Contadora's Tortuous Path

latin american issues May 25, two positions arose around Contadora's Contadora's ultimatum. On the one hand, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica Tortuous Path stated their willingness to sign the Treaty on June 6. Nicaragua, on the other hand, insisted it would sign only if Washington ceased its agression. Guatemalan president Vinicio Cerezo said that Nicaragua's position would mean an end to Latin When hopes were high for a The main point of tension at America's peace efforts in peaceful resolution, new the diplomatic summit was Central America. Likewise, in pressures once again Nicaragua's refusal to sign a his inaugural address on prevented the signing of the joint communique agreeing May 8, the new Costa Rican Contadora Treaty to a set date for the Peace president, Oscar Arias treaty's signature. Managua Sánchez, stated that the Contadora's efforts toward a argued that it could not Contadora Treaty was the peaceful, political solution to "dismantie its army at a time only alternative for the the Central American crisis when it is under attack from region, "or an apocalyptic increasingly resemble an the number one economic war will destroy us all." Hon- endless race. Each time the and military power in the duran head of state, José contestants seem to be world." Azcona, took a similar reaching the end of the stance. track, the finish-line gets Significantly, three pulled further back. Time Democratic congressmen Yet this eagerness to sign and time again, obstacles from the U.S., and a the Treaty changed, follow- appear in the path of new representative of the Euro- ing the presidential summit peace proposals. pean Economic Community, in the Guatemalan town of were present at the meeting Esquipulas. On May 27 In their search for a as observers. Contadora is- Rodolfo Castillo Claramount, breakthrough, the foreign af- sued a formal petition to the who is both vice-president fairs ministers of Mexico, United States Congress re- and minister of foreign af- Venezuela, Colombia and questing that the vote on fairs in the Salvadoran ad- Panama (the countries that President Reagan's ministration, declared that make up the Contadora proposed $100 million in aid his government would ask Group), as well as their to the contra "at least" be Contadora for an extension counterparts from Peru, postponed. on the time-limit. On the fol- Argentina, Brazil and lowing day, the Costa Rican Uruguay (the Contadora Between the April 7 meeting government said they con- Support Group), met in in Panama and the Central sidered the June 6 deadline Panama last April 5 through American presidential sum- "utopian." 7. They agreed on a two- mit held in Guatemala on month ultimatum, ending on June 6, for the five Central American nations to con- clude peace negotiations and sign the Contadora Treaty for Peace and Cooperation in Central America. Thus, the Group's efforts would end on that date. Discussions were tense at the April meeting. Reports indicated there were three main points of disagree- ment: arms controls and reductions, suspension of in- ternational military maneuvers, and treaty verification mechanisms. From left to right: Fernando Cardoze (Panamá). Bernardo Sepúlveda (México), Augusto Ramírez Ocampo (Colombia), Isidro Morales Paul (Venezuela). latin american issues The fact that the Nicaraguan restoration of democracy in "negotiating modifications government had changed its Nicaragua, that it cease to to the Treaty has come to an position was what led support subversion, that it end, since all that remains is Washington's Central break off military ties with to implement and execute American allies to bring up the Socialist countries, and the agreements, given the new obstacles to the that it reduce its military ap- political goodwill of the signature of the Treaty. In paratus. countries concerned." Esquipulas, the Sandinistas not only agreed to sign, they Thus, June 6 loomed closer As for the Panama Declara- presented a list of weapons and closer. Five days before tion, the document states and security aspects they the controversia) date, three basic commitments: would be willing to "reduce, Guatemalan president Central American nations limit, regulate or do away Vinicio Cerezo announced will neither lend their ter- 38 with." that none of the five Central ritory nor support irregular Washington's attitude, on the other hand, wavered between statements of support for Contadora and open opposition to the peace- maker's activities. Presiden- tial envoy to Central America, Philip Habib, first said that the U.S. would sus- pend aid to the contras if Managua signed the Peace . Treaty. Present at Oscar Arias Sánchez's inaugura- tion in San José, Vice- President George Bush declared that the United States would abide by the Contadora agreements if they were "global and verifiable." Nonetheless, a week later, on May 14, White House spokesman Larry Speakes indicated that Washington would not withdraw its support of the contra even if Nicaragua signed the peace accords. The following day, President Reagan confirmed Nicaraguan children defending their national sovereignty. this position. Meanwhile, Washington analysts spoke of struggles within the ad- American nations would forces; no country will join ministration concerning the sign the Peace Treaty on the military or political alliances official position vis a vis programmed date. He ex- that threaten peace and Contadora plained that the decision had security in the region; no been made at the Esquipulas power should provide The differences carne to light presidential summit. So military or logistical support when on May 20 the New June 6 came and went, and to irregular forces or subver- York Times published a Pen- nothing was signed. sive groups, nor threaten the tagon document which use of force as a means of argued that the Peace Treaty But there was one other overthrowing a government would leed the United meeting between Con- in the crea. States to a costly policy of tadora, its Support Groups containment of Nicaragua, and Central American Reactions to the final ver- as well as risking a representatives, to discuss sion of the Peace Treaty and generalized regional war. pending aspects of the to the Panama Declaration The Defense Department agreement. Out of this were diverse. The Sandinista immediately disowned the gathering carne two docu- newspaper, Barricada, said document. The conflict was ments: a definitive version of the documents were a apparently resolved when the Peace Treaty, and the "political bomb for the United the White House recon- Panama Declaration. Jorge States." On the other hand, firmed the official position: Abadía, Panamanian Foreign Guatemalan foreign affairs support for a peace treaty Affairs Minister, declared Minister Mario Quiñones, will be conditioned to the that the time for declared that Contadora's new proposal, "rather than closing gaps between the positions of the Central American countries, in cer tain aspects opens them even further." But the harshest criticism carne from El Salvador and Costa Rica, where the final version of the Treaty was referred to as "an in complete, gray and somewhat intranscendental document." At the same 39 time, it was announced that together with Honduras and Guatemala, they would work on a new plan to resolve the regional conflict. "Con tadora's tutelage has disap peared," said Salvadoran M inister Rodolfo Castillo. And Rodrigo Madrigal, head of Costa Rican diplomacy, accused Contadora of creating an aura of com placency around the San dinistas. "We leave behind the realm of complacency to enter the realm of peremp tory demands." Most regional analysts believe that the Reagan ad ministration's policy of sup port for the contra continues to be the "crucial element" hindering the Contadora agreement. And it's probably no chance coincidence that on the same day Secretary of State George Shultz stated that the Central American countries might reject the final version of the Peace Treaty, the Salvadoran government cal led a meeting to discuss the formation of an alternative to Contadora. Nicaragua was pointedly excluded from the initiative. The road to peace in Central America is long, winding, and full of obstacles. Once more the peace-making group's proposals come up against seemingly insur mountable difficulties. But �e membe� � Conwdora have reaffirmed their deter mination to continue their mediating efforts. The firm support of the world com munity is with them.* Horacio Castellanos Moya .

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