Nigeria and African Unity 1958 - 1963

NIGERIA AND AFRICAN UNITY 1958 - 1963

Michael D. Wallace

Submitted in partial fulfilmen~

of the requirements for the degree of

Ma.ster of Arts

McGill University, Montreal, Canada.

August 1965 Department of Economies and Political Science. PREFACE

I should like to thank the library staff of MCGill and

Loyola Universities, whose kind co-operation in obtaining newspapers, documents, and microfilms made this thesis possible. I should also like to thank Mrs. Colin Cameron, who graciously obtained permission for me to use the facilities of the Parliamentary

Library in Ottawa.

Finally, I should like to acknowledge my debt to

Professor Paul Noble, whose constant advice and criticism helped form this thesis into coherent shape. TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ; ...... 1.

PART I - Background Factors

CHAPTER I - The African Environment ...... 2.

CHAPTER II - The Nigerian Setting ...... 23.

CHAPTER III - Nigeria's Political Resources • • • • • • • • 56.

PART II - The Road to Unity

CHAPTER IV - The First Steps ...... 66.

CHAPTER V - The Storm Clouds Gather • • • • • • • • • • 85.

CHAPTER VI - The African Cold War ...... 104.

CHAPTER VII - The Grand Finale ...... 137.

CONCLUSION 164 1.

Introduction

This thesis will attempt three tasks. First of all, it will attempt to define the situation of Nigeria in the African subordinate state system. This will involve an analysis of the African subordinate

state system as a policy environment, followed by an examination of the factors shaping Nigerian decision-making in the field of African policy, aad, finally, an assessment of the political resources available

to Niweria for the purpose of implementing her policies in the system.

Secondly, it will trace the role played by Nigeria in the process of political integration leading up to the formation of the

Organization of African Unity in May of 1963.

Thirdly, it will attempt to draw some ~eneral conclusions as to the character of the African subordinate state system and the parameters of interaction within it. 2.

PART I BACKGROUND FACTORS

CHAPTER I - The African Environment

Introduction

This chapter will attempt to analyse the characteristics of the

African subordinate state system and its environment. We will examine the natural environment of the system, the economie, social, and political settings, and, finally, draw some conclusions about the basic operations of the system as a functioning unit. In doing so we will somewhat arbitrarily, although necessarily, restrict our discussion to the thirty two signatories of the Addis Ababa Charter(!). This scheme of classification, like any other, bas its drawbacks.

First of all, there is the question of the Arab states of North and Northeast Africa. It may well be asked if they deserve inclusion at all, or whether they are African 11only by accident of continental 2 location"( ). The answer can only be that they have played important

(1) These are Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,

Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Leopoldvilie, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon,

Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Mali,

Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Ruanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali

Republic, Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic,

Upper Volta. Not present: Mbrocco, Togo.

Quoted from the Charter in an appendix to Basil Davidson, Which

Way Africa, Penguin Books Ltd., 1964. Pp. 190-191.

(2) Thomas Patrick Melady, Faces of Africa, Macmillan Co., New York,

1964: p. 253. 3.

roles in African affaira, and have to a great degree become identified . with the attitudes and policies of their sub-Saharan confreres.

Secondly, there is the question of those nations which did not achieve independance until after Addis Ababa - Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, and Zanzibar - and those whose future is still in doubt at this writing -

Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. In this case the answer is that while they were not actors in the system, they were

(and are) potentially so, and in the meantime events within their borders are part and parcel of the political interaction of the system.

This classification bas two very important advantages. First, it focuses primary attention on the crucial event to be explained.

Secondly, the very formation of the Organization of African Unity is evidence of the objective and subjective existence of a system, and bence serves to identify the members of the system with some precision(3).

1. Geography, Topograpàf, Climate, and Resources.

Geographically speaking, Africa is a continent of small states.

Even the largest, Sudan, is less than a million square miles in extent, and the smaliest, Rwanda, is only about ten thousand(4). There is nothing to compare with the continental giants of North America or Asia.

Secondly, Africa is a continent of great climatic and topographical disadvantages. It bas a higher percentage of arid land than any other continent save Australia(5). Large areas have high annual

(3) See Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, Oxford University Press,

1964, P. 95, for a systematic treatment of the concept of subordinate state system.

(4) Melody, op. cit., P. 220, 244.

(5) William A. Hance, The Geography of Modern Africa, Columbia University

Press, 1964: P. 15. 4.

rainfalls, but in many cases it is so seasonal and comes in such torrent 6 ial bursts that it does little but contribute to soil erosion( ). The topographical pattern is characterized by steep scarps rising sharply out of a low-lying coastal belt. These tend to make inland rail trans 7 port extremely difficult( ). Roads are rendered impassable by the violent alterations in rainfall, resulting either in deep mud or blowing sand(B). Finally, the lack of natural harbours and navigable fluvial (9) axes make access by sea very difficult •

Tbese difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that political boundaries in Africa do not respect geographie barriers. This weakens national unity. An example is the Guinea Coast, where the political boundaries run largely north-south, yet the climatic regions run east (10) west. Thus, these states give the aspect of sUces from a layer-cake •

This can also result in friction where key transportation routes cross national frontiers. For example, the states of the Sudan belt - Mali,

Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, and the Central African Republic - are all dependent upon others for access to the sea.

Another severe disability is that much of the soil and vegetation is of only marginal value for human use. African grasses are not very nutritious, and the soil often produces very poor crop yields(ll).

(6) Robert w. Steel, "Africa: The Environmental Setting", in The Anna1s, March 1955, P. 3.

(7) Hance, op. cit., P. 4-5.

(8) ibid.

(9) ibid.

(10) ibid., map 5, P. 17.

(11) ibid., P. 16. 5.

Further, much of the continent is infested with such pests as locusts and tsetse flies, which constituëe an enormous economie drain(l2).

In energy resources, the continent 1 s potential is fairly good(lJ).

The untapped hydro-electric potential is enormous, and fissionable materials are plentiful. North Africa appears to have plenty of petroleum and natural gas. The only real deficiency is coal. However, two problems arise. Resources are far from evenly distributed, and, secondly, both hydro and atomic power require large amounts of investment capital and know-how to develop.

African mineral resources are plentiful; most basic non-ferrous metals are in adequate to abundant supply, and iron ore is extremely plentiful. But the shortage of coal has made it difficult to develop a steel industry and thus exploit known ore deposits locally. Further, many deposits by their very richness have created difficult political situations which hinder or prevent their integration into the African economy. The best example is the mining complex in Haute-Katanga.

In brief, then, nature has decreed that African economie development will be a frustrating process. The tantalizing potential is there, but the lack of a rich agricultural base and developed transportation routes severely handicap Africa in comparison with Europe and North

America.

(12) See Report on the U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Techno1ogy for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, Vol. III,

Chapter 11.

(13) Hance, op. cit., Pp. 17-19. 6.

2 • The Economy.

Taken as a whole, African economie systems tend to follow a rather discouraging pattern.

First of all, the transition to an exchange economy is far from complete. It is estimated that about 60% of the adult male population is engaged in subsistance agriculture(l4). This is inevitably a brake on economie growth since by definition these men do not enter the process of capital-formation, nor is their productivity likely to increase very much.

Secondly, the chief activity of the exchange economy is the extraction of primary products(l5). Too little manufacturing is done either to supply the home market or to process primary products internally.

This dependence on extractive activity is brought into still sharper focus by three other factors. The first is the gradually declining terms of trade in tropical commodities brought about by shrinking markets and oversupply(l6). The purchase value of raw materials in terms of industrial goods bas declined to 68% of 1950 levels(l7).

Secondly, even within this general decline there is greater priee fluctuation than anywhere in the world. This effects not merely trade, but also government revenue, much of which is derived from export levies(l8).

(14) ibid.' P. 23.

(15) ibid.' P. 24; see also Sidney Dell, Trade Blocs and Conunon Markets,

A.A. Knopf, New York, 1963, Pp. 174-175.

(16) Dell' op. cit., Pp. 176-186. (17) Hance, op. cit., P. 24.

(18) ibid.' p. 26. 7.

Thirdly, trade is dangerously concentrated both as to products and asto markets(l9). No less than 17 African countries derive more than 50% of their export revenue from a single product(ZO). Further, most African nations sell to a very limited market, particularly those states "associatedn with the EEC(Zl).

The result of all this is a continually worsening balance-of- payments situation just at the time when the demand for manufactured goods is increasing rapidly. The nations of Africa therefore depend heavily on outside aid for credits.

The situation is further exacerbated by the tariff structures of the developed nations, which tend to 4iscriminate against finished and semi-finisbed products, thus making it difficult to begin manufact uring industries(22 ).

Another problem of African economies is the lack of infra structure(23>. Railways, as we saw, are difficult to build, and most are one-track affairs. Four countries have none at all~ Roads are equally poor, and public services sucb as sewage, water supply, and communications, are minimal.

The lack of infrastructure is accentuated by the geographical pattern of economie activity. In general, it tends to be scattered in little pockets throughout the continent, mostly on the coast, which are

(19) Dell, op. cit., Pp. 175-176.

(20) Hance, op. cit., P. 27.

(21) Dell, op. cit., Pp. 190-191.

(22) ibid.' P. 194-203.

(23) Hance, op. cit., P. 35-37. 8.

24 linked to the sea but not to each other( ).

This bas bad two effects. Firstly, there bas developed in

Africa no great continental 11heartland" as in ancient Bus and the Han

Empire. Pockets. of economie activity, broken and scattered around the coast, isolated from the interior and each other, do not allow the establishment of a large, unified state from which to launch a drive for unity. As a corollary, the states of the interior tend to be dominated by those of the coast. This is most readily visible in West Africa, where Senegal and Ivory Coast have tended to make a mockery of the

11sovereign independence" of Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger. A recent variant on this theme is Malawi's position vis-a-vis Portugal.

Stil1 another barrier to unity is the fact that African economies tend to be competitive rather than complementary, and thus intra-African trade is minimal. In no single case does it account for more than 20% of any country's total, and typically it is under 1%(25 ). Thus, lowering trade barriers is of itself unlikely to be successful.

A final barrier to unity is the differences in organization of the African economies. These range all the way from Ghana, where the state sector comprises a vital part of the money economy and overall economie direction is performed by a government-administered economie plan, to the Ivory Coast and Liberia, where the state sector is limited and the money economy is dominated by private capital.

(24) Hance, op. cit., P. 46.

(25) Gerald K. Helleiner, "Nigeria and the African Conunon Market",

Ibadan University Press Reprint, 1963: Pp. 287-288. 9.

Finally we come to those two great stumbling-blocks on the road to development - lack of development capital and lack of skilled manpower. Because of the extremely low rate of interna! capital generation and the lack of educational facilities, Africa is dependent upon the outside world for development capital and professional and skilled expatriates(26 ).

Three factors emerge from the above considerations. Firstly, many African states are completely unviable economically. Secondly, there is a high degree of economie dependence on the outside. Thirdly, there is the lack of any real economie basis for unity.

The political corollary of this pattern is a persistent tendency towards weakness and disunity. Differences in the economie potentials of the states and the abject helplessness of some encourage competition for influence. However, because they are all more or less in the same stage of development and are not exceptionally unequal in size, there is no obvious leader amongst them. The high degree of outside economie influence bas caused, as we sball see, no end of friction between them.

3. Peoples and Societies.

Two facts about the population of Africa stand out immediately.

First, Africa bas a very low overall density of population(27 ). Secondly, the population is overwhelmingly rural, about 80% of the tota1(28 ).

This means tbat massive population shifts are necessary to expand commercial and industrial activity. Such shifts have already created

(26) Hance, op. cit., P. 42-46.

(27) U.N. Demographie Yearbook, (1963), P.141 gives an estimated population of about 220 million, allowing for considerable error. (28) Hance, op. cit., P. 52. 10.

widespread urbanization, wnich has led to great changes in the traditional

social structure and consequently a speed-up in the process of modern ization(29).

A third factor is the rapid improvement of health and sanitation facilities, which threaten Africa with a population explosion(3o). This may eventually prove as serious a barrier to development as it has become in Asia(3l).

A fourth feature of modern Africa is the wide gap between the

elite and the mass of traditional society. The traditional elite has

given way almost everywhere to a new Western-educated class who arose 32 in the process of achieving independence( ). This new elite takes much

of its background, concepts, beliefs, and almost always its language,

from the metropolitan power. It is, therefore, predilected towards

· ''modernity11 and "progress11 and consequently towards rapid social change.

In addition, this "Europeanization" creates trans-national bonds between

the various national elites. The new elite tends to be intensely

political in character, as politics has proved the fastest route to upward social mobility(33 >.

(29) See Daniel F. McCall, "Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa", in

The Annals, March 1955, P~ .151-160.

(30) Rance, op. cit., P. 57.

(31) For statistical evidence of the rapid increase in the growth rate, see U.N. Demographie Yearbook, op. cit., P. 142.

(32) Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States", in World Poli tics, Vol. 12, Pp. 329-368.

(33) Fred G. Burke, Africa's Quest for Orde~, Prentice-Hall Inc., N.Y.,

1964; P. 55. 11.

The final and perhaps most significant feature of African society

is its extreme heterogeneity. Tbere are a number of dimensions to this

phenomenon.

First of all, there is an enormous number of linguistic groups.

Below the Sahara, the great Niger-Congo family dominates in the same w,y

as does the Indo-European family in Europe. However, within this family

there are literally thousands of languages and lialects belonging to 34 dozens of groups( ). In the north, Arabie, a Semitic language, is universally spoken(35).

Secondly, there are differences of religion. MOst of the northern

parts of the continent adhere to Islam, and in several (Nigeria and Chad) religious divisions have political significance. In addition, most other African countries have MUslim minorities(36>. Also, Christianity has taken hold in sorne areas, especially amongst the elite, and there are now about 21 million Christiane in Africa(37>. It has, however, been noticeably less successful than Islam. What remains is usually

11 1 classified as pagan-animist' , a term which conceals a vast plethora of beliefs and practices.

(34) M.J. Herskovits, "Peoples and Cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa",

The Annals, March 1955, P. 13.

(35) P.W. Marcais, "Peoples and Cultures of North Africa", The Annals,

March 1955, P. 23.

(36) See "The Moslem World" an inset in the ma.p "Southwest Asia11 (Atlas

Plate 48) published by The National Geographie Society, May 1963.

(37) &nory Ross, "Impact of Crhistianity in Africa", The Annals,

March 1955, P. 165. 12.

Thirdly, there is heterogeneity based on the traditions! mode

of livelihood. The distinction here is between pastoral society based 38 on animal husbandry, and agricultural society based on settlement( >. Fourthly, there is structural heterogeneity based on the varying

types of traditions! socio-political systems. Professor Coleman(39)

distinguishes four types; large-scale states with 11classicalu political

institutions, centralized chiefdoms or conglomerations of tribes

dominated by a single ruling family, dispersed tribal societies or large

ethnie communities linked by common custom, and autonomous local commun-

ities centred on a village-based kinship group.

Fifthly, there is heterogeneity based upon differing colonial experience. Part of the difference here is due to the identity of the

colonial power. It is of no small significance that in all of the

former colonies south of .the Sahara, the political and educations! systems, administrative machinery, and language are those of the colonial power. Another set of differences is introduced by the length of colonial experience, which ranged from over 300 years in the case of Senegal to five in the case of Ethiopia(4o>. Another important factor is the extent of permanent European settlement. Where it has been heavy, society has been dominated by the white minority, which cames into conflict with the new African elite. In general, the larger this

(38) Herskovits, op. cit., P. 17-18.

11 11 (39) James s. Coleman, The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa , in Gabriel A. Almond and James s. Coleman (ed.), The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, 1960; Pp. 254-256.

(40) Me~dy, op. cit., Pp. 18-19, 227. 13.

minority is, the slower will be African political development, and the greater the likelihood that it will be accompanied by violence. There

is also the question of the extent to which the colonial experience disrupted the traditional patterns of social life. Here the continuum runs all the way from Northern Nigeria, where Lord Lugard 1 s nindirect rulen reinforced traditional patterns, to Nyasaland (now Malawi) where 4 nearly half the labour force is employed as migrant labour elsewhere( l).

In the typical case, however, the traditional authorities have been downgraded and important inroads made into the subsistance economies.

This heterogeneity bas had profound influence in the intra-

African state system.

First, the vast diversity of cultures, languages, and social traditions has meant that the concept of the nation state as a social unity bas never taken root in Africa. The "Volk-conceptn has thus not played a role in nation-building, either within the political boundaries bequeathed by colonialism or in the various schemes for territorial amalgamation. This fact also explains the relative absence of border disputes based on irredentist minorities. The exception - Somalia - proves the rule, for it is virtually the only state in new Africa whose existence is based on the ethnie consciousness of a single group(42 >. Ghana's dispute with Togo - despite the division of the Ewes between the two states - really does not fall into that category, but, as we shall see later, is rooted in the political history of the area and the

(41) Davidson, op. cit., P.-85.

11 (42) James s. Coleman, "Current Politica1 Movements in Africa ,

The Annals, March 1955, P. 101. 14.

character of the two regimes. If the appeal is not to cultural or

linguistic solidarity, then the presence of minorities is unimportant.

Another important result of this pattern is the common

experience of colonialism and racial discrimination. This exhibits

'itself in a strong reaction which is one of the most important elements

o.f· solidarity in Africa today. This reaction has developed into a

sense of the distinctiveness of the black race which goes by the name

of "negritude" and "African personality". Leopold Sedalt' Senghor calls

i.t "the sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, the gift of

rythym, which you will find indelibly stamped on all the works

11 43 and activities of the black man ( ).

4. The Political Systems~

With the exception of Ethiopia, Libya, MOrocco, and Burundi,

African political systems are not autochthonous, but derive the major

part of their struct~re from their pre-independence colonial administrat-

ions. Other borrowing is extensive; British, French, and American

models often provide the theoretical framework of the system, and the

secondary political institutions owe much inspiration to the Indian

National Congress and the CPSU. A notable absence, however, is any

system of the communist-totalitarian type.

This extensive common borrowing bas done much to create bonds

of unity, and the absence of any Communist state has downgraded great-

power rivalry on the continent.

A second major characteristic is the mode of fusion between the

(43) West Africa, (London), Nov. 4, 1961. 15.

political system and the traditional political structure. In general,

three patterns are evidenced.

There are first of all those areas in which the traditional authority-structure has by design or accident remained largely intact throughout the colonial period, causing political movement& "to . (44) reproduce the traditional patterns of authority" •

Secondly, there are those situations where a "tribal renaissance" or an ethnie based movement not tied to the traditional authorities has arisen (45 ).

A third type of situation is dominated by a largely secularized type of "national liberation movement"(46 ).

Closely related to this classification is another to be made between situations where the dominant party is a ncaucus" party and 4 those in which it is a "mass" party ( 7). Caucus parties generally tend to rest on the authority of the chiefs, emirs, headmen, or religious leaders. They are generally small-scale and intermittent in organization, and tend to be conservative and status quo oriented in policies. The mass parties build on direct links with the people through a broadly based mass membership organized into thousands of local branches.

These are large scale and continuous in organization, and tend to be oriented towards goals of social transformation. In general, where a

(44) Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties, Penguin Books Ltd., 1960;

Pp. 18-19, see also Martin L. Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single-Party

Tendencies in African Politics", World Politics, Vol. 15 (Jan. 1963), Pp. 264-268. (45) ibid. (46) Coleman in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., P. 296. (47) Kilson, op. cit., P. 264-268. 16.

party of one type is dominant, a party of the other type is in opposit ion(48). This fact, added to the close links which some have with their 49 opposite ideological numbers in other states( ), tends to raise the party differences into international conflict.

A third major characteristic of African politics is the lack of pluralistic secondary institutions. With relatively few exceptions, the tendency is toward monolithic structures and the effective absence of party competition. There is no single explanation for this; the presence of "national independence movements" endowed with a special aura of legitimacy, the influence of Marxist ideology, the widespread prevalence of internai and external threats to national security, the desire to preserve the statua quo, the disintegrating effects of

"acculturation", and the desire to foster rapid socio-economic change are all factors which have played a part at one time or another(SO).

Now this bas certain results important for us. It increases the discretion of policy-makers both as to the amount of resources to be channelled into foreign policy activity and as to the policies to be pursued. This may cause wide variations in foreign policy 11influencen entirely unrelated to the size and wealth of the nations involved. It also tends to augment the aforementioned experimental nature of their

~48) ibid., P. 273, 286.

(49) ibid., Pp. 280-281.

(50) Kilson, op. cit., Pp. 262-294. See also David E. Apter, nsome

11 Reflections on the Role of a Po1itical Opposition in the New Nations ,

Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 4 (Jan. 1962), Pp. 154-168,

11 and lûcien W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process , The Journal of

Politics, Vol. 20 (1958), P. 473. 17.

foreign policy.

The fourth major characteristic of these systems is, with a few exceptions, their extreme newness. In some cases, the territorial entities themselves did not antedate the beginning of the century, and their existence as independant political entities usually begins after 1960. As a result, there has not been sufficient time for stable patterns of international relations to develop. This state of affairs is augmented by the so-called "tabula rasa complex", which is the desire of these new nations to throw off traditional, Eurppean-centred patterns . (51) of interaction and adopt new ones upon the coming of independance •

As a consequence they tend to adopt an eclectic, experimental style of policy-making which often seems random and contradictory to the outside observer.

Internally, this newness results in the underdevelopment of loyalty to the nation-state. This loyalty is further weakened by the fact that the present states are, almost without exceptions, creations of colonialism, and many, as we have noted, are quite unviable. Many

Africans feel that it is simply impossible for Africa 11to produce either effective or stable states within its present higgledy-piggledy boundariesu(SZ). Internai instabiltty and externat intrigue are the

(51) James s. Coleman, "The Foreign Policy of Nigeria", in Joseph E.

Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (ed), Foreign Policies in a World of Change,

Harper and Row, N.Y., 1963; P. 396.

(52) Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism, Pall Mall Press, London, 1962; P. 65. 18.

inevitable results.

A fifth point vital to our analysis is the inseparability of

intra-national and international pol!tics within the system. The above

mentioned weakness of the nation-states and widespread contacts between

national elites are two main reasons. Important also are the political

refugees harboured in many African capitals, the persistence of (53) separatist or regionally based opposition groups , and the presen.ce

of historical and economie links between many nations, particularly

those with the same former colonial master. Two final developments

have also assisted; the ongoing drive for liberation of those parts

of the continent still under white rule, and the process of continuai

creation and destruction of territorial federations which characterized

African politics in this period.

A sixth characteristic of African political systems is the

extent to which they are not genuinely masters of their own political

destiny. In addition to the already-mentioned economie dependence on

the former colonial power and the geographical dependence upon other nations for access to the sea, many African states still retain upon

their soil the troops of the metropolitan power who still have authority

11 to ''maintain order •

Notable both for their economie and military dependence are

the ex-French African states. Examples are the Central African

Republic, Chad, and Congo-Brazzaville, which, during the period under study, bad large French bases(54>, and Senegal, which, in 1961, sold ber entire peanut crop - 85% of ber total exporta - to France at a priee r

(53) Davidson, op. cit., P. 163-164.

(54) Weeks, op. cit. 19.

(55) well above the world market •

At the other end of the spectrum, Guinea, Ghana, and the

United Arab Republic attempt to maintain their independance by balancing

off influence between the great powers(56).

5. African Liberation and Unity.

It is now opportune to examine the factors which led to the

rise of movements of African unity in order that we may complete the background to the events of 1960-63.

The basis for African unity, as we have noted earlier, is the high degree of situational, cultural, and attitudinal similarity amongst

the elites of the new states, and the "adoption" of these attitudes by such other states as the U.A.R., Ethiopia, and Liberia, who were not originally involved.

Of itself, however, this would hardly be sufficient. But there is another factor which is vital to the understanding of the entire process. It is the sense of continuity which many African leaders feel underlies their present roles as national leaders and their past roles as nationaliste. Three factors contribute to this. The first is the existence of 11unfinished businessn in the form of white-dominated nations still unliberated. African leaders clearly identify with these struggles, which help them relate both to their own past and to each other. In the words of novelist Peter Abrahams, 11Africa is my heart, the heart of all of us who are black. Without her we are nothing;

(55) Ben Wattenburg and Ralph Lee Smith, The New. Nations of Africa,

Hart Publishing Co., N.Y., 1963; P. 325.

(56) See MeLmdy, op. cit., P. 44, 69, 254, for the extent of this economie balancing. 20.

while she is not free we are not men. That is why we must free ber, or die. That is how it is."(S]) Secondly, the new states have

found that the process of achieving equality with the white man cannot

stop with national independence alone. The Nigerian Chief Delegate,

Mr. J.A. Wachuku, expressed his frustration at this fact:

11 •••• we are not accepted as equals. • • • I see the heads of African states being insulted and abused ••• ~nd the Great PowersJ using the smaller countries as pawns in their power politics.n(58)

The only cure for this situation seemed to lie in unity.

Thirdly, there is a rough parallel between the disunited

situation in Africa as a whole today, and that obtaining within its

component units right after World War II. Then, as now, the keystone

was unity; the path to human dignity was very largely the process

of uniting various regional and tribal groups under the banner of

independence and nation-building. Tbus, in a very real sense the

drive for African unity may be seen as a projection and extension of

the drive for independence into the arena of continental politics.

This is perhaps most clearly seen in the case of Kwame Nkrumah, who

put it simply:

"I cannot believe in the impossibility of achieving African union any more than I could ever have thought of the impossibility of African freedom •••• Independence ••• at that time 1947 looked a long way off ••• but that did_not stop us going forward.

That is how I feel about African union. Just as I was convinced tbat political freedom ••• must come, so I am equally convinced that African union will come ••• n(59)

(57) Peter Abrahams, A Wreath for Udomo, A.A. Kropf, N.Y., 1956.

(58) The MOntreal Star, Nov. 29, 1960.

(59) Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, Heinemann and Co., Loncio'Q., 1964; p. 110. 21.

But these psychological propensities towards unity tend to be balanced by the negative factors. There is amongst these, of course,

the lack of economie development and infrastructure, which, while it makes African unity more desirable, makes it at the same time and for

the same reasons less possible. Secondly, there is the ineluctable

fact that Parkinson's law admits no exception for Africa; as in any

social unit, there always must be a "number one". But if thirty-two states unite into one, how do you determine who is number one and who number thirty-two?

6. Characteristics of the African Subordinate State System.

We can now draw together the threads of our discussion and summarize the parameters of the African system.

First of all, it is characterized by a large number of small actors with a qualitatively equal and camparatively low level of power. The level of power increases towards the periphery of the system - the Arab north and the white-ruled south. This, in combination with a high degree of economie dependence on the outside world, has meant that the system is relatively exposed to outside penetration, and has made unlikely the riae·of one or several "dominant actors" in the system.

Secondly, it lacks cohesive sub•structure; there is relatively little interaction-discrimination between members of the system. To put it another way, all members tend to treat each other pretty much alike.

Thirdly, there is a relatively low level of intra-system sub political interaction, and no opportunity to increase it.

Fourthly, there is a relatively high degree of intra•system 22.

political interaction, operating bath inside and often outside an institutional framework.

Fifthly, there is a high degree of homogeneity in political structure, values, and history in the system.

Sixthly, and as a corollary of this, there is a high degree of solidarity amongst the politically-conscious elements of the continent.

Seventhly, differences of race, language, religion, economie and socio-political systems can effect the pattern of alignment in the system. However, a far more important factor in the determination of a state's intra-system alignments is its pattern of relations with the outside world. 23.

CHAPTER II - The Nigerian Setting

Introduction

It is now appropriate to examine those factors which shape

Nigeria's policy towards the rest of Africa, and how these differ

from the considerations which apply to Africa as a whole.

1. Geography. Topography. Clima te, and Re sources •

Nigeria is located in the 'tt>ack corner" of the Guinea Coast.

In common with the other nations of this area, her boundaries were

drawn up in the nineteenth century "scrambte for Africa", and are natural neither in the geographie nor the demographie sense. She is

373,000 square miles in extent, far larger than the others of this area(l), and has by far the largest area of non-arid land in West Afric~( 2 ). Nigeria is qui te flat and uniform in topography, making trans

portation easier. The only exception is the Jos Plateau(3). Temperature

fluctuations also tend to be minor(4).

The most important variation is that of rainfall, which decreases

in amount, seasonal length, and reliâbility as one moves northward(s).

This in turn causes a gradua! changé in vegetation from mangroves on

the coast to semi-arid steppe in the extreme north(G).

====-=-..::A=f:.:r.:i~c:a, Vol. I, Twentieth Century Fund, N.Y., 24.

This internai diversity produces conditions favourable to a wide variety of agrtcultural products, thus permitting intense cultiv-

ation without the usual dependence on one or two major crops, leading (7) to a greater degree of economie stability •

It also led to an historical isolation of the regions of the

country one from another. The Horth bas tended to look towards the nomad lands of the Sudan and the Sahara, while the south bas tended to look towards the sea<8>. The absence of any internai axes of communication prevented significant pre-colonial intercourse.

The resource picture is quite bright. The land is far more

fertile on the average than in most of Africa, permitting a much greater population density. She is also well-endowed with tin, columbite, oil, 9 and coal which will aid ber development considerably( ).

2 • The Economy •

Nigeria shares with the rest of Africa serious economie bandi- caps. She is poor even by African standards, ber GNP of $70 per annum putting ber below even India and Haiti(lO). In a composite table of economie indices, she ranks 33rd out of 46 developing nations(ll). Her

(7) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 3$1. (8) James s. Coleman, Nigeria: the Background to Nationalism, University of California Press, 1958; P. 41-44.

(9) See Frederick Harbison, '~n Resources and Economie Development in

Nigerian in Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole (eds .) , The Nigerian Political

Scene, Duke University Press, 1962; Pp. 199-204.

(10) Almond and Coleman, op. cit., Pp. 579-581.

(11) ibid.' p. 543. 25.

markets are concentrated, 45% of her exports going to Britain, another 35% to the Six(l2). She has a chronic balance-of-payments problem(l3),

and is dependent upon the outside world for most of her capital(l4).

She has a desperate shortage of high-level manpower, needing about 5,000 more per year than are being trained(l5).

Nigeria possesses, however, a number of important advantages

over her African confreres.

First of all, the domination of subsistence farming gave way

long ago to an active trade in agricultural staples between the diverse agricultural areas(l6).

Secondly, this economie diversity also applies to her export

trade. Unlike Ghana or Senegal, Nigeria is not dependent on a single export commodity but on three major ones, palm products, cocao, and peanuts, none of which make up more than 25% of the total(l7). The discovery of major oil deposits opens up the prospect of further diversification(l8).

(12) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 388.

(13) See Overseas Review, (Barclay Bank), London, 1963, Pp. 22-27.

(14) Pendleton Herring, "The Future for Democracy in Nigeria", in

Tilman and Cole, op. cit., P. 245.

(15) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 386, see also Harbison, op. cit., P. 204-213.

11 (16) Coleman, "Nigeria , op. cit., P. 67.

(17) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 385.

(18) The New York Times, African Business Review, Jan. 25, 1965. 26.

Thirdly, the country's size ensures a large protected domestic

market secure from fluctuations in foreign trade and thus increases

economie stability. It will also mean that Nigerian industries will be

able to adopt economies of scale and thus reduce export priees.

Fourthly, Nigeria's already established high rate of economie

growth (about 4% per annum)(l9) establishes confidence in her economie

potential abroad, leading to the attraction of vital investment capital.

One of the resulta of this rosy economie scene is the impetus

it gives to conservative policies towards development and foreign

economie relations. Because the policy of ''more of the same 11 has

worked so well, there is a powerful policy bias towards working within

the cautious, pre-colonial framework of economie relations. The radical

discontent characteristic of many African nations is absent, and their

propensity for derring-do and experimentation is replaced by care and

caution at each step.

The same reason has tied Nigeria fairly close to the Western world,

official protestations of·"non-alignment" notwithstanding. Nigeria has

everything to gain from this, and, as perhaps the most economically 2 viable of all African states( o>, she has little or nothing to gain

from sacrificing her Western ties to any sort of Pan-African Economie

Union. Success is always the best answer to any criticism.

It remains true, however, that there is very little room for

leeway in the Nigerian economy. Even a relatively minor economie set-

back could spell disaster. This is why she is quite willing to cooperate

(19) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 385. • (20) Helleiner, op. cit., Pp. 293-298. 27.

with other African states in the face of severe pressure from the EEC on her European Markets(2l).

3. Peoples and Society.

According to the latest census, Nigeria's population is nearly 22 56 million, the largest in Africa( >. This means that she contains about one-half the population of West Africa(23 >, and about one-fifth of the population of all Africa. It also means that Nigeria has a high population density, a fact which tends to expedite the growth of 24 consumer-oriented industries( ).

Nigeria's peoples are a complex and diverse mosaic, a number of important facets of which may with profit be examined.

Nigeria has been described as "one of the principal linguistic

11 2 crossroads of Africa ( S). There are 248 distinct languages belonging 26 to eight major groups( >. There are, however, three major cultural- linguistic groups; the Yoruba (16.6% of the population), the Ibo ? . (27) (17.9%), and the Hausa (28.1%) • Geographically, each group dominates one of the three original regions of the Nigerian Federation; the

Yoruba the West, the Ibo the East, and the Hausa the North. These three groups are also at the centres of Nigeria's three "population

(21) See Nnamdi Azikiwe's speech in The Times (London), March 21, 1962.

(22) lest Africa, (London), Dec. 5, 1964,

(23) Hance, op. cit., P. 169.

(24) ibid, Pp. 252-253.

(25) Coleman, "Nigeria", op. cit., P. 16.

(26) George P. Murdock, "The Traditional Socio-Political Systems of

Nigeria" in Tilman and Cole, op. cit., P. 5-6.

(27) Coleman, "Nigeria", op. cit., P. 15. 28.

28 nodes11 whose density can reach 500-1,700 per square mile in places( ).

Minor groups occupy the areas in between. This tripartite arrangement,

as we shall see later, provides a major political focus.

Nigeria's population is about half MUslim, and these are almost

entirely concentrated in the north. Islamic traditions are strictly 29 observed; women cannot vote in any election in the Northern Region. ( )

In addition, there are wll over two million Christians in the country, the proportion being higher amongst the educated population(3o).

Islaa has served as a buttress to traditional rule in the north, and

has accentuated the differences between South and North.

This bifurcation can be traced back to the traditional social

systems of pre-colonial times, which were largely determined by geograph- 3 1·cal considerations( l)• I n th e sou th , thi c k f ores t s an d h eavy seasona1

rainfall precluded the growth of large-scale centralized political 32 structure( ). In the north, however, the open country permits the use

of cattle and houses, allowing the creation of the great steppe emirates of Kanuri, Gwandu, and Sokoto(33 >. The coming of the British merely accentuated this division. Two

centuries of slave trade had all but destroyed the Yoruba kingdoms,

orienting their economies towards the supplies of British trade-goods

(28) Bance, op. cit., P. 174.

(29) The Constitution of Northern Nigeria, (1960), Section 8.

(30) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 382.

(31) Coleman, ''Nigeria", op. cit., P. 13 •

(32) MUrdock, op. cit., P. 12-15. • (33) ibid., P. 9-12. 29. from the sea(34>. The north remained outside these influences. When the British completed the conquest of the country and created Nigeria as an administrative unit in 1900(35), they adopted a colonial policy which carried the process a step farther. This was known as "indirect rule", and consisted of using the pre-existing native regime as the substructure of the British administration.

While it was a very efficient and inexpensive way to administer the north, where such a structure was highly developed(36), it could not work in the south where it was non-existent(37 ). Thus the British were forced to create an educated African class who, like their counterparts in the rest of the British Empire, soon began to agitate for rapid social and political change. Meanwhile, indirect rule in the north seemed to be designed for the 11protection of the North from the ' (38) forces of the twentieth century" • As Professer Coleman put it,

"the fact that the Northern and Southern protectorates were never effectively united has tended to perpetuate the sharp cultural differ ences between the South and the North"(3g).

Nor can it be said that independence has brought rouch change in the situation. The North still goes its own way under a veneer of

(34) Coleman, "Nigerian, P. 40.

(35) W.B. Hamilton, "The Evolution of British Policy toward Nigeria" in Tilman and Cole, op. cit., Pp. 30-31.

11 (36) Coleman, "Nigeria , op. cit., Pp. 156-161.

(37) ibid., Pp. 50-55.

(38) Hamilton, op. cit., P. 32.

(39) Coleman, "Nigeria", op. cit., P. 47. 30.

modernism. The South, however, has begun to feel the severe dislocations of modern education and the move to the cities, which create a new, politically radical class of neducated unemployed"(40).

This truly staggering heterogeneity has had at least three effects on her African policy.

Firstly, it continually challenges her existence as a united . (41) . ent1ty • As a result, most of her talent and energy must always be directed toward internai problems.

Secondly, the divergent pressures thus created on foreign policy require the government to follow a policy which is a compromise of internai interests.

Thirdly, the attitudes of compromise and eclecticism, which are the necessary political habits in a country such as Nigeria, are carried over into the foreign arena, producing a pragmatic and tolerant style of operation(42>.

4. The Political System.

Nigeria's political system is generally considered one of the most open and competitive in Africa. For this reason it is worth examining the lower levels of the system to an extent which would amount to waste with many nations.

(a) Nigerian Federalism

The federalr'Structure of the Nigerian state is one of the most

(40) See Archibald Callaway, "School Leavers and the Developing Economy of Nigeria", in Tilman and Cole, op. cit., Pp. 220-238.

(41) .Coleman in Black and Thompson, Pp. 383-384.

(42) ibid., Pp. 381-382. 31.

crucial facts in understanding policy decisions.

Two main features of the structure of Nigerian federalism stand

out. The first is the small number and disproportionate size of the

Regions. There were only three at the time of independance, a total

which was increased to four by the creation of a new state out of the

non-Yoruba parts of the Western Region(43 ). Secondly, the North has

nearly two-thirds of the area and over one-half the population of the

Federation(44). This gives the North disproportionate power both in

that its government is stronger vis-a-vis the federal and that it can

almost by itself command a majority of federal representation,

The second important feature is the degree of power invested

in the regions. At first it would seem that the federal government is

potentially very strong indeed(4S). It is granted an exclusive

legislative list which includes external affaira, defence, currency, and communications(46>. Especially important is its power over external borrowing, which gives the Federation government virtually complete 47 control over economie planning( >. Further, the federal government has priority in an extensive concurrent list, which includes labour,

(43) See The Times (London), June 15, 1963; see also Journal of the

Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. 44 (1963), Pp. 299-301.

(44) West Africa, Feb. 5, 1964.

(45) Kalu Ezera, "Constitutiona1 Government and Democracy in Nigeria",

Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. 43, (1962), Pp. 232-238.

(46) The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria (1960), Sections 64:

1 and 2, 154.

(47) John P. Mackintosh, "Federalism in Nigeria", Political Studies,

Volume 10 (1962), P. 226. 32.

higher education, hydro-power, and the administration of justice(48 >. Finally, it has extensive emergency powers which enable it to supersede (49) virtually any regional government •

Notwithstanding, the regions are very strong. First of all,

they possess residual powers, as the regional governments are not

restricted in their lawmaking(SO). Secondly, they have the lion's

share of available revenue, including personal income taxes and levies (51) on the export of primary products • Thirdly, the powers of the

regions are concentrated in those areas which are most likely to

affect the average citizen: agriculture, lower and intermediate 2 education, health and welfare, and local government(S ). As a consequence,

the immediate centre of political concern will be, for the average man,

the regional capital and not Lagos.

This rather de-centralized structure has '~de it more difficult 53 to project a single Nigerian voice in world affairs"( ). Out standing

in this regard has been the conduct of the powerful Premier of the

Northern Region, the Sardauna of Sokoto. His statements denouncing

Israel and promoting a pan-Islamic confederation have made it clear

that his ties are with the MUslim world. It is difficult to dispell 54 the belief that the Sardauna runs his own foreign policy when he sees fit( ).

(48) The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, op. cit., Section

64: 4.

(49) ibid., Section 65.

(50) ibid., Section 64: 1. (51) Mackintosh, "Federalism .. .. n ' op. cit., P. 227. (52) ibid.' p. 226.

(53) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 391.

(54) West Africa, Feb. 6, 1962. 33.

(b) The Nigerian MUlti-Party System.

Unlike many African countries, Nigeria bas a well-organized multi-party system at the Federal level. Bowever, this multi-party system represents not a nation-wide competition for power, but a projection into federal politics of three (now four) one-party systems in each of the regions(55 ). The wide powers given to the Regional governments and the existence of a dominant ethnie group in each has facilitated this process.

In the North, the scene bas been totally dominated by the Northern

People's Congress (NPC) based on and largely congruent with the 56 traditional Native Authority structure( >. It bas captured the allegiance of the vast majority of the agricultural producers, and bas absorbed the rising Habe com:nercial elite(SJ). Opposition parties

(during the period under study chiefly the Northern Elements' Progress ive Union and the United MOddle Belt Congress) have not developed beyond splinter groups. Their support is largely limited to intellectuals, some urban elements, the tin miners of the Jos-Bauchi Plateau, and certain minority tribal groups such as the Tiv(58>. The monolithic social structure of the region provides no basis for an alternative party, and the identification of the NPC with the traditional

(55) See John P. Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends and the Tendency towards a One-Party System in Nigeria", Journal of Com:nonwealth Political Studies,

Vol. I; P. 194-210.

(56) Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton University

Press, 1963; Pp. 445-448.

(57) ibid., Pp. 328-338.

(58) ibid., P. 338, 344-49; see also Ki1son, op. cit., P. 285. 34.

social order has meant that a switch in party support "involves a ' (59) fundamental change in one' s world-view" •

In the East, the dominant party is the National Convention of "' Nigerian Citizens (formerly the National Council of Nigeria and the

Cruneroons) or NCNC. Originally intended as a broadly-based independ-

ence party, "the principal carrier of the idea of Pan-Nigerian nation hood"(6()), it soon became identified as an Ibo party(6l). Minor (62) opposition has come from the Action Group (AG) in non-Ibo areas , 63 but the NCNC has never been in any danger( >. In the West, the situation was not quite so obvious. The Action Group, closely identified with the Yorubas(64 >, has been the dominant party, but its domination of the West was never as complete

as was that of its counterparts in the North and East. It lost the

1954 elections to the NCNC, which party was always able to command a

sizeable share of the popular vote from 1956 onwards(6S).

In addition, it was virtually destroyed in 1962 after the

Western Region Crisis of that year, which led to a massive re-shuffling of political allegiance in Nigeria(66>.

(59) Hodgkin, op. cit., P. 133.

(60) Coleman in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., P. 306.

(61) Sklar, op. cit., P. 65.

(62) ibid.' p. 140.

(63) Mackintosh, "Electoral Trends ••• ", op. cit., P. 200.

(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid.

(66) J.P. Mackintosh, "Politics in Nigeria: the Action Group Crisis of

1962", Political Studies, Vol. 11 (1963), Pp. 126-155. 35.

In the 1959 elections (which were to elect a government for the entire period under consideration) the regional pattern of balloting was upheld. As a result, the. NPC emerged with 134 out of 312 seats, a large plurality but far short of a majority. The NCNC/NEPU won 67 89 and the AG/UMBC won 73( >. Thus a coalition was necessary, and the head of the Federal NPC, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, formed an alliance with the NCNC. On the surface this might have seemed strange, since the NCNC was considered "radical", but the other choice, the AG, bad as part of its programme the splitting up of the Northern (68) Region, anathema to the NPC •

The consequences of this pattern of party competition can hardly be called auspicious. The regionalization of party loyalties in the Federation bas tended to accentuate the geographical and ethnie divisions of the country. Secondly, it bas tended to accentuate the preponderance of the Northern Region, as nearly every Northern Region member was on the government benches, while half of the Southern ones (69) were on~. Speaker's left •

Another significant feature of the pattern of party competition has been the absence of any major party dedicated to changing the system, such as a large communist party or a separatist movement. The integrity and independence of the state and the nature of the regime are not political issues.

On the one band, this ensures a relatively stable regime and

(67) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 393-394.

(68) ibid.

(69) Mackintosh, nElectoral Trends n, op. cit., P. 209-210. 36.

ensures continuity of policy. It also tends to insulate the government from severe domestic foreign policy pressures, thus giving it a wide latitude of discretion.

A third characteristic of the party system appears as a corollary of its regional character. Each party is largely dependent on communal support. The NPC is the outstanding example of this, but even in the south party affiliation is largely determined by ethnie origin. An example of this can be se en in the NCNC, where Dr. K. 0. Mbadiwe, a radical, and Mr. J.A. Wachuku, a conservative, can find room in the same party because they are both Ibos. Differences of policy are usually articulated within parties(JO). This, as we shall see, can lead to some very interesting resulta in the process of policy formation, but it also tends to blur issues, and obviates the traditional government-opposition dichotemy which produces clear-cut policy choices.

The result is - inevitably - lessened popular participation in policy formation.

(c} Nigeria and the Democratie Process.

It has generally been considered that Nigeria bas evolved a relatively high degree of respect for the traditional "rules of the game" upon which British constitutional practice is based. And indeed in 1960 it looked as if Nigeria was well on her way to becoming "a competitive system with rival national parties competing in periodic elections, an official parliamentary opposition, and a free press11 (Jl).

It is important to realize, however, that in a nation where

(70) Sklar, op. cit., P. 64-65.

(71) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 389. 37.

unity is still tenuous, the social structure undergoing rapid trans-

formation, and economie development falls short of rising expectations,

it is extremely difficult to find a middle way between anarchy and (72) tyranny: "Scylla and Charybdis seem very close together" •

Two very prominent examples come to mind. The first is the

Western Region crisis of 1962, which culminated in the destruction of the main opposition party, the arrest and imprisonment of its main 73 leaders, and the bifurcation of its political base( ). It is abundantly clear that there was collusion between Awolowo's enemies in the Action

Group and the Federal government to plot his political destruction, and to put the Western Region in more "realistic" bands (74). Equally, one cannot help but agree with Awolowo that if regions were to be divided up on·~: the basis of equity and political balance, the North would be 75 the prime candidate( ). Finally, we must agree along with the trial

11 76 judge that his was a "political crime ( ).

The second example is the continual harassment of political opposition in the North, which was ultimately to lead to the near breakup of the Federation in the election crisis of 1964-65(77 ).

(72) Herring, op. cit., P. 272. (73) See Mackintosh, "The Action Group Crisis .. .. Il ' op. cit., also Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, Vol. 43 (1962), Pp. 299-301;

West Africa, Jan~ 12, Sept. 14, 1963; The Times (London), Nov. 3, 1962,

July 15, Sept. 12, 1963.

(74) ibid., Pp. 151-153.

(75) Speech quoted in Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, op. cit., P. 299.

(76) West Africa, Sept. 14, 1963.

(77) ibid., Jan. 2 and Jan. 9, 1965. 38.

Because the NPC is so bound up with traditional loyalties, its

leaders come to regard any sort of opposition as subversion of the

social order. Thus, "a party spirit is engendered which may become

pathologically intense"(78). The Sardauna revealed this very clearly when he asked a party convention to consider "constitutional methods 79 f or t h e tota 1 liqu idat i on o f a 11 oppos1ng. po t•t•1 1ca 1 groups "( ) • In

practice this has meant that "seldom a week goes by without some

UMBC-AG or NEPU-NCNC supporter finding himself before the Alkali court"(80).

The important thing to note about thes.e violations is their

conservative and status quo tendency in terms of African policy. The

former was directed against an opposition which bad repeatedly attacked

the government for having failed to do enough to promote African unity(8l). The latter worked largely against the NEPU, whose leader was a stalwart of Pan-Africanism. They therefore aided in relieving

the radical pressure on the government, and assuring the continuation of the existing cautious policies.

5. Interest Articulation and Policy.

(a) Public Opinion.

If we mean by public opinion strong popular feelings on Africa apart from those contained in elite initiatives, we must agree that in

(78) Sklar, op. cit., P. 344.

(79) Dai1y Times (Lagos), Dec. 28, 1961.

(80) West Africa, Feb. 18, 1961.

(81) See Chief Anthony Enahoro's motion in the West African Pilot,

Nov • 23 , 1960 • 39.

82 Nigeria it has an 11underdeveloped or inchoate character"( ).

One of the reasons for this is, of course, historical.

Because she is a "new-new" state, (i.e., both recently independent

and without historie existence), she has no set of accumulated

traditions reaching back through centuri6s of international exist-

ence and consequently international conflict. Nigerian history has

no counterpart to Pearl Harbour, Verdun, or Caparetto in her dealings

with other African states. Foreign policy as a public issue only

appeared with the "independence elections" of 1959.

This does not mean, however, that public opinion is irrelevant,

or that there are no strong feelings on African affairs. Some general

observations are in order.

First of all, opinion is almost entirely limited to the

literate population, for as yet only newspapers provide detailed

coverage of affairs in the outside world. Secondly, and partially

for that reason, it is largely limited to the urban areas, and to the

South rather than the North. Thirdly, it seldom acts as an independent

factor in determining party loyalty(83 ). Two major groups of issues

can be discerned on which there is public feeling.

The first of these concerns situations which involve European

or white domination (or even strong influence) over Africans. In

these cases, unanimity is complete, and condemnation universal. Out- standing examples are South Africa's apartheid policy, French atomic

testing in Africa, residual colonialism in Angola, MOzambique, and

(82) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 380.

(83) See Cowan, op. cit., Pp. 132-133. 40.

Central Africa, and, to a limited extent, the Angle-Nigerian Defence Pact(84>. The second major issue centered around the phrases "African

Unity" and "Pan-Africanism". Virtually no one is beard to say these

are not beneficiai and desirable, but there is little clear under-

standing of what they mean or haw they are to be achieved. Was it

11 85 a case of "giving leadership to an emasculated continent ( ), or

·"co-operation on ministerial and official levels between the African states"?(86)

Three conclusions can be drawn from the operation of public

opinion. Firstly, it is far more powerful on issues affecting Africa 87 than on extra-African ones( ). Secondly, in the majority of cases opinion seems merely to re-inforce decisions already made, the best

example being the condemnation of South Africa. Thirdly, it can

occasionally play a role when the elite is undecided, indifferent, or

divided, as in the Defence Pact case.

It would seem then that the limiting factor is less the responsiveness of the elite than indifference and division in the public.

(b} The Press.

The Nigerian press is set off from the general practice in

Africa by being free from government restriction. "Nawhere in Africa

(84} ibid., Pp. 136-137.

(85) Nnamdi Azikiwe in West African Pilot, Sept. 9, 1959.

(86) The Daily Service (Lagos), June 28, 1960.

(87) Cowan, op. cit. 41.

bas there been •••• such free and open discussion of policy issues and (88) such frank and unrestrained criticism of official policy. 11 It must be admitted, however, that this freedom does not reflect itself in the quality of journalism, scandal-mongering and distortion being common practice. Of the three p'pers with national circulations, two are virtually party organs, ~nd a third, English-owned daily is 89 prudentially pro-government( ). This tends to limit their influence, as their readership expects them to endorse their party's stands.

But if the press is not exactly the "neutral medium" envisaged (90) by Professor Almond , it does aid political parties and interest groups in focusing attention upon demands. It therefore expands the range of public decision-making and thus prevents the government from making policy decisions in a vacuum.

For the purposes of this discussion, we will divide these groups into two types: ones that are temporary and intermittent, and those that are permanent and possess structure.

The first type has a single representative: the "Ail-Nigeria

11 9 PeopleM Conference of August, 1961 ( l).

The history of this conference is interesting. Smarting under

(88) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 392.

(89) Cowan, op. cit., P. 135.

(90) Almond and Coleman, op. cit., P. 47.

(91) For a detailed account of this conference, see Claude s. Phillips,

The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, Northwestern University Press,

1964; Pp. 55-62. 42.

radical criticism of his foreign policy, Sir Abubakar appointed

Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe, a radical NCNC M.P., as the "Prime Minister's

persona! adviser on African Affairs". The latter worthy proceeded to

organize a conference to include all the leading intellectuals which was to study foreign policy.

The result was a complete victory for the radical Pan-

Africaniste. Final resolutions demanded the expulsion of the Peace

Corps and MOral Re-armament from Nigeria, the adoption of a policy

of."positive neutralismn and Nigeria's entry into the Union of African

States.

If Balewa had sanctioned the conference to allow the radicals

to "let off steam", the idea backfired. lt moulded and articulated

the latent dissatisfaction of large numbers of the intelligensia with

official foreign po licy, ·Iegitimizing and unifying it. Further, it

gave this body of opinion a public platform and a channel to the P.M.

By allowing it a quasi-representative status, its voice has been

considerably strengthened. lt also reminded the government of the strength of radical ideas amongst the vitally-necessary educated population.

The intellectuals also form the backbone of the permanent groups. Perhaps the most vocal of these is the Zikist movement. lt is affiliated with the NCNC, and bas a long and honourable history in 92 the fight for independence( ). lt advocated the creation of a republic and "a more vigorous and neutral foreign policy"(93 ). lt

(92) Sklar, op. cit., P. 70-76, 403-406.

(93) Phillips, op. cit., P. 72. 43.

was also instrumental in "leaking11 information on the Defence Pact obtained from NCNC government members(94 ).

There are also several smaller, still more radical groups,

such as the Nigerian Youth Congress and the Dynamic Party, which

advocate Nkrumah-type socialism and a far more "pro-socialist''

foreign policy.

While all these movements have tiny membership roles, they

represent the most articulate and vital part of the population. In

the words of Dr. Kalu Ezera, Seminar Lecturer in Government at

Ibadan, they are "disgusted with the policies of drift and compromise,

the corruption, which seem to betray the hopes of independence"(gs).

They "believe that a lack of dedication on the part of the leaders

has crippled morale, lulled the nationalist spirit, and let party

politics and interna! party competition for authority monopolize

public attention, as the leaders concentrate upon persona! power instead of the general welfare"(96 ).

These intellectuals serve as an important 11radicalizing" force

on Nigeria's African policy whose influence cannot be overestimated. The other main foreign-policy pressure group ms the labour

union movement. This was, at the time, divided into two groups, the

Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN) and the Nigerian Trade Union

Congress (NTUC)( 97 ). These two unions have taken sharply divergent

(94) ibid., P. 73.

(95) Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Development in Nigeria, Cambridge

University Press, 1960; P. 260.

(96) H.H. and M.M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite, Stanford University

Press, 1960; P. 163.

(97) Phillips, op. cit., P. 77-80. 44.

courses on the question of intra•African relations. NTUC has affiliated with the AATUF, a Ghana-based group disclaiming affiliation with any extra-African trade unions(98 >. TUCN, on the other band, has affiliated with ATUC, a regional branch of the ICFTU( 99 ). Needless to say, there fore, NTUC has tended to support the so-càiUed "Casablanca line", and

TUCN the Monrovians. It must be assumed, however, that these groups effectively cancelled each other out; prior to the strike of 1964, it is impossible to find a single instance of overt trade union influence on Nigerian policy.

Several general characteristics of pressure groups thus appear.

Their members tended to be Southerners, young, better educated and paid than averagè, and closer to the "councils of political power" than the average citizen. In this sense they are not so much a pressure-group as a counter-elite. Finally, the influence of overt pressure groups has been almost entirely in one direction; towards a greater commitment to Pan-Africanism.

6. Political Parties and Policy.

(a) The Northern Peoples' Congress.

(i) Its Role in Policy-Making.

The NPC has been the dominant party in the Federal government.

(98) Erasmus H. Klomon, "African Unification Movements", in Norman J.

Padelford and Rupert Emerson (eds.), Africa and World Order, F.A. Praeger

Inc., N.Y., 1963; P. 126.

(99) ibid., P. 127. 45.

It is based on virtually unchallenged support in the Northern Region.

The Prime Minister and most of his cabinet are NPC. It cannot, however, be considered a national party, as its membership is restricted to

Northerners, a fact which causes no small amount of bitterness(lOO).

(ii) Influential Personalities.

The two central personalities in the party are the Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa(lOl), and the Premier of

the Northern Region, Sir Amhadu Bello. The P.M. is a rather colourless, self-effacing man who worked his way up through the Native Administrations.

He became P.M. '~ecause he was an uncontroversial figure and efficient 2 administrator whose integrity protected him from personal attack"(l0 ).

He is generally considered a compromiser and a moderate in all things, and has little persona! following.

He tends to favour the maintenance of close ties between Nigeria and Britain, and looks with disfavour upon the mystique of Pan-Africanism.

African unity for him means graduai expansion of the spheres of co-operation between African states. The Sardauna(l03) is a radically different type. He is a high- ranking member of the traditional Fulani elite, an extremely devout

Muslim. He is an extremely dynamic man who neither suffers fools gladly nor tolerates any slight which the rough-and-tumble of politics might

(100) Sklar, op. cit., P. 382.

(101) See Ronald Segal, African Profiles, Penguin Books, 1962; Pp. 205-209.

(102) ibid., P. 208.

(103) See Amhadu Bello, My Life, Cambridge University Press, 1962. 46.

bring to his aristocratie mien. As noted earlier, he is very conserv-

ative in outlook.

He bas little sympathy with Pan-Africanism, focusing most of

his attention on Pan-Islamic affairs, especially in conjunction with

ex-King Saud of Ar abia.

It should be noted in closing that it is the Sardauna, not the

P .M., who is the leader of the NPC. This anomalous position bas left people wondering whether the capital of Nigeria is Lagos or Kadauna(l04).

(iii) Policies.

Being the governing party as well as somewhat conservative and

traditional in outlook, it is perhaps understandable that its foreign

policy views have been somewhat amorphous. Besides, foreign policy bas much less relevance to the north with its low level of literacy

than to the south. In general, policy pronouncements tend to support

the Commonwealth, Allah, and what the government is doing, and leave it at that. The NPC does not stress African unity as a key part of its policy, and both Balewa and the Sardauna are skeptical about it(lOS),

favouring a very cautious approach which will not upset anything now extant.

(b) The National Convention (and NEPU) of Nigerian Citizens.

(i) Role.

The NCNC was one of the members of the government coalition

(104) West Africa, May 5, 1965.

(105) See Bello, op. cit., P. 234; also see Balewa's speech in The

New York Times, Oct. 4, 1960. 47.

during the period under study, holding the portfolios of foreign affaira

and finance. In addition, the leader of the NCNC was the Governor-

General (and later President). The leader of the NEPU was chief

government whip.

(ii) Personalities.

The chief personalities involved in foreign affaira were

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Governor-General, the Hon. J.A. Wachuku,

Foreign Minis ter, and Mallam Aminu lano, leader of the NEPU. Azikiwe, affectionat4!ly known as 11Zik", was educated in the (106) United States and bas travelled widely • He bas been a leader of

the African nationalist movement since the 1930's, and his news-

paper, the West African Pilot, has enjoyed national circulation. He

was the founder of the NCNC. He bas a buge popular following, being

about the only cbarismatic leader Nigeria bas. In terms of foreign policy he bas generally been to·the "left"

of the government, and is known for his strong feelings in support of

African Unity, as evidenced by the message of support he sent to

Dr. Nkrumah and M. Toure upon the announcement of the Ghana-Guinea union(l07), and by the numerous speeches he bas made associating Nigeria with the mainstream of Pan-Africanism(108>. Mr. J .A. Wachuk:u, the Foreign Minis ter, was also one of the

original leaders of the NCNC, joining the party after his return to

(106) See Paul E. Sigmund, The Ideologies of the Developing Nations,

Praeger, N.Y., 1963; Pp. 211-212, also Segal, op. cit., P. 198-204 • • (107) West African Pilot, Dec. 8, 1958. (108) See especially N. Azikiwe, "The Future of Pan-Africanism", Presence Africaine (Eng. ed.), Vol. 12, No. 1 (1962), Pp. 7-29. 48.

Nigeria from a law practice in Dublin(l09). He often ranged himself

in opposition to Zik, being one of the Parliamentary group that broke with that wortpy in 1954. He is es~entially a conservative, and is much less deeply committed to Pan-Africanism. Be is an extremely

colourful figure, whose intemperate statements, especially those

criticizing Ghana, have often made him far from popular(llO)•

Mali~ Aminu Kano is, like Zik, committed to Pan-Africanism.

He has played a prominent role in African conferences, and has tended (111) to adopt a "radical" position •

(iii) Policy Views

The wide divergence of policy views within the NCNC has caused a good deal of bitterness. The internecine struggle has often over-

shadowed the fight against the opposition, and complaints about

Wachuku's policies have often come more frequently from.Mr. Speaker's right. In general, the radicals have been able to use their position

in the government to good effect, often with the tacit support of Zik.

(i) Role.

During the period in question, the Action Group constituted the official opposition. Its position, however, was drastically eroded with the Western Region crisis and treason trials mentioned earlier.

(109) See Ronald Segal, Political Africa, F.A. Praeger, N.Y., 1961, P. 277.

(llO) See West Africa, Dec. 5, 1964.

(11}) See West African Pilot, Jan. 27-28, 1960. 49.

1ii) Personalities.

1 The leader of the party is Chief Obafemi Awolowa, or "Awe" for ~hort. Educated in London, he returned to join the nationalist movement

1 (112) ~ith Zik but soon broke with htm to form the Action Group • He is i • keen, bard-hitting politician whose concise barhs are capable of

'triking deep. He is a devout Christian, and rather contemptuous

f the MUsltm north. He is a strong supporter of a Western-style

onstitutional democracy, and bas tended to be pro-Western and skeptical r1 tf African unity as a useful objective. After the Defence Pact crisis, j • (113) nowever, he became a m~litant Pan-African •

The other personality is Chief Anthony Enahoro, who bas bad

ruch experience in African affairs, and is considered a Pan-Africanist. ~ led Nigeria's delegation to the All-African Peoples' Conference at ~nis in 1959-60(ll4).

,(iii) Policies. ' The Action Group's policy bas been a complete reflection of

fhat of their leader, moving from the cautious, conservative position

rf the 1959 elections to greater and greater militancy.

1 ! .l(d) Conclusions. Two conclusions seem in order. First of all, positions on

!foreign1 policy seem qui te flexible and amorphous, varying from time to

'(112) See Sigmund, op. cit., P. 223, and Segal, op. cit., Pp. 211-214.

lso Awo - the Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Cambridge University

London, 1961.

Phillips, op. cit., Pp. 63-65.

West African Pilot, Jan. 29, 1960. 50.

~ime and from leader to leader, Secondly, one cannot help but note

~he essential agreement amongst the parties on the broad outlines of

lfrican polie y. This we will now consider.

7. Elite Images and Attitudes.

~a) Their Image of Nigeria and Its Role.

1 l'be political elite holds a c01111101t view of Nigeria' s unique

~pportunity to assume the leadership in Africa, due mainly to her size 1 fnd wealth, When Nigeria was not invited to the Banduag Conference in

~955 Azikiwe pointed out bluntly that one-sixth of all Africans lived ~n Nigeria, and that "the Asian Powers will do well to appreciate the historie mission and manifest destiny of Nigeria on the African continaat"(ll5).

~achuku and Balewa have proved no less enthusiastic. In the January,

1960, session of the Nigerian Parliament, the Prime Minister noted that

1 ~'Nigeria will bave a wonderful opportunity to speak for the continent

1 (116) bf Africa" • ' Wachuku followed with his belief that Nigeria has a '~ission (117) lo rescue Black Africans from destruction, oppression, and repression" • This confident image of Nigeria as the strongest black African

nation was nowhere more clearly illustrated than by the P.M., when he

rxpressed his attitude towards an African political union.

1 '~igeria is big enough and does not need to join others. But

i(ll5) Zik, op. cit., P. 64. Zik, Selected Speeches of Nnamdi Azikiwe,

Cambridge University Press, 1961.

(116) Phillips, op. cit., P. 28.

:{117) ibid., P. 28. 51.

if others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made clear to them in such a union."(llS) This statement reflects both enormous

self-confidence and a sort of latent isolationism which makes itself

felt every so often.

In this regard it is interesting to note that opposition to

Nigerian policy from wit.hin is usually phraaed in terms of failure to

live up to her foreordained role as African champion. Kalu Ezera said 9 t h at h e 11 cou ld see no reason wh y N"1ger i a cannot 1ea d 11 (1l ) •

There are equally strong indications of a belief that Nigeria

should not play its role heavy-handedly. Wachuku stated that "Nigeria

herself bas absolutely no expansionist ambitions", and that she is 120 resolutely opposed to "bullying amongst Africans"( ). Zik sees the

paramount need as "respect for the principle of non-interference in the

interna! affairs of African States inter se and the inviolability of 121 the territorial integrity of each African State"( ). The Sardauna

comes closer to home:

'~e have no thoughts of aggression in any direction ••• We find

the expense of maintaining the forces we hav.e at present to be quite 122 heavy enough as i t is. "( ) • And Awo, typically succinct:

"A choice must be made between butter and bullets: we eannot have both, as some Western nations have contrived to do ••• " (123) •

(118) ibid., P. 90.

(119) ibid., P. 90.

(120) Wachuku, op. ci t. , P. 70, 72. Ja ja A. Wachuku, "Nigerian Foreign

11 Policy , University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. l(Oct. 1961); P.70-72.

(121) Azikiwe, "The Future of Pan-Africanism", op. cit., P. 19.

(122) Bello, op. cit., P. 236.

(123) Awo, op. cit., P. 307. 52.

In short, there seems to be a very large measure of satisfaction with Nigeria's position in the status quo.

Another point worth noting is that despite the attention

focused on the "a1igned" or "non-aligned" statua of Nigeria, she

is interested above all in ber statua as an African state; ber self-

image as African precedes and transcenda the notion of Nigerian nationhood. There exists for the elite a sort of "African gemeinschaft11 which

is the fount of a11 sovereignty and the ergos of political community.

We see this as an imp1icit assumpti~n running through the writings of the elite. Examp1es of this are to be found everywhere. Balewa asserts (124) simply, ''We belong to African • Zik' s 1964 New Year' s Message exhorts Nigerians to '~ke Nigeria a great and united nation that would

11 125 be worthy of the pride of Africa ( ). Action is justified in reference to a greater African Community and not to particular nationalism or ''humanity" in general. Another example is Wachuku' s continua! reference to Nigeria's "duty as an African nation" and his suggestions (126) as to how she can be "useful to Africa" •

Thus, while Nigerian leaders are fully conscious of their role and do not hesitate to indulge in a certain amount of national amour propre, the fact remains that what we would cal1 nationalism or national loyalty is seen as somebhing owed to the continent as a whole

(124) Alhiji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, "Nigeria Looks Ahead", in

Foreign Affaira, Vol. 41, No. 1. P. 136.

(125) Federal Nigeria, Jan.-Feb., 1964.

(126) Wachuku, op. cit., P. 73. 53.

and not simply to one state. There is, at first sight, a seeming

contradiction between this belief and their devotion to the building

of a Nigerian nation. To resolve this, we must now examine the

place which Africa occupies in the psyches and their attitudes towards

developments on the continent.

(b) Nigeria and Africa.

Nigeria's view of Africa can be seen as encompassing two broad

issues; firstly, the question of colonialism and racialism in Africa,

and, secondly, the problem of African unity.

On the first issue there is obviously total and complete agreement. It is not merely that an end to racism and colonialism is seen

as a vitally necessary goal of national policy; it is seen as a

completion of self, and their destruction as the end of a crusade.

Thus, the policy-makers flatly deny not merely the morality, but also

the authority of these regimes. Wachuku says:

'~e will never regard racial discrimination as the interna!

affair of any state ••• There can be no going back on that; colonialism

11 127 in all its manifestations anywhere in Africa must be ended ( >. Azikiwe states simply that "colonialism is an act of aggression against (128) the African States collectively" • It is this attitude which

constitutes the main pillar of Nigeria's solidarity with the Afro-Asian bloc, and he1ps augment ber ambivalence towards its more radical members;

she finds it agonizing to criticize any policy framed in terms of anti-

colonialism.

(127) Wachuku, op. cit., P. 68-69.

(128) Azikiwe, op. cit., P. 10. 54·.

The second major question is that of African unity. Here again

Nigerian views as to the telos are similar to those of the rest of

Africa. All conceive of a united and strong Africa, asserting itself on the basis of equality with other continents. As Wachuku puts it, ncivilization moves in a circle. It has travelled from Asia and Africa 29 to Europe, across the Atlantic and now is coming back to Africa again .. "(l )

But unlike Nkrumah, the Nigerian leaders do not conceive of this

11 11 130 pr imar il y as a po litica 1 process. Aziktwe 's AAfrican Leviathan { ) is not to be created by Hobbesian means.

The Nigerian concept of African unity is to begin with Afrtca as it is; all major leaders regard present boundaries as legitimate (131) pro tempore • Then, as national development proceeds, economie and social contacts and co-operation will increase, and, finally, common political institutions may be built. Wachuku likens the process to a 132 pyramid, built of necessity from the bottom up{ >. Thus, nation- building is seen as self-transcending; it moves Africa closer to unity rather than the reverse.

In terms of policy, this implies adherence to the functional approach to unity, stressing issues that are technical, cultural, and above all, apolitical. This in turn explains why Nigeria tends to see herself as a natural r!val of Ghana, whose approach is one of mono-

(129) Wachuku, op. cit., P. 73.

(130) Azikiwe, P. 22.

(131) ibid., P. 24-25; Wachuku, P. 70; Balewa, P. 137; Awo, P. 311-312;

Bello, P. 234-236.

(132) Wachuku, P. 71. 55.

lithic ideological unity(133 >. As a result, she perceives Ghana's (134) policies as dangerous and immoderate •

This approach to African unity is clearly consonant with

Nigeria's view of ber own role as status quo and moderate, but the

two clash with the equally central image of colonialism and racism

as the Summum Malum. This conflict tends to create a fundamental

ambivalence between an active and an inactive policy, a Sartrean

shadow between the thought and the act. It is what Coleman calls

"the agony of a contemporary African who is both a reasonable man and a nationalist"(135).

(133) John Marcum, "How Wide is the Gap Between Monrovia and

11 Casablanca? , Africa Report, Jan. 1962.

(134) West Africa, Dec. 5, 1964; also The Times (London), Jan. 26, 1962.

(135) Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 398.

e- 56.

CHAPTER III - Nigeria's Political Resources

We shall now examine the means at Nigeria's command to carry

out ber policies in the African system.

A. Ma.terial

(1) Military.

In the context of today's wars of millions, Nigeria's armed

forces with only 8,000 men all told(l) seem almost a joke. Yet in

the context of ber immediate environment, they are far from a laughing matter. Rer four neighbours (Ca.meroon, Chad, Dahomey, and Niger) have

a combined manpower total of only 5,300. Thus she is under no grave military threat which might govern ber policy and dictate ber choice

of friends, as, for example, is Pakistan. In the modern context, this means that she is not forced into the orbit of any major power.

A corollary of Nigeria's strength in relation to ber neighbours

is the possibility of ber adopting a policy of expansion. Aside from

the aforementioned strong bias of the elite against any such policy,

there are two other important raasons for ber not attempting such a policy. First of all, i~ would require a diversion of desperately needed capital and foreign exchange to the military establishment.

Secondly, there is no reason to assume the success of such a policy; 2 all four continuous states have their frontiers guaranteed by France( ).

In another context, however, Nigeria's armed forces have taken

(1) See George Weeks, "The Armies of Africa", Africa Report, Jan. 1964.

(2) Ibid. 57.

on a significance far greater than their mere numbers might indicate.

In the Congo crisis, the Nigerian contingent was by far the largest 3 African one, and Nigerian troops served with discipline and distinction( ).

Nor did Nigeria play politics with her troops as did the Casablanca states(4). This powerful and neutral presence undoubtedly gave her an important say in U.N. Congo operations, and was probably responsible for Mr. Wachuku's election as chairman of the U.N. Conciliation

Commission for the Congo.

This was to be illustrated once more when a succession of army mutinies in East Africa forced Presidents Kenyatta and Nyerere to look for outside assistance. Nigeria was able to supply troops to

Tanganyika, and her assistance was much appreciated(S).

(2) Economie.

Three main features stand out about Nigeria's economie resources as tools of policy.

The first is the aforementioned lack of leeway in the economy.

Nigeria is straining every nerve and fibre in the process of her development, and it is simply not possible for her to contemplate any sort of direct economie assistance to any other African state, even for the most

(~) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 397, see also West

African Pilot, Apr. 4, 1963.

(4) The New York Times, Jan. 6, 1961; see also Stanley Hoffmann, "The

U.N. in the Congo Labarynth", in Padelford and Emerson, op. cit., Pp. 73-75.

(5) African Recorder (New Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 1, P. 753-754 (Apr. 23 -

May 6, 1964). 58.

pressing reasons. Indeed, as has been noted, she is poorer than most of them.

However, her buge size does give her one economie lever. It means that no intra-African economie arrangements (for example, a

Common Market) could get very far without her support. Thus, in the field of "practical co-operation", she has a commanding voice. The difficulty is that this bas little immediate relevance. If it is true, as we have seen, that Nigeria would benefit very little from such arrangements at this stage, it is also true for other African nations in the short run. Nigeria bas no commodities they need and certainly cannot provide a aarket for their primary products. Thus in the immediate future, their ties with the outside world will remain the overriding economie consideration. Only after substantial industrialization will the "Nigerian colossus" have much economie significance.

Nigeria bas, finally, another peripheral advantage in her well- trained,civil service brought up in the British tradition of political neutrality and the "performance principle". It is no better than many others, but it is far bigger, and thus can be used as a political tool, rendering technical and administrative assistance to those states not so fortunate. She bas sent assistance teams to the Congo, and 6 Congolese have come to Nigeria to train{ ). It is perhaps no accident that soon afterwards the Congo government found itself in complete agreement with Nigeria on the question of African unity right before

(6) African Recorder (New Delhi), Vol. II, No. 14 (July 2-15, 1963), p. 508. 59.

the crucial Addis Ababa meeting(7).

B. Non-Ma.terial

(1) Political Strength.

Despite a multitude of controversy over domestic and foreign

policy, as well as a number of unsettling incidents, it remains true

that Nigeria's political system is one of the most stable in Africa.

There are no political leaders owing loyalty to another state, such (8) as in Ma.uritania , no assassination attempts as in Ghana, and no

serious secessionist movements as in the Congo. There has never been

a major breakdown in law and order, and only 1aughable attempts at

subversion have occurred. Even more important, there is a wide area of

agreement between politica1 parties on many issues. Fina11y, during

the entire period under consideration, Nigeria was ruled by one P.M.

and one party coalition.

Equally tmportant, Nigeria has been spared two problems which

have plagued many African nations. The first is the tendency for the

civil service to become so entwined in politics that the distinction (9) between administration and patronage disappears • The second is

the tendency for the army to interfere in po1itics, weakening the entire

regtme. It has been well said that "fortunate indeed is the democracy where such a reference can be treated as an afterthought"(lo).

(7) New York Times, May 9, 1963.

(8) Melody, op. cit., P. 11.

(9) See Taylor Cole, "Bureaucracy in Transition", in Tilman and Cole,

op. cit., Pp. 89-114.

(10) Her·ring, op. cit., P. 244. 60.

(2) Diplomatie Facilities.

Nigeria's diplomacy bas been conducted by a staff of professional

civil servants organized on the model of the British Foreign Office.

They are generally conceded to be the best in West Africa(ll). Since

1958, Nigerians were accepted as trainees with the British service in

the field and in Whitehall. By the time of independence, at least a

skeleton staff was ready with the balance made up of new trainees and (12) civil servants from other depaz:tments •

Nigeria has been far from active and enthusiastic in extending

her diplomatie representation. As late as January 1962 (the time of

the Lagos conference) Nigeria had embassies in only seven African countries, (13) with plans for three more • This seems almost ludicrous for a

country the size of Nigeria. Rather than attempting to establish her

influence quickly, she has pursued an 11economizing and pragmatic

course", allowing personnel and financial considerations to take

precedence over her self-assertion as an African power(l4).

Thirdly, Nigeria does not conduct "fringe diplomacy". This

technique, borrowed from the Soviets, is successfully used by the

Casablanca powers. It involves the creation of trans-national organiz- at ions dominated by the 1'mothern state, such as trade union movements, youth organizations, and "peoples' congresses", which put pressure on other governments internally to adopt favourable policies(lS). This

(11) Cowan, op. cit., P. 117.

(12) ibid., Pp. 118-119.

(13) Coleman in Black and Thompson, op. cit., P. 401.

(14) ibid.' p. 401.

(15) Klomon, op. cit., P. 123-126. 61.

reliance on "traditionaln methods of diplomacy lessens ber influence considerably.

(3) Propaganda Facilities.

Nigeria's propaganda facilities are even more underdeveloped. 6 While she bad the first television station in West Africa at Ibadan(l ), she bas nothing to compare with Ghana's powerful short-wave transmitter (17) operating in many languages and reaching most of Africa •

Part of the reason for this is the noted cautious and self- effacing style of Nigerian policy. One Nigerian who is prominent both in official and professional life camplained bitterly to the author that it was almost as if Nigeria was ashamed of herself.

A second important reason was the continua! conflict between

Foreign Minister Wachuku and the Information Minister, T.o.s. Benson, which made much newspaper copy in the spring of 1963. The nub of the matter seemed to be a dispute over jurisdiction in the foreign information services. The conflict did little to improve their quality or extent.

(4) Attractiveness. a) Domestic System and Policies.

Nigeria is virtua11y unique in Africa in baving a genuinely competitive political system. This has not, apparently resu1ted in any enbancement of Nigeria's image anywhere except in the West. In fact, the Nigerians quite often feel themselves odd men out in this respect(lS).

(16) New York Times, Sept. 13, 1959. (17) ibid., Oct. 28, 1961. (18) See feature article in the West African Pilot, Feb. 18, 1963. 62.

Other African leaders, having dumped democracy either to speed develop

ment or preserve the status quo, are not likely to look backward until

their problems are at least part way solved.

Of Nigeria's domestic policies, the most significant is her

commitment to free enterprise. This policy creates a powerful bond

between her and other nations, chiefly Liberia and the Ivory Coast, who

have adopted similar policies. On the other hand, ber lack of a firm

ideological commitment to rapid development alienates her from such

nations as Ghana and Guinea. Further, this lack severèly cripples

her ability to act as an example to the other peoples of Africa, as

Ghana bas done.

b) Foreign Policies.

In general her foreign policy, based upon cautious pragmatism

and the maintenance of close ties with the West, bas endeared her to

the more statua quo-minded African states. Again, however, it has

handicapped ber in her dealings with the radical ones. Whether or not

the overall effect has been beneficia! is difficult to determine. On

the one band, the absence of aggressive self-seeking policies and of an apocalyptic ideology bas made her one of Africa's most trusted nations, as the previous examples of the Congo and Tanganyika showed.

On the other hand, the lack of a popular and simple ideology is always a handicap in foreign policy, as the West bas discovered. c) Personalities.

The unique feature of Nigeria is that her two key figures seem

to appeal to two entirely different types of attitudes. 63.

Azikiwe is a nationalist leadee of long standing. He was an outstanding participant in the Manchester Conference, and his . (19) newspapers were read over all of West Afr1ca • Kwame Nkrumah 2 himself acknowledges considerable inspiration from Zik( 0). His influence in African radical circles is still probably quite great.

Sir Abu~kar, on the other hand, appeals most prominently ba the more conservative statesmen in Africa. Amongst th~se there is general respect for his seemingly unlimited talent for patient 2 negotiation and compromise( l). For this reason Nigeria has often been called upon to mediate disputes between African states.

A decided minus, on the ether hand, was the Foreign Minister,

Wachuku. He was extremely honest and forthright, never hesitating to speak his mind. Unfortunately, these talents are not universally admired in a foreign minister. The Prime Minister has even had to (22) caution him publicly to be "a little guarded" •

Nigeria has not, however, had any leaders of the fame of

Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana. This iS perhaps less due to any difference in stature than to press coverage.

Conclusions

A pattern seems evident in the foregoing. Nigeria's greatest

(19) Segal, op. cit., Pp. 199-202.

(20) ibid., P. 217.

(21) Coleman in Black and Thomppon, P. 381-382.

(22) See Balewa's statement in the Daily Times (Lagos), Feb. 2, 1963. 64.

strengths lie in the realm of material resources, her greatest

weaknesses in the non-material realm. For this reason, it is

perhaps no accident that Nigeria's approach to African Unity has

been concentrated in the concrete, material realm where she would

have the greatest influence. In this sense, Nigeria's 11pyramid"

approach to African Unity can be said to have positive feedback and

thus is internally stable or self-reinforcing.

A second consider~tion lies in the fact of her enormous

potential. We have seen that the future extent of her influence will

be much greater than at present in a way not possible for Togo or

Niger. As a result, few nations will want to make a permanent

enemy of Nigeria.

Another perspective might be obtained by examining these

resources in terms of the system as a whole. A number of conclusions

can then be drawn.

Firstly, given the large number of actors and the underdeveloped

character of the means of transportation within the system, the

absence of large military potential is no disadvantage, and its

presence little gain. An example is the United Arab Republic, whose huge army can seldom be brought to bear in Africa. On the other

band, even a small force (such as Nigeria's) can prove effective if

the political conditions are such that it can be brought to bear.

Secondly, given the multitude of trans-national ties between

politically conscious groups in Africa, an attractive political ideol

ogy can prove of great benefit to the prosecution of national policy,

and its absence can create difficulties. On the other band, given

the close relation between national and international politics in the system, such an ideology can also increase the leve! of tension and 65.

thus the danger to the actor. In Nigeria's case, the absence of such au ideology probably tends to act as a ''neutralizing" factor in the political realm, allowing her material capacities to make themselves more clearly felt.

Thirdly, the relatively uuderdeveloped character of trans national societal contacts in the system allows a nation such as

Nigeria, which has a large and pluralistic society to draw upon, to build up a good deal of influence through expansion in this area. 66.

PART II THE ROAD TO UNITY

CHAPTER IV - The First Steps

Introduction

The catalyst of what might be called contemporary Pan-

Africanism was the coming to independence of Ghana in March 1957.

Clearly this was not because she was the first independant African

state; the UAR, Ethiopia, Liberia, Tunisia, MOrocco, Sudan, and

Libya bad all preceded her. But these nations all suffered from

various disabilities which bad the cumulative effect of preventing

such a movement.

On the one band, the states of North Africa are separated

both by culture and by colour from the rest of Africa, and have

traditionally bad an 11 insular character"(l). Their aims for political 2 association bad always centred around the idea of a Maghreb Union( ).

For its part the UAR,was oriented both by culture and vital national

interest towards the politics of the Middle East, where she was a

major actor(3); any action taken in Africa would clearly have to

remain subordinate. Nor was her position enhanced by Nasser's

condescending attitude towards the sub-Saharan area. He regarded his

(1) Marcais, op. cit., P. 21.

(2) Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism - A Short Political Guide, Pall Mall

Press, London, 1962; Pp. 67-68.

(3) Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International • System", World Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3 (April 1958), Pp. 415-416. 67.

nation' s task as that of bringing "enlightenment and civilization to 4 the remotest depths of the jungle"( ). How ironie that the shade of

Cecil Rhodes should be speaking Arabie~

In this regard Nasser was not supported by his fellow North

Africans. Bourgiba, for example, felt it necessary that the initiative come from black Africa(5).

On the other hand, the interna! regimes of both Liberia and

Ethiopia were of such a character as to exclude them from African leadership. Despite President Tubman's reforme, the coastal Afro-

American still behaved towards the indigenous tribal groups in the same manner as did the whites mn East Africa(6), corruption and 7 stagnation were still endemic( ), and the Firestone Rubber Company 8 still owned nearly four percent of Liberia's total area( ). Ethiopia was still fighting her own battles with feudal disunity, and her 9 government was ''hardly dented by pressures for reform"( ). Thus bound up in themselves, these two nations were in no position to take the lead.

Ghana bad none of these problems, being quintessentially African

(4) Gemal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation, Public Affaire Press, 1956; p. 110.

(5) CoUin Legum, "The Accra Conference", Africa South, Vol. 2, No. 4

(July 1958); P. 82.

(6) Coleman in Almond and Coleman, op. cit.,

(7) Davidson, op. cit., P. 142-143.

(8) Segal, "Profiles", op. cit., P. 255-256.

(9) ibid., P. 136. 68 •

• and attaining independence with a dynamic and progressive political regime. In addition, she bad one enormous advantage. Her independence

represented the beginning of the breakup of the sub-Saharan colonial

empires. Her independence was therefore not merely a question of

freedom for less than 10 million, but the watershed after which it was

certain for a hundred million more. At the time, a poet put it this

way: "Ghana, all Africa is in your hand"(lO). Initially, then,

Ghana was the beacon for the renaissance of the entire continent, and

Nkrumah was the spokesman, not merely for Ghana, but for all those

peoples soon to follow.

Further, of all the leaders who bad dedicated themselves to

the cause of African unity at Manchester in 1945(ll) - a group which

included Jomo Kenyatta and Nnamdi Azikiwe - Nkrumah was the first to

"arrive". He therefore cons·idered it his immediate responsibility to

get the hall rolling - to press for the independence of others while

getting to work on a framework for African unity. No time was to be

lost - '~hile our independence celebrations were actually taking place,

I called for a conference of all the sovereign states of Africa to 2 discuss plans for the future of our continent"(l ). This conference

marks the beginning of the movement towards African political unity.

(10) Reginald Reynolds in The New Statesman and Nation, March 2,

1957, P. 267.

(11) See George Padmore (ed.), History of the Pan-African Congress,

Hammersmith Bookshop Ltd., London, 1964.

(12) Nkrumah, op. cit., P. 136. 69.

1. The Accra Conference - Africa Awakens

The Conference of Independant African States held in Accra

in April of 1958 represented the first experimental attempts at African

multilateral dip1omacy. Because it was a first attempt, it wou1d be

wise not to judge it too harshly; yet it is necessary to examine its

successes and f•ilures in the light of later developments.

The first point of note was the relatively limited range of

participation. Only eight nations, representing but a small fraction

of Africa's peoples, attended. Secondly, representation was heavily weighted in favour of the Arab north, which comprised five of the

eight participants (the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia

and MOrocco). A third point was the apparent excessively legalistic

criteria for participation in the conference. These were: geographie

location in Africa and sovereign status. Even South Africa was invited~ ('though she declined)(l3).

The unrepresentative character of the conference had two main

effects. Firstly, it severely weakened its political and psychological

impact, loud pronouncements and well-wishers notwithstanding. As one

editorial put it, "the organizers of this conference have been careful

to avoid the label •Pan-African' - Nigeria alone, for example, has a

greater population than all the conference countries put together, 4 omitting Egypt"(l ). This in turn probably contributed to the last- minute diplomatie downgrading of the conference that took place. Of

(13) Legum, 11The Accra Conference", op. cit., P. 82.

(14) West Africa, April 12, 1958. 70.

the seven nations invited to Accra, only Liberia sent her head of state- the rest were represented by foreign ministera{l5), which further weakened the impact of the conference.

The second effect was to cause "a good deal of offense ••• among Nigerians"{l6). They felt that to exclude them, yet invite

South Africa, was an insult pure and simple. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile this policy with Nkrumah's ideas of Pan-African solidarity.

To pour oil on troubled waters, Nkrumah hastily scheduled a quick visit to Nigeria just before the meeting, but cance11ed it when Balewa, Awolowo, and the Sardauna all refused to see him{l7).

This refusai in turn angered Azikiwe, who was the one who rea11y wanted to see him{l8).

Animosity did not last long, however. The tendency in Nigerian radical circles was to blame Nigeria's non-independence rather than

Dr. Nkrumah for her absence. Zik mellowed enough to send a message of encouragement to the conference in which he "regrets" Nigeria's . {19) absence, "but we fully appreciate the factors responsible" •

It is debatable, moreover, whether Nkrumah could have taken any other course of àction. Ethiopia and Liberia were dubious about the conference in the first place, especially President Tubman, who

11 11 2 regarded Nkrumah as an upstart { o). If delegations from states

(15) The New York Times, April 14, 1958.

(16) The Times (London), April 10, 1958.

(17) West African Pilot, April 8, 1958.

(18) ibid., April 11.

(19) ibid., April 15.

(20) Legum, "The Accra Conferencen, op. cit., P. 82. 71.

not yet independent bad been invited, it. might have "embarrassed (21) Governments" , and these two at least might not have attended.

An interesting· sidelight in this regard was the sudden appear-

ance of three delegates from the Algerian FCN. While they were not

permitted to sit as delegates, they were allowed to give testimony . (22) on the Algerian situation to the conference •

But despite all these handicaps, a number of important milestones were passed at this conference.

First of all, the leadership of the UAR in Africa was pointedly r~diated( 23 >. Two crucial propeaals of the UAR- direct aid to the Algerian rebels and condamnation of Israel - were decisively

rejected. In fact, Ghana went so far as to withdraw one of ber

delegates from the conference to attend Israel's indppendence anniversary~(24 ) Equally noteworthy was the fact that the North African nations did not offer the UARmuch support, resulting in what one Tunisian called an "almost complete identity of policy

11 25 between Tunisia, Ghana, Morocco, and the Sudan ( ). The UAR was

odd man out.

Secondly, the conference initiated an organized caueus of

African states at the United Nations: '~e have charged our permanent representatives at the United Nations to be the permanent machinery

(21) ibid.

(22) ibid.' P. 84, 88.

(23) See The New York Times, April 23, 1958.

(24) Legum, op. cit., p. 89' 91.

(25) ibid.' P. 90. 72.

for co-ordinating all matters of common concern to our States •• ~"( 26 ). Thirdly, it marked the debut of Ethiopia and Liberia into the

new Africa. Their traditional splendid isolation from the rest of

the continent was ended(27).

Fourthly, it set some very crucial precedents as to the style

and conduct of future African meetings. Two modes of behaviour were

not to be tolerated: public castigation of each,other at meetings,

and prima donna walkouts. The overriding importance of burying

disagreements and achieving public unanimity in the final comminique was established. From now on, no exceptions could be made., even if

severe bending of national positions was required to get them to meet.

Fifthly, for all its deficiencies, the conference greatly

increased Nkrumah's prestige, and established him as the doyen of

African spokesmen. He was now credited with the first and only

concrete attempt to bring free Africans together.

Sixthly, it proved the strength of the bond existing between (28) former colonial peoples • This manifested itself in two ways. On

the one band, it initiated support for the anti-colonial struggle within Africa itself. For example, the FLN was recognized as the

only legitimate representative of the A1gerian people(29).

(26) Declaration of the Conference of Independant African States.

Quoted from Africa South, op. cit., P. 93. See also John H. Spenser,

"Africa at the U.N. n, in Emerson and Pade1ford, op. cit., P. 107.

(27) Legum, "Pan-Africanism", op. cit., P. 41-42.

(28) ibid., P. 42.

(29) The New York Times, April 21, 1958. 73.

Secondly, it marked the genesis of a common policy towards the outside

world based upon the Bandung principle of "non-alignment".

2. The All-African Peoples' Conference - the Birth of a Messiah.

The rather timid start made by the Conference of Independent

African States must have spurred Nkrumah on to greater efforts. He

promptly drew up plans for another conference late in the year.

The All-African Peoples' Organization Conference (AAPOC)

was organized on a dramatically different basis. It was not to be

a conference of states, but of political parties and national independence movements(3o>. This procedure bad two clear advantages over that of the April conference. Firstly, it permitted expansion

of participation to that large majority of African states not yet

independent. This made it a truly continent-wide meeting, and far more representative. Secondly, it permitted decisions to be made

free of the exigencies of national po1icy which always surround

conferences at the governmenta1 level. These two factors permitted

Pan-Africanism to arise once more.

Nonetheless, there were two glaring absences from the (31) conference • The first was the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine,

the premier party of French West Africa. This area was 1eft to be represented by a few de1egates from Senegal and sorne splinter groups,

and as a consequence the French Africans were chiefly represented by

Guinea. Sorne of the French Afrinan political leaders bad held their

(30) Legum, "Pan .. Africanism", P. 42.

(31) West Africa, Dec. 13, 1958. 74.

own Pan-African Congress (or, strictly speaking, the founding

convention of the Parti du Regroupement Africaine) and did not

look beyond ethnie boundaries just yet(32 ). The second absence was

the Northern Peoples' Congress of Nigeria which was clearly entirely

out of sympathy with the whole business. As a result, Nigeria's voice was very largely a southern one.

But the absence of the NPC did nothing to weaken Nigeria's role in the conference. Mr. F.S. MCEwen, National Secretary of the

NCNC, was joint secretary of the conference with Mr. Tettegah of

Ghana. The absence of the Northerners seemed to free the Nigerians

to express the radicalism which bad historically put them in the fore

front of African nationalism. The strength of this radicalism is most clearly indicated in Mr. McEwen's preparatory declaration:

"This conference will formulate and proclaim our African personality based on the philosophy of Pan-African Socialism as the ideology of the African Non-Violent Revolution.

Henceforth our slogan shall be: 'Peoples of Africa, unite!

You have nothing to lose but your chains! You have a continent to regain!'" (33 )

This high pitch of revolutionary fervour was maintained by the

Nigerians throughout the conference. When a Liberian delegate rose to demand a policy of non-interference in the interna! affairs of

African states, the NCNC-NEPU delegation staged a walkout in which

(32) See Philippe Decraene, Le Panafricanisme, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1961; P. 54-56.

(33) West Efrican P~lot, November 4, 1958. 75.

(34) even Ghana did not participate • An article in the party newspaper the next day stated that the doctrine of non-interference was "one of those stunts with which the colonialiste hold Africa in bondage", and then went on to blast Liberia:

11By 1918 Liberia came under American financial contrôl. Any wonder then that its delegation should echo the master's voice •• "<35>. But the Nigerians were not the only ones to hold the spotlight.

Patrice Lümumba, Holden Roberto, and Tom Mboya all made impressive 36 speeches( ). Nkrumah made his historie speech in which he urged 37 Africans to 11 seek first the political kingdom"( ). He also declared that nthe independance of Ghanè. will be meaningless unless it is linked 38 up with the total liberation of Africa"( ). This clearly meant tbat

Ghana intended a firm commitment towards the liberation of all the remaining colonial territories, and she would henceforth undertake to use her resources to fulfil it.

Nkrumah bad, however, a word of caution which is interesting in the light of some of the Nigerian statements and some foreign press comment:

·~o not let us also forget that colonialism may come to us

11 39 in yet a different guise- not necessarily from Europe ( >. This conference, even more than the one in April, marked some important beginnings and contained some important implications.

(34) ibid.' Dec., 12. (35) ibid.' Dec. 13. (36) Legum, P. 44. (37) West African Pilot, Dec. 9, 1958. (38) Legum, op. cit. (39) West African Pilot, op. cit. 76.

First of all, the Conference was a complete victory for the

radicals. Even if it is argued that this was only because no one

else came, the magnitude of the victory is striking nonetheless, as . (40) can be seen from even a casual reading of the final resolut1ons •

Not merely was any form of colonial rule or limited franchise condemned unequivocally, but it was charged that NATO, and the ECM, exist "for

11 4 the purpose of strengthening their imperialist activities in Africa ( l).

Secondly, the conference manifested the growing impatience

of African nationalists with the continuation of colonialism and racism in Africa. The conference supported those '~ho are compelled 42 to retaliate against violence to attain national independence"( ),

thus breaking with the tradition of non-violent action. It also

called for an "African Legion" which would "protect the freedom of

11 43 the African peoples ( ). Another proposa! was to initiate pressure 44 for a world-wide economie and diplomatie boycott of South Africa( ).

Thirdly, the delegates examined and rejected the idea of working within the status quo of existing African political boundaries, which it said should be "abolished or adjusted ••• particularly those

11 45 which eut across ethnie groups ( ). One wonders who bad what in mind here. Perhaps Dr. Nkrumah was thinking of Togo.

Fourthly, it outlined for the first time concrete plans to

(40) Text in Legum, op. cit., P. 228-236.

(41) ibid.' p. 229. (42) ibid.

(43) ibid.' p. 234.

(44) ibid.

(45) ibid.' p. 231. 77.

achieve African political unity. A number of conditions were laid down (4G). Firstly, sub-continental groupings could be based on

geography, economies, language, or culture, but the latter two must

be subordinated in the event of a conflict. Secondly, such groupings

"should only take place between independent states governed by

Africans". Thirdly, popular consent must be given by referendum.

These conditions being fulfilled, the resolution conceives

of African unity in two stages. The first is the creation of

regional unions, West Africa and the Maghreb being specifically mentioned. The second stage involves the fusion of these into a

11 4 "Commonwealth of Free African States ( 7). As a first step, it is

suggested that tmmigration barriers and travel restrictions be minimized or done away with, that both French and English be taught

in schools, and that a system of common citizenship be instituted(48).

This programme, while ambitious, seemed to indicate the willingness of the conference to act positively in the realm of the possible, and to proceed step by step even if the pace was to be

samewhat forced.

Fifthly, the conference represented the assumption by

Dr. Nkrumah of the role of champion of African liberation. Henceforth

Accra was to be the meeting-place, refuge, and home-away-from-hame of ' African nationalist leaders. This following he built up was to give him enormous influence with new governments all over Africa, in many cases against their will.

(46) ibid.' P. 230. (47) ibid., P. 230-231. (48) ibid.' P. 232. 78.

Sixthly, the conference represented the initiation of the

Pan-African trade union movement, which was soon to play a vital role in political alignment(49 >. Seventhly, it represented the apogee of Nigeria's influence in the radical Pan-African movement. Her three-point programme for . (50) (51) Afr~can unity was accepted almost verbatim by the conference •

Eightly, the absences from the concerence foreshadowed later developments. The ~and the NPC were to form the political backbone of opposition to the radical brand of Pan-Africanism expressed so vehemently at Accra.

3. Developments in the French Community.

Meanwhile, the French African Community was evolving within itself. After the departure of Guinea as a result of the 1958 referendum, Senegal, the traditional leader in French Africa, tried to follow up the initiative gained by the formation of the PRA in

July by proposing a tightly-knit federation of West African States.

Dahomey, Upper Volta, and the French Sudan were interested, but

Ivory Coast, Mauretania, and Niger stayed away in a huff. Further inland, Gabon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, and the Central African Republic agreed to a customs union(52 >. Senegal's plans were soon dashed by Houphouet-Boigny of the

Ivory Coast. His party, the ~' won crucial elections in Dahomey

(49) ibid., see also P. 81.

(50) Text in West African Pilot, Nov. 4, 1958.

(51) See Legum,tpp. cit., P. 230-231.

(52) See The New York Times, January 18, 1959. 79.

and U~per Volta, causing these two states to pull out of the proposed

Mali Federation, which now consisted only of Senegal and the Sudan.

A new association was set up by Houphouet-Boigny (the Conseil de

l'Entente), this ttme centering on the Ivory Coast and being much looser in character(SJ).

4. The Accra-Con~kry Alis.

Guinea, however, had decided to go its awn way. In the

referendum of September 28 she had voted for complete indppendence -

and France gave it to her with a vengeance. She immediately withdrew all French personnel and economie assistance from the tiny country,

stopping many projects half-finished(S4). In desperation Guinea

turned to the Soviet bloc, which supported her with technical assistance projects, loans, and direct grants(55 >. However, her new friends were far away and perhaps not to be trusted. She desperately needed allies close by.

Ghana was the obvious choice. Nkrumah, seeing the Guinean vote as the first chink in French colonial armour, extended open arms.

When Toure visited Ghana in November of 1958, Guinea was invited to share in the creation of a Union of African States(S6). Nkrumah also provided a loan of ten million pounds to tide Guinea over, and agreed to "fournir 'a la Guinée toute aide technique et administrative nècessaire

(53) ibid., April 14.

(54) Melody, op. cit.', P. 41.

(55) ibid.

(56) Se kou Toure, uExperience Guineenne et Uni te Africaine~', Pressence

Africaine,Paris, 1962; P. 293-294. 80.

' a la consolidation du nouvel Etat" (57) •

Nkrumah now saw the opportunity to put his new ideas on

African Unity into practice. Prevailing upon his much weaker but equally radical partner, he drew up plans for confederation of the 58 two states. The accord was signed at Conakry on May 1, 1959( ).

This accord went farther than any other had done to date.

Provision was made for a flag, an anthem, and a motto. There was to be a common defence policy, citizenship, bank of issue, and common representation on an ad hoc basis in certain countries.

However, the union was far from a genuine federal structure.

Each state retained its own army, foreign representation, and its own,"individuality and structure". Further, the union was not an exclusive compact, but "open to all independent African States or

Federations". Observers tended to agree that above all "Nigeria ••• is the prize in view for the Accra-Conakry axis"(59), and certainly the very specifie reference to "Federations" would seem to bear this out.

5. Tubman Counterattacks - the Sanniguellie Conference.

Meanwhile, President Tubman of Liberia was looking on events with increasing apprehension. Clearly the radicalism of the AAPO conference upset him, and talk of a Ghana-Guinea union raised the fright-

(57) ibid.' p. 294.

(58) The New York Times, May 2, 1959. For text see Legum, op. cit., p. 160-161.

(59) The New York Times, May 3, 1959. am.

ening possibi1ity of being surrounded by a powerful radical federation.

In 1ate January 1959, he proposed the formation of a 1oose-knit group

called the Associated States of Africa. This would not invo1ve any

devolution of sovereignty, but mere1y 11provide for continuing consult-

ation on problems of common interest and for the peaceful solution of

all disputes"(60). This proposai was totally ignored.

After the signing of the Ghana-Guinea pact in May, Tubman, now thorough1y alarmed, decided to try again. This time he invited both leaders to the small resort town of Sanniquellie to diseuse the who1e question of unity. Nkrumah came to the meeting with no hesitation.

He could hardly refuse such an invitation, and felt confident that 6 he and Toure cou1d bring Tubman around to their point of view( l).

If not, nothing would be lost, and possibly a propaganda victory wou1d be gained, picturing Tubman as a stubborn reactionary.

Within a few days, however, the picture bad changed radica11y.

The argument bad evolved beyond the mere question of how all-

encompassing the projected union was to be. The question of timing was crucial. If a union of the three was established right away,

Dr. Nkrumah would c1ear1y be the pre-eminent personality. This prompted Tubman to propose a delay until 1960 when Nigeria, Togo, and Cameroon would be independant, and Ghana's voice much diluted(62 >. Tubman's careful cultivation of Toure's friendship since

Guinea's independence(63 ) began to pay off. He now added to this

(60) ibid,, January 30, 1959.

(61) ibid., Ju1y 17.

(62) ibid., Ju1y 20.

(63) Toure, op. cit., P. 273-275. 82.

history of friendship tempting economie assistance plus rights of 64 access through Liberia to Guinea's mineral deposits in the interior( ).

Forced to choose between ideology and economies, he decided to act on his earlier statement that "la Guinee et le Liberia sont inseparables 6 par la geographie et les realites economiques"( S). Nkrumah, isolated, was forced to go along.

The final declaration was almost word for word what Tubman had proposed(66 ). No mention was made of common benis, economie policy, or foreign affaira. In fact, it specifically stated that the proposed union was "not designed to prejudice the present or future international policies, relations, or obligations of the States involved". The principle of non-interference in internal affaira was agreed to. Finally, the formalization of the community was to wait until a wider conference to be held in 1960.

· Clearly, then, Tubman had won a decisive tactical victory.

If it were not quite true that 11Sanniquellie brought the end of a

11 67 dream ( ) for Nkrumah, it did effectively freeze the strategie situation until larger forces could be brought to bear. Exactly for whose benefit these would act was not yet clear.

6. Entr'acte - The MOnrovia Conference on Algeria.

Nkrumah soon got the opportunity to repay Tubman for his

(64) The New York Times, July 20, 1959.

(65) Toure, op. cit., P. 276.

(66) The New York Times, July 26, 1959. Text in Legum, Op. cit.,

P. 162-163.

(67) ibid. 83.

humiliation. One month later the long-awaited special concerence

on Algeria was held at MOnrovia. Nkrumah joined Nasser in drumming

up general support for a recognition of the GPRA (Gouvernement Provis

ionel de la Republique Algerienne), but Tubman, Selassie, and (very

surprisingly~) Toure did not want to offend France on tbat touchiest

of all subjects(GB). However, Algeria was finally voted into full

delegate statua, and Tubman bad to stand and watch the raising of the

GPRA flag in front of the legislature (even though he still withheld

recognition~).

Besides evening the score, this meeting bad one very important

effect. After baving rejected an active role by the UAR at Accra,

Nkrumah now saw that the presence of the North Africans made a

refreshing change from Sanniquellie. The de facto alliance between

North African and sub-Sabaran radicalism was a foresbadowing of the

later formation of the Casablanca group.

Conclusions

While this first period ended with Nkrumah still the great

African hero (and perbaps gaining strength), it was now quite apparent

that the road towards African unity was not going to be smooth. It was equally clear tbat in President Tubman, Nkrumah bad a shrewd and

formidable rival who bad discovered the one possible parry to Nkrumah's

ideology - economie self-interest.

The situation was still uncertain, however. There remained

a possibility that a monolithic Africa was in sight. The outcome

(68) ibid., August 4. could only be decided after the achievement of independance by the rest of West Africa, and particularly Nigeria. 85.

CHAPTER V - The Storm Clouds Gather

Introduction

Sanniquellie was important not because any significant step

in the achievement of Pan-Africanism occurred, but rather because it

did not occur. It stalemated the situation and forced postponement

of any further achievements along the lines of the two Accra conferences

until after the rest of Africa had been beard from.

This settled, two questions immediately arose. First of all,

what ro1e would Nigeria, the leviathan of West Africa, play? Wou1d

she follow the lead of Ghana in demanding rapid progress towards unity

along the lines of the AAPO Conference? Or would she strike out on a

course of her own?

Secondly, what was the status of the French Community to be?

Would they be able to ignore Guinea's example and continue to sub

ordinate sovereign statua to their ties with France? Or would the

winds of change sweep under their portals as well?

1. Nigeria - The First Bumblings.

Nigeria's answer was not long in coming. In a speech delivered

in London on August 2, 1959 (while the MOnrovia Conference on Algeria was still in session), Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe outlined his views on African unity (1).

Basically, he was entirely in agreement with Dr. Nkrumah on the nature and purpose of African unity, advancing very much the same thesis

(1) See full text pub1ished in West African Pilot, August 6 and 7, 1959. 86.

as members of his party bad propounded at Accra:

"Ours should be ••• the following objectives: the consu1'111lation of a United States of Africa to be realized by social, economie, and political integration; the complete rejection of racial bigotry ••• the jettisoning of tribalism ••• alignment of interest with colonial territories in Africa which would lead ultimately to their political emancipation • • • and unity of outlook and purpose in foreign policy. n

But then the emphasis shifted. He pointed out and deplored the fact tbat the whole question bad caused a dispute, and warned

"we nrust be realistic in this matter lest we plunge the continent of

Africa into a miasma of conflicting persona! ambitions and clash of interests", undoubtedly referring to the Sanniquellie conference.

He then went on to outline his own approach to unity, which would be a "graduai" one. To Dr. Nkrumah's slogan, "seek first the political kingdom", he answered:

"Ibelieve tbat economie and social integration will enable

Nigeria and its neighbours to bring to pass the United States of

Africa.

It will be capital folly to assume that hard-bargaining politicians ••• will easily surrender their newly-won political power in the interest of a political leviathan which is populated by people who are alien to one another in their social and economie relations •••

In other words, the pre~requisites of political integration in Africa are the economie and social integration of the African peoples."

While Zik did not in so many words call on Dr. Nkrumah to abandon his approach to unity, the implication seemed unmistakable. 87.

It cannot be emphasized too much, however, that this speech was in no sense a "break" with the Ghanaian leader. The very same speech carried denunciations of colonialism and racism every bit as strong as the Osagyefo's, and Azikiwe and his party remained Nkrumah's staunchest defenders in Nigeria. An NCNC manifesto, replying to criticism of Ghana in the press, stressed that it was folly to

"dissipate our energies in wantonly attacking any of the West African States"(2).

Two factors probably influenced Zik to take the position he did. First of all, by observing the events of 1959, he bad honestly come to believe that the "let it be done" approach to unity was not enough and was running into severe difficulties. Secondly, there was probably an element of personal rivalry involved(J). Zik, like

Nkrumah, had attended the Manchester Pan-African Conference, and consequently considered himself as much an apostle of the doctrine as

Nkrumah. He therefore did not feel he bad to follow the latter's lead on all matters.

The other Nigerian leaders were neither so sympathetic nor so charitable. On September 11, Chief Obafemi Awolowo made his famous speech in which he insisted that it was "unrealistic to labour for the emergence of United States of Africa", which would involve "the pursuit of what is quite frankly an ignis fatuus"(4). Sir Abubakar

(2) West African Pilot, Oct. 29, 1959.

(3) Philippe Decraene, "West African Unity", Africa South, Vol. 4,

No. 2,(January 1960), P. 97.

(4) The Daily Service (Lagos), September 12, 1959. 88.

Tafawa Balewa, who became Prime Mînister after the 1959 elections, firmly rejected Nkrumah's call for an African union on the plan of the Ghana-Guinea pact, insisting that Nigeria did 11not propose to

11 throw away ber freedom , and that such an idea was "very premature".

"I don' t know why you attach so much importance to what Dr. Nkrumah says,n he told reporters(S).

These statements made it clear that there was some division in Nigeria over the entire question of African unity. Nor was this split limited to political leaders; the Trade Union Congress broke apart on substantially the same issue.

As was noted earlier, the first AAPO conference bad initiated the idea of an African trade union federation. There was, however, sharp disagreement amongst the African unioniste on the form this was to take.

The majority of African uâions were affiliated with the

Western•oriented ICFTU, and wished to continue this affiliation.

They argued with some reason that in virtually every instance - over

Algeria, independence for the Congo and Portuguese Colonies, apartheid, and the Central African Federation - the ICFTU declarations bad 6 supported the line laid down at the Accra Conference( ). There would seem, then, to be no conflict between continued membership in this body and the consummation of a genuinely Pan-African trade union organization.

The militants led by Ghana disagreed. They saw the old WFTU

(5) The New York Times, January 14, 1960.

(6) Legum, op. cit., P. 83. 89.

as Conmunist-dominated, and the ICFTU as oriented towards the West.

In keeping with the policy of non;alignment for Africa, they demanded 7 a wholly African organization separate from both( ).

The Ghana TUC finally took matters into its own hands. It announced its resignation from the ICFTU, and announced the convening of a conference to form the new All-African Trade Union Federation

(AATUF) to take place in Accra at the very same time as the ICFTU regional conference in Lagos(8)(November 1959).

The majority of African unions went to Lagos, while Guinea, 9 the UAR, and Morocco sided with Ghana( ). This situation split the

Nigerian TUC from top to bottom. As has been outlined in a previous chapter, the nofficial" Trade Union Congress under Mr. Borka stayed with the ICFTU, while a break-away group, the Nigerian Trade Union

Congress under Mr. Imoudu went to Accra and from that time forth was considered "pro-Ghana".

Thus, by the end of 1959 Nigerian-Ghanaian relations had seriously deteriorated. Perhaps, as one commentator wrote, the root of the trouble lay in national pride: 11Dr. Nkrumah was a little too much the wise and experienced father of Independent Nations in West

Africa offering to guide stumbling Nigeria towards its own independ ence"(lO)• For his part, after the Nigerian elections of December 1959, which saw his arch-enemy, the NPC, dominate the government, the

(7) ibid.

(8) ibid., P. 83-84.

(9) ibid.

(10) West Africa, February 14, 1959. 90.

Ghanaian leader decided to adopt a much tougher attitude towards

Nigeria.

2. The Feud Commences - the Second AAPO Conference.

Two things are striking about the second AAPO conference held in January of 1960. The first is the character and direction

of the decisions arrived at. The second is the new twist it gave to

the developing feud between Nigeria and Ghana.

The proceedings at Tunis were generally characterized by an

extremely high degree of militancy. The tone was set at the very beginning by the joint Ghanaian-Nigerian objection to the seating of the UAR-led Afro-Asian Solidarity Group. .Aminu Kano (NEPU - Nigeria) put it very bluntly:

"If any white people are anti-colonial, let them go and hold their own conference ••• This is an African platform"(li~ Speech after speech denounced the African statua quo and called in increasingly firey terms for strong action on the part of the African states to 2 deal with it(l ). The final resolutions clearly indicate the mounting fury of the African radicals. A few examples will suffice:(l3)

"The Conference demands the inmediate and unconditional accession to independence of all the African peoples, and the total evacuation of the foreign forces of aggression and oppression stationed in Africa"(l4).

(11) West African Pilot, January 28, 1960. (12) Catherine Hoskyns, "Tunis Diary", Africa South, Vol. 4, No. 4, July 1960, P. 104-111. (13) See text of the resolutions in Segum, op. cit., Pp. 236-247. (14) ibid.' p. 237. 91.

The French atomic tests in the Sahara are "criminal obstinacy •• adding to the list of ber foul deeds ..... <15 ).

French policy in Algeria was condemned, and the Conference paid tribute to "the brave combatants of the Army of National Liberat ion and the whole Algerian People who have put themselves in the fore front of the struggle against colonialism"(l6). The French are accused of ''monstrous crimes ••• which have brought to this African country the worst atrocities of Nazism"(l7).

The French Comm.unity was condemned as "a new form of imperialist domination which attempts ••• to impose upon countries associated with this community ••• bends of a kind which would deprive them of true national sovereignity"(lS).

Equally strong resolutions condemned "white supremacy and domination in Kenya"(l9), "barbarities" in Buanda-Urundi(20), "the 2 Imperialist trick of using pigmentation" in Tanganyika( l), 22 11systematic repression" in Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique( ), and so on for many pages.

Besides the militancy of these resolutions, their anti-French character stands out. More space was devoted to the sins of France

(15) ibid.' P. 236.

(16) ibid.' P. 241. (17) ibid.

(18) ibid.) P. 237.

(19) ibid.' P. 244.

(20) ibid.

(21) ibid.' P. 245.

(22) ibid.' p. 244. 92.

than to either Portugal or South Africa. Three major points of French policy - Algeria, the Community, and the bomb tests - were relentlessly condemned. By comparison, resolutions on British policy are very selective, focusing on East and Central Africa only. This situation was in very large part due to the continuing absence of the major political forces in French Africa from the Pan-African forum, leaving (23) the field to splinter groups •

A third point of note was the inaction of the conference on the question of AATUF. The entire problem was simply referred to a conference to be held in May at Casablanca, which in fact never took place (24).

Fourthly, the conference failed resoundingly to come up with any new initiatives in the field of African unity. The final resolûûion contented itself with a re-affirmation of the Accra r~solut- ions of 1958, filling out the page with such things as African Youth Festivals(25 ).

The bitterness engendered between Ghana and Nigeria at this conference stood out as sharply as the militancy of the final resolutions. Four factors contributed to the raising of Nigerian hackles.

The first point was a sharp disagreement with Ghana over the question of non-interference in the internai affaira of other African states. What the Nigerians bad denounced at Accra as "an imperialist trick" was now a necessary and important principle which the Nigerian

(23) The Economist, Vol. 194 (February 20, 1960), P. 728-730.

(24) Legum, op. cit., p. 84.

(25) ibid., P. 239-240. 93.

26 delegation was happy to win( >. This sudden change of attitude clearly 27 related to Ghana's "invitation" to absorb Togo, soon to be independent( >. 28 Olympio's angry rejection of the proposai bad Nigeria's full sympathy( >. Secondly, the Nigerians were furious at the Accra-based secret-

ariat of the AAPO for failing to implement the 1958 resolutions, or

indeed to do much of anything except print up denunciations of 29 colonialism( >. Enahoro's opening speech began by icily "assuming" the delegates were all opposed to colonialism, and proceeded to agitate

for concrete measures and organizational infrastructure that would replace talk with action. This he finally managed to obtain(3o>. Thirdly, the Nigerians were angry at how little opportunity was given to the delegations from East, Central, and South Africa to

air their views. By the last day of the conference, only one bad (31) spoken • Chief Enahoro implied that the Ghanaians were talking

too much, and got his friends same more time. He heatedly denied the

11 32 charge that these delegations·were 'veak ( >. Fourthly, and most important of all, the Nigerians felt that

they bad been continually harassed and slighted by the Ghanaians at Tunis. The NCNC delegate, MX. Fred u. Anyiam, arrived late and angry,

(26) See Chief Anthony Enahoro's statement in West African Pilot, Feb.4, 1960. (27) The Ghanaian Times (Accra), Oct. 30, 1959. (28) The New York Times, Feb. 5, 1960. (29) See The Economist, Vol. 194 (February 6, 1960), P. 534. (30) West African Pilot, op. cit.; a1so West Africa, February 13, 1960. (31) Hoskyns, op. cit. (32) West Africa, February 13, 1960. 94.

contending that his invitation had been deliberately delayed(33). He had a hard time registering, and was once told that the NCNC was

11not a membern(34). When the delegation arrived at the opening plenary session, Enahoro could find no seats for Nigeria, and angrily seated his delegation in the reserved seats in the front row. The crowning insult came when the Ghanaian foreign minister refused the Nigerians a lift in the Ghana delegation's chartered plane, forcing them to fly to ~e to take a BOAC flight.

MOre seriously, the Steering Committee of the AAPO set up at the conference was flagrantly biased in its composition. Ghana seated "more than fourteen members", while Nigeria had only one, hardly an equitable distribution in view of their relative sizes.

"As I had already hinted, we were victims of a conspiracy';': said

Mr. Anyiam (36).

An editorial in the West African Pilot summed up the feelings of the Nigerians:

1 ~igeria has her destiny. No amount of intrigue by power- seeking newly-independent nations can deprive her of her rightful position11 (J7).

Whatever else was made clear at the conference, it was now obvious that the honeymoon was over between the Nigerian radicale and Ghana.

(33) Hoskyns, op. cit., P. 107.

(34) West African Pilot, Feb. 5, 1960. (35) ibid.

(36) ibid.' Feb. 8.

(37) ibid.' Feb. 5. 95.

3. The Standoff Crisis - the Second Conference of Independant

African States.

The next step took place at the Addis Ababa conference held in June of 1960.

This meeting is vitally important because it marks the first

Nigerian participation in an international forum of any sort as a united state. While she was not yet independant, the date of ber independance bad been set long since(38), and she bad just completed a federal election, the results of which would carry ber into independance and beyond. Thus, policies could now be set by the government which could be said to be official even though formal authority in foreign policy matters lay with London. As the Prime

Minister put it in a debate on April 1, 11Now the Leader of the

Opposition knows very well that though in name and legally we are not independant, the Prime Minister is really responsible for ... 39 our foreign relations"( >.

To mark the occasion, the government appointed Malam the

Hon. Yussuf Maitma Sule, Federal Minister of Mines and Power, to lead the Nigerian delegation. Unlike previous conference delegates from

Nigeria, Sule was a member of the NPC. Thus, in eféect, Nigeria's powerful and conservative North entered the Pan-African fray for the first time.

Three points stand out about this conference. The first is that Ghana no longer dominated the proceedings. Ghana is no longer

(38) See The New York Times, October 26, 1958.

(39) Quoted in Phillips. op. cit., P. 24. 96.

unique in being the only newly-independent black African state, and Nigeria's size amplifies her voice considerably(4o>. Secondly, there was still general agreement amongst the attending states on a wide variety of issues, as was expressed in 4 the final resolutions( l). First of all, there was the customary

condemnation of colonialism and apartheid. This time, however,

there was a new twist, the conference taking its lead from the AAPO.

It condemned the fact that "some of the non-independent countries may ••• enter into agreements with foreign powers which would restrict 42 in advance their total independence ••• n< ). There was agreement on the establishment of an "Africa Freedom Fund" to aid the process of 4 colonial liberation( J). A consensus was achieved that the Algerian war should be brought to an end on the basis of self-determination, and that other NATO powers should stop supplying France with arms to 44 continue the war( ). Finally, there was complete unanimity in

condemning France for her continued tests in the Sahara(4S).

The striking thing about these resolutions was how closely they resembled the AAPO resolutions of February, especially with regard to the warning against neo-colonialism and the wholesale condamnation of French policy. This pointed first of all to the fact that even now there was a lack of a clear distinction between governmental and non-governmental conferences, and a considerable overlap

(40) West Africa, June 25, 1960.

(41) Text in Legum, op. cit., Pp. 149-159.

(42) ibid., P. 154.

~3) ibid. (44) ibid., P. 149-151.

(45) ibid., P. 152. 97.

in personnel between the two. It also pointed up the continuing aloofness of the French Community from the rest of Africa.

This conference resembled the February meeting in yet another respect; absolutely nothing further was said on the question of

African Unity. The resolution read:

"The Conference

1) Requests the President of the Conference of Independent

States to address a communication to the heads of these States to initiate consultations through diplomatie channels with a view to promoting African Unity;

2) Decides to inscribe this item on the agenda of the next regular session of the Conference of Indppendent African Statesu(46>. Behind this empty verbiage lay a fundamental disagreement between Nigeria and Ghana, each with its supporters. The quarrel had not yet reached the acrimonious heights of the Second AAPO

Conference; nonetheless, two speeches by Nigerian delegates conveyed a firm warning to Ghana that howevermuch brotherhood existed between the two nations, Nigeria considered the entire Ghanaian approach to continental unity misdirected. Mr. Okafor (NCNC) put it this way:

'~e shall oppose any unwarrented expansionist tendency on the part of any independent African State against any other States. It is my view that it is against the spirit of Pan-Africanism ••• We cannot afford to exchange white imperialism for black imperialism"(47 >. Mr. Sule followed him, and spoke at sorne length on the question

(46) ibid.' p. 154.

(47) West African Pilot, June 13, 1960. 98.

of unity:

"No one in Africa doubts the need to promote Pan-Africanism ••

But we must not be sentimental ••• at this moment the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature •••

At the moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form union by

government with any African States by surrendering our sovereignty •••

President Tubman's idea of the association of states is

therefore more acceptable • • • Sooner or later the unity will come by necessity ••• I must warn, however, that ••• individual ambition and greed for power may spoil everything

At this juncture I wish to seize this opportunity to congrat- ulate those African leaders who have made such excellent contributions

to the Pan-African movement. For them we have undying love and respect •••

But, and this is a big but, if anybody makes the mistake of feeling

that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa, the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will, I fear, be defeated ••• Hitler

thought he had a mission to rule the world and in the pursuance of • n(48) h is mission h e ••• p 1unge d t h e wh o 1 e o f Eu rope ••• ~nto war •

There are two ways to interpret these speeches. On the one hand they can be seen as a direct slap at Ghana. They could not possibly refer to anyone else, and the comparison to Hitler was in very bad taste indeed for an internation gathering, indicating the intensely persona! character of the Ghanaian-Nigerian disagreement.

Also, they constituted a direct contradiction of one of Ghana's first principles of unity - that it must involve the surrender of national

(48) Text quoted in Legum, Pp. 172-174. 99.

(49) sovereignty • On the other band, the tone of the speeches was generally conciliatory and nowhere did the Nigerians promote an open break by mentioning names or making specifie threats.

It is probably a fair summary to say that the conference ended with an agreement to disagree. As one observer put it, "Unanimity may be more difficult; it remains the dldeal 11 (SO)• Events elsewhere were soon to upset the delicate balance.

4. Allons • Enfants - From Conmunity to Chaos in French Africa.

Meanwhile the French Community was undergoing rapid changes.

As we noted previously, plans to forma Mali Federation embracing most of the French West African States (AOF) bad been effectively scuttled by the arch-conservative and anti-federalist Houphouet-Boigny of the

Ivory Coast.

The apparent success of the moderates soon backfired. The

Federation leaders, especially Leopold Sedar Sengber, a passionate federalist since.the promulgation of the loi cadre(Sl), and Modibo

Keita, whose radical Union Soudanaise bad long-standing disagreements (52) with Houphouet-Boigny , determined to press on regardless. By

April of 1959 the Federa~ion was a going concern. Matters were not,

(49) See the speech by Ghana's Foreign Minister at the Conference; text in ibid., P. 170-171.

(50) West Africa, July 2, 1960.

(51) Segal, op. cit., P. 277.

(52) Ruth s. MOrgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, Oxford University Press, 1964; P. 298. lOO.

however, permitted to rest there. Unlike Houphouet-Boigny, the

Federation leaders, and particularly Keita, regarded their support

of a YES vote in the 1958 referendum as a purêŒy tactical manoeuvre . (53) to allow ttme for their plans for a wider Federation to Jell. •

When it became apparent that this would not happen, they began

vociferous agitation for independence. At the same time, at the

insistence of Senghor and the more moderate leaders of the Union

Progressiste Senegalaise, they expressed their willingness to achieve

this on the basis of constitutional negotiations with France to ensure continued close ties<54>. General de Gaulle, remembering the experience of Guinea and

faced with an increasingly desperate situation in Algeria, was in no

position to resist. In a speech in Dakar in December, 1959, de Gaulle

said that France was prepared to grant independence to the Federation

in 1960(55 ). He conceded that "international sovereignty means

something; it means a lotn(56 ). As events were soon to prove, it meant a lot indeed. Two important resulta were to flow from this

decision.

(53) ibid.

(54) Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schacter, "French-Speaking West Africa in

Transitionn, International Concilliation, No. 528, May 1960 (Actually published February 1961); P. 425.

(55) The Times (London), December 14, 1959.

(56) West Africa, January 30, 1960. 101.

The first was that it intensified the internecine political

warfare in Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Niger, whose leaders were split

between the Federation and the looser Entente. While anti-Federation

leaders were in power in all three, the achievement of independance

by Mali provided enough of an attraction for the fight to break out

all over again. The police had to use band grenades to break up

one riot in Dahomey, and President Yameogo (Upper Volta) banned the

Mali flag from his country(S7). Eventually the Sawaba Party in

Niger and the Parti Republicain de la Liberte in Upper Volta were out (58) lawed for advocating union with the Federation •

Secondly, this volte-face by France eut the ground out from

under Houphouet-Boigny, as the abovementioned agitation showed only

too clearly. Up until then ''the Entente leaders bad accepted

Houphouet' s view that the Community should be a French-centred federal

system; that membership in the Community was incompatable with

independance; and that the economie and social advantages of Community 9 membership outweighed the emotional appeal of sovereignty"(S ).

Suddenly, this was no longer true.

Houphouet was stung by what might be regarded as a French betraya1(6o>. Urged on by the necessity of maintaining his political position, he determined to go one better than Mali and demanded not merely independence but also his ~lking papers from the Community(6l).

(57) Africa Report, January 1960, P. 5.

(58) Kilson, op. cit., P. 381.

(59) Hodgkin and Schacter, op. cit., P. 428.

(60) See his statement in Le Monde, June 7, 1960.

(61) Hodgkin and Schacter, op. cit. 102.

The remainder of the Entente dutifully followed suit. The ex-A.E.F. states (Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Congo-Brazzaville - then knQWn as MOyen-Congo) were caught up by the example, although 62 they remained within the Community( >. They were, however, no more 63 successful than the West Africans in building a Federation( >. As a result, the month of August saw the independence of eight new states in Africa, many of which were completely helpless economically and which were bound together by the most tenuous of political and economie links(64>. Two more, Mauretania and Madagascar, were to follow shortly.

Then came the greatest irony of all. No sooner had the ink dried on the independence agreements than the Mali Federation, whose formation had been the instigator of the rush for independence, broke 65 up with a sudden wren~h ( ). Economie and ideological didfferences added to personal rivalries between the Senegalese and Soudanese leaders were responsible. Senegal promptly smuggled back towards her comfortable relationship with France, while Mali began developing 66 closer ties with Ghana and Guinea( ).

The sudden arrival of vwelve new states on the African arena severely disturbed the political balance, and brought an entirely new dimensio.n to the Pan-African discussions. Firstly, they could hardly be expected to shed their traditional isolation from the rest

(62) The Times (London), July 13, 1960.

(63) Decraene, "Le Panafricanismen, Bp. Bit!~~ Pp. 81-83.

(64) For the dates of independence, see Africa Digest, Vol. 8, No. 2,

(Oct. 1960).

(65) The New York Times, August 21, 1960.

(66) Kloman, op. cit., P. 122. 103.

of Africa overnight. Secondly, their policy positions on such vital issues as atomic testing and Algeria were - with the exception of

Mali - much more sympathetic towards the French than were those of the ex-British Afriaaas, a fact which was soon to cause friction.

"African states which are equivocal about their opposition to these policies - as Nigeria is not - have, Dr. Nkrumah and many other African leaders hold, no place in the community of independent Africa." The writer concludes: " ••• it is the independence of the ex-French

Community states, and not ••• Nigeria's independence which bas altered the picture of unity ••• which the 1958 Accra conference produced"(67).

How much it bad changed was soon all too clear.

(67) West Africa, December 31, 1960. 104.

CHAPTER VI - The African Cold War

Introduction

The crisis in Africa was precipitated by two events on the continent completely outside the control of the independant African states.

The first event was the Algerian war. While this crisis bad been going on for years, it was not until the independance of the

French African states that it played any significant role in intra-

African politics. These new states were caught in a dilemma. On the one band, they had a long history of supporting French policy in

Algeria, even supplying troops for France, much to the disgust of the Tunis AAPO Conference(!)• On the other band, they were faced with the implacable hostility of almost every ether independant

African state towards French policy. They could not live without

France - but they had to live in Africa.

The problem was outlined in sharp relief by the letters sent by Ferhat Abbas, head of the GPRA, to the ex-French states in October 2 1960 explaining the rebel cause and requesting support( ). It now became clear to Houphouet-Boigny, acknowledged doyen of the group, that it was no longer enough to express pious hopes. He believed that a solution to the Algerian problem would have to be found which was acceptable to France, and that he and his fellows could play a useful role in mediating, provided of course that they did not alienate

(1) Legum, op. cit., P. 49, 242.

(2) The Times (London), Oct. 4, 1960. 105.

France in trying(3).

The first feelers were put out at the Nigerian independence

celebrations which were widely attended by the ex-French Africans and

thus provided a marvellous opportunity for each one to sound out his (4) confreres • It was rapidly agreed that a meeting should take place

at Abidjan, capital of Ivory Coast. A few days later Mamadou Dia,

Prime Minister of Senegal, buried his country's rivalry with the 5 Ivory Coast and visited Abidjan to help prepare the meeting( ). 6 The attendance at the meeting gave no surprises( ). Of the

twelve new states, only the Malagasy Republic stayed away, called the

Algerian problem "an internal French matter". As compensation

Cameroon, a former French trust territory, participated. Togo was also invited, but felt the meeting was pointless if the North Africans were not there.

The final communique said nothing about Algeria, but shortly after the meeting Dia set off with M. Hamoni Diori, President of Niger,

to visit Tunis and meet Bourguiba and Abbas, while Senghor and

Houphouet-Boigny went to Paris(7). Clearly an important diplomatie initiative bad been agreed upon.

The assembled stated agreed on another point - that they would support the creation of an independent Mauretania despite the claim by

(3) See Bella Pick, "The Brazzaville Twelve", Africa South, Vol. 5,

No. 3 (April 1961), P. 77-78.

(4) ibid. P. 78.

(5) ibid.

(6) ibid.

(7) ibid., P. 79. 106.

MOrocco tbat the territory was historically part of that country, and

was being created by France as a helpless vassal-state(S)• This was

to prove a crucial decision, as it meant a clean break between MOrocco

and the French group, with the consequence that the former moved

completely into the 11radicaln camp.

The meeting clearly indicated that all these new states shared

a common view of African problems and a common desire to maintain close

relations with France. They also shared a dislike of the policies and

methods of the radical African states, some of which had been directed

towards what they considered the subversion of the political arder 9 in the Community prior to independence( ). It was only natural that,

isolated in Africa, they should at least explore the possibility of

banding together.

The second major event was the rapid deterioration of the

situation in the newly-independent ex-Belgian Congo. Long a holdout

against the tide of African nationalism, Belgium was increasingly unable to cape with disorders sparked by African nationaliste and

tribal politicians(lO)• In a sudden volte-face, Belgium agreed to

hold a round-table conference, the result of which was the sudèen

decision to grant the Congo full independence at the end of June 1960(ll).

The complete lack of preparation, the total absence of an

educated African class to carry the burden of independence, and the particularly violent nature of the election preceding independence

(8) The New York Times, Sept.' 16, 14, 1960.

(9) Legum. op. cit., P. 49.

(10) Segal, op. cit., P. 155-157.

(11) The New York Times, Jan. 28, 1960. 107.

produced their inevitable result. Widespread disorders broke out

immediately upon the granting of independence, followed by a mutiny

of the Congolese army against its Belgian officers(lZ)• The Belgians

responded by flying in thousands of regular troops, and Premier

Moishe Tshombe of the wealthy Katanga region took advantage of the

confusion to declare his independence.

In desperation, Premier Patrice Lumumba, head of the nationalist

and centralist Movement National Congolais, appealed to the United

Nations for help in ousting the Belgians and restoring order. Almost

immediately Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold took the lead in

assembling and dispatching a mixed force made up of contingents

from Afro-Asia and a number of other smaller nations.

Up until now there was little disagreement amongst Africans on

what should be done about the situation. The Belgians and Great

Powers should be kept out, while the UN, in which Afro-Asia bad a

decisive voice, acted to restore some modicum of internai order.

The turning point was the total co1lapse of the Congolese

central government in ear1y ieptember, 1960. In a farcical series of moves, the Premier and the President, Joseph Kasavubu, dismissed each other, and the Congolese Senate nullified both actions(lJ). Finally,

Colonel Joseph Mobutu staged a coup d'etat, which was 1ater fo1lowed

by a "understanding11 wlth Kasavubu and the arrest of Lumumba. His

(12) The Observer (London), July 10, 1960, and The Times (London), July 11,

1960; see also Africa Digest, Vot. 8, Nos. 1-5, which provides an

excellent and succinct chronology of the Congo crisis.

(13) Segal, op. cit., P. 158. 108.

power was then gradually consolidated with U.N. acquiescence.

This caused a sharp split in the African community. On the one hand, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and the UAR supported Lumumba, and agitated for his re-instatement(l4). They argued that if the UN was not willing to support Lumumba it bad no business there at all, as he was the legitimate authority who had called them in in the first place. They beèame increasingly opposed to the UN Congo operation, and most of them withdrew their troop contingent, and broke relations with the Congo government(lS). In this they were supported by the

Communist bloc and most of the Asians. On the other band, the French

African nations tended to feel that what was needed at pt"esent was not unyielding support for one political leader but discussion and compromise between many, and that the "federalist'' Kasavubu could (16) do much better than the "centralist" Lumumba •

Nigeria was in a peculiar position with regard to the Congo situation. She bad been catapulted into the middle of the Congo mess in October upon becoming independant, and it took ber a while to find her feet. However, Mr. Wachuku, at this time Nigeria's ambassador to the UN, rapidly applied himself add by the end of October bad successfully pressed for a 6onciliation Commission to be composed of representatives from all those African states which bad contributed

(14) The New York Times, Sept. 24, 1960.

(15) ibid., Nov. 19, Dec. 2, 8, 1960.

(16) West Africa, Dec. 24, 1960. 109.

troops to the Congo operation(!])• Unlike many African states, (18) Nigeria firmly supported the UN role in the Congo • They quickly ' dispatched a large contingent of troops(l9).

Nigeria was not, however, a particularly enthusiastic partisan of Kasavubu. She co-sponsored a resolution with Guinea,

Ghana, and the Soviet bloc to postpone the question of seating the 2 Kasavubu delegation at the UN( o). She also voted for the eight- power resolution (backed by the Lumumbists) calling for the release of political prisoners (i.e., Lumumba) and the prevention of military 2 interference (i.e., Mobutu) in Congolese politics( l). When this resolution failed to pass, she did not vote against the U.S.-British resolution (which in its essence called for support for Kasavubu) but 22 abstained, probab1y out of deference to Britain( ). However, as this measure failed to pass by on1y one vote, Nigeria's decision not to support it was a crucial one.

By these acts, Nigeria had taken an intermediate, or, as some would say, an equivocating position on the Congo, and thus tended to isolate herself from the process of alignment that was proceeding apace. We shall now examine the first concrete step of this process of alignment - the creation of the "Brazzaville" and "Casablanca" blocs.

(17) The New York Times, Oct. 30, 1960.

(18) See Balewa's statement in Federal Nigeria, Sept. - Oct., 1960, P. 13.

(19) The Times (London), Nov. 17, 1960.

(20) The New York Times, ·Nov. 10, 1960.

(21) See Stanley Hoffman, The UN in the Congo Labarynth, in Eaerson and Padelford, op. cit., P. 74-75.

(22) The New York Times , Dec. 21, 1960. 110.

1. The Brazzaville Twelve.

The Brazzaville group obtained its name from the capital of the Congo Republic (ex-French) where a meeting of former French territories (this time including Madagascar) took place in December 1960.

As at the Abidjan conference in October, the crucial topic was Algeria. This time, however, the position they took was somewhat firmer, as can be seen from the tone of the final resolution.

"Les Etats soussignes,~ attaches/ au principe de decolonisation~ pour lequel ils ont tant lutt~ majs conscients du danger, mortel pour l'Afrique, de la prolongation de la guerre en Algerie, ont pris la seule attitude qui permette, par des negotiations, l'application honnete èt democratique"' de principe de l'autodetermination,, proclame,. solennellement par le general// de Gaulle •••

; Bien que n'appartenant pas touts a la Communaute, ils n'ont jamais cachErleur amitie pour la France. Mais ce n'est pas cette 23 amitie qui a dicté' et dicte encore leur conl(iortement d'aujourd'hui. n( )

In other words, they indicated they would not be able to support

France very much longer if the war were not ended. In this matter ëhey were able to claim some success, as in

January 1961 de Gaulle called for a referendum in Algeria on the 24 question of self-determination( >. Another point which carried over from Abidjan was their continued support for Mauretanian independence(2s).

(23) Legum, op. cit., P. 177.

(24) Pick, op. cit., P. 80.

(25) Legum, op. cit., P. 176. 111.

A new element, however, was their attempt to help mediate in the Congo. Probably the site wa:s chosen with the specifie intention of making such an attempt; Leopoldville was right across the river.

Kasavubu, Tshombe, and several other Congolese leaders (but not 26 Lumumba) came to hold discussions( ). The twelve concluded that

"la solution politique du probleme:.... Congolais ne peut "etre trouvee; que dans une Conférence de la Table Ronde, qui grouperait les 27 repré'sentanté de tous les Partis sans exception"( >. It must be admitted that this added very little to the solution of the problem; but in reply it is necessary to point out that few others had done any better(28 >.

But if the political resolutions were little more than an extension and expansion of the Abidjan meeting, crucial decisions affecting the pattern of relations amongst the twelve and between them and the other African states were taken. The proposition that there was to be some sort of closer unity between them was never really in question. Two facets of the agreement on unity stand out.

First of all, it was the first time that attempts towards 29 African unity were made on an exclusive basis( >. Only the ex-French states were invited to Brazzaville, and not all of them - the

"radical s", Guinea and Mali, .. were snubbed. Only the "twelve" were permitted to participate in the plans for closer co-operation. This move was quite a different thing from the numerous projected regional unions and co-operation agreements; here the criterion was not

(26) Pick, op. cit.

(27) Legum, op. cit., P. 177-178.

(28) Pick, op. cit.

(29) Legum, op. cit., P. 50. 112.

geography but a cammon set of political and cultural attitudes and affiliations. For this reason it must be regarded as a retrogressive step in terms of continental unity, which would have to embrace wide differences in these spheres. The move tended to protect and even reinforce the isolation of French-speaking Africa from the rest of the continent. In particular it eut them off from the more moderate non-French states such as Liberia, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, even though there existed many meeting grounds of cammon interest between tem on sorne issues.

Of note also is the mode and extent of the attempt towards unity. The final resolution concentrated exclusively upon economie matters, particularly the problems of liquidity and credit, priee stabilization, the harmonizing of development plans and the creation of a system of common guarantees for private investment(3o>. Later on at meetings at Dakar, Yaounde(, and rort Lamy they were to work out details and discuss further plans for functional co-operation(3l).

The Brazzaville meeting must be seen as a double victory for

Houphouet-Boigny over Senghor. First of all, Senghor' s desire for politieal union is decisively rejected in favour of Houphouet's preference for a losse economie one. Secondly, Senghor's 11African road 32 to socialism"( ) was rejected in favour of the laissez-faire conservatism of the Ivory Coast.

Nigeria's attitude towards the new grouping was two-sided.

On the one hand, its approach both to African unity based upon 1ow- keyed functional co-operation and to economie development based on

(30) ibid., P. 178-179.

(31) West Africa, April 8, 1961.

(32) Melady, op. cit. 113. capitalism were completely in accord with Nigerian policy.

However, the Brazzaville bloc's close relations with France were a serious barrier. Nigerians were becoming increasingly annoyed with French policy in Africa, and on January 5, 1961, broke diplomatie relations with France over that country's refusal to halt atomic tests (33) in the Sahara • Not content with this, the government declared that "French aircraft shall be disallowed from using Nigerian airports and French ships ••• our ports. Transit rights ••• shall cease forthwith"(34). This, needless to say, created great dffficulties for

Dahomey and Niger, whose transportation routes, by canal in one case and overland in the other, were dependent on Nigeria(35 ). Gloser relations with the French Africans, who bad conspicuously avoided mentioning French tests at Brazzaville, appeared to be a remote prospect.

2. The Casablanca Six.

A second development towards establishing an African pattern of alignment took place less than a month later in January 1961, at

Casablanca, capital city of MOrocco, where a group of African leaders met to consider the stunning developments of the past year. Besides

MOrocco, the participants were Libya, the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali (36).

Like the Abidjan-Brazzaville meetings, the Casablanca conference was primarily concerned with three issues: Mauretania, the Congo,

(33) The Daily Times, (Lagos), Jan. 6, 1961.

(34) West African Pilot, Jan. 6, 1961.

(35) Hance, op. cit., P. 186-187.

(36) Margaret Roberts, 11Sununitry at Casablanca", Africa South, Vol. 5,

No. 3 (April 1961), P. 68. 114.

and Algeria. Their views on these subjects, however, were diametrically

opposed to those of the Casablanca group.

On Mauretania, the policy was set by MOrocco, whose claim of historie sovereignty over this territory had been denied by the

B~azzaville group. A number of the nations who attended the meetings

had not previously supported MOrocco's stand (especially Ghana,

Guinea, and the GPRA delegation), but in a spirit of log-rolling, . (37) supported MOrocco 1 s claim in order to obta~n her support elsewhere •

The final resolution approved 11any action taken by Morocco on Mauretania for the restitution of her legitimate rights"(38>. On Algeria, the conference took a militant anti-French position.

Not merely did they sêat the GPRA delegation as a full-fledged partie-

ipant in the conference, but they declared that "the Provisional

Government of the Algerian Republic is the only authority qualified

to speak on behalf of Algerian(39), and called for aid to that government.

Two other small items are of interest. The first is a resolut ion condemning French nuclear testing(4o). The second was a resolution condemning Isr•el. This was surprising in view of Ghana's traditionally close relations with that country and her objections to resolutions of this nature at previous conferences. And indeed reports indicated that Nkrumah found the resolution highly distasteful, but was forced togo along with the majority, which was comprised of Muslim states(4l).

(37) ~gum, op. cit., P. 51.

(38) ibid.' p~ 189. (39) ibid.' P. 191. (40) ibid.' P. 190. (41) ibid.' P. 51; see also l'he New York Times, Jan. 7. 1961. 115.

Each of these issues, however, was of vital interest to, at most, one or two delegations. The really vital issue - in fact, the reason for their assembly - was the situation in the Congo. This was shown by the invitations which bad been sent to certain Asian countries who bad taken a "radical" stand on the Congo. Asians bad been hitherto rigorously excluded from Pan-African meetings. And in fact Ceylon, . (42) represented by ber ambassador to MOrocco, d~d actually participate •

For most of the delegates, the question was simple. The UN bad failed, and aught to be abandoned for something else, some more

"positive" action. By the time of the conference, almost all of them bad pulled their troops out of the Congo, or threatened to do so, and many bad recognized the Lumumba-Gizenga government in Stanleyville(43 >. They pressed for a conference resolution endorsing both of these moves.

Surprisingly, the chief opposition to this proposai came from President Nkrumah of Ghana. One observer said he "appeared in the role of a moderate" on the Congo issue (44). Nkrumah was in fact in a very difficult position. While he denounced the actions the UN bad taken and like the others considered that it bad failed, he still felt that the UN operation represented the only potential 4 Solution to the Crisis ( S). If t h e UN cou ld not so1 ve t h e prohl em, the civil war between Leopoldville and Stanleyville factions would inevitably lead to the intuoduction of the Cold War into Africa,

(42) Rober1S 111 op. cit., P. 68. (43) ibid., P. 68-71; The New York Times, Dec. 8, 1960. (44) The New York Times, Jan. 8, 1961. (45) Roberts, op. cit., P. 69. 116.

4 ''with a farewell to Pan-Africanism and neutralism alike"( G).

Thus Nkrumah refused to support a withdrawal of troops or a

policy of direct assistance to the Stanleyville regime, despite

tremendous pressures from other delegations(47 ). That he won his

point is made clear in the final resolution, which did not call for

the favouring of any faction, and asked for the implementation of 48 the decisions of the Security Council( ). In effect, he had

persuaded the conference to give the UN one very last chance.

As at Brazzaville, the question of African unity was raised.

It was expected that the tone would be set by Ghana, Guinea, and

Mali, who only a week earlier had signed a declaration at Conakry avow 49 ing to establish a three-state union( ).

This did not happen, however. Instead the final charter

called for the creation of an African Consultative Assembly,

three Committees, and an African High Command which would 'ueet periodically"(5o). There was no mention of the surrender of any

sovereignty, nor indeed of any binding form of collective decision-

making whatsoever. None of the Arab African nations had any intention

of making binding cammitments; indeed, with such a hodge-podge of widely separated states, who could blame them? But the effect on the

final comminique was to render the Casablanca approach to unity

hardly distinguishable from the nmoderate11 point of view(5l).

(46) ibid., p. 69-70.

(47) Legum, op. cit., P. 51.

(48) ibid.' P. 192.

(49) ibid., P. 175.

(50) ibid., P. 187-188.

(51) Roberts, op. cit., P. 72. 117.

This meeting, like Brazzaville, indicated two things. First of all, because it was in one sense an "equal and opposite reaction" to the Brazzaville meeting, it represented the genesis of an African bipolarity and a division of the "African dream" into two parts.

Secondly, it represented the end of Nkrumah's position as unquestioned leader of the African radicals. The bitter fights over the Congo,

Israel, and proposais for·African unity made it clear that the Osagyefo had lost at least some of his aura.

Nigeria's attitude towards Casablanca was as ambivalent as her reaction to Brazzaville had been. She was entirely in sympathy on the issues of Algeria and nuclear testing, and there was nothing she could really object to in the plans for co-operation. But she had been deeply suspicious of the conference for its anti-UN vehemence, and the announcement of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union in December - 2 flying in the face of Balewa's dislike of the idea(S )- had "eut the biscuit". In the last analysis, she could never really feel happy amidst increasingly vehement denunciations of imperalist brutality and neo-colonialist plots. It was not her style, not her method of operation at all.

3. Denoument in the Congo.

The murder of Patrice Lumumba in February 1961(SJ) set off riots and disturbances all over Africa. Yet, paradoxically, it paved

(52) The New York Times, Oct. 4, 1960.

(53) The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1961. 118.

the way for a rapprochement between the two groups over the Congo issue. The nations which had supported Lumumba but also the UN

(notably Ghana) were in a predicament. They could either be vindictive and attack the UN viciously, or operate within the UN to press for the same goals as before - unification and the neutral- ization of Mobutu. On the other hand, the '~oderates" had now less reason to be afraid of such steps, for a Stanleyville regime with

Lumumba was dangerous, but without him powerless. His death meant (54) that the UN operation would have to be based on Leopoldville •

Mr. Wachuku played a key role in getting the more reasonable members of both camps to join forces. A few days after Lumumba's death, he was able to obtain general agreement in the UN Conciliation

Commission as to what should be done. The meetings were so heated that h e was f oreed t o a dj ourn f requent 1y to prevent bl ows (55) • Th e 56 settlement which finally emerged was a compromise( ). On the one hand, it called for UN operations in the Congo to be based on that country's loi fondamentale - that is, upon ~. Kasavubu. Secondly, no troops were to be disarmed. On the other hand, it called for the creation of an army council under civilian leadership, presumably to check Mobutu's power. Finally, parliament was to be recalled, a concession to the radicals.

Now while recriminations and hostility over the Congo were by no means over, the new developments split the unity of both blocs.

On the one hand, the Ghanaian policy of tacitly accepting the Commission's

(54) Hoffman, op. cit., P. 76.

(55) See report in The Times (London), Feb. 17, 1961.

(56) see ibid. 119.

report contrasted sbarply with the recognition of the Gizenga regime (57) by the UAR, Morocco, Guinea, and Mali • On the other band, the sequel to the report (the General Assembly resolution of April 15) split the Brazzaville group, the majority voting against it, but Chad and Senegal supporting it(SS).

In a similar way the beat bad been taken off the Algerian problem. Ever:;' since the de Gaulle referendum in J'anuary both sides in the war bad been putting out feelers for a settlement, and with 59 the announcement that negotiations would open( >, there seemed little reason why divergent views on the topic should be a serious obstacle any longer.

It seemed, then, as if the issues which divided the blocs in the first place bad taken themselves out of the limelight.

Although not actually settled, they were at least blurred to a degree where some new initiative ~owards re-establishing the pre-1960 spirit of unity might begin.

4. The Monrovia Conference - Ralf a Loaf is Better than Nothing.

The initiative for the conference came from those states who bad felt themselves isolated by the formation of the two blocs.

Chief amongst these were Ethiopia, Tunisia, Liberia, and Nigeria, who fitted naturally into neither category, even though they bad been prominently associated with earlier Pan-African conferences. Nigeria especia1ly was con~cious of being "out in the cold" as one writer put

(57) The New York Times, Feb. 23, 1961.

(58) Hoffman, op. cit., P. 77.

(59) The New York Times, Ma.rch 28, 1961. 120.

"t(60) ~ . To these must be added Senegal, who found herself very much alone in the Brazzaville group after the dominating influence of the

Ivory Coast had asserted itself. Togo, as we saw, had refused to join over the Algerian issue. According to Colin Legum(6l), the first initiative came from

Senghor. As a member of the Brazzaville group, he did not want to appear to be taking too active a role himself, .so he approached

Premier Sylvanius Olympio of Togo to investigate for him. The latter woEthy quickly secured the agreement of Nigeria and Liberia, and the three together approached ~Brazzaville bloc. Cameroon and, infinitely more important, the Ivory Coast, agreed to be sponsors.

What induced Houphouet-Bwfgny (and thus the entire Brazzaville bloc) to support the conference is a matter of conjecture. One factor may have been his desire to avoid the loss of prestige and perhaps disaffection amongst his allies if Senghor attended the conference and he did not. Another reason may have been to placate Nigeria, whose anti-French embargo had caused serious difficulties, as we have seen. He also probably felt that the meeting could not possibly affect the unity plans of the Brazzaville group, by now well under way.

The only problem remaining was the Casablanca bloc, now minus (62) . (63) Libya • MOrocco and the Sudan d1d not show up because of Mauritania ,

(60) West Africa Pilot, May 17, 1961.

(61) Legum, op. cit., P. 52.

(62) Kloman, op. cit., P. 123.

(63) Legum, op. cit., P. 20. 121.

and the UAR felt disinclined to come for unspecified reasons which probably bad samething to do with the Congo.

But while there may have been clear and powerful reasons for the non-attendance of the North Africans, there were no obvious excuses for Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Indeed, Guinea and Mali had initially agreed to co-sponsor the conference, but withdrew under (64) severe pressure from Dr. Nkrumah •

The question thus boiled down to: why was Dr. Nkrumah opposed to the conference? The less said about the official reason - that

"preparations were i.nadequate"(65 ) - the better. It is obvious that any gathering of nearly thirty heads of state arranged on short notice will cause complications, but this did not deter Nkrumah at Accra in 1958.

Nor can it be said that any outstanding political disagreements kept him away. If this were so, then Mali and Guinea, who bad taken a much more radical stand on nearly everything at Casablanca, should have been even more unwilling to attend, and in fact the reverse was true. For exactly the same reason, it cannet be attributed to differing internai regimes, as some writers have tried to indicate(66 ).

In fact, the sponsors had gone out of their way to make things easier for Casablanca, even refusing to invite the Congo (Leopoldville) to avoid arguments over credentials(67 ).

The reasons for Nkrumah's attitude were four in number. First

(64) West Africa, May 6, 1961; The New York Times, May 4, 8, 1961.

(65) West African Pilot, May 4, 1961.

(66) Marcum, op. cit.

(67) Legum, op. cit., P. 201. 122.

of all, he was deeply suspicious of the Brazzaville states. He charged that they were "dominated by a sentimental attachment to (68) France" , and later spoke of France's "present neo-colonialist 69 relationship with the less-developed nations within ber orbit"( ).

Secondly, he did not want anything to pre-empt his endeavours to forma "Union of African States" with Guinea and Mali, which had just been agreed upon at a meeting of the three leaders at the end of April (70).

Thirdly, it was clear from the very outset that he could not expect to achieve very widespread support for his more daring concepts of African unity; they bad been specifically rejected by Liberia and Nigeria at previous gatherings, and it was obvious they would find little favour with the conservative French Africans.

Fourthly, it was undoubtedly quite obvious to him that the number of independent African states was now so large that he could no longer play the crucial role he had at earlier conferences; thus

Monrovia represented for him "the beginning of the end of Ghana's leadership in Africa"(7l).

But despite Dr. Nkrumah's attitude, the conference must be considered a success as far as attendance was concerned, attracting

20 out of 27 possible African leaders(72 ).

When the conference opened, two outstanding disagreements

(68) Ghana Evening News (Accra), May 16, 1961.

(69) Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 176.

(70) Legum, op. cit • , P. 183.

(71) Quoted in Klomon, op. cit., p. 129.

(72) West Africa, May 13, 1961. 123.

had to be gotten out of the way.

One arose out of Nigeria's position on French atomic tests,

which threatened to cause a break between Nigeria and the Brazzaville (73) group. Senghor came up with the final solution ; the Conference

simply appealed for a halt to "all further nuclear explosions anywhere

11 in the world , and noted favourably "assurances given by the French

government that they will c•ase all further nuclear explosions in

Africa"(74). A conference spokesman connnented that "things would 7 be quite different for France if there were other Sahara !ests"( S)•

With this disagreement out of the way, Nigeria did her part by 76 quietly lifting the ban on French aircraft and shipping( ).

The other main dispute, the Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute, was quietly put aside on Nigeria's initiative<77 >. The disputants were admonished to ''ma.ke renewed efforts towards a sincere and early solution"(78 ).

Having dispensed with their disputes, the leaders now found

themselves in a high degree of accord over a wide range of problems.

These involved firstly the major problems of African international

politics, and secondly the correct approach towards closer co-operation

and unity.

(73) West Africa, May 20, 1961~

(74) Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States held at the . th th Monrovia C~ty Hall, &==- 12-- May, 1961, Resolutions of the Plenary

Sessions, Liberian Information Service, 1961 •

(75) West African Pilot, May 16, 1961. • (76) ibid., May 18, 1961. (77) The Dai1y Express (Lagos), May 11, 1961.

(78) Resolutions, op. cit. 124.

The Algerian problem received only two paragraphe; the dele gates simply welcomed the recent attempts at negotiation, and called for a settlement. Support was given for the independance of

Mauretania, just as at the Brazzaville meeting but unlike Casablanca.

But, unlike Brazzaville, the conference issued a strong ~ondemnation of Portugal and South Africa.

The resolution on the Congo was somewhat more pithy; it re-affirmed the ro1e of the UN, and condemned 11the hasty recognition of breakaway regimes" and "the action of certain non-African states

11 79 which encourage subversion ( >. These resolutions are more striking for what they do not say than for what they do. Gone are the sweeping and bitter condemnations of France so characteristic of ear1ier meetings. Absent is any direct reference to Lumumba's murder. Not a word is said about neo-colonialism.

The problems of East and Central Africa are not mentioned at all.

Two reasons can be given for this. The first was the influence of the French Africans, a solid majority, who took very conservative positions on the Congo and Algeria. The second was the overwhelming desire on the part of the other states to achieve unanimous agreement even if, as in the case of Nigeria, it involved shifting position a good deal. The inevitable result was that contentious points were simply omitted. (80)

On the question of African unity, it was Nigeria 1 s turn to

(79) ibid.

(80) West Africa, May 20, 1961 (a spokesman said that the de1egates were amcious not to umake difficu1ties" - West African Pilot, May 13,

1961). 125.

set the pace. All reports give ber full credit for the proposais adopted by the conference(81 >. Balewa called for the establishment of a set of principles to govern international conduct in Africa. The most important of these were the "absolute equality of African and

Malagasy Statesn, "non-interference in the interna! affairs of other

States", nrespect for the sovereignty of each State and its inalienable right to eJiistence", the 11non-acceptance of any leadership", and an admonition to "refrain from encouraging, directly or indirectly, dissident groups or individuals of other States in subversive

11 activities • Finally the resolution stated:

11The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African States, but unity of

11 82 aspirations and action ( >. This .as a double-barrelled assault on the policies of the

Casablanca powers. It represented an implicit condemnation of the policies of Ghana towards Togo, MOrocco towards Mauretania, and the UAR towards the Congo. tt was also a flat renunciation of

Nkrumah's cherished beliefs about African unity. Thus, while the conference urged the Casablanca states to join their group, it was made clear on whose terms this was to be done.

But disagreements with Casablanca notwithstanding, the conference was crucially important in two ways. It was the first

African meeting open to all that bad been called since the mass of

African states became independent in 1960, and thus provided a

(81) Africa Report, (Washington), June 1961, P. 5; The Economist,

Vol. 199, P. 1240 (June 17, 1961).

(82) Resolutions, op. cit. 126. signpost for future progress. Secondly, it had the effect of catapulting Nigeria into the role of leader of the moderate African states. Ber willingness to compromise on the most sensitive of issues made her appear statesmanlike, and the firm initiative she took on the question of African unity ensured her the support of all those African states who saw in her proposais a refuge from the political pressures of their more radical neighbours.

5. The Reaction - a Barrage of Words.

Nkrumah rightly interpreted the resolution on African unity as being very largely aimed at him, and aimed specifically by Nigeria.

His reaction was immediate and harsh; the Ghanaian press opened an inmediate all-out assault on the conference. An editorial appeared under the headline "Scrap Imperialist Frontiers ~ Monrovia Bogus

Ma.jority Claim Can Fool Nobodyn.

"The very moment the British Broadcasting Corporation and other imperialist broadcasting brassbands began their phoney adulation of the Monrovia slave-mentality operated slogan ~ic] of 'Unity Without

Unification', students of African history suspected with considerable concern (si~ the genesis of this new brand of 'His Ma.ster's Voice' - just to discover that it was only the band that was Esau's!n

"The imperialiste chose Monrovia because they believed that

Liberia ••• must dance to the tune of their shampoolah11 (SJ}.

The Nigerians were not slow to realize that this attack was largely directed against them, and their newspapers replied in kind:

(83) Ghana Evening News, May 17, 1961. 127.

"Dr. Nkrumah is an advocate of unity. He was not there

Monrovia because he and his minority group could not, as they planned, impose their will on the conference ••• "

"THE TRUTH IS THAT DR. NKRUMAH MUST BE AT THE HEAD OF AN!THI.NG

OR OUTSIDE IT because he must always lead. He is the Messiah and no camp follower, this man."

11 ••• his real aim is to swallow up little Togo and chew off parts of the Ivory Coast"(84>. This view was not unanimous, however. Chief Awolowo, Leader of the Opposition, paid a visit to Ghana a few weeks later where he called for a "Pan-African Organization" to overthrow all African . (85) regimes which did not "serve the 1nterests of the people" •

Later he charged that the Monrovia conference was "inspired and completely financed by the more important countries of the Western (86) . Bloc" • The government was furious at the spectacle of a fellow- countryman using the quarre! to strengthen his political position.

Far from decreasing tensions, this move only further aggravated the Nigerian government.

Thus, the Monrovia conference, while it had gone a long way towards reducing the barriers that existed between English and French

Africa, had created as a byproduct animosity between two old friends.

The situation continued as a standoff throughout most of the summer. In July, meetings of both blocs were held to discuss economie

(84) West African Pilot, May 18, 1961.

(85) The New York Times, June 12, 1961.

(86) The Daily Express, Sept. 13, 1961. 128.

co-operation, the Casablanca powers assembling at Conakry and the

Monrovia group at Dakar. The really significant thing about these 87 meetings is how similar their proposais were to each other( >. . . Initiatives were timid, and decisions were temporizing. Both were thinking in terms of reductions in tariffs, trade expansion, standardization of priees and procedures and the like. The Daiar conference was interesting because it meant that the Brazzaville group, despite its own far-flung economie plans, was willing to expand its horizons and agree to co-operate with the rest of Africa. The Conakry meeting was interesting because it represented a complete abandonment of the

"political kingdom" type of union by the Casablanca bloc. A consensus seemed to be developing.

The Nigerians felt that it was now time for another initiative.

The logical person to begin it was Dr. Azikiwe, Nkrumah's old friend, whose enormous prestige and position as Governor-General could perhaps place his efforts above the Ghana-Nigeria quarrel in which he bad taken no direct part. The occasion came on August 12, when he addressed a meeting in London(88>. His speech, despite its hedging, qualifying, and questioning style, made two definite peace overtures to the Casablanca group, and particularly to Ghana.

The first was that political union is considered as the

(87) West Africa, July 29, 1961; West African Pilot, July 20, 22,

1961.

(88) Azikiwe, "The Future of Pan-Africanism", op. cit. This speech is quoted previously in another context. 129.

desirable and inevitable goal of Pan-Africanism(S9).

"As I see it, there is bound to arise an African leviathan in the form of a political organization or association or union or concert of States.11 This concert "must have organs of administration, ••• a Parliament of African States ••• organized on the basis of the United Nations Assembly ••• a Pan-African Court of

International Justice • • • and a Pan-African Secretariat. n These would be supplemented by a "Convention on Economie Co-operation ••• a Convention on Collective Security ••• and a Convention on

Human Rights".

It can be readily·seen that this plan goes a very long way indeed to meet Dr. Nkrumah's demands. If it does not quite concede him his "political kingdom", it certainly leaves the door open.

To be sure, Zik was rather vague on how to achieve this, but then so was Dr • Nkrumah.

The second conciliatory gesture was the carefully balanced way in which he distributed praise and blame. At one point, for example, he said "both Ghana and Nigeria made inexcusable mistakes".

He carefully avoided blaming anyone over the Ghana-Togo and MOrooco-

Mauretanian disputes, expressing his feelings only by the gentlest (90) . of hints • Finally, he d1stributed lavish and equal praise to the efforts of both blocs:

"The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union is an experiment with great

(89) ibid.' p. 22-26.

(90) ibid., P. 19-20. 130.

possibilities ••• The Casablanca Conference shamed those who thought that African leaders were mainly moderates and tongue-tied marionettes. The MOnrovia Conference presaged the emergence of 9 reasonable and statesmanlike leadership on a wider scale in Africa"( l).

Ue concluded with a reference to the economie conferences held in

July and says nthe Conakry and Dakar Recommendations are so similar that it is fervently hoped that these would break down the unfortunate (92) misunderstanding between the Casablanca and MOnrovia groups" •

This speech was an important indication of Nigeria's desire to end the feud between herself and Ghana. This willingness was spurred on by preparations for the next meeting of the MOnrovia group in Lagos in 1962, which Nigeria was most anxious the Casablanca states attend.

~ was Zik's speech the only gesture made. The MOnrovia members tried to improve relations by a series of visits to the

Casablanca nations. Ould Daddah of Mauretania visited Ghana, Balewa paid a visit to Guinea, and Houphouet-Boigny visited Mali(93 >. By all accounts they were well-received, and the final communiques glowed with friendship.

Thus, the beginning of 1962 brought with it the confident belief that the Casablanca nations would attend the Lagos Conference, ending the division of Africa as quickly as it had begun.

(91) ibid., P. 26.

(92) ibid., P. 28.

(93) See West African Pilot, Jan. 5, 1962; West Africa, Jan. 20, 1962;

Federal Nigeria, Jan. - Feb., 1962. 131.

The decision by the Casablanca ministers to hold their caucus in Lagos and not Accra(94) was very auspicious, and Nkrumah's assent to the principle of the meeting seemed the clincher(9S).

6. Lagos - The Dashing of Hopes.

The efforts of the African states were soon to trip upnon an old stumbling-block - Algeria. The Casablanca powers, having seated the GPRA as a full-fledged delegation at their conferences, insisted . (96) that they participate at Lagos • However, the French Africans demurred after receiving frowns from Paris. Nigeria attempted to mediate in the hope that sorne basis could be found for attendance 97 by all( ). But the impasse seemed complete.

Nigeria, growing desperate, attempted to stun the deadlocked discussions into action with a bold move. Balewa, already under severe domestic pressure on the issue, suddenly anriounced the abrogation of the Angle-Nigerian Defence Pact(9S). This seemed to be aimed in two directions at once. On the one band, it offered dramatic proof to the Casablanca powers of Nigeria's sincerity in wanting them to attend; it represented a complete surrender to

Dr. Nkrumah's views on neo-colonialism. At the same time, it was undoubtedly designed to set an example for the French-speaking Africans to induce them to make similar concessions on their stand; for

(94) West African Pilot, Jan. 15, 1962.

(95) West Africa, Jan. 20, 1962.

(96) West African Pilot, Jan. 17, 19, 1962.

(97) The New York Times, Jan. 21, 1962.

(98) The Times (London), Jaa. 22, 1962. 132.

Higeria made very little secret of the fact that her sympathies lay with Casablanca on this issue(99 >. In addition, of course, it provided an answer to domestic criticism.

The Foreign Ministers' meeting, opening on January 22 before the heads of state gathering, proved that Nigeria was far from alone in her stand. An official spokesman in Lagos said that delegations from Ethiopia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika supported the participation of GPRA(lOO)• In addition, there was talk of a major division within Brazzaville itself, Senegal wishing to find some (101) face-saving way to allow Algeria to attend • In a desperate final manoeuvre, she came up with a rather Byzantine compromise.

This compromise resolution would have stated that "la conférence des Ministres des Affairs etrangeres~ ' avait laisse/ le soin ' a celle des Chefs d'Etats de prendre une décision concernant la question

~ ~ , algerienne et leur avait recommande de decider la prolongation de la conf~ence des Ministres des Affairs Etrangères, 'y compris le G.P.R.A.' Cette conference prolongée aurait dééider à son tour d'un second sommet africain des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernements, c 1 est-a 1 dire semblait-il, que le 'G.P.R.A.' pourrait egalement~ y ~tre represent~" (lOZ) •

It was all to no avail, however. Casablanca plus Tunisia and the Sudan had decided not to come(l03).

(99) ibid., Jan. 23, 1962; also Daily Express, Jan. 22, 1962.

(100) West African Pilot, Jan. 24, 1962.

(101) ibid., Jan. 23-24, 1962.

(102) Afrique Nouvelle, (Dakar), Jan. 31,1962.

(103) The New York Times, Jan. 25, 1962. 133.

This bad two immediate effects. First of all, it meant that the Lagos meeting would degenerate into an 11appendage of the

Monrovia Conference"(l04). New plans for effecting unity would (105) either have to be postponed, or be of a temporizing nature , and that for the nonce the division of Africa would continue.

The second effect was the re-kindling of Nigeria's anger towards Ghana •• While Nigeria was miffed at Brazzaville for the group's intransigence, they were absolutely furious at the Casablanca powers, and with some reason. After all, both Ethiopia and Liberia wanted the GPRA to attend, but were nonetheless willing to compromise 6 rather than Walk Out (l0 ). On e e d"t1 or1a. 1 wr iter a 1 so po1n . t e d ou t that all the fuss over Algeria obscured the fact that there were no black nationalists from Kenya, Angola, and South-West Africa either,

. 11 (107) and accused Casablanca of be1ng "Ar ab first, Arab last •

This anger was reflected by Dr. Azikiwe, whose initiative bad (108) lamentably failed. In his opening speech to the Conference he pointed out that the Casablanca states bad "reneged" at Monrovia, and

"recently we have witnessed the same tactics on the eve of the Lagos

Conference". He then went on to criticize "the conspicuous absence of a specifie declaration on the part of the Casablanca states of their inflexible belief in the fundamental principles enunciated at Monrovia .. n .

(104) West African Pilot, Jan. 26, 1962.

(105) The New York Times, Jan. 27, 1962.

(106) West Africa, Jan. 27, 1962.

(107) West African Pilot,. Jan. 25, 1962.

(108) Teltt in Da.ily Times (Lagos), Jan. 26, 1962. 134.

For this reason· 11 it can be a matter of speculation whether ••• secretly they nurse expansionist ambitions against their smaller and weaker neighboursn.

Undaunted, the Conference pushed ahead to take new initiatives.

First of all, some new items were added to the resolutions about colonialism, and the condemnations were somewhat sharper than at

Monrovia; even Balewa spoke of "the danger of economie exploitation (109) by outside powers" •

But the bulk of the achievement of the conference came on the question of African unity. What stood out especially was the drafting of a "Charter of African and Ma.lagasy Organization11 (llO).

The tone was set by the Nigerians. Jaja Wachuku said."let us be practical and pragmatic. Let us aim at creating a machinery that is workable". Azikiwe said that 11the Unity which this conference (111) seeks is not based on regimented uniformity" •

The Charter reflected Nigerian views very well - despite the fact that President Tubman submitted the final draft. First of all, the same basic printtples of intra-African political conduct are (112) there, virtually unaltered from MOnrovia • There is no reference at ali to political integration or the abandonment of sovereignty, all the stress being on educational, cultural, social, and economie 3 matters(ll ). It is far more like the UN Charter than a constitution.

(109) West African Pilot, Jan. 29, 1962.

(110) Text in West African Pilot, Dec. 29, 1962; Jan. 1, 2, 1963.

(111) Federal Nigeria, Feb. 1962 (special issue).

(112) Article 3.

(113) Article 2. 135.

The new Charter called for an Essembly of Heads of State to meet every two years, a Council of Foreign Ministers to meet every year, a General Secretariat to serve as permanent staff, and a . (114) Conciliation Commission to settle d~sputes • But in no sense did these bodies have ahy binding authority, being in fact weaker than their counterparts in the UN. The Security Council's power to act on disputes is absent. There is not even an Article 19 or 99; there is no provision to force the members to pay the budget, and no provision for initiative by the Secretary-General. It is impossible 15 to d isagree with Pr ofessor Ph il1 ips - "Caution permeate d t h e Ch ar t er "(1 ) •

But if it were cautious it was also open-ended - any state "under indigenous African rule" could adhere. Nothing was done to alienate or exclude Casablanca(ll6).

This conference, then, was a landmark in three ways.

First of all, it marked the institutionalization of the hopes for African unity of nearly all African States. No longer were unity attempts to be vague declarations or localized, irregular pacts, but from now on universal and comprehensive.

Secondly, the codification of the MOnrovia principles of intra-African conduct into the Charter of an International Organization represented a uniquely African - and specifically Nigerian - contribut- ion to international law.

Finally, it marked the emergence of Nigeria as the ranking nation of Africa. This was so in two major ways. The first was the

(114) Articles 8-25, 28. (115) Phillips, op. cit., P. 95. (116) West Africa, Feb. 10, 1962. 136.

totality of ber commitment to the idea of universality in African unity. She bad given ber all to achieve this. She deserved far more success tban she got.

Secondly, the voice of Nigeria predominated in the final proposals. Balewa • s admonition to begin "by empbasizing and building

1 (117) upon those cultural links tbat a1ready exist' , bad barried the day.

Now it was up to the Casablanca powers. The Charter bad put the writing on the wall for their group. The question was; what would they do?

(117) Phillips, op. cit., P. 41. 137.

CHAPTER VII - The Grand Finale

Introduction

The immediate effect of the Lagos conference was a re-ignition of the smouldering press-feud between Ghana and Nigeria. Right after the conference, a high Ghan4tan official charged that Azikiwe's speech bad been "prepared in London and read in Lagos"(l). The Nigerian press was furious. "Insolent", 11insulting as it is stupid", and 2 "megalomania", they retorted ( ). The Nigerian government filed an official protest, and Dr. Nkrumah was forced to dissociate himself (3) from the statement •

Nigerians as a whole, however, seemed more burt than angered at the Ghanaian outburst; this applied especially to the radicals, who were still deeply committed to Pan-Africanism, and who watched the developing conflict with mounting distaste. In a thoughtful editorial, the West African Pilot sadly pointed out that the conflict was to a degree inevitable:

"The facts are that long before Nigeria became independant in

1960, men of international standing the world over bad tipped her as the only African country destined to lead the continent.

However, having gained independence before Nigeria, Ghana felt that as of right, the analogous (sic] position of being 1 uncrowned king' of Africa should be hers - as if on ber part Nigeria invited majority opinion to so extol ber.

(1) The Ghanaian Times, Feb. 2, 1962.

(2) Phillips, op. cit. P. 95.

(3) ibid. 138.

This gave rise to an unhealthy rivalry in which Nigeria was a most unwilling participant.n(4)

At this point Africa was at a critical juncture. Could the specifie issues which still divided the two groups - Algeria, the pace of unity, the bitterness between Ghana and Nigeria - be solved before the alienation became self-feeding? Could Nigeria continue the sustained effort she had made? Or had she run out of concessions and patience, and spent herself? Finally, would the Casablanca group continue to remain aloof, or would they attempt some sort of initiative?

1. The Process of Probing.

The summer and autumn of 1962 brought forth a spate of hopeful initiatives. The first emerged from the meeting of the

Casablanca powers in Cairo in June. The decisions taken and the reactions to these provided a valuable guide to the extent of the problems confronting Africa. The conference reached two main decisions. First of all, it decided to proceed with plans to set up an African High Command and establish a Common Market amongst themselves. General Jawzi of the UAR was to be in command of the (5) former body • Secondly, the final communique called for a conference of all African states as soon as possible(6).

The conference thus ended on an ambivalent note. It was not

(4) West African Pilot, July 13, 1962.

(5) ibid., June 19, 1960.

(6) ibid., June 20, 1960. 139.

that the two moves were unclear by themselves, but rather that they seemed to pull in different directions. On the mne hand, the Casa- blanca group was attempting to strengthen its own internal solidarity; on the other, it seemed to be calling for a renewed attempt to break down the barriers between the two groups.

A closer look at the situation, however, would leave little doubt as to which move was the most significant. It was clear immediately that neither an African High Command nor a Common Market would have much practical effect; vast distances and considerable variation in military power and commitments, added to totally dissimilar economies, made it highly unlikely that these plans would be realized.

On the other hand, the dipœomatic feeler put out for a new conference was vitally important. With Algeria on the eve of full independance, the main source of conflict at Lagos was eliminated. A new initiative at this time, then, represented a willingness to proceed with the task at hand and let bygones b' bygones.

The reaction amongst the Monrovia group, however, was decidedly cool, especially in Abidjan. President Houphouet-Boigny strongly criticized the Casablanca decisions, and in Lagos the unity initiative was greeted with two laconie sentences: "Any move to unity is welcome.

We would expect the lesser unit to join the greater unit"(])•

These remarks served to illustrate the extent of the split that had developed as a result of the Lagos debacle.

There appeared, however, to be no lack of initiatives.

(7) ibid. 140.

Immediately after the Cairo conference, Sekou Toure once more announced his willingness to mediate between Ghana and Nigeria, in order to scotch wbat be regarded as the most serious division between the two blocs(a). This was quickly followed by a visit by MOHi8o

Keita to the Ivory Coast, and one by Houphouet-Boigny to Guinea.

In both cases disagreements seemed slight, and there was considerable (9) talk of economie accords between the three countries involved •

The general spirit of these visita was embodied at the Libreville meeting of the Union Africaine et Malagache(lO). As at

Cairo, however, their initiatives were two-faced. On the one band, they moved still further towards economie, cultural, and technical co-operation. Having already establisbed a co-ordinated defence policy, an airline, and an economie organization (~CE), they decided to proceed further towards complete standardization in marketing procedures, particularly within the EEC. On the other hahd, there was a widespread feeling that a strengthening of the

UAM would render co-operation with the rest of Africa more difficult, particularly with regard to their special status in the EEC.

On the otber band, the conference made a diplomatie gesture towards the Casablanca bloc. They announced first of all that they were not going to nominate Mauritania for a seat on the Security

Council as they bad planned, and they sent a conciliatory note to the

King of MOr oc co.

(8) ibid., June 25, 1960.

(9) West Africa, Aug. 25, 1962.

(10) West Africa, Sept. 22, 1962. 141.

As the end of the year approached, the visits and new accords multiplied as if the sands of time were running out. In September a (ll) commer i ca 1 treaty was s i gne d b etween Mali and t h e I vory Coas t •

This alliance could not but have a dissolving impact on the two blocs, especially as it meant that the Ivory Coast was in future to be Mali's outlet to the sea. It also implied, when coupled with Guinea's refusal to take advantage of a Ghanaian loan, the complete failure of the Guinea-Ghana-Mali Union. As one writer put it, "Ghana ••• appears to be the only member of the union with unreserved enthusiasm . (12) for its perpetuatJ.on" •

Other visits in this round-robin included one by President

Olympio of Togo to Conakry, a meeting in the uplands between Toure and

Senghor, a visit by Niger's President Diori to Guinea, a trip by

Houphouet-Boigny to Senegal, and finally a three-~n summit between

Keita, Houphouet-Boigny, and Toure, which bad the avowed purpose of

"erasing differences"(l3).

The significant development that came out at these meetings was the now-universal fendency for the French-speaking members of both blocs to get back on good terms with each other. This development together with the elimination of the Algerian issue as a source of friction following its achievement of independence in the summer of

1962, left the Ghana-Nigeria conflict as the only real obstacle to

(11) West Africa, Oct. 6, 1962.

(12) Kloman, op. cit., P. 122.

(13) See West Africa, Oct. 6, Nov. 3, Dec. 21, 1962. 142.

the formation of a single ali-inclusive African organization.

2. The Togo Crisis - A Fly in the Ointment.

Just at the moment the wounds seemed about to heal, they were re-opened by the assassination of President Olympia of Togo in

January 1963. He was murdered by some dissident army elements, who· proceeded to stage a coup d'etat and install Nicholas Grunitsky as provisiona1 President(14).

This act produced immediate shock and outrage for two reasons. First of a11, it represented the first time, with the exception of the Congo, that the military bad seriously and open1y interfered in politics, and, with the same exception, the first time that political assâssination bad been used in conjunction with a seizure of power.

Second1y, it was wide1y be1ieved that Ghana was implicated.

Bare1y a week before the assassination, Ghana warned Togo that if she continued to harbour Ghanaian po1itica1 refugees, Ghana wou1d

"take such steps as may be found necessary"(lS). Nor was this a11.

Immediately after the assassination, Ghana moved substantial concent rations of troops to the Togo border(lG). Furthermore, no sooner bad Grunitsky established himself than he p1edged to return a11 po1itica1 refugees to Ghana, and paid a long visit to Accra, in the

11 1 course of which he signed a "non-interference p1edge ( 7). From this

(14) The New York Times, Jan. 12, 1963. (15) West African Pilot, Jan. 7, 1963.

(16) Daily Times, Jan. 20,1963.

(17) West African Pilot, Jan. 26, Feb. 14, 1963. 143.

many drew the conclusion that the plot had been organized by

Dr. Nkrumah to get rid of an enemy.

Even at this time, however, it should have been clear that the asaassination was not the doing of Ghana. First of all, there was not one shred of concrete evidence. Secondly, it is hardly likely that President Nkrumah would make a threat of that kind to

Togo a week before such a thing.was planned. Thirdly, there is some direct evidence painting the other way. Immediately after the coup, the military junta announced that one of its first moves would (18) be to join the UAM • This hardly would have happened if the military had been in cahoots with Accra.

The Nigerian government, however, did not wait until the situation became clear. Almost immediately it decided to take 9 strong action in the event that the coup was engineered from outside(l ).

When it was announced that Ghana had recognized the Grunitsky regime, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Wachuku, called a news conference 2 and delivered a stinging blast( o). He informed the press that any recognition of the Grunitsky government woo1d be regarded by Nigeria

11 11 as an unfriendly act • He charged that the coup was "cold-blooded murder directed, financed, and carried out by someone". He then issued a warning:

"Nigeria will not accept any decision affecting .the territorial integrity or the status of Togo1and without ascertaining the true

(18) West Africa, Jan. 26, 1963.

(19) Daily Times, Jan. 15, 1963.

(20) Daily Times, West African Pilot, Jan. 22, 1963. The two versions differ in detail because no written statement was released. 144.

feeling of the people. Nigeria will not tolerate a dictatorship in Togo."

But he did not stop there. In an unprecedented piece of sabre-rattling, he stated flatly that "for the purpose of our security, Nigeria considera the Ghana-Togo border as her frontier

We are not unaware of the massive buildup of troops on the Togo border by the Ghana government ••• we must warn any ambitious person to keep clear of the internai affairs of Togo and to curb his ambitions".

This statement cannot be regarded as other than a colossal blunder, perhaps the worst made by Nigeria since independence. First, she accused Ghana of a serious crime without direct proof, jeopard- izing both Ghanaian-Nigerian relations and her own good name.

Secondly, the statement constituted fully as much of an interference in Togolese interna! affairs as the one charged to Dr. Nkrumah.

Thirdly, it contained a thinly-veiled threat to use military force against Ghana or Togo or both, a posture which seemed strangely at odds with her usual dislike of aggressive action - and, indeed, with the principles she had enunciated at Lagos! Fourthly, the sudden

"expansion11 of Nigeria 1 s frontiers must have caused a good deal of concern and annoyance in Lmme and Cotonou, and probably raised questions in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon as to how deeply Nigeria's

"security" involved their territories. Reaction to this statement must have indeed been unfavourable, because Balewa publicly rebuked his minis ter:

"I feel that in matters of this nature people should be a

11 2 little guarded and not allow oneself to be carried away ( l)•

(21) Daily Times, Feb. 2, 1963. 145.

Another man who was outraged at the assassination was Sekou

Toure. He called it "an odious plot, knowingly organized outside the 22 country"( ). But on1y taken out of context cou1d this remark be said to support Nigeria's claim that Ghana was responsible. He also mentions plots against himself, Haile Selassie, Nasser, Lumumba, and even Nkrumah himself~ He felt that this 11 sudden explosion of plots cannot be accidentai", and that they were "organized by the imperialists and their docile instruments". Here he may have been referring to the statement by France reminding one and all that France bad a mi1itary assistance treaty with Togo, and warning others not to 23 11 interfere"( ). At all events, he could not possibly have meant

Ghana. Nonetheless, he was angry when that nation recognized the

Grunitsky regime, and cabled his "surprise" to Accra(24).

Nigeria followed up ber declaration of po1icy by officially asking Ghana to pull ber troops back from the Togo border, and ca11ing a meeting of the Council of Mlnisters under the emergency 25 clause of the Lagos Charter( ). Guinea expressed ber desire to attend and ber request was quick1y granted.

This meeting, whweb2consisted largely of African representatives in Lagos for the sake of speed, soon became embroiled in sharp (26) controversy • On the one band, Guinea, supported by Nigeria and

(22) West African Pilot, Jan. 25, 1963.

(23) Daily Times, Jan. 15, 1963.

(24) ibid.' Jan. 24, 1963.

(25) ibid.' Jan. 23, 1963.

(26) Dai1y Times, Jan. 26, 1963; West Africa, Feb. 2, 1963. 146.

(27) • to a 1esser degree the Ivory Coast , came out 1n favour of (28) non-recognition of the new regime. On the other hand, Dahomey , Cameroon(29 >, and Senega1(30) all decided to accord her recognition.

Nor was there much support for the thesis that Nkrumah was responsible; in fact, President Hubert Maga of Dahomey stated flatly that ~rumah (31) had "behaved very correctly in the recent crisis" • 32 After much wrangling they issued a final commmnique( ). Four points were of note. First, it asked for consideration of mutual security arrangements at Addis Ababa. Secondly, it called on the Togo government to establish the rule of law and constitutional guarantees, free political prisoners, and organize elections. Thirdly, it called on the Togo government to receive a commission made up of members from the conference states to investigate the assassination(33 ).

Fourthly, it recommended that "where there is sufficient evidence that internai subversion has been engineered by another state, diplomatie relations with that state be severed by all members of the Inter

African and Malagasy Organization"(34).

Clearly, while Nigeria had won the issue of theoretical principle, she had lost the contest at hand. The conference did not

(27) ibid.

(28) West African Pilot, Jan. 26, 1963. (29) Daily Times, op. cit. (30) West African Pilot, Jan. 24, 1963. (31) ibid. (32) Daily Times, Jan. 29, 1963. (33) ibid., Jan. 31, 1963. (34) West African Pilot, Jan. 29, 1963. 147.

agree to refuse recognition to the new Togolese government and, in fact,

as one writer pointed out, the requests made of the Togo government

constituted de facto recognition(3S). Further, there is considerable

evidence to show that many African states were not at all happy about

Nigeria's handling of the entire affair, and particularly the part

played by Mr. lfachuku. As the "Pilot" put it, they were angered by 36 his "threats and boasts", and "they slapped his face"( ). In the

end, the conference broke up having nagreed only to disagree"(37).

All in all, it can scarcely be said that this incident

reflected much credit on Nigeria, and especially upon her foreign

minister. It is also true that while relations with Guinea were

stronger than ever, those with Ghana had hit their nadir. The wrath

of the Ghanaian press knew no bounds, and after the publication of

the Lagos communique, the Ghanaian High Cammissioner in Lagos was

recalled(38). This in turn caused a postponement of the proposed

All-Africa Foreign Ministers' Meeting scheduled for February in Tunis(39).

By now many African leaders had become thoroughly alarmed.

Senghor appealed for reason to prevail, and said that the projected

Addis Ababa meeting was "too important a conference to be allowed 4 to fail11 ( 0).

(35) ibid.' Feb. 2, 1963.

(36) ibid.' Jan. 31, 1963.

(37) West Africa, Feb. 9, 1963.

(38) West African Pilot, Feb. 8, 1963 •.

(39) ibid., March 4, 1963.

(40) Daily Times, Feb. 19, 1963. 148.

Perhaps under pressure from some of his confreres, Dr. Nkrumah decided to make an initiative. He sent out notes in which he explained his plans and hopes for a united Africa(4l). Hœs proposais called for a common foreign policy, a common development plan, a common currency, and a joint defence system. These, he said, would eut waste and reduce dependance on Europe. He paid tribute to the efforts of both blocs, which he called 11clear manifestations of the desire to achieve African unityn.

While these proposals found little favour with the Nigerian government, they nonetheless represented a proffering of the olive branch from Accra. In this he was aided by President Tubman, who came out strongly in favour of p1aying down differences before Addis Ababa, and said he saw nothing wrong wi th a '\nerger" between Liberia, Guinea, 42 and Sierra Leone( }. A1so, Senegal and Mali made conciliatory (43} gestures to one another for the first time since their separation •

In this context, the meeting of the heads of state of the

UAM at Ouagadougou provided a much-needed shot in the arm for the addis Ababa meeting. The tone was set by Leon Mba of Gabon who pleaded, nlet us not shut ourselves in the ivory tower of our union and . (44) remain aloof from the problems of the rest of Africa and the wor1d" •

In this he was strong1y supported by Senghor. The conference did not, however, achieve agreement on the recognition of Togo, which wou1d have put pressurè on Nigeria. Ivory Coast and Upper Volta dissented

(41) ibid., Feb. 22, 1963; contents in West African Pilot, April 19, 1963.

(42) West Africa, Feb. 9, 1963.

(43) ibid.

(44) Daily Times, March 13, 1963. 149. strongly(45 ). These nations both thought themselves to be under severe pressure from Ghana, the Ivory Coast in the form of a "redshirt" insurrection in February(46), Upper Volta from pressure to join the 47 Guinea-Ghana-Mali union and thus link the three territories together( >. Another encouraging sign was the stupendous success of 48 Sekou Toure's visit to Nigeria in Apri1( ). He bad a long conference with the Nigerian Prime Minister, at the end of which they were able to announce agreement on three major points(49).

The first was the Togo question. They agreed that the present government was "illegal and unconstitutional", and refused to recognize it. Secondly, they reached a tacit agreement on the correct approach to African unity. This was made plain when Tour~ was asked a question about a "political union of African states".

He replied, '~ybe the gentleman who as~ed the question was talking of African unity. Then I will not hesitate to say that I have great confidence in Africa and its unity ••• "

Thirdly, there was agreement that the Addis Ababa Conference must not be allowed to fail or "the future of Africa is doomed"(SO).

But more than political accords came out of the meeting.

The two leaders also agreed to take a number of concrete steps to bring their countries closer together(Sl). Specifically, they made

(45) West African Pilot, March 15, 1963. (46) West Africa, Feb. 16, 1963.

(47) Kl~n, op. cit., P. 122. (48) Daily Times, Apr. 26, 1963; West Africa, May 4, 1963. (49) ibid., Apr. 30, 1963. (50) The New York Times, May 1, 1963. (51) Daily Times, Apr. 30, 1963. 150.

plans for a trade pact, direct air service, the expansion of postal,

telegraph, and telephone services, and exchange of teachers and

students.

This visit made it clear that a new pattern of alignment was

springing up, and attested to the success of Nigeria's efforts to woo the Casablanca nations. Their achievement was made yet sweeter by Cyrille Adoula's visit to Niaeria, where, after obtaining techniaâl

and administrative assistance, he stated that he possessed a "complete 52 identity of views" with Balewa on African aatters< l.

There remained yet one stumbling-block - the scheduled meeting

of the Casablanca group in MOrocco on May 8, If this took place, all

the hard work that had gone into the breaking down of the blocs might be swallowed up in a renewed expression of Casablanca solidarity. But after an exchange of "secret notesn between Nigeria and Algeria at

the end of Apri1(53 ), the Algerian government requested the npost- ponement of the meeting". Faced with this request plus the dis inclination of Sekou Tour~ to attend, the MOroccan government had no choice but to accede(54). This act placed the tombstone at the head of the Casablanca bloc(55>.

3. The Last Act - Addis Ababa, May. 1963.

The gathering at Addis Ababa took place in two stages, as did Lagos. It consisted of a prolonged foreign ministers' meeting

(52) ibid.' May 9' 1963.

(53) ibid.' May 15.

(54) The New York Times, May 1, 1963.

(55) ibid.' May 4, 1963. 151.

to draw up the agenda and smooth the way, followed by the Heads of

State meeting itself.

The foreign ministers' meeting began with substantial

agreement on one vital issue - that the two blocs must be merged

into some sort of common organization (56) • . Beyon d this, there was widespread agreement on many miner items mn the agenda. Nigeria took the lead in presenting a comprehensive list including a Pan-African

airways, cultural co-operation, and so forth(S7). Nigeria also put

forward items that, while far from miner, were not subject to any

severe disagreement. The delegates agreed, for example, that on

the question of racism and colonialism, the time for resolutions was over, and the time for action - institutionalized, multilateral action- bad arrived(SB). At the same time, however, they decreed

that only 11self-governing territories11 (i.e., Kenya and Nyasaland)

amongst non-independent States could come to the conference, and then only as observers(59).

They also agreed to discuss the questions of an African

Common Market, a common currency, and the setting up of a conciliation commission.

After some discussion on these points, the conference agreed

to draw up the agenda on the basis of the Ethiopian draft in order to give the honour to the host country(6o). However, most of the items

(56) West African Pilot, May 17, 1963.

(57) ibid.

(58) The Times, May 23, 1963.

(59) West Africa, May 25, 1963.

(60) West African Pilot, May 18, 1963. 152.

on the agenda - and particularly those dealing with modes of practical • • i i. (61) co-operati on - were o f Ni ger~an 1nsp rat on •

On two items, however, there was furious disagreement. The first was the question of a charter for the new organization. This 62 developed into a three-cornered fight( ). Nigeria wanted the (63) Lagos charter to be the basis of discussions • Mr. Kojo Botsio,

Ghana's Foreign Minister, presented the conference with a set of proposals contained in a book published by Nkrumah just before the conference. These included "over-all economie planning on a continental basis", "the establishment of a unified military and

11 defence strategy , "a unified foreign policy and diplomacy", and 64 11a continental parliament"( ). Ethiopia also presented a charter drawn up by aMr. Truco of Chile based on that of the Organization of American States(6S).

The Ghartâian proposals, sharply different from the other two, never really had much chance of acceptance. Nigeria and Ethiopia, 66 however, remained at loggerheads over their drafts( ). The final solution was to "modify" the Ethiopian plan until it was acceptable . (67) to Nigeria, and then present it as the basis for discussions •

(61) Daily Times, May 18, 1963.

(62) Norman J. Padelford, "The Organization of African Unity",

International Organization, Vol. 18, No. 3(Summer 1964); P. 525-526.

(63) Daily Express, May 17, 1963.

(64) Nkrumah, op. cit., P. 218-221.

(65) Padelford, op. cmt.

(66) Daily Times, May 20, 1963.

(67) Africa Diary, Vol. 3, No. 23 (June 1-7, 1963) P. 1182. 153.

But the foreign ministers balked at recommending this draft for acceptance by the Heads of State, and instead asked the latter group (68) to set up machinery to draft a "master chartern • This indicated that there was still a good deal of disagreement amongst the ministers as to the final provisions of the Charter. A good many delegates felt it best to go slow, in order that the final result be as deliberate as possible. For, as Doudou Thiam of Senegal said,

'lwe are not magicians"(G9). Nevertheless, the decision of the ministers to put off the final adoption of a charter represented a setback 7 for Ethiopian efforts to have the meeting draft one without delay( o).

The difficulties over the charter, however, paled into insignificance beside the question of Togo. Nigeria's original recommendation - that Togo be excluded from the conference - was not accepted by the foreign ministers(7l). She then modified her position, and maintained that as a substantive issue was involved, it was 72 necessary to take the matter up at the Heads of State meeting( ).

Ghana, on the other hand, maintained that Togo's inclusion was 73 automatic( >. Messrs. Wachuku and Botsio exchanged no small number of very heated words over the matter. In this instance, Ghana had a good deal more support for her stand on Togo than she had for her proposais for African unity. She was backed up by Chad, Senegal,

(68) The Times, May 23, 1963.

(69) West Africa, May 25, 1963.

(70) Padelford, op. cit., P. 524-525.

(71) Daily Times, May 18, 1963.

(72) West African Pilot , May 20, 1963.

(73) ibid. 154.

. (74) Cameroon, Dahomey, and - surprisingly - by Sierra Leone and Mauretania •

Nonetheless, the Nigerian-Guinean view clearly had majority support, 75 and an invitation was not sent( >. In assessing this conference, two remarks can be made. First, one cannot help but agree with Professor Padelford that "taken all told, the ministers' meeting was disappointing, leaving doubts as

11 76 to the usefulness of the coming summit ( ). For if the central purpose of the Heads of State conference was to agree on plans to unite the two blocs, the foreign ministers' admonition to set up a separate body to study the matter would make a meeting at the highest level redundant.

Secondly, much of the responsibility for the relative failure of the ministers' conference must rest with Nigeria and Mr. Wachuku in particular. On both major contentious issues before the meeting,

Nigeria's minister had taken a stubborn and obstructionist position.

As we have seen, she refused to consent to Ethiopia~:e draft charter, even after it had been "modified" so as to be almost identical to hers.

He also irritated many nations with what they considered his rather 77 self-righteous attitude towards Togo( >. Apparently a good number of countries wanted to recognize Togo, but "it is being said that nobody 78 wants to offend Nigerian( >. It was no overstatement that Nigeria's reputation "risked damage because of the clumsy tacties of Mr. Jaja

(74) ibid.

(75) The Times, May 20, 1963.

(76) Padelford, op.cit., P. 528.

(77) Daily Times, May 20, 1963.

(78) West African Pilot, May 27, 1963. 155.

n(79) w:ac h u ku • One labour leader summed up the general feeling: "It would be a sad day for the people of Nigeria if the breakdown of the conference could be traced to our door"(8o). The Heads of

State Conference could not have opened on a less auspicious note.

Three themes were evident in the speeches of the Heads of

State and Government. The first was a militant anti-colonialism almost completely absent at Monrovia and Lagos. To be sure it was not surprising to hear Ben Bella call for a '~lood bank before a development bank", or Sekou Toure demanda deadline for decomonization

"after which our armed forced must intervene"(Sl). What was interesting was the fact that the so-called "moderates" appeared to outdo them. Milton Obote said "I would go to the extent of

11 82 offering Uganda as a training ground •'•. for liberation forces ( ).

Houphouet-Boigny attacked "Portugal' s , criminal obstinacy", and Senghor 83 called for a 11methodical blockade11 of that country ( ). Balewa charged that foreign aid, no matt~r what the source, might lead to "colonization 84 in a different form"( ). As one writer put it, 11 there are no longer any 'moderate' states in this respect"(8S).

A second theme visible throughout was gradualism in the approach to African unity. Selassie set the tone in his opening speech when he declared, "The union which we seek can only come

(79) The Times, May 27, 1963. (80) West African Pilot, May 21, 1963. (81) ibid., May 25, 1963. (82) ibid., May 24, 1963. (83) West Africa, June 1, 1963. (84) Dai1y Times, May 25, 1963.

(85) West Africa, op cit. 156,;

gradually, as the day-to-day progress which we achieve carries us 6 slowly but inexorably along this course11 (S ). Bourguiba said that uni ty could arise only from 11the consent - the real, profound, and fully-expressed consent of the people", and "can never be imposed by means of force or subversion serving a desire for supremacy, which, 8 he said, bad caused some to "turn away from unity"( 7). Houphouet-

Boigny asked for "absolute tolerance, scrupulously and religiously 8 observed11 (a ). Nyerere asked, '~hat is sming far enough? No mason 89 would complain that his first brick did not go far enough"( ).

But perhaps Balewa came out the strongest of all:

"The first essential is for all countries to denounce subversion ••• Some people say those colonial boundaries must disappear overnight. Nigeria will not accept that ... Nigeria recognizes the existing boundaries ... My country stands for the practical approach to the unity of the African continent ••• To my mind we cannot achieve unity as long as some African countries 9 continue to carry on subversive activities in other African countries"( o).

The only odd man out was Ghana; and she, sensing the will of the majority, proclaimed herself satisfied that the 11principle" of

African unity bad been affirmed, and did not press hét proposals(9l).

The final and most crucial theme was a sense of urgency.

Haile Selassie, sensing the rather despondent mood at the opening of

(86) Padelford, op. cit., P. 529.

(87) West African Pilot, May 24, 1963.

(88) Padelford, op. cit., P. 531.

(89) ibid.

(90) Daily Times, May 25, 1963.

(91) Padelford, op. cit., p. 531. 157.

the heads of state meeting, decided a bold initiative, sorne brave words were necessary:

"The task on which we have embaaked will not wait. We must act, to shape and mold the future and leave our imprint on events as they slip past into history •••

Let us here and now agree upon the basic instrument that will· constitute the foundation for further growth in peace and harmony and oneness of this continent ••• Let us not put off, to later consideration and study, the single act, the one decision, which must emerge from this gathering if it is to have any real meaning.

This conference cannot close without adopting a single African charter"(92 ).

This Churchillian prose seemed to mobilize the delegates to action. Nkrumah insisted that, here and now, the conference "set up effective machinery for achieving African unity"(93 ). Balewa

11 94 said flatly "we can't leave Addis Ababa without sorne kind of Charter ( >, 95 and in this he was strongly backed by Houphouet-Boigny( ). With these powerful leaders firmly on the side of immediate action a

16-1/2 hour marathon meeting was begun(96 ). From this meeting emerged the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

(92) ibid., P. 528-530.

(93) Daily Times, May 25, 1963.

(94) ibid.

(95) West Africa, June 1, 1963.

(96) West African Pilot, May 27, 1963. 158.

4 • The Charter of Uni ty •

The Charter signed at Addis Ababa is in its essence simply a slightly re-phrased version of the Lagos Charter. The Addis Ababa document can therefore best be studied in close comparison with its predecessor at Lagos.

First"li the pu'#poses are virtually identical. As at Lagos, the stress is on diplomatie, economie, educational, health, scientific, and defence co-operation.<97 )

Secondly, the basic principles of intra-African co-operation, introduced by Nigeria at MOnrovia and codified in the Lagos Charter, . (98) occupy an equally prominent position at Addis Ababa • Two new additions have been made, however. They caU for "absolu te dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent", and "affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs"(99 >. These new principles no doubt reflect the presence of the Casablanca states at the conference. It j is interesting to speculate how a principle of "non-alignment" can be reconciled with the close military ties most of the ex-French states still have with France.

Thirdly, the machinery set up by the two charters is virtually identical; the Addis Ababa Charter echoes Lagos in setting up an

Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers,

(97) Article II (text in Davidson, op. cit., P. 183-199).

(98) Article III: 1-5.

(99) Article III: 6-7. 159.

a General Secretariat, and a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, (100) and Arbitration • Differences in the operation of the two drafts boil down to such trivialities as frequency of meetings and aize of (101) majorities • An interesting sidelight in this regard is the fact that the head of the Secretariat is styled the ..Administrative Secr~tary-General 11 (l0 2 ), a title whose slumsiness can only be explained as an attempt to deny him the powers of political initiative possessed by his counterpart at the UN.

OUtside these three basic similarities there are minor differences. For example, new membership is no longer automatic, (103) but must be approved by a majority of members , and the

Organization is no longer to refer disputes over interpretation to an extra-African tribunal(l04).

Two more significant departures are contained in the resolutions which follow the charter proper. The first calls for the establishment of a "èo-ordinating cotmnittee" made up of Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, the UAR, Tanganyika, Congo-Leopoldville, Guinea, Senegal, and Nigeria, to harmonize and direct national liberation movements in dependent territories(lOS). The second caUs on all nations to "deci.lre and accept Africa as a denuclearized zoné~ 'the banning of all nuclear and

11 thermonuclear tests ; and the "removal of all military bases from

Africa and the disentanglement of African countries from military

(100) Article VII.

(101) Articles IX, XII, XIV.

(102) Article XVI.

(103) Article XXVIII.

(104) Article XXVII; see West African Pilot, Jan. 1, 1963.

(105) Davidson, op. cit., P. 193. 160.

(lOi) pacts with foreign powersn • It is, once more, easy to see

Casablanca inf~uence here, and at the same time, incompatibility with the policies of much of French-speaking Africa.

Five general conclusions may be drawn from the Addis Ababa meeting.

First, it settled once and for all that African unity was to build on the existing political status quo in black Africa. As one writer put it, they re-ratified the Treaty of Berlin at Addis Ababa(lO]).

Secondly, it marked the emergence of Nigeria as the single most powerful nation in the intra-African system. Her dominance in the drafting of a Charter, the way in which she commanded respect and even obedience from dissenting nations, and the relatively generens and progressive way these pvwers were used (at least at the Heads of State meeting) moved ber a step closer towards the pre-eminent role envisaged for ber at the timè of ber independence. If Haile Selassie was the Sun King of the conference, Sir

Abubakar was the Cardinal Richelieu.

Thirdly, and as a corollary to the first two points, the conference represented the final laying to rest of Ghana's bopes for continental leadership. Not merely were ber elaborate proposals for

African unity completely ignored, but she was even denied a place on the co-ordinating committee for liberation movements - an omission unthinkable only a few years earlier. Dr. Nkrumah had clearly

(106) ibid., P. 196.

(107) Le Monde Diplomatigue,juin, 1963, P. 3. 161.

overplayed his· band; so, in the end, he played it alone.

Fourthly, the conference marked the establishment of a

common consensus as regards the two overwhelming problems facing

the Afr~can state system; the problem of relations with the outside

world, and the problem of the white-ruled territories on the African

continent. The divisions on these issues which had emasculated earlier

attempts at finding a common denominator seamed fast disappearing.

Ironically enough, the decisions which the conference made were largely

those advocated by the radical nations, and particularly Ghana, for

some time. Their suspicion of cold war bloc politics and towering

fury at colonialism and racism had been, through constant repètition,

internalized and adopted by the '~oderates". It was not a victory

for the Radicals, but a decision by the moderates to do radical things.

Fifthly, and most important of all, the conference represented

the closing of the circle of African unity. Before 1960 they were

too few to be divided; after 1960 they were too many to be united.

This conference represented the first time they had all sat down

together as the independent nations of Africa. Africa thus achieved in three years what had taken Latin America one hundred and thirty(lOS);

to agree that what they had in common outweighed by far the differences between them, and build from this fact a functioning international

organization.

(108) Padelford, op. cit., P. 540. 162.

CONCLUSIONS

Three general condluding observations may be drawn from this study.

The first relates to the character of political interaction in Africa. For various reasons - geography, logistics, economies, and political inhibitions on the part of states in and outside of

Africa - the effective application of military coercion to the achievement of political goals has been almost non-existent. This produces an entirely new sort of political environment for the operation of international relations. It produces, for one thing, an extremely fluid pattern of alignment. Unhampered by the necessity of obtaining protection against external attack, alignments can shift back and forth with amazing rapidity according to fluctuating internai pressures and the personal prejudices of policy-making elites.

A comparison may be made with the so-called '~alance of power system" operating in Euttope from Westphalia to Sarajevo. Here too the relative impermeability of states to destruction or serious damage by means of military invasion produced a pattern of political interaction based on shifting alignments. In contemporary Africa this situation is seen in extremis. The result is what we might call a ''no-power system". This makes it almost impossible for the states of the system to establish a hierarchy amongst themselves. If international politics are confined to diplomacy, then the theoretical concept of "sovereign equality" will tend to be realized in fact; the weaker nations will more easily assert themselves against the 163.

stronger. This largely explains Nigeria's difficulties in assuming the mantle of leadership in spite of the fact that she possesses one sixth of the continent's population.

A second observation may be made concerning the role of ideology in the system. One might expect from the foregoing that it would play a major role in the absence of substantial military power, as indeed it bas. The attractive force of the concepts of independence, African unity, and non-alignment, ean easily be seen by tracing.their history from their unilateral promulgation by Ghana in 1957 to their universal acceptanc8 in 1963. But this very universality now prevents them from being used as the central instruments of national policy they were in the beginning. Thus, paradoxically, the greater the "success" afforded Ghana's point of view, the less influential Ghana became. An interesting parallel may be drawn with the Soviet Union. It is precisely ber success in spreading and consolidating the Communist ideology which is weakening her influence within the bloc.

A third observation relates to the role of leadership in the two African blocs. As we have seen, African unity was finally achieved by the disintegration and absorption of the Casablanca bloc by the MOnrovia group. The underlying reason for this, in direct contradiction to the protestations of the MOnrovia statesmen, lay in the fact that MOnrovia bad effective leadership, while Casablanca did not. Monrovia was domim ted by two nations - the Ivory Coast by virtue of its special relationship with former French Africa, and

Nigeria because of its size and the diplomatie skills of its leaders.

As a result, it was able to achieve an increasing degree of internai 164. solidarity and consensus. By contrast, the Casablanca group seemed to be all leaders and no followers. Three of its members - Ghana,

Guinea, and the UAR - had definite aspirations as regards African leadership. Further, they were such a polyglot crew that no tmmediately visible bond - either racial or religious - could reinforce their ideological agreements. The result was that in contrast to MOnrovia, the degree of solidarity and consensus within

Casablanca underwent a continuai decline from the time of its birth.

Thus, African unity was achieved. The one question remaining is: will the slender threads binding the African nations together hold firm, or will they be rent asunder between the Scylla of breakneck development and the Charybdis of the Cold War? At this writing, the signs are hopeful. 165.

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Quarterly, Vol. 31 (1961-62), P. 62-73.

Weeks, George, "The Armies of Africau, Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 1

(Jan. 1964). 171.

PERIODICA.IS

Africa Diary

Africa Digest

Africa Report (formerly Africa Special Report)

Afr ica Today

Africa World

African Recorder

Afrique Contemporaine

Current History

Federal Nigeria

Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth.

Le MOnde Diplomatique

Overseas Review (Barklay Bank) , Presence Africaine

The Economist

The New Statesman (formerly New Statesman and Nation)

West Africa

NEWSPAPERS

Nigerian

The Daily Express (formerly the Daily Service)

The Daily Times

West African Pilot

Other African

Afrique Nouvelle (Dakar)

The Ghana Evening News

The Ghanaian Times 172.

Non-African

Le Monde

The Montreal Star

The New York Ttmes

The Times (London)

The Observer

DOCUMENTS

The Const.itution of Nigeria and Regions, Statutory Instruments, 1960,

No. 1652 (West Africa), First to Fourth Schedules.

Report on the UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas,

1963.

Resolutions of the Plenary Sessions, Conference of Heads of African

and Malagasy States, Held at Monrov1a• City Hall, 8 th-12 th

May, 1961. MOnrovia, Liberian Information Service, 1961.

UN Demographie Yearbook, 19631

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