example, Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus

reported that Cárdenas’s presidential message, the expropriation decree, and the British

and Mexican notes were published under headings that indicated that they were bulletins

from the Mexican Embassy, thereby disassociating the newspapers from the opinions

expressed therein.372 Similarly, the chargé d’affaires in Honduras, Eduardo Espinosa,

charged that because the newspapers all had some “secret link” to the interests of the

United Fruit Company that prevented them from reporting freely on Mexican events, they

printed only official bulletins from the legation to satisfy those who pulled the strings of the Honduran press.373 Even in Chile, Campos Ortiz had difficulty securing the

publication of these statements: engulfed in a hotly contested electoral campaign, the

directors of Santiago’s dailies simply did not have space to publish the texts, despite their

sympathy.374

As a result, diplomats deployed the multi-pronged strategy that they had

developed in dealing with criticism of alleged persecution of Catholics in the early years

of the Cárdenas presidency. They distributed literature explaining the government’s

position, such as La verdad sobre la expropiación de los bienes de las empresas

petroleras.375 They gave innumerable speeches to a wide variety of public audiences on

the theme of the expropriation. They arranged goodwill flights by Mexican pilots

372 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 27, 1938. 373 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Espinosa to Hay, April 30, 1938. 374 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 565, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 16, 1938. 375 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605, Ernesto Hidalgo to the chargé d’affaires in Lima, June 12, 1940. A copy of this book was also found in Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto (MRECIC), Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3984, Expediente 3, Tomo III. 150

throughout Latin America.376 They encouraged the organisation of cultural associations such as the Sociedad Cuauhtémoc of Guatemala and the Cuban group Amigos del Pueblo

Mexicano.377

Diplomats made extensive use of the new mass media, using transmissions of both commercial and public radio broadcasts throughout the region. Mexico’s new

Ambassador to Guatemala reported in December of 1938 that because the major dailies in Guatemala City were published in the evening, most people had already heard the

news on their radios at least twenty-four hours before events received comment in the

press.378 As Mexico’s neighbours, Guatemalans and Cubans could hear broadcasts directly from Mexico, so in addition to Mexican music and soap operas, they may have heard propaganda meant for domestic consumption, such as the radio spots on “The Oil

Question” produced for the weekly national broadcast, the Hora Nacional.379 In addition, diplomats organised series of concerts and lectures for broadcast on Latin American radio stations.380

376 On the goodwill flight of Antonio Cárdenas and his reception in Buenos Aires see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 4-29-12. 377 On the incorporation of this association, which included such distinguished members as Emilio Roig de Leuschering see, Cuba, Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Fondo Asociaciones, Legajo 00331, Expediente 009782. Interestingly, the membership of this organisation overlapped significantly with Spanish Republican associations. 378 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 20-2-13 (II), “Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de diciembre de 1938,” Salvador Martínez de Alva to Hay. 379 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605, Alfonso Pulido Islas of the DAPP to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 22, 1939. On the development of radio in Mexico see Joy Elizabeth Hayes, Radio Nation: Communication, Popular Culture and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920-1950 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000); and Philip L. Barbour, “Commercial and Cultural Broadcasting in Mexico,” Annals of the American Academy of Political Social Science 208 (March 1940): 94-102. Also see, James Schwoch, The American Radio Industry and Its Latin American Activities, 1900-1939 (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1990). 380 “Dos Grandes Conciertos de las Radio Emisoras TGWA y XEW,” Acción (Guatemala City), September 4, 1938, 3. 151

Film also played an important role in disseminating ideas about the expropriation.

Campos Ortiz reported in April that Santiago’s cinemas had begun to exhibit United

States newsreels showing the demonstrations that had occurred in Mexico in support of the expropriation and audience members of all classes shouted ¡Vivas! when Cárdenas appeared on the balcony of the National Palace.381

The chargé d’affaires also made full use of the series of films produced by the

DAPP promoting the accomplishments of the Mexican Revolution and the Cárdenas

government. In the act of homage held by the Asociación Amigos de México in Santiago

on March 30, the meeting began with a showing of the DAPP film La Construcción

Socialista en México, and when Cárdenas appeared on the screen the entire audience

burst out in spontaneous applause.382 Shortly after the expropriation, the DAPP produced two films entitled La Nacionalización del Petróleo and México y su Petróleo, copies of

which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to its diplomats.383 Unfortunately, like

previous DAPP productions, these films were sent on a diplomatic circuit, where

Ministers and Ambassadors would show them as propaganda and then forward them to a

neighbouring country for exhibition. This caused chargé d’affaires in Argentina Salvador

Martínez Mercado to complain that he had not been able to exhibit the films widely

because he had received them five months after they had left Mexico, by which time most

cinemas in Buenos Aires considered them out of date, having already shown newsreels

381 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 566, Campos Ortiz to Beteta, April 20, 1938. 382 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 566, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 6, 1938. “Los trabajadores de Chile saludaron ayer a la Revolución Mexicana,” Claridad (Santiago), March 31, 1938, 1. 383 Chargé d’affaires in Cuba Octavio Reyes Spíndola asked for funds from the DAPP to film the act of homage to Mexico held in Havana June 12, 1938. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-1248-8, telegram from Reyes Spíndola to Hay, June 9, 1938. 152

covering the expropriation.384 Nevertheless, his complaint makes clear that images of the

expropriation circulated widely throughout Latin America.

Latin Americans and their governments were inundated with Mexican propaganda

supporting the oil expropriation. Workers, student groups, and Leftist politicians

embraced the message, while their governments generally did not. Cárdenas might prove

himself the legitimate leader of the working people of the Americas, but he aimed to

solidify the accomplishments of the Revolution and translate his moral authority into a

leadership position in Latin America.

Government Reactions: Interference in the internal affairs of the nation?

Only the Bolivian government made an official declaration of its support for the

Mexican expropriation. In the wake of the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, the

Bolivians had seized the properties of Standard Oil in the war-torn border region, and

when Germán Busch dispensed with the military junta that had governed the country

since 1936, he announced his government’s refusal to return the properties and stated his

support for Cárdenas’s nationalisation.385 Bolivia’s Minister to Mexico Alfredo Sanjinés decorated Cárdenas with the Cross of the Condor of the Andes on June 6, giving a speech

384 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605, Martínez Mercado to Hay, January 31, 1939. These films were still making their rounds in 1940, when the Venezuelan Legation reported that it was unable to secure their exhibition because of official censorship. Quoted in a letter dated April 30, 1940 from Luis G. Inzunza of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior. AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 605. 385 One Bolivian paper carried the headline “México sigue los pasos de Bolivia nacionalizando sus petroleos,” a theme that was sometimes repeated in the South American press. A clipping of the article was found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 563. In Mexico, on the other hand, the papers reported that Bolivia was following the example of Mexico when, in March 1939 the Supreme Court confirmed the seizure of Standard Oil’s properties there. “Confirma la Suprema Corte de Justicia de Bolivia el fallo de la expropiación del petróleo,” Excélsior (Mexico City), 1; “Bolivia adopta nuestras ideas,” Excélsior March 14, 1939, 3. This is evidence of the tendency within the Mexican press to claim that whenever another Latin American country amended its oil legislation, it was following the Mexican example. 153

that US Ambassador Josephus Daniels described as “unusually effusive and laudatory.”386 For the remainder of the Cárdenas presidency, Mexican-Bolivian relations intensified, leading to missions of Mexican educational and irrigation experts who strengthened the ties between the two countries. The “Military Socialism” championed by

Busch had similar goals to the Revolution that Cárdenas’s diplomats expounded upon in

La Paz. Given the mutual policies on oil, it is not surprising that the Bolivian government came out in favour of Cárdenas’s action. The question remains why so many other Latin

American governments did not.

Governments in the region either did not support the expropriation or were unwilling to make their support public. Even among those governments that were sympathetic to Cárdenas’s decision, the wave of propaganda unleashed by Mexican diplomats created tensions in domestic politics that made it difficult to officially sanction

Mexico’s oil expropriation. Confidentially, several heads of state expressed their sympathy and support to Mexico’s diplomatic representatives, but they generally did not make their adherence public.387 Although Cárdenas’s diplomats reported that some of the governments to which they were accredited had been pressured overtly by US and British oil interests to withhold support, in most cases concerns regarding the maintenance of the delicate political balance between governments and their opposition held the most sway.

When conservative forces in Venezuela and Colombia accused the Mexican representatives in their countries of interfering in their internal affairs through overtly

386 United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930- 1939, Record Group 59 (RG 59), Reel 6, 812.00/30593, Josephus Daniels, “Resume of Conditions in Mexico During June, 1938,” July 15, 1938. 387 The new Ambassador to Argentina so reported in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 4-29-12, Félix Palavicini to Hay, April 4, 1939. 154

political statements and activities, both governments had to consider whether they valued their diplomatic relations with Mexico more than their own political survival. Both were also oil producers and economic decisions weighed into their policy decisions.

Venezuelan and Colombian oil production came up in a September 1938 report by

US Consul in Mexico James Stewart to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on a meeting of the Communist Party of Mexico that was attended by representatives from Cuba, Chile,

Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, Paraguay, Colombia, and Venezuela. He referred to the speech of the Colombian delegate, Jorge Regueros Peralta, who called for a united front of Latin

American workers to support Mexico and its expropriation. Regueros Peralta stated that it was a well-known fact that Venezuelan and Colombian oil was replacing Mexican oil in international markets at the behest of the companies whose interests had been expropriated.388 Be that as it may, the governments of Colombia and Venezuela seem to have taken different approaches in their responses to the expropriation. While the

Venezuelan government of Eleazar López Contreras was clearly hostile to Mexico and its representatives, the Liberal Colombian government seems to have had more sympathy for

Cárdenas’s act. Similarly constrained by oil interests in the country and a vocal

Conservative opposition, the Colombian government nevertheless took a much more measured approach to the events and their potential ramifications in South America.

As South America’s largest oil producer, the government of López Contreras had a particular stake in demonstrating Venezuela’s opposition to the expropriation.

Following the decree of March 18, Mexican chargé d’affaires José Rendón y Ponce

388 United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930- 1939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30616, Stewart to Hull, September 17, 1938. 155

published President Cárdenas’s message in the Venezuelan press and began a propaganda

campaign in favour of the expropriation. His efforts received a positive response from

students and workers in Venezuela. The Federación de Estudiantes de Venezuela sent their congratulations to the Mexico City headquarters of the Confederación de

Estudiantes Antiimperialistas de América, which were published in the major Mexico

City dailies.389 Leftists in Venezuela greeted the news of the defence of Mexico’s

constitution, workers, and national resources with great enthusiasm. The Venezuelan

government and the foreign-owned oil companies operating in the country, on the other

hand, saw the potentially radicalising effects the announcement could have on the local

labour movement.

The publication of the students’ message of support coincided with a major

propaganda effort on the part of the Mexican newspaper Excélsior to promote Venezuela.

The newspaper published a special edition on April 19, 1938 dedicated to Latin

America’s other major oil-producing nation on the first anniversary of its Constitutional

Congress. Through the private initiative of Director Rodrigo de Llano, Managing

Director Gilberto Figueroa, and the paper’s travelling representative Dr. Rafael G. Rosas and special envoy Luis Guillermo Villegas Blanco, the special issue’s stated aim was to support the Cárdenas government’s efforts to increase ties with Latin America, and

Venezuela in particular, by helping Mexicans and Venezuelans learn the reality of each

389 “Otra Felicitación al Señor Presidente,” Excélsior, April 21, 1938, 3. 156

other’s countries more fully, something Rosas believed needed to be achieved outside the

usual diplomatic channels.390

The special edition carried glossy photos, tourist information, descriptions of the

Venezuelan states, articles on social conditions and industrial development, and editorials on the state of Mexican-Venezuelan relations, and its publication was greeted with some fanfare. That day, Excélsior organised a reception featuring music, poetry, and speeches, broadcast on XEW, La voz de América Latina desde México (The Voice of Latin

America from Mexico).391 To reciprocate, the newly-inaugurated Venezuelan radio

station Universo broadcast a special homage to Mexico, which could also be heard in both countries.392 The same day as this broadcast, the Venezuelan chargé d’affaires in

Mexico City, Diego Córdoba, and his wife held a banquet in honour of the newspaper at

their residence, attended by several members of the Latin American diplomatic corps.393

What should have been propitious for the strengthening of ties between the two countries was instead overshadowed by growing tensions in Mexican-Venezuelan relations.

Two Venezuelans wrote a response to Excélsior’s special issue, correcting what they believed were inaccuracies, especially those pertaining to the activities of Standard

Oil in Venezuela. They detailed conditions of “slavery” in the oil fields of Venezuela:

390 “Como se preparó esta edición de Excélsior,” Excélsior, Edición especial dedicada a la República de Venezuela, April 19, 1938, 2nd section, 2. This private initiative, although apparently altruistic, undoubtedly sold a lot of newspapers as well. This idea is examined by Rick López, who describes that in the case of the India Bonita Contest of 1921, then director of El Universal Félix Palavicini, who went on to be posted as Ambassador to Argentina from early 1939 to late 1940, was behind the idea of the contest. Rick A. López, “La India Bonita Contest of 1921 and the Ethnicization of Mexican National Culture” Hispanic American Historical Review 82:2 (May 2002): 297-299. 391 “Gran homenaje de Excélsior para la Rep. de Venezuela,” Excélsior, April 20, 1938, 2. 392 “Un homenaje de Venezuela para nuestra patria,” Excélsior, May 8, 1938, 2. 393 “La Legación de Venezuela en México dió ayer una comida en honor de Excélsior,” Excélsior, May 7, 1938, 2nd section, 3. 157

poor living conditions, and the threats of violence they had faced when attempting to organise workers, which had led to their expulsion from the country. They hoped that

Excélsior’s readers were not deceived by what they believed was a piece of propaganda with the goal of painting Venezuela as a capitalist Arcadia.394 By implication, the idyllic picture the newspaper painted contrasted with the chaos that seemed to be reigning in the

Mexican oil fields and in the halls of its National Palace. This is not surprising given that

Excélsior had a reputation as an instrument of the conservative elite.395 The exiles’ letter reveals the conservatism of the message contained in Excélsior’s special issue on

Venezuela, and suggests that the newspaper’s private initiative was designed to undercut

Cárdenas’s oil policy and attempts to seek better relations with Latin American countries.

Because exiled Venezuelan Leftists and perceived radical groups within the

country, such as the Federación de Estudiantes de Venezuela, were in favour of the expropriation, the López Contreras government needed to prevent President Cárdenas’s

act from gaining widespread approval in Venezuelan society and contributing to the

mounting objections to Standard Oil’s practices in the country. He could not tolerate the

activities of a Mexican diplomat who seemed to be stoking the fires of discontent.

On the same day that Excélsior published its special issue, La Prensa reported

that the Venezuelan government had demanded the recall of José Rendón y Ponce, who

had served in Caracas since late 1937. As chargé d’affaires he had proven to be a great

supporter of the Cárdenas government’s international policies: as well as publicising the

394 “El esclavismo del petróleo en Venezuela,” El Nacional, April 22, 1938, 8. 395 Royal Institute of International Affairs, “Notes on the Latin American Press” Review of the Foreign Press, 1939-1945: Latin American Memoranda 1:1 (February 29, 1940):10. 158

expropriation and rallying progressive groups in the country behind the cause, Rendón y

Ponce took a hard line on other issues that were at the heart of Cárdenas’s foreign policy.

When he criticized the López Contreras government, in a letter to the press, for

recognizing the Franco regime and inviting its representative to attend a diplomatic

ceremony paying tribute to Simón Bolívar, the Venezuelans found the excuse they had

been looking for and immediately requested his recall.396 Such criticism, they argued, did

not befit a foreign representative accredited to the Venezuelan government. This incident

demonstrates not only the interconnectedness of Cárdenas’s foreign policy objectives in

Spain and Latin America, but also the lengths to which governments opposed to his

policies would go in order to temper his influence.

Criticism of Mexican domestic and foreign policy did not end with the expulsion

of Rendón y Ponce. When his replacement, Salvador R. Guzmán, arrived in May 1938 he

met the same kind of opposition. The problem had not been the diplomat, but the

threatening ideas he represented. In September, Guzmán wrote to Foreign Minister Hay

concerning the propaganda campaign against Mexico.397 Given the dominance that foreign oil companies exercised over the Venezuelan press, Guzmán had been waging an uphill battle since his arrival. He attempted to counter the attacks, but his efforts met with little success. A free daily called La Esfera had reprinted from The Atlantic an article by a

Venezuelan banker in New York who accused Mexican diplomats in Latin America of

396 “Venezuela pidió el retiro de un representante de nuestro país,” La Prensa (Mexico City), April 19, 1938, 3, 18. 397 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-3, Guzmán to Hay, September 9, 1938. 159

spreading the epidemic of communism throughout the region.398 Originally written for a

US audience, Henrique Pérez Dupuy’s goal seems to have been to promote US investment in Venezuela by showing the country to be a haven of stability and capitalist development in comparison with Mexico. Once translated and published in Venezuela, it constituted a direct attack on Mexico’s diplomatic representative. Guzmán immediately requested a meeting with Foreign Minister Esteban Gil Borges and asked that the allegations be rectified. The subdecano (second to the dean) of the diplomatic corps,

Chilean Minister to Venezuela Enrique Gallardo Nieto, spoke to the directors and

“pseudo-owners” of La Esfera. As a result of Gallardo Nieto’s intervention, director

Ramón Davíd León agreed to flatter Guzmán in the newspaper’s coverage of the upcoming Mexican Independence celebrations.399 Gil Borges, on the other hand, waffled because of his desire not to anger the representatives of Standard Oil.

Guzmán’s problems did not end there. A delegation from the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores del Distrito Federal (FST) went to the Mexican legation in Caracas in

March 1939 to give the minister copies of several documents they had submitted to the

Venezuelan press for publication, congratulating Cárdenas on the first anniversary of the expropriation and detailing a commemorative meeting they had held in honour of

Mexican oil workers. The three documents were published together on the first page of the Venezuelan daily Ahora, where the unionists vowed to follow the Mexican example

398 Henrique Pérez Dupuy, “La Situación Actual de Venezuela,” La Esfera (Caracas), September 6, 1938, 1. 399 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-11-3, Gallardo Nieto to Guzmán, September 8, 1938. 160

and work toward the liberation of their own oil industry.400 The following day the

government dissolved the unions involved for inciting class conflict through the spread of

Marxist ideas.401 When Guzmán met with Gil Borges a few days later and mentioned that copies of the letters were destined for the diplomatic pouch, the Foreign Minister broke with protocol and asked him for the offending documents. It was not appropriate, he argued, for the Mexican legation to maintain contact and correspondence with entities other than the Venezuelan government.402 Guzmán suggested that since the letters had

already been published in Venezuela, and had probably been picked up by Mexican

newspapers as well, he would be criticized if he did not ensure their delivery to those to

whom they had been addressed: President Cárdenas and the Mexican working class.403

Mexican Foreign Minister Hay wrote to Guzmán, wishing him to express to Gil Borges in a friendly but energetic manner that his request was completely against diplomatic practice and could be considered harmful to relations with Venezuela.404 The matter

seems to have ended there, but Standard Oil’s campaign against Mexico in Venezuela

continued.405 Despite the support and encouragement they received from some social

groups, the experience of Mexican diplomats in Venezuela seems to have been one of

almost continual harassment by the Venezuelan government officials, who disapproved

of the expropriation and the foreign and domestic policies it represented.

400 “Los trabajadores venezolanos y el aniversario de la Expropiación Petrolera de México,” Ahora (Caracas), March 24, 1939, 1. 401 “Disolución official de la FST y la UGT,” Ahora, March 25, 1939, 1. 402 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Memorandum by Gil Borges, March 30, 1939. 403 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Guzmán to Hay, April 10, 1939. 404 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Hay to Guzmán, April 15, 1939. 405 See for example, AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 561, Peón del Valle to Ernesto Padilla, February 6, 1941. 161

Mexico’s Minister to Colombia faced similar allegations of interference in the internal affairs of the nation, but the Colombian government’s attitude differed markedly from that of Venezuela. Relations between Colombia and Mexico were close during the period of Colombia’s Liberal Republic. Alfonso López Pumarejo broke onto the national scene in 1934, the same year as Cárdenas, with his self-styled Revolución en Marcha.

Although Eduardo Santos’s election campaign and inauguration as president in August

1938 represented a tempering of the radical rhetoric emanating from the Colombian presidency, both Liberal presidents had much in common with their Mexican counterpart.

Because Colombia was seen in Mexico as a natural ally, special care seems to have been taken in the choice of Ministers to Colombia. In early 1937 José Domingo Ramírez

Garrido replaced Palma Guillén (Mexico’s first female Minister) in Bogotá. This former director of the Mexican Military School was an ardent Revolutionary general who had fought in his native Tabasco. This was his first diplomatic post, and he wrote to Foreign

Minister Hay in December 1937 to explain what he believed were the difficulties inherent in his new position. He had to walk a fine line between promoting the accomplishments of the Mexican Revolution and attempting to influence the internal politics of his host nation.406 Ramírez Garrido seems to have maintained this balance until March 1938.

Following the oil expropriation, he held a meeting at the Mexican Legation of the most important members of the Leftist wing of the Liberal Party that included the firebrand radical Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. He also invited the directors of Bogotá’s two Leftist newspapers, Acción Liberal and El Diario Nacional. In a letter to Cárdenas, Ramírez

406 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 42-25-19, Ramírez Garrido to Hay, December 4, 1937. 162

Garrido explained that he had little faith in the Good Neighbor Policy of President

Roosevelt, and he anticipated that a propaganda campaign emanating from the US would

follow in the wake the expropriation decree. At the confidential meeting, the leaders of

Colombia’s radical Left pledged their support to help Ramírez Garrido defend the

expropriation in the Colombian press and, if necessary, in the streets.407 El Diario

Nacional published a report of the meeting that did not mention this commitment,408 but

both Conservatives and moderate Liberals seized on the meeting as an example of

Ramírez Garrido’s interference in the internal affairs and called for his immediate

expulsion.409 El Diario Nacional responded with an article claiming that the meeting had a purely social character, and attacked the Conservatives for making something out of nothing.410 Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabriel Turbay agreed and assured

Ramírez Garrido of his support.411

Given the delicate political atmosphere in Bogotá, the incident must have shaken

the government’s confidence in the viability of an alliance with Mexico. López Pumarejo

and his successor Santos were beholden to Colombia’s strong political tradition, which in

this period meant a Liberal party that had been divided along radical and moderate lines,

and an extremely vocal opposition embodied in the personality of Laureano Gómez and

his Conservative newspaper El Siglo. Closer relations with Cárdenas’s Mexico threatened

407 Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Archivo Particular Lázaro Cárdenas (APLC), Rollo 14, Expediente 72, Ramírez Garrido to Cárdenas, March 29, 1938. 408 “Los jefes izquierdistas fueron agasajados en la Legación de México el Sábado,” El Diario Nacional (Bogotá), March 28, 1938, 1. 409 Interestingly, their cause was taken up in the conservative Catholic press of Latin America. “Labores siniestras de un embajador mexicano en Colombia,” Crisol (Guatemala City), May 29, 1938. 410 “Mala fé de El Siglo y La Razón,” El Diario Nacional, March 30, 1938, 1. 411 AGN, APLC, Rollo 14, Expediente 72, Ramírez Garrido to Cárdenas, March 30, 1938. 163

to upset the delicate balance these Liberal presidents needed to maintain in order to achieve their domestic and international goals. Ramírez Garrido reported to Hay in May that the situation was so difficult that he had only been able to secure publication in El

Diario Nacional of Great Britain’s most recent note and the Mexican response. The

Liberal paper El Tiempo, run by Eduardo Santos’s brother, had agreed to publish the notes but then withdrew this commitment at the last minute. According to Ramírez

Garrido’s sources, the Liberal and Conservative papers had come under pressure from US oil companies, who claimed that the publication of the notes would have been contrary to their interests.412

The press, like Colombian society, was sharply divided on the question of

Mexico’s oil expropriation, and the government could not afford to come out in favour of

Cárdenas’s action. The fact that Turbay, unlike Venezuelan Foreign Minister Gil Borges, smoothed things over following this incident does show that the Colombian government was more inclined to be sympathetic. Even in the sensitive area of oil policy, Colombian contacts with Mexico continued. Colombia had reformed its own oil industry through the petroleum law of 1936, which allowed for an increase in the activity of US oil companies. The Colombian government nevertheless remained open to learning about the

Mexican expropriation. Turbay actually visited the Mexican oil fields in June 1938. US

Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels reported that Turbay had stated that “Colombia was satisfied with her own petroleum laws and indicated that his country would not

412 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-17, Ramírez Garrido to Hay, May 13, 1938. 164

follow Mexico's example in expropriating the oil.”413 Nevertheless, his visit signalled

that the Colombian government was still willing to engage Mexico on the question of oil and had not given in completely to the pressures of the US oil companies.414 Because of

the growing polarization of Colombian society, the government had to steer a difficult

course, reflected in the reception of the expropriation in the press and the government’s

measured response to the accusations of Ramírez Garrido’s interference. Mexican and

Colombian governments continued to co-operate on a number of symbolic

demonstrations of their affinity. A few months after the conflict over the meeting

Ramírez Garrido hosted at the Mexican Legation, he unveiled a statue of Benito Juárez

on the commemoration of the four hundredth anniversary of the founding of Bogotá.

Although sympathetic to Cárdenas’s action, the Colombian government, like other

friendly governments in the region, could not afford to support him publicly.

Selling Expropriated Oil in Latin America

Bolivia, Venezuela, and Colombia, like Mexico, numbered among the few oil-

producing countries of Latin America, and as a result, their reactions to the expropriation, in addition to responding to domestic political considerations, reflected their positions in the oil industry. The responses to the expropriation in countries that were importers, on the other hand, were influenced by their need to purchase oil and other petroleum

413 United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930- 1939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30593, “Resume of the Conditions in Mexico during June, 1938,” Daniels to Hull, July 15, 1938. 414 The Chilean chargé d’affaires wrote that his visit was “un gesto de solidaridad en la política de entendimiento que viene acercando a estos países en los últimos años.” Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico, Vol. 1658, Miguel Cruchaga Ossa to Ministro, September 23, 1938. 165

products from abroad. This afforded them more options when reacting to the expropriation. Although declining to approve openly of Cárdenas’s action, governments could purchase “expropriated” oil, thereby giving their unspoken approval to the Mexican

measure and contributing to the success of the expropriation. In some cases, it appears

that these decisions were indeed politically-motivated demonstrations of sympathy. In

addition, PEMEX was also able to sign contracts with some rather unlikely customers,

who were otherwise quite vocal in their opposition to the Revolutionary social and

economic policies of the Cárdenas government. The effectiveness of PEMEX’s

representatives in the region was therefore of the utmost importance in securing the Latin

American market. Regardless of their allegiances, sympathetic governments were

unwilling to pay a higher price for Mexican oil, just as critical governments were

reluctant to pass up a good deal simply because of their opposition to the expropriation.

On June 10, 1938, a Norwegian ship called the Vinga departed Veracruz for

Uruguay carrying 2,900 barrels of diesel and 67,950 barrels of fuel oil with a total weight

of 10,900 tonnes.415 El Nacional reported that the sale demonstrated that the newly-

nationalised oil industry was prosperous in spite of the conflict with the expropriated

companies.416 This first shipment represents the opening of the Latin American market

for oil, which was important both to Mexico’s relations with the region and the survival

of PEMEX.417

415 “El Primer Petróleo que Vende México al Uruguay,” El Universal (Mexico City), June 11, 1938, 9. 416 “80,000 barriles de petróleo salieron ayer de Minatitlán,” El Nacional (Mexico City), June 11, 1938, 8. 417 On sales to Uruguay, see AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 596. 166

Throughout the remaining years of the Cárdenas presidency, and until Mexico’s

entrance into the Second World War effectively ended the boycott against Mexican oil,

representatives in Latin America worked feverishly to cultivate this market, with some

significant success. Their efforts were overshadowed at the time, and in the subsequent

literature on the expropriation, by Cárdenas’s controversial decision to sell oil to the Axis

and the Mexican government’s negotiations with the expropriated oil interests.418 Given

the Cárdenas government’s criticism of the fascist powers’ intervention in Spain,

Abyssinia, Manchuria, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, when the Chilean chargé d’affaires

in Mexico Miguel Cruchaga Ossa wrote home to report on the proposed sale of oil to the

Axis, whoever read his report at the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote “words,

words, words” incredulously in the margin.419 These were turbulent times, and the

interest with which these developments were met obscured the somewhat less dramatic

work undertaken in Latin America.

Amid his description of the tense aftermath of the expropriation, Jesús Silva

Herzog briefly mentions in his Historia de la Expropiación de las Empresas Petroleras that as manager of the Distribuidora de Petróleos Mexicanos he also oversaw sales to

Latin America—which he deemed only a minimal success, with sales to Brazil,

418 For analysis see Schuler, Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt, Chapter 5. 419 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Oficio confidencial recibido de la Embajada de Chile en México, April 6, 1938. Latin American diplomats posted in Mexico sent home a steady stream of information on the expropriation. Guatemalan Foreign Minister Carlos Salazar thanked his Ambassador Antonio Nájera Cabrera for the analysis and news clippings he had forwarded the Ministry, Guatemala, Archivo General de Centro América (AGCA), Fondo Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4398, Expediente 93342, 235, Salazar to Nájera Cabrera, March 23, 1938. 167

Argentina, Uruguay, and Guatemala.420 This dismissive attitude would have been a shock

to the agents and diplomats who worked so hard to secure the existence of a market for

Mexican oil in Latin America after the expropriation. Although sales to the region in

1938, 1939, and 1940 were less than half of what they had been in 1937 under the

management of the foreign oil companies,421 these small victories were won against great

odds through the tremendous efforts of Mexico’s diplomats and PEMEX’s agents.

Soon after the announcement of the expropriation, PEMEX arranged for its agents

to travel to Latin America to begin negotiations for the sale of oil. As well as working

with the Mexican representatives to begin bidding on oil contracts, they were charged with establishing relationships with local companies and contracting them to become the official distributors of Mexican oil in each country. In early May 1938, Jacinto

Hernández Barragán departed for Cuba and Antonio Rivero Osuna left for Central

America.422 Alfonso Reyes headed up a special delegation for the establishment of oil

purchases in Brazil. Reyes had served as Ambassador to Brazil from 1930 to 1936 and

had innumerable contacts in Rio de Janeiro and significant goodwill in the capital that

derived from his status as a celebrated writer.423 Although Reyes was assisted in his

undertakings in Brazil and the other South American countries by Fernando Saldaña

Galván of PEMEX, his title of Special Ambassador demonstrated that the Ministry of

420 Jesús Silva Herzog, Historia de la Expropiación de las Empresas Petroleras (Mexico City: PEMEX, 1988), 101. The first of many editions of this classic was published in 1947, but it drew extensively on his 1941 publication. PEMEX issued the edition I consulted to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the expropriation. 421 Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 114-116. 422 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Espinosa Mireles to Hay, May 6, 1938. 423 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 588, Espinosa Mireles to Hay, May 24, 1938. For an indication of Reyes’s popularity in Brazil, see his personnel file AHGE, SRE, Expediente 25-6-70. 168

Foreign Affairs was bringing out the big guns for an assignment it regarded as being of vital importance. As a result of these efforts, the firm Corrêa e Castro & Companhia

Limitada became the authorized agents for PEMEX in Brazil.424 Many other such

agreements followed: with Salvador Altamirano in Argentina and Uruguay, Arturo

Aguirre Matheu in Guatemala, the firm Castro y Quesada y Compañía in Costa Rica, and

Felipe Mantica y Compañía of Nicaragua, among others.425 Thereafter, these companies

and individuals worked closely with the Mexican diplomats in the region to secure a

market in Latin America for Mexican oil.

The representatives of PEMEX who fanned out throughout the region were

somewhat successful in establishing a number of distribution agreements, but

nevertheless their efforts were sometimes hindered by the interference of US and British

oil interests. Antonio Rivero Osuna’s activities in Central America were closely

monitored by US diplomats and military attachés in the region. Alex A. Cohen wrote a series of confidential military intelligence reports on Rivero Osuna’s efforts in Costa

Rica.426 He reported that because US oil companies were so long-established in Central

America, it would be difficult for Mexico enter the market. Moreover, his sources told

him that “all of the oil companies doing business in this territory have pledged

themselves to prevent Mexico from making sales” of its “hot oil” in the region.427 In his

424 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 588, telegram from Mireles to Correa Castro, November 14, 1938. 425 Argentina: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 588; Uruguay: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 596; Guatemala: AHD SRE, LE 587 and AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 592; Costa Rica: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589; Nicaragua: AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 594. 426 United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, Record Group 165 (RG 165), Reel IX, Document 0989, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, June 16, 1938. 427 United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, RG 165, Reel IX, Document 0995, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, July 14, 1938. 169

estimation, the chances that Rivero Osuna would meet with success in Central America

were slim to none. Indeed, Mexico’s first bid in Costa Rica was unsuccessful, despite the

fact that the price Rivero Osuna offered was substantially lower than that of the US

company that won the bid, suggesting that there may have been some undue pressure on

the Costa Rican government.428 Nevertheless, he and the firm Castro and Quesada, which

set up the Costa-Mex Distribuidora de Petróleos, got back into the fray and by October

1938 they had won a contract to provide 500 tons of asphalt to the municipality of San

José.429 Mexico’s cut-rate prices eventually won over the Costa Rican government,

despite the obstruction of the US oil representatives who had previously maintained a

near monopoly in the region.

Cohen, in his military intelligence reports of July 1940, analysed the attitudes of the governments of Central America towards Rivero Osuna’s visit. He believed that in

Costa Rica, as in El Salvador, there was “unquestionably a certain amount of pro-

Mexican sentiment.”430 Although the Costa Rican government never publicly came out in

favour of the expropriation, they supported it through their purchase of Mexican

petroleum products. As difficult as it is to trace the “sentiments” of governments

throughout the region, the ideologies upon which they based their domestic political

programmes make it clear that some were more likely to support the expropriation than

others. One case that provides an interesting opportunity to analyse the importance of

428 United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, RG 165, Reel IX, Document 1000, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, July 20, 1938. Also see Mexico’s chargé d’affaires’s report on the failed bid. AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Ortega to Hay, July 19, 1938. 429 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Ortega to Hay, October 15, 1938. 430 United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, RG 165, Reel IX, Document 0995, G-2 Report: Mexican Attempts to Sell Oil in Latin America, July 14, 1938. 170

“sentiment” in these purchases is that of Chile. When the expropriation occurred in

March 1938, Chilean President Arturo Alessandri was on the verge of losing an election

campaign to the Leftist coalition of the Frente Popular. The outgoing Conservative

government had no ideological affinity with the Mexican Revolution, but president-elect

Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a member of the Radical Party, made common cause with

Cárdenas. Once he was inaugurated in December 1938, a pronounced policy shift took

place. Responsive to popular support for the expropriation among the social groups that

had helped elect him, his government substantially increased relations with Mexico.

Mexican chargé d’affaires in Santiago Pablo Campos Ortiz began exploring the

possibility of exporting oil to Chile shortly after the expropriation. His inquiries led him

to the Chilean navy, which he happily reported in July of 1938 might be interested provided the price was right.431 Campos Ortiz entered into negotiations, and in

September, Salvador Altamirano came from Uruguay to assist him in the process. Still,

by November, a deal had not yet been reached and he suggested that the delay might be related to the transmission of power in Chile.432 Given that Aguirre Cerda’s election had

taken place on October 25, 1938, it seemed likely that once the position of the Frente

Popular was secure it would only be a matter of time before the negotiations were

complete. He knew the contract was within reach and believed that while the first

shipment would not amount to much in commercial terms, it would have great symbolic

value: “while some governments are discussing Mexico’s right to expropriate its oil, one

foreign government, that of Chile, will acquire Mexican oil for the consumption of its

431 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, telegram from Campos Ortiz to Hay, July 4, 1938. 432 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Campos Ortiz to Hay, November 14, 1938. 171

navy, giving us preference over the oil companies of other countries,” he stated

triumphantly.433 By December, the Mexican and US press reported on the sale, which

seemed sure to go through shortly after Aguirre Cerda’s inauguration.434

In fact, the first shipment of Mexican oil to Chile took on even greater symbolic

importance than Campos Ortiz originally imagined. On January 24, 1939, Chile suffered

an 8.3 magnitude earthquake that left more than 50,000 people dead and another 60,000

injured. The recently-named Ambassador to Chile, Octavio Reyes Spíndola, immediately

created a relief committee in Mexico City. Campos Ortiz had telegraphed the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs with details of the donations other governments had announced they would make in early February 1938. In addition to medicine and other provisions, several governments pledged to contribute cash. For example, the US promised one million dollars, Brazil $150,000, Venezuela $16,000, and Peru $60,000.435 If it were not possible

for the Mexican government to give money, he suggested, it might offer oil instead.

Because the Cárdenas government was completely cash-strapped, this seemed like an

ideal plan. The oil was valued at approximately $25,000.00 and, in addition to the money

that was being raised by subscription throughout Mexico, it would constitute a

respectable donation.436 With the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

PEMEX the new Ambassador announced that, as part of its contribution to the recovery

433 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, Campos Ortiz to Espinosa Mireles, November 14, 1938. 434 “Se pronone la venta de Petróleo de México a Chile,” El Universal, December 11, 1938, 9; “Mexico Busy in Chile,” New York Times, December 11, 1938, 20. 435 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 28-20-77, telegram from Campos Ortiz to SRE, February 4, 1938. 436 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 28-20-77, telegram from Campos Ortiz to SRE, February 3, 1938. 172

effort, Mexico would make a donation of oil.437 In May 1939, the Chilean tanker

Rancagua docked in Tampico to collect the donation.438 Ever diligent in their efforts to

discredit the Mexican expropriation, Ambassador Manuel Bianchi reported that British

representatives of the expropriated El Águila delivered a protest note to the commander

of the Rancagua condemning the Chilean government’s acceptance of stolen goods.439

The letter must have seemed petty to the Chileans, who were grateful for this generous

contribution to their recovery, which strengthened the ties between the Cárdenas and

Aguirre Cerda governments. By donating oil instead of money, the Mexican government

could solve a cash-flow problem and increase goodwill at the same time. This was a

remarkable propaganda opportunity, and Campos Ortiz and Reyes Spíndola took full advantage of it. In his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the presentation of his

credentials in Santiago that July, Reyes Spíndola said President Aguirre Cerda had given

his enthusiastic approval of purchases of Mexican oil,440 and 1939 and 1940, the

Rancagua and the Maipo made several visits to Mexican waters to pick up subsequent

shipments of Mexican oil for the Chilean armada.441

Chilean purchases of Mexican oil represented a political statement made by the

Leftist government of Aguirre Cerda of its support for Mexico and its expropriation.

437 On the Mexican response to the earthquake see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-19-59 (XII partes); AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-399-2; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 28-20-77; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-387-2; and Reyes Spíndola’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-26-7 (VII). Also see the corresponding documents in the Chilean archives, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1736. 438 “El primer barco chileno ha llegado a Tampico para cargar petróleo de México,” El Nacional, May 28, 1938, 8. 439 MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1763 A, Bianchi to Ministro, May 24, 1939. 440 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7 (VII), Reyes Spíndola to Hildago, July 29, 1939. 441 The great advantage presented by purchases by the Chilean navy was that they could transport the oil themselves. Given PEMEX’s lack of oil tankers, this was ideal. AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 589, telegram from Campos Ortiz to Hay, July 4, 1938. 173

Mexican-Chilean relations had already been cordial under Arturo Alessandri, but

following the election and inauguration of a more like-minded head of state, they

improved markedly. Although he did not state publicly that he approved of the expropriation, his allegiances were clear. Purchasing Mexican oil provided him another avenue through which to voice his adherence to the Cárdenas government’s

Revolutionary social and economic policies. The Chilean case provides an example of politically-motivated oil sales, but the small number of governments in Latin America that agreed with Cárdenas ideologically were not enough to guarantee the market for oil, and interestingly, some governments that were otherwise opposed to Cárdenas’s policies made purchases from PEMEX.

Heavily dependent upon the US not only for oil but also for investment through the United Fruit Co., Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico had long found the Revolutionary social and economic policies of Mexico to be a thorn in his side. Moreover, his tight control of the press was such that Mexican diplomats found it difficult to undertake effective propaganda campaigns. Nevertheless, Guatemala was one of the Latin

American countries that purchased Mexican petroleum products. This apparent contradiction suggests that while for some governments buying Mexican oil may have been a matter of principle, for others it was one of the many economic decisions made on the basis of price.

Writing at the beginning of the Cárdenas sexenio with reference to the

Guatemalan reaction to socialist education and the religious question in Mexico, chargé

d’affaires Eduardo Espinosa said that the defining characteristic of Guatemalan 174

newspapers was their total and complete submission to the government. He followed by providing an analysis of the directors and editorial policies of the major dailies which, although they had some differences, shared in strict government censorship. He did not recommend a vigorous propaganda campaign regarding the religious question, because it would have little chance of success in this atmosphere.442 Little had changed by 1938 when Cárdenas announced the expropriation of US and Anglo-Dutch oil interests.

Ambassador Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus wrote that the Guatemalan press generally published news service items regardless of bias,443 and the Embassy’s press releases appeared without editorial comment.444 The exception to this rule was the coverage in

Nuestro Diario. Criticism of the Cárdenas government in editorials by director Federico

Hernández de León and columnist Carlos Bauer Avilés had come to be expected by

members of the Mexican Foreign Service in Guatemala. Cienfuegos y Camus considered

Nuestro Diario to be a government mouthpiece.445 Its criticism waxed and waned, mirroring in general the Ubico regime’s mercurial attitudes towards its neighbour to the

north.446

442 AHGE, SRE, Archivo de la Embajada de México en Guatemala (AEMGUA), Legajo 13, Expediente 6, Espinosa to Portes Gil, January 4, 1935. He describes El Imparcial, El Liberal Progresista, Nuestro Diario, El Diario de Centro América, as well as less important papers such as Éxito, La Epoca, Ideas y Noticias, and El Occidental. 443 The Embassy’s secretary, Enrique Solórzano, reported that the four major Guatemalan dailies received news from the UP and AP news services, and occasionally directly from Radiomex. “Las tendencias de la AP y UP son ampliamente conocidas del Gobierno de México, que ha sido en los últimos años una de sus víctimas favoritas.” AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-2-13 (I), Enrique Solórzano, “Prensa,” Informes confidenciales preparados por el personal de esta mission y Consulado General, September 28, 1838. 444 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 14, 1938. 445 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 14, 1938. 446 Enrique Solórzano, reported that “Los directores de todos los periódicos de Guatemala se presentan todos los días en la oficina del Presidente de la República, quien les imparte sus órdenes acerca de lo quer deben o no publicar… Algunas veces, en editorials, se flirtea con la democracia, para dar la impression de que hay “libertad de prensa, pero este ardid es ya bastante conocido del pueblo de Guetemala.” Enrique Solórzano, “Prensa.” 175

In his column “Acotaciones,” Carlos Bauer Avilés repeatedly criticised the

expropriation.447 Nevertheless, the paper’s capacity to influence the Guatemalan people was extremely limited, with a circulation of only 1200. The paper was outweighed in importance by El Liberal Progresista and El Imparcial, both with a circulation of five thousand. Furthermore, the new Ambassador to Guatemala, Salvador Martínez de Alva, stated in December 1938 that Nuestro Diario’s editorials were so vague and confused that the attacks on Mexico would be missed by the majority of readers, who generally did not even read them because of their poor quality.448 This may explain why, despite the

ambiguous if not hostile reception to the expropriation by the Guatemalan press and the

Ubico regime, Cienfuegos y Camus had nevertheless believed that most Guatemalans

who we aware of the controversy were actually sympathetic to the Mexican

expropriation.449

Because of Mexico and Guatemala’s traditionally contentious border relations, the two governments had to deal with another potentially explosive issue that seems to have had a constant presence in the two countries’ relations during this period. Shortly after the expropriation, in response to rumours in the Mexican press that an army of 60,000 revolutionaries was organising south of the border and preparing an insurgency against the Cárdenas government, Excelsiór published a letter from the Guatemalan Ambassador to Mexico, Antonio Nájera Cabrera, describing the reports as absurd and claiming

447 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574. See for example, Carlos Bauer Avilés, “El petróleo y la política,” Nuestro Diario (Guatemala City) March 23, 1938; and “La situación petrolera de México como precedente,” Nuestro Diario April 21, 1938. 448 Salvador Martínez de Alva’s credentials were accepted August 26, 1938. He discussed the situation of the Guatemalan press, with particular reference to Nuestro Diario’s attacks at great length in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-2-13 (II), Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de diciembre de 1938. 449 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 574, Cienfuegos y Camus to Hay, April 14, 1938. 176

absolute neutrality regarding the internal affairs of Mexico.450 Guatemalan Foreign

Minister Carlos Salazar instructed Nájera Cabrera to quell the reports, and he complained

that in popular opinion, Guatemala was always believed to harbour revolutionaries ready

to mount insurgencies against the Mexican government.451 Inaccuracies in the Mexican

press relating to supposed revolutionary activities taking place in Guatemala were so

numerous that the Guatemalan government did not attempt to counter every rumour that

surfaced.452 On the other hand, the coincidence of the reports of March 1938 with the oil

expropriation, the transcendent importance of which Nájera Cabrera had reported to the

Minister, meant that the reports had to be taken seriously and refuted immediately.

Ironically, the fact that both Nájera Cabrera and Foreign Minister Hay made official declarations to that effect caused US Ambassador Josephus Daniels to suspect that there may have been something to the rumours after all.453

If the border between the two countries presented special problems for the

governments of Cárdenas and Ubico, it also presented opportunities. Despite the Ubico

regime’s opposition to the so-called communist government of México, it became one of

the first Latin American governments to purchase petroleum products from Mexico.

Efforts to create a market in Guatemala for Mexican oil had been underway for several

450 “Guatemala será siempre leal a nuestra patria,” Excélsior March 29, 1938, 6. 451 Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4398, Expediente 93342, 241-243, Salazar to Nájera Cabrera, March 25, 1938. 452 Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4399, Expediente 93343, 108-109, Salazar to Nájera Cabrera, May 21, 1938. 453 United States, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930- 1939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30593, “Monthly resume for June 1938,” Daniels to Hull, July 15, 1938. The incident was also reported in Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930-1939, RG 59, Reel 6, 812.00/30583, “Monthly resume for May 1938,” Boal to Hull, June 14, 1938. 177

years before the expropriation,454 and immediately after the expropriation, Guatemalans began to inquire about the possibility of importing petroleum products.455 The first representative of Petróleos Mexicanos, Antonio Rivero Osuna, arrived in Guatemala in

May 1938. Although Ubico initially argued that the Guatemalan government was obliged to decline Rivero Osuna’s offer because it might be interpreted as a hostile act by the

British government, with which Guatemala was in a dispute over its boundary with

British Honduras, he subsequently authorized him to deal with Guatemala City’s municipal authorities, who contracted to purchase asphalt from Mexico. Asphalt came to comprise a large portion of the petroleum-based products Mexico exported, especially to

Central America. The high demand was likely a result of the fact that road construction

projects were of particular importance in Central America, as they were in Mexico.456 In

September, the Distribuidora de Petróleos Mexicanos contracted Ing. Arturo Aguirre

Matheu to be the company’s agent in Guatemala City.

Unfortunately, the first shipment of oil was detained at the Guatemalan border.

Mexican Consul Bernardo Blanco reported that the delay was a result of interference

454 See AHGE, SRE, Expediente IV-603-3. The early efforts of PETROMEX to create a market in Latin America for Mexican oil lend support to the hypothesis that Mexico’s oil industry was well on its way to becoming “nationalised” before the expropriation. Jonathan C. Brown states that “Quedó entonces para el gobierno del presidente Cárdenas solamente la etapa final de un largo proceso de nacionalización, que llegó a su cúspide con la expropiación del 18 de marzo de 1938, y la fundación de PEMEX.” Jonathan C. Brown, “Los archivos del petróleo y la revolución mexicana,” Boletín del Archivo Histórico de Petróleos Mexicanos 5 (Dec., 2004): 67. On PETROMEX’s attempts to sell oil in South America see, Mexico, Archivo Histórico de Petróleos Mexicanos (AHPM), Caja 2699, Expediente 71493; AHPM, Caja 2720, Expediente 71998; AHPM, Caja 2744, Expediente 72550. 455 AHPM, Caja 2419, Expediente 66331, 31. 456 See Wendy Waters, “Remapping Identities: Road Construction and Nation Building in Postrevolutionary Mexico,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920- 1940, eds. Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 221-242; and “Re-mapping the Nation: Road Building as State Formation in Post-revolutionary Mexico” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 1999). 178

from representatives of the expropriated El Águila, but Ambassador Martínez de Alva

wrote that it was a result of Aguirre Matheu’s own incompetence.457 The shipment

eventually entered the country October 23, but subsequent events proved Martínez de

Alva right. After even greater mismanagement, the Petróleos Mexicanos eventually sued

Aguirre Matheu for his debts and the rights to the name PEMEX in Guatemala.458 Efforts to export petroleum-based products to Guatemala continued, but like the first shipment, they too were plagued with difficulties.459 Although these efforts were not particularly

successful, they are interesting given the Ubico regime’s ambiguous relations with the

Cárdenas government. Despite the dictator’s cosy relationship with the US and his reluctance to antagonize the British, with whom he had pressing disagreements,

Guatemala became a fairly regular client of PEMEX. The criticism of Cárdenas found in the pages of Nuestro Diario only served to obscure the fact that the Guatemalan government supported the oil expropriation, if not in thought then in deed, through the purchase of “expropriated” oil. If Cienfuegos y Camus was correct in his judgement that the majority of Guatemalans were sympathetic to the expropriation, and we find that the

Guatemalan government pragmatically decided to purchase oil after the expropriation, we

might conclude that the Guatemalan press’s reception of the oil expropriation neither

reflected nor influenced Guatemalans’ perceptions or actions.

457 AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 592, Blanco to Hay, October 18, 1938; AHGE, SRE, Expediente LE 592, Martínez de Alva to Hay, October 19, 1938. 458 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2419-2. References to conflicts with Aguirre Matheu are found throughout the Mexican embassy’s monthly reports for the next several years. See for example, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-30; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, 30-12-11; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, 31-1-21; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, III-1909-1; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, LE 587; AHGE, SRE, Expediente, LE 606. 459 The 1940 sale of gasoline to Guatemala encountered quality control and transportation problems. See the reports found in AHPM, Caja 2420, Expediente 66363; AHPM, Caja 2420, 66364. 179

Decisions were not always based on political support for the expropriation; the

effectiveness of PEMEX’s agents in Latin America was of primary importance in

securing oil contracts. As well as their general competence (or lack thereof in the case of

Aguirre Matheu), their political sympathies were at issue. Mexican Ambassador to

Argentina Félix Palavicini reported in February 1940 an incident that occurred a farewell

dinner held at the Mexican Embassy in Buenos Aires for Consul Jorge C. Altamirano.

José Figueroa, President of the Compañía Comercial Sudamericana, of which Jorge

Altamirano had been manager, exclaimed that he himself would not return to Mexico so

long as the government did not guarantee private property. As the representative of the

Distribuidora de Petróleos Mexicanos in Argentina, the Compañía Comercial

Sudamericana had an important role negotiating oil contracts, and Palavicini was worried

that they might not put in the necessary effort because Figueroa had been one of the large

landholders whom Cárdenas had expropriated in La Laguna. He maintained a large

fortune, but needless to say he was not ideologically supportive of the Cárdenas

government.460 This example suggests that the agents PEMEX contracted to sell oil in

Latin America were generally in it for the money, not because of their loyalty to

Cárdenas’s Revolutionary social and economic policies. Perhaps Palavicini need not have worried, as Jorge Altamirano’s brother Salvador was instrumental in negotiating oil contracts in both Argentina and Uruguay and was one of the most effective and tireless agents in Latin America. Nevertheless, Figueroa’s remarks serve as a reminder that just

460 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 4-29-12, Palavicini to Hay, 2 February 1940. 180

as these sales were generally not altruistic acts of support for Cárdenas’s expropriation on the part of the purchasing countries, the agents involved were not entirely selfless.

Shortly after the end of the Cárdenas presidency, Foreign Minister Ezequiel

Padilla wrote to Mexico’s representatives in Latin America asking that they complete

studies of the market for Mexican oil in the countries to which they were posted. In

writing these reports, the diplomats took stock of their efforts over the past three years to

open the Latin American market.461 They reported on their successes and analysed the reasons for their failures and proposed methods by which the PEMEX could increase its sales to Latin America. Nevertheless, as early as 1940 the United States had regained its position as the largest importer of Mexican oil, taking approximately seventy-five percent of Mexican exports in 1940 and eighty-five percent in 1941.462 The crisis in the Mexican export market that had followed the expropriation was clearly over, and as shipping became more dangerous because of German attacks on merchant vessels, it became increasingly impractical to risk PEMEX’s small fleet of tankers by sending them to ports

of call that were far from home. Although Cuba remained an important customer

throughout the war years, and the odd sale was made to other Latin American countries,

the seemingly inevitable integration of the North American market had begun, and the

role that Latin American countries’ purchases had played in helping PEMEX survive the

boycott was soon forgotten. Despite the fact that most Latin American governments had

not publicly come out in favour of Mexico’s oil expropriation, many of them helped

Mexico weather the economic storm it had created by making purchases of petroleum

461 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-602-9. 462 Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 114-116. 181

products. Their share of Mexican exports was not large, but it was significant, both to the

diplomats and agents in the region, and to the Latin American social groups that may

have felt that their vocal support of the expropriation contributed to their governments’

decisions to purchase Mexican oil.

Reflections in and on the Mexican Press

The mobilizations that took place in Latin America in support of the oil

expropriation were reported in the Mexican press, reflecting and in turn influencing the

Mexican reception of the expropriation.463 Given that most Latin American governments

remained silent on the issue compared to the workers, students’ groups, and Leftist

political parties in the region that made their approval of Cárdenas’s gesture well known,

it follows that the majority of articles describing the Latin American reaction focused on the response of these progressive social groups. Reports of these events were received

with interest in Mexico. In a front-page article that hailed Mexico as the vanguard of the

autonomy of America, Excélsior described a meeting the Juventud Universitaria de Chile

held in support of the expropriation.464 Even more common, however, were articles that

described the letters of adhesion and sympathy received from individuals and unions

throughout the region. Whereas some were re-printed from Latin American newspapers,

the majority were forwarded through diplomatic channels to the Mexican government,

often addressed to President Cárdenas himself. In one noteworthy example, Cuban author

463 These conclusions are based on the clippings collection at the Mexican Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada (BMLT), Archivos Económicos (AE), Petróleo – Expropiación (O08075-O08145), as well as the excellent selection of clippings found at PEMEX in the Hemerografía de la Expropiación Petrolera. 464 “México, poderosa vanguardia de la autonomía de América,” Excélsior, April 10, 1938, 1. 182

Juan Marinello congratulated the Mexican President.465 Even more commonly, however, these messages were sent to the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM).

Vicente Lombardo Toledano was famous (and in some circles infamous) among workers’ groups throughout Latin America, where he had long been involved in supporting the organisation of labour. Out of solidarity with Mexican workers—oil workers in particular—several unions forwarded him their congratulations. In articles such as “Los obreros zapateros de Cuba nos felicitan por el caso petrolero,” (The shoe workers of

Cuba congratulate us for the oil case) “Los obreros argentinos y el caso petrolero,”

(Argentine workers and the oil case) and “Los trabajadores peruanos opinan de la expropación,” (The workers of Peru speak out on the oil expropriation), Mexican readers learned that the expropriation had widespread support from workers in the rest of Latin

America.466 La Prensa reported that not a single day went by in which the CTM did not receive letters or telegrams regarding this historic event.467 These articles were so numerous that instead of publishing them individually, the Mexican papers began to run articles that printed the messages of several organizations together at one time.468 These letters served to shore up support for the expropriation among workers and other

465 “Felicitación al Sr. Presidente Cárdenas,” El Universal (Mexico City), March 29, 1938, 9. Also see “Una felicitación al Presidente de la República,” El Universal, April 19, 1938, 9; “Felicitación al gobierno del Sr. Gral. Cárdenas,” El Nacional, April 19, 1938, 8. 466 La Prensa, April 7, 1938, 12; La Prensa, May 1, 1938, 3; El Nacional, May 20, 1938, 8. 467 “Felicitaciones de los obreros extranjeros por la expropiación,” La Prensa, May 23, 1938, 18. 468 “La CTM sigue recibiendo adhesiones de todo el mundo por la expropiación del petróleo,” La Prensa, April 17, 1938, 19. This article mentions letters the CTM received from Crítica in Argentina, the Sindicato de Choferes Particulares in Cuba and the Confederación de Trabajadores Chilenos. These letters of sympathy were also reported in “Mensajes a la CTM del proletariado del mundo,” La Nacional, April 17, 1938, 8. The support of the Federación de Trabajadores Textiles del Perú, the Sociedad de Auxilios Mutuos de Motoristas y Conductores de Lima, Peru, and the Federación Local del Trabajo de la Ciudad de Tulúa, Departamento del Valle del Cauca, Colombia was reported in “Colombia y Perú respaldan al gobierno,” El Universal, May 20, 1938, 9. 183

progressive social groups that needed and wanted reassurance from abroad regarding

Mexico’s expropriation. Conversely, they may also have caused concern among business groups and conservatives, who would have seen that this support came not from Latin

American governments, but from groups that, in their eyes, were suspect due to their radical tendencies. Alan Knight has argued that the expropriation divided Mexico’s already fractured Left, leaving it prey to conservative attack.469 I would suggest that, on the contrary, the domestic reception of the Latin American reaction to the expropriation served to create points of unity for those on both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum.470

When examining these articles as a group, it would seem that the Latin American reaction to the expropriation was covered extensively in the Mexican press. Although it is important to understand the broad characteristics of this body of sources, it is equally important to recognize that articles dealing with the reaction in Latin America were consistently outnumbered by articles describing the reaction to the expropriation in the

United States, and to some extent Europe and Great Britain.471 For example, in March

1938, Excélsior printed three full analyses of the US reaction to the expropriation, but did not publish a comparable analysis of the Latin American press. Here then may be one of

469 Alan Knight, “The Politics of the Expropriation,” in The Mexican Petroleum Industry in the Twentieth Century, eds. Jonathan C. Brown and Alan Knight (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 117. 470 Likewise, in Latin America, the expropriation served to unify divergent political factions around the issues it brought to the fore. 471 That is why, in addition to making extensive use of the Archivos Económicos at the Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, I conducted thorough surveys of the newspapers Excélsior and La Prensa in order to understand the relative weight given to articles on the Latin American reception of the expropriation in these papers. It should be noted that Vicente Lombardo Toledano was traveling in Europe at the time and sent regular dispatches to the Mexican press regarding his speaking engagements and the responses of European workers to the expropriation. 184

the reasons for the fact that the Latin American reception of the oil expropriation has

been neglected in the historiography.

This suggests that Latin American reactions were considered less important at the

time. Mexicans devoured articles describing the responses of the United States and

British governments because of the role these principal actors would play in influencing

the outcome of the expropriation. In doing so, they did not recognise an essential element

of Cárdenas’s foreign policy: he aimed to secure his accomplishments with support from

Latin America. It was recognized at the time that one of the most important ways in

which the Mexican government could ensure the success of the nationalised oil industry would be by guaranteeing that there would be a market for Mexican oil. As a result, the number of articles on oil in the Mexican press relating to Latin America surged whenever

PEMEX signed contracts with Latin American countries.472 Nevertheless, these purchases were consistently overshadowed by articles on the controversial sales to Japan,

Italy, and Germany. The literature on the expropriation followed suit, giving primacy to the reactions of the US and Great Britain and seeking explanations for the apparently contradictory sale of oil to the undemocratic powers that Cárdenas repeatedly chastised on the world stage.

Conclusion

The oil expropriation of 1938 had great resonance in Latin America, where

workers, students, Leftist politicians, and economic nationalists all found inspiration in

472 BMLT, AE, Petróleo - Exportación (O07136 -O07149). 185

the events that transpired in Mexico. Although Cárdenas’s diplomatic representatives in

the region were extremely successful in firing their passions, more often than not they

were unable to persuade the governments to which they were accredited to publicly

support the expropriation. Some presidents demonstrated their sympathies by shielding

Mexican diplomats from the wrath of their Conservative detractors; others merely gave confidential assurances of adhesion that could not be acted upon. Some governments expanded their cooperation with Mexico either through symbolic gestures or in practical areas such as education; others effectively contributed to the survival of Mexico’s oil industry by purchasing “expropriated” petroleum products. In each case, the governments of the region calculated the political risks of their involvement with the nation that, depending upon their perspective, was seen either as the pariah of the Americas or the true leader of the region. Although this may not have been enough to secure Cárdenas’s unqualified leadership of Latin America, each of these instances was essential to maintaining Mexico’s good relations with its Latin American neighbours and in securing the eventual outcome of the expropriation. Moreover, his actions, and those of Mexican diplomats in Latin America, and the responses they met, galvanized his supporters in

Mexico and abroad, enhancing the moral authority of his government and its policies.

186

CHAPTER FIVE A TALE OF TWO CONFERENCES: THE III CONFERENCIA INTERAMERICANA DE EDUCACIÓN AND THE PRIMER CONGRESO INDIGENISTA INTERAMERICANO

In August 1937 the students of the Escuela Normal in Mexico City prepared a

performance entitled Revolución for the entertainment of the delegates to the III

Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, held in the capital. Performed on the main

stage of the Palacio de Bellas Artes, the show consisted of three acts that represented the

Revolutionary awakening of the masses in song and dance. At the climax, the students,

bathed in red stage-lighting, raised their fists and sang “The Internationale.” After the applause, the orchestra began the Communist anthem again and most spectators— including Minister of Education Gonzalo Vázquez Vela, Undersecretary of Education

Luis Chávez Orozco, and other high government officials—stood, raised their fists, and sang along. By contrast, the foreign diplomats attending the performance as part of their duties in representing their nations at the conference remained seated and did not sing or clap. Brazilian delegate Afonso Barbosa de Almeida Portugal commented that the impression caused by the spectacle would remain with him and the other international delegates for all their days.473 He reported to his government that many of the foreign

representatives thought it a great discourtesy and resented that the Mexican delegates had

insisted upon referring to them as “comrade” and “compañero” during the conference’s

473 Brazil, Arquivo Nacional (AN), Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, 1930-1945, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 1. This twelve-page memorandum, marked secret, is neither signed, addressed, nor dated, but because Almeida Portugal was the only Brazilian delegate to the conference listed (erroneously as Alfonso instead of Afonso) in its Memoria, it can be assumed he wrote it for the Itamaraty, or perhaps, given its location in the Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Getúlio Vargas. 187

proceedings.474 The Marxist language and Revolutionary symbols the Mexicans

employed rankled, so much so that even the entertainments prepared for the delegates

seemed completely inappropriate and objectionable, diminishing his already low opinion

of the Mexican government, its programme, and officials.

Almeida Portugal’s description of the III Conferencia Interamericana de

Educación provides an opening for analysis of the Mexican government’s use of inter-

American conferences as propaganda tools during the Cárdenas presidency. It numbered

among a long series of special technical meetings at which representatives of the Pan

American Union’s member states debated and made policy suggestions that the governments of the region could use in their attempts to address common problems.

During the Cárdenas era, the Mexican government participated extensively in the Pan

American Union and other multinational organisations such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation, often playing host to conferences affiliated with the inter-American System.475 In addition to the III Conferencia Interamericana de

Educación, these included the VII Congreso Panamericano del Niño, the VII Congreso

Científico Americano; the XXVII Congreso Internacional de Americanistas; the Primer

Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la Literatura Iberoamericana; the XVI

Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación; and the Primer Congreso

Indigenista Interamericano, among many others. Analysis of these meetings demonstrates

the role Cárdenas believed his government could play in multilateral organisations, as

474 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 5. 475 On Mexican participation in the Pan American Union and its special technical conferences see Carlos Marichal (ed.), México y las conferencias panamericanas, 1889-1938 (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002). 188

well as its use of international conferences in putting the achievements of the Mexican

Revolution on display. The government intended these political, social, and cultural

events to reinforce the image of Mexico as a leader in social policy, and hence inter-

American affairs. As such, they formed an integral part of the government’s efforts to

convince delegates from the rest of the Americas and their governments that Mexico

should be a hemispheric leader by virtue of the achievements of the Revolution in areas

as diverse as maternal and child welfare, educational policy, the organisation of labour, the construction of rural housing, the teaching of Ibero-American literature, and the resolution of the so-called indigenous problem. Their descriptions in the press and the

reports of the diplomats and intellectuals who attended them offer an account of the

results of the government’s attempt to shape international opinion and achieve a

leadership position in the region.

The primary responsibilities of Mexican ministers and ambassadors as they

related to the hosting of inter-American conferences included securing the meaningful

participation of American governments in the conferences held in Mexico in these years.

The question of representation directly affected a conference’s chances of success, both in technical and propagandistic terms. In an era of tight budgets and competing claims to national expenditures, many governments could not afford to send special representatives with relevant expertise to every international conference to which they received an invitation. As a result, ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d’affaires resident in the country often served as many governments’ official delegates. The trick, from the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to demonstrate that a conference was 189

of such importance that it necessitated representation of each country in the region by

experts in the field. To this end, the activities of the Ministry’s ambassadors and ministers

provided an essential service. Whereas diplomats demonstrated themselves to be fairly

reluctant students of the Revolutionary propaganda they met with, technical delegates

proved much more receptive. Because the members of the government ministries and

departments involved in the resolution of the social issues under consideration hoped to

work with their Latin American colleagues into the future, their participation in these

conferences benefited from and led to increased cooperation. Conference organisers

learned through experience that the importance of many international technical

conferences was not self-evident; governments needed to be convinced of their individual

merits. The planning that went into the organisation of conferences could therefore be as

important to a conference’s chances for success as the symbology the organisers employed once the delegates convened. Similarly, the ambassadors’ and ministers’ efforts to ensure the ratification of conventions passed and intellectual cooperation on the

issues discussed consolidated the conferences’ gains, helping to promote Mexican

leadership in inter-American relations. Although the Cárdenas government’s practice of

using technical meetings as propaganda tools sometimes had ambiguous results, when

supported by the pre- and post-conference activities of diplomats and intellectuals they

could help secure a leadership position for the Mexican government in inter-American

affairs.

190

III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación

Building upon the success of the VII Congreso Panamericano del Niño476 and the programme of intellectual cooperation that supported the government’s efforts to increase

its profile in the region, the Cárdenas government hosted the III Conferencia

Interamericana de Educación (CIE) in 1937 with the goal of showcasing the educational

advances it had achieved through its socialist education programme.477 The second such conference had taken place in Santiago de Chile in September 1934, before Cárdenas’s

476 On the VII Congreso Panamericano del Niño and the Pan-American Child Congresses, see Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Ramo Presidentes, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (LCR), Caja 454, Expediente 433/83; Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expedientes III-199-1 and AHGE, SRE, III-13-3; Nichole Sanders, “Protecting Mothers in Order to Protect Children’: The Seventh Pan-American Child Congress and the Latin American ‘Civlizing Mission,’” in Maternalism Reconsidered: Social Welfare in Twentieth Century History, ed. Rebecca Plant et al (Oxford: Berghahn Books, forthcoming); Nichole Sanders, “Gender, Welfare, and the ‘Mexican Miracle’: The Politics of Modernization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1937- 1958,” (PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 2003), Chapter 4; Donna J. Guy, “The Politics of Pan- American Cooperation: Maternalist Feminism and the Child Rights Movement, 1913-1960,” Gender & History 10:3 (November 1998): 449-469; Donna J. Guy, “The Pan American Child Congresses, 1916-1942: Pan Americanism, Child Reform, and the Welfare State in Latin America,” Journal of Family History 23:3 (July 1998): 272-291. 477 On educational policy and the socialist education programme, see Museo Casa Estudio Diego Rivera y Frida Kahlo, Misiones Culturales: los años utópicos, 1920-1938 (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1999); Isidro Castillo, México y su revolucón educativa 2 vols. (Mexico City: Academia Mexicana de la Educación, 1966); Jorge Rafael Mora Forero, Historia de una Reforma Educativa Socialista (Tunja: Ediciones CUPENAL, 1982); Victoria Lerner, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana v. 17 La educación socialista (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979); John A. Britton, Educación y radicalismo en México v. 2 Los años de Cárdenas (Mexico City: SEP, 1976); Guadalupe Monroy Huitron, Política educativa de la Revolución (Mexico City: SEP, 19750; Augsto Santiago Sierra, Las misiones culturales (1923-1973) (Mexico City: SEP, 1973); Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997); Susana Quintanilla and Mary Kay Vaughan, eds., Escuela y sociedad en el período cardenista (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997); Mary Kay Vaughan, “Nationalizing the Countryside: Schools and Rural Communities in the 1930s,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 157-175; Elsie Rockwell, “Schools of the Revolution: Enacting and Contesting State Forms in Tlaxcala, 1910-1930,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Moodern Mexico, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 170-208; Elsie Rockwell, Hacer escuela, hacer estado: la eduación posrevolucionaria vista desde Tlaxcala (Mexico City: CIESAS, 2007); María Candelaria Valdés Silva, Una sociedad en busca de alternativas: la educación socialista en La Laguna (Saltillo: Secretaría de Educación Pública de Coahuila, 1999); Juan Alfonseca, “Escuela y sociedad en los distritos de Texcoco y Chalco, 1923-40,” in Miradas en torno a la educación de ayer, ed. Luz E. Galván (Mexico City: COMIE, 1997); Salvador Camacho Sandoval, Controversia educativa entre la ideología y la fe: La educación socialista en la historia de Aguascalientes (Mexico City: CONACULTA, 1991). 191

inauguration. The Mexican delegation at that meeting had included Ambassador Adolfo

Cienfuegos y Camus and two educational delegates: Elena Torres, who gave a paper on the education of women, and Rafael Ramírez, who presented on the topic of rural

education.478 Fernando Murtinho Braga of the Brazilian delegation to that conference

acknowledged the importance of the Mexicans’ participation and their government’s

success in the realm of education when he suggested that the next meeting be held in

Mexico City.479 The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education began planning the

conference, which the Santiago delegates had resolved would take place in 1937, approximately one year in advance, appointing Manuel Palacios president of the organising committee. Although Minister of Education Gonzalo Vázquez Vela served as the committee’s honorary president, Palacios took charge of the local arrangements. In

February, the Ministry of Education asked for information on the state of education in each country, which the ambassadors and ministers then requested of the governments to which they were accredited.480 Because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled all

communication with foreign governments, the Ministry and its ambassadors and

ministers in the Americas played an instrumental role in the organisation of the conference.

478 Elena Torres’s paper was entitled “Educación femenina, con el fin de obtener que la mujer conserve sus características, sin disminuir el rol que desempeña en la vida moderna,” and Rafael Ramírez’s paper was entitled “La Educación Rural en México.” Cienfuegos y Camus responded to the Chilean Minister of Education’s speech at the opening ceremony. III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, Memoria de la III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación (Mexico City: DAPP, 1938), 7. Hereafter this source will be referred to as Memoria de la III CIE. 479 Ibid., 8. 480 See, for example, Mexico, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-70-3, Cravioto to Montalvo, February 10, 1937. 192

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged its ambassadors and ministers throughout

Latin America with the task of securing effective participation in the conference by each

country. The Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP) published the

official announcement and internal regulations of the conference in pamphlet form, and

in April 1937 the Ministry instructed the ambassadors and ministers to distribute these

and issue formal invitations to the governments of the region.481 The diplomats began propaganda campaigns promoting the conference that both encouraged the governments to name delegates in a timely manner and raised public interest in the conference and its expected results.

When reporting in March 1935 on the invitation to participate in the XII Congreso

Panamericano del Niño, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Carlos García Vélez had written

that the conference represented an excellent opportunity for his government to study both

scientific advances in children’s health and welfare and the programmes and institutions

charged with these responsibilities that had been established by the Mexican

government.482 Correspondence between the Cuban foreign minister and other

government departments followed regarding the naming of delegates, but Ambassador

García Vélez nevertheless served as Cuba’s official delegate. Two years later, Cuban

relations with Mexico had strengthened greatly, and whether due to genuine interest in

the conference, its relative geographical proximity, or the desire to increase ties between

481 See, for example, the official invitation to the Cuban government. Cuba, Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 514, Expediente 11838, Cravioto to Remos, April 21, 1937. The convocatoria and reglamento interior were published as the first issue of the Boletín de la III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937). 482 Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009692, García Vélez to Barnet, March 22, 1935. 193

the two countries, the Cuban government chose as head of its delegation Minister of

Education Dr. Fernando Sirgo. Mexican Ambassador to Cuba Alfonso Cravioto

expressed great satisfaction with the decision; he considered arranging for a sitting

Minister of Education to attend the conference quite a diplomatic coup. He suggested that

the organising committee should ensure a special reception for Sirgo upon his arrival in

Veracruz, in recognition of the distinction his appointment represented for the Mexican

government.483

The night before Sirgo’s departure, Cravito hosted a banquet attended by the

Minister of Foreign Affairs, the newly-appointed Ambassador to Mexico, the President of the Academia Nacional de Artes y Ciencias, and several other diplomats and intellectuals.

Cravioto also invited noted Mexican violinist Celia Treviño, who had stopped in Cuba on

her way to perform in the United States.484 Special delegates Dr. Matilde Cruz Planas of

the Amigos de la Escuela Nueva and the Associación Pedagógica Universitaria, Aurora

García de Rodríguez of the Universidad de la Habana, Esther Fernández de Beltrán of the

Escuela Normal de la Habana, Dr. Joaquín Añorga of the Escuela Profesional de

Comercio, and Manuela Fonseca de García of the Escuela Normal de Santiago de Cuba

rounded out the Cuban delegation, serving as technical representatives to the conference.

As a result, Cuba held the position as the country with the most representatives to the

conference, after Mexico and the United States, demonstrating both the Cuban

government’s interest and growing expertise in educational matters and the effectiveness

483 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XIX), telegram from Cravioto to SRE, August 11, 1937. 484 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Monthly report for August 1937, Cravioto to SRE, September 11, 1937. 194

of Cravioto’s campaign in favour of the III CIE. 485 Upon his return, Sirgo hosted a reception at the Hotel Nacional in honour of Cravioto, in recognition of the hospitality he had received at the conference, or perhaps, as we shall see, to calm the diplomatic waters after an unfortunate incident marred his time as head of the Cuban delegation to the III

Conferencia Interamericana de Educación.486

The campaigns of most of the other Mexican ambassadors and ministers to Latin

America did not succeed nearly as well, despite their best efforts. The chargé d’affaires in

Paraguay, Domingo Trapani, publicised the conference in Asunción’s dailies, El Día and

La Nación, in hopes of pressuring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to name a delegate, but in the end only the Paraguayan Minister to Mexico, Anselmo Jover, attended the conference.487 The Honduran government originally resolved not to send any representatives to the conference, but chargé d’affaires Salvador Brom Rojas eventually convinced them to name their Minister to Mexico, Edgardo Valenzuela.488 The

Venezuelan government named Professor Luis Padrino, who was already in Mexico, commissioned to study the rural education programme by his government. Perhaps because Mexican chargé d’affaires Salvador Navarro Aceves intimated that the

Venezuelan government rarely sent delegates to Mexico while often sending representatives to other, often much more distant, conferences, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs eventually also named Drs. Juan Jones Parra and Antonio Domingo Narváez as

485 Memoria de la III CIE, 30-42. 486 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Monthly report for September 1937, Cravioto to SRE, October 2, 1937. 487 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (VI), Trapani to Hay, 26 May 1937. 488 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (X), Brom Rojas to Hay, June 19, 1937 195

delegates.489 Nevertheless, at the last minute, both cancelled their participation, the first because of illness and the second because he found himself unable to abandon his responsibilities as Minister of Public Works.490

In the face of low projected attendance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs secured a

reduced rate of 50 percent on national railways for delegates to the conference in the

hope that this would help offset the high cost of attendance and encourage more countries

to send educational delegates. Ambassadors and ministers to Latin America duly

forwarded this information to the governments to which they were accredited, but it had

little effect. The Ecuadorian chargé d’affaires in Mexico City, César Coloma, wrote that

this gesture typified the hospitality that foreign representatives received from the

Mexican government, but in the end he remained the only delegate from Ecuador at the

III CIE.491 Three delegates from Chile took advantage of the special rate, but this does not seem to have been the deciding factor in their participation, as the several Chilean delegates had been named well in advance of the announcement of this financial assistance, not surprising given that the last conference had been held in Santiago.492 The subvention did help two representatives from the Costa Rican organisation Maestros

Unidos to attend the conference. Jesús Vega of Maestros Unidos had written to the

Mexican chargé d’affaires in San José regarding the availability of financial support for

Latin American delegates, and in response the Ministry of Education resolved to pay for

489 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (I), Navarro Aceves to Hay, July 6, 1937. 490 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (I), Navarro Aceves to Hay, August 18, 1937. 491 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XV), Coloma to Hay, August 14, 1937. 492 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XVIII), Bianchi to Hay, September 9, 1937. 196

the expenses of two delegates from Maestros Unidos during the conference.493 Coupled with the 50 percent reduction in travel within Mexico, this must surely have helped the organisation send representatives.494 Nevertheless, they did not form part of the official

Costa Rican delegation or have voting rights at the III CIE. In the first plenary session of the conference, Raúl Cordero Amador of the organisation made clear his allegiance to

Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Perhaps his organisation’s politics had influenced the

Ministry of Education’s decision to help him financially and the Costa Rican government’s reluctance to fund his travels.495 In all, thirteen Latin American governments merely named members of their diplomatic missions as official delegates to the conference; only Cuba, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and the United States sent special educational representatives.

Interested parties who wanted to see the III Conferencia Interamericana de

Educación succeed supplemented the efforts of Mexican diplomats to encourage the meaningful representation of each country. The Salvadoran government initially named only its Minister to Mexico, Dr. Héctor Escobar Serrano, as delegate, but the Salvadoran

Consul General in Mexico City, Francisco Osegueda, sent a letter to the editor of La

Prensa (San Salvador) exhorting the government to appoint technical delegates instead of diplomats unfamiliar with the field of education.496 In response to his appeal, Gustavo

Solano and Cristóbal Colíndres represented the Facultad de Jurisprudencia y Ciencias

493 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XXI), Vega to Martínez de Alva, May 27, 1937; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XXI), Palacios to Hay, July 16, 1937. 494 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XXI), González Rojas to Vega, August 3, 1937. 495 Memoria de la III CIE, 61. 496 Agrarian and educational themes interested Osegueda. See Francisco Osegueda “La vida del campesino salvadoreño de otros tiempos y la del campesino actual,” Revista del Ateneo de El Salvador 20 (1932). 197

Sociales and the Facultad de Ingeniería of the Universidad de El Salvador at the III

CIE.497 Haiti’s representation at the conference, on the other hand, seems almost

accidental. The diplomatic correspondence between José Vázquez Schiaffino, Mexico’s

minister in Santo Domingo, and the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that

the Haitian government resolved not to send a delegate.498 Nevertheless, the Memoria of

the conference lists Madeleine Sylvain as their representative. Sylvain had received a

scholarship to study at Bryn Mawr and would later go on to write L’éducation des

femmes en Haïti and work for the United Nations.499 She also represented the Pan

American Union’s Inter-American Commission of Women at the conference and,

because of the PAU’s vested interest in its success, she surely travelled to Mexico on

their funds and not those of the Haitian government.

Sylvain numbered among the many women who participated in the conference.

The delegation from Chile included Gertrudis Muñoz de Ebensperger and Dr. Martha

Arcaya Vargas of the Escuela Normal in Santiago. Many Mexican women also

participated, though they were in the minority. The official delegation of sixty-four

included five women; the delegations from the states of Campeche, Durango, and Sinaloa

each included one woman; and twenty-four of the eighty-seven representatives from

government departments and institutions were female, including Elena Torres, who

represented the Asociación Universitaria Mexicana. Elena Picazo de Murray of the

497 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (III), chargé d’affaires Federico Cáceres to Hay, June 18, 1937; Memoria de la III CIE, 32. 498 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XI). 499 Madeleine Sylvain Bouchereau, L’education des femmes en Haïti (Port-au-Prince: Impr. De l’Etat, 1944); Haïti et ses femmes: une étude d’évolution culturelle (Port-au-Prince: Les Presses libres, 1957). Memoria de la III CIE, 33. 198

Departamento de Secundarias served as secretary of the third section of the conference,

which dealt with secondary education.500 Female representation at the conference demonstrates nominal government recognition of the important role that women played in the field of education in Revolutionary Mexico.501 The increasing preponderance of women in educational circles also held true for the rest of the hemisphere. Katherine M.

Cook headed the US delegation to the III CIE. She gave a salutary address at the inauguration and in the first plenary session the delegate from Nicaragua nominated her president of the first section of the conference, dealing with maternal and pre-school education. Although Cook initially demurred because she did not speak Spanish,

Palacios, as head of the Mexican delegation, seconded the nomination given the availability of interpreters, and the vote met with unanimous approval.502 Unfortunately,

only three papers had been submitted in advance of the conference for the consideration

of her section, as opposed to the thirty-four papers that had been submitted for the ninth

section on general topics headed by the delegate from Brazil, Afonso Barbosa de

Almeida Almeida Portugal. Nevertheless, Cook’s influence and that of her colleagues

assured them an important role in the conference’s deliberations. US representation also

included Esther J. Crooks of the American Council on Education, Dorothy Epplen of the

University of Oregon, Katherine Briggs and Guadalupe Ramírez of the National Board of

500 Memoria de la III CIE, passim. 501 See Mary Kay Vaughan, “Women School Teachers in the Mexican Revolution: The Story of Reyna’s Braids,” Journal of Women’s History 2:1 (Spring 1990): 143-168; Mary Kay Vaughan, “Rural Women’s Literacy and Educaion during the Mexican Revolution: Subverting a Patriarchal Event?” in Women of the Mexican Countryside, 1850-1990, ed. Heather Fowler-Salamini and Mary Kay Vaughan (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992); Stephanie J. Smith, “Educating the Mothers of the Nation: The Project of Revolutionary Education in Yucatán,” in The Women’s Revolution in Mexico, 1910-1953, ed. Stephanie Mitchell and Patience A. Schell (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 37-51. 502 Memoria de la III CIE, 77. 199

Young Women’s Christian Associations, Mary Helen McCrea of the American Library

Association in Chicago, Mrs. Charner M. Perry of the University of Chicago’s

International Journal of Ethics and, in addition to Madeleine Sylvain, five women from

the Inter American Commission of Women. Concha Romero James of the Pan American

Union presented on the topic of intellectual cooperation in the Americas.503 The

prevalence of female representatives from Washington D.C. certainly derived from the

PAU’s headquarters there.

The relatively large number of delegates from Chicago may have been due to the

fact that Robert Redfield represented the American Sociological Society at the

conference. Redfield numbered among the many distinguished delegates to the conference who presented papers in the nine sections into which the delegates divided

their work. The eminent Colombian writer Jorge Zalamea, who had studied in Mexico

and was then serving as President Alfonso López Pumarejo’s Secretario Particular

(Private Secretary), gave a paper, as did exiled Peruvian intellectual José Antonio

Encinas, who had previously served as rector of the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San

Marcos. The Bolivian government had originally proposed naming Encinas as one of

their delegates, but decided against it so as not to ruffle any diplomatic feathers among

the Peruvians. Encinas therefore attended as an observer only, but nonetheless

participated actively in the conference’s deliberations.504

503 Concha Romero James, “La cooperación intelectual en América, 1933-1936,” Trabajo presentado a la Tercera Conferencia Interamericana de Eduación, México, D.F., Agosoto 22-29, 1937. 504 See, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2340-1 (XXIII), telegram from Rosenzweig Díaz to SRE, August 17, 1937. 200

It seems clear that among the primary goals of the Cárdenas government in

hosting the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, propaganda ranked highest.

Undersecretary of Education Luis Chávez Orozco’s opening address, which he delivered

in the absence of President Cárdenas and Minister Vela, set the tone for the conference in

this regard.505 Although Chávez Orozco said he was well aware of the protocol that

limited his responsibilities to greeting the delegates on behalf of the host nation, he

decided to abandon that practice and launch instead into a thorough explanation of the

socialist education programme.506 He described socialist education’s evolution, aiming to

demonstrate that it did not arise from the imposition of foreign ideologies but rather socio-economic circumstances. Beginning with the colonial era, he analysed the class struggle, culminating in an explanation of the Revolution and its educational aims, which he said aimed to further the broader goal of transforming the relations of production in society.507 During the following week, teeming groups of Mexican delegates expounded

upon the Cárdenas government’s progress in achieving this transformation of society by

giving presentations to the relevant working groups on advances in areas such as

agricultural education, primary education, secondary education, the organisation of rural

schools, and the education of workers and their children.508 The organising committee

505 The organising committee invited Cárdenas to preside over the inaugural session of the conference, but the President was in the Yucatán on one of his frequent giras. See AGN, LCR, Caja 453, Expediente 433/35, telegram from Palacios to Cárdenas, August 17, 1937. 506 “Discurso pronunciado por el señor Luis Chávez Orozco, Subsecretario de Educacíon Pública de México, en la sesión solemne inaugural celebrada el domingo 22 de agosot de 1937,” Memoria de la III CIE, 45. 507 Ibid., 49. 508 See III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, Delegación oficial del Gobierno mexicano, (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937), which includes pamphlets of Mexican papers entitled “La educación agrícola y normal rural,” “La Educación Primaria en el Distrito Federal,” “La Enseñanza Secundaria en México,” “La 201

also arranged for the delegates to participate in daily field trips to model schools in the

Federal District in order to showcase the facilities and methods they promoted in their conference papers. Delegates visited the Escuela Nacional de Maestros, the Centro

Escolar “Revolución,” the Escuela Industrial “Hijos del Ejército,” the Escuela Secundaria

No. 1, and the Parque Lira, which housed schools for malnourished, developmentally delayed, and disabled children.509 All these activities had been designed with the goal of impressing upon the delegates that Mexico provided excellent guidance to governments struggling to overcome similar socio-economic problems in their own countries.

Shortly before the beginning of the conference, Jorge Zalamea gave an interview to the Mexico City daily El Universal that suggested that this propaganda campaign might be successful. He considered Mexico’s socialist education exemplary for Colombia and the rest of the Americas, where the implementation of reforms to Article 3 of the

Constitution of 1917 had been observed with great interest.510 He expressed particular interest in the rural education programme that promised to incorporate the indigenous population into the nation and said he hoped to have the opportunity to visit educational institutions in the capital and beyond. Zalamea had great optimism at the beginning of the conference, but the reports of several delegates written after the fact suggest that, for many, it did not meet these high hopes.

Many of the foreign representatives did not take kindly to the heavy-handed propaganda techniques the government employed at the III Conferencia Interamericana

organización de las escuelas rurales,” and “Síntesis de Labores del Departamento de Educación Obrera.” Also see the ponencias found in AGN, LCR, Caja 453, Expediente 433/35. 509 Memoria de la III CIE, 23-4. 510 “La Escuela Socialista,” El Universal (Mexico City), August 21, 1937, 1. 202

de Educación. Chilean Ambassador Manuel Bianchi believed that the government’s objective had been to take advantage of the conference to increase the prestige of the

socialist education programme. He complained to his government that Mexicans had

outnumbered the international delegates in most sessions ten to one.511 Although the

internal regulations of the conference had stipulated that voting would take place by

country, not by delegate, many sections dispensed with this rule and on occasion, fifteen

to twenty Mexicans out-voted the few foreign delegates in attendance who had

reservations about the resolutions.512

The Brazilian delegate’s critique of the conference and the methods of the

Mexican government were even more pointed. In his confidential report on the III CIE,

Afonso Barbosa de Almeida Portugal railed to his government about the objectionable nature of the conference. It became apparent to him from the first plenary session that the

politics of the Cárdenas government and its most vocal adherents would interfere with the

smooth functioning of the III CIE.513 Instead of beginning by electing the conference’s

president, the verbose labour leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano took the stage and

proposed a resolution condemning the removal from their positions of tenured professors

who held revolutionary ideals, a practice that had become common in the polemical

political atmosphere of most Latin American countries.514 Although Lombardo Toledano

511 Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1587 B, Bianchi to Ministro, September 21, 1937. 512 Ibid. 513 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 9. 514 The Memoria of the conference states that this debate occurred after the election of Palacios as President and the choice of presidents of the sections, but Portugal states that because of “some confusion” or perhaps on purpose, Lombardo Toledano spoke before any of this business had been conducted. Memoria de la III CIE, passim. 203

served as Rector of the Universidad Obrera and an educational delegate to the

conference, he spoke in the name of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México

(CTM) and the 83,000 educational workers in Mexico.515 Most of the diplomats thought

of him as the red labour leader whose machinations in the Latin American labour

movement had been a thorn in their governments’ sides.516 They considered his

suggestions an anathema to the goals and attitudes of the generally conservative

governments they represented. Several diplomatic representatives attempted to find some

common ground on the resolution, while hoping to prevent offence being taken by the

delegates whose governments had engaged in politically-motivated dismissals. Jorge

Zalamea suggested a friendly amendment to the resolution, declaring instead la cátedra

libre, freedom of expression for tenured university professors.517 While several diplomats supported this suggestion, many educational delegates, such as Raúl Cordero Amador of the Maestros Unidos de Costa Rica, resisted the change in wording because it would not have specifically chastised the repressive practices of right-wing governments in the region. Fernando Sirgo had himself been forced out of the professoriate in the past, but he attempted to diffuse the situation by suggesting that the resolution be forwarded for study to the appropriate section of the conference for consideration.518 The long and divisive

debate raged on. When the voting finally took place, Rosa Pastora Leclerc, one of the

members of the Cuban delegation who had been fired from her position in 1935 and only

515 See Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Obra educativa 3 vols. (Mexico City: Instituto Politécnico Nacional/Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Políticos y Sociales Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 2002). 516 See Daniela Spenser, “Vicente Lombardo Toledano envuelto en antagonismos internacionales,” Revista Izquierdas 3:4 (2009): 1-19. 517 Memoria de la III CIE, 61. 518 Memoria de la III CIE, 86. 204

reinstated in January 1937, broke ranks with Sirgo and said that as a result of this

experience, she urged her delegation to support Lombardo Toledano’s resolution in the

name of persecuted Cuban teachers.519 In the end, the resolution passed, with Chile,

Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, El

Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela in favour, and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba,

Guatemala, and the United States abstaining (the Bolivian and Peruvian delegates had not

been present during the vote).

The ideological lines had been drawn. As the delegates discussed the resolution at

great length it became clear that sharp differences of opinion would fuel the debates in the coming week. Brazilian representative Almeida Portugal had abstained entirely from the debate during the first plenary session and he reported that it had left many delegates who simultaneously exercised diplomatic functions in Mexico with the impression that the government had attempted to impose its ideas upon the delegates.520 In his opinion,

this created a “hostile environment” not conducive to the discussion of the simplest of

issues. Whenever a proposal unfriendly to its position came up, an immediate chill, provoked by the numerosíssima Mexican delegation, came over the assembly. At one point, their intransigent attitude threatened to derail the entire conference, an eventuality only avoided by the timely intervention of Minister of Education Gonzalo Vázquez

Vela.521

519 Memoria de la III CIE, 97. 520 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 1- 5. 521 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 5. 205

“Mexico no se propone imponer sus sistemas,” proclaimed the headline of a front- page article in El Universal, but the editors of the daily and the foreign delegates alike remained unconvinced.522 Vázquez Vela’s speech to the delegates upon his return from the Yucatán, where he had been on a tour with President Cárdenas, recognised that each delegate should vote according to the instructions he had received from his government.

Mexico’s educational system resulted from its particular historical evolution, and likewise, each country in the Americas should pursue educational reform pursuant to its own unique circumstances. He remained confident that the overall result of the conference would be to contribute to the betterment of education throughout the continent.523 His calming words and presence did not diminish the often heated debate that raged in the sessions at the Palacio de Bellas Artes and in the press. Alfonso Junco of

El Universal took the opportunity to editorialise on the idea of socialist education, which he remained certain was being held up as an example for the rest of the continent to follow.524 He found it ironic that the fiery discussion of the situation of persecuted professors would have turned to a discussion of educational freedom, which he argued did not exist in Mexico. Although Lombardo Toledano had said in the course of the debate that only conservative governments had a history of persecuting teachers, Junco argued that the imposition of socialist education, which did not permit parents to educate their children according to their own ideas and beliefs, demonstrated that religious education met the same persecution in Mexico that socialist education met in other

522 “Mexico no se propone imponer sus sistemas,” El Univeral, August 28, 1937, 1. 523 Ibid. 524 Alfonso Junco, “La Conferencia Interamericana y la Educación Socialista,” El Universal, August 28, 1937, 3. 206

countries.525 Junco’s critique of the government’s position at the conference exemplified what many delegates already understood from the international propaganda campaign that had followed the announcement of socialist education in 1934: its implementation met great resistance in many quarters. The task of the Mexican government then was to demonstrate that, despite this resistance, the socialist education programme had made great strides and deserved to be emulated.

Once again, the Brazilian delegate remained unimpressed, and if his experiences

were at all typical, the visits of delegates to schools in the D.F. may have actually

backfired.526 During a visit to the Escuela República de Brasil, Almeida Portugal was

appalled when one of the students who could not answer a question his teacher had posed

received the immediate assistance of one of his classmates, who gave him the answer so

that he could respond correctly. He believed that the collective impulse of the Mexican

educational system had removed the necessary stimulus to individual student

performance.527 To his horror, the 5th year students he visited performed a rendition of

“The Internationale,” although the effect this caused was mediated somewhat when the

4th year students sang the Brazilian national hymn and one little girl, in excellent

Portuguese, delivered a short speech asking him to extend a greeting to the children of

Brazil.528 When the school’s director, Loredo Ortega, suggested an educational exchange

525 Memoria de la III CIE, 93; Junco, “La Conferencia Interamericana,” 3. 526 For a newspaper report of one such visit, see “Escuela Modelo,” El Universal, August 28, 1937, 2nd section, 1. 527 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 10. Also on the Escuela República de Brasil see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-342-24. 528 For other examples of the use of children as cultural ambassadors see Elena Jackson Albarrán, “Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen, 1920-1940” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2008), Chapter 6. 207

between five of his teachers and five Brazilian educators, Almeida Portugal avoided

responding. He believed that Brazilian teachers had nothing to learn from their Mexican counterparts because of the absolute disparity in the methods they employed.529

Almeida Portugal’s report on the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación

remained confidential and his outspoken critique of the Mexican delegation and

educational system did not come to the attention of his hosts. The criticism of Fernando

Sirgo, the star guest at the conference, by contrast, became public, much to the dismay of

the conference’s organisers. After the conference’s closing, the Mexico City weekly Hoy printed an interview with Sirgo, in which he stated that the III CIE had been a complete and utter failure.530 Sirgo had agreed to give the magazine an interview on August 28, but

had arrived late to the meeting because the afternoon’s session had run long. When

giving his excuses, he explained in a humorous manner that the proceedings had no fixed

schedule and anyone who wanted to speak was given an opportunity, which several

speakers chose to do by deviating from the topics under discussion. He concluded by

saying that he had never seen a bigger waste of time and there was nothing he could do

but put up with it.531 Sirgo’s comments must have come as a shock to the organisers, who counted him as one of their most faithful collaborators. Palacios immediately issued a statement from the Ministry of Education that contrasted the comments attributed to

Sirgo with the solemn words he had spoken at the conference. Referring to the shorthand version of the proceedings and debates of the III CIE, Palacios quoted Sirgo as having

529 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 10. 530 Hoy (Mexico City), no. 29, September 11, 1937, 17. 531 Ibid. 208

said in the closing session that all of the delegates should feel proud of their contribution

to the solution of educational problems that affected the whole continent, and that their

hard work had been rewarded by the conference’s real achievements.532 Nevertheless, as

El Universal editorialised, the words spoken by Sirgo while wearing his diplomatic hat at

the conference could not be compared to the off-hand remarks he made to the reporter.533

Given the prevailing characteristics of the ruling governments in Latin America, Mexico seemed to the delegates an alarmingly radical country, and whether they approved of the conference’s more controversial resolutions out of politeness, knowing full well that their governments could reject them after the fact, made fun of the earnestness of the Mexican delegates’ soliloquies, or pronounced their reservations “with a Portuguese accent,” the government could be assured that many of the representatives of the American republics would seek to err on the side of caution by downplaying the importance of the conference.534 Although certainly correct, El Universal’s editorial underestimated the

objections of some of the delegates.

Chilean Ambassador Bianchi, who discussed Sirgo’s declarations in his report on

the conference, said that the Cuban Minister’s estimation of the conference’s failings

contained more than a grain of truth, and reflected the real difficulties that met the foreign

delegates who faced an overwhelming Mexican propaganda effort.535 The Cuban chargé

d’affaires wrote home about the incident and explained that Sirgo officially denied

having made the remarks. Nevertheless, the damage had been done. After the publication

532 “Aseversaciones Atribuídas al Miistro Doctor Sirgo,” El Universal, September 11, 1937, 2nd section, 4. 533 “Por el ojo de la llave,” El Universal, September 14, 1937, 3. 534 Ibid. 535 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1587 B, Bianchi to Ministro, September 21, 1937. 209

of Sirgo’s comments in Hoy, representatives of the Liga de Escritores y Artistas

Revolucionarios (LEAR) protested in the government newspaper El Nacional, calling his outburst offensive to the progressive spirit that had inspired the conference participants.

La Prensa, on the other hand, agreed that the conference had been a waste of time.536 His comments, whether taken out of context or a true representation of his feelings about the conference, created a public and diplomatic debate regarding the results of the III CIE and the Mexican government’s use of technical conferences as propaganda tools.

Although Mexican Ambassador to Cuba Alfonso Cravioto’s report on the banquet Sirgo offered in honour of the Mexican Embassy at the Hotel Nacional September 22 following his return to the island did not include many details, the reception must have been rather tense, given the stir he had left behind in Mexican capital.537

Despite the general depreciation of the conference among its foreign delegates and the controversy Sirgo’s comments caused, the delegates to the III Conferencia

Interamericana de Educación did pass a total of seventy-four resolutions on the topic of educational policy and intellectual cooperation in the Americas, some of which had important consequences.538 The fifteenth gave explicit support to the movement in favour of the civil and political rights of women throughout the hemisphere and the sixteenth

536 Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 514, Expediente 11838, García Mesa to Remos, September 14, 1937. 537 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-24-3, Monthly report for August 1937, Cravioto to SRE, September 11, 1937. The newspaper report he included is similarly silent on the matter. “En el Hotel Nacional.” El Mundo (Havana), September 30, 1937. 538 Conferencias Internacionales Americanas: Primer Suplmento, 1938-1942 (Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1990 [Washington, DC: Dotación Carnegie para la paz internacional, 1943]), 281; III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, Resoluciones Aprobadas (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937). 210

commended President Cárdenas for his declarations in favour of women’s suffrage.539 As

Francesca Miller has demonstrated, Latin American feminists made great strides at inter-

American conferences by pushing for resolutions that bound their governments to promote the equality of women in their home countries, and their success in doing so at

III CIE lends support to her conclusions.540 The sense of optimism these resolutions created must have been heightened by the fact that the political situation of women, and the proposed amendment to the Constitution of 1917 allowing female suffrage, received significant positive attention in the Mexican press during the conference.541 Although the

amendment eventually succumbed to Cárdenas’s opposition, this outcome could not have

been foreseen during the heady atmosphere of the III CIE.

Indigenous issues received even greater attention. The new Bolivian minister to

Mexico, Alfredo Sanjinés, ably represented his government at the conference, giving an

important speech on the topic of indigenous education and serving as president of the

section that dealt with that topic.542 The III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación

numbered in a long line of congresses that passed resolutions in support of holding an

inter-American meeting devoted specifically to the status of the indigenous peoples of the

Americas. First proposed at the VII Pan American Conference in Montevideo (1933) and

seconded by the VII Congreso Científico Americano held in Mexico in 1935, after the III

539 Brazil, AN, Fundo Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República, Lata 118, memorandum, n.d. [1937?], 7- 8. 540 Francesca Miller, “Latin American Feminism and the Transnational Arena,” in Women, Culture, and Politics in Latin America, ed. Emilie L. Bergmann et al, 10-26 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 541 See, for example, “Tendrán las mujeres, como los hombres, derechos políticos,” El Universal, August 27, 1937, 1. 542 See, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (IX), “Discurso del Exmo, Sr. Dr. Don Alfredo Sanjinéz, presidente de la sección octava de Educación Indígena de grupos socialmente retrasados, y delegado de Bolivia.” 211

CIE the idea also received the explicit support of the VIII Pan American Conference in

Lima (1938).543 During the speech he gave in the section he directed, Sanjinés discussed

the proposed congress and called for the restitution of lands to indigenous communities

throughout the Americas.544 Upon reporting to the general assembly on the work of his

section, he discussed the many papers presented by delegates of diverse national origins,

and described Mexico as a continental example in the field of indigenous education.545

He also described the efforts of the Bolivian government in addressing the so-called

indigenous problem, the participants in which were so busy, he noted, that they had been unable to abandon their work to come to Mexico for the conference.546 In recognition of

Bolivian advances, and Sanjinés’s own contribution to the III CIE, the assembly resolved

unanimously that the first inter-American conference on indigenous issues should meet in

La Paz on August 6 (Bolivian Independence Day) the following year.547 Despite the

sincere interest and enthusiasm that indigenous issues had found at the III CIE, this plan

met with frustration and the Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano eventually

convened at Pátzcuaro, Michoacán in April 1940. At first glance, the change in locale seems surprising given the fallout of the public and diplomatic discussion caused by the

Mexican government’s hosting of the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación.

543 Conferencias Internacionales Americanas, 297; Marichal, México y las Conferencias Panamericanas, 171-173. 544 “Estudio de los problemas del indígena,” El Universal, August 25, 1937, 5. 545 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2339-16 (IX), “Discurso del Exmo, Sr. Dr. Don Alfredo Sanjinéz, presidente de la sección octava de Educación Indígena de grupos socialmente retrasados, y delegado de Bolivia,” 2. 546 Ibid. 547 “Trece resolucioes tomó la conferencia,” El Universal, August 29, 1937, 12. 212

Regardless of the achievements of the conference in the fields of women’s rights

and indigenous education, the overall impression left by the Mexican government’s effort

to spearhead educational change in the Americas had been fairly negative. The theatrics

that representative Almeida Portugal of Brazil so abhorred and the interminable speeches that irked Sirgo of Cuba certainly played a role in leaving a bad taste in the delegates’ mouths. Frequent articles in the press that detailed labour unrest in the education sector must also have caused delegates to suspect that all was not well in the Mexican education system.548 Most shocking of all may have been the news of the death by electrocution of

one of the famous niños de Morelia at the special school allocated for the education of

the exiled children of Spain in Michoacán.549 The Mexican government’s acceptance of

the young refugees had been the cause of widespread acclaim among Leftist intellectuals,

workers, and Spanish expatriate groups throughout the Americas. News that even these

most favoured students of Cárdenas were not receiving the model education and upbringing that the Mexican government claimed existed for children throughout the

republic may have given even those sympathetic to Cárdenas and his programmes reason

to pause before accepting wholesale the leadership of the Mexican government in the

realm of education.550 A general sense emerged that the Mexican government used

conferences as propaganda tools in an unfair and heavy-handed manner for the promotion

548 See for example, “Huelga del profesorado,” El Universal, August 23, 1937, 1. “Manifiesto a los meastros,” El Universal, August 28, 1937, 11; “Maestros inconformes con los descuentos,” El Universal, August 29, 1937, 12; Un Intento más Para Unificar al Magisterio en Jalisco,” El Universal, August 30, 1937, 5. 549 “Murió uno de los niños traídos de España,” El Universal, August 21, 1937, 2nd section, 1; “Fué Inhumado el Niño Español Muerto en Trágico Accidente,” El Universal, August 22, 1937, 13. Also see, “El Problema de los Niños Españoles Continúa: Actos de Indisciplina,” El Universal, August 31, 1937, 1. 550 On the niños de Morelia see Albarrán, “Children of the Revolution,” 267-283. 213

of its ideology and programmes. Dr. Glen Levin Swiggett, organiser of the First Inter-

American Conference on Education held in Atlanta in 1929 in conjunction with the 67th

meeting of the National Education Association, deplored the Mexican government’s

organisation of the conference, which he said took on an excessively local character.551

On the whole, the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación seems to have been a failure, particularly as it related to the Cárdenas government’s goal of presenting Mexico as an example to follow in social questions and a leader in inter-American relations.

The Politics of Inter-American Conference Locations

Between the III Conferencia Interamericana de Educación of August 1937 and the

Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano of April 1940 the Mexican government’s uses and abuses of technical conferences remained the subject of discussion and debate.

Although countries continued to send delegates to the conferences held in Mexico on a case-by-case basis, depending upon their interest in the matters under discussion (for example, the Cuban government enthusiastically sent delegates to the XVI Congreso

Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitación held in Mexico in January 1938), international participation in the conferences held in Mexico decreased drastically.552

This garnered severe comment in the press and in diplomatic circles. In one important instance, it cost the Mexican government the chance to host an international conference that its representatives felt it deserved to hold in recognition of the advances the Cárdenas

551 Conferencias Internacionales Americanas, 412. 552 On Cuban participation in the XVI Congreso Internacional de Planificación y de la Habitaciónn see Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 476, Expediente 10739. 214

government had made in organisation of workers: the Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo

de los Estados de América, Miembros de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. In

the intervening years between the III CIE and the PCII, the Cárdenas government suffered from this poor record in its handling of inter-American meetings. When the arrangements for the first inter-American indigenous conference, originally scheduled for

La Paz, fell through, this necessitated the redoubling of efforts to ensure the success of the conference in its Mexican venue.

Chilean chargé d’affaires Miguel Cruchaga Ossa, commenting on the poor

projected attendance for the Primer Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la

Literatura Iberoamericana scheduled to be held in Mexico City in August 1938, said that

it seemed curious to many that the United States had demonstrated more interest in the

conference—as evidenced by the large number of US delegates—than Latin American

countries.553 Aside from Mexico and Cuba (and a large delegation from Puerto Rico), the remaining Latin American governments delegated members of their diplomatic missions instead of the authors and intellectuals the Mexican government had invited, something

Cruchaga said had become typical.554 The majority apparently feared that the conference

would devolve into political controversies that would undermine the productivity of the

meeting. Cruchaga, whose reports generally exhibited fairly unrestrained criticism of the

Cárdenas government, suggested that the general feeling among his colleagues was that

the Mexican government’s abuse of technical conferences had lowered the prestige of

553 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Cruchaga to Ministro, July 23, 1938. 554 See the call for papers, Primer Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la Literatra Iberoamericana, Convocatoria y Reglamento Interior (Mexico City: Imprenta Universitaria, 1937). 215

such events, resulting in a distinct lack of interest on the part of most Latin American governments. In August alone, eleven congresses on various topics had apparently been scheduled. Moreover, because the Cárdenas government used these congresses for propaganda and encouraged the adoption of Mexican ideas and policies, they were rarely productive. Cruchaga explicitly mentioned the III CIE as an example of one such conference that, in the opinion of the Chilean delegates, had resulted in few practical outcomes because of this tendency.555 Although Cruchaga’s observations could be interpreted as the remarks of an opponent of Revolutionary change, his concerns echoed in more sympathetic circles as well, suggesting that this perception had become a problem for the Cárdenas government.

Shortly before the Primer Congreso Internacional de la Enseñanza de la Literatura

Iberoamericana, Mexico’s delegate to the twenty-fourth meeting of the International

Labour Organisation (ILO), Primo Villa Michel, wrote to Foreign Minister Hay from

Geneva to report that it had been suggested that a second meeting of the American members of the ILO be held to follow up on that which had occurred in Santiago de Chile in 1936. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who happened to be in Geneva during his trip to

Europe following the oil expropriation that March, immediately suggested that this meeting be held in Mexico City.556 Hay telegraphed Ramón Beteta, who had travelled to

Tampico with President Cárdenas on another of his famous tours, to ascertain the

President’s opinion on the matter.557 He should not have bothered. Primo Villa Michel

555 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1658, Cruchaga to Ministro, July 23, 1938. 556 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-424-8, telegram from Villa Michel to Hay, June 9, 1938. 557 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-424-8, telegram from Hay to Beteta, June 10, 1938. 216

soon reported that the director of the ILO, Harold B. Butler, could foresee several obstacles to choosing Mexico as the host for such a conference. At the meeting’s end, the

Minister in Geneva wrote home with more details. In a private meeting with Butler, Villa

Michel had asked for the director’s thoughts on the possible choice of Mexico for the conference. The director said that, although he would have supported the idea personally, he doubted it would be warmly received by the other American delegates. Mexico had played host to a series of recent conferences, including the Congreso Obrero

Latinoamericano that Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the CTM had called for that

September, to which the ILO had been invited. Moreover, he feared that because of the

Cárdenas government’s Leftist orientation, some Latin American governments would not attend or might even try to sabotage the conference were it to be held in Mexico.

Although Butler had received no firm invitations, rumours circulated that either Brazil or

Cuba would be chosen. The director responded that he hoped it would be held in Havana because he believed Brazil (during Vargas’s Estado Novo) to be unfriendly to the cause of organised labour.558 Villa Michel also hoped for Cuba; Havana’s proximity would put the Cárdenas government in a good position to obtain the “desired result” from the conference.559

This desired result of which Primo Villa Michel spoke was the consolidation of

Mexico’s leadership position in the Latin American labour movement. The Cárdenas government and Lombardo Toledano in particular saw Mexico as the natural leader of

Latin America in matters relating to the organisation of labour. Although his efforts to

558 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-424-8, Villamichel to Hay, June 29, 1938. 559 Ibid. 217

encourage the organisation of workers met with the approval of a many labour leaders

and workers, the more conservative governments of the region resented his interference.

As early as 1935, Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfredo Skinner Klée had

written to his Ambassador in Mexico, Manuel Echeverría y Vidaurre, that it was high

time that Mexican functionaries should leave their neighbours in peace and cease their

attempts to impose upon them the theories of the Lombardo Toledanos of the world.560

Nevertheless, that is exactly what the Mexican government continued to do throughout the Cárdenas presidency through its diplomatic representatives in Latin America, the inter-American labour conferences it held in Mexico City, and its participation in the ILO

and its meetings in the Americas. In his comments on the founding of the Confederación

de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL) at the Congreso Obrero Latinoamericano in

1938, the acting British Consul-General in Mexico expressed his doubts that the rest of

Latin America would welcome Mexican leadership of the new organisation.561

Nevertheless, Lombardo Toledano became the CTAL’s first president and

maintained a prominent position in the Latin American labour movement. Lombardo

Toledano enjoyed particularly strong influence in Cuba, where it was eventually decided that the Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo de los Estados de América, Miembros de la

Organización Internacional del Trabajo would be held in November 1939. Lombardo

Toledano had been extremely helpful during the founding of the Confederación de

Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) in January of that year, and the Cuban organisation became

560 Guatemala, Archivo General de Centro América (AGCA), Fondo Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), B99- 23-1, Legajo 6250, Skinner Klée to Echeverría y Vidaurre, December 14, 1935. 561 United Kingdom, National Archives, FO 371/21480, Cleugh to Halifax, September 5, 1938. 218

one the firmest supporters of Lombardo Toledano and the CTAL, which he represented at

Havana. When, during the conference, Lombaro Toledano found it necessary to publicly defend the oil expropriation, the Cubans jumped to Mexico’s defence.562 Wilfredo H.

Brito, one of the Cuban business delegates, had openly attacked Mexico, causing

Lombardo Toledano to expose the delegate as a lawyer for the Sinclair Oil Company.563

The exchange received wide coverage in the Cuban press and struck a chord throughout

Latin America. Carlos Fernández of the CTC stated that he considered the attack against the Mexican people an attack against all of the workers of the continent and called Brito a servant of imperialist interests and an enemy of the independence of the Americas.564

Lombardo Toledano seemed to be the star of the show at Havana. The fact that Mexico’s permanent delegate to the League of Nations (and hence the ILO) Isidro Fabela had been

562 Argentine chargé d’affaires in Mexico Ricardo Siri had noted in August 1939 that Lombardo Toledano used the network of the CTAL to generate international support for the Mexican government following the expropriation. Siri suggested that the Argentine Confederación General de Trabajadores would probably heed Lombardo Toledano’s call for letters of support written to US President Roosevelt by virtue of its membership in the CTAL. Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto (MRECIC), Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3983, Expediente 3, Tomo II, Siri to Cantilo, August 21, 1939. Also see “Los obreros de México piden el más amplio apoyo para el Gobierno de nuestro país en su actitud frente a las Cías. Petroleras expropiadas,” El Universal (Mexico City), August 19, 1939. 563 For Mexican chargé d’affaires Fernando Lagarde y Vigil’s report of the incident see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-396-10, Lagarde to Hay, November 30, 1939. Clippings regarding the controversy are found in the same file, and in Cuba, Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana, Fondo Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Legajo 448, Expediente 3. Although Lagarde y Vigil’s report identifies Brito as a representative of Sinclair, the Cuban newspaper article cited below describes him as Standard Oil man. In the ILO’s record of the proceedings, Lombardo Toledano states that he was a representative of Royal Dutch Shell. Despite this discrepancy, his allegiances are clear. Second Labour Conference of the American States Which Are Members of the International Labour Organisation, Record of the Proceedings (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1941), 564 “Toledano Ridiculiza al Agente de la Standard en la Conferencia de Trabajo,” Hoy (Havana), November 26, 1939. 219

chosen as an official representative of the ILO at the meeting was also a source of

pride.565

The Mexican delegation, of which Antonio Villalobos of the Department of

Labour, was head, clearly dominated the meeting. Perhaps in recognition of this, or as an

expression of support for the Mexican oil expropriation and Lombardo Toledano’s

trouncing of the oilman, the delegates reportedly passed a motion congratulating

Lombardo Toledano on Mexico having the most advanced social legislation in the

Americas.566 Such obvious showmanship had its detractors. In his December 1939 report

to the Chilean Foreign Minister on the Havana meeting, the recently-appointed

Ambassador to Mexico Manuel Hidalgo criticised the resolution in favour of Lombardo

Toledano and unleashed a stream of vitriol against Mexico’s purported leadership in the

organisation of labour and other social issues.567 He argued that Chile was advanced in

social issues, much more so than Mexico. He thought that Latin Americans had been far

too dazzled by Mexican propaganda and believed that Chilean democracy and its

advanced political parties did not need to come looking for shining examples of social

progress in Mexico. Instead, Chile’s civil and democratic tradition should serve as an

example to its continental neighbours.568 Ironically, Hidalgo’s appointment had been

565 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-396-10, telegram from Fabela to Hay, February 6, 1939. For copies of the speeches delivered by Fabela at the conference see, Mexico, Centro Cultural Isidro Fabela, Archivo Personal Isidro Fabela, IF/II.4-007. 566 For Villalobos’s speech see, AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo de los Estados de América Miembros de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, “Discurso del Lic. Antonio Villalobos, Jefe del Departamento del Trabajo y Delegado de México a la Conferencia,” La Habana, Cuba, 28 de noviembre de 1939. 567 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, 1939, Vol. 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, December 18, 1939. 568 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, 1939, Vol. 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, December 18, 1939. 220

greeted with great enthusiasm in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the new ambassador

was actually a harsher critic of Lombardo Toledano and Mexican diplomacy than his

predecessor, Manuel Bianchi.569 Whereas Bianchi’s reports to the Chilean Ministry of

Foreign Affairs demonstrated the careful objectivity of a career diplomat, Hidalgo’s

reports exhibited the pride of one who had participated directly in the Leftward

movement of Chilean politics. Appointed by the new Popular Front government of Pedro

Aguirre Cerda, Hidalgo had been a prominent labour organiser in Chile since 1905 when

he was only 23. A former Senator and a member of the Socialist Party, Hidalgo had been

condemned as a Trotskyite by the Communist Party, which opposed his appointment to

Mexico. He may have been chosen for this diplomatic post in order to remove him from

domestic politics, but he was probably also chosen because it was thought that he would

be a sympathetic representative to Cárdenas’s Mexico.570 Nevertheless, his reports of

October and November of 1939 on the Mexican education system suggested that he did not see Mexico as a potential leader in this area either.571 In Hidalgo’s mind, Lombardo

Toledano was merely a self-important blowhard who travelled the continent spreading

false news of Mexico’s advances.

Despite Hidalgo’s harsh critique, the climate at the Havana meeting had been

highly favourable to Mexico, and on November 23, Antonio Villalobos, as head of the

Mexican delegation, telegraphed for permission to propose that the next meeting of the

569 For the new Ambassador to Chile, Octavio Reyes Spíndola’s reports on Hidalgo’s appointment see, AGN, LCR, Caja 1071, Expediente 574.4/37. 570 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-13-13, chargé d’affaires Pablo Campos Ortiz to Hay, February 18, 1939; AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-13-13, Campos Ortiz to Hay, April 22, 1939. 571 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, October 19, 1939 and November 28, 1939. 221

American member states of the ILO be held in Mexico.572 Hay duly sent word to

Cárdenas to ascertain his opinion on the matter, explaining that the costs of holding the conference would be far outweighed by the propaganda value such an event would hold.573 Hay gave Villalobos permission to propose Mexico as the next host country a few days later. This time, Villalobos reported that Mexico’s offer had been warmly received by the delegates and that after the closing of the conference the ILO intended to accept the offer.574 Although the third American Regional Conference of the ILO did not occur until 1946 after the conclusion of the Second World War, the Mexican government did play host to the event. The diplomatic memory of the Cárdenas government’s over- use of technical conferences as propaganda tools may have faded by that time. In the immediate wake of the conference, Lombardo Toledano’s antics at the meeting in

Havana had undoubtedly rankled more than just Ambassador Hidalgo, and as a result, the

Cárdenas government’s reputation for the sensational use of conferences did not abate.

The commitment made at Havana in 1939 surely resulted in part from Mexican propaganda activities, but the fact that the meeting was held in Mexico City so many years later also attests to the efficacy of long-standing Mexican participation in the ILO.

Similarly, the Mexican government’s international activities in the sphere of indigenous issues continued unabated, and the Cárdenas government’s hosting of the Primer

Congreso Indigenista Interamericano in 1940 spoke to the efficacy of this intellectual cooperation.

572 AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, telegram from Villalobos to Cárdenas, November 23, 1939. 573 AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, telegram from Hay to Cárdenas, November 24, 1939 574 AGN, LCR, Caja 460, Expediente 433/455, telegram from Villalobos to Cárdenas, December 2, 1939. 222

When the arrangements for the first inter-American conference on indigenous

issues—originally scheduled to be held in Bolivia—fell through, another of the reasons

for Hidalgo’s depreciation of the Cárdenas government may also have worked in the

Mexican government’s favour. As Bolivian Minister Sanjinés had stated at the III

Conferencia Interamericana de Educación, the Mexican government truly played a

leadership role in this arena. Notwithstanding the Cárdenas government’s activities,

indigenous issues were also an area of leadership that many other diplomats and their

governments willingly gave up. In his scathing report on Mexican participation in the

Segunda Conferencia del Trabajo de los Estados de América, Miembros de la

Organización Internacional del Trabajo, Ambassador Hidalgo crowed about the superiority of Chilean social legislation over the simplicity of that of Mexico. The majority of the Mexican population was indigenous and therefore ill-equipped to work rationally toward social and political change, he explained.575 Hidalgo’s comment

indicates the prejudiced views of indigenous populations held by many Latin American

diplomats. While the Mexican government celebrated the nation’s indigenous roots,

albeit in a manner that had negative consequences for its indigenous population, many

other Latin American governments continued to denigrate indigenous inhabitants and

their ancestors. Even several countries with sizable indigenous populations, such as

Chile, did not consider the resolution of issues central to their wellbeing of vital

importance. They did not want to be considered indigenous nations, or to be associated

primarily with their indigenous populations. A famous case in point is the reception the

575 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1763 A, Hidalgo to Foreign Minister, December 18, 1939. 223

Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the first issue of magazine Araucanía, which

Consul General Pablo Neruda produced in Mexico City near the end of the Cárdenas presidency. A stark and beautiful image of a Mapuche woman graced the cover of the first issue of Neruda’s literary and cultural magazine, which aimed to augment Chile’s contribution to inter-American cultural relations and serve as a vehicle for Chilean propaganda. Neruda had independently published the magazine, but hoped that the interest it had generated would enable him to secure funding from the government.576

Nevertheless, Neruda received a rather terse note explaining that, for reasons of economy, the government could not support an initiative that had not been previously approved by the Ministry.577 The Chilean government did not approve of Neruda’s title, cover art, nor the explicit association they created between Chile and the indigenous peoples of the Americas. For lack of funding, the magazine met a quiet end.578 Taken in this context, Ambassador Hidalgo’s comments on the negative relationship between

Mexico’s indigenous population and the government’s potential for leadership in social issues represent a prevailing Chilean opinion. Racial prejudice against Mexico’s predominantly mestizo and indigenous population had long played a role in Mexico’s relations with the rest of Latin America. The politics surrounding the decision to hold the meeting on indigenous issues originally planned for Bolivia at Pátzcuaro instead were

576 Chile, Archivo Nacional de la Administración (ANA), Fondo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (RREE), Volúmen 4372, Ricardo Reyes [Neruda] to Ministro, January 8, 1941. 577 Chile, ANA, RREE, Volúmen 4372, Marcelo Ruiz to Reyes, March 3, 1941. 578 On this incident, and the importance of Neruda’s experience in Mexico in his literary development see, Fundación Pablo Neruda, Cuadernos no. 39, Hugo Méndez-Ramírez, Neruda’s Ekphrastic Experience: Mural Art and Canto general (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1999); Vicente Quirarte et al, Pablo Neruda en el corazón de México: en el centenario de su nacimiento (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2006); Manuel Lerín, ed., Neruda y México (Mexcio City: B. Costa-AMIC Editor, 1973). 224

naturally affected by these ideas, as were several governments’ desires not to be associated with indigenous issues by taking a leadership role on this inter-American issue. When the Bolivian arrangements fell through, the way for the Mexican government’s initiatives had been cleared and Cárdenas and his collaborators and representatives began to work towards the establishment of Mexican leadership on this inter-American issue.

The heavy-handed nature of Mexican diplomacy, international politics, and ideas of racial prejudice all influenced the debate that had emerged following the III

Conferencia Interamericana de Educación on the Mexican government’s use of inter-

American meetings as propaganda tools. While attendance at the myriad technical meetings held in Mexico City dwindled between 1937 and 1940, diplomatic representatives and indigenistas began working tirelessly towards the agreed-upon goal of an inter-American meeting devoted specifically to problems of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Although a certain sense of entitlement to the hosting of meetings on education and labour held in the Americas had been evident in the Mexican government’s attitudes towards earlier congresses, the fact that its labours had not been rewarded with the great success anticipated surely caused a redoubling of efforts during the preparations for the first inter-American congress on indigenous issues.

Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano

The landmark Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, held at the end of the

Cárdenas sexenio in 1940 in the president’s home state of Michoacán, represents the 225

energy that Mexican indigenistas poured into the resolution of the so-called Indian problem during the Cárdenas presidency.579 The first inter-American meeting to deal

specifically with indigenous issues also demonstrates a rare successful use of inter-

American conferences as propaganda tools by the Cárdenas government. In many ways, the methods employed by the Mexican government at this meeting represented a continuation of previously-established practices. The Mexican delegation outnumbered every other country, and its members presented the vast majority of papers at the congress. These presentations, and the entertainments prepared for the delegates, contained a heavy dose of Marxist rhetoric. Moreover, the social and cultural events the government hosted aimed to reinforce the image of Mexico as a leader in indigenous policy, and hence, inter-American affairs that the government hoped to solidify through

579 On Indian policy and indigenismo more generally, see Alexander S. Dawson, Indian and Nation in Revolutionary Mexico (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004); Alexander S. Dawson, “From Models for the Ntion to Model Citizens: Indigenismo and the ‘Revindication’ of the Mexican Indian, 1920-1940” Journal of Latin American Studies 30 (1998): 279-308; Alexander S. Dawson, “‘Wild Indians,’ ‘Mexican Gentlement,’ and the Lessons Learned in the Casa del Estudiante Indígena, 1926-1932,” The Americas 57: 3 (January 2001): 329-361; Stephen E. Lewis, “The Nation, Education, and the ‘Indian Problem’ in Mexico, 1920-1940,” in The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940, ed. Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 176-195; Stephen E. Lewis, “A Window to the Recent Past in Chiapas: Federal Education and Indigenismo in the Highlands, 1921-1940,” Journal of Latin American Anthropology 6:1 (2001): ; Ben W. Fallaw, “Cárdenas and the Caste War That Wasn’t: State Power and Indigenismo in Post-Revolutionary Yucatán,” The Americas 53:4 (1997): 551-577; Engracia Loyo, “Los centros de educación indígena y su papel en el medio rural (1930- 1940),” In Educación rural e indígena en Iberoamérica, ed. Pilar Gonzalbo Aizpuru (Mexico City: El Colegio de México: 1996); Engracia Loyo, “La empresa redentora. La Casa del Estudiante Indígena,” Historia Mexicana 46:1 (1996):99-131; Ricardo Pérez Montfort, “Indigenismo, Hispanismo, y panamericanismo en la cultura popular mexicana de 1920 s 1940,” in Cultura e identidad nacional, ed. Roberto Blancarte (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994); Alan Knight, “Racism, Revolution and Indigenismo: México, 1910-1940,” in The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940, ed. Richard Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); David A. Brading, “Manuel Gamio and Official Indigenismo in Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 7:1 (1988): 75-89; Guillermo Palacios, “Postrevolutionary Intellectuals, Rural Readings and the Shaping of the ‘Peasant Problem’ in Mexico: El Maestro Rural, 1932-34,” Journal of Latin American Studies 30:2 (May, 1998): 309-339; Guillermo de la Peña, “Social and Cultural Policies Toward Indigenous Peoples: Perspectives from Latin America,” Annual Review of Anthropology 34 (2005); Juan Comas, La antropología social aplicada en México, trayectoría y antología (México: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1964). 226

the conference. Unwilling to rely solely upon the positive impression it hoped to promote

among the often recalcitrant members of diplomatic missions who usually attended these sorts of events, the government did everything in its power to ensure that sympathetic indigenistas attended the conference.

By building upon a strong history of intellectual cooperation in indigenous issues, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas (which took

care of the local arrangements) engaged in an unprecedented level of pre-conference

planning to ensure its success. Ambassador and indigenista Moisés Sáenz led members of

the Foreign Service in working to encourage meaningful participation in the conference

of all American nations, and their indigenous inhabitants. Although many of the same

issues regarding overbearing and verbose Mexican delegates surfaced and some of the

cracks in the government’s indigenous policy began to show when an armed group of

protesters threatened to derail one of the ceremonies, by and large Sáenz’s efforts

succeded. One of the most important outcomes of the Congress was the resolution calling

for the creation of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (III), which officially opened

its doors in Mexico City 1942 under the direction of Manuel Gamio. With the publication

of América Indígena and the Boletín Indigenista, the III and the Mexican indigenistas who controlled it continued to influence inter-American indigenous policy well into the future. In this area of inter-American relations, which the Mexican government deemed

important, Cárdenas succeeded in achieving leadership in the region. In and of

themselves, the hosting of inter-American conferences and their use as propaganda tools did not secure the Cárdenas government a leadership position, but when based upon 227

substantial intellectual cooperation and held with a specific goal—one that would deepen

Mexico’s influence—in mind, they could be tremendously successful.

The eyes of Latin American diplomats, their governments, and their indigenous

populations had long been on Mexico’s indigenous policies. The Argentine chargé

d’affaires in Mexico City reported to his government on Cárdenas’s intention to found

the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas (DAI) days after the president’s inauguration.580

His interest in the matter and that of other diplomats continued unabated throughout the presidency. Some indigenous groups also demonstrated great interest in the Cárdenas government’s activities. In November 1936, Cárdenas received a greeting in Quechua from an indigenous group in Peru that admired the president’s work.581 Similarly, in 1938

Cárdenas received a message of appreciation from members of the Araucanian

indigenous group, as the Mapuche were then known, sent through the Chilean chargé

d’affaires in Mexico City.582 Members of the Foreign Service encouraged this interest

and appreciation through their efforts at intellectual cooperation on indigenous matters. In

1936 Minister Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz attended the first Bolivian conference on the

topic of indigenous education, and became an instrumental and active collaborator of the

group of Bolivian educators and indigenistas then at work on the altiplano.583 When

Rosenzweig spearheaded the establishment of a new series of publications funded by the

Mexican mission in La Paz, the first book his Biblioteca de la Revista México published,

entitled Siembra: Lecturas Escolares para los Niños del Campo, was intended for use by

580 Argentina, MRECIC, Archivo Histórico de Cancillería, Caja 3415, Expediente 1, Adolfo N. Calvo to Carlos Saavedra Lamas, December 3, 1934. 581 AGN, LCR, Caja 1073, Expediente 577/10, Ricardo Olivera to Cárdenas, November 11, 1936. 582 Chile, ANA, RREE, Volúmen 4047, Miguel Cruchaga Ossa to Ministro, July 23, 1938. 583 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-332-17, telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, October 31, 1936. 228

indigenous children in the schools that had recently been established for their

education.584 Rosenzweig facilitated the travels to Mexico of Bolivian indigenista

Elizardo Pérez, Director General de Educación Indígena y Campesina, and the trip of a mission of Mexican educators who in 1939 visited the Escuela Warisata that Pérez had

founded for indigenous children in 1931.585 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consistently expressed interest in other Latin American countries’ indigenous policies, hoping that the

DAI could learn from the reports it commissioned on their programmes.586 Essential to this aim were the educational missions undertaken by Mexican representatives to Latin

American countries, such as the visit to the Escuela Warisata, where indigenous policies of neighbouring countries could be observed and analysed by Mexican indigenistas.

The diplomatic career of Moisés Sáenz began in part as a result of such

experiences. After serving as Undersecretary of Education, Sáenz had been commissioned in 1931 by that ministry to undertake studies of the indigenous populations

of the Americas. He completed thorough studies of Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru, the

latter two of which he published in 1933.587 His visits generated much interest and in the

course of his travels he gained long-lasting professional contacts among those working

toward the betterment of the indigenous population in the Americas, and established his

own reputation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an able representative of Mexico

584 A copy can be found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-22-1 (IV). 585 See the study written by one of the Mexican members of the mission, which was published by the DAI on the occasion of the PCII: Adolfo Velasco, La Escula Indigenal de Warisata (Mexico City: Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas/Editorial Mundo Nuevo, 1940). 586 For example, Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1543, Cruchaga Tocornal to Cienfuegos y Camus, March 27, 1936. 587 Moisés Sáenz, Sobre el indio ecuatoriano y su integración al medio nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933); and Sobre el indio peruano y su integración al medio nacional (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1933). 229

and its intellectual priorities.588 In Peru, José Antonio Encinas, who then served as rector

of the Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, paid him special attention, inviting him to give

two well-attended lectures, one on the topic of rural education, and the second on

Mexican society.589 During a meeting with President Ubico in Guatemala, Sáenz

reportedly discussed the idea of convening an inter-American congress on indigenous

issues, which he said would be of particular interest to the Guatemalan government

because of its large indigenous population. Ubico initially expressed interest in the idea, but his enthusiasm for such a conference flagged considerably over the years. Sáenz almost certainly proposed the idea to the government officials he met in Ecuador and

Peru as well, and with the cooperation of other indigenistas in the Americas, he continued his efforts on behalf of such a meeting for the next ten years.590

The phenomenal success of Sáenz’s study-tour undoubtedly led to his first

diplomatic posting as minister to Ecuador in 1934. In the diplomatic juggling that

occurred at the beginning of the Cárdenas presidency, the Ministry appointed Sáenz to

Denmark, but when Palma Guillén requested a new position due to the difficulties she

faced in Colombia, the Ministry decided to send her to Copenhagen and return Sáenz to

Latin America. In May 1936 Sáenz arrived in Lima as minister to the country that had

welcomed him so warmly in 1931. Although he returned to Mexico several times during

588 For comment on his 1931 visit to Guatemala see Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B80.23, Legajo 5985. For comment on his visit to Ecuador see, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (I), Federico Rocha y Margáin to SRE, November 26, 1931. 589 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (I), Juan G. Cabral to SRE, n.d. [January 1936]. 590 See the clipping from El Liberal Progresista on the banquet offered Sáenz by the Guatemalan Ministry of Education (at which Gabriela Mistral and Palma Guillén were also in attendance), and the report on his visit by then Ambassador to Guatemala Eduardo Hay found in AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (I). “Banquete a un funcionario de México, D.F.,” El Liberal Progresista (Guatemala), October 15, 1931; Hay to Ministro, October 17, 1931. 230

the next few years because of his work with the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas, he

became ambassador to Peru in July 1937 when the Mexican and Peruvian governments

agreed to elevate their missions to the rank of Embassy. He vacated his post at the

beginning of 1938 because of the measures of economy undertaken by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, but returned to Peru in November to facilitate Mexican participation in

the VIII Inter-American meeting in Lima. Sáenz left Peru once again in order to

spearhead the organisation of the PCII, but retained his position there and returned after

the conference to his second home, where he unexpectedly died in October of 1941.591

Minister Rosenzweig also provided essential services to the planning process, as

well as the larger project of intellectual cooperation on indigenous matters that led up to

the conference. After the III CIE resolved that the meeting would be held in Bolivia,

Rosenzweig’s position as Mexico’s minister in La Paz enabled him to do his utmost to

ensure the meeting’s success. Manuel Palacios reported the substance of the III CIE’s

resolution to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which asked Rosenzweig to communicate it

officially to the government of Bolivia in December 1937.592 Rosenzweig immediately contacted Bolivia’s foreign minister and met with the minister of education, after which he sought an interview with President Germán Busch because, in an indication of the difficulties to come, the minister of education initially vetoed Bolivia’s acceptance of the

591 See the obituaries in his personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (III). 592 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Palacios to Hay, December 11, 1937; Beteta to Rosenzweig, December 16, 1937. 231

invitation for reasons of economy.593 Although the Bolivian government eventually accepted the invitation, the planning of the conference continued to be turbulent.594

The organising committee formed in Mexico City after the III CIE consisted of

Sáenz, Encinas, Minister Sanjinés, Mexico’s Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo

Cienfuegos y Camus, and John Collier of the United States. Their activities preparing recommendations for the conference’s convocatoria and the publication of Angel M.

Corzo’s Ideario del maestro indoamericano continued independent of the difficulties

Rosenzweig experienced in Bolivia.595 The Bolivian Minister of Education named an organizing committee and decided that the conference should coincide not with the anniversary of Bolivian independence, but the anniversary of the founding of the Escuela

Warisata on August 2, and that the inter-American meeting would be held on the premises of the school. Rosenzweig doubted the wisdom of this idea because construction of the school’s Pabellón Mexico, where the Minister proposed to hold the assembly, had not yet been completed.596 The Bolivian organising committee first met in

February of 1938 and named Rosenzweig president, an honorary position that did not enable him to impose his wishes or those of the Mexican government upon the Bolivians,

593 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, December 29, 1937. 594 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, January 17, 1938. 595 “Mexico en el 1er Congreso Continental Indigenista que se Celebrará en Bolivia,” El Nacional (Mexico City), November 5, 1937; Angel M. Corzo, Ideario del maestro indoamericano (Mexico City: DAPP, 1938). In October 1938, the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to his ambassador in Mexico City that Minister Sanjinés, President of the Comité Organizador del Congreso Indigenista, had announced the publication of the volume, which included a prologue by President Cárdenas, and that 300 copies would be sent to the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City. Guatemala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4399, Skinnner Klée to Nájera Cabrera, October 1, 1938. 596 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-16, Rosenzweig to Hay, Feburary 9, 1938. 232

but underscored his role as a liaison between the two groups of organisers.597 In the midst

of these early activities, Rosenzweig telegraphed the Ministry to report in March on a

proposal to hold the hold the meeting in 1939 instead of 1938.598

This change received the positive endorsement of (and perhaps even emanated

from) Leo S. Rowe, Director of the Pan American Union, who argued that because five

other Panamerican meetings, including the VIII inter-American meeting in Lima, had

been scheduled for 1938, he deemed it preferable to hold the indigenous conference in

1939.599 Moreover, neither Minister Sanjinés in Mexico nor Rosenzweig in Bolivia

believed that either the Mexican or Bolivian organising committees would be ready in

time for August 1938.600 The postponement seemed a good solution to these difficulties and the Busch government approved the change in May.601 Rosenzweig thought the

postponement would have the added advantage of enabling the Bolivian organising committee to prepare the convocatoria for the conference more carefully and allow them to counter the negative propaganda that had begun to emerge in Bolivia against the conference. The one firm supporter upon whom Rosenzweig felt he could count during

this process was Elizardo Pérez, whom he referred to as the soul of the movement in

favour of indigenous issues in Bolivia. Together they faced a fierce campaign mounted

by members of the Bolivian Roman Catholic Church who objected strongly to close

597 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-16, Ministro de Educación y Asuntos Indígenas Alfredo Peñaranda to Rosenzweig, February 7, 1938. 598 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, March 17, 1938. 599 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, March 20, 1938. 600 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, March 20, 1938 601 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to Hay, May 5, 1938. 233

cooperation with the “Marxist” Cárdenas government.602 By deciding to hold the conference at a later date, this propaganda campaign could be neutralised effectively by the time the conference was actually held. Moreover, Rosenzweig felt that by heeding the suggestions of Rowe and the Pan American Union, more effective participation on behalf of the United States might be secured. This would be an advantage in securing the meaningful representation at the congress of more the conservative governments of the region, such as Guatemala, which had firm ties to the United States, but had so far exhibited little interest in the conference.603

Acutely aware of Rosenzweig’s concern that all governments of the Americas participate effectively in the conference, Moisés Sáenz operated in tandem with him to ensure the congress’s success. At the express wish of President Cárdenas, Sáenz once again insisted on the importance of the indigenous meeting at the VIII inter-American meeting in Lima, tabling a motion in favour of the La Paz meeting.604 Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, and despite his best efforts and those of Rosenzweig, Sáenz wrote to

Foreign Minister Hay that he held serious concerns regarding the Bolivian organising committee’s work.605 Principally, he felt that, despite the extra time they received, the convocatoria proposed did not adequately represent the intellectual goals he and the other members of the Mexican organising committee had set for the conference, particularly as

602 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-3-16, Rosenzweig to Hay, Feburary 9, 1938. For later examples of the conservative Catholic campaign against indigenous education in Bolivia, and the government’s links with Mexico see, AHGE, SRE, 30-3-16, Rosenzweig to Hay, August 26, 1938; “Se tomó el ejemplo de México para combatir los esfuerzos de Bolivia por la educación indigenal,” La Noche (La Paz), August 29, 1938. 603 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, March 20, 1938. 604 His motion elicited a contradictory and unsuccessful proposal from the Argentine delegation that Sáenz described as paternalistic in character. Sáenz reported to President Cárdenas on the Argentine proposal and his own successful resolution in AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 4, 1939. 605 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (II), Sáenz to Hay, March 4, 1939. 234

they related to the founding of an Inter-American Indigenous Institute. The Bolivian government issued invitations to the conference in February of 1939, after which Sáenz undertook a brief trip to La Paz to voice his concerns.606 Sáenz met with Pérez as well as

President Busch, who assured him of the Bolivian government’s commitment to the success of the conference.607 In his meetings with the organising committee, Sáenz made a number of concrete suggestions regarding the programme, and received designation as the committee’s representative in Peru and Ecuador, charged with drumming up support for the conference. Sáenz commended the work of Minister Rosenzweig, particularly in his efforts to help Pérez and the administrators of the Escuela Warisata complete the

Pabellón México in time for the conference. Rosenzweig had recently learned that the

Ministry had decided to transfer him to Panama, and Sáenz lamented the loss of his energy on behalf of the organising committee.608

After Rosenzweig’s departure, it seems that the preparations underway in La Paz suffered. In particular, a flurry of correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas, and Sáenz indicates that few countries named delegates to the conference. Several contradictory proposals regarding the further postponement of the conference surfaced, engendering their share of ill feelings: Pérez became increasingly pessimistic about the conference’s chances of success in Bolivia and

Sáenz and Mexico’s new minister to Bolivia, Alfonso Cravioto, had several cool

606 See, for example, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Sanjinés to Hay, February 20, 1939. A preliminary version of the covocatoria and the internal regulations of the conference are attached to the invitation. 607 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Sáenz to Hay, March 16, 1939. 608 For information on the transfer see Rosenzweig’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 14-22-1. 235

exchanges.609 By September 1939, President Cárdenas authorised Cravioto to suggest

that the conference be moved to Mexico in April 1940. Sáenz immediately wrote to

President Cárdenas with his suggestions regarding the steps that needed to be taken in

order to ensure its success. Primary among these suggestions were that he be recalled to

Mexico to assist in its organisation, and that he travel via air instead of sail, making stops

in the principal capital cities along the way, engaging in each country in an extensive

propaganda campaign in favour of the conference in order to secure meaningful

representation in the long-awaited inter-American meeting on indigenous issues.610

President Cárdenas immediately authorised Sáenz’s return to Mexico and the

plans he had laid out for generating enthusiasm for “their” conference.611 Sáenz called it

their conference because, as he explained in a letter to President Cárdenas, he considered

it the president’s, his, and Mexico’s.612 Sáenz planned to stop in the capitals of Ecuador,

Colombia, Panama, Honduras and Guatemala—the usual stops for an airline flight to

Mexico from Peru at this time—and stay approximately three days in each country, meeting with prominent indigenistas and government officials in order to support the propaganda campaigns already underway in each locale by the Mexican representatives

there, then catch the next flight onwards. At an additional cost of only $100.00 USD, the

value of his activities would prove immeasurable.613 Before leaving, Sáenz wrote to

Cárdenas with another proposition: the president had previously authorised funds for the

ambassador to bring celebrated intellectuals such as Alfonso Caso and noted cultural

609 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-236-8 (I), Sáenz to Hay, May 20, 1939. 610 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, September 27, 1939. 611 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Cárdenas to Sáenz, October 5, 1939. 612 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 27, 1940. 613 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 35-13-13 (II), Sáenz to Hay, December 22, 1939. 236

representatives such as Carlos Chávez to Peru to encourage intellectual and artistic cooperation between the two countries, but Sáenz suggested that the funds could be better

used to invite special Latin American delegates to attend the PCII with the financial

support of the Mexican government. He proposed inviting hand-picked representatives

from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panma, and Guatemala, in addition to the delegates each

country named to the conference.614 Sáenz argued that, in terms of propaganda, this

$1,900.00 USD plan would be worth more and cost less than many other forms of publicity because the special delegates would make important contributions to the conference and in turn influence the resolution of indigenous issues in their home countries by applying what they had learned of the Mexican example.615

Sáenz’s stopovers in Latin America proved instrumental in securing the meaningful participation of Latin American countries in the Primer Congreso Indigenista

Interamericano. For instance, upon receipt of the original Bolivian convocatoria for the

PCII in 1939, the Guatemalan government initially declined the invitation to attend, but

due to the interventions of Sáenz, Guatemala was well represented at Pátzcuaro in

1940.616 Although Mexico’s Ambassador to Guatemala Adolfo Cienfuegos y Camus had been named to the Mexican organising committee after the III CIE in 1937, his posting to

Guatemala City ended in July of 1938 and Salvador Martínez de Alva took over the

Embassy. The new ambassador reported on Sáenz’s visit to Guatemala in February of

1940. Before the Ambassador to Peru’s arrival, Martínez de Alva had met with Ubico

614 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 27, 1940. 615 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, January 27, 1940. 616 Guteamala, AGCA, RREE, Signatura B99-6, Legajo 4400, Expediente 99346, Secretario to Ambassador Hernández Polanco, March 7, 1939. 237

who warned that once he made his mind up about something, he did not tend to change it.

Moreover, in an allusion to the Mexican government’s over-use of inter-American

conferences as propaganda tools, he concluded that he believed that the only tangible

results of most such conferences were the waste of time and money.617 Nevertheless,

Martínez de Alva announced Sáenz’s impending visit and asked the Guatemalan

president to reconsider his position on the indigenous conference. Sáenz arrived on

February 28 and as a result of his intervention, Ubico did indeed change his mind.

Moreover, Sáenz’s special invitation for a Guatemalan delegate to the conference resulted

in the attendance of David Vela, who contributed greatly to the PCII. Vela published an

extensive series of articles in the Guatemalan daily El Imparcial about his participation in

the conference, contributing to the dispersion of the indigenista ideas in the neighbouring country.618 Martínez de Alva noted that in addition to the visit of Sáenz, the fact that so

many indigenistas from points south stopped in Guatemala on their way to Mexico also

encouraged the discussion of indigenous affairs in the Guatemalan capital, which the

ambassador had previously thought impervious to Mexican thinking on the matter of the

incorporation of the indigenous population of the Americas into national life.619 In

617 The report of this meeting of Feburary 12, 1940 is found in Martínez de Alva’s monthly report corresponding to the month of February. AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe mensual reglamentario correspondiente al mes de febrero de 1940,” p. 22. 618 The organising committee for the fourth inter-American indigenous conference collected and published Vela’s columns prior to the meeting held in Guatemala in 1959. David Vela, Orientación y recomendaciones del Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (Guatemala: Publicaciones del Comité Organizador del IV Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, 1959). Vela’s collaboration was so effective that he was initially named to the organising committee of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, only to be substituted by Guatemala’s Consul General in Mexico City Carlos Girón Cerna. See, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe reglamentario correspondiente al mes de julio de 1940,” 10. 619 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe reglamentario correspondiente al termino del 15 de marzo al 25 de mayo de 1940,” 37-39. 238

additon to Vela, special representatives to the conference whose attendance was

supported financially by the Mexican government included Elipidio Arce Laurerio and

Alipio Valencia of Bolivia, Antonio García of Colombia, Jorge Icaza and Victor Gabriel

Garcés of Ecuador, Hildebrando Castro Pozo and José María Arguedas of Peru, as well as

the sole representative of Panama’s indigenous population, Rubén Pérez Kantule.620

Although President Ubico eventually relented and permitted Guatemalan

representation at the meeting, Sáenz and all of the other indigenistas who traversed

Guatemala were unable to convince the dictator of the need to delegate indigenous

representatives to the conference. This suggestion surfaced as soon as the conference’s

move to Mexico became official, but Foreign Minister Hay also proved rather hostile to

the idea, telegraphing in November 1939 President Cárdenas (then absent from the

capital on another tour of the Yucatán) to question the wisdom of the suggestion.621 He doubted that the indigenous peoples of the Americas in general were sufficiently well prepared for participation and asked for permission to remove the directive from the official invitation he was preparing to circulate to the governments of the region. Luis

Chávez Orozco, who accompanied the president during his trip to the Yucatán, immediately informed Hay that President Cárdenas definitely desired that each country be represented by two indigenous representatives, in addition to the diplomatic and

620 AHGE, SER, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), “Lista de las personas que han sio invitadas por conducto del gobierno mexicano para tomar parte en el congreso indigenista,” n.d. [1940]. This list is consistent with those described as “invitados especiales” in the Boletín of the Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano. Biblioteca Nacional de Antropología e Historia (BNAH), E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, Boletín, No. 1. 621 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Hay to Cárdenas, November 25, 1939. 239

technical representatives named to the conference.622 President Cárdenas stood firm, also

telegraphing Hay himself to emphasise the point.623 The majority of Latin American governments agreed with Hay, not Cárdenas.624 Guatemalan Minister of Education

Villacorta reportedly told Ambassador Martínez de Alva that not one indigenous

Guatemalan possessed the necessary preparation to attend such a meeting.625

Nevertheless, some countries did take the directive to heart.626 Naturally, the Mexican

contingent of indigenous representatives proved to be quite strong, but in addition

Minister Rosenzweig, from his new position in Panama, secured the participation of

Kantule, an indigenous representative of the Kuna Indians, who took active part in the

conference. Although the Canadian government was not officially represented at the

conference, Moisés Sáenz read a greeting from Jasper Hill, Chief Big White Owl, to the

delegates. The US delegation included representatives of the Apache, Hopi, Pueblo,

Papago, Nez Perce, and Taos nations. Moreover, the conference’s daily bulletin also mentions the participation of an indigenous representative from Chile, although he is not included in the official list of delegates to the conference.627

From Moisés Sáenz’s first mention of the idea of an inter-American indigenous

conference to President Ubico in 1931, its subsequent proposal in the inter-American

622 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), Chávez Orozco to Hay, November 27, 1939. 623 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), Cárdenas to Hay, 28 November 1939. 624 Also see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (II), Martínez de Alva to Hay, March 6, 1940. 625 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe reglamentario correspondiente al mes de febrero de 1940,” 15. 626 The proposal was also unusual enough to have warranted comment by the US military attaché to Mexico. See, United States, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: Mexico, 1919-1941, Record Group 165 (RG 165), Reel V, Document 0528, MA Report: Current Events, April 26, 1940. In this report Gordon H. McCoy mentioned that whereas the remarks of English-speaking delegates were translated for the Spanish- speaking delegates, two Apache delegates from Arizona abandoned the congress after the opening session because they could not understand Spanish, the official language of the congress. 627 BNAH, E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, Boltetín, No. 2, 7. 240

conference system, and throughout the tumultuous initial planning that had taken place in

Bolivia, the Mexican government and its representatives had spearheaded the initiative.

The government supported these activities through its broader programme of intellectual

cooperation on indigenous matters. Once it had been decided that the conference would

move to Pátzcuaro, it remained for Mexican indigenistas and government officials to

seize this momentum and ensure the conference’s success, securing Mexico’s leadership

in inter-American affairs on this issue. An unprecedented amount of pre-conference

planning ensured that scores of indigenous, intellectual, and diplomatic representatives

from Mexico and the rest of the Americas would converge on this small town in April of

1940. There, the Cárdenas government sought to make effective use of this conference as a propaganda tool to support its inter-American aims.

At Pátzcuaro, Mexican delegates and organisers portrayed their government as a

hemispheric leader in the formulation of indigenous policy. Although the government’s

indigenous policies were foremost among the accomplishments it put on display, the

Mexicans also aimed to show that their government’s achievements were wide-ranging and resulted from their successful social Revolution. Members of the Foreign Service throughout the region continuously attempted to convince their host governments of the

virtues of the Mexican Revolution, but the Pátzcuaro conference represented a unique

opportunity to make a concerted effort to prove to the representatives of other Latin

American nations that Mexico deserved a leadership role in Inter-American relations by

virtue of the Revolution’s achievements. The coordinators of the congress took charge of

creating the impression that Mexico was the natural leader of Latin America. They 241

attempted to achieve this through their choice of venue for the conference, the symbolic ceremonies they enacted, and the program of social events and lectures that they planned for the delegates. Although their plans did not always go off without incident, and each of these aspects of the conference was open to the interpretation of both the delegates and the media, the Mexican government did its best to guide them in forming positive conclusions regarding the state of Mexican society, and the suitability of its government for leadership.

The Mexican government made a strategic decision in choosing Pátzcuaro as the location of the PCII. The region was home to a large P’urhépecha indigenous population that had participated extensively in government projects designed for their betterment. As the home state of President Cárdenas, their involvement in such projects had been strong since the days of his governorship of Michoacán.628 The organisers of the conference

could therefore be reasonably sure that the 174 delegates and the legions of aides and

bureaucrats who converged on the lakeside community would receive a fairly warm

welcome. Nevertheless, they took special efforts to make sure that the population had

been adequately prepared for their arrival. Excelsiór reported that a brigade of doctors

and nurses had descended on the region prior to the conference, undertaking a massive

sanitary campaign in Pátzcuaro and the surrounding area. Armed with phonograph

recordings in P’urhépecha , they readied the indigenous population for the national and

international scrutiny they would undergo.629 The small town, which had a population of

628 For contrasting views of this process see Marjorie Becker, Setting the Virgin on Fire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) and Christopher Boyer, Becoming Campesinos, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 629 Excélsior, April 14, 1940, 13. 242

8,150 at the time of the 1930 census, had been long recognised for its beautiful climate and colonial architecture.630 A PEMEX travel guide published the same year that the

congress occurred recommended it for vacations because of the picturesque character of

the town and its landscape.631 Ideal for a motoring party perhaps, but the hundreds of

visitors who arrived for the congress put an obvious strain on the small town’s resources.

A housing shortage resulted, and when all of the hotels and pensions were full, some

important guests were apparently forced to stay in small rooms better suited to manual

workers.632 To accommodate the three hundred guests at a luncheon served on the

penultimate day of the congress, it was necessary to borrow cutlery from all of the hotels

in town.633 In another exposé of the conditions that met the delegates in Pátzcuaro,

Excelsiór reported that the employees working in the town’s small post and telegraph office were unable to keep up with the extra demand imposed by the congress. They called for additional workers, newer equipment, and a more suitable location to accommodate the delegates’ needs.634 The same article stated that, by all accounts, the

delegates were nevertheless satisfied with the consideration they had received from the

townsfolk and the civil and military authorities of Pátzcuaro, but the dislocations caused

by their arrival could not help but be felt in the small town. It seems that the media

delighted in informing its readers of inconveniences such as these, but it is not clear that

these incidents affected the delegates’ impressions of the town or the nation that hosted

630 Justino Fernández, Pátzcuaro (México: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 1936), 15. 631 PEMEX Travel Club, Mexico’s Western Highways, including the cities of Toluca, Morelia, Pátzcuaro, Uruapan, Guadalajara (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1940), 60. 632 Excélsior, April 15, 1930, 1. 633 Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 1. 634 Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 1. 243

them. No doubt, Chávez Orozco and Sáenz hoped that the delegates would admire the

level of development that the small town had attained and be so charmed by the lovely architecture and the numerous ceremonies and entertainments organised by the DAI that they would overlook some of the problems that resulted from being in a rather out-of-the- way location.

The DAI organised a full calendar of social events to divert the attendees from the

work of the conference, but these often had didactic purposes. Following the inauguration

of the Congress on the evening of April 14, a musical group from the island of Tarácuaro on Lake Pátzcuaro, under the direction of the indigenous composer Nicolás B. Juárez, serenaded the delegates with a program of sones isleños.635 This musical program set the tone for the social and cultural events that followed by featuring the accomplishments of

Indians and demonstrating the foundational position that the indigenous population occupied in the formation of national identity. On April 17, Procurador General de la

República Jenaro Vázquez opened an exhibit of indigenous art from his native state of

Oaxaca. The exhibit, which the delegates received warmly, demonstrated the artistic accomplishments of Mexico’s indigenous population.636 The delegates were further

reminded of this when, at one of the receptions held in their honour, the meal was served

on glass- and stoneware made by the indigenous craftspeople of the Pátzcuaro area.637

Instead of deciding to adorn the tables with the expensive crystal and china place settings more characteristic of diplomatic ceremonies, the organisers chose instead to demonstrate

635 Vela, Orientación y recomendaciones del Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, 26. 636 Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 1. 637 Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 1. 244

the positive value they placed upon indigenous artistic production. On two separate occasions the delegates were invited to view films documenting the progress of the

Mexican government in dealing with indigenous issues, one on the Valley of Mexico and the second on the Otomí.638 More often than not, the delegates spent their free time

strolling along the historic streets of Pátzcuaro, or fishing on the lake.639 The author of the gossip column Cosmópolis suggested that delegates from Cuba and Guatemala,

Oswaldo Morales Patiño and Carlos Girón Cerna, even skipped some of the conference sessions to go duck hunting, but Luis Chávez Orozco quickly issued a press release denying that the delegates had been shirking their duties.640 In fact, most of the delegates

seem to have taken their work so seriously that several outings planned by the DAI, including a boating excursion and a day trip to Uruapan, were cancelled so that the delegates would have time to read the more than two hundred papers that were presented

at the congress.641 Nevertheless, several social events, both before and after the

temporary suspension of entertainments, afforded them the opportunity to enjoy the

company of their fellow delegates and see some of the aspects of Mexican culture that the

congress organisers believed would leave them with a favourable impression.

Central to this goal were the conference organisers’ consistent efforts to connect the activities underway in Pátzcuaro to the town’s illustrious history. Steeped in the

Pátzcuaro’s symbolic past, the delegates were guided in their interpretation of the

meaning these symbols held for the present by the organisers of the congress. The

638 Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 3; Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 10. 639 Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 3 640 “Cosmópolis”, Excelsior, April 22, 1940, 2nd section, 1; Excélsior, April 23, 1940, 12. 641 El Universal, April 19, 1940, 1; Excélsior, April 21, 1940, 10. 245

conference came in an auspicious year in the small town of Pátzcuaro, as it marked the four hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Colegio de San Nicolás, the famous university established by the Spanish humanist Vasco de Quiroga, the first Bishop of

Michoacán, and then moved to Valladolid later in the sixteenth century. This anniversary established the town as a recognised centre of learning, and the fact that the Colegio de

San Nicolás’s founder had been a noted defender of New Spain’s indigenous population in the sixteenth century linked the activities of the delegates to his goals. The inauguration of the congress and many of its plenary sessions were held in the renovated remains of the Augustine complex located on the north side of town’s plaza chica. In

1936, the convent had been converted into the Teatro Emperador Caltzontzin, named for the last P’urhépecha leader, Tangaxoán II, whom the brutal conquistador Nuño Beltrán de

Guzman ordered tortured and executed on the banks of the Rio Lerma in 1529. In 1938, the adjoining church was converted into the Biblioteca Gertrudis Bocanegra, named in honour of the Heroine of Pátzcuaro, who fought in the struggle for independence and died at the hands of a royalist firing squad in 1817.642 Statues, plaques, street names, and other memorials in honour of Vasco de Quiroga, Tangaxoán, and Gertrudis Bocanegra surrounded the delegates as they went about their daily activities at the congress, but the

DAI also sought to link the congress more explicitly to Vasco de Quiroga and Tangaxoán in order the substantiate the impressions they hoped to create among the delegates.

642 This description of the conversion of these buildings and their original uses is based on Manuel Toussaint, Pátzcuaro (Mexico City: UNAM/Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas y Escuela de Arquitectura, 1942). 246

Don Vasco de Quiroga arrived in Michoacán in 1536 to reverse the damage that

Nuño Beltrán de Guzman had caused in the area around Lake Pátzcuaro. He initially

based his operations in nearby Tzintzuntzan, but relocated to Pátzcuaro in 1540. Famous

for the founding of mission-hospitals throughout the region, he also sought to make the

villages surrounding the lake self-sufficient through their concentration upon a variety of

crafts, many of which survive as regional specialties to this day. Influenced by the

utopian ideals of Thomas More, he founded the towns of Santa Fe de México, Santa Fe

de la Laguna, and Santa Fe del Río. Widely revered by the indigenous population of the

area, many of whom came to call him Tata Vasco, he was the principal agent of

evangelisation and Spanish dominance in the region.643 He wrote two principal works

expounding his views regarding the good government of indigenous Mexico during his

time in Michoacán, La utopia en América and the Reglas y ordenanzas para el gobierno

de los hospitals de Santa Fe de México, y Michoacán. The Secretaría de la Economía

Nacional issued a new edition of the latter in honour of the PCII, and gave a copy to each

of the delegates in attendance.644 A tall statue of the bishop dominates Pátzcuaro’s plaza

grande, and the meeting of the indigenous representatives to the congress, which took place on April 21, was held in an inn named for Vasco de Quiroga. His memory loomed

large over both the congress and the indigenous inhabitants of the region.

The parallels between the sixteenth century bishop and President Lázaro Cárdenas

were clear. Similarly revered by the indigenous population, Cárdenas came to be known

643 Bernardino Verástique, Michoacán and Eden: Vasco de Quiroga and the Evangelization of Western Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), Chapter 6. 644 Vasco de Quiroga, Reglas y ordenanzas para el gobierno de los hospitals de Santa Fe de México, y Michoacán (Mexico City: Secretaría de Economía Nacional/Talleres Gráficos de la Nacion, 1940). 247

as Tata Lázaro among the poor Indians and campesinos whose lives he had touched.

Following his inauguration of the PCII on April 14, Cárdenas spent the next day visiting

the island of Janitzio on Lake Pátzcuaro, where he ate with the indigenous community of

the island. Cárdenas had recently overseen the construction of an impressive statue of

José María Morelos y Pavón on Janitzio that could be seen from Pátzcuaro and had

already become a significant tourist attraction for the area.645 Later that day, he received a medal and a certificate awarded to him by a commission of representatives of the town of Pátzcuaro in recognition of all he had done to further the development of the town. In

response, he announced the construction of a new hospital to meet the community’s growing needs. On his way back to Mexico City the following day, he stopped in a number of other villages in Michoacán, making similar announcements and receiving commensurate thanks.646 Both Tata Vasco and Tata Lázaro had earned the gratitude of

the population around Lake Pátzcuaro. Like Vasco de Quiroga, Cárdenas and his representatives in the DAI also served, for good or ill, as the principal agents of the incorporation of the indigenous people of Michoacán into the Mexican nation.

These historical connections were performed symbolically during the ceremonies

held on April 23. Mexican delegate Luis Alvarez Barret had suggested that the speeches

made by President Cárdenas, John Collier, and Bolivian Ambassador to Mexico Enrique

Finot at the inauguration of the congress be deposited in an urn and symbolically buried

at the foot of the nearby statue of Tangaxoán.647 The delegates approved Alvarez Barret’s

645 Excélsior, April 17, 1940, 3. 646 Excélsior, April 19, 1940, 1, 9. 647 El Universal, April 19, 1940, 1; “Cosmópolis”, Excélsior, April 19, 1940, 2nd section, 1. 248

idea enthusiastically, and the congress organisers decided that the symbolic event would follow a luncheon at the Museo de Artes Populares given in honour of the delegates by the President. As it turned out, pressing business kept the Cárdenas from attending the ceremony, but he was represented by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Ramón Beteta.

The day’s events began at eleven in the morning at the museum, which occupies the original building of the Colegio de San Nicolás near the Basílica de Nuestra Señora de la

Salud, where the bishop’s sacred remains are contained in the Mausoleo de Don Vasco.

Historian and biographer of Morelos, Alfonso Teja Zabre, gave an address honouring

Vasco de Quiroga, and Ramón Beteta spoke on the president’s behalf.648 Before the three

hundred guests had finished their lunch, a crowd nearly as large as the guest list amassed

outside the museum.649 Armed with knives and daggers, they believed that the remains of

Vasco de Quiroga had been removed from the mausoleum and were to be buried beneath

the statue of Tangaxoán. Fiercely protective of Tata Vasco, and suspicious of the motives

of the three hundred indigenistas in their midst, the group, said to be composed of

militant Catholics, aimed forcibly to prevent the transfer of the bishop’s earthly remains by the Bolsheviks within. Employees of the museum were reportedly injured in the

scuffle that ensued before the abbot, Rafael Méndez, arrived to calm his parishioners.

Méndez offered his own life as a guarantee that no harm would come to Vasco de

Qurioga’s remains, and attempted to explain that the delegates only intended to pay homage to the bishop. Not convinced, representatives of the angry mob asked to see the

648 El Universal, April 24, 1940, 1. 649 The following account is based upon the descriptions found in Excélsior, April 24, 1940, 4 and El Universal, April 24, 1940, 11. 249

undisturbed remains of Don Vasco for themselves and stood guard at his tomb while the

rest of the afternoon’s events unfolded as planned. Ramón Beteta presided over the interment of the inaugural addresses, and Argentine Ambassador to Mexico Juan C.

Valenzuela made a speech commemorating the symbolic act and recognising the

Mexican government for its efforts in hosting the conference. The descriptions of the incident do not detail the ethnic backgrounds of the members of the group that had threatened the ceremony, but if the protestors were members of Pátzcuaro’s sizable indigenous population, the disturbance may have reminded the delegates of the recalcitrance and scepticism with which many indigenous people had met the civilising projects of the state from the time of Vasco de Quiroga forward.

The demonstration hinted at some of the religious tensions caused by the

introduction into indigenous communities of projects led by indigenistas who held to their anticlericalism as tightly as they held to their belief that Indians were capable of full citizenship in the nation. This was, of course, not news to most of the representatives from abroad, who had read of the Church-State conflict in their own papers.

Nevertheless, it may also have given them pause to consider whether to emulate Mexican indigenous policies in their own countries. The Mexicans at the congress maintained that their nation’s indigenous policies stemmed directly from the social Revolution the country had undergone, and used them as proof positive that the Revolution had been a success. If the adoption of policies rooted in the Revolution created increased social tensions, perhaps they were not worth the risk. 250

The officials who organised the PCII had attempted to convince the delegates to

the conference of Mexico’s rightful position as a leader in Inter-American relations by choosing a symbolically charged location, organising a series of social and cultural events that demonstrated their social and economic achievements, and orchestrating symbolic ceremonies that linked the Cárdenas government and the Revolution to the pursuit of justice for the nation’s indigenous population. A further indication that propaganda numbered among the primary goals of the conference is that Lombardo

Toledano also played a prominent role in this congress despite the fact that he had few indigenista pretensions. The firebrand leader, who could always be counted on to make a strong defence of the Revolution, attended the conference at the explicit instructions of the President.650 Luis Chávez Orozco lunched with Lombardo Toledano at the beginning

of April and telegraphed the president thereafter that he should be asked to attend both to

enhance the presence of organised labour at the conference and because of his

international reputation.651 The narrative Lombardo Toledano constructed of the history

of the Revolution in the speech he gave to the delegates on 16 April placed President

Cárdenas at the apex of an immense social movement that had made significant gains in

the realms of social and economic justice since its beginnings in 1910.652 Although he

ruffled some feathers by downplaying the contributions of previous Revolutionary

presidents, he made clear that the Cárdenas presidency represented the fulfilment of the

650 Excélsior, April 7, 1940, 10. 651 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Chávez Orozco to Cárdenas, April 4, 1940. 652 Excélsior, April 17, 1940, 1, 12. Lombardo Toledano’s remarks, along with Cárdenas’s inaugural speech, were also published in pamphlet form after the conference. Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina, Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (Mexico City: Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas, 1940). 251

promises of the Revolution.653 Moreover, he stated that he believed that the people would be able to count upon a powerful ally in their struggle: that Mexico would serve as the conscience of America, leading Latin America in the pursuit of social and economic justice in inter-American relations.654

The Mexican government carried out an extensive propaganda campaign at

Pátzcuaro, distributing pamphlets and books on the country’s history and governing practices.655 Even more effective than this propaganda in demonstrating their ability to lead Latin America in Inter-American relations were the experiences of the delegates who participated in the congress and witnessed the energy and resources that had gone into the solution of indigenous issues in Mexico. When the establishment of a permanent organisation dealing with American indigenous policy came up for discussion, there appears to have been no question that its headquarters would be located in Mexico City.

In many ways, the Mexican delegates to the Pátzcuaro congress were preaching to the choir. Indigenistas from throughout the Americas had been in contact for years, keeping abreast of each other’s writings and activities. The delegation that presented the most papers at the congress after Mexico and the United States was Ecuador, one of the countries where Sáenz had spent time as a researcher and as a diplomat. Sáenz had dedicated his 1933 volume on indigenous policy in Ecuador to Pío Jaramillo Alvarado, the head of the Ecuadorian delegation to the PCII, and had maintained significant contact

653 José Angel Ceniceros came out in defence of Emilio Portes Gil, who he pointed out had also distributed significant amounts of land to campesinos. Excélsior, April 18, 1940, 3. In an interview with Excélsior the following day, Lombardo Toledano reaffirmed his position that Cárdenas had distributed more land, and accomplished more than all previous Revolutionary presidents. Excélsior, April 19, 1940, 11. 654 Excélsior, April 17, 1940, 12. 655 Excélsior, April 27, 1940, 3. 252

with his fellow indigenista over the years.656 By the time that the Primer Congreso

Indigenista Interamericano took place in 1940, indigenistas and indigenous groups alike already acknowledged the Mexican government as the leader in the formulation of indigenous policy in the Americas. The Mexican delegates to the congress, as well as the organisers from the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas and President Cárdenas himself, performed this leadership role to a tee at Pátzcuaro, helping to convince Latin American

governments of what their collaborators had long known.

The founding of an inter-American institute charged with the responsibility of

studying and developing indigenous policy in the Americas had been an explicit goal of

the PCII at least since the passage of the motion Moisés Sáenz proposed at the VIII Pan

American Meeting in Lima. Although the institution’s headquarters in Mexico City do

not seem to have been a matter of debate at Páztcuaro, the Mexican government’s

methods of promoting its leadership continued to arouse some concern in diplomatic

circles. Heavy-handed as always, the proposed membership of the III’s executive

committee once again reflected its efforts to dominate the diplomatic and organisational

stage. Ramón Beteta wrote urgently to President Cárdenas on April 26, 1940 to let him know that Pierre de L. Boal of the US Embassy had confidentially informed him that the

Latin American delegates to the conference had expressed to him their dissatisfaction with the fact that all of the members of the proposed committee were Mexican, except for

John Collier of the US and a Guatemalan alternate.657 It was rumoured that Luis Chávez

656 Sáenz, Sobre el indio ecuatoriano, xi. 657 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 26, 1940. I thank Guillermo Palacios for bringing this memorandum to my attention. 253

Orozco had suggested this composition in order to secure for himself leadership of the

III. As a result, the Latin American delegates to the congress feared that the Institute

would serve Mexican interests, rather than attending to the problems of the continent as a

whole. Boal warned that Collier would resign rather than be part of an inter-American

committee that had only Mexican members. Beteta estimated that this would cause the

stillbirth of the institute and suggested that the Mexican representatives should be limited to Chávez Orozco and Sáenz and Latin American membership extended to include representatives from both Central and South America. Cárdenas immediately sent Chávez

Orozco a telegram asking him to ensure broad Latin American representation on the executive committee, and the diplomatic crisis seems to have been averted when he followed the president’s instructions.658 The resignation of Alfonso Caso, Miguel Othón

de Mendizábal and Gilberto Loyo, announced by Chávez Orozco, enabled the integration

of representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala and Peru. Broad Latin American

representation on the committee not only served to prevent diplomatic scandal, but also

helped to ensure that stakeholders throughout the region would work to promote the

organisation of the new Institute. Yet again, the heavy-handed methods of Mexican

delegations to Latin American conferences had elicited comment and stirred up some

resentment, but once alerted to this poor diplomacy, the Cárdenas government acted

quickly to neutralise the issue and prevent Chávez Orozco’s attempted manipulation of

the committee’s composition to cause the III to begin its efforts amidst a storm of

controversy.

658 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Cárdenas to Chávez Orozco, April 26, 1940. 254

When Cuban Ambassador José Manuel Carbonnel reported on the conference to

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he stated that without doubt, the most important

resolution of the conference had been that which mandated the creation of the Inter-

American Institute.659 He commented with interest on the controversy Lombardo

Toledano’s declarations had created and in subsequent reports he discussed the flap

surrounding the executive committee’s membership.660 He surmised that the controversy

related to domestic politics, not any overt desire to minimise Latin American

involvement in the congress or the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano.661

In general, the responses of Latin American diplomats and delegates mirrored

those of Carbonell, who considered the congress a great success. The Peruvian delegates

to the congress made an official deposition to the Congress in Lima in September of 1940

that highlighted the depth of their participation in the proceedings at Pátzcuaro and gave a

very favourable impression of the importance of the conference and its resolutions.662

The report took place within the context of an ongoing legislative debate on Peru’s new

Ley Orgánica de Enseñanza, and representative Escalante, who had headed the Peruvian

delegation to Pátzcuaro, explicitly stated that they could learn from Mexico to solve

“identical problems” in Peru.663 An excellent student of Mexican propaganda, Escalante

described Mexico’s Revolutionary process and even explained the importance of the

659 Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009699, Carbonell to Campa, April 26, 1940. 660 Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009699, Carbonell to Campa, April 17 and April 20, 1940. 661 Cuba, ANC, Fondo Secretaría del Estado, Volúmen 438, Expediente 009699, Carbonell to Campa, May 3 and May 4, 1940. 662 La Cámara de Diputaos del Peru, Exposición ante la Cámara, del señor Diputado por Espinar Doctor José Angel Escalante, Presidente de la Delegación Peruana al Congreso Indigenista (Lima Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1940). 663 Ibid., 7. 255

meeting’s location at Pátzcuaro and the humanist example provided by Vasco de

Quiroga.664 His remarks also echoed some of the internal inconsistencies of the ideas

presented at the congress. Although he insisted upon the importance of bilingual

indigenous education, he also paraphrased President Cárdenas’s opening address

declaring that their goal should be the “peruvianisation of the Indian.”665 He reported

with great satisfaction that Cuzco had been chosen as the location of the II Congreso

Indigenista Interamericano, an equally symbolically-charged location.666 In addition to

Escalante’s report to the Peruvian Congress, Manuel T. Calle Escajadillo also published

the paper he had delivered at Pátzcuaro that summarised the situation of Peruvian

indigenous peoples and the government’s efforts to improve their conditions.667 Escalante

and the other Peruvian delegates to the congress clearly looked forward to effective

cooperation with the indigenistas of the Americas in the III, in the preparations for the

second congress, and in their own attempts to address the marginalisation of Peru’s

indigenous population.

The delegation from El Salvador presented a similar report to the Salvadoran

government upon its return from the PCII. Minister Hector Escobar Serrano had also attended the III CIE and he was joined by José Andrés Orantes, undersecretary of education in San Salvador.668 Much more expository than the Peruvian delegation’s

deposition, the report written by Orantes included a complete transcript of President

664 Ibid., 23-26, 12-13. 665 Ibid., 52. 666 Ibid., 16. 667 Manuel T. Calle Escajadillo, Ponencia presentada al Primer Congreso Indigenista de México (Lima: Imprenta Moderna, 1940). 668 José Andrés Orantes, Informe presentado al gobierno de El Savador por la Delegación Salvadoreña al Primer Congreso Interamericano de Indigenistas (San Salvador, 1940). 256

Cárdenas’s inaugural speech as well as the delegate’s own submission, summaries of the

resolutions, and reports on the social events the Salvadoran delegation had attended.

Orantes too discussed the history of the lakeside town of Pátzcuaro and its illustrious

founder.669

Ambassador Hidalgo’s reports to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign of Foreign

Affairs during the conference exhibited some of his usual scepticism. He reported that the

PCII’s opening had been rather frosty because it followed so closely on the receipt of the

critical US oil note of April 1940.670 He drew upon Cárdenas’s speech at the opening of

the congress to criticise again Mexico’s “inert” indigenous subproletariat, which he said weighed heavily on national life.671 Nevertheless, in his annual report for 1940, Hidalgo

commented favourably upon the PCII, which he said had been exceptional, not only

because of the number and quality of the delegations, but also because of the quantity and

importance of the scientific papers presented and the importance of its resolutions.672

Even Hidalgo had been convinced.

The popular reaction to the conference likewise demonstrated the positive results

of the Mexican government’s propaganda efforts. On April 18, the PCII had approved a

motion proclaiming President Cárdenas Benemérito de los Indios de América. Although

Cárdenas declined the honour as inappropriate during his lifetime, the significance of the

resolution remained clear.673 Cárdenas’s decision not to accept the honour met with

669 Ibid., 73-75, 99-100. 670 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, April 17, 1940. 671 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, April 23, 1940. 672 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1918 A, Hidalgo to Ministro, January 11, 1941, 19. 673 El Universal, 20 April 1940, 16; AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, telegram from Cárdenas to Chávez Orozco, April 19, 1940. 257

approval from Costa Rica. Attaching a clipping from La Tribuna, Rafael Noe Fuentes

wrote to the president to congratulate him on providing “An Example Worthy of

Imitation.”674 Ambassador Rubén Romero sent Cárdenas a series of favourable clippings

from Havana, one of which stated that Mexico could be considered the only country of

the Americas that had undertaken a methodical campaign to improve the conditions of its

indigenous population.675 Cárdenas also received a congratulatory message from Augusto

Charnaud MacDonald of Guatemala City, who had visited Mexico the year before and

witnessed the government’s efforts to incorproate the Indian into national life first hand.676 Charnaud MacDonald had long followed Mexican indigenous policy and no

doubt kept abreast of the events at Páztcuaro with the benefit of David Vela’s columns in

El Imparcial. He hoped to visit Mexico again the following year and gauge the

government’s progress in implementing the congress’s resolutions. Charnaud

MacDonald’s letter must have been particularly encouraging because of the Ubico

government’s initial disinclination to participate in the PCII. Despite governmental lack

of interest, Guatemalan citizens followed Mexican government programmes and hoped

for collaboration between the two governments and the growing community of

indigenistas in Guatemala.

Notwithstanding the positive propaganda created by the PCII itself, the Mexican

government and Moisés Sáenz, who had been chosen to serve as director of the new III,

did not cease their tireless efforts to ensure Mexican leadership on this inter-American

674 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Fuentes to Cárdenas, April 26, 1940; “Un ejemplo digno de imitarse,” La Tribuna (San José), April 21, 1940, 2. 675 Jesús González Scarpetta, El Mundo (Havana), April 27, 1940; AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Romero to Cárdenas, May 6, 1940. 676 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Charnaud MacDonald to Cárdenas, May 8, 1940. 258

issue. Most pressing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed to secure ratification of the

convention creating the III by governments throughout the region.677 Ambassador Sáenz

once again took advantage of the stops between legs of his journey back to Peru to drum

up support for indigenous issues. Before he left, Ramón Beteta wrote to the ambassadors

and ministers resident in each of the countries he proposed to visit, explaining the

importance of his trip and the Institute.678 Sáenz arrived back in Lima at the beginning of

October, whereupon he wrote directly to Cárdenas to describe his success.679 He met with

the presidents of Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador, who assured him of their intention to

expedite ratification of the convention, but in Guatemala, he had been unable to secure an

audience with President Ubico. The Guatemalans were full of suspicions and jealousies,

he reported, but he nevertheless had been able to help to gather a small group of

interested citizens who he felt confident would help to ensure the continued influence of

indigenismo.680 Negotiations for ratification by Peru continued apace, and he suggested that once this had been secured, he would undertake to visit Bolivia and Chile in order to

ensure that the III received the attention it deserved in La Paz and Santiago. Sánez also

mentioned that he had requested of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorisation to

confer upon Peruvian President Prado and his vice president the Order of the Aztec

677 For a copy of the convention see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (I). 678 See, for example, Beteta’s letter to the Minister to Colombia. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Beteta to Ojeda, August 26, 1940. 679 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, October 18, 1940. See Sáenz’s report to the Ministry from Bogotá, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Sáenz to Hay, September 26, 1940. Minister Ojeda sent a favourable report of Sáenz’s visit. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Ojeda to Hay, October 4, 1940. Also see Sáenz’s report on his visit to Quito and the clippings surrounding his visit, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Sáenz to Hay, October 2, 1940. 680 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, October 18, 1940. Also see the report on his visit to Guatemala City, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2401 (III), Herrera Frimont to Hay, September 18, 1940. 259

Eagle, believing that it would be fitting to decorate them as soon as Peru ratified the

convention, thereby creating a positive association between the order of merit and

commitment to indigenismo.681 Moisés Sáenz died only one year later, but in that time he

did indeed succeed in securing Peruvian ratification and the decorations he requested.

By the time of Sáenz’s death in Lima in October of 1941, the organisation of the

III had been placed on firm footing by the executive committee of which the Ambassador

to Peru formed a part. Although several governments had reservations about their annual

quotas—Costa Rica, and more remarkably Chile, among others, claimed that they should

be designated lower contributions because of the lack of indigenous peoples within their

national territories—ratifications continued apace, and remained on the diplomatic

agenda of those ambassadors and ministers appointed to countries that did not

immediately ratify the convention.682 By June of 1941 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba,

Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru had all

ratified, and the ambassadors and ministers in those countries had not yet ratified had been asked to inform the governments of this fact, thus applying a bit of peer pressure to the recalcitrant.683 In addition to providing for the organisation of the III, the convention

suggested that each country found or affiliate national indigenous institutes to the III.

Although the Argentine government had proven particularly slow to ratify the

convention, the chargé d’affaires in Buenos Aires, Manuel de Negri, reported to the

681 AGN, LCR, Caja 684, Expediente 533.4/1, Sáenz to Cárdenas, October 18, 1940. 682 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Romeo Ortega to Hay, September 30, 1940; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), telegram from Reyes Spíndola to Hay, December 18, 1940. 683 See, for example, Ambassador Octavio Reyes Spíndola’s letter confirming that he had informed the Chilean government. AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Reyes Spíndola to SRE, June 3, 1941. The Dominican Republic also objected to its quota, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2402-1 (II), Juan Manuel Alcaraz Tornel to SRE, January 21, 1941. 260

Ministry in 1943 that Argentina’s Comisión Indigenista Argentina intended to affiliate with the III, and had also complied with another of the resolutions passed at Pátzcuaro, the celebration of the Día del Indio. Held at the Parque de los Andes at the base of the monument to the Indio Argentino by sculptor Luis Perlotti, de Negri had been invited to speak at the April 18 event.684 The newspaper coverage of the commemoration noted that indigenous costumes of Argentina and Mexico and folkloric music of the two nations graced the event.685 This resolution in favour of the Día del Indio had been one of the few motions proposed by the indigenous attendees at the PCII.686 A similar event took place in Asunción.687 Paraguay had been the only Latin American country not represented at the PCII. In the flurry of correspondence that followed the conference, one of the suggestions Sáenz had taken up was the creation of a directory of indigenistas, but the chargé d’affaires in Asunción regrettably wrote in response that there were effectively no indigenistas in Paraguay to list.688 Nevertheless, three years later, the celebration of the

Día del Indio had taken root. Although the members of Paraguay’s Guaraní had not been among those indigenous representatives who helped to create the celebration at Pátzcuaro in 1940, they and a growing number of intellectuals in Asunción benefited from their subsequent collaboration with the III, operating under Mexican leadership. That the

684 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (III), de Negri to SRE, April 21, 1943. 685 “Se Celebrará Hoy El Día del Indio,” La Prensa (Buenos Aires), April 18, 1940; “Se celebró hoy El Día del Indio,” La Razón (Buenos Aires), April 18, 1943; “En el Parque de los Andes Fué Celebrado Ayer el Día del Indio,” La Prensa, April 19, 1943. 686 BNAH, E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, Boletín, No. 3, 13. Another of the indigenous section’s initiatives was the recommendation that the indigenous peoples of the Americas prepare artistic and folkloric exhibits for the Second Inter-American Tourism Conference, scheduled to be held in Mexico City in 1941. BNAH, E51 C7493b, Congreso Indigenista Interamericano, Boletín, No. 4, 9- 10. On this conference see, Dina Berger, The Development of Mexico’s Tourism Industry: Pyramids by Day, Martinis by Night (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 687 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2362-1 (III), Gamio to SRE, June 3, 1943. 688 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2403-1 (VI), Aceves Navarro to Sáenz, July 30, 1940. 261

celebration of this day had been taken up in Argentina and Paraguay demonstrated one of

the enduring achievements of the congress, and the lasting association between the

Mexican government and indigenous issues held well into the future.

Conclusion

The Cárdenas government’s extensive use of inter-American meetings as

propaganda tools met with ambiguous results. The sheer number of meetings hosted—

and the heavy-handed methods and Revolutionary symbols employed by the organisers

and delegates—detracted, in some instances, from the conferences. They also diminished

the Cárdenas government’s opportunities to use the meetings to secure the leadership

position in inter-American relations it believed Mexico deserved. The delegates’ experiences of these conferences related closely to their perceptions of the Cárdenas government and whether its policies were anathema to the philosophies that guided their own governments, but also to their personal experiences of the domestic processes under way in their own countries. As a result, the broader projects of intellectual cooperation and development assistance that the Mexican government engaged in could play a decisive role in preconditioning the reception of technical delegates who had worked personally with representatives of the Mexican government to resolve social problems in the Americas. The activities of the ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d’affaires who undertook propaganda campaigns on behalf of these inter-American meetings, attempted to secure the meaningful participation of Latin American countries through the appointment of diplomatic and technical delegates, and ensured the ratification of 262

conventions that institutionalised future cooperation between Latin American countries, played a decisive role in determining the effectiveness of the hosting of inter-American meetings in creating the possibilities for Mexican leadership in hemispheric relations.

263

CONCLUSION. THE VOYAGE OF THE DURANGO: FINAL THOUGHTS ON LA POLÍTICA DEL BUEN AMIGO

In summary, and in a word, the voyage of the Durango to South America has been a complete triumph. The success obtained leaves nothing to be desired and could not have been bettered in any way or in any sense. It has been, without a doubt, the most effective propaganda that Mexico could have undertaken; but it is also, and above all, something much more important and transcendental: through its projections abroad, the visit of the Durango represents a concrete realisation of the Americanist policy of the government of General Cárdenas.689

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a farewell banquet on February 27, 1940, in honour of Col. Ignacio Beteta’s impending departure for South America as head of an extraordinary three-month-long artistic, military, commercial, and athletic mission of goodwill aboard the destroyer Durango.690 At the luncheon, attended by members of the diplomatic corps and officials of the government ministries represented among the special embassy’s nearly five hundred members, the goodwill ambassador’s brother,

Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Ramón Beteta, wished him well on behalf of the

Ministry. El Universal reported that the objectives of the mission, in addition to extending fraternal greetings to the governments of the region, included the demonstration of the country’s industrial and commercial capacity, its advances in the fields of physical and military education, and the beauty of its folklore.691 Nevertheless, the goals of Beteta’s floating goodwill embassy were much more complex than those described in the capital’s daily, and its results much more significant, as indicated by the

689 Mexico, Archivo Histórico Diplomático Genaro Estrada (AHGE), Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Expediente III-415-14 (I), Pablo Campos Ortiz to Hay, May 10, 1940. 690 “Banquete en honor del Coronel Beteta,” El Universal (Mexico City), February 28, 1940. 691 Ibid. 264

comments of Mexico’s Minister to Ecuador, Pablo Campos Ortiz quoted above. The voyage of the Durango epitomised the cultural aspects of the Cárdenas government’s

Política del Buen Amigo. Undertaken at the end of the sexenio, it represents the accumulation of knowledge and experience the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had gained in pursuing its foreign policy aims in the region during the previous years.

Like so many of Cárdenas’s firm collaborators, Beteta had served militarily during the Revolution and participated in the cultural effervescence associated with its reconstructive phase. A noted watercolourist, later in life his oeuvre would be exhibited

in the United States, as well as in special exhibitions at the Museo de San Carlos.692

During the Cárdenas presidency, Beteta published an historical and social analysis of the

Revolutionary Army,693 but he also served as head of the Departamento Autónomo de

Educación Física until its dissolution at the beginning of 1940.694 The Autonomous

Department of Physical Education had been created in 1935 alongside the Departamento

Autónomo Forestal y de Caza y Pesca and the Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y

692 See the catalogue of the exhibition held October 5-20, 1964 produced by the Pan American Union, Ignacio M. Beteta (Washington: Pan American Union, 1964), and Alfonso de Neuvillate y Ortiz and Raúl Salinas de Gortari, Gral Ignacio M. Beteta: XXV aniversario de acuarelista, Museo de San Carlos, Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes octubre 25-noveimbre 27 1977, México, D.F. (Mexico City: Museo de San Carlos/INBA, 1977). Also see Jaime Torres Bodet, The artist, gral. Ignacio María Beteta (Mexico City: s/n, 1964). 693 Ignacio M. Beteta, El ejército revolucionario: visión histórica y social (Mexico City: PNR, 1936). Also see Ignacio M. Beteta, Mensaje al ejercito nacional (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937). 694 This history of the short-lived Departamento Autónomo de Educación Física has yet to be written, but the materials for its study are abundant. See the Memoria del Departamento de Educación Física, and the agency’s magazine, Educación física, both published by the DAPP, as well as Departamento de Educación Física, Programa de trabajos que desarrollará el propio departamento durante el año 1937 tanto en su acción directa como en la que efectuará ligada con las demás secretarías y departamentos de estado (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937); Departamento de Educación Física, Compendio de ejercicios de orden cerrado tomados del reglamentario del arma de infantería (Mexico City: DAPP, 1939). 265

Publicidad, all of which represented new priorities of the Cárdenas government.695

Nevertheless, the president disbanded the three autonomous departments at the beginning

of 1940, apparently due to economy measures, and their functions were subsumed into

lager government agencies following a generous banquet Cárdenas gave at the beginning

of 1940 to thank department heads Beteta, Agustín Arroyo Ch, and Miguel Ángel de

Quevedo for their service.696 Even before the end of Beteta’s term as head of Physical

Education, he and Cárdenas had begun plans for the colonel’s next project, the voyage of

the Durango, which would enable him to contribute his expertise in the arts, the military,

and physical education to the furtherance of Cárdenas’s diplomatic goals in Latin

America. Beteta wrote to Cárdenas in December 1939 outlining a fairly modest proposal

for a voyage to Chile.697 He expected the financial outlay to be quite minimal because

the costs could be divided among the ministries represented in the delegation, and the

members of the special embassy would be treated as guests of honour in Chile during

their stay there.698 In the coming months the embassy’s itinerary would expand to

include Peru, Ecuador, Panama, and Colombia, and so would its budget, but it is

nevertheless significant that the idea began as a demonstration of affinity between the

Mexican and Chilean governments that originated with Beteta, Cárdenas, and one of the

695 On the Departamento Autónomo Forestal y de Casa y Pesca see Emily Wakild, “Resources, Communities, and Conservation: The Creation of National Parks in Revolutionary Mexico under President Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2007). On the Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad see Rafael López González, “Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP). La experiencia del Estado cardenista en políticas estatales de comunicación, 1937-1939” (Tesis de licenciatura, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM, 2002). 696 On the dissolution of the departments and this banquet, see Mexico, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Ramo Presidentes, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (LCR), Expediente 545.3/252. 697 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta, “Memorandum para el Señor Presidente de la República relativo al envío de una delegación mexicana a la República de Chile,” December 14, 1939. 698 Ibid. 266

president’s most trusted diplomats, Octavio Reyes Spíndola, who had recently been

appointed Ambassador to President Pedro Aguirre Cerda’s Chile.699

Beteta was a natural choice for the appointment as head of the Durango, not only

because of his unique combination of interests, but because he had headed a similar

mission to Cuba in 1938. While Octavio Reyes Spíndola served as chargé d’affaires in

Havana, he had arranged for an enormous goodwill mission to coincide with the

Homenaje México held in favour of the Cárdenas’s oil expropriation, organised in large

part by segments of the Spanish colony in Cuba, which had occurred at the stadium El

Polar on June 12, 1938.700 The mission included a Brigada Artística Popular Mexicana,

organised by the Ministry of Education, that travelled to Havana by sea, an exhibit of the

Liga de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios (LEAR), and a military mission under the

direction of Col. Beteta that arrived as part of the goodwill flight of three military

airplanes.701 Reyes Spíndola received funding from the DAPP to produce a short film

about the event. The homage represented the cross-germination of support for Mexico’s

Spanish Civil War policy, its oil expropriation, its Revolutionary philosophy, and interest

in its artistic and military achievements. The special embassy had been very well

received in Havana, and its activities were widely reported throughout the Americas,

699 See Reyes Spíndola’s personnel file, AHGE, SRE, Expediente 26-25-7. On these ideological ties, see AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Aguirre Cerda, June 5, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Marmaduke Grove, March 1, 1940. 700 For documents relating to the homage and an album of signatures of those Cubans who supported the expropriation, see AGN, LCR, Caja 1073, Expediente 577.1/7. 701 See Beteta’s letter of thanks to Cuban President Federico Laredo Bru, Cuba, Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Fondo Presidencia, Caja 98, Número 35, Beteta to Laredo Bru, June 19, 1938. 267

increasing the positive propaganda value of the mission.702 Beteta had performed the role

of enlightened military officer in Havana, earning him the friendship of General

Fulgencio Batista, who repaid Beteta’s visit by heading a Cuban military mission to

Mexico in early 1939.703 The special embassy of which Beteta had been a part proved

particularly effective in strengthening relations between Mexico and Cuba, and this

success undoubtedly motivated Reyes Spíndola to suggest a similar mission at the

beginning of his new posting to Chile, a country that had become a foreign policy priority for the Cárdenas government after the election of the Frente Popular.

Reyes Spíndola wrote to President Cárdenas in January 1940 that the proposed

goodwill mission to Chile would be worth ten years of active diplomatic labour, and

would achieve more practical results because it would reach the entire pueblo.704 The anticipation with which the Chilean population awaited the mission’s arrival is evident in newspaper coverage that began with rumours of the visit nearly six months before the

Durango docked at Valparaíso.705 Indeed, while the initial idea had been to symbolically

demonstrate the ideological ties that bound Chile and Mexico, the announcement of the

special embassy met with such great enthusiasm from so many quarters, and had been

reported so widely through the services of the United Press, that President Cárdenas was

702 See the SRE’s file on the mission, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-1248-8, which contains correspondence from El Salvador and Panama responding to newspaper and radio coverage of the homage and the special embassy. 703 For US Ambassador Josephus Daniels’s report of Ignacio Beteta’s speech welcoming Batista to Mexico in 1939, see United States, National Archives Records Administration (NARA), Record Group 59 (RG 59), 033.372/13, Daniels to Hull, February 3, 1939. 704 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, January 13, 1940. 705 See, for example, “Embajada Mexicana,” La Opinión (Santiago), November 15, 1939; “El Deporte en México,” Qué Hubo (Santiago), November 28, 1939. Also see “La embajada mexicana de arte y deporte es esperada en Chile con vivo interés,” La Crítica (Santiago), February 3, 1940; “Sólo Campeones Traerán los Mexicanos,” La Crítica, February 10, 1940; “Rescientos cuarenta Mexicanos nos envia el Pdte. Cárdenas,” La Opinión, February 10, 1940. 268

soon convinced that it would indeed outweigh regular diplomatic activities and

accordingly agreed that the Durango should also make official visits to other Latin

American ports of call during its return trip from Chile.706 Nevertheless, Mexico’s

Minister to Panama, Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz, only received official word on

February 29 from Foreign Minister Hay that Cárdenas had determined that the Durango should also visit Ecuador, Panama, and Peru.707 The decision to visit Colombia came

even later, long after the Durango had set sail and in response to an explicit invitation

from President Eduardo Santos.708 Beteta and Mexico’s Minister to Colombia Carlos

Darío Ojeda debated the merits of ascending to Bogotá from Cali or Barranquilla,

eventually deciding upon the latter, which meant that the visit to Colombia would occur

after crossing the Panama Canal and be the last stop on the Durango’s tour.709 The

diplomats in these countries had much less time in which to prepare for the embassy’s

arrival than Reyes Spíndola, but these visits were also of much shorter duration (typically

three to four days) than the mission to Chile, which lasted a full three weeks. Regardless

of duration and level of planning, the embassy’s activities in the five countries visited had

broad similarities, and the Durango and its head of mission Beteta met a similarly

enthusiastic response in each port of call.

In the draft budget Beteta submitted to Cárdenas in January 1940, the contingent

of delegates he proposed to take on the Durango numbered 352, including eighteen

administrators, ninety-six athletes and five coaches, eighty-one students each from the

706 Ibid. 707 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, July 20, 1940. 708 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), Zawadsky to Beteta, April 9, 1940. 709 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Carlos Darío Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de 1940 rinde la legación de México en Colombia.” 269

Escuela Militar and the Escuela Naval, and fifty-two members of the Orquesta Típica

Miguel Lerdo de Tejada.710 The membership, like the itinerary, soon expanded greatly.

Cárdenas received petitions from interested individuals who hoped to join the expedition.

Fernando de la Llave wrote to Cárdenas’s personal secretary, Agustín Leñero, in January

1940, enclosing an article he had written celebrating the Durango’s mission for the

newspaper they had once worked on together, Guadalajara’s Las Noticias. He asked

whether Leñero thought a poet and firm admirer of the work of the “greatest President

our country has ever had” (such as himself) should perhaps be aboard.711 Although de la

Llave’s offer does not seem to have been taken up, his suggestion anticipated Cárdenas’s desire to hand-pick journalists to join the embassy. Travelling correspondent and reporter Roberto Moya S. sent his calling card to the president to remind him of the authorisation he had given him to travel with the Durango to Chile as a reporter for both

El Universal (the newspaper with which he was normally affiliated) and, to his “utmost pleasure,” the government’s El Nacional.712 Leñero wrote to Beteta informing him of the

president’s decision, which he said was based upon Moya’s exemplary services during

Cárdenas’s recent tour of Guerrero.713 By exemplary services, he surely meant that he

had written articles favourable to Cárdenas, portraying the tour in the light desired by the

government. As a result, a large contingent of journalists accompanied the Durango, but

the publicity they provided was invaluable. The number of other delegates began to

710 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, “Personal que formará parte de la delegación dportiva mexicana y elementos militares que visitarán la República de Chile,” January 11, 1940. 711 AGN, LCR, Caja 454, Expediente 433/85, de la Llave to Leñero, January 12, 1940; Fernando de la Llave, “El Viaje del ‘Durango’ a Chile,” Las Noticias (Guadalajara), January 12, 1940. 712 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Moya to Cárdenas, February 2, 1940. 713 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Beteta, March 2, 1940. 270

creep up too; the Orquesta Típica eventually sent sixty-five musicians, in addition to director Mario Talavera (who replaced Miguel Lerdo de Tejada because of his ill health), instead of the originally-projected fifty-two.714 Moreover, as the length of the mission increased to accommodate the invitation of President Santos, the represented government ministries had to increase the stipends of their delegates, which led to a panicked flurry of correspondence between Beteta, Cárdenas, and Raúl Castellano, head of the

Departamento del Distrito Federal, which paid for the Orquesta Típica’s participation in the mission. Beteta sent word that its members’ situation had become “desperate” and he called upon the president to impress upon Castellano the immediate need to send additional funds to the musicians.715 Despite the ballooning membership and expenses of the special embassy, the value of the mission far outweighed its costs, and the number and variety of participants were one of the keys to the mission’s success.

The special embassy Durango included track and field athletes, tennis stars, a basketball team, boxers, cyclists, swimmers, shooting and fencing experts, an eighteen- member football team, an equal number of acrobatic motorcyclists, charros and polo

714 The Orquesta Típica had a long history of cultural diplomacy, having formed part of the 1922 mission to Rio de Janeiro in honour of the centenary of Brazil’s independence. “Sobre folk-lore mexicano hizo importante exposición el Licdo. Alfredo B. Cuéllar,” La Estrella de Panamá (Panama City), May 11, 1940. In February 1940, Miguel Lerdo de Tejada had requested that given his advanced age and propensity for seasickness, he be permitted to travel on a steamer with greater comforts to Santiago instead of accompanying the Orquesta Típica on the Durango, but rather than taking up what would have been an expensive and difficult proposition, especially given the extension of the mission to other South American countries, it seems that Mario Talavera was sent in his stead. AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Beteta, February 20, 1940. 715 Beteta requested an extra dollar per day for each member of the embassy for the duration of the mission. See, AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, May 9, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Castellano, May 10, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Miembros Típica Mexicana, May 10, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Castellano, May 13, 1940AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Ernesto Corono Resga to Leñero, May 15, 1940. By contrast, the military members of the mission received an additional month’s worth of pay in good time. 271

players (along with twenty horses), as well as the military and naval cadets, commercial representatives, orchestra members, and other popular artists.716 In each port of call,

Beteta and the local diplomats arranged for commercial exhibits, conferences on the history of the Mexican Revolution, military parades, concert series, athletic exhibitions, and competitions between Mexican and local athletes, as well as numerous receptions and diplomatic ceremonies. In Panama and Peru, the proximity of the port to the centres of government enabled the members of the mission to stay in one spot for the duration of the visit. In Chile the mission as a whole travelled by train the short distance to Santiago and participated in such events in the capital and beyond. In Ecuador and Colombia, the embassy docked at port, where many members of the mission remained while Beteta and selected participants travelled to the Andean capitals. Organising the embassy’s movements and activities called for a tremendous amount of coordination, and its members—particularly Beteta, whose presence was demanded at nearly every event in which the embassy took part—required a remarkable amount of stamina. In a letter to

Cárdenas after the completion of the Chilean and Peruvian legs of the tour, Beteta wrote that only the training he had received at the side of the president during the many tours of the Mexican countryside upon which he had accompanied Cárdenas had prepared him for the demands of attending all the events held in their honour, giving several speeches daily, and eating and drinking in abundance at up to four receptions per day.717

716 For the list of participants Reyes Spíndola provided to the Chilean government, see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), Reyes Spíndola to Cristóbal Sáenz, February 27, 1940. 717 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 29, 1940. 272

As well as comparing the Durango’s mission to Cárdenas’s frequent travels to remote corners of the republic, Beteta stated that the enthusiasm provoked by the special embassy’s arrival in Santiago most reminded him of celebrations of Mexican independence.718 Delayed by one day because of bad weather off of Valparaíso, they did not delay at the port city, despite the magnificent welcome reception that had been prepared for their arrival.719 They left for Santiago by rail immediately after lunch, but despite their best efforts did not arrive in the capital until late at night, because at each train station they passed through they were obliged to stop for a short while to greet the crowds that had assembled to welcome them. They finally arrived in the capital at nearly eleven o’clock, much later than planned. Although many of those who had gathered to await their arrival had by then returned home, more than 60,000 people still lined the streets. Military and civil authorities, cadets from the Chilean military school, various police contingents, as well as groups of workers, campesinos, and athletes joined the special embassy in a procession from the train station to the Casa de la Moneda. Reyes

Spíndola declared it the warmest reception ever to have occurred in the capital, and

President Aguirre Cerda expressed to the Ambassador his great pleasure and surprise at seeing this demonstration of the pueblo’s affection for Mexico.720 Beteta described the abundance of placards bearing slogans such “Viva México, faro de América,” “Viva

Lázaro Cárdenas, abanderado de la libertad en el continente,” and “Viva Lázaro

Cárdenas, líder de la organización proletaria de América.” The streets were filled with

718 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, telegram from Beteta to Cárdenas, March 26, 1940. 719 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940. 720 Ibid. 273

such a multitude, and Beteta heard “Viva México” so many times that he said it bore

striking similarity to commemorations of the Grito de Dolores held in the Mexican

capital.721

The ambassadors and ministers resident in Latin America celebrated

Independence each year by organising propaganda campaigns, conferences, and banquets

for the Mexican colony, the diplomatic corps, and government officials in the countries to which they were posted, the lavishness of which depended upon the states of their budgets. As well as varying according to the resources at their disposal, they also differed depending upon the international context and the extent to which Mexico’s most recent foreign and domestic policies received approbation in each country. The celebrations of 1938, the first after the oil expropriation, had been particularly large and

well-coordinated in most countries, but they had never reached the level of popular

participation seen in the welcome of the Durango that Reyes Spíndola and Beteta

described. In this sense, the Durango’s mission more than outweighed the regular

activities of Mexican diplomats, just as Reyes Spíndola had prophesised.

Beteta’s comparison of the Durango’s reception in Chile to celebrations of

Independence is especially significant because it signals the similarities in purpose and

methods of the special embassy and the celebrations organised by Revolutionary governments, including that of Lázaro Cárdenas, in honour of both September 16, and

Revolution Day, which was November 20 in this era. Although September 16 maintained pre-eminence as a celebration of Mexico abroad, within the republic

721 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 3, 1940. 274

Revolutionary governments paid increasing attention to the celebration of Madero’s Plan

de San Luis Potosí and the beginning of the Revolution of 1910.722 Whereas

Independence celebrations continued to maintain their martial character, including a

military procession on September 16—as well as the popular participation of the rather

unruly masses the evening of September 15—Revolution Day came to include a parade

of the country’s athletes, linking the Revolutionary government to the youth, vigour, and

discipline on display. The Durango’s mission included all of these elements, as well as

the celebration of Mexican industry and popular arts, unifying the multifaceted image of

the nation the government aimed to present abroad.

Although military missions had strong precedent in the region—one of the

reasons the Mexican government decided to expand the Durango’s mission to include

Peru was to reciprocate the visit to Mexico of Peruvian cadets in 1939 aboard the

Almirante Grau—the use of athleticism in cultural diplomacy had long been debated

among members of the Foreign Service.723 It was particularly effective during the

Durango’s tour, both in generating interest in the mission and goodwill towards Mexico,

but also in portraying the youthful vigour of the Revolutionary government and the

Mexican nation. Sports teams and individual athletes had participated in friendly

exhibitions, as well as organised athletic competitions such as the Juegos

722 See David E. Lorey, “Postrevolutionary Contexts for Independence Day: The ‘Problem’ of Order and the Invention of Revolution Day, 1920s-1940s,” in ¡Viva México! ¡Viva la Independencia!: Celebrations of September 16, ed. William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 233- 248; Thomas Benjamin, La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000). Also see, Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo, Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 723 On reciprocity for the 1939 visit of Peruvian cadets, see AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (II), Anselmo Mena to Sáenz, January 29, 1940. 275

Centroamericanos for years, sometimes to the consternation of diplomats who warned of the negative consequences these could have for Mexico’s relations with Latin America.

In 1935, Ambassador González Roa had commented on the positive impression in

Guatemala City of the Mexican athletes who had travelled through the country on their way to the III Juegos Centroamericanos in El Salvador.724 Notwithstanding this praise, on this occasion Mexican athletes had only paraded before President Ubico, instead of competing against their Guatemalan neighbours. A few years later, newly-appointed

Ambassador to Guatemala Martínez de Alva issued a strong warning to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs following the arrival of a large contingent of Mexican athletes in 1938 as part of the enormous delegation Mexico sent to the Féria Centroamericana that Ubico held to coincide with his birthday in November of each year. He discussed an incident that had occurred at a football game between Guatemala and Salvador, which resulted in a Salvadoran protest against the Guatemalan referee. He counselled emphatically that

Mexico, despite its eagerness to pursue closer relations with Guatemala, should not use sports in this endeavour. He warned that all of the gains made by diplomats and consular officials over the course of years of patient activity under the direction of the Ministry could be lost in the course of one afternoon’s competition.725 Nevertheless, he proudly reported in January 1940 that school children in Totonicapán were copying, using bicycles, the acrobatics of the Mexican motorcyclists who had formed part of the

724 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 27-28-13, González Roa to Portes Gil, “Informe de la Embajada correspondiente al mes de marzo de 1935,” April 23, 1935. 725 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-2-13 (II), Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe Reglamentario de esta Embajada, correspondiente al mes de noviembre de 1938,” December 15, 1938. 276

delegation to the Féria.726 Athletic exhibitions could be positive, but they were still quite risky as far as cultural diplomacy went. The Mexican government did not send a delegation to the Féria in November 1940, and their absence was widely remarked upon in Guatemalan society. Regardless, the Guatemalan organising committee had paid for the Mexican football team Atlante to play three friendlies that coincided with the Féria, and Martínez de Alva’s fears became reality when in the second game the Guatemalan referee’s actions led to a disagreeable protest by the Mexican players. All was not lost, as the Mexican coach smoothed things over, but once again it became necessary to warn that sports might not be the most effective method of strengthening relations between two countries, particularly if one or both lacked a strong tradition of good sportsmanship.727

One of the difficulties faced by the Durango was that similarly disagreeable incidents had stained Mexican participation in the IV Juegos Centroamericanos held in

Panama in February 1938.728 At the beginning of the games, the Mexican athletes had been the most applauded of all, but their success on the field soon gave the impression that they could not be beaten. The crowd turned against them and became violent, causing the police to intervene in a particularly brutal manner. The rest of the games were marred by negative attitudes towards the Mexican delegation and inflammatory

726 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Martínez de Alva to Hay, “Informe mensual reglamentario que rinde la Embajada de México en Guatemala, C.A., correspondiente al mes de Enero de 1940,” February 10, 1940. 727 The monthly report for November 1940 was actually submitted by chargé d’affaires José Gorostiza owing to the Ambassador’s return to Mexico to attend the inauguration of President Ávila Camacho, but the absent ambassador’s opinions are nevertheless mirrored in his subordinate’s report. AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-1-21, Gorostiza to Hay, “Informe mensual reglamentario que rinde la Embajada de México en Guatemala, C.A., correspondiente al mes de noviembre de 1940,” December 10, 1940. 728 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, May 15, 1940. 277

articles about its athletes in the press.729 Two years later, Minister Rosenzweig and Col.

Beteta both worried that these incidents would cause the Durango to be met with a lack

of enthusiasm in Panama City.730 Nevertheless, after the special embassy’s stay on the isthmus, Rosenzweig concluded that the mission had actually done much to repair the damage done to Mexican-Panamanian relations during the Juegos; the mission had been a real success that would long be remembered by the people of Panama.731 Moreover,

while prejudicial to Mexico’s relations with Panama, the 1938 Juegos had positively

affected relations with Colombia. The municipality of Barranquilla, which Mexico had

supported at Panama City in its bid to host the next Central American and Caribbean

Games, paid special attention to the Durango and its representatives as a result of this

support, and considered the athletic competitions and exhibitions of the special embassy

good practice for its upcoming responsibilities. Barranquilla’s Asamblea Departamental

del Atlántico declared Beteta and the embassy he presided over as guests of honour of the

city, and the welcome they received there was particularly warm.732

The athletic contingent of the Durango also contributed greatly to the success of

the mission in Lima, helping it to overcome great odds. More than any of the other

countries visited, some resistance to the idea of the special embassy had been evident in

Peru. Prior to the Durango’s arrival, one conservative weekly warned that Peruvians

729 For details, see AHGE, SRE, Expediente 30-4-3 (VIII), Estrada Cajigal to Hay, “Reseña política de Panamá por los meses de enero y frebrero de 1938,” March 10, 1940. 730 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Beteta to Cárdenas, May 15, 1940. 731 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), Rosenzweig to Hay, “Memorandum Reservado: Anexo al informe de la legación en Panamá sobre la visita hecha a este país por la misión presidida por el Coronel Don Ignacio M. Beteta,” June, 1940. 732 AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Carlos Martín Leyes, Presidente de la Asamblea Departamental, to Cárdenas, May 16, 1940. The V Juegos Centroamericanos y del Caribe were eventually held in Barranquilla in March of 1946 after the conclusion of the Second World War. 278

should not forget that in addition to being athletes, artists, and cadets, the members of the

mission were also representatives of the Revolutionary government of Mexico and its

“bloody persecution” of the Roman Catholic Church.733 An enemy of Western Christian

Civilisation, the Mexican government sought to exercise ideological hegemony over the

Americas, and Peru and Bolivia in particular. On the one hand, the embassy brought a

message of goodwill, while on the other it brought the political ideology it aimed to

spread through the demonstration of Mexico’s artistic, athletic, and military prowess.734

The Mexican government had indeed pursued closer relations with Bolivia, and had the

Andean nation not been land-locked it would surely have been included on the maritime embassy’s itinerary. It is also true that the Cárdenas government and its representatives played a rather delicate role in internal Peruvian politics because of the affinity of the

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Revolutionary Popular Alliance with the Revolution. In fact, Baumbach reported that APRA leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre had visited him to say that APRA wanted to organise a demonstration of sympathy for Mexico, but that the chargé d’affaires had advised against it.735 The

Ministry approved of his response, saying that the aims of the mission were purely

“apolitical.”736 Chargé d’affaires Baumbach had intended to organise a procession of all

of the members of the Durango before Peruvian President Manuel Prado upon the

mission’s arrival in Lima, but Prado had declined the honour. Baumbach knew

immediately that the idea had been refused because the president feared that members of

733 “La Embajada Mexicana del ‘Durango,’” Verdades (Lima), April 6, 1940. 734 Ibid. 735 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from Baumbach to SRE, April 10, 1940. 736 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from SRE to Baumbach, April 11, 1940. 279

APRA would take the opportunity to demonstrate against the government, and in favour of Mexico.737 The Peruvian government met the arrival of the Durango with trepidation,

but both the President and the people were won over by the mission. Prado

spontaneously suspended a cabinet meeting so that he could preside personally over the

polo match held between the Mexicans and the Peruvian military’s equestrian team. At

Lima’s country club he resolved to decorate Beteta later that evening with the Orden

Militar Peruana de Ayacucho, a high honour only rarely bestowed upon foreigners.738

After the Durango’s departure, Oscar N. Torres V., President of the Peruvian Comité

Nacional de Deportes, wrote to the chargé d’affaires praising the athletes who had formed part of the mission. He believed that the visit had planted a seed that would grow into strong ties between their two countries.739 The sports contingent of the Durango proved

very effective in establishing strong links with the pueblos of South America, on some

occasions helping the embassy to overcome obstacles to the establishment of closer

relations between Mexico and Latin America.

During the Durango’s short stop in Callao on the way to Santiago, Jesús E. Ferrer

Gamboa (one of the Mexican journalists aboard the special embassy) had given an

interview to Lima’s La Prensa, in which he had stated that the Mexican government

considered sports the most democratic medium through which to unify disparate peoples

because athletics were not influenced by racial or nationalist prejudices.740 Nevertheless,

737 AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940 738 Ibid; “Magnífica Exhibición de Equitación Hicieron los Jinetes Aztecas y Peruanos,” La Prensa (Lima), April 27, 1940; “El Embajador Coronel Beteta fué condecorado por el Mandatario de la Nación con la Orden Militar de Ayacucho,” Universal (Lima), April 27, 1940. 739 AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Baumbach to Hay, May 14, 1940. 740 “Notable Progreso ha Alcanzado en Méjico la Educación Física,” La Prensa, March 19, 1940. 280

the athletic exhibitions and competitions they engaged in exemplified the racial and

nationalist goals of the mission of the Durango, and those of the Revolutionary government. As in the rest of Latin America, education specialists, public health

advocates, and eugenicists alike championed physical education as a way to improve

Mexico’s “backward” and predominantly rural population during the Cárdenas era.741

The exhibition of Mexican athletes through the voyage of the Durango represented the apparently positive results of this nationalist project to the region, and the Latin American press seems to have accepted the image they presented wholeheartedly. La Crónica of

Lima declared that never before had a delegation so large and bursting with the strength of youth arrived on Peruvian shores.742 Reports of this tenor reflected Beteta’s

declarations to the effect that the athletic delegation represented the youth of Mexico’s

march towards perfection and “racial improvement.”743 Physical education, he continued, when practiced scientifically, enabled the pursuit of physical perfection, intellectual growth, and the development of moral and spiritual solidarity among its practitioners.744 La Crónica echoed these remarks when it described the athletes as

representatives of the youthful Mexican “race,” full of optimism and the faith that the physical and spiritual strength gained through sport afforded them.745 The inclusion of

the Mexican fencing team in the embassy is significant in this regard. Echoing the ideas

741 On the eugenics movement in Mexico, see Nancy Leys Stepan, “The Hour of Eugenics”: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 742 “Le Delegación Cultural y Deportiva de México partió ayer rumbo al Norte,” La Crónica (Lima), April 28, 1940. 743 “El Coronel Ignacio Beteta, presidente de la Embajada de México, nos hizo interesantes declaraciones antes de su partida,” La Crónica, April 28, 1940. 744 Ibid. 745 “Recuentro de la actuación de la Embajada Cultural Deportiva Mexicana en Lima,” La Crónica, April 29, 1940. 281

of the duelling diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, El Comercio opined that,

above all other sports, the ancient practice of duellists evidenced the moral and spiritual

heights reached by the Mexican nation.746 References to their youthful masculine

vigour—and by extension that of the Mexican nation and “race”—abounded in the

coverage of the embassy’s activities throughout the region. The embassy was

overwhelmingly male, and only five women were included: songstress Mercedes Caroza,

and four women who performed national dances and sang at performances of the

Orquesta Típica.747 Carlos González served as the artistic director of the mission,748 which had rather different goals than the athletic component, which indeed sought to display the young men’s physical strengths and “racial improvement” as one of the accomplishments of the Revolution. The artistic mission also sought to demonstrate the accomplishments of the Revolution, but in the very different field of popular arts and national folklore. Nevertheless, as Eric Zolov has convincingly argued in relation to cultural presentations of the Mexican nation at the 1968 Olympics, “stage-managed displays of ‘folklore’ were also an implicit response to the racialized assumptions of

Mexican backwardness.”749

Perhaps only the Orquesta Típica, which sometimes played up to five times per

day during the special embassy’s visit to Chile, created a more popular impression of

746 “Con una enorme concurrencia se realizó la exhibición de lorete con los esgrimistas visitantes,” El Comercio (Lima), April 25, 1940. 747 “Mexican Good Will Mission Going to Chile,” La Estrella de Panamá, March 12, 1940. 748 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), Reyes Spíndola to Cristóbal Sáenz, February 27, 1940. 749 Eric Zolov, “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics,” The Americas 61:2 (October 2004): 159-188. Also see, Amelia M. Kiddle, “Cabaretistas and Indias Bonitas: Gender and Representations of Mexico in the Americas during the Cárdenas Era.” Journal of Latin American Studies 42:2 (May, 2010). 282

Mexico than the athletic mission during the Durango’s voyage.750 Members of the

Orquesta Típica played at nearly every event organised for the mission; dancers performed the jarabe tapatío at the Olympic pool in Panama City and the barrios populares of Santiago.751 They performed to acclaim for elite audiences at Panama’s

Teatro Nacional and Quito’s Teatro Sucre, reinforcing among these circles the prestige

that Mexican music already enjoyed in the region.752 Even more significant were the

popular concerts that enabled thousands of common people to enjoy Mexican music and

dance. These popular concerts presented the canon of Revolutionary folklore to the

assembled audiences.753 The performance at the American Park in Guayaquil was

typical: thousands of people gathered to hear, among other musical numbers, the “Marcha

Miguel Lerdo de Tejada,” “Lindo Michoacán,” “Sobre las Olas,” and the title song from

the blockbuster film Allá en el Rancho Grande (directed by Fernando de Fuentes, 1936),

which had been a huge hit in Latin America.754 Afterwards a pair of dancers treated the

crowd to demonstrations of Mexico’s national dances.755 In addition to performing at the

Teatro Sucre in Quito, the Orqesta Típica agreed to also give a much larger concert at

Quito’s bull ring. Popular disappointment resulted when rain caused the cancellation of

the open-air concert. In response, Beteta decided to put off the Durango’s return from

750 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940. 751 “Una noche de arte tuvo lugar en la Piscina Olímpica,” La Estrella de Panamá, May12, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570.31, Beteta to Cárdenas, April 3, 1940. 752 “Sobre folk-lore mexicano hizo importante exposición el Licdo. Alfredo B. Buéllar,” La Estrella de Panamá, May 11, 1940; “La gran velada azteca,” El Día (Quito), May 2, 1940. 753 On the establishment of this canon, see Alex Saragoza, ‘The Selling of Mexico, Tourism and the State’, in Gilbert M. Joseph et al (eds.), Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico since 1940 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 91-115. 754 For example, on the exhibition of Allá en el Rancho Grande in Buenos Aires, see AHGE, SRE, Archivo de la Embajada Mexicana en Argentina (AEMARG), Legajo 48, Expediente 1. 755 “El concierto de la delegación artística musical en el American Park,” El Telégrafo (Guayaquil), May 1, 1940; “Cálida recepción a la brillante Embajada,” El Universo (Guayaquil), May 1, 1940. 283

Quito to Guayaquil by one day and add a second performance to the itinerary. The proceeds from the concerts went to a local orphanage and the society of Saint Vincent de

Paul in the capital.756 The Plaza de Toros “Arenas de Quito” was nearly full to capacity the following day, as Quito’s popular classes—who had been unable to attend the concert held at the Teatro Sucre, attended by Acting President Andrés F. Córdova—ringed the

Mexican orchestra that played on a stage raised on the sand below.757 Minister Campos

Ortiz concluded in his report on the visit of the Durango that he simply could not describe the success of these popular concerts, they had been so exceptional.758

Likewise, the Orquesta Típica had performed two concerts in Lima at the Teatro

Municipal for members of the elite, and a popular concert on April 26 at the auditorium of the Campo del Marte.759 More than 20,000 people attended the free event, which

Baumbach characterised as the pueblo’s opportunity to demonstrate its sincere affection for Mexico, thereby contrasting it sharply to the Peruvian government’s initially chilly welcome.760 He reported that a long-time resident of Lima, not directly interested in the mission, with whom he had spoken said that a greater reception had not been seen since the time of the viceroys.761 The Orquesta Típica extended its programme due to the crowd’s insistent calls for an encore. Beteta mounted the stage and gave an impromptu speech, after which the Orquesta Típica played the Mexican national anthem, to which

756 “Delegación mexicana aplaza su regreso al Puerto hasta mañana para poder ofrecer nuevas audiciones del Conjunto Típico,” El Comercio (Quito), May 4, 1940. 757 “Ruidoso éxito de la Orquesta Típica Mexicana,” El Comercio (Quito), May 5, 1940; “El conjuntoorquestral mejicano alcanzo todo un éxicot en la capital de la repúblic con su actuación la que fue aplaudida por distinguidos elementos de esa urbe,” El Telégrafo (Guayaquil), May 5, 1940. 758 AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Campos Ortíz to Hay, May 10, 1940. 759 “Festival Mejicano en el Municipal,” La Prensa, April 26, 1940; “La Orquesta Típica Mejicana Ofrece Hoy 2 Conciertos en el T. Municipal,” La Prensa, April 25, 1940. 760 AHGE, SRE, III-415, 14 (I), Confidential report from Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940. 761 AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Non-confidential report Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940. 284

the assembled crowd paid reverent respect. Upon the concert’s conclusion, the cheering continued and Col. Beteta had difficulty exiting the auditorium as the crowd of admirers that enveloped him attempted to hoist him onto their shoulders to the cry of “¡Viva

México!” This extraordinary event demonstrated for chargé d’affaires Baumbach the true sympathy of the Peruvian people for Mexico.762 Lima’s La Crónica called music

“the soul of Mexico,” in its review of special embassy’s mission.763 Seeing up close

Mexico’s charros and trajes típicos had transported this Peruvian journalist to the

“picturesque and beautiful” country to the north. The Durango’s musicians, as well as the other goodwill ambassadors on board, encouraged the development of empathy and understanding among peoples of the Americas. This was precisely the mission’s goal, just as it also underlay the Política del Buen Amigo. Mutual understanding bred cooperation and mutual protection, which the Cárdenas government sought in both its domestic and international policies.

Reyes Spíndola had argued that the activities of the Durango mission would be worth ten years of regular diplomatic labour, but in addition to the many extraordinary events its members participated in, they also connected the excitement and enthusiasm they brought with them to standard diplomatic activities, thereby imbuing them with increased meaning and demonstrating that these activities were comparable tools to be used in the pursuit of the Política del Buen Amigo. In addition to the smaller military, educational, and technical exchanges and more modest musical and cultural

762 AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (I), Confidential report from Baumbach to Hay, April 27, 1940. 763 “La Delegación Cultural y Dportiva de México partió ayer rumbo al Norte,” La Crónica (Lima), April 28, 1940. 285

performances they supported over the years, ambassadors and ministers to Latin America

made significant use of the gift of statues of national heroes and the decoration of high

government officials with the Orden del Águila Azteca, the highest honour bestowed by

the Mexican government upon foreigners.764 By undertaking these same activities under

the special embassy’s auspices, the visit of the Durango reinforced the use of these

diplomatic devices in solidifying Mexican-Latin American relations.

After the Durango’s arrival in Guayaquil, Beteta visited the governor of the

province, Enrique Baquerizo Moreno, and offered a wreath at the base of the statue of

Vicente Rocafuerte, whom he called a true “citizen of America,” giving a speech that

recognised the illustrious Ecuadorian for his labour on behalf of Mexico as its minister to

Great Britain after Independence.765 The governor responded that the nineteenth century

hero was a symbol of the need for better knowledge of the common destiny of the region

and understanding and fraternity among Latin American countries.766 The members of

the Durango performed similar wreath-laying ceremonies in the other countries,

honouring the national heroes of each nation. Even more significantly, the embassy also

supported Mexican diplomats’ efforts to commemorate Mexican heroes and promote

them as meaningful figures for Latin America as a whole. In Bogotá, Beteta and Minister

Ojeda made sure to include in their itinerary a stop in El Nogal, the neighbourhood where

764 Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, La Orden Mexicana del Águila Azteca; ley y reglamento (Mexico City: DAPP, 1936). On national decorations, see John D. Clarke, Gallantry Medals and Decorations of the World (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001). 765 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, telegram from Ferrer Gamboa to Cárdenas, April 30, 1940. 766 Ibid. On Vicente Rocafuerte see, Jaime E. Rodríguez O., The Emergence of Spanish America: Vicente Rocafuerte and Spanish Americanism, 1808-1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Jaime E. Rodríguez O., “Rocafuerte y el empréstito a Colombia,” Historia Mexicana 18:4 (April-June, 1969): 485-515. 286

stood a statue of Benemérito de las Américas Benito Juárez that the Mexican government

had given to Colombia in 1938 in honour of the four hundredth anniversary of the

founding of the city of Bogotá.767 The delegation, in the company of members of the

Mexican colony, placed a laurel wreath at the foot of the statue, connecting the special

embassy to the unveiling that had taken place in 1938, thus keeping alive the memory of

this diplomatic ceremony and past activities of the legation associated with its

inauguration.768 A similar monument of Independence hero José María Morelos had

been earmarked for donation to Panama, and Minister Rosenzweig thought the visit of the

Durango a propitious opportunity to symbolically lay the cornerstone of the statue.769

This ceremony, which was well-attended by government functionaries and the diplomatic corps, had the effect of taking some of the spotlight off of the somewhat contentious presence of Mexican athletes in Panama and focusing it instead on diplomatic ceremony.

Moreover, the attendance of the Mexican military and naval cadets enabled the presentation of a much more elaborate ceremony than could have been prepared by the

Minister without the special embassy’s presence. President Augusto Boyd of Panama explicitly thanked Cárdenas for the permanent reminder of the mission Beteta had left, by laying the cornerstone of the statue, in the telegram he sent the Mexican president to express his appreciation of the special embassy’s visit.770 Henceforth, when inaugurating

the statue of Morelos, the Minister would be able to build on the symbolic capital the

767 On the donation of the statue of Juárez, see AGN, Archivo Particular Lázaro Cárdenas, Rollo 14, Expediente 72; AGN, LCR, Caja 978, Expediente 562.2/61. 768 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de 1940 rinde la legación de México en Colombia.” 769 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, July 20, 1940. 770 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Boyd to Cárdenas, May 14, 1940. 287

numerical presence and grandeur of the mission had created to once again increase the

significance of the gift and the friendly relations between Mexico and Panama.771

The mutual decoration of members of the Durango mission and officials of the

countries visited played a similar role in reinforcing both the importance of the special

embassy and the regular diplomatic practice of conferring national honours upon

representatives of friendly governments. Peruvian President Prado’s spontaneous

decision to confer upon Beteta the Orden de Ayacucho described above was noteworthy

because it represented the about-face of the Peruvian government in its reception of the

Durango. Nevertheless these decorations played an essential role in each of the countries

visited. In the early stages of making arrangements for the Durango to visit other Latin

American countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had telegraphed Minister Campos

Ortiz in Quito to inquire whether Ecuador’s minister of foreign affairs Julio Tobar

Donoso would be able to travel down to Guayaquil so that Beteta could bestow the Orden

del Águila Azteca upon him there, as the special embassy’s tight schedule would prevent

the mission from ascending to Quito.772 Campos Ortiz responded that it would be

impossible for the minister to go to Guayaquil at that time and said that the government

was prepared instead to put at the mission’s disposal a special train to facilitate their trip

to the capital.773 The suggestion of the decoration had such symbolic power that it

encouraged the Ecuadorian government to extend its hospitality to Beteta’s mission, thus

771 On the Morelos statue, also see AGN, LCR, Caja 978, Expediente 562.2/61. 772 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from SRE to Campos Ortiz, February 14, 1940. 773 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from Campos Oritz to SRE, February 22, 1940. The Mexican government accepted the offer in AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (II), telegram from SRE to Campos Ortiz, February 26, 1940. 288

enlarging the significance of his visit by including Quito on the mission’s itinerary.774

Similarly, in Colombia, the government paid for a special airplane to take Beteta and a few other members of the mission to Bogotá, where they were fêted. Upon their arrival in the capital on May 15, and after presenting the embassy’s credentials to President

Santos and attending a presidential banquet held in the embassy’s honour, Beteta decorated Foreign Minister Luis López de Mesa with the Orden del Águila Azteca. Two days later, during a visit to Colombia’s Escuela Militar, Beteta received the Orden de

Boyacá in return.775 In Panama, Beteta received the Gran Cruz de la Orden de Vasco

Núñez de Balboa, its highest grade, while two other members of the mission were

decorated at the level of Caballero in recognition of their contribution to the

strengthening of relations between the two countries. Minister Rosenzweig reported that

during the ceremony, Foreign Minister Narciso Garay also made reference to his own

labours in pursuit of that goal in the speech he gave following the presentation of the

honours.776

Although the mutual decoration of ambassadors and government officials may

seem to be empty diplomatic ceremonies, the extreme concern Ambassador Reyes

Spíndola exhibited concerning the honours he wished to bestow upon those Chileans who

had been instrumental to the success of the Durango in Chile suggests how essential

these rituals were to the pursuit of friendly diplomatic relations between countries. Reyes

Spíndola wrote to President Cárdenas to report on the success of the Durango’s mission

774 On the decoration of Tobar Donoso, see III-415-14 (I), Campos Ortiz to Hay, May 9, 1940. 775 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de 1940 rinde la legación de México en Colombia.” 776 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), telegram from Rosenzweig to SRE, May 13, 1940; AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Rosenzweig to Hay, July 20, 1940. 289

in Chile on May 1, 1940 and attached a list of individuals he wished to decorate with the

Orden del Águila Azteca. He explained that although the request may have seemed excessive, all were deserving of the honour, which would be a fitting token of the

Mexican government’s appreciation of their efforts on behalf of the special embassy.777

Reyes Spíndola suggested that no less than thirty nine individuals receive varying degrees

of the highest national honour bestowed on foreigners. On May 31, Cárdenas responded

to Reyes Spíndola that he had recommended to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the

order be conferred upon all of the individuals named by the Ambassador.778 The

decoration of the Chilean officials later that year would help to solidify through regular

diplomatic practice the increased ties between the two countries created by the visit of the

Durango.

Reyes Spíndola had a keen appreciation of the reciprocity necessary in diplomatic relations. As early as January 1940, Reyes Spíndola had alerted the president to the fact that a group of Chilean marines would be arriving at the ports of Tampico and Veracruz on a practice mission during the Chilean navy’s second voyage to collect the Mexican oil it had contracted to purchase.779 He wrote again in May to suggest that the twenty-seven marines and thirteen officials be invited to the capital in order to return in part the multiple attentions paid to the members of the Durango.780 Steps were immediately

taken to prepare a welcome for the members of the Maipu who would arrive at the end of

777 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940. 778 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Cárdenas to Reyes Spíndola, May 31, 1940. Also see, AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Hay, May 30, 1940. 779 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, January 13, 1940. 780 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Leñero, May 8, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, May 8, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Cárdenas, May 15, 1940. Also see AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-429-5. 290

that month.781 The Departamento del Distrito Federal quickly organised a gala function

at Bellas Artes for May 31 and a visit to the ruins of Teotihuacan, followed by a special comida campestre given in their honour.782 Unfortunately, Chile’s Ambassador to

Mexico Manuel Hidalgo was not impressed by these attentions, or those paid by the

Mexican government to subsequent groups of Chilean visitors. He repeatedly

complained to his Ministry that his countrymen were not as well received in the Mexican

capital as the Durango had been in Chile.783 He commended Col. Beteta for arranging a special reception for General Beguño, who had come to Mexico as part of the special

embassy attending the inauguration of President Ávila Camacho in December 1940, but

remained generally nonplussed by the Mexican government’s attitudes towards visiting

Chileans.784 The Ambassador’s comments, though they should be taken with a grain of

salt, underscore the importance of reciprocity in diplomatic relations. Ambassador Reyes

Spíndola and Col. Beteta both seem to have been attuned to this, seeking to solidify the

gains made by the mission of the Durango through regular diplomatic practice.

Few receptions could have equalled the outpouring of goodwill met by the

Durango’s special embassy to Chile, but it is nevertheless a representative indication of

the bases of the Cárdenas government’s Política del Buen Amigo. Despite Ambassador

Hidalgo’s negative perception of the Durango, it only served to strengthen relations

between Mexico and Latin America into the future. In July 1940, Ambassador Reyes

781 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Castellano, May 21, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Reyes Spíndola, May 21, 1940. 782 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Ernesto Corona Ruesga to Leñero, June 17, 1940. 783 Chile, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MRE), Archivo General Histórico (AGH), Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 B, Hidalgo to Ministro, August 28, 1940. 784 Chile, MRE, AGH, Fondo Histórico, Volúmen 1848 B, Hidalgo to Ministro, December 7, 1940. 291

Spíndola reported that the mission of the Durango had provoked interest among a group of Chilean teachers, who then sought to organise an educational exchange with

Mexico.785 The results were felt even outside the countries visited by the special

embassy. Also in 1940, the chargé d’affaires in Brazil forwarded the Ministry an inquiry

from the Conferação Universitária Brasileira do Desporto Universitário regarding a

proposed trip to Mexico.786 Even before the Durango had returned to Mexico, the Cuban representatives of Rotary International had written of the Orquesta Típica’s phenomenal triumph in South America to their counterparts in Mexico and requested that they appeal to the Mexican government for an agreement that the celebrated musicians could play at their international convention that June.787 Unfortunately for the Rotary Club, their

request was declined because the musicians did not return to the Mexican capital until

May 26 and were unable to go abroad again so soon.788

The reverberations of the Durango in cultural and diplomatic circles are clear and

would continue to influence Mexico’s relations with the rest of Latin America well into

the future, but the special embassy even improved the reception of Mexican policies in

previously hostile quarters. Reyes Spíndola had reported to Cárdenas that the mission

had done much to counter the negative propaganda Mexico had suffered in Chile in the

past; the delegates had demonstrated the speciousness of the harmful image of Mexico

and its Revolution that had been implanted in Chile by the reactionary press and the

international press agencies that were sustained by the power of “international

785 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-2401-4, Reyes Spíndola to Hay, July 24, 1940. 786 See, AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-429-7. 787 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Rafael Oriol to Luis G. Águilar, April 29, 1940; AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Águilar to Cárdenas, May 22, 1940. 788 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Leñero to Águilar, May 30, 1940. 292

imperialism.”789 In a concrete example of how the Durango had served to counteract

these ideas, Minister Ojeda wrote that he believed the visit of the special embassy and the

positive impression it had created in Bogotá was instrumental in causing the hard-line

leader of Colombia’s Conservative Party Laureano Gómez to soften his approach to

Mexico.790 In the coverage Gómez’s newspaper El Siglo gave to Mexico’s response to

US Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s oil note of April 3, the Conservative stalwart took a

decidedly pro-Mexico position, outlining the Cárdenas government’s reasons for

rejecting the arbitration suggested by the US government, and going so far as to say that

all of the republics of South America should demonstrate their solidarity with Mexico.791

Gómez’s attacks against Mexico had in the past been quite vociferous, but these had

recently begun to diminish, and Ojeda believed that this change in attitude had resulted in

part from the legation’s successful efforts to provide him with a more positive

understanding of Mexico, of which the mission of the Durango had been the prime

example.792 President Santos had offered a banquet in honour of Beteta on May 16, to which members of his cabinet and the editors of the capital’s newspapers had been invited.793 Quite out of character, Gómez had attended the reception. His presence was

so unusual that Ojeda had made a special point of greeting him and thanking him for his

attendance.794 The Minister believed that these attentions and the positive image of

789 AGN, LCR, Expediente 570/31, Reyes Spíndola to Cárdenas, May 1, 1940. 790 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-12, Ojeda to Hay, June 13, 1940. 791 “Razones del gobierno de México para rechazar el arbitraje de los EE. UU.,” El Siglo (Bogotá), June 13, 1940. 792 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-12, Ojeda to Hay, June 13, 1940. 793 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-11, Ojeda to Hay, “Informe que por el mes de mayo de 1940 rinde la legación de México en Colombia.” 794 AHGE, SRE, Expediente 31-2-12, Ojeda to Hay, June 13, 1940. 293

Mexico Beteta had left in the Colombian capital had begun to bear fruit. Even in the

realm of oil policy, cultural diplomacy such as that Beteta engaged in could have positive

results for the Mexican government.

Final Thoughts

Mexico, breaking the mould of traditional diplomacy, brings together on a warship an Embassy composed of everything that is distinctively and characteristically hers: her Army, product of social revolution, whose sole purpose is sustaining the institutions that guarantee that which the people, at the expense of blood and life, have achieved for their mutual and concrete betterment; her popular art, which embodies the aesthetic tradition created by our ancestors, despite their exhaustion from the struggle for independence, and which bursts forth from the present generation and its similar outlook on life. Finally, her athletes, representing not the fleeting invigoration of a few transitory events limited to stadiums and fields, but rather the physical improvement of our nation, to prepare the people for our daily labour and strengthen them for the great tasks to come, in America’s brilliant future!795

In his report on the success of Beteta’s mission in Ecuador, Minister Campos

Ortiz had stated that the overwhelmingly positive reception the Durango had met

demonstrated that the Mexican Revolution was not only understood, but admired for its

achievements, in the Andean nation.796 The admiration of the Durango’s athletic,

cultural, and military contingents enabled the greater understanding of the Revolutionary

government of Cárdenas. At the performance of the Orquesta Típica at the Teatro Sucre

in Quito, noted pianist and musical critic Juan Pablo Muñoz Sanz stated that the embassy

represented three characteristics of the Mexican national personality: art, nationalism, and

795 Ignacio Beteta, quoted in “Urge unificar los anhelos de progreso,” La Estrella de Panamá, May 13, 1940. 796 AHGE, SRE, Expediente III-415-14 (I), Campos Ortiz to Hay, May 10, 1940. 294

revolution.797 Focusing on popular music as an example of how these three dimensions

informed each other, he argued that Mexican culture provided a prototype of

americanidad for the Latin America. One Ecuadorian editorialist averred that the essence

of the Mexican nation lay not in its trajes típicos, the beauty of its art, sculpture, music, or literature; these only elicited excitement because they were expressions of its

Revolution.798 These observers saw the cultural presentations of the Durango as representative of the Revolution, and made conclusions regarding its popular character, and the potential applicability of Mexican approaches to domestic and international politics through their analysis of the special embassy’s cultural programme. Ambassador

Reyes Spíndola had argued that the visit of the Durango would serve to make Mexico known to the countries it visited and demonstrate, in an objective and eloquent form, the great progress achieved by its “much discussed” Revolution. Art and sports would serve as the “currency” offered to their Latin American neighbours as proof of these achievements.799 Though certainly not objective, the cultural message of the Durango

was eloquent. Overcoming considerable opposition, the special embassy—and the

Política del Buen Amigo of which it was a part—increased mutual understanding and affinity between Mexico and the countries it visited, and by making the character and aims of the Revolutionary government comprehensible and even admirable in popular,

797 “Discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Juan Pablo Muñoz S. presentando a la orquesta típica mexicana en el Sucre,” El Comercio (Quito), May 4, 1940. Juan Pablo Muñoz Sanz would later found Ecuador’s Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional. Also see his contemporary works, La música ecuatoriana (Quito: Universidad Central, 1938); Nacionalismo y americanismo musical (Quito: Imprenta del Ministerio del Gobierno, 1938). 798 “Charlas del día,” El Comercio, May 5, 1940. 799 AHGE, SRE, III-415-14 (II), Reyes Spíndola to Hay, February 16, 1940. 295

political, and diplomatic circles, it contributed to Cárdenas’s efforts to obtain support for

his domestic and international policies.

An editorial that appeared in El Comercio after the embassy’s departure for

Guayaquil suggested that a new era in inter-American relations had been inaugurated

with the Durango’s visit; it represented the desire to increase mutual understanding of the

pueblos of the Americas.800 One Panamanian journalist agreed that the Durango had

made great strides towards achieving this aim. He argued that the day that such missions

took place throughout the continent, Latin Americans would have done more to achieve

rapprochement and mutual understanding than could be achieved through all of the

conferences they organised and the tomes they published.801 Nevertheless, although the

mission of the Durango epitomised the Política del Buen Amigo and the Cárdenas

government’s attempts to increase mutual understanding, the numerous conferences and

publications the Mexican government sponsored, like the statues it unveiled and the

national medals it bestowed, formed part of the same strategy for increased cultural

relations between the governments of the Americas. The voyage of the Durango was certainly more successful than many of the other aspects of this programme of cultural relations; it represented the accumulated expertise gained through six years of promoting the Cárdenas government and its domestic and international policies in the region.

800 “Despues de la visita,” El Comercio, May 5, 1940. 801 “La Delegación Mexicana,” La Estrella de Panamá, March 12, 1940. 296

The voyage of the Durango was part of what Ecuadorian journalist Julián Sorel

had called diplomacia de la escuela moderna, diplomacy of the “modern school.”802 He believed Beteta to be an embodiment of Mexican diplomacy, that undertaken by men of high scientific and artistic cultural standing, such as Alfonso Reyes and Jaime Torres

Bodet. No longer the preserve of private drawing rooms, intense cultural activity characterised this modern form of diplomatic activity.803 Mexico’s diplomats were

cultural representatives of the Revolutionary regime as much as they were political

representatives of the Cárdenas government. Moreover, their cultural pursuits facilitated

the political objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cárdenas himself. Beteta

described the voyage of the Durango as breaking with the moulds of traditional

diplomacy.804 Although continuities certainly connected the diplomacy of the Cárdenas

era to that of both his predecessors and successors, the purposeful use of cultural relations

in furthering mutual understanding among Latin American countries was one of the main

characteristic of the government’s Política del Buen Amigo. As a military man, artist,

and bureaucrat, Beteta had much in common with the regular ambassadors and ministers

posted to Latin America; likewise, the activities of the Durango both mirrored and

supplemented those everyday cultural and political efforts the special embassy supported.

802 This was most likely a pen name – Julien Sorel is the main character in Stendahl’s Le Rouge et le Noir. Julián Sorel, “El Embajador de México en misión especial, habla para ‘El Día,’” El Día (Quito), May 4, 1940. 803 Ibid. 804 “Urge unificar los anhelos de progreso,” La Estrella de Panamá, May 13, 1940. 297

APPENDIX A. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY, 1934-1940*

Country Name Rank Date of Presentation End of Appointment of Mission Credentials ARGENTINA Puig Ambassador April 1, 1935 May 21, May 21, Casauranc, 1935 1936 José Manuel Reyes, Ambassador May 21, 1936 July 22, 1936 January 1, Alfonso 1938 Martínez Ambassador January 1, NA March 15, Mercado, 1938 1939 Salvador Palavicini, Ambassador February 1, March 31, November Félix 1939 1939 30, 1940 Fulgencio BOLIVIA Rosenzweig Minister January 1, April 17, March 4, Díaz, José 1935 1935 1939 Maxilimiliano Alfonso de Cravioto Ambassador January 1, April 5, 1939 May 1, 1944 Mejorada, 1939 Alfonso BRAZIL Reyes, Ambassador February 16, May 6, 1930 May 21, Alfonso 1930 1936 Puig Ambassador May 21 1936 August 4, June 22, Casauranc, 1936 1937 José Manuel Romero Ambassador July 1, 1937 September February 28, González, 21, 1937 1938 José Rubén Veloz Ambassador February 1, May 2, 1939 December González, 1939 29, 1939 Vicente CHILE Cienfuegos y Ambassador January 17, May 16, January 9, Camus, 1934 1934 1936 Alfonso De Negri, Ambassador January 8, April 23, September Ramón P. 1936 1936 14, 1936 Pérez Treviño, Ambassador January 1, March 20, May 1, 1938 Manuel 1937 1937 Reyes Ambassador February 1, July 8, 1939 February 27, Spíndola, 1939 1942 Octavio COLOMBIA Guillén, Minister February 16, April 26, September Palma 1935 1935 1, 1936 298

Ramírez Minister January 16, March 17, February 1, Garrido, José 1937 1937 1939 Domingo Ojeda Rovira, Minister February 1, May 17, September Carlos Darío 1939 1939 15, 1941 COSTA RICA Padilla Nervo, Minister January 1, August 13, Feburary 16, Luis 1934 1934 1937 Estrada Minister January 1, March 2, January 1, Cajigal 1937 1937 1939 Ortega Minister February 1, April 21, August 1, Castillo de 1939 1939 1943 Lerín, Romeo CUBA Cravioto Ambassador December 8, February 8, January 1, Mejorada, 1933 1934 1938 Alfonso Romero Ambassador January 1, June 39 1939 November González, 1939 1, 1944 José Rubén DOMINICAN Pérez Gil y Minister January 1, February 14, March 1, REPUBLIC Ortiz, José 1934 1934 1936 Álvarez del Minister February 29, April 13, May 31, Castillo, Juan 1936 1936 1937 Manuel Romero Minister March 11, June 5, 1940 March 5, González, 1940 1941 José Rubén ECUADOR Enríquez Minister February 1, March 7, January 1, Cruz, 1935 1935 1938 Raymundo EL De Negri, Minister January 1, May 4, 1935 1 January SALVADOR Manuel Y. 1935 1940 Estrada Minister January 1, February 22, January 1, Cajigal, 1940 1940 1941 Vicente GUATEMALA González Roa, Ambassador February 1, March 13, January 1, Fernando 1935 1935 1936 Cienfuegos y Ambassador January 9, October 6, July 1, 1938 Camus, 1936 1936 Adolfo Martínez de Ambassador January 1, August 26, September Alva, 1938 1938 6, 1941 Salvador HAITI Pérez Gil y Minister Septebmer November March 1, Ortiz, José 28, 1934 16, 1934 1936 Vázquez Minister March 1, April 30, January 1, Schiaffino 1936 1936 1937 Romero Minister March 11, June 11, November 299

González, 1940 1940 29, 1945 José Rubén HONDUAS Vázquez Minister January 1, February 13, March 1, Schiaffino, 1934 1934 1936 José De Negri, Minister Feburary 3, May 12, September Manuel Y. 1937 1937 24, 1940 Estrada Minister September October 11, January 1, Cajigal, 20, 1940 1940 1941 Vicente NICARAGUA De Negri, Minister September 1, April 18, December 6, Manuel Y. 1935 1937 1937 Ortega Minister February 1, July 24, 1939 January 1, Castillo de 1939 1941 Lerín, Romeo PANAMA Padilla Nervo, Minister April 1, 1935 April 26, June 15, Luis 1935 1936 Estrada Minister September 1, October 14, January 1, Cajigal, 1936 1936 1939 Vicente Rosenzweig Minister December 23, May 6, 1939 January 1, Díaz, José 1938 1941 Maximiliano Alfonso de PARAGUAY Rosenzweig Minister January 1, April 17, November Díaz, José 1935 1935 10, 1936 Maximiliano Alfonso de Padilla Nervo, Minister October 3, January 12, December 2, Luis 1936 1937 1937 PERU Álvarez del Minister June 16, 1933 July 24, 1933 December 3, Castillo, Juan 1935 Manuel Sáenz Garza, Minister January 1, May 14, March 22, Moisés 1936 1936 1937 Sáenz Garza, Ambassador October 1, November 7, October 24, Moisés 1938 1938 1941 URUGUAY Vadillo, Minister January 1, February 26, July 26, Basilio 1932 1932 1935 Villa Michel, Minister September 1, November December Primo 1935 12, 1935 15, 1936 Padilla Nervo, Minister September 1, January 11, January 8, Luis 1936 1937 1938 De Negri, Minister March 31, June 1, 1939 September Manuel Y. 1939 17, 1940 VENEZUELA Alonzo Minister February 6, April 23, April 8, Romero, 1935 1935 1937 300

Miguel Guzmán Minister February 1, April 27, March 15, Esparza, 1939 1939 1941 Salvador

* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 25-7-9, 42- 25-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13-290, 26-25-6, 4-29- 12, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 35-6-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 36- 2-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10

301

APPENDIX B. DIPLOMATS POSTED TO LATIN AMERICA, 1934-1940*

Name Country Rank Date of Presentation End of Appointment of Credentials Mission Alonzo Venezuela Minister February 6, April 23, April 8, 1937 Romero, 1935 1935 Miguel Álvarez del Peru Minister June 16, 1933 July 24, 1933 December 3, Castillo, Juan 1935 Manuel Dominican Minister February 29, April 13, May 31, Republic 1936 1936 1937 Cienfuegos y Chile Ambassador January 17, May 16, 1934 January 9, Camus, 1934 1936 Alfonso Guatemala Ambassador January 9, October 6, July 1, 1938 1936 1936 Cravioto Cuba Ambassador December 8, February 8, January 1, Mejorada, 1933 1934 1938 Alfonso Bolivia Ambassador January 1, April 5, 1939 May 1, 1944 1939 De Negri, El Salvador Minister January 1, May 4, 1935 January 1, Manuel Y. 1935 1940 Nicaragua Minister September 1, April 18, December 6, 1935 1937 1937 Honduras Minister Feburary 3, May 12, 1937 September 1937 24, 1940 Uruguay Minister March 31, June 1, 1939 September 1939 17, 1940 De Negri, Chile Ambassador January 8, April 23, September Ramón P. 1936 1936 14, 1936 Enríquez Ecuador Minister February 1, March 7, January 1, Cruz, 1935 1935 1938 Raymundo Efraín Estrada Panama Minister September 1, October 14, January 1, Cajigal, 1936 1936 1939 Vicente Honduras Minister September 20, October 11, January 1, 1940 1940 1941 El Salvador Minister January 1, February 22, January 1, 1940 1940 1941 González Guatemala Ambassador February 1, March 13, January 1, Roa, 1935 1935 1936 Fernando Guillén, Colombia Minister February 16, April 26, September 1, 302

Palma 1935 1935 1936 Guzmán Venezuela Minister February 1, April 27, March 15, Esparza, 1939 1939 1941 Salvador R. Martínez de Guatemala Ambassador January 1, August 26, September 6, Alva, 1938 1938 1941 Salvador Martínez Argentina Ambassador January 1, NA March 15, Mercado, 1938 1939 Salvador Ojeda, Carlos Colombia Minister February 1, May 17, 1939 September Darío 1939 15, 1941 Ortega Nicaragua Minister February 1, July 24, 1939 January 1, Castillo de 1939 1941 Lerín, Romeo Costa Rica Minister February 1, April 21, August 1, 1939 1939 1943 Padilla Nervo, Costa Rica Minister January 1, August 13, Feburary 16, Luis 1934 1934 1937 El Salvador Minister January 1, April 30, April 1, 1935 1934 1934 Panama Minister April 1, 1935 April 26, June 15, 1935 1936 Paraguay Minister October 3, January 12, December 2, 1936 1937 1937 Uruguay Minister September 1, January 11, January 8, 1936 1937 1938 Palavicini, Argentina Ambassador February 1, March 31, November Félix 1939 1939 30, 1940 Fulgencio Pérez Gil y Dominican Minister January 1, February 14, March 1, Ortiz, José Republic 1934 1934 1936 Haiti Minister Septebmer 28, November 16, March 1, 1934 1934 1936 Pérez Chile Ambassador January 1, March 20, May 1, 1938 Treviño, 1937 1937 Manuel Puig Argentina Ambassador April 1, 1935 May 21, 1935 May 21, Casauranc, 1936 José Manuel Brazil Ambassador May 21 1936 August 4, June 22, 1936 1937 Ramírez Colombia Minister January 16, March 17, February 1, Garrido, José 1937 1937 1939 Domingo Reyes, Brazil Ambassador February 16, May 6, 1930 May 21, Alfonso 1930 1936 303

Argentina Ambassador May 21, 1936 July 22, 1936 January 1, 1938 Reyes Chile Ambassador February 1, July 8, 1939 February 27, Spíndola, 1939 1942 Octavio Romero Brazil Ambassador July 1, 1937 September February 28, González, 21, 1937 1938 José Rubén Cuba Ambassador January 1, June 39 1939 November 1, 1939 1944 Dominican Minister March 11, June 5, 1940 March 5, Republic 1940 1941 Haiti Minister March 11, June 11, 1940 November 1940 29, 1945 Rosenzweig Bolivia Minister January 1, April 17, March 4, Díaz, José 1935 1935 1939 Maximiliano Alfonso de Paraguay Minister January 1, April 17, November 1935 1935 10, 1936 Panama Minister December 23, May 6, 1939 January 1, 1938 1941 Sáenz, Moisés Peru Minister January 1, May 14, 1936 March 22, 1936 1937 Ambassador October 1, November 7, October 24, 1938 1938 1941 Vadillo, Uruguay Minister January 1, February 26, July 26, 1935 Basilio 1932 1932 Vázquez Honduras Minister January 1, February 13, March 1, Schiaffino, 1934 1934 1936 José Veloz Brazil Ambassador February 1, May 2, 1939 December González, 1939 29, 1939 Vicente Villa Michel, Uruguay Minister September 1, November 12, December Primo 1935 1935 15, 1936

* Sources: AHGE-SRE, Expedientes 8-4-11, 6-8-14, 24-22-43, 42-25-73, 26-14-25, 25-7-9, 42- 25-5, 42-25-3, 29-1-14, 26-25-4, 27-10-143, 35-11-1, 14-11-2, 25-7-4, 14-13-290, 26-25-6, 4-29- 12, 25-7-6, 3-8-56, LE 907, LE 908, 42-25-19, 25-6-70, 26-25-7, 35-6-30, 14-22-1, 35-13-13, 36- 2-17, LE 1006, LE 1007, 23-1-78, 7-24-10

304

REFERENCES

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Kiddle, Amelia M. “Mexican Participation in the League of Nations during the Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940.” Master’s thesis, University of Chicago, 2003.

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López González, Rafael. “Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad (DAPP). La experiencia del Estado cardenista en políticas estatales de comunicación, 1937- 1939.” Tesis de licenciatura, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM, 2002.

Mulligan, Donald Willard. “Background of Contemporary Mexican Relations with Spain.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1950.

Neufeld, Stephen. “Servants of the Nation: The Military in the Making of Modern Mexico, 1876-1911.” PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2009.

Sanders, Nichole. “Gender, Welfare, and the ‘Mexican Miracle’: The Politics of Modernization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1937-1958.” PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 2003.

Schuler, Friedrich E. “Cardenismo Revisited: The International Dimensions of the Post- Reform Cárdenas Era, 1937-1940.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1990.

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Waters, Wendy. “Re-mapping the Nation: Road Building as State Formation in Post- revolutionary Mexico.” PhD diss., University of Arizona, 1999.

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Alemán Valez, Miguel. La Verdad del Petróleo en México. 2nd ed. Mexico City: Biografías Gandesa, 1977. 308

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———. México y el Perú, segundo año. Lima: Sanmartí, 1935.

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Beezley, William H. Mexican National Identity: Memory, Innuendo, and Popular Culture. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2008.

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