Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye (Eds)
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
LIT
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities
edited by
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
LIT
(Bibliographic information here)
Contents
Preface vii Foreword ix Abbreviations xi
1 Mapping Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 1 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
2 Benin 17 Théodore C. Loko
3 Burkina Faso 45 Jean-Pierre Bayala
4 Côte d’Ivoire 73 Raphaël Ouattara
5 Guinea 95 Dominique Bangoura
6 Mali 125 Mahamadou Nimaga
7 Mauritania 151 Boubacar N’Diaye
8 Niger 177 Anonymous
9 Senegal 205 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone
10 Togo 229 Comi M. Toulabor
11 Entry Points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone 255 West Africa Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
List of Contributors 275 About DCAF 279
Preface
These are defining moments for Africa. The ‘Arab spring’ in North Africa has in some cases overturned regimes that have held power for decades. In other cases, authorities have been impelled to embrace more participative modes of governance. Yet conflicts have also been unleashed that are causing widespread bloodshed and suffering. If these dynamics are evident across the continent, West Africa’s politico-security environment certainly seems to defy prediction. Since this research project was launched, Guinea and Niger’s political landscapes have shifted radically from entrenched authoritarian rule to military regimes of exception and now (following successful elections) to fledgling democratic dispensations. By contrast, elections that were meant to heal divisions in Cote d’Ivoire had the opposite effect as Laurent Gbagbo, until forcibly removed, sought illegitimately to hold onto power. Even in apparently ‘stable’ environments such as Burkina Faso, mutineering soldiers and citizens protesting against the rising costs of basic necessities are combining to challenge the authority of the state. This latter event in particular should provide both a warning and a wake up call for other countries in the sub-region and beyond. It certainly seems to vindicate analyses in this volume that highlight the precariousness of security sector governance in francophone West Africa and the need to attend to this serious challenge through proactive, people focused reforms. What does this mean from the perspective of security sector governance? First, these events demonstrate the transformational role that can be played by civil society. Courageous individuals and groups have responded to their marginalisation and through their actions provoked widespread changes in national and regional governance patterns. But second, removing the political and security elites of the ‘old regime’ is insufficient. Experience tells us that if wider political transitions are to be successful, due attention must be paid to the development of effective, well managed and democratically accountable security sectors. For these reasons, we believe that it is critically important to scratch beneath the surface of security sector governance dynamics in countries where security issues have frequently remained a reserved domain. Only by understanding the issues and perceptions that divide the state, security sector and citizens can we hope to develop legitimate, sustainable reform processes at the national level. This viii volume helps fill this gap through analysing security sector governance in each of the nine francophone West African states. We would like to acknowledge the diverse community of committed actors that have supported our work to shed light on security sector governance in francophone West Africa. First and foremost, this volume has been made possible thanks to the dedication and expertise of our nine country case study authors. We would also like to express our gratitude to the Mission for Democratic Governance within the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs for their generous material and substantive support. Valuable input was provided by DCAF colleagues Heiner Hänggi, Fairlie Chappuis, Nicole Schmied, Lynda Chenaf and Maria Lisiakova. Aviva Proville and Sroda Bedarida-Gaveh contributed their excellent translation skills to this project. Our interim findings were discussed at a meeting held in Dakar in February 2010. This event was one of the fruits of the strategic partnership between the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and DCAF. It was organised jointly with the ECOWAS Commission and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). We would like to thank all those who contributed for offering their valuable insights and ideas.
The views expressed in this volume are those of the authors alone and do not in any way represent the views of the institutions or their representatives involved in this project.
The Editors Geneva, September 2011
Foreword
Should we look for a common thread across the different events that have shaken Guinea, Niger or Cote d’Ivoire, the issue of security would certainly figure prominently. It has proven to be the cornerstone of their democratic transitions; all are confronted in one manner or another with the same question: how to reform their security sectors? West Africa is confronted by multiple tensions and complex security dynamics. Regional actors are prominent in addressing these challenges. These complexities pose specific challenges to any interpretation of local events. A thorough understanding of West Africa requires a detailed analysis of every country as well as a regional appreciation, taking into account political, cultural, economic, social and security factors. This is the approach applied in this study of Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities. The analysis in this publication identifies both challenges and entry points for security sector reform (SSR) in each country while setting this analysis in a broader regional context. As a political process located at the intersection of security, governance and development, SSR aims to develop coherent, coordinated approaches from the range of applicable national actors as well as in the support provided by development partners. SSR is not just about reforming the army, police or the justice system. It calls for a reform of the whole security system, understood in a holistic sense, ensuring that all these actors are subject to democratic oversight (exercised by the state, parliament, civil society, media, etc.). The fundamental goal of SSR is also the (re-) establishment of the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force with security and defence forces placed under civilian control. France is committed to promoting such an approach that links SSR to other processes of transition or development (for example, programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or transitional justice). The French policy on SSR which sets out this approach stresses the necessity of local ownership, an explicit acknowledgement of the political nature of this process as well as the need for its inclusion into wider governance reforms within the state. Both the objectives of the reform process and its implementation must be adapted to the local context.
x
In this spirit, France through the Democratic Governance Unit within the Directorate General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships has developed its cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in this area. DCAF has been responsible for groundbreaking research on SSR since its establishment in 2002. As the fruit of an agreement between France and DCAF signed in 2007, this joint endeavour has sought to promote research and reflection about security systems in the states of francophone West Africa, a region where the intricacies of security matters often remain hidden. By drawing on the knowledge of experts from the region, in-depth analysis of security sector governance dynamics is provided for each country. On this basis, concrete steps are proposed to support SSR. In so doing, this study addresses two major dilemmas of the SSR agenda. On the one hand, SSR is often treated from a narrow security perspective. On the other hand, the issue is often approached through a global prism, which, while relevant, needs to be adapted to the specificities of francophone administrative, legislative and juridical traditions. Based on analysis of the nine francophone states in West Africa, this study seeks to evaluate strengths and weaknesses, consider local capacities, and identify initiatives to improve security sector governance. Through the participation of practitioners, researchers and diverse local actors, this project also seeks to bring together francophone experience on SSR. France, together with its national, regional and international partners, hope that this ambitious and far reaching study will be useful for all those who, in spite of all the complex challenges facing them, work to support security sector reform in West Africa. Bringing together experience about processes, actors and strategies is crucial for the successful implementation of SSR, which always require strategic commitment and strong political leadership from local policy makers and other national actors. SSR seeks to embed a culture of democracy within security forces. It is therefore, ultimately concerned with improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of public institutions and allowing citizens to freely exercise their rights.
Serge Tomasi Director of Global Economy and Development Strategies Directorate General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
List of Abbreviations
ANDDH Association nigérienne pour la défense des droits de l’homme, Nigerien Association for the Defence of Human Rights, Niger APG General political agreement APMT Professional Association of Togolese Magistrates, Togo AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ASSN African Security Sector Network AU African Union, former Organisation of African Unity BAC Anti-crime Squad, Benin BASEP Presidential Guard, Mauritania BPLP Coastline Protection and Antipollution Squad, Benin CAED Foreign Affairs and Defence Commission, Burkina Faso CDR Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, Burkina Faso CEMGA Chief of Joint Military Staff CENI Independent National Electoral Commission CFA African Financial Community CMIS Mobile Intervention and Security Company, Guinea CMJD Military Council for Justice and Democracy, Mauritania CMRN Military Committee for National Recovery, Guinea, Mauritania CNDD National Council for Development and Democracy, Guinea CNDH National Human Rights Commission CNOSCG National Council of Civil Society Organisations, Guinea CNSP National Council of Public Safety, Côte d’Ivoire CODDHD Grouping of Organisations for the Protection of Human Rights and Democracy, Niger CONASCIPAL National Civil Society Coalition for Peace and Control of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Mali COS Strategic Orientation Centre, Senegal
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CRIFF Centre de recherche d’information et de formation pour la femme, Women’s Research Centre for Information and Education, Togo CRS Compagnies républicaines de sécurité, Republican Security Companies, Benin CSM Higher Council of the Judiciary, Togo DDM Disarmament and Dismantlement of the Militia, Côte d’Ivoire DDR Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration DGPN General Police Directorate, Togo DGSN General Department of National Security, Senegal DIC Criminal Investigation Division, Senegal DIRPA Military Public Relations Department, Senegal ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECPF ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework EMIA Joint Forces Military Academy, Guinea ENAM Ecole Nationale de l’Administration et de la Magistrature, National School of Administration and Magistracy, Niger ENVR National Schools with a Regional Dimension, Niger FAN Nigerien Armed Forces, Niger FANCI National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, Côte d’Ivoire FAT Togolese Armed Forces, Togo FNIS National Intervention and Security Force, Niger FPI Front populaire ivoirien, Popular Front of Côte d’Ivoire, Côte d’Ivoire GF2D Action group femme, démocratie et développement, Action group Women, Democracy and Development, Togo GRAD Groupe de réflexion et d’action pour le dialogue, Reflection and Action Group for Dialogue, Togo GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IUHR Inter-African Union for Human Rights, Niger JUDA Jeunesse unie pour la démocratie en Afrique, United Youth for Democracy in Africa, Togo LTDH Ligue togolaise des droits de l’homme, Togolese Human Rights League, Togo
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MALAO Mouvement contre les armes légères en Afrique de l’Ouest, Movement Against Small Arms in West Africa MFDC Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance, Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, Senegal MNJ Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice, Nigerien Movement for Justice, Niger NGO Non-governmental Organisation OAU Organisation of African Unity, now African Union OGA Organisation of African Gendarmeries OIF Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, International Organisation of la Francophonie OPJ Criminal Investigation Department, Niger PARJ Programme of Support to Judicial Reform, Niger PCRD African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development PDG Parti démocratique de Guinée, Democratic Party of Guinea, Guinea PDS Senegalese Democratic party, Senegal PPG Parti du Peuple de Guinée, Guinean People’s Party, Guinea PSC Private Security Company PUP Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès, Guinean Party of Unity and Progress, Guinea RADDHO Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l’homme, African Meeting for the Defence of Human Rights RAID Research, Action, Intervention and Deterrence Group, Benin RPG Rassemblement du people de Guinée, Guinean People’s Rally, Guinea RPT Togolese People’s Rally, Togo SALW Small arms and light weapons SSG Security sector governance SSR Security sector reform UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union UFDG Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée, Union of Democratic Forces, Guinea UFR Union des Forces Républicaines, Union of Republican Forces, Guinea
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UPG Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée, Union for Progress, Guinea UPR Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau, Union for Progress and Renewal, Guinea
Chapter 1
Mapping Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Introduction
A resurgence in the very unwelcome phenomenon of coups d’état in West Africa highlights the importance of security sector governance (SSG) in shaping moves towards more democratic political systems. Transitions from authoritarian rule to more transparent, participative governance frameworks are by no means uniform across West Africa. Each state’s transition takes place within its own unique context and at its own pace. The authoritarian nature of many civilian as well as military regimes has resulted in security sector institutions becoming instruments for regime security. In these cases, exploitation, repression and in some cases the abuse of human rights have characterised the relationship between the security sector and the population. Yet the region also contains many examples of increasingly tolerant and pluralistic political systems that oversee a fairly well-managed security apparatus. However, across the region efforts to enhance democratic governance of the security sector have lagged far behind advances in other areas of public policy. If this state of play is perhaps inevitable under authoritarian regimes, it has also proved to be the case even where democratic transitions have taken root.1 While African states have often been the subject of detailed case- studies covering various aspects of their governance, little systematic research has been dedicated to the nature of SSG across the West African sub-region as a whole. In particular, the developments, challenges and lessons particular to Francophone contexts have not been sufficiently analysed. This knowledge gap has a number of causes and effects. On one level, it highlights a pervasive reluctance among different national actors to critically analyse the security sector and its relationship to state authorities and citizens. In some cases, this reluctance is exacerbated by top-down
2 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye pressure from elites with a vested interest in the status quo. In other cases, there is a lack of capacity, resources and public space at the national level to nurture a robust debate on questions of democratic security sector governance. On another level, this knowledge gap reflects the perceived Anglo-Saxon roots of the security sector reform (SSR) discourse. In West Africa, comprehensive SSR programmes – understood explicitly as such – have so far been limited largely to post-conflict Anglophone contexts such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. As a consequence, the literature on SSR in West Africa has developed a pronounced focus on these same cases. As this Anglophone emphasis is beginning to change, especially with continuing efforts to support SSR in Lusophone Guinea-Bissau and potentially Francophone Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, there is a clear need for further systematic research on SSG and SSR in non-Anglophone contexts in West Africa. This volume seeks to help fill this knowledge gap through promoting a clearer vision of SSG dynamics across the region. Drawing on extensive and varied personal knowledge and experience, contributors analyse SSG in each of the nine Francophone West African states. This context-specific analysis provides a systematic overview that is intended to feed into policy relevant recommendations that will contribute to SSR efforts at national and regional levels. In order to introduce the range of different national contexts within Francophone West Africa, this introductory chapter begins by providing a brief summary of key issues highlighted in the various country chapters. It then sets out an understanding of the SSG/SSR concepts and their evolution in relation to West African specificities. Recent developments are considered that are helping to crystallise the regional framework for SSR in West Africa. This chapter concludes by underlining some of the policy objectives that could be advanced through enhanced knowledge of the national contexts analysed in this volume.
The importance of context
Understanding the nuanced realities of different reform contexts allows us to recognise the challenges specific to each and identify potential entry-points for SSR. Critical analysis that pays due consideration to the diversity of experience from across the region is essential in order to bridge gaps between strong normative regional policy frameworks and support to reform efforts on the ground. Thus, in order to introduce the issues covered in the
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 3 various country chapters, a brief summary of context-specific SSG dynamics is provided below.
Benin
From a particularly challenging backdrop of dysfunctional civil-military relations, Benin’s transition to democracy has resulted in an acknowledgement that human security should represent the guiding principle for the security sector and its governance. However, in terms of implementation, exogenous and endogenous security challenges including increasing levels of domestic crime and trans-border threats exacerbated by Benin’s geopolitical situation pose significant security risks. Théodore C. Loko argues that this context translates into three sets of SSG challenges. First, there is a need for security institutions to better recognise strategic threats and address them within a holistic approach to security provision, management and oversight. Second, there is a need to prioritise the appropriate security sector responses and coordinate efforts on the ground. Finally, popular participation in security decision-making remains minimal, perpetuating cleavages between security providers and citizens.
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso also faces a range of external and internal security challenges from corruption and rising domestic crime rates to transnational trafficking in drugs, gemstones and other commodities. A lack of clarity over national defence and public security roles, a growing private security industry as well as the absence of a culture of transparency and accountability in the security domain represent further security sector governance challenges. Jean-Pierre Bayala argues that better defining the respective roles of the state, the security sector and the different actors responsible for democratic oversight – in particular the National Assembly, the justice sector and civil society – is essential in order to find sustainable solutions to these different challenges.
Côte d’Ivoire
The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates the challenges of improving SSG through SSR in a post-conflict context. The 2010 elections supposed to permit the country to move forward in fact exacerbated tensions, leading to renewed conflict and further suffering. Raphael Ouattara contrasts Côte d’Ivoire’s post-independence stability and prosperity with the political
4 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye pressures that led to the 1999 coup and ultimately to civil war. With the violent resolution of the post-election stand-off, interrelated DDR and SSR activities will require a delicate balance that combines the re- professionalisation of the security sector with the need to re-build trust between the armed forces and citizens. Restoring democratic control of the security sector and ensuring strict oversight over the use of force will be particularly challenging given scale of the post-electoral violence coupled with the array of state and non-state actors involved on both sides.
Guinea
Dominique Bangoura analyses a long history of politicisation of the security sector that has contributed to Guinea’s current security sector governance crisis. Two sets of challenges are identified: indiscipline within the armed forces and repression of the civilian population. Widespread public determination within the country, reinforced by the support of the international community, may represent an opportunity for positive change. However, a root and branch programme of SSR is essential in order to support a wider process of political reform. Guinea thus provides an example of the importance of SSR and SSG in relation to wider political transitions.
Mali
Mali’s democratisation process has proved a positive example of national consensus building. Indeed, this political context has favoured the development of a new national security policy framework that has been characterised by broad civil society participation. Mali thus represents a promising environment for SSR. However, Mahamadou Nimaga underlines an important distinction between institutional reforms on the surface and the absence of deep reforms that require significant additional political will to be implemented in practice. A major challenge for Mali is thus to engage stakeholders beyond the security forces themselves in a discourse on SSG issues in order to ensure the legitimacy and sustainability of the reform process.
Mauritania
The numerous coups or attempted coups that have marked Mauritania’s post-independence history are evidence of deep rooted security sector governance dilemmas within the country. At the heart of this challenge is a
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 5 dysfunctional relationship between security forces, public sector institutions and citizens. In order to understand the state of SSG in Mauritania, Boubacar N’Diaye argues that it is essential to shed light on historical dynamics of politicisation and ethnicisation of the security sector that contributed to the current situation. Only through addressing these deeply engrained divisions can reform truly take root. Mauritania thus provides an example of the possibilities and limits for SSR in a context of political resistance to change.
Niger
Niger’s February 2010 coup d’état ended another political stalemate among the country’s political class and serves as a reminder that military intervention is not a thing of the past. Our contributor’s analysis highlights the challenges faced by Niger’s political system as well as its security sector in all areas of the security apparatus. He argues that while the structure of the security sector may not need any serious alteration, a genuine reform that gives an appropriate role to traditionally excluded actors is essential, albeit hard to achieve. Niger has now made the transition to a new republic under a democratically elected president. The new constitutional order is fragile but may offer a window of opportunity for the authorities to engage in an overdue reform of the security sector.
Senegal
Senegal is the only state in Francophone West Africa that has never experienced a coup. In contrast to many other contexts, the army plays an important role in national life and benefits from a positive image among the population. However, Niagale Bagayoko-Penone identifies weaknesses in other parts of the security sector, notably the gendarmerie, judiciary and the police. Police reform is identified as a particular priority given the troubling relationship between a weak police role in the provision of public security and a growing presence of private security providers in this field. More broadly, a lack of public confidence in these institutions represents a significant challenge.
Togo
Comi Toulabor describes the case of Togo, showing how the security sector governance framework has been distorted over many years by the imperatives of regime security. Politicisation and ethnicisation of security
6 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye institutions represent a major obstacle to the strengthening of democratic governance. Despite a number of ongoing SSR initiatives within the country, the absence of effective oversight and accountability mechanisms undermines hopes for a security sector that is transparent, accountable to public authorities and trusted by Togo’s citizens.
In summary, the security sectors analysed within this volume have been shaped by very different national trajectories. They reflect highly specific cultural, political and socio-economic dynamics. Yet a number of common features also emerge. First, popular participation in matters relating to security is very limited. This results in a widespread lack of public confidence in, or understanding of, security actors. Second, and relatedly, very few examples can be found of processes that have sought to forge a genuinely national vision of security. This lacuna is reflected in an imbalance between preponderant external security capabilities and weak domestic security provision (thus providing additional impetus to the growth of private security actors offering public security). And finally, we see that sectoral reforms (e.g. army, police or gendarmerie) have not been matched by a commensurate emphasis on enhancing security sector governance. Where SSR programmes are evident, a lack of emphasis on management, oversight and accountability therefore risks to undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of these efforts.
Addressing knowledge gaps
Progress has already been made in West Africa to reduce the distance between the Anglophone and Francophone spheres on matters of SSG and SSR. The growing consensus around the need for SSR in West Africa has been supported by developments in the Francophone world. France issued its own policy paper on the concept: Security System Reform: France’s Approach.2 By embracing the core principles and objectives of the SSR approach and making it ‘a key component of France’s strategic action,’ many of the suspicions around the concept in Francophone Africa have been laid to rest. Similarly, the Organisation International de la Francophonie (OIF) also embraced SSR. Specifically, OIF members committed to becoming involved in ongoing SSR debates. The October 2008 Quebec Declaration reiterated the direct links between stability, democracy and peace already highlighted in the Bamako Declaration, emphasising the need to support democratic governance of the security sector within the
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 7
Francophone world. The OIF can serve as an important bridge between internal processes within member states and the support of the international community. These developments have increased the space for public discourse available to Francophone countries in West Africa and contributed momentum to the development of a more integrated regional discourse on SSG and SSR. Despite the labelling of SSR as an Anglo-Saxon concept, the roots of what is now understood as SSR in West Africa can actually be found in the national conferences held in Benin and Mali during the early 1990s. As elaborated in the relevant case study chapters, these events were significant less for the specific reforms that followed and more for the tipping point they represent in re-orienting civil-security relations in these two countries. Yet while SSR activities with and without external support are increasingly evident in Francophone countries such as Mali or Senegal, both knowledge and dialogue on the security sector and its governance remain limited. A lack of appreciation of contextually-specific cultural, political, economic and security dynamics can have significant consequences. At worst, failure to consider the contextual elements of SSR runs the risk of engaging in reforms that cause more harm than good because they fail to adequately account for the very factors that make reform necessary or exacerbate existing tensions and dysfunctions. The lack of focus on the SSR/SSG discourse in Francophone West Africa points to the need to promote a common language in relation to key concepts. Although there are no universally accepted definitions of the security sector, SSG or SSR, this section will attempt to highlight and analyse a number of shared principles commonly discernible in the frameworks developed by influential international, regional and national actors in this area.3 These approaches share the need to move beyond the optic of state security by delivering on the underpinning objective that the security sector should respond to the security needs of individuals and communities.
The security sector
The democratic governance rationale is critical to our analysis of the nature of the security sector and the need for SSR in different Francophone West African states. In particular, this approach requires a broad understanding of the security sector.4 Three categories of actors sit within a government- focused notion of the security sector:
8 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye
Organisations legally mandated to use force: armed forces; police; gendarmeries and other paramilitary forces; coast guards; territorial border guards; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, presidential guards, official militias); military and civilian intelligence services; customs and other uniformed bodies such as secret services. Justice and law-enforcement organisations: judiciary; correctional services; criminal investigation and prosecution services; customary and traditional justice bodies. Civil management and oversight bodies: President/Prime Minister; national security advisory bodies; legislatures and legislative committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, justice and foreign affairs; office of the president/prime minister; financial management bodies (ministries of finance, budget offices, auditor’s general’s offices); national security advisory bodies; relevant regional/provincial and local authorities, including customary and traditional authorities; statutory civil society organizations such as human rights ombudsmen, police commissions, public complaints commissions.
Two further categories of actors – non-state security organisations and non- state civil society bodies – reflect a wider, governance-driven approach to the security sector:
Non-statutory security organisations: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; traditional militias; political party militias; self-defence organisations, including those based on regional, ethnic or religious affiliations; and private security companies. Non-statutory civil society bodies: professional organisations, including trade unions; research/policy analysis organisations; advocacy organisations; the media; religious organisations; membership organisations; other non-governmental organisations; and the concerned public.
Understanding the roles and influence of different private security actors is particularly relevant to the realities of SSG in Francophone West Africa. Private security actors pose a number of qualitatively different dilemmas. Across the region, non-statutory security organisations have emerged to fill gaps created by the state’s inability (or unwillingness) to provide security.
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 9
This poses a challenge to state security. Armed non-state groups undermine the state’s monopoly over the use of force while the growth in commercial security provision raises important questions about the state’s ability to effectively regulate and oversee the activities of such actors. From a people- centred perspective, the fact that security needs are increasingly being met by private commercial actors also highlights the troubling reality – which if not new may well be a growing problem – that security is a privilege of the wealthy rather than a public good. At the same time another repercussion of the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide security is the fact that this need is often met by self-organising non-state actors in the form of vigilante or neighbourhood-watch groups, who may have a tenuous understanding or respect for human rights.
Security sector governance
If ‘government’ describes political authority engaged in decision-making about policy at the level of the state, then ‘governance’ represents a broader concept that comprises all of the structures and processes that affect the way in which policy decisions are made. Governance therefore includes diverse actors – both private and public – while reflecting the reality of fragmented political authority, which may differ substantially from the theoretical distribution of political power at local, national and international levels.5 This shift in emphasis makes ‘governance’ rather than ‘government’ a particularly appropriate optic through which to examine the intertwined dynamics of security and insecurity in Francophone West Africa. A security sector governance approach aptly reflects the significant roles within the security field played by actors above and below the level of the state. Reform efforts need to extend well beyond security sector agencies and their interactions with the executive, legislative and judiciary. On the one hand, this highlights the role of regional and international stakeholders in these processes. On the other hand, it focuses on the key roles played by non-state actors, particularly civil society, as both central participants but also the ultimate beneficiaries of reform processes. The importance of an inclusive reform process that works across national, regional and international levels and includes a wide range of stakeholders reflects the emerging consensus that a governance-driven approach to SSR is essential. While security sector governance provides a useful analytical approach to security challenges at a number of levels, a SSG approach specifically focuses on actors empowered to use coercion by extension of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Where these powers are not
10 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye exercised effectively and efficiently, challenges can be directly linked to the absence of a robust framework of civilian democratic control and oversight. SSR focuses on SSG challenges by seeking to address both security and democratic deficits that contribute to insecurity at the level of the state and its citizens. The effectiveness of security provision is therefore intrinsically linked to concerns of security sector oversight and accountability. This relationship is critical and highlights two sets of tensions. First, if reform of security institutions does not improve democratic oversight then there is a risk that security actors may become more effective and efficient in their use of force but remain either detached from or represent a threat to the state and its citizens. This is a central challenge in many regions of the world where reforms take place but do not constitute ‘SSR’ according to the holistic understanding outlined above, since they focus on effectiveness without reference to the imperatives of democratic governance. Indeed a recent lessons-learned report on donor practice in SSR identified a lack of focus on governance dimensions, notably parliamentary oversight of the security sector, as a critical gap in current international support to SSR.6 Second, inherent to this approach is the reality that while individual activities may be technical in nature, the SSR agenda is inherently political because it seeks to change relationships of political authority related to the use of coercive force. Thus, efforts to support democratic transitions in the sensitive area of security inevitably produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ Therefore, resistance to change is a key factor that must be taken into account.
Security sector reform
Fundamentally, ‘good’ SSG is understood as the effective and efficient provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance, while SSR describes efforts taken to achieve this goal.7 The definition of SSR applied throughout this volume embraces this approach by focusing on concerns of democratic governance. SSR is closely linked to the human security discourse because both concepts are based on a vision of people-centred security. Addressing how individuals and communities experience security is therefore essential in order to account for the different security needs and perceptions of women, men, boys and girls. Giving a voice to communities and civil society groups in national debates on SSG issues fulfils a dual purpose: it helps to ensure that diverse interests are taken into consideration in designing and implementing reforms; it also contributes to demystifying the security sector and its status in the eyes of citizens and thus to re-building trust between them.
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 11
Human security has become increasingly visible in the language of African regional organisations; for example, one of the objectives of the African Union’s Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) is that ‘the promotion of human security be at the basis of all PCRD activities.’8 Similarly, the strategic vision of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) envisages a transformation from an ‘ECOWAS of states’ to an ‘ECOWAS of the peoples’.9 This change of attitude towards security may be considered due recognition of the past and current role played by many African security forces as agents of insecurity. This shift in the definition of security goes a long way in explaining why SSG and SSR have become so significant. Better understanding the nature of the security sector and its governance in different contexts can clarify both challenges and potential opportunities to address them through SSR. Consequently, particular emphasis is placed throughout this volume on unpacking highly context- specific SSG dynamics. An important set of issues surrounds the relationship between the state, the security sector and actors involved in democratic oversight (parliament, the judiciary, the public, etc.). Understanding the de facto roles assumed by these stakeholders is essential in order to determine entry points for reform. Mapping the range of state and non-state actors that play a role in the provision of security represents a first step to defining SSR initiatives that can contribute to an efficient, professional security sector accountable for its actions and respectful of civil authorities. SSR shares with other areas of public policy the need to choose between competing priorities when faced with limited resources. The costs of reform in financial and political terms therefore need to be carefully assessed. It is important to identify the most urgent problems that reform efforts should tackle and establish how success can be measured. If numerous policy frameworks exist that detail generic SSR good practice, relevant criteria or indicators of success at national and local levels are often absent. Given the sensitive nature of SSR, political concerns must be at the heart of recommendations for reform. Where a broad SSR programme is not feasible, graduated measures may be more realistic. Sensitivity is required to understand how dialogue can be initiated on delicate issues such as the politicisation or ethnicisation of the security sector. This can help to identify and address potential spoilers. In the face of resistance to change it is also important to consider the consequences of avoiding or delaying reform.
12 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye
The evolving regional framework for SSR in West Africa
A number of important SSR-related initiatives are underway in West Africa. They reflect a growing consensus around the centrality of dysfunctional SSG to recurring political crises and conflicts that spread beyond national borders. At the continental level the African Union (AU) has committed to supporting its member states in carrying out reforms by developing an AU framework for SSR.10 Significantly, it draws a direct link between SSR as a means to promote a culture of democratic SSG and the need to reverse the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.11 ECOWAS has strongly endorsed this approach, stating that for member states there shall be ‘zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.’12 If these prescriptions are to be realised in practice, the development of AU capacities and joint strategies with regional economic communities that are sensitive to different national contexts represent key priorities. Among the regional economic communities, ECOWAS has made distinct progress in developing a comprehensive set of norms and standards in the area of SSG. Indeed, acknowledgement of the relationship between security and democratic governance underpins the regional normative framework for peace, security and development constructed by ECOWAS. The 2001 Dakar Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance supplementing the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted in 1999 is particularly significant in this regard. The protocol encompasses key SSG concerns by situating the need for well-trained, apolitical, democratically governed security actors within a broader framework of human rights and the rule of law. Another important addition to the regional security governance architecture has been the development and adoption process for a West African Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces. The code sets out a number of common standards for the treatment and behaviour of armed and security forces in the region and provides further evidence of the commitment of ECOWAS in this area. However, as important as the specific provisions is the overarching goal to use the code as a confidence-building measure to reinforce relations between civilians and security sector institutions within the region. The latest element in regional progress towards improved SSG is the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) which was endorsed by Member States in January 2008 and places a strong premium on democratic
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 13
SSG as a key element of the region’s human security architecture. Specifically, the ECPF stipulates that ‘Member States shall adopt and implement security sector governance reforms to ensure that the practice of security agencies and prison services are in strict conformity with the requirements of human rights and the rule of law and are subject to democratic control.13 This process has led to the development of a draft ECOWAS SSR framework and plan of action. The focus of ECOWAS on operationalising the security governance component of the ECPF puts this process at the heart of regional SSR efforts in West Africa. In order to achieve the goals set out in the ECPF, generating political will within Member States will be critical. Deepening the knowledge base on SSG dynamics across the region thus represents an essential point of departure for engaging states undergoing very different types of transitions on these politically sensitive issues. At the global level, the development of the United Nations’ approach to SSR has drawn heavily on African experience and expertise. This was highlighted at the international workshop held in Cape Town in November 2007 on ‘Enhancing United Nations Support for Security Sector Reform in Africa: Towards an African Perspective’14 which addressed some of the opportunities and challenges for the UN in supporting SSR in countries in the region and contributed directly to the development of the first UN Secretary-General’s report on SSR.15 The relationship between the UN, the AU and ECOWAS has been identified as critical to further enhancing the range of UN support to nationally-led SSR processes in Africa. Widely different attitudes to SSR can be discerned among Francophone West African states. Positive examples of internally generated SSR processes can be found. Yet even in the best cases, earlier research has highlighted lethargy in undertaking necessary reforms.16 At the other extreme, authoritarian regimes offer few openings for SSR activities that support democratic SSG. And while it might seem counter-intuitive, the condition of state collapse through conflict and subsequent post-conflict peacebuilding efforts has in some cases resulted in the most serious efforts at SSR. Beyond African states and multilateral institutions, individual experts have been instrumental in shaping the SSG/SSR discourse in West Africa. It is particularly significant that African civil society expertise is coalescing within networks and thus integrating more readily into national, regional and international SSR efforts. Networks such as the African Security Sector Network17 (ASSN) and the West African Network on Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED) can provide impetus to reforms at the
14 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye national level but also reinforce the capacities of multilateral institutions and bilateral donors involved in supporting SSR. Such networks provide an alternative regional platform for discussion on important SSG issues that may be very sensitive in some national contexts. Another example of the clustering of SSR expertise is the Association for SSR Education and Training18 (ASSET) which brings together experts in the area of SSR training and capacity building. Organisations with African expertise are strongly represented in this voluntary association that supports more coherent approaches to developing SSR capacity within governments, security sector institutions, parliaments, civil society and multilateral organisations. Together, these developments offer important opportunities to ensure that SSR processes draw on a range of expertise from within the region in which activities take place. This can only help to address criticism over a lack of local ownership frequently levelled at externally supported SSR while also ensuring that national-level efforts benefit from South-South experience-sharing.
Conclusion
A sustainable SSR agenda for West Africa as envisaged by ECOWAS in its conflict prevention framework cannot be mapped out without close knowledge of the dynamics of SSG in the region. Equally, the current level of progress can only be properly understood in relation to context-specific cultural, social and political dynamics and their deep historical roots which have shaped the security sector and its governance in different national contexts. The contributions to this volume are therefore intended to add to the state of knowledge of SSG in Francophone West Africa with the goal of supporting the development of a sustainable SSR agenda for the region as a whole. It is certainly evident that policy frameworks are becoming better established and more capacities are being developed to support the SSR agenda in Francophone West Africa. The operationalisation of the security governance component of the ECPF through a regional framework and plan of action could be a catalyst for change if stakeholders fall in behind a common SSR strategy. However, all of the initiatives discussed above share a common challenge – implementation at the national level. In this respect, it is clear that if norms and principles of democratic governance have gained ground across the West African region, in many cases their practical
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa 15 application remains far more limited. The analyses provided by the country case study authors are therefore important because they identify entry-points that can help to bridge this critical gap between policy and practice. Perhaps the most meaningful contribution of this volume can be to support vocal and vigorous critical discussions on SSG in West Africa at the local, national, regional and international levels, and within and between Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone contexts. Bringing the security sector into the light and dispelling deeply engrained perceptions of the security sector as la grande muette19 is an essential step in fostering political will at the national level for much needed security sector reforms.
Notes
1 Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye and 'Funmi Olonisakin, Security Sector Governance in West Africa: Turning principles to Practice, DCAF Policy Paper, No. 8 (Geneva: DCAF, 2005). Available at www.dcaf.ch 2 The guide, developed by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on SSR, is available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/12-Aug-MAEE-RSS-final.pdf 3 For example: OECD DAC, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD DAC, 2007); Council of the European Union, EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform, 12566/4/05 REV 4 (Brussels, 13 October 2005); European Commission, a Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, COM (2006)253 Final, (Brussels, 24 May 2006); Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform, 2736th General Affairs Council Meeting (Luxembourg, 12 June 2006); United Nations Security Council, Securing Peace and Development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, Report of the Secretary-General, Document No. S/2008/39, 23 January 2008. 4 The description of the security sector and the security community here is taken entirely from the definitions provided in Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds.), Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook (Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development, 2004). The same description is also contained in the UNDP Human Development Report, 2002, 87. 5 Heiner Hänggi, ‘Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective,’ in Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, 7 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005). 6 See Alan Bryden and Rory Keane, ‘Security System Reform: What Have We Learned?’ OECD, 2009. Available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/44/44391867.pdf 7 See Heiner Hänggi, ‘Security Sector Reform’ in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon, ed. Vincent Chetail, 337 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 8 African Union Policy Framework on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development. Doc. EX.CL/274 (IX), adopted in Banjul, The Gambia, June 2006. The purpose of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) is to ‘serve as a reference for the ECOWAS system and Member States in their efforts to strengthen human security in the region’. ECPF, Section II (5).
16 Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye
9 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), paragraph 4. 10 In February 2008, the African Union Assembly ‘encouraged the African Union Commission to develop a comprehensive policy framework on SSR’. (Assembly/AU/Doc.117 (X)). 11 ‘Towards an African Union Policy on SSR’, Address by H.E. Mr. Ramtane Lamamra, Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union Commission, at the African Regional Workshop on Security Sector Reform, Addis Ababa, 23 March 2009. 12 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), Article 1(c). 13 ECPF, Article 57(1). 14 International Workshop on ‘Enhancing United Nations Support for Security Sector Reform in Africa: Towards an African Perspective’, co-hosted by South Africa and Slovakia, Cape Town, 7-8 November 2007. 15 United Nations Security Council, ‘Securing Peace and Development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform,’ Report of the Secretary-General, Document No. A/62/659 – S/2008/39, 23 January 2008. 16 See Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin, eds., Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2008). 17 See www.africansecurity.org 18 The Association for SSR Education and Training (ASSET) is a professional association of education and training organizations that supports the development of SSR capacity within governments, donors, security sector institutions, parliaments, civil society and international/regional organizations. Its membership spans the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. See: www.asset-ssr.org 19 In Francophone contexts, the armed forces are sometimes referred to as ‘the silent one’.
Chapter 2
Benin
Théodore C. Loko
Introduction
The Republic of Benin occupies a key geographical position in the West African sub-region. As a result, any events that occur in its surrounding environment can affect the country’s stability. This socio-political context defines the opportunities and challenges related to implementing security sector reform (SSR). Indeed since geo-strategy places the state within its political, economic and social context, defence and security matters can only be defined within a general view that requires the participation of all players in the life of the nation. This obvious fact leads to a reassessment of traditional approaches which only view national defence from the military angle. Similarly, security, which goes hand in hand with national defence, must be examined in its various dimensions, including human security, in this new framework of understanding.1 In theory, the need for SSR is broadly accepted in Benin, both by security sector officials and by the other components of society. This was made clear during the geostrategic forum organised by the ministry of national defence in February 2003, which brought together representatives of the military and many other social groups. Present among the participants were members of the national assembly, government officials, engineers, academics, heads of non-governmental organisations, legal experts, sociologists, historians, religious leaders, police officers, etc. In addition to the very high level of representation from various levels of responsibility in society, the working approach adopted also sought to be holistic. Indeed, the forum was part of a series of national analyses regarding the country’s long term prospects, which had led to the submission of an official report to the head of state on 23 August 2001. This report described the deepest aspirations of all citizens of Benin, from all walks of life, to a future filled with happiness and prosperity for the country, as well as their belief that these objectives could be attained. This was demonstrated by their overwhelming acceptance of the ALAFIA (‘peace’) vision which by 2025
18 Théodore C. Loko aims at making Benin a country that is well governed, united and peaceful, endowed with a prosperous and competitive economy and a beacon of cultural influence and social wellbeing. The opening address at the forum showed that the objective was to have a better understanding of all aspects of security in Benin, with its multiple facets and, above all, to raise awareness among stakeholders from the various sectors of national society.2 This approach is well in line with the new paradigm that is developing in the sub-region. In the light of all the measures adopted by different states there has been a notable change in the concept of security since the late 90s and this has transformed armies, both in terms of their structures and their organisation. The military has been entrusted with new responsibilities and now carries out its traditional functions differently. The renewed interest in security and defence sector reform analysis is linked to both the geopolitical developments that are compelling African states to review their security systems and to the central position of security and defence mechanisms with regard to good governance in sub-Saharan African countries. Furthermore, in francophone Africa, SSR falls within the general framework of public service reforms. It can only be reassessed after an overhaul of the administration, aimed at improving relations between citizens and the government through the better provision of public services. This improvement has a two-fold objective:
To provide a better response to collective needs (since satisfying the needs of citizens is one of the missions of government) through more appropriate and better managed services within the framework of available resources; Establish the link between citizens and public services, with respect to the principles of the rule of law.
Although the security sector reforms implemented in francophone sub-Saharan countries are rather limited in this regard, they are nevertheless beginning to reflect the institutionalisation of security and defence sector governance in West African countries.3 In Benin, the reforms provided an opportunity to integrate the security sector in an overall framework that includes the concept of human security. The government acknowledged the absence of a security policy and strategy and decided to correct the weaknesses and dysfunctions. And yet, a review of the current situation (cf. the recent wave of armed robberies), as well as both the national and regional context, clearly shows that this task is still immense. The challenges to be met include the ability of the security sector to tackle organised transborder crime, ensuring a better understanding of the
Benin 19 threats, as well as coordinating forces on the ground. These challenges raise three series of questions related to the institutional, civil-military and strategic dimensions. Civil-military relations require a systemic analysis of the security sector. Where strategy is concerned, the issues raised relate to problems of administration and management. This chapter begins with a brief description of the environment for SSR, as well as the security apparatus, before examining the many challenges to be met and finally proposing some effective options for reform.
The security environment
Benin is the first African country to have moved peacefully from a dictatorship to a truly multiparty system. Not only did the 1990 national conference result in the referendum in which the people of Benin adopted the 11 December 1990 constitution, it also, and more importantly, enabled a return to democracy. Its direct impact on SSR was that the military withdrew from the political scene, which very fortunately led to a slowdown in the rearmament effort for state security. Nevertheless, faced with the spate of armed robberies and given the slow pace of police reforms, the whole question of the link between state security and human security arises again in the following terms: is the security apparatus capable of protecting its citizens and their property? When a state is weak or fragile, it is incapable of protecting its citizens effectively, yet when it is too strong and when it seeks to provoke other countries, it can become a source of insecurity.
Threats, weaknesses and internal dysfunctions
The security apparatus in Benin is finding it difficult to curb insecurity. This is due to malfunctions in the security system,4 which is characterised by inadequacies within the management and command structures and a shortage of human, material and financial resources. The obsolete nature of existing capacities and working methods only further highlights the inefficiencies in managing the security sector, which are also demonstrated in the lack of motivation on the part of personnel discouraged by their professional difficulties, poor working conditions and meagre salaries. For many of them, ethics and good conduct give way to corruption, misbehaviour and indiscipline, thus making it impossible for the judicial system to combat insecurity.5 In addition to these difficulties, there is the lack of collaboration on the part of the population that is disappointed by the poor performance of the security forces, the absence of a clear and effective security policy, the
20 Théodore C. Loko burden of political pressure and the struggles for influence between the armed forces and the public security forces. As a result of these dysfunctions, people in the hinterland continue to represent an easy target for criminal activities that can be characterised as endemic. There are two levels of crime in Benin: on a large scale, there are transnational organised crime networks, responsible for cases of armed robberies both in daylight and at night time in certain urban centres; hold- ups on highways often leading to the loss of human lives; trafficking in stolen vehicles to countries in the sub-region, as well as other illicit forms of trafficking (e.g. children, drugs, arms, foreign exchange, human skulls, illicit medicines, petroleum products, etc.). On a more modest scale, criminal activity consists of robberies and other forms of theft, road accidents and the illegal exploitation of water sources. The ministry of interior and public security is responsible for implementing the national public security policy. The national internal security council provides guidance according to developments in the global security situation. In addition to its strategic dimension, an evaluation as a response to the problem of governance would also serve as a form of mediation by facilitating information exchange and coordination among independent actors who are involved in a partnership of public action.
The regional context
Insecurity in the region is mainly due to the threat of international terrorism, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the increasing occurence of cybercrime. Benin’s participation in the activities of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s committee on development information, science and technology should make it possible to counter the latter activity. The growing interest of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organisation in sub- Saharan Africa can be linked to the terrorist threat facing the region, in particular as a result of the widespread weakness of central governments and corruption. Other factors also compound this situation: cultural and ethnic differences that go beyond geographical borders, as well as the competing (and sometimes convergent) interests of various Islamic groups with differing aims, strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, Africa remains a lucrative market for small arms and light weapons, although the continent is poor and apparently only of marginal financial interest to the global arms market. Weapons circulate on the market, attracting countries and manufacturers seeking to get rid of the surplus stocks left over from the cold war, or weapons made obsolete by
Benin 21 technological advances. Some do not hesitate to place more recently produced weapons on the African market. According to some experts, arms- trafficking continues to be a major security problem in sub-Saharan Africa, which has already been the theatre of many bloody conflicts. In the maritime domain, countries in the Gulf of Guinea are faced with various scourges such as piracy (including abductions of fishermen in territorial waters by pirate boats), over-fishing, poaching, pollution and trafficking in various goods, in particular petroleum products. Indeed, each year, more than 70 000 barrels of oil are stolen from the Gulf, representing an annual loss of 1.5 billion dollars.6 In order to resolve this problem, the authorities of the various countries must demonstrate political will and focus on regional solutions. The maritime threats should compel governments to improve governance, with the aid of sub-regional and international organisations and with a view to obtaining improved harmonisation and coordination of measures to combat insecurity. According to the minister of national defence, measures to combat maritime insecurity should fall within a robust regional operational framework, underpinned by the appropriate instruments and legal capacities, as well as effective institutions. It is therefore necessary to identify the security concerns and the means to counter threats, before defining the right instruments for implementation. Measures should be adopted with a view to consolidating national legislation and putting the institutional means in place. In addition, the privatisation of war also has had paradoxical consequences both within the sub-region and on the continent, as shown by the gradual diminution in the capacities of regular African armies. Fearing coup d’états and military rebellions, many African presidents, several of whom seized power through military coups themselves, transformed the regular armed forces into ‘ceremonial armies’, while ensuring their own safety through well equipped praetorian guards and private militias. These corps are made up of loyal men who usually belong to the same ethnic group as the country’s leader. Clearly, this method undermines the foundations of the state, in favour of entities that exist beyond its reach (ethnic groups, religious communities, etc.) or outside of the state (criminal networks, mining and agriculture multinationals, etc.). West Africa is home to a wide variety of non-state armed groups, ranging from pro-government militias to rebel groups. These groups are unstable, and their motivations, loyalties and the scope of their missions change constantly. They tend to continue to exist beyond their political usefulness and are capable of reinventing themselves, when given enough incentive. In the end, local communities are the victims. In Benin, like in other parts of the region, this phenomenon contributes to
22 Théodore C. Loko increasing crime (mainly hold-ups). The scope of the problem shows that West African governments do not yet understand the precise nature of the threats.
The security apparatus
In Benin, the inception of democracy had a positive impact on institutional reforms. Audits were carried out in government bodies and the administration was decentralised, in order to bring the public service closer to the population. This enabled civil society organisations to gain ground. Other reforms are still underway, although their effects have been limited considerably by difficulties related to a lack of financial resources. As far as security sector reform is concerned, the keystone of the texts that govern the security system in Benin is still law n° 90-032 of 11 December 1990, establishing the Constitution of the Republic of Benin. Each component of the armed forces is governed by some specific provisions drawing inspiration from provisions on human rights and human security, as well as the more nebulous concept of governance. The constitution outlines the principles governing the organisation, use and supervision of the armed forces. Any infringement of its provisions can lead to checks and sanctions by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. However, due to widespread illiteracy and lack of knowledge about these provisions, all this remains purely theoretical. The structure of the security sector in Benin is rather complex. Despite the multiplicity of forces the most important question, in terms of governance, is to determine how they are to be deployed and controlled. There is also the subsidiary question of the large number of command centres and control bodies. The best way to review these forces and their command structure is therefore to examine them from the point of view of their missions. The security forces legally constituted to protect national interests comprise the following entities:
The armed forces; The national gendarmerie; The national police force; The customs service; The forest rangers; The fire brigade; The intelligence service (this service is invisible, but is perceived as being attached to the presidency because its role is linked to state
Benin 23
security; since the revolutionary period, it has been the source of bad memories for the people of Benin).
Authorities with a mandate to implement the national security system
The national conference held in February 1990 between the key national stakeholders established the Superior Council of the Republic, in charge of drafting the constitution that was adopted by referendum on 11 December 1990. The desire to safeguard the institutions of the state was reaffirmed in the wake of this national conference. It was thus decided to reform the armed forces, in order to refocus them on their principal role of protecting the integrity of the national territory. This fundamental choice was enshrined in the constitution. In accordance with article 62, the president of the republic is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, appoints the members of the higher council of defence in the council of ministers and chairs the meetings of the former.
General organisation of the armed forces
The armed forces comprise the army, the navy and the air force. The army is between 8,000 and 9,000 men strong.7 To this can be added the 3,000 to 4,500 men of the national gendarmerie, which carries out military missions in times of war. The air force comprises between 500 and 800 men. The armed forces are however embryonic and under-equipped. The minister of defence is in charge of implementing the national defence policy, under the authority of the president of the republic. He is responsible for organising the armed forces, providing them with equipment and infrastructure and ensuring that they are ready to deploy. In addition, he has the responsibility for military cooperation with other countries. To carry out these tasks, the minister is assisted by the chief of staff of the armed forces, who is also a military advisor to the government. The chief of general staff provides the general command of the armed forces with the assistance of the various force commanders and the heads of the joint force units. He also serves as liaison with his foreign counterparts. The military high command is thus made up of a chief of general staff; a deputy chief of general staff; the various force commanders and the heads of the joint force units. The armed forces of Benin have acquired practical experience in a number of theatres of operation such as:
24 Théodore C. Loko
Defending territorial integrity in the dispute between Benin and Niger over the Lété islands in 1963; Protecting national territory from foreign invasion during the Biafra war (1967-70) in Nigeria (in this instance, the greater part of the equipment mobilised was shown to be faulty); Peacekeeping missions with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations blue helmets (Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.).8
These missions raised issues of command and control of the components of the Beninese forces. The frequent external interventions also led to some anxiety on the part of the country’s leaders who were afraid that the soldiers would become envious of the allowances paid to soldiers on international duty. Furthermore, on several occasions, the ineffectiveness of its activities (due in large part to inadequate equipment) has revealed the operational limitations of the army.
Public security
In certain exceptional circumstances, the armed forces, which are under the authority of the president of the republic, may be called in as back-up for the conventional security forces, the gendarmerie and the national police force. The subordination of the armed forces to a civilian authority has always been enshrined in the constitution. This did not however prevent the military from interfering in the democratic process, as shown by the various putsches during the 1960s and 70s. The most recent example of an armed forces intervention on national territory was within the framework of the activities of the national commission in charge of controlling illicit sales of petroleum products, which resulted in the loss of human lives.
National gendarmerie
The gendarmerie is one of the main components of the security forces. The Beninese gendarmerie bears a close resemblance to the French gendarmerie and was created on 1 August 1961. Since 2006, it has been under the command of a brigadier general and is made up of 2,800 officers, other ranks and gendarmes, representing 30% of the country’s armed forces personnel. The gendarmerie has competence over 90% of the national territory and 81% of its population. Its missions include those of administrative police, criminal investigation and military police. It also contributes to protecting
Benin 25 many sensitive sites and areas and has a contingent of about 250 men who can take part in peacekeeping missions. To carry out its missions, the gendarmerie has its general headquarters in Porto-Novo, operational and training units, three regional squads (one mobile squad, one prisons squad and one services squad) and a national gendarmerie school, which houses the advanced criminal investigation training centre. It has headquarters in each region, as well as brigades in all rural and urban districts. In the rural areas, it carries out a number of missions of the national police force. Like the police, the gendarmerie ensures the security of persons and goods. Its scope of action extends to almost all of the national territory, but it is mainly responsible for security in the countryside and on major highways. In peacetime, it is responsible for territorial surveillance, protecting the population, ensuring public security and civil defence. It is also in charge of criminal investigations in rural areas, under the authority of the appropriate judicial authorities. The gendarmerie may sometimes be requisitioned for public security missions under the supervision of civilian and military authorities such as mayors, regional prefects, the minister of interior, or the minister of defence.
National police force
The police force is headed by a director general and comprises several specialised rapid intervention groups: the criminal investigation brigade, the compagnies républicaines de sécurité, whose headquarters are in Cotonou and their units stationed in the regional capitals. The general directorate, which falls under the authority of the ministry of interior and public security, centralises and coordinates the activities of all technical departments (police administration, public security, criminal investigation, general intelligence and territorial surveillance and the national police academy) and external departments (regional, central police stations, local police stations, special police units, border posts and stations), as well as the compagnies républicaines de sécurité (CRS), the anti-crime squad (BAC), the research, action, intervention and deterrence group (RAID) and the coastline protection and antipollution squad (BPLP). The republican security units are organised to operate in constituted groups. They are mobile reserve units that can be deployed throughout the national territory with the following duties: to support the urban police force in maintaining law and order; to provide assistance to citizens in case of any serious incidents or public disasters; and to carry out actual surveillance missions involving highway patrols, motorised police, official escorts, airport and port surveillance and communication channels. The BAC, CRS,
26 Théodore C. Loko
RAID and the BPLP are elite armed units of the police force. They were created as part of the attempt to adapt the public service to the latest requirements in the field. In principle, the police may intervene on the request of any individual who requires their assistance. In practice, however, there are many violations of individual security in town centres, which is an illustration of the inadequacies of the police force. With the implementation of decentralisation, it is to be hoped that innovative measures will be taken with a view to setting up local police services. There is a good degree of interest in setting up a municipal police service in the new communes. Since January 1999, the mayors are in charge of ensuring the security of goods and persons in their towns. In spite of their limited capacities, these communes are nevertheless legal entities that enjoy a certain autonomy that allows them to set up municipal police services. Unfortunately, given the scope of demand and the limited means available, this reform may not produce the expected results. These ideas have been put forward on the assumption that there would be an extended wave of disturbances, but there has been no real discussion of the matter. For the moment, however, it is not a question of deciding between the central and the peripheral levels; insecurity should be the main subject of debate, especially if citizens increasingly feel threatened. During the revolutionary period, Benin had a ‘militia’, a very effective, but politically indoctrinated local police organisation. The main question is whether the municipal police project will be a carbon copy of the revolutionary militia. This may not be the case, since the previous system was aimed at giving the authorities political control over the whole of the national territory, while the decentralisation policy seeks to bring governance closer to the citizens and thus improve security in the broadest sense. There are however some problems about transferring central government powers and resources to the decentralised local authorities. It is not certain that the regulatory texts adopted in 1990 to reorganise the police services took into account the current concerns of decentralisation.
The customs service
The customs service, which is present along the country’s borders, ensures that import and export taxes, as well as customs duties on goods that transit through the country are paid. It is also required to make sure that such taxes and levies are paid in to the public treasury. The customs service monitors, protects and regulates the national economy, while also enforcing prohibitions on the import, export, or transit of certain goods, as decided by the appropriate national authorities. Customs officers play a very important
Benin 27 role in the country’s economy because the national budget relies mainly on the taxes collected. Furthermore, given the regional vocation of the port of Cotonou, indiscretions in management can sometimes lead to problems at the highest level of government. In addition to this highly sensitive point, there are some cross border issues that also fall under the responsibility of customs. In addition to the customs service, the police force, in particular border police, are also responsible for coordinating security and for the surveillance of activities related to migratory flows along the country’s terrestrial, maritime and aerial borders. These services centralise and process information and statistics that they receive regularly from the various border posts. It is not enough to re-define the mission of the customs service; issues of logistics and ethics must also be taken into account. There is an even more obvious need for reform at the moment, in particular since the ministry of economy and finance organised a seminar during which senior officials of that ministry could make recommendations that, if applied, would contribute greatly to implementing the government’s programme of action.9 In order to improve the effectiveness of customs services, reforms should include provision for establishing automated one-stop services and also for improving communication with the public. In the long term, the public service will have to be gradually overhauled and control mechanisms at the Cotonou port and along the borders will need to be strengthened, in the same way as the system of sanctions against customs officers whose behaviour could be detrimental to the state. Other reforms should establish a well defined framework of exemptions and rewards to be granted to deserving customs officials (citations, bonuses, etc.). Alongside its mainly fiscal and economic role, the customs service also carries out a number of functions that have been entrusted to it over time due to its constant presence along the borders and its effective intervention techniques. Apart from the assistance provided to other administrative departments in carrying out their missions, the customs service applies a number of protective measures adopted by legislation with respect to persons and goods crossing the border. These relate to public health, public security, public morals, consumer protection, industrial and commercial property rights and the protection of cultural heritage and endangered species.
28 Théodore C. Loko
Private security companies
Many private security companies have been established recently in Benin, especially over the past ten years, with the inception of a democratic renewal. Approximately 50 licences have been granted by the ministry of interior. These companies are not all equal to their task, but they are supervised by the public security forces. They have however shown proof of their usefulness and some public institutions use their services. The private security sector is regulated by provisions governing the activities of watch and guard companies, as well as private companies in charge of protecting persons and goods.10 The regulatory text stipulates the scope of application, the conditions for obtaining a licence, as well as the terms of recruitment and training. It also organises the supervision of the sector. In order to carry out watch, guard and protection activities, or to manage such a company, a person has to be born in Benin or have acquired Beninese nationality at least five years prior. Individuals who have been found guilty of immoral or dishonourable acts, or who have violated the security of persons and their property, or who have been sentenced or even granted an amnesty are prohibited from carrying out such functions. The prohibition applies also to persons who have declared bankruptcy or whose affairs are being administered under court supervision. The ministry of public security is the supervisory body for this sector. Since the former needs to be reformed, the question of whether or not to consolidate private sector regulation must be considered. Another difficulty is the fact that private companies are responsible for training their recruits: given the lack of any form of accountability, there is the risk that the budget allocated to such programmes could be extremely limited, thereby leading to insufficient training. The new government has expressed its position through the minister of public security who stated in a meeting with private sector managers that he intended to put some order in the situation. A new policy may be expected. In Benin, anything linked to public security is considered confidential. It is extremely difficult to gain access to documents and since information is not available, businesses, organisations and individuals find it difficult to have their rights respected. What is even more difficult is to have an overall vision of public security as defined by the executive and ensure that the legislative power and civil society accept this approach.
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Security sector management and oversight
The national assembly
The principal prerogatives of the national assembly include passing laws, approving and amending the financial law and adopting the general state budget. As a result, the assembly has several opportunities to exercise control over the security sector. Where the general state budget is concerned, parliament in Benin may revise the amounts allocated to the sector upward or downward. It may also reallocate budget shares to sectors that it considers to be of priority. It may, as appropriate, decide on the total amount to be allocated to the security sector. The assembly may also exercise its control on draft bills submitted that apply to the security sector. It also has other powers in the area of security, in particular with respect to adopting laws ratifying agreements related to international alliances and assistance in case of attack. Finally, any intervention by the armed forces outside the national territory requires the approval of the national assembly. The national assembly is endowed with considerable powers. In wartime, it may mobilise forces to defend the national territory. Similarly, it must approve any new alliance or military cooperation agreement. The national assembly’s national defence committee specifically deals with all matters related to the national security system.
Parliamentary standing committees
The national assembly has a standing committee on security matters to which draft bills from the government are submitted and which can also propose draft bills on security issues. At any time, the assembly may also set up an ad hoc commission, if it becomes necessary to carry out a parliamentary enquiry in the security sector. In certain cases, such enquiries may lead to oral questions directly addressed to the executive authorities in charge of managing the sector. In others, the case may be brought before the constitutional court. Most often, the aim is to invalidate certain decrees passed by the executive power. In Benin, parliamentary oversight of the security sector is no different from other forms of control. The enquiries rarely ever produce concrete results and the oral questions often only lead to recommendations that are not binding on the executive branch. There is therefore a need to educate assembly members on the importance of parliamentary oversight in this area. Moreover, it is important to inform civil society better, in both urban centres
30 Théodore C. Loko and in villages. This is why it is necessary to organise seminars in Benin with reports on the experience of other countries, rather than sending officials to take part in international meetings without providing feedback when they return. Such seminars provide an opportunity to exchange views with parliamentarians from other regions and countries and compare experiences.
The role of the judiciary
The Constitutional Court is the main guardian of fundamental rights and public freedoms. It is the regulatory body that governs the functions and activities of public authorities. It is worth noting that this very strategic institution within the Beninese democratic system has issued a number of opinions concerning the functioning of some of the organs that make up the national security system. Although it has competence to control all decisions and actions by the authorities, the constitutional court restricts itself mainly to the security agencies. Nevertheless, on many occasions, it has ruled on the constitutional invalidity of laws passed by parliamentarians and also government decrees, thus protecting citizens’ rights. Other rulings handed down have involved cases of mistreatment perpetrated by the police and gendarmerie. The police are also subject to various forms of judicial control by the administrative, civil and criminal courts. The administrative judge has competence to hear requests for damages resulting from police interventions and cases related to the misuse of power, for which it is possible to have the illegally imposed measure overturned. The rulings are generally very satisfactory when it comes to settlements; however they are rather ineffective when they concern temporary measures (for example, prohibiting a meeting).11 The civil courts also have general competence to hear cases of personal fault or, where personal liability is involved, for acts of violence committed by a police officer. Finally, criminal courts are the competent body for complaints about arbitrary acts and acts of aggression carried out by the police (assault, verbal violence, murder, etc.).12
Informal means of oversight
Some local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Benin are working with the authorities to study the functioning of the national security system. These bodies very quickly recognised the strategic importance of this area for the democratic process underway in Africa. They also realised that a harmoniously functioning security sector is of vital
Benin 31 importance in the life of a nation. For this reason, when there is no mechanism that allows citizens to carry out any form of oversight over the smooth running and effectiveness of the sector, it becomes necessary to encourage the participation of the various components of civil society. In this way, this powerful instrument, which could easily become destructive and be used to undermine democracy, is not left in the hands of just one authority or institution. For example, Amnesty International’s annual reports on human rights, which review the way in which the security sector functions in each country, are very useful. They expose human rights violations carried out by the various security forces and on this basis, they draw conclusions about the strengths, weakness and dysfunctions in the country involved. Oversight of the national security sector by NGOs also takes the form of training seminars, organised for the benefit of various components of the system. In addition, press releases condemning abuse and misconduct by different security organs are a way of drawing the attention of the national community and the sector itself. For example, the Research Group on the Democratic, Economic and Social Development of Africa set up an independent commission of enquiry to investigate the role played by the different parties involved in the tragic events of 18 August 2004 in Porto- Novo. In this case, government efforts to restructure the oil industry had led to riots, which resulted in the loss of human lives. The enquiry highlighted the weakness of the regulatory framework governing the oil sector, as well as some shortcomings in its application. It also demonstrated the socio- economic inadequacies of the sector. The results of the investigation were published and submitted to the authorities to serve as a guide for any future initiatives. In addition, civil society can count on the support of sub-regional institutions in its security initiatives. Thus, as part of the small arms control mechanism, the United Nations launched a five year programme for coordination and assistance for security and development. The objective of the programme is to provide technical assistance to ECOWAS in the efforts to establish a climate of peace and stability in the sub-region, through the national small arms and light weapons anti-proliferation commissions. With the exception of Liberia, all ECOWAS member states have established their national commissions. Benin’s national commission was set up on 14 February 2003. Various coalitions are actively mobilising the population to implement the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, signed by ECOWAS Heads of State and government on 31 October 1998 for a three-year renewable period.
32 Théodore C. Loko
On the whole, the issue of SSR remains a matter of debate among experts. The police force is not very proactive; it remains reactive. Citizens and civil society only show interest in reform in times of crisis. Since the press and the general population often do no more than comment on events, judicial control becomes a luxury. Civil society could contribute more to educating individuals about security, because very few people are aware of their rights. Various components of civil society, the media, as well as national and international NGOs do exercise some form of oversight over the security sector in their own way. However, it is true that the debate focuses only on the credibility of civil society itself. Oversight by the media is limited to publishing articles, accounts and reports or investigations. Some press organs and groups also organise debates focusing on the failures, dysfunctions and shortcomings of the national security system and on its internal crises. Both the oral and written press report on events that involve state security, as well as the security of persons and goods, which makes it possible to draw the attention of the population to the various inadequacies of the national security system. The different ministries claim to want to enhance their dialogue with the press, either as a simple communication strategy, or with the aim of enhancing transparency.
Challenges of security sector governance
The challenges facing francophone African countries with respect to improving their security sector governance are related to the challenges facing African countries in general. This is the phenomenon of a continuum of conflict that threatens the state itself. The objective of ensuring state security must go hand-in-hand with a reform that emphasises human security. Within this context, the challenges are polymorphous and the solutions may come from different directions: the United Nations system,13 development partners,14 regional organisations15 and the countries themselves. That being the case, the vision of making Benin a country of freedom and security is clear and unambiguous. The requirements to be met are as follows:
Make security a priority by means of a development policy that is applied in an environment of peace and tranquillity;
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Put in place adequate security conditions that will reassure and attract investors; Enable the population and agents of development to focus on creating wealth in a secure environment; Promote the values of civism and citizenship among the police forces and the population as a whole; Promote human security within the national security framework as a means of protecting lives, the country's heritage and the environment.16
For now, this vision appears to be a vain wish, given the numerous and varied obstacles, which relate among others, to the regional environment, inadequate knowledge of the threats, the need for capacity building and the lack of coordination among the various stakeholders.
New management and role of police forces
As far as SSR is concerned, the principle of mutability is extremely important. It has made it possible to envisage a new concept for the management and the role of the police force; a master plan for the development of police personnel starting from 2009 and the possibility of organising joint operations. The following are the main principles guiding the national security policy:
To define a strategic plan based on an assessment of the geopolitical environment; To rationalise objectives, action, methods and resource deployment and accompany these with guarantees of ethics and proper conduct; To improve exchanges and synergies; To do away with overlaps and duplication of activities; To take account of the territorial breakdown of the different government services; To optimise management of staff and resources; To set up joint, or at least convergent, training programmes.
To meet these objectives, the director general of police who, under the authority of the minister of interior, represents the police with regard to the nation, institutions of the republic and also abroad, will become more of a corporate leader than a simple day-to-day manager. Thus, as an enlightened visionary, he will choose to steer the activities of the police towards
34 Théodore C. Loko preventing crime and seeking longstanding and fruitful collaboration in all social sectors where the police have a role to play.
New staff structure in the national police force starting from 2009
At the time of writing, the staff of the national police force (headquarters, technical departments, central services and specialised units, i.e. CRS, BAC, RAID and BPLP) numbered 2,143, comprising 197 police commissioners, 209 inspectors, 406 officers and 1,349 sergeants and policemen. With large numbers retiring and a few deaths, these numbers will be reduced drastically if nothing is done urgently. Starting from 2009, steps will gradually be taken to correct the security coverage ratio, bearing in mind government resources available, the cost of training and the inherent cost and charges involved for any new recruitment. According to forecasts there will be between 500 and 1,000 new police personnel recruited in 2008 and between 750 and 1,000 in 2009, before the rate stabilises at around 500 per year for the period from 2010 to 2018.17 Moreover, as a result of the rising problem of armed robberies in Cotonou, the government will recruit 1,000 new gendarmes to strengthen the ranks of the public security forces and enable them to curb the crime wave that is spreading throughout the country.18 It is essential that these steps are implemented to ensure that levels of public security are maintained.
Organising joint operations
There is a real problem of lack of coordination among the different government bodies in the area of defence and security. The three forces, namely, the police (urban security), gendarmerie (rural and suburban security) and the army (territorial defence) have never learned to work together. From time to time, when it becomes necessary, they are compelled to do so, without any prior preparation. When the intervention takes place in town, the police should play the leading role, with possible support from the gendarmerie and in some extreme cases, from the army. However, because the army is larger and has better equipment, it is likely to play the leading role, although it is not necessarily well prepared for this type of activity. In addition, the difficult relations among the three forces do not facilitate joint operations, especially because stereotypes abound: the military feel that they have operational superiority, while the police feel that they are intellectually superior. The military also considers that police agents are generally corrupt.
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For several years now, senior Beninese military officials have been considering the issue and have come up with some answers that, for the moment, have not gone beyond the drafting stage. A joint operation carried out on 18 December 2008 with the support of the public and in particular the help of zémidjan motorbike-taxis to capture the perpetrators of a hold-up at Continental Bank in Cocotomey demonstrated that such an exercise is feasible: five criminals and two fraudsters were arrested and roughly twenty- one million francs were seized. Clearly, there is a need for such collaboration. To demonstrate its usefulness, a scenario was drafted based on two recent hold-ups (the most bloody ever recorded) that took place right in the centre of the Dantokpa international market in Cotonou, to enable elements of the Benin armed forces and their colleagues from the public security forces to carry out an exercise in a hotel in Cotonou. The army chief of staff and the director general of police, together with the minister of state in charge of national defence and several other officers of the Beninese armed forces and public security forces, monitored an intervention carried out jointly by components of the naval forces, the air force, the army, the gendarmerie and the national police force.19 Speaking on condition of anonymity, an officer in charge of one of the units engaged in an exercise supervised by Belgian, American and Dutch armed forces confided: ‘Our security apparatus has often been unsuccessful in dealing with these criminals because there was not such coordination between the armed forces and the public security forces.’ For the minister of state in charge of national defence, this type of exercise enables the government to prepare its forces to improve their response when faced with serious crime.
Public finance and external aid
The principle is the following: expenditure for security relates to sovereign expenditure, which makes it quite clear that the only party that is prepared to invest totally in the security of the people of Benin is the state itself. It is the sovereign duty of a government to guarantee state survival, as well as peace and tranquillity. For this reason, a government must be prepared to bear the financial cost of the operation.20 The country can however count on the support of its partners to transfer technology and new methods. One example that can be cited is the cooperation between Benin and France in the area of consolidating internal security in Benin. The main aim of the project is to effectively curb all forms of crime by equipping the security forces (gendarmerie, national police force
36 Théodore C. Loko and customs) with a modern, high-performance IT tool that satisfies the requirement of protecting personal data. The project covers three phases:
Training personnel on the use of the computerised tool and operating the network, as well as on the use of new procedures that take into account the ethical dimensions of the use of electronically stored personal data; Establishment of a common database for the three forces, based on a network of about forty computer terminals deployed throughout the national territory, which will make it possible to draft reliable crime statistics and serve as a valuable decision-making tool; Putting in place the required legislative and regulatory framework.
Public security and decentralisation
In Benin, the effect of the decentralisation policy has been to transfer certain competences and the related resources to the local authorities. The transfer of power to local elected officials has enabled democracy to advance. Citizens’ expectations are expressed better than in the past, but practical solutions to the long-standing problems inherent to local development are still being delayed. In the area of public security, the objective is to have a police force that is close to the population and its expectations and which works in an integrated manner, that is, as a complement to the society. The municipal police should draw lessons from the experience of the people’s militia during the revolutionary period in the People’s Republic of Benin. With the support of neighbourhood and village chiefs, these militias were real guardians and monitored all movements both during the day and at night, for the greater interest of the people. Many people can bear witness to this. In this area, it would be worthwhile trying to better understand the positive (as well as the negative) impacts of informal security actors. By decree n° 2009-027 of 4 February 2009, defining the modalities governing the exercise of powers of administrative police by the mayor in communes with a specific status, the government authorised the establishment of a police service called the municipal police service, under the authority of the mayor, in these three communes (Cotonou and Porto- Novo in the south and Parakou in the north). These communes are part of a wider transfer of competences to the communal level. The adoption of this decree consolidates implementation of the provisions of article 76 of law n° 97-029 of 15 January 1999, organising the communes of the Republic of Benin, which stipulate that ‘the mayor shall
Benin 37 have responsibility for the administrative police in the commune’. Thanks to this initiative, a municipal police pilot programme could be launched in the seventy-seven communes of Benin. Since the municipal police are under the authority of the mayor, some people already fear a possible conflict of competences between the national police force and the municipal police service. Since the municipal police is also in charge of ensuring order, peace and security, its boundaries must be clearly defined and it should be endowed with adequate means. Every effort must also be undertaken to avoid recruiting policemen from among the ‘strong arms’ of the mayor’s political party, which would run the risk of the security forces being misused.
Organising the private sector
Decision n° 101/MISAT/DC/DGPN/DSP/SA of 5 August 1997 regulates the activities of private agencies that provide watch, guard and individual protection services. The companies covered by this regulation are those that provide individuals or legal entities with all forms of protective services for moveable or immoveable goods, as well as for persons, on a permanent, exceptional, or sporadic basis. Major factories and other bodies that personally employ more than six guards are also subject to the terms of this regulation to the extent that they are allowed to have their own internal security service under the same conditions as specialised companies. Apart from the abovementioned activities, the specialised companies are prohibited from supplying any other services that are not related to security. They are also prohibited from monitoring the expression of political, religious, or trade union views, as well as from interfering in a labour dispute or any other related events. To be able to carry out guard and watch activities, private agencies have to first obtain an accreditation from the minister in charge of security. Management and staff who wish to carry out such activities must also fulfil certain conditions. The license granted to the company may be suspended or withdrawn in the following cases:
Infringement of any of the provisions of the regulation; Trial and sentencing of the managers.
Only those employees in charge of watch and guard activities are obliged to wear uniforms and insignia that should in no way resemble those of the security forces or the armed forces. On the other hand, employees in charge of protecting individuals are not authorised to wear a uniform. The
38 Théodore C. Loko characteristics of these uniforms are decided by the ministry of interior and are the same for all guard and watch companies. Nevertheless, the use of army combat uniforms, also called fatigues, and the green army beret is prohibited; as are any insignia that may resemble those of the police and armed forces in any way. Agents in charge of watch and guard missions may carry sophisticated weapons, as long as they are concealed and subject to the conditions stipulated under decree n° 61/39 PR/MI/AM of 7 February 1961 governing weapons, ammunition and explosives for civilian use in the Republic of Benin. On the other hand, agents in charge of protecting individuals may not carry weapons. The use of sophisticated weapons, as well as any cutting or sharp instrument or suffocating gas or smoke bombs is not authorised except in legal situations of self defence. The major problem to be resolved is that of the quality of personnel recruited, in particular with regard to their moral standing, as well as the reorganisation of the profession, especially the wages paid. This is a very sensitive sector although the administration is slow in understanding this. If the right care is not taken, there is a risk that this could quickly become a breeding ground for criminals, in particular within the current context of widespread insecurity.
Conclusion
There are two dimensions for action: the first is within the framework of domestic policy, and the second is within the framework of the interaction between national and international policy. In establishing priorities there are several possible options. The government of Benin intends to set up a programme to reorganise the security sector. This includes a number of urgent measures with regard to passing the appropriate laws and adopting specific regulations, as well as major reforms related to the creation of a municipal police service. Nevertheless, this reorganisation will not change much on the ground if it is not preceded by a number of sub-regional and international measures, which take into account the sub-regional context and its related problems. Such measures should bear on the effective interaction between national and international security policy, as well as how the ECOWAS early warning system can be applied to the area of SSR.
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Reorganising the security sector in terms of domestic policy
The government programme provides for several types of action: raising awareness with local elected officers and the population21 in order to encourage them to participate in security sector management; organising sporadic patrols, crackdowns and dismantling of mafia-type networks; updating major text and statutes, as well as the gradual overhaul of security material and equipment; creating adequate security infrastructure (construction, rehabilitation and equipping of police stations, constructing and equipping army barracks) and increasing the number of security personnel. Reorganising the security sector will need to be carried out in several stages:22
Defining a strategic plan based on an assessment of the geopolitical environment; Rationalising objectives, action, method and resource deployment, without neglecting to accompany these with guarantees of ethics and proper conduct; Bringing the various stakeholders to work together and improving exchange of information and synergies, do away with overlaps and duplication, taking into account the territorial coverage of the various government departments, improving personnel and resources management and set up joint or at least convergent training programmes.
Parliament and measures to be taken urgently
The adoption of a number of draft bills and regulations is still pending before Parliament:
The law establishing the status of national police force personnel; The security orientation and programming law; The decree establishing a code of ethics and conduct for the police; Various other purely administrative decrees relating in particular to careers, housing, incentive and motivation allowances, as well as bonuses for working in difficult conditions, etc.
40 Théodore C. Loko
Civil society
The effort to raise awareness with civil society must be sustained, both in urban centres and in villages. In this vein, it would be useful to organise seminars in Benin itself with reports about experience from other countries. Such activities could also be supplemented with an exchange of views with parliamentarians from other countries and regions in order to compare their experience in this area.
Interaction between national policy and international policy
This depends on three factors: the design of an overall security system that includes the participation of all stakeholders in development; immediate reactivation of the frameworks for cooperation with Nigeria (see below); reactivation of existing channels and application of the ECOWAS early warning system to control major crime and transborder organised crime.
Designing an overall security system that includes the participation of all development partners
Benin has initiated cooperation on security matters with several development partners. Increasingly these partners work as a network and often carry out joint operations in the field. It would be appropriate therefore to suggest a joint strategic forum focusing on essential security issues in order to rapidly identify the adequate solutions. Such networking should facilitate on the one hand the functioning of the automatic identification system for the naval forces (the result of cooperation with the United States) and on the other, the activities of the national maritime protection, security and safety council whose role is not very well known.
Immediate reactivation of the frameworks for cooperation with Nigeria
These frameworks for cooperation involve joint patrols on land and sea and require the participation of the intelligence services of both countries. Given the nature of transborder problems to be resolved, Nigeria is an important partner. There are several instruments governing this type of partnership:
The 13 February 2007 Benin-Ghana-Nigeria-Togo memorandum of understanding on a co-prosperity alliance zone;
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The memorandum of understanding between the Republic of Benin and the Federal Republic of Nigeria on transborder matters, dated 14 August 2003; The extradition treaty between the Republic of Benin, the Republic of Ghana, the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Togolese Republic, dated 10 December 1984; The treaty on transborder cooperation between the government of Benin and the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which has been initialled but not signed.
Applying the ECOWAS early warning system to controlling major crimes and transborder organised crime
The ECOWAS early warning and rapid response system for conflict prevention was born out of the desire of heads of state and government who signed the 1999 Protocol on a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in the sub region. Its aim is to facilitate the identification of the underlying causes of instability in the region. As part of this observation system the 15 ECOWAS member states have been divided into four zones that are coordinated from Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Benin), Monrovia (Liberia) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), with the observation and control centre being located in the ECOWAS Secretariat at Abuja. The observation system began its operations in 2001 with funds from the European Union. Since that date it has collected and analysed information and data on security in the region. Discussions are currently underway to improve its logistic capacity through a U.S. proposal to establish a military planning secretariat within the ECOWAS Secretariat, in addition to two logistics bases. The aim of the latter, of which one would be situated in a coastal country and the other in a country in the hinterland, would be to reduce the reaction time necessary for deploying ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) troops in times of crisis. Armed robberies are also a serious cause of instability. It is therefore urgently necessary to ensure that the system is capable of controlling such acts, as well as major crimes. This would enable the police and the army to be proactive and to work together in partnership. In conclusion, it is clear that the government of Benin has the responsibility for prevention in the area of security and crime. Nevertheless, this is a long-term undertaking and the results depend on a number of variables relating to the interaction between national and international
42 Théodore C. Loko policy. It cannot be overstated, however, that SSR should also include the domestic dimension within the general context of modernising the public service in Africa, which covers various components, in particular access of citizens to basic public services and the concept of ethics in citizens’ participation. In Benin, after the national conference of the vital forces of the nation in 1990 and the separation between police and the armed forces, the specific missions assigned to the national police were as follows:
Maintenance of law and order, security and protection of state institutions; Ensuring respect for freedoms and protection of goods and persons throughout the national territory; The national police directorate was expected to carry out intelligence, security and public protection missions, in support of the national defence system.
While the missions assigned to the national police force by the laws and regulations are being implemented to an extent, there is still a need to revive the flame of dignity, the duty of loyalty, patriotism and a sense of self-sacrifice in the supreme interest of the nation in the hearts of police officers of all ranks. Indeed, overall development will only become a reality if the population as a whole is mobilised and galvanised by the public authorities to participate in tasks of general interest. For this purpose, the role of the administration goes far beyond the domain of public service as it is understood by civil servants.23 In the area of SSR in Benin, the constant appeal launched by security forces to the general population is a demonstration of this fact. Government has also made this a priority.
Notes
1 Ministry of National Defence, Rapport général du Forum géostratégique (Cotonou: Imprimerie CACI), 34. 2 Ministry of National Defence, Actes du forum (Cotonou: Imprimerie CACI, February 2003). 3 Axel Auge, ‘Les réformes du secteur de la sécurité et de la défense en Afrique sub- saharienne: Vers une institutionnalisation de la gouvernance du secteur sécuritaire’, Afrique contemporaine, no. 218 (2006/2): 49-67. 4 Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Politique et stratégie nationale de sécurité (Cotonou: Imprimerie CACI, June 2008).
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5 On 11th February 2009, a seminar was organised by the national police union (Synapolice), with the support of the Ministry of Interior and Public Security, to try to seek a lasting solution to the phenomenon of extortion within the national police force. 6 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) endeavours to raise awareness in the area of terrorism control and oil trade protection in Africa. Bearing in mind its historic links with the continent, the United States of America has declared readiness to make their contribution. 7 Taken from the interministerial working document entitled ‘Fondements, principes et objectifs’, La politique de défense du Benin. 8 Benin’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations started in 1985 and subsequently decreased as a result of the military’s preference for domestic politics (revolutionary period). After the national conference, Benin’s resumed its participation in peacekeeping operations in 1994 as a sign of solidarity with other countries. This engagement allowed Benin to gain very rich and diverse experience as the armed forces carried out numerous missions involving almost three thousand soldiers and gendarmes of all categories, liaison officers, general staff officers, and observers, in more than a dozen operations on four continents (Europe, Africa, America, and Asia). 9 See Lettre de mission du directeur général des douanes et des droits indirects. 10 Décision n° 101/MISAT/DC/DGPN/DSP/SA, on the regulation of surveillance and protection services by private companies. 11 Jean Rivero, Droit administratif (Paris: Dalloz, 1996), 396. 12 Rivero, 397. 13 See Security Council resolutions and the United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 14 See measures adopted by the OECD and the EU with respect to security sector reform in countries of the South. 15 See measures adopted by the Economic Community of West African States with respect to marking and tracing small arms and light weapons. 16 Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Politique et stratégie nationales de sécurité, (June 2008). 17 Ibid. 18 Recently, right in the centre of Cotonou, bandits robbed a shop and stole FCFA 2 million. This operation resulted in two fatalities and dozens of injured. 19 After the attempted bank robbery in Cotonou, the bandits escaped off the coast of Benin. The air force located them on the high seas and informed the naval forces that surrounded the bandits and forced them to head for the beach where their boat ran aground. The bandits then sought refuge in a hotel but were followed by the national police and gendarmerie and then by the army. 20 Recruitment and training costs for police officers are estimated at FCFA 1,908,396 for a police commissioner, FCFA 1,605,312 for a police officer, and FCFA 793,656 for a police sergeant. 21 All the successful police and gendarme operations owe their success to the security forces’ collaboration with the people. Officials of the public security services highlight this point whenever the exploits of the security forces receive media coverage. In addition, people have now developed the habit of calling on the fire service whenever there is a road accident, which shows that the educational campaigns have been effective. 22 Ministry of Interior and Public Security, Politique et stratégie nationales de sécurité, (June 2008), 13. 23 In 1959, Mamadou Dia declared before the National Assembly of Senegal that
44 Théodore C. Loko
‘development must be total, that is, it must apply to all urban and rural regions of the country, to all classes of society, to all sectors of the economy, and to all levels of individual and collective life’.
Chapter 3
Burkina Faso
Jean-Pierre Bayala
Introduction
Burkina Faso, the former Upper Volta, also called ‘the land of upright men’, attained independence on 5 August 1960. It is bordered to the north and to the west by Mali, to the north-east by Niger, to the south-east by Benin and to the south by Togo, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso is a landlocked country with no maritime outlet and is a hub for trafficking in all sorts of goods destined for and coming from the neighbouring countries, especially small arms and light weapons, drugs, precious stones, livestock, wood, coffee and cocoa. In addition to the smuggling trade, starting from the 1990s, the country also appears to have been directly or indirectly involved in several internal armed conflicts in the sub-region (Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire). These conflicts no doubt contributed (and continue to contribute) to the rise of insecurity in the sub-region.1 As a Sahelian country, the rainy season in Burkina Faso lasts from mid-May to October. The structure of its economy has remained practically unchanged for half a century and its principal resources are still agriculture and livestock, which are easily affected by poor rainfall. This economic situation places the country among the poorest in the world, with almost 43% of the population still living in poverty.2 Where education and health are concerned, the ineffective systems are unable to develop the human capital that the economy sorely needs, instead leading to large scale unemployment, which is in itself a source of growing insecurity.3 Nevertheless, the principal wealth of the country still lies in the courage and determination of its valiant population, which in the past represented a valuable source of labour for neighbouring countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Ghana. With regard to the political dimension, Burkina Faso is one of the countries in the sub-region where the military has played and continues to play a major role in the management of internal affairs. In fact, since
46 Jean-Pierre Bayala independence, the country has experienced eleven regimes, four of which were constitutional and seven of which were exceptional. This represents a change of regime every four years.4 As far as the armed forces and security forces are concerned, the 4 August 1983 revolution seriously undermined military values such as discipline and the established hierarchical order, by encouraging the politicisation of military ranks. Indeed, the establishment of committees for the defence of the revolution (CDR) within the general population and the revolutionary service committees in the government apparatus undermined the foundations of the military and paramilitary corps. This new politico- military order established to defend the revolution had a lasting effect, in spite of the rectification that took place on 15 October 1987 and the changes that have occurred since 1991 with the return of constitutional rule. The famous slogan of the CDR, ‘a soldier without political and ideological training is a potential criminal’ remains very vivid in the minds of the military. The fact that some of them are openly active in political parties or have been elected as members to the national assembly may have inspired other members of the military and paramilitary corps to imitate them in the political arena. In addition to the politicisation of the armed forces and the police, the effect of the creation of the people’s rapid intervention battalions, based on the concept of a ‘generalised people’s war’ was the anarchical and massive distribution of uncontrolled weapons of war, some of which are now no doubt being used for organised crime in the country and even the sub-region. With the Constitution of 11 June 1991, Burkina Faso returned to a semi-presidential constitutional regime, marked by the separation of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of power. The regime is open to a multiparty system and there are numerous private media that contribute to political activities and significantly enrich the democratic debate. The country is made up of a mosaic of ethnic groups, the main ones being the Mossi, the Gourounsi, the Senoufo and the Mandingo. Many of them engage in ‘joking relations’, as they are called in Burkina Faso, a practice that contributes to the harmonious existence and peaceful cohabitation of ethnic groups. ‘Joking relation’ days are sometimes organised in the country, providing the younger generations with an opportunity to learn about and cultivate this centuries-old tradition. This customary practice is used by all the groups concerned. This ‘joking’ is one of the reasons why Burkina Faso is considered a haven of peace, because it is considered as a real valve for regulating social tensions, thus enabling various ethnic groups to live together in harmony.5
Burkina Faso 47
The security apparatus and its environment
The security apparatus in Burkina Faso is made up of the armed forces, gendarmerie, the national police force, communal police and the fire brigade. The security apparatus inherited from the former colonial authority has changed little in its doctrine of use and its behaviour. By nature, it engages more in repression than prevention. From a security sector governance perspective, the security sector should include the presidential security corps, the justice system, prison guards, the customs service, forest rangers, as well as private guard and security companies. Most of the forces in the Burkinabe security apparatus are still unable to move away from their congenital and acquired defects that manifest in the form of misconduct, which isolates them from the population that they are supposed to be protecting. This is particularly true of the armed forces, the police and the gendarmerie, for which it will take some time before they are well integrated in the population. Furthermore, whereas these institutions are meant to work together in synergy, they rather tend to engage in conflicts of competence or demonstrate a superiority complex, which can lead to confrontation.
The national armed forces
The national armed forces, which were created on 1 November 1961, comprise the army, the air force and the gendarmerie. They make up the national armed forces, organised in military and gendarmerie regions within the framework of operational defence of the national territory. In addition to their conventional missions, they undertake rescue missions, as well as international peace and development missions. As third category forces, they also participate in operations to maintain or restore law and order and support the security forces in combating organised crime through military security support units know as compagnies militaries d’appui à la sécurité. Contrary to the other armed forces mentioned above, the gendarmerie is a second category force where maintaining and restoring law and order is concerned, intervening on the request of the civilian authority. Due to the country’s lack of resources, the armed forces are not able to carry out the necessary training properly and regularly, to keep the men in fit condition. This has led to a relaxing of discipline and thus to forms of behaviour that could potentially lead to disruptions in law and order.6
48 Jean-Pierre Bayala
National gendarmerie
The national gendarmerie is an integral part of the army. In addition to its military missions, it also has the same functions as the national police force. The gendarmerie is organised according to the breakdown of the country into administrative and judicial zones. It is subdivided in two main branches: the territorial gendarmerie and the mobile gendarmerie. The gendarmerie in a département comprises all the territorial brigades established in the main town of each département of the country. It has the responsibility for police functions related to administration and criminal investigation and is under standing orders to the appropriate authorities as a first category force for all operations for restoring and maintaining law and order. It can therefore take the initiative without waiting to be requisitioned to carry out its missions. The mobile gendarmerie, for its part, is in charge of both territorial defence and maintaining/restoring law and order. Because of the military character of the gendarmerie, its relations with magistrates are not always easy as it carries out criminal investigation missions. There are still some misunderstandings in spite of the legal provisions that are clearly defined in the code of criminal procedure.
National police force
The national police force is in charge of administrative and criminal investigation missions, as well as maintaining and restoring law and order. Like the gendarmerie, it is organised according to the breakdown of the country into administrative and judicial zones. Although police-gendarmerie relations are quite good, this is not always true for relations with the rest of the armed forces. The concept of a local police force is a major innovation in the organisation of the police force since the return to a constitutional order. The process of establishing a local police force started in 2005 and provides the basis for wider reforms. Apart from the partnership with citizens in the local security committees, the security apparatus itself is essentially limited to the police and gendarmerie. As to the resources required to set up this local police force, they depend on the limited annual budgetary resources of the three ministerial departments that are supposedly the most closely concerned, namely, defence, security and local authorities. This seems to explain why it is taking so long to establish the local security committees and why the rapprochement between security forces and the population is so
Burkina Faso 49 delayed. In this matter, experience shows that when such a mechanism is established piecemeal, it inevitably either fosters the displacement of insecurity from one place to another, or fosters its reorganisation, or both at the same time. In spite of some shortcomings, a local police force could be a form of response, albeit limited, to insecurity in the country. The fact that decentralised police services have been set up within a radius of about 60 km from each other and that the security surveillance ratio has been reduced from 3,386 inhabitants per police officer to 2,386 in 2010, with the support of the local security committees, could help reduce insecurity. Nevertheless, it is generally indicated that the optimum security surveillance ratio is 360 to 400 inhabitants per police officer. Indeed, setting up a local police force is a lengthy process, with a high financial cost. If the local police force is approached from a systemic point of view, this should enable the national assembly to pass the necessary programme laws, not to mention for development aid to be forthcoming from some partners who are particularly interested in security sector reform (SSR).
The justice system
In addition to the army, police and gendarmerie, the justice system is one of the pillars of the security sector. Unfortunately, it is not included anywhere in the establishment of the local police force, although it could have played a major role. The Burkinabe justice system emerged weakened from the August 1983 revolution and its people’s tribunals. However, with the return to a constitutional regime in 1991, it started being reorganised. Courts were created in each province and the former Supreme Court was divided into four main structures (the Constitutional Council, the Council of State, the Court of Cassation and the Court of Accounts), thus giving a new dimension to the judicial landscape.7 In addition to these efforts, the criminal code was revised and judiciary staff were recruited and trained, thus consolidating the numbers of existing staff and also gradually enabling the newly created provincial courts to be put into operation. Meanwhile, and in spite of all these efforts, the Burkinabe justice system still needs to show its worth. Indeed, like many other state bodies, it has been affected by corruption and politicisation and has not gained the trust of the citizens. A lot needs to be done to enhance its credibility.
50 Jean-Pierre Bayala
The presidential security regiment
The presidential security regiment is a military body in charge of protecting the head of state and presidential infrastructure. It was established by the exceptional regime and has gradually replaced all of the security forces that in the past had responsibility for these duties. This institution sometimes exceeds its security boundaries and requires a framework that clearly defines its functions, responsibilities and relations with other components of the security apparatus of which it is an integral part. Because of the importance and sensitivity of its missions, it is important to avoid conflicts in competence and unnecessary duplication that could be detrimental to security.
Prisons service
The prisons service, which is under the authority of the ministry of justice, is in charge of surveillance in prisons. Apart from the lack of resources, which is found everywhere in the security sector, it does not encounter any major difficulties in its relations with other security departments. Nevertheless, the fact that prisoners under military jurisdiction are held in the same establishments as those sentenced under common law and for which the prisons service is responsible, could lead to difficulties. A better solution would be to construct a military prison, to avoid any threat that could emerge from the military side in certain crisis situations.
The fire brigade
The fire brigade is a military unit and is organised as such. It is made up of companies that are established in the main towns of the country. It falls under the responsibility of the ministry of defence but is placed under the ministry of local authorities for their use. In peacetime it carries out civil protection missions. In case of armed conflict, the fire brigade is expected to join the other components of the armed forces to defend the national territory, thus depriving the country of its civil protection. To avoid such a situation, the International Civil Defence Organisation recommends that member states create a civilian fire service. This would be an advantage for Burkina Faso.
Burkina Faso 51
The customs service
The customs service is under the authority of the ministry of finance. The customs service is represented throughout the territory and mainly in major urban centres and along the borders. In spite of the widespread corruption that affects the customs service, it still remains a major provider of financial resources for the country. However, its performance could be improved if better anticorruption mechanisms were put in place.
Forest rangers
The forest rangers fall under the responsibility of the minister for the natural and local environment. In particular, they are in charge of protecting the country's forests and its animal and fish resources. The major difficulties in this sector are improper woodcutting, deforestation, poaching and use of prohibited fishing techniques. These are all issues to be resolved that require the assistance of other security forces, something that has not yet been organised.
The internal security inspectorate or internal audit division
There is a police inspectorate division within the ministry of security.8 It is in charge of monitoring, counselling and controlling the functions of various departments and projects, as well as the application of government policy. It is in charge of controlling the application of texts governing the use of public security forces; of carrying out investigations on the administrative, technical and financial management of police services and projects; of receiving and examining complaints from police officers and the users of police services and projects; and of verifying the operational readiness of the security forces and suggesting the necessary adjustments to be made to consolidate their capacities. In reality, however, this institution, which does not have the required resources for its functioning, is simply a sinecure for its members. Since 1976, the Burkinabe gendarmerie has not had an internal inspectorate division and the one that existed prior to that date was never actually operational. The inspection of the various departments and units is carried out within the chain of command. Each commanding officer carries out inspections at their level of command, according to pre-established annual timetables, or without notice. This practice, which makes the hierarchical authority both judge and defendant, is severely flawed: instead
52 Jean-Pierre Bayala of carrying out the planned inspections, they are generally taken as opportunities to hold feasts. Both gendarmerie and police have excessive powers, with insufficient oversight for their right to hold individuals in custody, to search houses and to arrest people. Since these services contribute to state financial resources, there have to be independent inspection and control bodies put in place to enhance their credibility and their sense of accountability under the rule of law.
Private security companies
The law on internal security in Burkina Faso grants private companies the right to carry out public security activities, on condition that these relate exclusively to protecting persons and goods. They do not enjoy any of the benefits of public law enforcement, although their agents, like any citizen, can report crimes and offences and, if necessary, arrest the perpetrators. By virtue of this law, more than sixty private companies now contribute to consolidating public security. Apart from these companies, there are no guerrillas, militias, or any other form of private security organisations in the country. These types of bodies are characteristic of countries experiencing internal armed conflict, or in an advanced state of instability. In spite of the numerous exceptional regimes, Burkina Faso has always enjoyed relative peace. This stability is supposedly due in part to the spirit of tolerance of the Burkinabe people, something that results from the cordial and beneficial practice of ‘joking relationships’. With the growing security needs around the world, governments are now turning to private security agents. Indeed, the concept of SSR makes them potential agents of public security. There is not yet a threat of privatisation of public security in Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, the absence of bold reforms aimed at enhancing the ability of security forces to control public insecurity could lead to the excessive use of private companies, thus jeopardising public security. In the case of Burkina Faso, private security companies are a necessity, which means that their rights and responsibilities need to be regulated. If properly governed, they can be a tool for enhancing the activity of the security forces in combating insecurity. Nevertheless, the multiplication of private companies should not put them on an equal footing with the security forces, or worse, tip the scales in their favour.
Burkina Faso 53
As indicated above, security is first and foremost the prime responsibility of the state. In Burkina Faso, although private companies are not accessible to all citizens, they do allow the security forces to concentrate their efforts in the dangerous zones where their presence is most needed. Although there are no duly established statistics on the results obtained by private security companies, it can be assumed quite reasonably that they do have a generally positive impact that is encouraging for the public authorities. Indeed, the increase in their numbers and the fact that none of them has ever had to be sanctioned do tend to justify their existence.
The security environment
In Burkina Faso, the composition of the security apparatus is obviously defined by its environment. In the government’s general policy statement dated 10 October 2002, the national security situation is described in the following terms:
Our fellow citizens are quite legitimately concerned about the increase in crime. Insecurity is demonstrated in increasingly diversified forms. In urban areas, crime is still widespread and mainly involves young people who are more and more often seen as either perpetrators or victims. Major crime is now organised and has become international, to adapt to economic and social mutations. Insecurity is a challenge for our society that we must all face together.
This summary shows not only the level of insecurity the country has reached, but also the fact that the government is aware of the need to adopt urgent measures. The manifestations of insecurity are diverse and complex. Among the endogenous factors of insecurity, crime in the country stems mainly from poverty and affects the security of goods and persons. This growing phenomenon includes among others robberies, fraud and breach of trust, embezzlement and assault. Organised crime is another concern which is demonstrated by armed robberies, organised thefts and rape. This lack of order also facilitates various forms of fraud and trafficking, in particular drugs, small weapons, precious stones and children. Another source of insecurity is white collar crime in the form of embezzlement and misuse of public money and goods by civil servants and other agents of government. Corruption is dangerously undermining the state apparatus, in particular the customs service, gendarmerie, police and the justice system. These are the services that seem to be most decried by the general public but, in reality, the
54 Jean-Pierre Bayala scourge affects all sectors of life in ‘the land of upright men’. The situation is made worse by acts of illegal enrichment and their corollary, money laundering. More and more people die each year through violations of traffic regulations because the government is incapable of reacting; the most recent tragedy, a collision between a passenger bus and a lorry carrying goods occurred on 15 October 2008 and led to 70 deaths. Endogenous threats may seem easier to combat, but in reality, this is far from being the case. Indeed, they require either substantial resources, or a strong political will and commitment, or both at the same time. These threats include, in particular, crowd control during operations to maintain or restore law and order (which should be carried out without violating human rights); politicisation and militarisation of security forces; nepotism; favouritism; impunity; lack of transparency in managing careers; lack of professionalism; and the lack of appropriate equipment for the different missions to ensure the rule of law. Where professionalism is concerned, there are some tangible efforts being made, but for the other cases, a lot still remains to be done. One of the sovereign missions of any democratic state is to ensure that its citizens, individually and collectively, enjoy protection of their life, safety, and physical integrity. The first heading of the Burkinabe constitution guarantees these rights to all citizens. But is this a reality? According to the independent journalist Laurent La Plante, ‘sixty years after its adoption, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains a utopian vision in many countries.’9 Between 2003 and 2007, the average number of assaults was 795, that is, at least 2 per day. For 2008, 423 cases were reported in the first six months alone. The table below indicates the number of armed robberies recorded in recent years:
Table 1. Police/gendarmerie statistics of armed robberies10
Order 2008: 1st Institution 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 n° semester 01 Gendarmerie 126 127 320 215 204 109 02 Police 963 610 675 469 278 314 Total 1089 737 995 684 482 423
In Burkina Faso, the police surveillance ratio, which was one police officer per 3,686 inhabitants in 2005 is expected to go down to one per 2,686 inhabitants in 2010, with the establishment of a local police force.11 Although this is a significant reduction if it is indeed reached, it would still be a long way from ensuring effective individual security, for which the
Burkina Faso 55 optimal ratio is arguably around 360 to 400 inhabitants per police officer. Pending better times for individual and collective security, the security forces would do well to avoid all excesses and misuse of their power and/or mandates. With regard to insecurity, similar to many other ills, there are no borders between countries. That is why all governments must also take into account any security threats that might emerge in the international environment. For Burkina Faso, its central position in West Africa exposes the country to numerous threats, namely corruption, terrorism, kidnappings, illegal enrichment, money laundering, proliferation of trafficking in drugs and precious stones, as well as cybercrime. All these scourges, which cannot be tackled effectively by Burkina Faso alone, compound already existing security problems and considerably jeopardise the government's efforts to ensure the country’s security.
Relations among the various components of the security apparatus
Coordination and cooperation among the armed forces, internal security forces and the gendarmerie are not enough by themselves to establish a climate free of counter-productive competition. In fact, they would have no effect without a review of the law on internal security and the adoption of various legal acts that have been suggested many times in the past. Such acts would need to include very clear provisions concerning the sovereign attributions, missions, circumstances and areas of intervention of each of the forces, while also setting the objectives to be met. They also have to be given the necessary and appropriate means to carry out their missions, so that each force can hold its place in the field without feeling disadvantaged vis-à-vis the others. Beyond these precautionary principles, however, there will still be the thorny issue of the trust that decision-makers place in each force, given that politics has now become entrenched in this sector. From that point of view, competition is now a major issue for security sector governance in Burkina Faso and remains inextricably linked to the pace of current democratic progress. In the meantime, the areas identified for coordination and cooperation appear to be those that are easiest to develop, in spite of their limitations.
56 Jean-Pierre Bayala
Coordination
In order to improve their effectiveness in controlling insecurity and because they are made up of a broad range of agencies, the security forces are represented by a commission, under the authority of the ministry in charge of security.12 Its members include the permanent secretary of the ministry of security, the chiefs of staff of the gendarmerie and the fire brigade and the director general of police. Its tasks are as follows:
Draft a policy for combating insecurity and monitor its implementation; Organise and coordinate the activities of the public security forces in carrying out their administrative and criminal investigation missions; Coordinate the security forces’ prevention and emergency activities, in particular in the area of security of infrastructure and crowd safety and control.
This coordination process unfortunately appears somewhat inadequate. Obviously, its members come from an incomplete security apparatus and the four members are entrusted with the weighty responsibility of drafting a policy to combat insecurity and monitor its implementation. Because of its very nature, a policy to combat insecurity cannot be limited only to security providers. The agencies should rather serve as advisors in its drafting, in order to set up an ad hoc political authority. As far as monitoring this coordination process is concerned, this is already under the responsibility of the general inspectorate of the police and is not only inappropriate but also a source of conflicts in jurisdiction, as well as duplication.
Cooperation v. competition
Cooperation among the different actors in the security sector should be automatic within any security apparatus because carrying out their missions requires synergy. Generally, however, the situation is quite different. For the police and gendarmerie, the question of cooperation during administrative and criminal investigation missions, as well as law enforcement operations is regulated by the code of criminal procedure and decree n° 5005-025 of 31 January 2005, governing the maintenance of law and order in Burkina Faso. In the specific case of maintaining law and order, the issue of who commands joint army/police/gendarmerie operations, which
Burkina Faso 57 was mentioned above, requires a revision of the aforementioned decree. As to the relations between the other security agents, they could be defined through a review of the law on internal security and the decree governing the coordination of internal security forces. During the revolutionary period, the roles and tasks of the different armed and security forces and the revolutionary defence committees were often confused, thus exacerbating existing rivalries, especially between the police and the military. In spite of the fact that joint training programmes are now organised in the military training centres, with a view of creating a spirit of solidarity and the understanding that they belong to complementary forces, this negative competitive feeling persists. The measures proposed to enhance coordination and cooperation among the armed and security forces are the same as those suggested to eradicate the rivalry among internal security forces. The issue of competition is essentially a policy issue. To sum up, in the case of Burkina Faso, texts alone will not be enough to resolve the question of coordination, cooperation and competition among the different forces. The intrusion of some of these forces into the internal security apparatus highlights the forces in play at the moment. But here as well, time will ease the way. Changing this situation will most likely be a lengthy process, as it has been in the area of moving toward democracy and good governance.
Relations between the police and the gendarmerie
These relations are defined under the code of criminal procedure, the law on internal security and the decree organising the maintenance of law and order in Burkina Faso.13 In particular, these texts stipulate their territorial competences and their attributions. According to the provisions of the law on internal security, the police and gendarmerie have competence over all of the national territory to conduct policing activities. However the gendarmerie carries out its functions mainly in the hinterland and on major road axes, while the police operate mainly in urban areas. As far as the municipal police are concerned, they are limited to the communes. The national police force and the gendarmerie are in charge of enforcing regulatory measures related to security, health and safety as well as maintaining and restoring public order. They are in charge of territorial surveillance, protecting institutions, persons and goods and also carry out criminal investigations in line with the legal provisions, in particular those of the common law code of criminal procedure, the code of military procedure, as well as the decree organising law enforcement. In the specific case of
58 Jean-Pierre Bayala maintaining and restoring law and order, article 32 of decree n° 2005-025, dated 31 January 2005, stipulates the following:
Where several units from different categories of forces are called on to carry out the same mission, it is necessary to establish a close link immediately between the commanding officers. To this end, an operational staff shall be put in place, comprising representatives of each of the forces. Overall command shall fall to the longest serving military officer of the highest rank.
These provisions lead to a few comments: except in the case of a state of siege or of emergency, entrusting the management of operations to maintain and restore law and order to a military commander rather than a gendarme or a police officer could seriously jeopardise the smooth running of the mission. Indeed, the use of force and arms during such operations is governed by some fundamental rules that the military commander may not be familiar with, or worse, may not know about. These are in particular the principles of self-defence and the proportional use of force or arms. When the military is called in as back-up, not being specialists of law enforcement, the difference is not always made between the concept of an enemy in combat and a simple demonstrator. This confusion or grave misconception can have tragic consequences and even lead to greater disruption of law and order. There are many examples of this throughout the world. The municipal police service is mainly in charge of carrying out the policing functions attributed to the mayor, and which relate to public safety, security, health and peace. All security agents must be subject to constitutional and institutional control, as well as to oversight by civil society, to enable them to carry out their responsibilities and respond as best as possible to national security needs. The inspections and checks put in place within the different forces themselves are often inoperative.
The difference between the national dimension and the local dimension
As far as internal security is concerned, that is, police, gendarmerie, the fire brigade and the prisons’ service, there must be a clear distinction between the national level and the local level. The national police force and the gendarmerie operate at the national level. At the local level, they are subdivided into units that as decentralised bodies have limited powers. Powers in certain areas could be devolved to them, to enable them to act in some instances without having to refer to the national level. With respect to the fire brigade and the presidential guard, although they are under the
Burkina Faso 59 authority of the national level, their decentralised institutions are authorised to take certain initiatives in carrying out their missions, since they need to find immediate responses at the local level. Where security is concerned, any delay in making decisions and reacting can lead to disastrous consequences. It is important for national services such as police and gendarmerie to be truly decentralised. The concept and establishment of a local police force are well in line with this requirement, although this is not an end in itself.
Excesses and misuse of mandates
The security forces need to act within a legal framework that clearly defines the tasks and responsibilities of each force. Overzealousness and ignorance very often lead to excesses and/or the misuse of powers and mandates while carrying out their duties. The following examples are quite significant:
The case of David Ouedraogo (a driver who was arrested, detained and tortured to death by soldiers of the presidential guard for having stolen cash) was brought before a military tribunal in Ouagadougou on 19 August 2000; Summary executions during ‘clamp downs’ against organised crime in the eastern part of the country, in Boulpouré on 6 December 2005 and in Piéla on 28 October 2006; Confrontations on 20 December 2007 between soldiers and policemen, following the refusal of a group of soldiers from the military garrison in Ouagadougou to submit to a simple police check. These events led to two deaths and seven injured among the police as well as major destruction of police equipment, estimated at a total of more than 1 billion CFA francs (vehicles and premises destroyed through gunfire). The group of soldiers continued their punitive campaign against the police by breaking down the doors of a civilian prison, thus allowing many detainees to escape.
Human rights and the security services
The fact that there is a ministry in charge of promoting human rights implies that the Burkinabe government accords importance to human rights related issues. This ministry has set up a national human rights commission whose mission is to disseminate information about and defend such rights. In addition to the efforts of this commission, certain non-governmental
60 Jean-Pierre Bayala organisations and associations such as the National Red Cross, the Burkinabe movement for human and peoples’ rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross organise seminars for members of the armed and security forces. Within the armed forces, there is a department in charge of disseminating information about human rights and international humanitarian law. In spite of all these training programmes, there is still a lot to be done to ensure that human rights are scrupulously respected by the security forces.
Security sector management and oversight
The Constitution of 2 June 1991 established a semi-presidential regime with a clear separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. Thus, in the area of security, organisation and management of the sector falls under the responsibility of the executive power, while the power of oversight lies with the legislative and judicial branches. The bodies in charge of managing the security forces are the general directorate of police, the gendarmerie general staff and the general staff of the fire brigade. Under the responsibility of their respective ministers, they are in charge of the organisation, functioning and management of the various security forces. They also carry out internal control of the services through permanent technical inspection missions or ad hoc inspections.
Constitutional and legal control
In accordance with the constitution and the code of criminal procedure, oversight of the security forces falls to the national assembly and the judicial branch of power. Under the terms of article 84 of the constitution, the national assembly passes laws, approves taxes and monitors government activity. According to the provisions of the code of criminal procedure, courts and tribunals lead and control the security forces in carrying out their criminal investigation functions. The national assembly and its foreign affairs and defence commission (CAED) are the main mechanisms available to the legislative branch of power for oversight of the security forces. The national assembly carries out its functions through oral questions, requests for information and enquiries. The CAED deals with questions of international relations, foreign policy and cooperation under international treaties and agreements, as well as general organisation of defence and security and military cooperation policy.
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Judicial oversight of the security forces is carried out by public prosecutors, the attorney general and the courts of criminal appeal. Due to the fact that there is no hierarchical link between judicial police officers, agents of these forces and the magistrates, such oversight is not always easy to carry out. Putting in place mutually binding working relations would help to resolve some of the difficulties that exist among these different agents. In the national legal arsenal, there is no single instrument that defines the functions, rights and obligations of the security apparatus. Each agency defines its own area of competence without taking into account the issue of complementarity. This shows that security is not seen as being a part of the national apparatus. The law on internal security, which was supposed to provide the legal framework, says nothing about the functions, rights and obligations of the various agents in the security sector. In order to ensure coordination of the internal security forces, it would be appropriate to set up a legal body in charge of implementing best practices with a view to building the capacity of the security forces and enabling them to fulfil their responsibilities. All these gaps must be filled within the framework of a holistic SSR process.
Civilian oversight
Civilian oversight is carried out by the national assembly, the judicial branch of power and the general government inspectorate. Civilian control of security forces has been and remains an extremely sensitive issue for young democracies, in particular when the executive branch holds a large parliamentary majority. It becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out such control, as a result of the political choices of the authorities. Events have shown that Burkina Faso is no exception to this rule.
Parliamentary oversight
The national assembly is the body that has oversight over the executive power and consequently over the security forces. It must therefore ensure the smooth functioning of security services, which requires enormous resources, both in terms of quantity and quality. It is in charge of voting the budget and passing laws aimed at guaranteeing general peace and tranquillity for all citizens throughout the national territory. In addition, it controls the activities of the security forces and ensures that they carry out their responsibilities in observance of human rights and in conformity with national laws and
62 Jean-Pierre Bayala policies, as well as the treaties and conventions to which the country is a party. The national archives do not contain any records of enquiries, audits or reports drafted by the successive parliamentary majorities that relate to oversight of the internal security forces. The armed forces and security forces seem to be granted implicitly the privilege of ‘auto-control’ in this area. Nevertheless, on three occasions between 2005 and 2008, the ministry in charge of security was called to question on issues related to organised crime, the impact of the establishment of a local police force on insecurity and the state of progress in setting up this force. The assembly must be commended for this. In order to play its role of overseeing the executive and in particular the security forces fully and effectively, the National Assembly must possess special mechanisms and adequate means for its effective functioning.
Judicial oversight
Judicial oversight is carried out by a technical inspectorate within the ministry of justice, which falls under the authority of this ministry. However, like many similar government bodies, it exists in a vegetative state. As to judicial oversight of the security sector, it is governed by the code of criminal procedure, which places security sector staff under the management and control of the public prosecutor’s office and the court of criminal appeal, with respect to their criminal investigation functions. The criminal appeal chamber, which is established within each court of appeal (Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso), is in charge of controlling the activities of officers of the judicial police. If criminal proceedings are brought against them, they may be assisted by a lawyer and if necessary, a lawyer is appointed for them. The criminal investigation department and the prosecution departments of the police and gendarmerie are completely outside any control by the judiciary. Given their key role with regard to human rights, there is a need for them to be under the oversight of the courts of appeal. The courts of the land must have unfailing control over internal security forces. In practice, the only control is through preliminary legal proceedings, that is, reports by the police or gendarmerie. It is indeed rare for prosecutors to carry out any control of security services. Prosecutors and investigating magistrates almost never go out in the field. Neither do they tour prisons or detention centres in the gendarmerie brigades or police stations. This laxity leads to people being held overly long in custody;
Burkina Faso 63 sometimes as long as a month or even more, without the knowledge of the public prosecutor.
Government inspectorate general
The government inspectorate general is in charge of controlling all government and paragovernmental departments, as well as national institutions that receive government subsidies. In order to improve its effectiveness, it would need to be endowed with the power to bring cases directly to the courts. Many of its reports have piled up in the offices of certain ministers because of the alleged or actual sensitivity of the topics they cover. More stringent rules in governance, as stated in recent general declarations from government, should enable this institution to be given the right to bring cases to court as part of its functions. It is also the duty of every citizen to report any criminal violations that they may be aware of.
Public oversight
Public oversight is the responsibility of civil society. In Burkina Faso, this is carried out by a number of NGOs,14 as well as certain media and trade unions. Given the general climate of distrust and suspicion between civil society and security actors, such oversight is carried out through sporadic and specific visits to police stations and gendarmerie brigades when information is received about cases of human rights violations, proven corruption and/or other reports. It is not easy for civil society institutions to carry out public oversight because they have limited resources and in particular because they are faced with a lack of cooperation on the part of the security forces who often refuse to respect certain rights: the right to visits, communication and information for the families of people who are being held in custody or have been arrested.
The role of civil society in SSR
Civil society cannot participate productively in reforming the security sector if it does not have a good knowledge of the relevant issues. Unfortunately, in Burkina Faso the SSR concept is far from being well-known due to a lack of research in this area. Civil society can nevertheless play a positive role in terms of democratic oversight. In order to do this, its activities should be coordinated
64 Jean-Pierre Bayala better and civil society should demonstrate greater determination in fighting against insecurity and scourges such as corruption, politicisation, impunity and all the other evils that undermine the security forces. Their participation in an SSR process also requires that the general population be informed and trained about individual and collective rights and in particular the obligations upon the security forces and the government to render an account of their activities. To this end, civil society organisations must be more closely involved and show proof of greater cohesion in fighting to promote and respect human rights, by refusing to give in to political intimidation and manipulation.
Challenges of security sector governance
According to the statements made by government in the recent general policy declarations mentioned above, the major challenges to be faced are in fighting growing insecurity and organised crime. However, after analysing the country's security environment and apparatus, it appears that other, equally important challenges also exist: security sector reforms to improve management and oversight of the security forces. Meeting these challenges means first and foremost defining the respective roles of government, the security sector and the various bodies that exercise democratic control, in particular the national assembly, the justice system and civil society.
Definition of roles
In the absence of effective oversight of the security forces, there is a need to set up the appropriate legal framework to govern all constitutional and institutional bodies that exercise democratic control over the security sector. Generally speaking, existing legal and regulatory texts related to the security sector all have shortcomings that need to be corrected. This applies particularly to the law on internal security and the decrees setting up a plan of action for implementing a local police force, as well as maintaining and re-establishing law and order. Where the aforementioned law is concerned, a sound review should define not only the security apparatus as a whole, but also the role of the executive in relation to the national assembly, the justice system and civil society. This text should also clearly define the highly sensitive concept of confidentiality, which has become a catch term used by the security forces to justify their total refusal to submit to external control.
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Finally, harmonising the texts governing security would facilitate management and oversight of the sector. In addition, it is up to the government to set up the necessary mechanisms to ensure functioning and control of internal security forces after having defined the functions and tasks of each actor. Such measures will make it possible to lay the foundation for establishing links of collaboration and trust amongst the various security forces.
Improving relations
It must be acknowledged that there has never truly been an atmosphere of trust between security agents and civil society. Indeed the security forces have usually been seen as a tool of repression to protect political regimes, which has always been an obstacle to good relations between the forces and civil society. There is no universal panacea for improving these relations. Nevertheless, in this specific case, the rights and obligations of all stakeholders have to be defined through an exhaustive and appropriate legislative text. This text should also provide for the mechanisms for consultation and communication, which are indispensable for establishing a dialogue that will prepare the way for a change of behaviour. In any event, there is a need for a national framework for reflection on the security sector, to resolve all these issues. It appears indispensable to organise a forum to examine the various sensitive aspects of security.
Sensitive aspects of SSR
The sensitive points that could be covered within the framework of reform are corruption, speculation, politicisation, militarisation, ethnicity, nepotism, favouritism and impunity, which all dangerously undermine the internal security forces. Obviously, issues related to professionalism and capacity building for the security forces, as well as the establishing the priorities of reform will all be at the centre of the debate. Although SSR is brought about by political will, it must take into account democratic progress, good governance and the rule of law, which it aims to enhance and consolidate. Indeed, any reform brings about a sudden change, which is imposed; in other words it ‘goes against the grain.’ An SSR process goes against all types of interests and must be expected to encounter resistance, because reforming also means losing some advantages or taking a leap of faith.
66 Jean-Pierre Bayala
In the case of Burkina Faso, the first source of resistance could be the political authorities themselves; it is not easy in a young democracy to de- politicise the security forces and to assure that their first priority is their service to the population. The second could be the security forces, which might fear losing certain privileges and advantages, especially if they are obliged to submit to civilian and public oversight with the attendant accountability requirements. Finally, implementing SSR in Burkina Faso also means bearing the financial and political cost and carrying it out within the context of economic crisis and democratic consolidation. In order to bring this forward, a cautious, pragmatic and realistic approach must be adopted.
Spaces for national and regional dialogue
Security sector governance is currently at the heart of debates within the international community. The growing interest in the subject has placed it on the agenda of all national and international meetings that include security in their areas of interest. As a result, institutions such as the national assembly, the economic and social council, political parties, trade unions, humanitarian and development NGOs, as well as international bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union parliament and the African Union (AU) itself constitute important fora for debating security sector governance. In a country with many borders like Burkina Faso, security cannot be provided without a minimum of transborder and even international cooperation and collaboration. In the area of security cooperation, the country has signed agreements with France. In the sub region, ECOWAS has a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security, which is provided for under the Lomé protocol of 10 December 1999. Within the AU, security is governed by the Durban Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, dated 9 July 2002. Burkina is a party to all these instruments, which serve to strengthen its internal security arrangements. Periodic meetings of police and gendarmerie authorities are also organised in the region to allow them to exchange experience and information. Finally on the international scene, the national police force is a member of the International Criminal Police Organisation. In addition to these collaboration and cooperation efforts, there are also inter-country exchange training programmes. Thus, certain members of the Burkinabe security forces are able to benefit from opportunities in countries such as France, Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Ghana.
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For its part, Burkina also hosts trainees from Niger, Gabon, Togo and Benin. With regard to training for peacekeeping operations, the Koulikoro centre in Bamako and the Kofi Annan centre in Accra provide good examples of international cooperation. As far as SSR is concerned, external assistance is indispensable. Burkina Faso cannot undertake its reforms by itself. The country requires funding through development assistance, but in observance of its sovereignty. Such assistance is based on the Bamako and Paris declarations relating to democracy and good governance for the first and development aid for the second. These instruments, which require that assisting countries respect the choices of assisted countries, both provide opportunities to be seized. In the absence of any in-depth studies on SSR in Burkina Faso, it is difficult to draw even immediate conclusions. The subsequent section therefore takes a critical look at current security practice while including the concept of SSR, identifies the country’s security needs and proposes solutions that will enable government to undertake real reforms (both generally and targeted on security), which will serve as a lever for development.
The SSR process and different options
Burkina Faso is not a country emerging from a recent conflict as has been the case for Sierra Leone, Liberia or Côte d'Ivoire where SSR has come about or become necessary as a matter of urgency. As far as Burkina Faso is concerned, the factors that could lead to inciting a process of security sector reform are the long history of political instability, the level of poverty and the sharp rise in insecurity that has been mentioned above.
The following measures therefore need to be taken very urgently:
Organise a national forum on the security sector; Redefine the security apparatus and include all agents of security; Define the functions, rights and obligations, as well as the responsibilities of each of the components of the security apparatus, including the role of the different oversight mechanisms; Set up real mechanisms for control and coordination, which are reliable and viable;
68 Jean-Pierre Bayala
Adopt fully fledged policies on fighting crime and internal security; Adopt strategies and action plans for implementing such policies.
Measures to control insecurity, as well as SSR both include short, medium and long-term aspects.
Short term
In the light of the growing insecurity, the following measures could be envisaged:
Intensify the control of organised crime by enforcing the prohibition on summary executions, which undeniably worsen the situation of insecurity; Continue and strengthen existing measures: establish the local police force within a holistic approach and set up local security committees throughout the national territory; Expand the concept of a local police force to include all components of the security apparatus; Hold workshops on the concept of SSR; Establish training programmes to educate the security forces on the re- establishment and enforcement of law and order, as well as respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.
The court system should accompany these measures by dealing with cases speedily. Without being hasty, the courts should rule on such matters with the appropriate degree of urgency required for prevention and deterrence and in all fairness, legality and independence. The resources made available for the establishment of the local police force must continue to be improved, not through the budget of the three ministries as stipulated in the action plan, but through the adoption of substantial programming laws. There is also a need to review the law on internal security in such a way as to allow it to take account of all private and public security actors. Thus, in the short term, it is essential to organise a national forum aimed at setting the foundations for an adequate security sector reform process by developing a systemic and effective national approach. This forum will also make it possible to identify priorities among reforms which all appear urgent. It will indicate the measures that need to be taken in the medium and longer term.
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Medium term and long term
Medium and long-term measures will cover the following:
Entrenching the concept of SSR within the national security discourse; Review of the law on internal security in the light of the previously adopted policy on fighting crime and the internal security policy; Defining the security apparatus and the functions and responsibilities of each of its components, including the different mechanisms for democratic control; Adopting strategies and action plans that are in line with the concept of SSR; Continuation of the recruitment and training of internal security force personnel; Improving national security coverage by reducing the police surveillance ratio and the range of action of the security forces to less than 60 km; Strengthening the operational capacities of the security forces; Harmonising texts governing security; Further SSR measures as identified during this process.
At this stage, the national assembly will need to adopt three-year or five-year budgets and programmes, aimed at consolidating the rule of law and ensuring the security of human development, which are both based on the efficiency and efficacy of the national security forces.
Conclusion
Given the level of insecurity in Burkina Faso, an urgent reaction is needed, requiring the adoption of a systemic approach. The measures indicated above are those that are recommended as a priority. Nevertheless, we must not neglect the fact that insecurity is a transnational phenomenon, which can hardly be controlled by one country alone no matter what means it may have at its disposal. Indeed, due to the porosity of our borders, the effects of globalisation, as well as the different economic and financial crises that are affecting countries, it is not possible to fight in isolation against global scourges such as corruption, drug trafficking, smuggling and various types of trafficking, organised crime and the circulation of small arms and light weapons. In order to be effective, governments, in particular those that share
70 Jean-Pierre Bayala borders, must set up frameworks for cooperation. In addition, they should consider the possibility of jointly establishing schools, sub-regional or regional centres and modules for training subregional or regional security forces. The centres in Bamako and Accra are praiseworthy examples in the sub-region. Since security affects all citizens of Burkina Faso, it cannot be entrusted only to the police force and gendarmerie. External agents have an important role to play which they must act on. This role falls as a priority to the executive branch, which is in charge of guaranteeing individual and collective rights and freedoms and also to the legislative branch of power, which is in charge of drafting laws and controlling the executive power and thus the internal security forces. Development cannot wait, but insecurity is not biding its time either. Any hesitation or delay in fulfilling commitments made to control insecurity reduces the chances of success, because this promotes the spread of insecurity and increases both the financial and human costs of combating the phenomenon. The measures suggested above must be implemented urgently in order to halt the spread of the scourge. Considering that there is no country in the world with absolutely no insecurity, these recommendations are not a universal panacea but should rather succeed in limiting insecurity to proportions that are not detrimental to development. Burkina Faso can achieve this with its legendary bravery, the determination of its inhabitants and the clear support of the international community to help the country implement the reforms of development sectors, including the security sector.
Notes
1 Government general policy statement (4 October 2007). 2 In 2007, 42.6% of the population was living below the poverty threshold, ‘Tableau de bord social du Burkina Faso 2008’, Direction de la démographie, Secrétariat général, Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Institut national de la statistique et de la démographie (December 2008), 72. Available at: www.insd.bf 3 Government general policy statement (4 October 2007). 4 Burkina Faso government portal: www.primature.gov.bf/burkina/histoire/précoloniale.htm 5 These events take place every two years either in an even or an odd number year. 6 Collective demands for an increase in housing allowance for soldiers in the military garrison in Ouagadougou in June/July 1999; military and police clashes in 2007. 7 Reorganisation of the Supreme Court, J.O. special, no. 001 (14 August 2001). 8 Decree no. 2001-296 (25 June 2001).
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9 Laurent Laplante, L’utopie des droits universels: l’ONU à la lumière de Seattle (Montreal: Éditions Ecosociété, 2000). 10 Statistics sources of the Ministry of Security/studies and planning department. 11 Government general policy statement (2 October 2002). 12 Different ethnic groups organise joking days. 13 Law no. 032 - Internal Security Act, (14 May). 14 For example, Burkinabe movement on human and peoples’ rights (MBDHP), National human rights commission (CNDH), Christian Association for the abolition of torture (ACAT), Burkinabe movement for emergence and social justice (MBEJUS), Burkinabe movement for peace (MPB), and National anticorruption network (REN-LAC).
Chapter 4
Côte d’Ivoire
Raphaël Ouattara
Introduction
Looking back, Côte d’Ivoire experienced unparalleled political stability within a sub-region weakened by numerous military coup d’états. Houphouët Boigny, the founding father of the independent state of Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed unquestioned historical legitimacy. Indeed, at the beginning of the 80s, it was one of the rare countries in the sub-region that was led by a civilian government. Côte d’Ivoire was considered a haven of peace and was also an economic beacon that attracted the citizens of neighbouring countries who came seeking a better life. President Houphouët Boigny’s government encouraged this immigration of cheap labour in order to consolidate the country’s position as the economic and even political powerhouse of the sub- region. Later on, however, the same immigrants became an electoral weapon in the hands of the government, to be brandished in the face of the growing demands of the opposition. Thus, in the 80s and 90s, the cyclical economic difficulties and the democratic aspirations of the population created a climate poisoned by the exacerbation of ethnocentric and nationalist reflexes, thus making way for all sorts of sectarian and exclusionist excesses. Of course, the most obvious targets were foreigners; those brethren who in the past had been courted for their labour, but were now considered out of place and were accused of being the cause of every ill. Like the economic fabric, the social fabric started to give way. Crime and delinquency began to undermine the tranquillity of the population, spreading from cities to the countryside. Gradually, acts of aggression were no longer carried out against individuals, but against small interest groups, then against communities and even states. The issue of the security of individuals, goods and borders became an overriding concern. President Houphouët passed away on 7 December 1993. The right of succession was governed by the highly controversial article 11 of the 3 November 1960 constitution, which generated confusion at the summit of
74 Raphaël Ouattara government because both the Speaker of the National Assembly, Mr. Henri Konan Bedie and the incumbent prime minister, Mr. Alassane Ouattara, sought to succeed the president. Finally, Mr. Konan Bedie, escorted by the national gendarmerie, declared himself president of the republic in a nation- wide television broadcast. By this unprecedented act in the political and constitutional history of the country, the defence and security forces lost their unity and neutrality and became central players and arbiters on the democratic field. A feeling of mistrust was thus established between the existing government and the national armed forces. The ‘Silent One’ had just broken its silence and began to make itself heard, even making certain corporatist demands. In response, on 24 December 1999, the army took over political power and put Brigadier General Robert Guei at the helm of affairs. He suspended the constitution and dissolved all institutions of the republic by ordinance on 27 December 1999. The military transition was established under the collective leadership of the National Council of Public Safety (CNSP), presided by the general himself. Among other things, the CNSP set itself the task of revising the constitution and organising general elections for the purpose of handing over political power to civilians. However, persistent divisions in the security forces between partisans and opponents of the overthrown government led to a split. Many conspiracies and pseudo-conspiracies were foiled, followed by a wave of arrests and summary executions. Armed groups were formed, trained and assigned to do the dirty work. After the referendum on the constitution in July 2000, when Guei decided to stand for election as president, against the advice of his principal lieutenants and contrary to the promise made to Ivorians, the division became even clearer and new splits appeared within the council, the military hierarchy and among the rank and file. The day after the presidential election that followed the referendum, the head of the CNSP, substituting for the national electoral commission, the body in charge of organising, centralising and proclaiming the results, proclaimed himself ‘elected’ as president of the Second Republic. Candidate Laurent Gbagbo called on the population to come out into the streets to counter the usurper. The situation deteriorated and the general’s partisans were thwarted by the force of arms and the popular movement. Laurent Gbagbo was ‘installed’ as de facto head of state by the national gendarmerie and some soldiers who supported him even before the results were published. The national electoral commission ended up proclaiming Gbagbo elected. But from that moment, the in-fighting within the security and defence
Côte d’Ivoire 75 forces found an echo in the political antagonisms and vice versa. Within this environment, an unprecedented military/political crisis emerged, which resulted in the armed insurrection of 19 September 2002. Since that date, Côte d’Ivoire has been divided in two with the existing regime in Abidjan on the one hand, controlling the southern half of the country and the rebels on the other, occupying and controlling the northern half. Today, much debate on SSR in the country focuses on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the former belligerents. Following the Pretoria agreements, the national DDR commission was established with the support of the international community. Intense negotiations started, with the involvement of the prime minister of the transition government and eminent personalities from civil society. They led to an agreement on various stages that was expected to culminate in the total disarmament of the pro-government and pro-New Forces militia, starting from 27 June 2005 for the latter. Accompanying measures, including a financial component (European Union Fonds Sud) were also included, to ensure the success of the DDR exercise and prepare the ground for elections. Presidential elections took place on 28 November 2010 but recourse to arms was necessary before the choice of the Ivorian people was respected. The two armies that had been engaged in DDR confronted each other, complicating significantly the security equation. In this study, we shall start by describing the security apparatus and its environment before going on to examine its strengths and weaknesses. In conclusion, we shall suggest some guidelines for implementing reforms that are capable of supporting democratic governance of this sector in Côte d’Ivoire.
The security apparatus and its environment
In line with the conventional nomenclature, we can distinguish between those forces in charge of protecting and defending territorial integrity and those in charge of internal security. These different units are not organised formally. The national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) are under the authority of the chief of staff, while the gendarmerie, police force, customs service, the navy and the forestry service are under separate and independent command structures.
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The national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire
Defence is provided by the national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), which include the air force, the navy and the army. Since the military coup in December 1999, the army has often been involved in politics. The head of the FANCI is the chief of staff, appointed by the president of the republic, who is also the commander in chief of the armed forces according to the terms of article 47 of the constitution. The air force and the navy are each under the command of senior officers from their units, who are under the authority of the chief of staff. Because of the current situation, it is difficult to give a precise estimate of the real strength of the FANCI. Until recently, the Ivoirian army was made up of 15,000 men. This figure may have increased to 17,000, not including auxiliaries, since 19 September 2000.1
National gendarmerie
The FANCI are supported by the national gendarmerie when necessary. The gendarmerie is considered to be a well-equipped and well trained elite unit. Since its principal mission is to maintain law and order, in the past its equipment only included light weapons. However, because of the role that it was compelled to play in the recent history of the country, the gendarmerie is now equipped with tanks and cannons, which were used to rout General Robert Guei’s men during the attempt to ‘steal’ the elections. There might be a total of up to 2,000 gendarmes throughout the national territory. Almost every administrative constituency has its own gendarmerie post or brigade. Gendarmes are recruited by means of a competitive exam and are trained in the national gendarmerie training school, which is situated in Abidjan and headed by a senior officer. The school also provides upgrading and refresher courses for non-commissioned officers and officers currently in service. The gendarmerie was given military status, at its own request, in the 1980s. The gendarmerie falls under the authority of a senior commander. Today, this corps is probably over- equipped.
Customs
The customs service provides surveillance at the borders and seeks to protect the national economy from smuggling and financial crime. Its functions are mainly related to internal revenue. Customs officers are armed with
Côte d’Ivoire 77 handguns to foil the attempts of criminals who take advantage of the porous borders to carry out activities that are harmful to national economic activity. The customs service remains a paramilitary force whose supervisory ranks are trained at the national school of administration in Abidjan, while the agents in uniform are trained at the customs training school. Because of the advantages linked to military status, the customs service has been demanding to be included in the military for many years, as did the gendarmerie and the national police force.
National police force
Internal security is provided by both public and private forces, whose missions are not always clearly delineated. The national police force is the main agent of internal security: it ensures order and security for goods and persons. When necessary, the gendarmerie intervenes as back-up to the police. The police force was able to obtain military status and enjoys the attendant prerogatives (specific status within the public service, a special military provident fund, free accommodation, etc.). Police stations are found in almost all the main urban centres. The police force is under the authority of a director general. The criminal investigation department is in charge of investigations and prosecutions that are ordered by the public prosecutor or by the court, in the case of common law offences. The commercial police department is in charge of preventing and sanctioning economic crime. There is a department of territorial surveillance, which provides intelligence using civilian personnel who are nevertheless authorised to carry handguns. They fall under the authority of the director general of national security.
The navy
Security on the seas and lagoons is provided by the personnel of the department of maritime and port affairs: the navy is in charge of training the river and coastal police in maritime waters and lagoons that fall under national jurisdiction and also contributes to regional coordination of coastguard activities, while participating in policing fishing activities and other security related activities.
Security of fauna and forests
Security of the fauna and forests is provided by a paramilitary force called
78 Raphaël Ouattara the forest police. The forest wardens carry handguns and rifles. They take their orders from a director general.
The republican guard
This is in fact a militia in charge of protecting the presidential palace and the president of the republic. Until very recently, their weaponry was limited to rifles, machine guns and a few cannon for parading.
Private security forces
This situation dates back to the start of the armed insurrection in September 1999, but it clearly shows the main problems that have to be resolved in order to guarantee the security of persons and goods. Insecurity has led to the establishment of self-defence militias (alongside the regular forces described above) in certain popular neighbourhoods, to provide security at night: these militias were in charge of sounding the alert and therefore acted as watchdogs and were rarely armed. In certain areas, the population called on the services of traditional hunters, who were reputed to have supernatural powers: they were armed with locally manufactured hunting rifles. It is impossible to say just how many such informal security organisations exist. This uncontrolled proliferation of paramilitary groups, a consequence of the failure or the incapacity of authorised forces to provide adequate security of goods and persons, was of even greater concern in light of the fact that some weapons that had come into circulation during the 1999 coup remained unaccounted for. Similarly, weapons coming in from neighbouring Liberia could be purchased dirt cheap from refugees. In addition to these groups, other watch brigades set up business providing guards for various premises, offices and private residences. These more or less structured organisations had been stifled during the military transition. However, they were able to resume their activities after the inception of the Second Republic. The issue of security in Côte d'Ivoire has been redefined in different terms since the politico-military crisis of September 2002. The tragic confrontations of 19 September 2002, which have been qualified by some as an armed insurrection, by others as a military-civilian crisis and by yet others as a civil war or aggression, certainly complicated the situation considerably. These acts benefited from the lax and corrupt economic and social fabric, as well as the weakness of institutions of democratic governance and the fact that political quarrels had been transposed into the armed forces.
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The direct consequence of this situation was the restructuring of private entities that are authorised to use force. While some have closed down, others have been set up more formally and yet others have been created. Following the resumption of hostilities in November 2004 and the subsequent scenes of violence in Abidjan against foreigners and the French in particular, the security sector has been ‘enhanced’ with the establishment of private security agencies mainly in charge of protecting French citizens and their property and businesses from the violence aimed at them and of which some had been victims. This trend can be explained by the incapacity or the lack of willingness on the part of the Ivoirian authorities to provide protection to the citizens of a country that they have portrayed throughout the crisis as hostile. The proliferation of such private security companies is also a reaction to the alleged activities of the ‘death squads’, which are believed to have operated throughout the political and security crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. All that is known about these squads are the acts that are rightly or wrongly attributed to them. Whatever the case may be, the emergence of private security agencies only contributes to making the security equation even more complex as they are potential players in the use of violence, the Ivoirian state having lost its monopoly a long while back. Thus, increasingly, and especially in Abidjan, the economic capital, the neighbourhood militias are armed. Most of the traditional hunters joined the armed rebellion and have practically disappeared from Abidjan and the areas controlled by loyalist forces. They are found mostly in the extreme north and serve as auxiliary forces for the Forces Nouvelles (FN). Other new so-called patriotic militia groups have been set up and claim to be armed to ‘defend’ the existing legal authority and ‘free’ Côte d’Ivoire from the ‘assailants’. Faced with such a picture, it becomes clear that the security equation is increasingly complex and even more difficult to resolve. Indeed, security sector reform should be applied not only to organised forces (both loyalist and rebel), but also to armed groups and security agents who have no fixed leaders.
Security forces without leaders
With regard to structure, the security forces are faced with a multiplicity of centres of command. Although this ensures a formal division of tasks, it is nevertheless a challenge in terms of administrative management and operational coordination, in particular within a context of civil war. The task
80 Raphaël Ouattara is even more arduous because in the operational dimension, the separation between defending territorial integrity and ensuring internal security of goods, persons and communities is not so clear in a failed state whose authority is called into question. The situation is made more complicated today with the excessive politicisation of the military as a result of the effects of the 1999 coup and the fact that party heads and leaders all want to have their men in the armed and security forces. Today, indiscipline and insubordination have become entrenched in the military, transforming it into a many-headed monster. In a 2001 report assessing the state of democracy in Côte d’Ivoire, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs uncovered the personal rivalries within the army, which have been compounded by disobedience and the creation of various groups with divergent loyalties, especially during the military transition.2 There is also the bitter feeling that the authorities of the Second Republic have not entirely succeeded in restoring civilian control over the military, and it quickly becomes clear that the renegade forces continue to pose a threat to national stability. Thus, indiscipline, frustration with mismanagement, partisan positions, ethnic and religious divisions, massive and uncontrolled flows of weapons of war from hot zones and/or neighbouring countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone) and the desertion of many soldiers have led to the total disintegration of cohesion in the defence and security forces. Today, it is quite obvious that the formal security forces have failed to fulfil their mission of protecting goods and persons. A person who carries weapons inspires more fear than trust in the population. Even worse, suspicion has now sunk its roots among security agents, not only between the different forces, but also within the ranks of these forces. Communities no longer trust each other and distrust is generalised: stakeholders in the security sector whose vocation is to serve as an interface and protect the population have failed to reassure the latter of their ability to fulfil this role. It must be said in their defence that the logistics and resources at their disposal are inadequate for the growing requirements of their duties. Furthermore, the excessive importance accorded to external threats does not allow for balanced and clearheaded resource management to face the numerous dangers. All these imbalances are accompanied by a feeling that internal security forces are the ‘poor relations’ compared to others who are seen as more privileged. This uneasiness is due to the terrible dilemma of having to choose between giving priority to security along the borders and guaranteeing internal security. One consequence of choosing to go to war to
Côte d’Ivoire 81 save the republic has been a proliferation of self-defence militias and private security forces.
Security sector management and oversight
In a democracy, the conventional channels for civilian control of those bodies in charge of the security of persons and goods are the institutions of the republic and the main depository of sovereignty, namely the citizenry, through grassroots organisations.
Parliamentary oversight
Where the legislative branch is concerned, the 225 national assembly members are divided into only six standing committees that do not even have rooms for their meetings. In the absence of a parliamentary majority, small parties are at an advantage as they can ‘sell’ their votes to the ruling party, thus distorting the exercise of democracy and discussion of ideas in the assembly. Against such a backdrop, it is not surprising that parliamentary control of the executive is almost inexistent. In addition, the Ivoirian regime is more presidential than parliamentary. As such, the president of the republic holds executive power exclusively (article 41) and appoints people to civilian as well as military positions (article 46) without needing the approval of parliament. He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (article 47). The president cannot, however, declare war (article 73) or extend a state of siege beyond two weeks without the authorisation of parliament. In the same vein, the status of military personnel and staff of the national police is governed by law (article 71). The president may requisition defence and security forces without first referring to the national assembly. He may also request that foreign troops be stationed on the national territory under the same conditions. Of course, the national assembly approves the general state budget but it is clear that the real budget allocated to the defence forces is considered a defence secret. Indeed, the same applies to information about the available arsenal, the numbers of troops and the real salaries of senior officers. Nevertheless, the minister of defence, like any other member of government, may be summoned by the national assembly to give explanations about issues relating to his ministry. From a strictly governance point of view, like all other ministries in Côte d’Ivoire, the ministry of defence has an inspectorate department that is
82 Raphaël Ouattara in charge of ensuring the proper application of management standards and procedures. This department is generally entrusted to officers at the end of their career and, like its counterparts in other ministries it is severely hampered by incompetence and corruption. Unfortunately, the government inspectorate general, a sort of inspectorate of inspectorates, is in a similar state. It must however be pointed out that although the minister of defence is often – if not always – a civilian, he is very quickly ‘taken into hand’ by the ministries of internal security and the navy, which are almost always headed by senior officers of these national police force, gendarmerie and the navy.
Oversight by the judicial branch of power
The judicial power in Côte d’Ivoire is very much disputed because of its complicity with the executive. The Ivoirian justice system takes its orders from above and in the minds of the population it demonstrates the fact that impunity is the rule. There is a double standard of justice in the country: a permissive one for those in power, which allows them to do as they wish and a stringent and exemplary one for the common people. Those in power are above the law, but then so are defence and security force personnel. Indeed, security forces have been accused of many transgressions and acts of violence, for example a nocturnal intervention by commandos in a university hostel in Abidjan in 1990, during which young female students were raped, the massacres of civilians in 2000 during the demonstrations and counter- demonstrations that followed the presidential elections (mass graves in Yopougon) and again in 2004 (killings during opposition protest marches in March), not to mention flagrant human rights abuses. Nevertheless, no sanctions were ever imposed.3 It would appear from this state of affairs that wearing a military uniform confers a status of being untouchable by law. In reality, the military are under the orders of the public prosecutor and the state prosecutor, as far as criminal investigations are concerned. Nevertheless, when military personnel are involved in a case related to their functions, the public prosecutor is competent, acting on behalf of the military prosecutor’s office. The criminal code and the military code define the scope of application and the limits of both processes. It is however important to note that the military tribunal is always presided over by a civilian judge from the appeal court. The same applies to the high court, which is chaired by a civilian judge from the Supreme Court. This structure, in theory, enshrines the pre-eminence of the judiciary in managing the security sector in Côte d’Ivoire. However, when we consider the weight of the security forces in ensuring stability and
Côte d’Ivoire 83 maintaining regimes in place, including civilian regimes, it is easy to understand that control by the judicial branch is only in existence outside of the security apparatus but not inside it. Often the esprit de corps or solidarity among ‘brothers in arms’ runs counter to the requirements of public governance and accountability and has undermined the trust of the citizens in their system of justice, especially when it comes to cases involving the security forces.
Civil society
As indicated above, since the coup d’état of 1999, reports about human rights violations by the security and defence forces against others or against members of the forces have increased exponentially. Nevertheless, even in well-documented cases of violence, rape and murder, the perpetrators enjoy a level of impunity that has led to a clear deterioration of the image of the military and its relations with the population. Faced with this situation, political parties, who know that they must retain good relations with the army if they wish to accede to power, hardly ever speak out against such abuse. The Ivoirian Human Rights League, the Ivoirian Human Rights Movement, the Ivorian section of the Groupe d’Études et de Recherches sur la Démocratie et le Développement Économique et Social, the Ivoirian chapter of the International Association for Democracy in Africa and sometimes religious groups are the only organisations that have been bold enough to speak out to urge the authorities to face up to their responsibilities, because no one, not even those who bear arms, should be above the law. Some commissions of enquiry have thus been established in order to appease the human rights defenders, but either they never arrive at any conclusions, or no punitive measures are ever imposed. In actual fact, civil society organisations only show interest in the security sector occasionally which limits their impact on security sector management. Since there has never been any serious analysis of human rights abuses by security actors, the occasional statements and outcries of human rights advocates don’t produce any results, since they are limited to reacting to isolated cases instead of the processes behind them. Ivorian civil society lacks cohesion, which prevents it from acting as a lever that can have any real impact on governance. Thus, while a part of the public denounces and condemns abuses and calls for sanctions, another part attempts to justify or even legitimise the unjustifiable, or limits itself to a silence that can only be seen as approval. For example, it might be recalled
84 Raphaël Ouattara that demonstrations were organised by some sectors of civil society in support of the person who murdered Jean Hélène, a journalist of Radio France Internationale, who was shot by a policeman while on duty reporting for the radio station. Where civil society organisations or the media have focused critically on the security sector, it has indeed become quite commonplace to see or hear of defence forces breaking into the offices of one NGO or the other, or one press house or the other to carry out an unauthorised search, on the pretext of maintaining law and order or state security. Even more commonplace is the sight of honest citizens being brutalised, assaulted, or humiliated by representatives of the security forces for something as simple as an identity check, And woe betide any individual who would dare bring such a case to court. Many civil society organisations have set themselves up as the proxies for political parties and groupings, thus riding roughshod over the very principles that they are supposed to defend or promote. The most glaring example of this is the media, which, for the most part, have chosen to engage in propaganda, rather than wielding the powerful tool of informing the public. By openly showing themselves to be partisan, NGOs and associations that promote and defend democracy, as well as the media and other non partisan popular instruments of expression considerably reduce their chances of playing a significant role as stakeholders in the governance movement in Côte d’Ivoire. Each day they disqualify themselves even more either by inappropriate statements or their guilty silence that calls into questions their integrity and legitimacy. But such doubts must be tempered by taking into account the numerous obstacles that journalists and other activists have to overcome to access information about security, thanks to the secrecy that surrounds decisions on defence, as though the right to information and the principle of accountability did not apply to this sector. Each side has its responsibilities and they must be faced jointly.
Trade unions and professional associations
Professional organisations, in particular teachers’ unions, were at the forefront of the popular struggle that compelled the one-party state to return to a fully fledged multi-party system in 1990, as stipulated by the constitution. During the troubled years of structural adjustment programmes, trade unions were the voice, the conscience and the hope of the people: with
Côte d’Ivoire 85 bravery and integrity, they took up the mantle of the responsibilities and expectations placed on them. Today, political interests have undermined corporatist solidarity among workers. How else can one understand the fact that the legitimate demands of cocoa producers’ unions have not been taken up by any others to date? How else can one interpret the fact that there was no movement of union solidarity to support the magistrates who went on strike, following brutal acts of violence against a number of judges at their workplace by so- called ‘Young Patriots’ unhappy about their appointment?
Religious Groups
Unfortunately, even religious groups have been affected by this sad turn of events. Indeed, believers have also been affected by the political divisions that undermine the ability of all citizens to live together. Certain places of worship and prayer, of all religions and denominations, have become fora for the dissemination of extremist ideas. Most Christians quickly identified with President Laurent Gbagbo, while the majority of Muslims rallied behind Alassane Ouattara. This led to the conclusion by some uninformed observers that there was a religious component to the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. These preconceptions, which have been promoted by the militants and supporters of the two leaders, have now contaminated the security forces and a Christian soldier or agent in uniform is now automatically wary of any Muslim soldier, gendarme, or policeman and vice versa. Very often, people are categorised solely on the basis of their name. All in all, public opinion appears particularly polarised, lacking any dependable basis or ethical references. It has been intoxicated, rather than fashioned or informed. It has been manipulated and divided by a political class that is power hungry and cares little about the danger to which it subjects national cohesion. Certainly, before the events of 19 September 2002 and increasingly after the Marcoussis accords,4 which were supposed to bring an end to the war, activities have been carried out within the defence and security forces to raise awareness and educate them about human rights. However, the acts of violence perpetrated against people and their property remain unpunished or are even denied outright and civil society appears not to appreciate the role it can play to exert pressure and bring about security sector reform. Is this due to corruption, a lack of interest or resources, or have they simply given up? Maybe it is all this at once!
86 Raphaël Ouattara
Challenges of security sector governance
The military/civilian crisis that started on 19 September 2002 no doubt constitutes the key element of the security situation in Côte d’Ivoire today.
How to bring an end to the military/civilian crisis?
DDR remains the stumbling block of the whole reconciliation process. Past agreements have not produced any results since the Forces Nouvelles constantly asked for solid guarantees before their implementation. Implementation of the most recent agreement appeared to have been slowed down following the massacres perpetrated in the western part of the country in 2006 and the continued presence of armed, pro-government militia in the region. But while the DDR process remained at an impasse, the political agreement signed in Ouagadougou on 4 March 2007 between the central government and the former rebellion gave rise to hope for a return of peace. The national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme which is now to be carried out by the Integrated Command Centre (CCI), under the responsibility of the chiefs of staff of the FANCI and the armed forces of the Forces Nouvelles has made good progress, for example in identifying and equipping the sites before regrouping former combatants. While regrouping operations have effectively begun, nevertheless there is still a lot left to be done. On Tuesday, 8 July 2008, the Integrated Command Centre held a meeting at its headquarters in Yamoussoukro with all of its partners involved in the programme for disarming and dismantling the militias, to identify the zones and examine the major outlines of the operation. This meeting brought together the majority of self-defence groups from the Great West, as well as the military prefects of the western region, the national civil service programme, the national community reintegration and rehabilitation programme, the support unit from the Prime Minister's office and representatives of the United Nations Office in Côte d’Ivoire, the Force Licorne and the United Nations Police. The ‘Compagnie Scorpions guetteurs’ militia based in the political and administrative capital, Yamoussoukro, which is close to the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), the governing party, openly displayed its opposition to the process. Major Bamba Die, the head of the group, declared to the press with pictures to support his claim that he and his men had fought alongside the loyalist forces in Bouake, M’bahiakro and Logouale.5 For Major Die, disarmament and dismantlement of the militia (DDM) in his zone of influence could only take
Côte d’Ivoire 87 place if general Mangou and the authorities of the FPI fulfilled their commitments made to him. Because, as he stated forcefully:
Côte d’Ivoire was not liberated by the FANCI: it was us, the militia, who took up arms to liberate this country. Operation ‘Dignity’6 depended on us. Mangou and the authorities of the FPI made us promises.
This gives an idea of how difficult the task is, because how can these promises be fulfilled – if such promises were made – to militia members whose role and numbers are not known precisely? Nevertheless, since January 2008, all the security forces have effectively been grouped together. However, when it comes to disarming the ex-belligerents of the FN, it has been very difficult to group them together; this exercise only started on 2 May 2008. Various parties have expressed their opposition to both the DDR and the DDM processes, demonstrating the fears of the ex-belligerents that they will lose the privileges that they had been accorded and have been clinging on to for the past six years. For them, disarmament sounds the death knell for their life as ‘kinglets’. Since the start of the war, they have been illegally collecting money in the form of parallel taxes levied, as well as through the plundering of the mining and agricultural resources in their zones of competence. Needless to say, the militias are in no hurry to be dismantled either. If viable reforms are to be implemented, there is a need to address this reluctance to disarm, which is hampering the process and complicating the situation and work on overcoming the opposition to DDR and DDM, Those involved in the Ivorian crisis, including the international community and in particular the African Union and especially ECOWAS, do not yet fully understand the nature of the obstacles to be overcome. The challenges to security sector governance, as well as their solutions do indeed have an obvious regional and sub-regional dimension, as is shown by the efforts deployed by these organisations and their authorities to arrive at an agreement and bring an end to the crisis. Setting aside its economic importance (Côte d’Ivoire represents 40% of trade within the CFA zone), its proximity to other areas of tension such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea also makes it one of the key countries for security in West Africa. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, bloody civil wars have only recently ended and Guinea has been experiencing strong turbulence, in the aftermath of the coup that followed the death of president Conte. Indeed, many combatants, who either participated in confrontations among armed militias or in the massacres of
88 Raphaël Ouattara civilian populations in the west of Côte d’Ivoire came from Liberia, Sierra Leone and even Guinea, all neighbouring countries that are engaged to varying degrees in DDR programmes or are restructuring their security apparatus. Thousands of demobilised ex-combatants who now find themselves at a loose end and, due to a lack of alternatives, are often ready to respond to any call to take up arms again, represent a permanent threat to regional security, requiring a holistic approach to the various DDR programmes within the sub-region. The sub-region has also been the theatre of large population movements after each outbreak of violence, and thousands of people were displaced at the outset of the conflict. This is why it is important to include the sub-regional dimension in any attempt to overhaul the security system in Côte d’Ivoire, if there is any hope of finding well-designed solutions (in particular DDR in all its components) that are applied to this end. This requires sustained cooperation with all its neighbours not only on DDR, but on all aspects of prevention and intervention in the security sector.
The dilemma of France
Côte d’Ivoire has signed defence agreements with France, the former colonial power. During the events of 19 September 2002, the head of state seemingly requested the intervention of the French forces stationed at Port Bouët, a neighbourhood of Abidjan located close to the airport. The French authorities apparently refused to intervene, claiming that the agreements only applied in the case of an external attack. The authorities in Abidjan felt that it was indeed an external attack and pointed their finger at neighbouring Burkina Faso. This was the first difference of opinion that served to further darken the horizon in the relations between Abidjan and Paris, which had been rather cool ever since the inception of the Second Republic. In spite of efforts by the two capitals to normalise their relations, trust is far from having been restored. The conference in Linas-Marcoussis was the first opportunity for the Ivorian head of state to visit France after he was sworn in, but he has no fond memories of this visit because the agreements signed by the principal political parties in Côte d’Ivoire stripped him of most of his constitutional prerogatives. Immediately upon his return, President Gbagbo quickly denounced the agreements, which his supporters had termed a ‘constitutional coup d’état’. This unfortunate divergence between Paris and Abidjan in the assessment of the military/political crisis must be understood as part of a broader picture because today the security and defence forces, or at least
Côte d’Ivoire 89 what remains of them, have become an instrument of political power. One might be tempted to write that they defend regime security and not that of the republic. On the other hand, the regime is a hostage to these forces, which are now aware of the role that they play in maintaining it in power. This has resulted in a vicious circle which is reassuring for no one, in particular the neighbouring countries, many of whose citizens live in Côte d'Ivoire. The latter are accused of all ills and are often the prime target of uncontrolled elements of the security and defence forces. How long will these countries continue to tolerate such abuse, especially if they can take advantage of the disorder within the security forces? Fortunately today, in the name of national reconciliation and peace, such acts are becoming less frequent. The decision has also been taken to merge the New Forces with the security forces, thus placing individuals who had taken up arms against each other under a single command structure (the integrated command centre). With the dismantling of the 43rd Battalion d’Infanterie Marine (with troops being integrated into Operation Licorne) and challenges faced by the United Nations blue helmets, it is not yet clear how difficult this mix will be. However, when the DDR/DDM process nears completion, restructuring of the security forces may become a priority challenge for Côte d'Ivoire.
Recommendations
Security and defence forces have an undeniable place in a democracy. The role of each of these agents must be clearly defined in order to avoid them becoming an obstacle to this same democracy. And when security forces turn away from their traditional framework for intervention (as has been the case in Côte d'Ivoire) there is a need to take a certain number of measures to safeguard the integrity of democracy.
The security forces must achieve self-reconciliation
Security forces are commonly described as a ‘corps’. This term translates the idea that the army is – or should be – a unit, just like a body whose constituent elements must strive to meet the same objective, in coordination and perfect synergy. It is therefore vital that all these components be mobilised together to meet the same objective. If they do not have the same understanding of the objective, not only will they not meet it, but the situation will lead to internal tensions that cannot be compatible with the
90 Raphaël Ouattara idea of a ‘corps’. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire the following needs to be done:
Include the missions of the security forces within the framework of the republic and redefine these missions; the forces must be in the service of the state and the population and not in the service of the regime; Protect the security sector institutionally against any attempts at intimidation or manipulation by political forces; Undertake enlightened and professional awareness-raising in the security forces; Redefine career profiles and plans according to objective criteria and in line with existing standards in the military profession. Consequently, all new recruits who joined the military between 2000 and 2004 would have to be evaluated under the supervision of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire and only those who comply with criteria of eligibility for the military profession should be retained. The state must then find a solution for the reintegration of the remaining ex-combatants; Identify mechanisms to discourage any temptation towards political partisanship. For example, an allowance in the form of an additional pension to all agents of the security forces who are considered ‘politically upright’; Set up a mechanism for monitoring ethics and equity within the security forces.
These measures could enable the security forces to achieve a measure of self reconciliation, which is a prerequisite for their cohesion, albeit insufficient in and of itself.
The security forces must inspire trust
Another no less important challenge is to reconcile the security forces with the civilian population that they are supposed to protect. The acts of violence and other forms of abuse committed during the military transition, in addition to the physical, moral and psychological injuries, have left lasting scars. It is essential to re-establish trust between these two entities. In order to do this:
The issue of security must not be dealt with as though it plays an important role solely during elections; it is a question that needs
Côte d’Ivoire 91
further reflexion and long-term commitment; The temptation to establish a security system based on ethnic affiliation or allegiance to a regime must be abandoned; this must be understood clearly by all communities; Participative events must be organised periodically to debate issues of common interest in the security field. Depending on the topic, the moderator could be either a personality from civilian society or from the military; The principle that the military is not above the law must be clearly re- established by enhancing civic instruction, providing training on human rights and reinforcing the role of the judiciary.
Conclusion
There is a clear need to redefine the roles and responsibilities of each of the components of the defence and security apparatus within a democratic system. The security sector will also need to assimilate the rights and duties of the citizens that they are to protect and occasionally supervise and should have the resources to build a professional and republican army. The criteria for recruitment, career profiles, as well as discipline in military and civic training should be drafted formally. The greatest challenge however lies in maintaining the military apart from political turbulence and intrigues. There will no doubt be a need to go beyond simply indicating formally in the constitution that exercise of a military career is incompatible with holding any political office. Impunity must be banished and military tribunals must play their role fully and set the example by sanctioning any acts that run counter to the duties and ethics of the military. Nevertheless, to be able to implement the reforms suggested above, hostilities must come to an end. The guns have now fallen silent. The principal stakeholders have demonstrated a firm determination to hold elections as quickly as possible, as this is the best means of resolving the crisis. One wonders, however, whether there is a real understanding of the challenge implied in restructuring the defence and security forces according to a timetable that is related more to electoral considerations than to the nature of the problem. If the sub-regional, regional and international aspects of the issue are neglected or not integrated, it will unfortunately not be possible to definitively remove the risks of a resurgence of violence, which could compromise the success of all the reforms undertaken within the
92 Raphaël Ouattara framework of the various programmes. We must make no mistake: security cannot be guaranteed in any country as long as its neighbours are torn apart by conflict. Any security or stabilisation strategy necessarily depends on the efforts and progress accomplished by the immediate neighbours. The history of the birth of our nations invites us to move in this direction and geography compels us to do so. The only viable security policy is one that is based on a comprehensive understanding of the nebulous concept of sovereignty and whose acts and messages are rooted in the people and not those who hold power.
Epilogue
Terrible events have taken place in Côte d’Ivoire while this publication has been finalised. Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to accept defeat in the 2010 presidential elections plunged the country into an unprecedented crisis as the two belligerent sides of 2002 resumed their conflict. His regime decided to follow to the letter the saying ‘those who want peace must prepare for war.’ This was made evident by the discovery of a formidable arsenal, despite overt calls for ‘disarmament’ and a negotiated return to peace, following the arrest of Mr Gbagbo. Yet the forces loyal to the declining regime had neither the training nor the motivation to use these weapons. For this reason, the atrocities and the war crimes committed particularly in the West of the country can be attributed mostly to pro-Gbagbo mercenaries, militias and hardliners within the army.7 Since the start of the post-electoral crisis, parts of the armed and security forces (the majority according to sources close to President Ouattara) have changed camp. On 17 March 2011, President Ouattara issued an order to create the Republican Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI):
“…In accordance with the Treaty of Ouaguadougou, I have issued an order to create the Republican Armed Forces of Cote d’Ivoire in order to put an end to the chaos in the country. This new army is composed of the National Armed Forces and the armed wing of the New Forces, under the leadership of a general staff directed by a Chief of General Staff supported by a Deputy Chief of General Staff…”8
However, it must be noted that the FRCI also abused its power and participated in bloody reprisals in the West of the country, according to the Amnesty International Report cited above. The FRCI reached Abidjan
Côte d’Ivoire 93 without meeting great resistance, but its capture proved to be much more difficult than anticipated. Both sides perpetrated acts of violence in the capital and eventually clashed when the FRCI attempted to capture the Radio Télévision Ivoirienne, presidential palace and residence. Poorly equipped, inexperienced, and simply incapable of capturing these ‘fortresses’, the FRCI prevailed thanks to the implementation of UN Resolution 1975 (2011) that called on the UNOCI and the French forces of Operation Licorne to ‘prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population,’ a tactic employed by the pro-Gbagbo forces. The UN intervention silenced the guns. President Ouattara won the war, but it remains to be seen whether he wins the peace. The challenge of controlling the armed forces has been further complicated by the intervention of international forces. The address to the nation announcing the creation of the FRCI suggests that the new authorities appreciate the extent of the challenge:
“The primary mission of the new army is to ensure the security of the people and property without distinction, as I outlined in my address to the nation on Tuesday 15 March 2011. The army will also be responsible for the defense of the national territory.
In all its actions, the new army will follow a code of conduct designed to put the army at the service of all citizens. This will allow the army to contribute effectively to the building of a modern, unified and democratic Ivorian nation.
The new army must also be a powerful instrument of national unity and serve as a practical school for civic duty, tolerance, transparency, good citizenship and national integration.
The new army will be competent and professional, always prioritizing its mission and the respect for citizens over private interests.
Our army must also be a tool in support of development, serving the people, which means serving the Republic…”
This statement expresses the essence of the security sector reform challenge in Côte d’Ivoire. However, it is up to the new authorities to adopt concrete decisions and take real steps towards SSR. Neither speeches nor mere goodwill suffice. President Ouattara must avoid the trap into which his predecessor fell and avoid becoming the hostage of those who helped him into the presidential palace. Appointments to the High Command present the
94 Raphaël Ouattara first test. Will he keep the Generals who waited until the last moment to join him? How is he going to manage the inevitable frustrations that follow the promotion of some and the demise of others? And how to collect all the weapons used during the conflict, some of which are still being kept by militias or pro-Gbagbo elements? Given the nature of the post-electoral crisis, the unification of the two armies, which should normally be the goal of DDR, represents its beginning. Indeed, Côte d’Ivoire seems to walk the path of DDR backwards. This is an unprecedented situation that cannot be managed according to existing frameworks. And more than ever, the international community has a critical role to play.
Notes
1 According to Military Balance 2009, the total number of active men was 17,050 (army 6,500, navy 900, air force 700, presidential guard 1,350, gendarmerie 7,600, militia 1,500). 2 National Democratic Institute, Côte d’Ivoire: National Reconciliation and the State of Democracy. An Assessment Mission Report (July 2-13, 2001), 19. 3 After Gbagbo’s election, a mass grave was discovered near Yopougon on 26 October 2000. In his declaration, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, stated that he was deeply distressed by this discovery (New York, United Nations, 30 October 2000, AFP). 4 The agreements, negotiated in Linas-Marcoussis under the auspices of France, formally put an end to the conflict and set up a ‘government of national reconciliation’. 5 These towns were the theatres of operation during the 2002 military crisis. 6 This name given by loyalist forces to the military operation seeking to liberate the ‘occupied zones’. 7 Amnesty International, ‘Ils ont regardé sa carte d’identité et l’ont abattu : Retour sur six mois de violences post-électorales en Cote d’Ivoire’. AI Index : AFR 31/002/2011 (London: Amnesty International, 2011). Available at : http://www.amnesty.org 8 See Alassane Dramane Ouattara, ‘Message du Président de la République aux Forces Républicaines de Cote d’Ivoire’, Abidjan, 17 March 2011. Available at: http://www.primaturecotedivoire.net/site/suite.php?newsid=117.
Chapter 5
Guinea
Dominique Bangoura
Introduction
Security sector governance (SSG) is not well known in Guinea because few studies have been carried out on the concept. It is still a taboo subject reserved for the military, the uniformed corps, or even the president of the republic himself. The principal reasons for this lack of knowledge and suspicion are political: they go back to the dictatorship of Sekou Toure, who ruled the country with an iron fist from 1958 to 1984 and then the authoritarian military regime of General President Lansana Conté, from 1984 to 2008. In order to understand current issues and challenges in this area a review of the historical, political and geopolitical contexts of the sector is required. This chapter therefore begins by providing a historical analysis of developments in the Guinean security sector and how these have contributed to the current state of SSG. It then focuses on issues of security sector management and oversight. Finally, this chapter considers challenges to a process of security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea before providing a brief update on events since the time of writing of this chapter.
The military and security under Sekou Toure
Guinea has the singular honour of being the first and only Francophone West African country to have claimed its independence on 2 October 1958, after the historic ‘No’ in the 28 September referendum proposed by General de Gaulle. In marking the break with France, President Sekou Toure declared at the time: ‘It is better to live free in poverty than enslaved in opulence’.1 Influenced by socialism, he turned to the Soviet bloc to make up for the departure of the former colonial authority From that time, Sekou Toure established a government of absolute power and an extremely repressive police regime. The system was based on
96 Dominique Bangoura the single party, the Parti démocratique de Guinée (PDG) which was supposed to represent a united front against imperialist ambitions and also work for national unity and state construction. According to Siradiou Diallo, the party, which was designed as the steering body, the driving force and the instrument for controlling national life, was placed at the top of the pyramid of government. All other institutions, including the army and the militia, were subordinate to the party and only represented organs of implementation, instruments in the service of the party, which was the cornerstone, the heart and the brain from which all parts of the social body were irradiated and around which the life of the country gravitated.2 Thus, the PDG was named the party-state, in line with its totalitarian and omnipresent nature. Sekou Toure used the party and the police system to influence people's minds, keep citizens under surveillance and sow the seeds of fear and terror. The country turned inwards, obliging thousands of opponents and intellectuals to seek exile in neighbouring countries or in the West, while the general population suffered from shortages. During this period of dictatorship, the military remained strongly linked to the political apparatus: following the model of ‘militants in uniform’ which was common in socialist countries and was adopted by Sekou Toure, the military became subordinate to the PDG. The president mistrusted the army and decided not to provide it with the means of acting beyond simply defending his regime, while also making sure that soldiers lived in miserable conditions. The Guinean leader set up political committees called military unity committees, thus reproducing within each army unit the organisational structure of the party. These political bodies were in competition with the military chain of command. The excessive politicisation of the army led to indiscipline because on the basis of politics, any soldier could question orders from a superior officer, or even humiliate such an officer. Sekou Toure himself was paranoid about his own security and constantly denounced often imaginary plots supposedly organised from outside with the support of foreign powers. The military like the rest of the population were often victims of purges, leading to bloodshed. The following may be cited among the victims in the military: Major Keita Mamoudou, executed in 1965 during the so-called ‘traders’ conspiracy; Colonel Kaman Diaby, deputy army chief of staff and dozens of his companions, executed in 1969 as part of the Fodeba Keita ‘affair’; General Keita Noumandian, joint army chief of staff; Colonel Diallo Mamadou; Majors Barry Siradiou, Camara Diouma and Zoumanigui Kékoura, executed
Guinea 97 in 1971 during what was described as the ‘plot’ by ‘the imperialist and nazi SS fifth column’ and Captain Lamine Kouyaté and Lieutenant Diallo Assane, who were arrested in 1976 during the ‘Peulh conspiracy’ and died of starvation at camp Boiro at the same time as Diallo Telli, former secretary general of the Organisation of African Unity. In 1977, the death of the latter while in prison led to strong reactions in the international community and showed a clear picture of the harsh reality of this country. The People's militia was established by Sekou Toure as his ultimate protective shield, to provide close security. It also served as a deterrent force for the military. Its mission was to maintain law and order alongside the police, but in reality it was in charge of keeping watch over the military and the population. Police officers, gendarmes, soldiers and civilians were frequently victims of acts of violence committed by this political force. Members of the militia were from the poorer social categories and were sent to Cuba for training. Well trained and armed, they came back with the rank of officer and in turn trained young recruits at the Kwame Nkrumah camp. Towards the end of his life, Sekou Toure’s militia was a counterbalance to the military in terms of numbers: 10,000 men on either side. However, the militia was better endowed in all ways. Sekou Toure died suddenly on 26 March 1984, leaving a country that was totally drained, with the prisons full, hundreds of victims who had died under torture and countless disappeared. The military, represented by Lansana Conté, took over power a week later on 3 April 1984.
The military and security under Lansana Conté
Lansana Conté, who was the embodiment of the loyalty that Sekou Toure had been seeking, took over the leadership of the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN). This was the start of a new era for relations between civilians and the military since the country was no longer run by a civilian but by a soldier with combat experience. Indeed, Colonel Lansana Conté had served in the colonial army in Algeria. When Guinea attained independence, he came back home and had been slowly climbing up the ranks of the military hierarchy. Having held the rank of deputy joint army chief of staff for several years, he was chosen from among his peers to take over leadership of the country. Apart from the fact that this put an end to civilian control of the military, the period that started with the new leader of the country was in many ways similar to the former regime in terms of governance.
98 Dominique Bangoura
There are three distinct periods in Lansana Conté’s regime.3 The first of these, the exceptional regime, started on 3 April 1984 and ran to 23 December 1990. The CMRN banned the single party, dissolved political institutions and suspended the 1982 Constitution. Between 1984 and 1990, no institutional reforms were implemented. Power was in the hands of the president and the CMRN and most decisions were taken by presidential decree. The president appointed a prime minister in the person of Colonel Diarra Traore, who had helped him take over power. However, following a crisis of confidence between the two men the head of state abolished this position. Feeling disgraced, Diarra Traore attempted a coup in July 1985. He failed and was executed. The second period marks the establishment of the democratic process and lasted from December 1990 to the end of 1995. Under the pressure of protest movements by school pupils and students, trade unions and political groupings, the country on 23 December 1990 adopted by referendum a new constitution introducing a multi-party system and respect of human rights and public freedoms. The democratic process was put in place, but the opposition was unable to impose the organisation of a national conference similar to other African Francophone countries. Although political liberalisation had occurred, it was solidly controlled by the existing regime. The first presidential and legislative elections took place in 1993 and 1995: Lansana Conté and his party, the Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès (PUP) won those elections, but the results were highly disputed because of the lack of transparency and the occurrence of many irregularities. The third period, from 1996, marks the return of authoritarianism. It has been accompanied by lasting political violence in the country. In February 1996, the regime of Lansana Conté was threatened by a mutiny that broke out within the army for corporatist reasons. To save his own life and avoid a coup d’état, the general gave in to all the demands. This grave crisis ended in a bloody repression within the army. A brief period of political calm appeared possible with the appointment of a technocrat, Sydia Toure, as prime minister with the task of giving the national economy a new start. The truce was however broken just before the presidential elections in 1998 when Alpha Conde, a member of the National Assembly and one of the principal opposition leaders was illegally arrested and imprisoned.4
Insecurity in the sub-regions
After various incidents of internal protest both on the part of the military and civilian forces, the regime was further weakened in 2000-2001 by a rebellion
Guinea 99 in the southern part of the territory.5 In addition to the erosion of power and Guinea's isolation on the sub-regional scene, the regime was further destabilised by armed groups linked to the rebels in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Lansana Conté, who at the beginning of the 1990s had sent Guinean contingents to join the ECOMOG troops to fight the rebellion by Charles Taylor and his allies, now suffered the effects of his past political choices. The regime nevertheless resisted and attempted to counter the attacks by strengthening its military capacity and responding.
Issues and challenges
To sum up, ever since independence in 1958, Guinea has constantly experienced political violence. After Sekou Toure's dictatorship, Lansana Conté's authoritarianism led to a deep and generalised political, social, economic, as well as military crisis. The country has never had the possibility of holding free or credible and transparent elections, be they presidential, legislative or local. In November 2001 the government hardened its stance by adopting by referendum a constitutional amendment abolishing the limitation on terms of office. Lansana Conté could therefore stand for election in December 2003, December 2010 and so on. Guinea certainly is endowed with enormous human and material resources. But under what conditions can the country flourish? Is it possible to envisage another form of governance, a new conception of power and government, a republican army and security forces that respect human rights? Is it possible to envisage security sector reform? In 2006 and 2007, for the first time in the history of the country, civil society, in particular trade unions, decided to fight en masse against the deterioration of the living and working conditions of the general population. Three major strike movements took place on the initiative of the main trade union federations: from 27 February to 3 March 2006, from 8 to 16 June 2006 and from 10 to 27 January 2007. The leitmotiv during the strikes, the demonstrations and the ‘dead city’ operations was a constant call for change. Guineans fought to bring about social and political change. They paid a high price, in bloodshed, to achieve this. The repression by the armed and security forces against the youth was extremely violent. And yet, the right to join a trade union, the right to go on strike and the right to resist oppression are enshrined in the constitution under articles 18 and 19. After bitter negotiations, the last strike led to the tripartite agreements of 27 January 2007, which were signed by trade unions, employers and government. However, despite the appointment of a ‘consensus’ prime minister in the
100 Dominique Bangoura person of Lansana Kouyate following pressure from trade unions and civil society, no change was obtained because state institutions (national assembly, supreme court, government and the old military guard) put up resistance and the opposition political parties gave in. The long awaited change did not come about after Lansana Conté either. In violation of the 2007 agreements, the latter removed Lansana Kouyate from office on 20 May 2008 and appointed a loyal follower, Ahmed Tidiane Souare, in his place. How then can one expect a peaceful and democratic future for this country? How can one imagine the role of the armed and security forces in these conditions?
The security apparatus and its environment
The security forces comprise the military, law enforcement and the intelligence services. The Guinean army was set up on 1 November 1958 with volunteers from the colonial army who arrived from units based in France, Indochina, the French Sudan (Senegal-Mali), Madagascar, Dahomey, Syria, Algeria and Morocco.6 At the time France did not hesitate to destroy archives, heavy and light weapons, equipment and buildings, rather than transfer them or even make its military camps available to the new national army.7 Under Sekou Toure, the military was deprived of resources, training and equipment; some of its non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers were trained in eastern bloc countries and Cuba where they were provided with Soviet equipment. As the victim of many purges, the military remained traumatised, poorly organised and poorly managed. Under Lansana Conté, the Guinean military comprised about 14,000 men. It is made up of the army, the air force, the navy and the gendarmerie.8 In theory, the mission of the military is to defend territorial integrity, contribute to internal security and contribute to peacekeeping in the sub- region and throughout the world. To this end, it takes part in operations within the framework of the appropriate sub-regional and international organisations (ECOWAS, UN, etc.). There is a two year military service system. The army represents the largest component of the Guinean military forces. It is 9,700-man strong and has two types of units; the territorial units situated in each of the four military regions (Kindia, Labé, Kankan and N’Zérékoré) and the specialised autonomous units in the special zone of Conakry. These are the independent battalion of airborne troops, the
Guinea 101 armoured battalion, the presidential security battalion and the Conakry security battalion. The most famous specialised units are the presidential guard,9 made up of the ‘red berets’ which are under the authority of the president and the chief of joint staff and are based at the presidency, as well as the Rangers, an elite battalion trained by the Americans at the high point of the war against Charles Taylor. The army is equipped with heavy and light tanks (T34), rocket launchers (Stalin organs), machine gun carriers, towed guns and armoured cars. The navy (400 men) provides surveillance of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone, participates in defending the Guinean coasts and controlling maritime smuggling, as well as providing maritime police services. It has a general staff and two buildings for ground forces (marines and coast artillery defence). The coastline is divided into four maritime operational regions (Conakry, Benty, Boffa and Kamsar). The air force (800 men) guarantees air space security, provides coverage and support to ground troops and participates in operational defence of the territory, as well as international missions. The principal air force base is in Conakry, with secondary bases in the interior. It owns Soviet transport and fighter planes, but is currently poorly equipped and only has two helicopters purchased from Ukraine.10 It has taken part in a number of external operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The gendarmerie was also set up in 1958. Officially, it is in charge of ensuring public security, maintaining law and order and enforcing laws and protecting individuals and their property. In its operations, it is under the authority of the joint army chief of staff and is headed by a colonel. The gendarmerie falls under the responsibility of the ministry of national defence. It comprises two subdivisions: the territorial gendarmerie, spread out in brigades in the interior of the country and the mobile gendarmerie, which is made up of three operational squadrons stationed in Conakry. Like the other army corps, it has participated in peacekeeping operations in Africa. It is under the command of a colonel, the chief of staff. It is made up of about 2,500 men. Training for the Guinean army is provided by the Joint Forces Military Academy (EMIA) in Conakry. The EMIA is the national officers’ academy, which is located at Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo, 15 km from the city centre. Between 1961 and 1965 three classes were trained, including Lansana Conté and the principal military leaders of the country. It was closed down in 1965 and was only able to open once again in 1994 with the assistance of French military cooperation. The initial training cycle lasts for three years, with courses in both general and military subjects. Admission to
102 Dominique Bangoura the EMIA is through a competitive exam for candidates holding a certificate validating 2 years of university education. In addition to the armed forces there are other security forces in Guinea, such as the national police force and in particular its mobile intervention and security company (CMIS), as well as the intelligence services, which fall under the authority of the ministry of security.
Military cooperation with France and the United States
After the break with France in 1958, Guinea fell into the ideological and strategic camp of the eastern bloc countries and their allies. It was not until diplomatic relations were effectively restored in 1976 and indeed until 17 April 1985, that a military cooperation agreement could be signed between Conakry and Paris. Since then, the French military cooperation mission has been involved in several projects to support schools, logistics, transmission, the gendarmerie and military health. In 2005, considerable efforts were undertaken to train trainers. Guinea also requested French support for projects to open the national NCOs Academy at Maneah, as well as the national signals school.11 Starting from 1999, when relations between the (socialist) French government and Guinea had deteriorated following the Alpha Conde case, President Lansana Conté sought to develop military cooperation with increased support from the United States. Conakry and Washington had worked together to fight against the ex-rebel Charles Taylor. Starting in September 2000, incursions by Liberian and Sierra Leonean rebels provided a new opportunity for the Guinean military to rearm its troops, diversify its weaponry, increase its numbers and modernise its equipment. The country called on France and the United States, which came to its assistance. Guinea nevertheless continued to maintain close relations with its former allies Russia and Ukraine. The defence budget increased significantly, but its management was shrouded in secrecy. By the end of the first quarter of 2001, Lansana Conté had overcome these armed attacks and emerged strengthened from this ordeal. He made clever use of the feeling of national unity. Nevertheless, neither the opposition political parties nor the national assembly demanded any accounts from the government. And yet, independent sources of information as a counter balance to the propaganda by the regime and a parliamentary enquiry might have shed light on the circumstances surrounding the numerous losses of human lives among the young volunteers sent to the front. One example is the case of a local militia
Guinea 103 made up of more than 2000 young people, for the most part unemployed, who were allegedly hastily enrolled in the Forecariah region and armed with rifles; many of them never returned.12 Also, some oversight of military spending might have made it possible to learn more about this period.13 Generally speaking, figures related to military spending and the percentage of GNP or GDP allocated to defence are a carefully guarded secret. Probably the only person who knows the truth is President Conté. He has had control over the sector ever since taking over power in 1984 and it has not been possible to have any form of transparency throughout his terms of office. Since the events of 2000-2001, defence and security cooperation with external partners has been intensified both bilaterally (American International Military Education and Training Programme, French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities Programme, etc.) and multilaterally (European Union), in particular for military training and exercises, capacity building for the government of Guinea and good governance in these sectors.
A divided army
Although the army is the main pillar of the Lansana Conté regime, it is undermined by its internal contradictions and divisions. It is often the theatre of personal rivalries, generational conflict and ethnic tensions. According to Mamadou Aliou Barry, there appear to be three groups of officers that neutralise each other. The first group is made up of the older generals, colonels and lieutenant-colonels who experienced the colonial period and the Sekou Toure regime. They are from different ethnic groups and due to their rivalry are incapable of deciding on any common action. The second group is made up of subordinate officers who were promoted at the time when the new regime took over power. They belong to the same ethnic group as President Conté who knows that he can count on them. They are seen as the undeserving beneficiaries of the regime's generosity. Although their professionalism is often questioned, they nevertheless occupy positions as prefect, sub prefect, or governor. The third group is made up of young officers who have often been trained in the major military academies of France, the United States or Morocco. They are from other ethnic groups in the country, are viewed with suspicion by the regime and are not allowed to advance in rank. Some have considered overthrowing the existing regime, but they are closely watched, in particular by the second group. This category was most affected by the waves of arrests in November 2003.14
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The military is thus paralysed by its mode of functioning. As is the case for many African militaries,15 training and career development for Guinean soldiers is not linked to their competence, since recruitment and advancement are based on ethnic affiliation or allegiance to the existing regime. Often assigned to protecting the existing regime whose discourse of national unity is only an illusion, the military finds itself in a situation of hidden crisis. The spirit of service to the republic that should exist in any army is absent and patriotism, where it does exist, is more akin to a sense of ethnic belonging.16 Finally, there are huge disparities within the military; whereas high ranking officers who are closest to the circles of power enjoy great opulence, the rank and file live in poverty. With the engagement of Guinean contingents in the conflicts in Liberia (600 men), Sierra Leone (800) and Guinea Bissau (200), soldiers were able to compare their living and working conditions with those of other soldiers. The military suffered heavy losses. This situation led to lasting frustration and discontent. This unease, compounded by the impoverishment of the institution, was demonstrated during the mutinies of 2 and 3 February 1996. Under the pressure of the bombings, the president gave in to the demands of the mutineers. However, he did not keep his promises and the issue of unpaid arrears in military wages that was mentioned in the ‘Bulletin rouge’ still arises. Even worse, General Lansana Conté carried out purges in the camps. Since then, the corporatist demands of the soldiers are regularly brought up. These movements sometimes take the form of mutinies (in particular in May 2007 and 2008), attempted coups (late 2003), rumoured coups (2006), or the supposed imminent change of power or death of the president (2006). Each time, demands are initially material, but soon move to the political domain. And yet, in spite of all the problems, the military remains the most privileged national entity. It enjoys the benevolent attention of the president of the republic. While most of the country’s principal infrastructure is in total decline, the military is benefiting from sustained efforts with the support of French and American military cooperation. New recruits have been taken on in recent years, whereas there have been no such recruitments in the civil service. The military can purchase rice at unbeatable prices. Compared to civilians, it enjoys numerous advantages. If Lansana Conté has been able to escape unscathed after each military threat and save his regime, it is because he is a master in the art of ‘divide and rule’. What other explanation could there be for his longevity? Indeed, he applied the same method to the political clans at the head of state (in
Guinea 105 particular in the presidency and in government), which are tearing each other to pieces in an atmosphere reminiscent of the end of an era.
Indiscipline in the military and competition between the armed and security forces
In this atmosphere of confusion, it is not surprising to note that in addition to a flagrant lack of cooperation, there is strong competition among the different armed and security forces in the country. Could there be collaboration and coordination among these forces under such circumstances? As illustrated by a number of events, this hardly seems likely: On 21 and 23 May 2008, discontented soldiers carried out acts of violence and brutality similar to the earlier mutiny in May 2007, killing many civilians outside their barracks. Demands included payment of arrears in allowances and wages (the famous ‘Bulletin rouge’); amnesty for the mutineers; freedom for their colleagues who had been detained since the January 2007 events; promotions and a reduction in the price of rice. Shortly before that, under the government of L. Kouyate, they had had to accept to pay 60% of the market price for a bag of rice (as opposed to 10% in the past). The first part of the arrears in allowances (1 million Guinean francs) was paid at the beginning of 2008 and the second part (the same amount) was paid after an agreement was signed with the ministry of defence, which was to pay them a total of 7 million Guinean francs. However, the delay in payment of the balance of 5 million for the allowances promised led to dissatisfaction in several camps and ended with the deputy army chief of staff, General Moussa Sampil being ‘taken hostage’ when he came to negotiate with the mutineers. During this protest movement, which was led mainly from the Camp Alpha Yaya Diallo, the spokesperson of the mutineers, Claude Pivi, alias ‘Coplan’ distinguished himself with a display of indiscipline, disobedience to the military hierarchy and disdain for the minister of defence.17 Once again, as in May 2007, in an attempt to end the crisis, president Conté decided to sacrifice the second minister of defence in just one year, General Baïlo Diallo,18 and removed him from office on 27 May 2008. And as usual, he promised to pay the amounts demanded by the soldiers and free those who had been held for a year on the island of Kassa, close to Conakry. The measures taken by the head of state inspired the security forces. On 16 June 2008, it was the turn of the police to follow the ‘example’ of the military. Discontented policemen, who were demanding the payment of their
106 Dominique Bangoura allowances and their promotions,19 fired gunshots into the air and seized and held several officers including the national director of police, Sekou Mohamed Bangoura. Next, it was the turn of the customs service. The military clamped down on the police protests, leading to bloodshed. On 17 June, with the police protests continuing, the gendarmerie was requisitioned to regulate traffic in the capital city. That morning, military trucks from the Alpha Yaya Diallo camp in the suburbs of Conakry were seen moving towards the city. A violent confrontation took place when they arrived at the headquarters of CMIS, which had become the epicentre of the police protest movement.20 This confrontation between the military and the police led to about ten deaths and a number of seriously injured in both camps. The soldiers wrecked the area and ransacked the premises. On 27 June the police buried their dead. They were torn between mourning and humiliation, while the army chief of staff only described the acts as ‘unfortunate incidents’. Soon after he took up his position, the new minister of security and civil protection, Mohamed Damba, appointed by A. Tidiane Souare, took one of his first decisions and granted the promotions demanded. The other points were to be negotiated. These movements of protest and demand among the ranks of the armed and security forces are further proof of the poor living and working conditions of men in uniform; of the fact that rules on recruitment and advancement are not applied and of indiscipline in the barracks. The general public does not understand why these forces attacked the civilians that they are supposed to protect and are shocked by such acts. They are convinced that all Guineans share the same poor conditions. The citizens also counted their dead and condemned the rapes and plundering. They could not understand why all these forces did not join the trade unions and civil society during the three major strike movements in 2006 and 2007, which had been massively followed by the public, private and informal sectors. On the contrary, at the time the military, the presidential guard and the police engaged in a violent repression of demonstrators, in particular the youth. The chasm between civilians and those in uniform therefore widened further between 2006-2008.
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Security sector management and oversight
The constitutional framework
In Guinea, the 1990 constitution has never been revised to bring about reform. On the contrary, several articles were amended by the November 2001 referendum, marking a regression in democratic terms since there are no longer any limitations on the number of presidential terms of office, their duration and the age of candidates. Due to the authoritarianism of the Conté regime, this constitution which stipulated a presidential regime has degenerated in practice into a regime where the president holds absolute power. Under article 41 of the constitution, the president of the republic is the guarantor of national independence and territorial integrity. He is responsible for national defence. He presides over the higher council for national defence. He is the head of the armed forces. He makes appointments to all military positions. Anything related to defence is his responsibility. This is why for many years (following the events of February 1996) he jointly held the positions of head of state and minister of national defence. In April 2007 when Lansana Kouyate formed his government and probably also due to his age and ill health, President Conté ‘gave way’ to General Arafan Camara. He personally chaired the handing over ceremony21 at the Almamy Samory Touré camp.22 However, he removed General Arafan Camara from office in May 2007 during the mutiny and replaced him with General Baïlo Diallo. Since the dismissal of Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate and the arrival in the prime minister’s office of Ahmed Tidiane Souare, who is close to the Conté regime, there has nevertheless been a major innovation; for the first time, a civilian has been appointed minister of defence. His name is Almamy Kabele Camara, an economist by training. Some military personnel who are used to having one of their own in this position will probably find it difficult to adapt to this change. The principle of subordination of the military to civilian authority will be difficult to enforce. Nevertheless, in his inaugural speech, the new minister tried to reassure them, indicating that he was ready to listen. He announced a training and modernisation programme; recalled the major principles to be respected, namely strict recruitment practices and discipline in the ranks and spoke about the need for reconciliation between civilians and the military.23 These initial remarks could make it appear that reform of the armed forces is imminent; it must not be forgotten, however, that the government is still under the leadership of Lansana Conté. And as the latter has often recalled: ‘I am the boss, the others are subordinates’.24
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Indeed, no prime minister has ever been able to carry out the envisaged reforms to term and all of them have been dismissed,25 with the notable exception of François Lonseny Fall who resigned in April 200426 when the head of state rejected his programme of economic and judicial reform.
Separation of powers
In Guinea, the democratic principle of separation of powers is enshrined in the 1990 constitution. It is part of the presidential regime, which in theory comprises four essential characteristics: 1) indivisibility of the executive power, which is exercised and embodied by the head of state and president of the republic, who is also the head of government under whose authority ministers do not have any intrinsic autonomy; 2) election of the president of the republic through direct universal suffrage, which grants him his legitimacy; 3) mutual independence of the president and parliament; and 4) independence of the judiciary. In principle, each branch of power carries out its functions fully and does not intervene in the functions of the others. In practice, however, these principles are not observed. First of all, the head of state exercises the executive power absolutely; he appoints prime ministers, (a function not stipulated in the constitution) who are thus easy to dismiss. Even Lansana Kouyate, the only one to have been appointed prime minister and head of government27 under pressure from trade unions and civil society after the 27 January 2007 agreements, was dismissed in 2008. Secondly, since Lansana Conté took over power, none of the elections held, whether presidential (1993, 1998, 2003), legislative (1995, 2002) or local (2000, 2005), have been free, credible and transparent. The same may be said of the November 2001 constitutional referendum. All the results of these elections have been disputed by opposition parties and by observers. All the appeals brought before the courts have been rejected by the Supreme Court whose president, Lamine Sidime (one of the authors of the 1990 constitution) is loyal to Lansana Conté. Thirdly, the national assembly is dominated by the ruling PUP party and those affiliated with the president. Fourthly, the president of the republic is the first to interfere in judicial affairs. Proof of this was shown in December 2006 when Lansana Conté went in person to free his friend Mamadou Sylla, the president of the employers’ association, from prison where he was being held for corruption and embezzlement of public funds. This forceful and intolerable act was the straw that broke the camel’s back and trade unions and civil society protested strongly, starting off the demonstrations that resulted in the events of January-February 2007.
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Parliamentary and judicial oversight
Under such conditions, the principle of civilian democratic oversight or oversight by the legislative or indeed the judicial power can hardly be effective. In order to understand the position of the national assembly in the Conté regime better, a few reminders are necessary. The parliamentary elections that took place in 2002 brought about strong divisions in the opposition and most opposition parties boycotted the elections, with the exception of the Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau (UPR), the Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée (UPG) and the Parti du Peuple de Guinée (PPG). Officially, the UPR, led by Siradiou Diallo, obtained 20 seats (out of 114) and is represented in the National Assembly; the UPG, led by Jean- Marie Dore, obtained 3 seats but refused to sit in protest while the PPG, led by Pascal Tolno, failed to win any seats. The Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (RPG), led by Alpha Conde, opted for the boycott, as did the Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG), led by Mamadou Ba (recently replaced by Cellou Dalein Diallo) and the Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR), led by Sydia Toure. As a result they have no representatives in the assembly. Consequently, since 2002, only the UPG, led by Ousmane Bah has had seats in the assembly alongside personalities of the regime. Furthermore, the speaker of the national assembly is yet another Lansana Conté stalwart. He is very unpopular in Guinea for having served both the Sekou Toure regime and the current one. The term of office of members of the national assembly ended in July 2007 and has been extended. The parliamentary elections have already been postponed several times. The former prime minister, Lansana Kouyate, seemed in no hurry to organise these elections because having himself arrived at his position without the backing of a political party, he feared being dismissed by the president after such a vote and the election of a parliamentary majority. One of the major achievements of this period was the adoption by members of the national assembly of the law setting up the independent national electoral commission (CENI) in May 2007. At the same time they adopted three other laws governing the status of political parties, the modalities for subsidies to be granted to such parties and amendments to the electoral code. The text on the CENI nevertheless contains a number of uncertainties and has led to strong concerns about the independence of this commission vis-à-vis the government, in the electoral process.28 On several occasions, the president of the commission, Ben Sekou Sylla, who is also the head of the national council of civil society organisations (CNOSCG), has
110 Dominique Bangoura drawn attention to the functional and operational difficulties that plague this fledgling institution. It is also important to note the behaviour of the speaker of the national assembly and the president of the Supreme Court during the time when the president of the republic was ill. The head of state was suffering from several serious diseases. He had been treated in Morocco and Cuba and was transported urgently to Switzerland on two occasions in 2006. Terrible rumours about his state of health circulated at different times. In addition to the erosion of power after 24 years in office, Lansana Conté has become very unpopular and Guineans came out onto the streets in 2006 and 2007 to demand change in both the political and social spheres. In spite of this, he was not ready to resign nor to retire (for him, a general does not retire; he carries on to the end) and his term of office was supposed to run until December 2010. In the face of this situation, which had worsened as a result of the infighting at the summit of state, a series of contradictory decrees and the deterioration of the living conditions of the population, the national assembly and the Supreme Court remained totally passive. They did nothing to implement article 34 of the constitution relating to a power vacuum, which stipulates that following a death or resignation or any definitive cause, this is noted by the Supreme Court on information by the speaker of the national assembly. The heads of these two institutions were incapable of declaring that there was a vacuum of power in spite of the pressure from the street, the letter from trade unions29 and the appeals from several opposition political parties, etc.30 In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that in Guinea there is no culture of free democratic debate within the national assembly, especially with regard to defence and security issues. And yet, under the terms of the constitution (article 59) and its own rules of procedure, the assembly passes laws on defence, law enforcement, the status of the military, etc. It also adopts the finance law (article 61) and the state budget (including the ‘Bulletin rouge’). Through its committee on defence, it may initiate parliamentary enquiries or fact-finding missions. However, this control remains limited and superficial. On 27 September 2006 at the start of the legislative session, the speaker of the national assembly made a lengthy speech looking at both past events and future prospects and indeed was quite critical about the situation of the country. However, not once were the expressions ‘armed forces’, ‘security forces’, or ‘defence’ ever pronounced and no mention was made of reform in this sector although the speech was supposed to review all the required reforms.31
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Now that the minister of defence is a civilian, maybe in future the question and answer sessions between members of the national assembly and competent ministers will be more open. Better results in the area of parliamentary oversight may only however be possible after the next parliamentary elections and the election of new members of the national assembly with the arrival of several opposition parties, which are preparing for this task. There is another substantial issue that arises with relation to parliamentary and judicial oversight in Guinea. This is the issue of the investigations into the massacres of 2006 and 2007, which took place during the repression by the armed and security forces against demonstrators. International and regional organisations, as well as development partners have all unanimously condemned these acts of violence and the summary executions. Guinean and international human rights organisations have also called for independent investigations. According to eyewitness accounts of the events of June 2006, there were more than 90 deaths and hundreds of seriously injured in particular among the youth. An investigation report drafted by a group of Guinean human rights NGOs and associations on the acts of violence perpetrated between January and February 2007 speaks about 186 deaths, 1188 injured, 940 arrests followed by detention and torture, rape, plundering and burning.32 Those who fired their guns were essentially from the presidential guard, the gendarmerie and the mobile intervention and security company, which is a part of the police force. Apart from the chief of staff General Kerfalla Camara, who has passed away, those in charge of these forces are still in their positions or have been transferred and are enjoying total impunity. According to the International Crisis Group, the refusal to recognise the seriousness of the crimes committed by the armed and security forces is an indication of the enormous efforts that the national enquiry commission will have to undertake to shed light on these events and set up the necessary processes to bring those responsible to book.33 On 18 May 2007, the national assembly adopted a draft bill presented by the Minister of Justice34 establishing an independent national enquiry commission charged with investigating the massacres.35 The question is whether this commission, which according to article 1 is required to investigate the crimes, offences and serious human rights violations committed during the strikes of June 2006 and January-February 2007, will be able to do its work independently within the current context where the judicial system has been undermined by corruption and its close ties to government.36 The commission is made up of 19 members, mostly judges
112 Dominique Bangoura and lawyers, who were appointed on 21 September 2007 by decree of Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate37 and swore an oath of office on 31 December before the court of appeal of Conakry. However, three months later, the commission still had neither premises nor means of functioning. In addition, some Guinean associations have appealed to the International Criminal Court. The question is to determine whether this court has competence.38 Finally, further light has to be shed on the role of the national assembly. On 12 February 2007, at the height of the crisis, President Conté declared a state of siege for twelve days,39 under the terms of article 74 of the constitution and after consultations with the speaker of the national assembly and the president of the Supreme Court. The powers of maintaining law and order that are normally attributed to the civilian authority were thus conferred on the military authority. Fundamental freedoms were suspended, a curfew was imposed throughout the national territory and armoured cars took up positions in the streets of Conakry. On 23 February, the state of siege was either to be cancelled or extended by the national assembly. President Conté therefore turned to the national assembly. Quite unexpectedly, the latter decided not to extend the state of siege. This was a great relief for the citizens of Guinea. Observers have wondered what could have led to this decision. It is most likely that assembly members from the PUP and affiliates of the presidential movement feared the repercussions from an angry population in neighbourhoods and within the country.
Challenges of security sector reform
There has been some little progress in the area of defence and security, but this still remains well below the expectations of the population. There is no need to recall that the general population are victims of violence and crime, not to mention deplorable living conditions (soaring inflation, unemployment, social insecurity and lack of running water and electricity). The challenges facing them are accordingly enormous. First among these is to set up a culture of democracy and observance of all manner of established rules, starting with the constitution. Such a culture inevitably requires education, training and excellence. These are almost vain words in Guinea where on the one hand, the adult literacy rate does not exceed 40% and only one out of two children is enrolled in school and on the other hand, students each year demand better living and study conditions.40 One of the after effects of Sekou Toure's dictatorship and the obscurantism under Lansana Conté has been that the elite has been decimated and that anybody
Guinea 113 can now set themselves up as specialists without any real competence; anything can be ‘fiddled with’ due to the lack of professionalism and a wide spread practice of ‘wangling it’. A demonstration of this was given during the negotiations for the 27 January 2007 agreement. In January, it appeared clear that the current proposals could not produce the expected results because they were still oriented towards a continuation of the Lansana Conté regime and the post of prime minister was still not enshrined in the constitution.41 And yet most of the discussion focused on setting up a broad consensus government under the leadership of a prime minister as head of government.42 Among other things a constitutional amendment would have been necessary to guarantee this new institution. Although the balance of power remained in favour of the presidential camp, for the first time ever, civil society, in particular the CNOSCG and trade union federations had an enormous capacity to mobilise and undertake action. Indeed, the latter had moved from the field of labour demands into the field of politics, with the demand for change. It must be added that during this period, Guinea was deprived of the committed support of the international community which had adopted a wait and see attitude and was monitoring the situation from a distance, whereas a few months later, in January 2008, the international community had not hesitated to give a mandate on behalf of the African Union to the former secretary general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, to go to the rescue of Kenya, which was wracked by post-electoral violence. One of the principal acts undertaken by this experienced mediator in Nairobi was to have the post of prime minister included in the constitution. Reform of the armed and security forces cannot take place without a reform of government and another conception of power. It is clear that no change is possible without democratic rule of law and a legitimate and accountable government. The most plausible future scenarios are those of a military government or a joint government.43 Among the former, there are three possible types of coups d'état: conservative, redemptive and by filiation. Among the second type one could envisage a civil-military transition after a civil-military putsch, with the possibility of an alliance between the speaker of the national assembly as interim head and the military. Any of these cases of a forceful takeover of power would represent a threat to the reestablishment of democratic process after Conté. Any de facto power is by definition anti- democratic and the political history of Africa since independence has shown that when the military takeover power it is never easy to ask them to step down and hand over power to civilians. Other scenarios (insurrection,
114 Dominique Bangoura rebellion) are not reassuring either, but they must not be neglected. Furthermore, the authorities have always prevented the possibility of a sovereign national conference similar to what was held in Benin, which would lead to a political transition and new institutions. Finally, the scenario of a negotiated constitutional transition seems to be the ideal, because it includes observance of constitutional provisions (civilian) in case of a vacuum of power, while at the same time limiting the powers of the interim president for the benefit of a transition prime minister who would organise free, credible and transparent presidential elections because he himself would not be a candidate. Such a transition scheme could provide sufficient guarantees for obtaining a democratic electoral process. It should include a review of the constitution in order to restore the articles amended in November 2001; enshrine the post of prime minister in the constitution; limit the powers of the interim president; extend the duration of the interim period; and amend article 26 on the monopoly of political parties in order to make it possible to renew and rejuvenate the political class through the presence of independent candidates. This revision could take place after a tripartite national dialogue involving all groups, which would identify a national consensus on the transition after open debate and negotiation.44 One of the means of preparing political and institutional reforms, including reforms of the defence and security sectors, is to organise a platform bringing together all the living forces of the country: civil society, government institutions and political parties. An open national dialogue established within a permanent framework appears to be a constructive and lasting means for preparing the future of the country. Such a tripartite dialogue does not yet exist in Guinea. To date there have only been episodes of bipartite dialogue between government and political parties prior to elections; or between political parties and civil society during the national consultation (March 2006); or between trade unions and government institutions (strikes in 2006-2007), but all three groups have never been brought together at the same time. And yet, the democratic process cannot begin without interaction among all these stakeholders. This is why after the withdrawal of opposition political parties in 2006-2007, their re-emergence on the political scene in 2008 is noteworthy. The new prime minister, Souaré, invited the opposition to join his government, an unprecedented occurrence under Lansana Conté. While the RPG opposed this idea in principle and the UFR declined because the conditions were not favourable, the UPR, the UFDG and the UPG accepted the offer. Mr. Bah Oury (UFDG) was assigned the very important
Guinea 115 sector of ‘national reconciliation’. This is a first in Guinea, where there has never been any official mention of these two words; the truth about the crimes and massacres committed by the authorities from 1958 to date has never been revealed. Although there have been some improvements, we must not forget that, once again, the Lansana Conté regime remains in place. Any real change or reform is therefore unlikely and subject to caution. The idea of a national dialogue is growing. It made progress starting from the national consultation in March 2006 and the setting up of a joint monitoring committee. The 27 January 2007 agreement also led to the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation committee. In addition, there has been a start to civil-military dialogue since 2005 with a number of analysis and discussion meetings being organised and held with the support of development partners.45 Furthermore, in 2006 and at the beginning of 2007, meetings were held between the army general chief of staff and the minister of security, with their respective departments. A meeting was also organised between the armed and security forces and the media from 11 to 13 June 2007.46 Finally, between April and July 2008 a series of public consultations took place in the four natural regions of Guinea as well as within the communes of Conakry. The idea is to promote national dialogue starting from the grassroots and to discuss all issues of concern to citizens.
Conclusion
The defence and security sectors in Guinea have been plagued with enormous difficulties since 1958. These are linked to the illegitimate use of power and the serious dysfunctions of the government. Credible reforms and the change for which some Guineans have sacrificed their lives cannot come about without a change of the political regime. The dismissal of the former prime minister, L. Kouyate, in May 2008 only strengthened the power of President Conté, but there were no protests against this forceful act from civil society47 or trade unions48 and much less from opposition political parties.49 More than ever before, Guinea needs an open national dialogue to manage the post-Conté period. All internal and external efforts must urgently converge towards organising and holding such a forum, which is the only way to avoid another bloodbath. It is also important to prepare the electoral process in the best possible conditions: both the parliamentary elections that should have taken place at the end of the term of office of members of the
116 Dominique Bangoura national assembly in July 2007 and the presidential elections, which raise several crucial issues. Reform of the military and security sector is therefore not really on the agenda for Guinea. It is in a stalemate. The same applies to the system of justice, for similar political reasons. In the meantime, some hard work has to be done to enable all civilian, political, military and security forces in the country to come together, speak to each other, listen to each other and have an open debate. This is possible and has already got off to a timid start. The effort must be sustained. Failing that, the existing bad situation will become even worse.
Epilogue (1): December 2008 – August 2009
During the night of 22 December 2008, the announcement of the death of President Lansana Conté on national television sounded the knell on an authoritarian regime that had been in power for twenty four years. In the very early hours of the next day, a military junta led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power by force, putting an end to any attempts at a constitutional transition.50 The very first communiqué51 that was read out on radio and repeated throughout the day against a backdrop of military music announced that the National Council for Development and Democracy (CNDD) had effectively taken over power; suspending the constitution, the government and other state institutions, as well as political and trade union activity. On 24 December, Captain Camara took over the leadership of the CNDD and proclaimed himself president of the republic. A page of the political history of Guinea had just been turned and a new transition has started. The questions that arise are the following: what is the nature of this putsch? Is it conservative or redemptive? As the new commander-in-chief of the armed forces, will Moussa Dadis Camara be able to undertake security sector reform? Would this be the right time in the new political context? What is the future of SSR in Guinea? Three elements could help to answer these questions:
1. In principle, Moussa Dadis Camara is in favour of reform
As has been proven by the recent events in Guinea, Captain Camara was nothing like Amadou Toumani Toure, his actions being similar to those of former regimes. In several interviews, he referred to his links to the late
Guinea 117 president, the respect that he had for General Lansana Conté and the fact that this was the reason why he did not attempt to take his place earlier. His coup d'état was therefore a conservative one. Nevertheless, Captain Camara is aware of the serious divisions that exist within the military and the defects that are increasingly difficult to deal with and to tackle. He has inside knowledge of its limitations and is aware of the negative image the population has had of men in uniform since the bloody repression of 2006-2007.With his friend Claude Pivi, he participated in the damaging events and repeated mutinies that have rocked Guinea in recent years. He knew that his power was not yet stable. For all these reasons, he believed that reforms were necessary and did not hesitate to state this publicly.52
2. Political limitations
Dadis Camara entrusted to a loyal follower, General Sekouba Konaté, the minister of defence, the task of touring all military barracks starting from January 2009 to demand discipline and obedience to the hierarchy,53 as well as respect for all citizens in the neighbourhoods and an end to acts of violence. This did not prevent repetitions54 of such acts and new blunders, in particular with members of the presidential guard assaulting General Toto Camara, the minister of security and an influential member of the CNDD when he entered Camp Alpha Yaya on the night of 21 July. Elsewhere, the captain made a public apology to the police for the deaths of June 2008. Security sector reform needs to be tackled using a comprehensive and integrated approach. But when should it start? It requires considerable resources for reorganising, demobilising a part of the troops, education, training, equipment and practical training for the armed security forces. It has to go hand-in-hand with reform of the system of justice and special services. However, looking at the way in which Dadis Camara has been exercising power ever since he took over, in particular maintaining the exceptional regime, concentrating all powers (executive, legislative and judiciary) in his own hands, the lack of effective transition institutions (prime minister, government, parliament), as well as his daily turnabouts, it was doubtful that this reform would be introduced in 2009. Let us not forget the concerns about the fate of officers who were detained and transferred to Kassa Island, far from sight and with no contact to their families.55 Finally, the national commission of enquiry on the 2006- 2007 massacres is still ineffective.
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3. Support to the junta
Dadis Camara restated his desire to carry out military reform during a visit to Conakry by the International Contact Group on Guinea on 16 and 17 July 2009. At the end of the meeting, the African Union commissioner for peace and security, Ramtane Lamamra stated: ‘We warmly welcome the request of the Guinean government with regard to the need to reform the military. We shall undertake to satisfy this request in the very near future, with the United Nations.’ What is most important for the transition period is that it should lead to free, credible and transparent presidential elections which will make it possible to elect a new civilian leader who will bring about change in Guinea for the first time since independence in 1958. Support to the junta for this purpose will strengthen the transition. In order for the CNDD and the armed forces to accept to hand over power, a number of measures have to be taken to improve the living and working conditions of soldiers and officers, while also guaranteeing a better future for high-ranking officers and generals in power or close to the power structure. Ideally, SSR as a whole whould have been implemented by a civilian president of the republic elected during free, transparent and uncontested elections. However, tragic events marked the ascendance to power of the CNDD and led to a very different transition than the one that even the most experienced observers of Guinean politics or Guineans themselves could have anticipated; neither was it the transition Dadis Camara had planned.
Epilogue (2): September 2009 – May 2010
In September 2009, it became evident that the leader of the junta was determined to run for president at the upcoming elections organised by the transition regime, despite having promised to step back from power once the transition was completed. To protest against Dadis Camara’s plans, which were viewed with great concern by both national and international actors, a rally was organised by his opponents on 28 September. Dadis Camara perceived this manifestation as a challenge to the junta’s power and a personal attack. The intervention by the armed and security forces against the participants of the rally led to a blood bath. At least 157 people were killed, hundreds wounded and dozens of women raped. This tragedy provided irrefutable proof of the severe dysfunctions in the armed and security forces of Guinea and the urgent need to reform them.
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While Captain Dadis Camara and his regime were doing everything they could to justify themselves, limit the damage done and avoid responsibility for what had happened, an assassination attempt was committed against the leader of the junta by the head of the presidential guard. Camara required hospitalisation and had to radically rethink the junta’s strategy, especially with regard to its most influential members. On 15 January 2010, the Declaration of Ouagadougou was signed between Captain Dadis Camara, who had been significantly weakened by the assassination attempt that almost cost him his life, the General Sékouba Konaté, his deputy within the Junta, as well as the Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré, who had been selected by ECOWAS as a mediator in the Guinean crisis. Under its third point, the Ouagadougou Declaration made provisions to reorganise and reform of the armed and security forces, in addition to fixing a transition period of six months. This declaration opened a window of opportunity for Guinea to finally engage in the crucial reform of its defence and security institutions. Immediately after the signing of the document and at the invitation of the then Government of Guinea, a joint mission of ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations, directed by the retired Senegalese General Lamine Cissé, set off on an evaluation mission to evaluate the possibilities for reform of the security sector in Guinea. An inclusive process of evaluation of the security sector followed, in which many Guinean stakeholders took part, including civil society from all parts of the country. At their insistence, the mission was later extended to include representatives from the European Union, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie and the United States. The mission report was handed over to the interim Head of State and Minister of Defence, General Sékouba Konaté, on 4 May 2010. The joint mission has undoubtedly contributed to significantly improving civilian-military relations and increasing acceptance of security sector reform and governance in Guinea. What remains to be seen is whether the recommendations it made with regard to all aspects of the security sector will be put into practice. The political stalemate in which the political transition is currently finding itself has certainly delayed the implementation of the necessary first steps. However, the mistakes made with regard to the political transition should underline the necessity to push forward the SSR process. This would relieve some of the pressure the armed forces are under in the current situation and help prevent it from further degenerating as has been the case in Niger.
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Notes
1 Sekou Toure, speech on the occasion of General de Gaulle’s visit, Conakry, 25 August 1958. 2 Siradiou Diallo, ‘Les relations entre l’armée, l’Etat et le parti, et le problème des forces civiles (milice, parti)’ in Les armées africaines, ed. Dominique Bangoura, 111-117 (Paris: Economica, 1986). 3 On these three periods, see Dominique Bangoura, Guinée: L’alternance politique à l’issue des élections présidentielles de décembre 2003 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 29-33. 4 Under the terms of Article 52 of the Constitution, the candidate Alpha Conde enjoyed immunity as Member of the National Assembly. 5 Dominique Bangoura, ‘La Guinée face aux rébellions au sud de son territoire’ Afrique contemporaine, no. 200 (October-December 2001): 17-33. 6 ‘Aperçu historique sur les forces armées guinéennes’ Horoya, 20 December, 1993 and 31 December, 1993). 7 Keite Fedoba, speech of Keite Fodeba as new Minister of Defence, cited in Horaya, 1 November 1961. 8 Pascal Boniface, ed., L’Année stratégique 2005 (Paris: IRIS & A. Colin, 2005), 434. 9 Major Mounie Donzo is the commander of the presidential security battalion. Recruits to this special unit are usually from President Conté’s ethnic group, the Soussous. 10 Ministry of Defence, Republic of Guinea (April 2003). 11 Frères d’armes, no. 247. Direction de la Coopération militaire et de défense - Dossier Guinée. Available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr 12 ‘Guinée’, Le Monde, 6 October 2000; ‘Guinée: une semaine meurtrière le long des frontières du Sud’, Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, 6 October 2000. 13 ‘La Guinée est déstabilisée par les conflits voisins’ La Croix, 15 February 2001. Another source indicates that military spending increased from 50 to 70 billion Guinean francs between September and December 2001 and that the 2001 budget stipulated an amount of 100 billion Guinean francs (about 400 million FF), according to Les Echos de Conakry, no. 28/01 (Conakry: Ambassy of France), 2. 14 Mamadou Aliou Barry, ‘L’armée face aux défis démocratiques et au changement’ in Enjeux et défis démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007–décembre 2010), eds. Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, 31-94 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007). 15 Dominique Bangoura, Les armées africaines (1960-1990) (Paris: La Documentation française, 1992). 16 Mamadou Aliou Barry, ‘Quelle va être la position de l’armée?’ in Guinée: L’alternance politique à l’issue des élections présidentielles de décembre 2003, ed. Dominique Bangoura, 53-55 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004). 17 Interview with CWO Claude Pivi, spokesperson of the mutineers: ‘Quiconque m’attaque aura perdu…’, Guineenews, 6 May 2008. Available at: www.guineenews.org See also Aboubacar Sakho, ‘Bruits de bottes dans nos garnisons: Ce n’est pas fini!’ Dixit Claude Pivi, L’Observateur, 7 June 2008. 18 General Baïlo Diallo was appointed Minister of Defence to replace General Arafan Camara, former Deputy Army Chief of Staff, following the May 2007 mutiny. 19 The platform of demands drafted by the police mediation commission included twelve points: liberation of police officers, promotions, supply of rice, cancellation of deductions on salaries, recruitment of 6705 additional police agents, appointment of a serving police
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officer as director general, continued training and equipment, recall of the class of 2003, training to be initiated for applicants who had passed the exam, cancellation of arbitrary transfers of those who had participated in the strike, and no sanctions against striking police agents. 20 Interview with second lieutenant Alphonse Saa, ‘If the police attempt to detect the secrets of the military, we will demonstrate our striking force’, Guineenews, 23 June 2008. Available at: www.guineenews.org. Second lieutenant Alphonse Saa belonged to the Conakry special battalion on duty at camp Alpha Yaya Diallo and was charged by his peers to carry out the operations and instructions of the military demand movement. 21 Lansana Conté, speech at camp Almamy Samory Toure, 5 April 2007: ‘I have held too many positions for too long: President of the Republic, Chief of Staff, Minister of Defence. I am now reducing them. I am reducing them to try other people. From this day, you now have a different Minister of Defence… I am appointing General Arafan in my place. The longest serving officer remains as Army Chief of Staff that is General Kerfalla…’ Speech reproduced by Ibrahima Sylla, 7 April 2007. Available at www.guineeconakry.info 22 Camp Samory Toure is the headquarters of the Army General Chief of Staff and the private residence of President Conté. 23 Almamy Kabele Camara, the new Minister of Defence, speech at Camp Samory Toure, 24 June 2008: ‘I shall endeavour to develop respect for the concept of discipline…’, Guineenews, 25 juin 2008. Available at www.guineenews.org. See also Maséco Conde, ‘Le nouveau ministre de la Défense Kabélé accueilli dans l’enthousiasme’, Le Diplomate, 26 June 2008. 24 Interview with Lansana Conté, ‘I am the boss; the others are subordinates!’ As broadcasted by Radio France Internationale - Dossier Afrique Soir, Paris, 15 June 2007, at 20:40 (local time). 25 Former Guinean Prime Ministers dismissed by Lansana Conté were Sydia Toure, Lamine Sidime, Cellou Dalein Diallo, Lansana Kouyate. 26 François Fall, ‘Lettre de démission’ (dated 24 April 2004), Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent (May 2004) and in L’espace de la société civile, no. 6 (17 May 2004): 9. 27 Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, eds., Enjeux et défis démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007–décembre 2010) (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007). 28 Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, ‘Comment obtenir une véritable Commission électorale nationale indépendante?’ in Enjeux et défis démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007– décembre 2010), eds. Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, 97-106 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007). 29 Lettre à l’honorable président de l’Assemblée nationale dated 16 January 2007, handed by trade union federation to the Speaker of the Assembly, requesting him to ‘duly record the vacuum of power due to the ill health of the Head of State and his inability to govern.’ 30 The opposition political parties in favour of the constitutional arrangement are: the UPR, the UPG and the UFD, led by Baadikko Bah. The parties belonging to the radical opposition wing, the RPG, the UFDG and the UFR, are not in favour of implementing the Constitution. 31 Intervention by M. Somparé, Speaker of the National Assembly, during the budget session, Conakry, Wednesday 27 September 2006. Available at: www.nlsguinee.com 32 Investigation report presented by Thierno M. Sow, President of the OGDH, on behalf of a group of eight NGOs, 11 December 2007. Available at: www.kababachir.com. See also
122 Dominique Bangoura
Amnesty International, Guinea:‘Soldiers were shooting everywhere’. The security forces’ response to peaceful demands for change. Index AI: AFR 29/003/2007 (London: Amnesty International, 27 June 2007). 33 International Crisis Group, ‘Guinée: le changement en sursis’, Briefing Afrique, no. 49 (8 November 2007): 10. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org 34 The draft bill by Paulette Kourouma goes further than the proposal by her predecessor, the outgoing minister René Alseny Gomez, who had set up an enquiry commission simply on the basis of an administrative note. He took this step, which was contested by the Bar association, to prevent the arrival of an international enquiry commission as demanded by civil society. A. Somparé, Speaker of the National Assembly, expressed serious reservations about the possibility of his institution initiating a parliamentary enquiry, because the matter was already before the courts. This statement contradicted his previous assertion from 15 June 2006. 35 ‘Act establishing the organisation and the function of the National Commission for Independent Enquiry’, Guineenews, 25 May 2007. Available at: www. guineenews.org 36 The court of appeal of Conakry was very lenient with Mamadou Sylla, Head of the Employers’ association, in May 2007. 37 ‘Order no. 51/PM/SGG nominating the members of the National Commission for Independent Enquiry Commission’, Conakry, 21 September 2007. Available at: www.guineenews.org 38 Amadou Thidiane Kaba, ‘Les dossiers brûlants de la Justice’, in Enjeux et défis démocratiques en Guinée (février 2007–décembre 2010), eds. Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, 107-134 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007). 39 ‘Presidential Decree D/2007/011/PRG/SGG of 12 February 2007 declaring the state of emergency in Guinea’. Available at www.waati.com 40 Dominique Bangoura, ed., Quel avenir pour les jeunes de Guinée? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005). 41 Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Dominique Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, Quelle Transition politique pour la Guinée ? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006). 42 Minutes of the negotiations following the general strike of CNTG-USTG extended to l’ONSLG-UDTG, Section I, Conakry, 27 January 2007. 43 Dominique Bangoura, Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Moustapha Diop, ‘Chapitre III: Les scénarios’ in Quelle Transition politique pour la Guinée? (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006). 44 Ibid, 107-176, 261-266. 45 Richard Stirba, ‘Workshop Promotes Democratic Dialog between Military, Civil Society’, 7 July 2006. Available at: www.usaid.gov 46 Interview with Dr Thierno Maadjou Sow, President of l’Organisation guinéenne des droits de l’homme, ‘La Guinée n’est pas un Etat de droit’, 28 June 2008. Available at: www.guineeactu.com. 47 Through the CNOSCG, civil society ‘took note’ of the dismissal of the Prime Minister in a communiqué dated 21 May 2008. 48 In a statement dated 22 May 2008, the trade union federation deplored the fact and ‘noted flagrant violations of the tripartite agreements signed on 27 January 2007’. 49 Opposition parties did not react. They had not been invited to take part in the Kouyate government. 50 The response to the first question: ‘Has constitutional succession been aborted or prevented?’ is dealt with in an article analysing the putsch by Dominique Bangoura, ‘Le
Guinea 123
coup d’Etat du 23 décembre 2008 en Guinée’ in Enjeux diplomatiques et stratégiques 2009, 107-111 (Paris: Economica, 2009). 51 Press release no. 001/CNDD from 23 December 2008 announcing the take-over of power by the National Council for Development and Democracy (CNDD). 52 Moussa Dadis Camara declared: ‘We must carry out a radical reform of the military, but to do this, we need funds’ stated before about one hundred journalists, 12 May 2009. Available at www.kababachir.com 53 Hamidou Sow, ‘Le CNDD, par la voix de son ministre de la Défense, veut assainir l’armée’, Guineenews, 29 January 2009. Available at www.guineenews.org 54 Human Rights Watch, Le Gouvernement guinéen doit discipliner les soldats, 27 April 2009. 55 Amnesty International, République de Guinée: des soldats placés dans un lieu de détention illegal. AFR 29/002/2009 (Toulouse, 4 August 2009).
Chapter 6
Mali
Mahamadou Nimaga
Introduction
After the March 1991 revolution and the inception of the Third Republic, Mali initiated a democratisation process that was characterised by the establishment of several democratic republican institutions. The process continued with decentralisation and the holding of free and transparent elections, which brought about a democratic change of regime. After the 2002 elections, the country found itself in an unusual political situation with General Amadou Toumani Toure, an independent candidate, acceding to the position of president of the republic. During his first term of office, there was a general consensus about governance of the country. Today however, given the divergent strategic interests of stakeholders in the political arena, this consensus has all but disappeared. What we now see is the emergence of an opposition that is attempting to carve a place for itself in the political arena by adopting specific positions on various national issues. The greatest security threat comes from the northern part of the country, where the nomadic population periodically shows signs of a desire to secede vis-à-vis the central authority and bandits carry out acts of violence on the pretext of fighting for independence. There are also smaller scale conflicts among different socio-ethnic groups, in particular with relation to the control of land and water points (between farmers and cattle owners for example). The current political context has made it possible to establish a climate that is favourable to the government, with the latter having crafted a new national policy framework on security issues. This framework demonstrates the government’s interest in enhanced civil society participation in the management of major security matters. To this end, the minister of internal security and civil defence worked with civil society organisations to organise the estates general on peace and security, which took place between September and November 2005. Similarly, through regional consultations
126 Mahamadou Nimaga and a national forum on peace and security, the government sought to involve all components of the nation in drafting a new national security and civil defence policy. With these consultations a real dialogue on security issues was established among all stakeholders, including civil society. According to participants, this was the moment when they started to really feel involved. Since then, the ministry of security has been engaged in a process of security sector reform (SSR) that is expected to lead to a national strategy. It is quite clear that all the conditions are now in place to promote the entrenchment of reform in Mali. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to bring about a change in behaviour and mentalities, one wonders what percentage of these stakeholders are really prepared for true SSR. Many civilians believe rightly or wrongly that most security sector agents are corrupt. Such prejudices constitute a real obstacle, but they have not prevented the reform process from going ahead as it is part of national policy. Security sector reform establishes the order of priorities of issues to be resolved through a strategy that defines the functions, roles and responsibilities of different actors in the sector, with the aim of ensuring the security of the state and its citizens.1 It must be pointed out that the security sector includes all those institutions and organisations which, with the approval of government, may legitimately use coercive force to respond to threats (both external and internal) for the security of the state and its citizens. For civilians, including public servants, the issue of SSR is seen only from the angle of public security. The majority continue to believe that security is the responsibility of the police or the gendarmerie alone. Although the regional consultations that formed part of the estates general on security raised awareness, it is unfortunate to note that the concept is still in an embryonic phase. As far as the military is concerned, thanks to the implementation of the army Code of Conduct, the SSR process seems to have been accepted.
The security apparatus and its environment
The security apparatus inherited from the French colonial power has been improved through the different regimes, to reach its current form of a republican force at the service of public institutions and the general population. In Mali, the security sector is governed by various bodies and institutions: the Presidency, the ministry of defence and former combatants,
Mali 127 the ministry of internal security and civil defence, the ministry of territorial administration and local authorities and the ministry of justice. The president of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces.2 In this capacity, he presides over the higher council for national defence and the national defence committee.3 According to the terms of the constitution, he may declare a state of siege or a state of emergency and take exceptional measures to this end. He makes appointments to high ranking civilian and military officials as provided by law. In the area of defence and security, two departments are under his responsibility: the department of state security and the private presidential staff. The threats are numerous and varied: urban crime; banditry; armed robberies; crimes along and across the borders; terrorism; intra-community conflicts; drug trafficking; and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In addition to this, the civil defence services are often called in to deal with disasters, flooding and road accidents. Apart from public or collective security, the security sector is also in charge of ensuring human security in order to face all the threats that could endanger the civilian population, whether or not these threats are accompanied by acts of violence (banditry, armed attacks, thefts, flooding, and natural disasters). This is where the general population truly appreciates the role of the armed and security forces. Despite its inadequate resources, the security sector obtains encouraging results. Nevertheless, efficiency could be improved if more resources were made available. It is generally accepted that the government has the responsibility for ensuring the security of citizens and their property. This is the main function of the security sector. Although citizens have the possibility of calling on private companies to ensure their security (depending on their status and level of income), the armed and security forces are nevertheless still responsible for maintaining the security of the general population. Furthermore, the government must face external threats. In this instance, it is the fundamental mission of the military to ensure national defence. In accordance with existing legislation, the security services comprise the police force, the gendarmerie, the civil defence force and the National Guard.
The armed forces
In addition to their security missions, the armed forces are in charge of national defence and territorial integrity. The armed forces must protect the
128 Mahamadou Nimaga population against external threats or aggression, in particular by setting up the necessary patrols. In addition to its conventional mission, the military takes part in development operations through the military engineers’ corps, thus playing a valuable role in national development. It thus faithfully translates the spirit of the orientation letter drafted by the president of the republic in 2002, in which he emphasised the need for the armed forces to participate actively in ‘national construction efforts’ and the ‘security of the nation’. The head of state felt that it would be a good thing to set up ‘new forms of complementarity with the security forces’, with a view to ‘better integrating the Armed Forces and security forces in their overall, proactive, human security environment’. This new approach mainstreams internal security in national defence. The Constitution confers legitimacy on special security missions of the armed forces in these terms:
When the institutions of the republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of the national territory and the implementation of international commitments are faced with a grave and immediate threat and when the regular functioning of constitutional public authorities is disrupted, the president of the republic shall take any exceptional measures required by the circumstances, after consultation with the prime minister, the presidents of the National Assembly and the high council of local authorities and the president of the Constitutional Court.4
The close link between internal and external security determines the new approach to security sector governance in Mali. Under the terms of the new law on national defence, the mission of the armed forces is at all times and in all circumstances to ensure the security of the population and territorial integrity, as well as to protect the lives of citizens against all forms of aggression.
The national police force
The national police force is headed by a director-general appointed from among the police commanders by a decree adopted in the council of ministers and signed by the president of the republic. It has competence in urban areas with a high population density. According to article 2 of ordinance n° 04-026/P-RM dated 16 September 2004,5 the missions of the national police force are:
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To maintain law and order, safety, security and public peace; To ensure the protection of persons and goods; To ensure the observance of laws and regulations through its administrative and criminal investigation functions; To enforce regulations on arms and ammunition; To control private security services; To control gambling establishments; To carry out border police missions; To participate in protecting institutions of state and high-ranking personalities; To participate in the mission of providing information to the government; To participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations; To participate in civil defence and national defence.
This redefinition of responsibilities takes into account not only democratic requirements, but also the reforms that need to be implemented within the national police force. It must be noted that under the different regimes, the police force has experienced several mutations. Thus, it went from conventional status immediately after independence to a militarised police force under the regime of the military committee for national liberation. With the advent of the third republic in 1992, the police force was once again given civilian status.
The civil defence force
The mission of the civil defence force is to implement, coordinate and control emergency operations in line with the national civil defence policy. In particular, it is in charge of organising prevention and emergency operations, drafting disaster management plans and implementing them and managing the logistics resources allocated to carrying out such missions. Management of the civil defence force is under the responsibility of a director-general appointed by a decree adopted in the council of ministers upon proposal from the minister in charge of civil defence. Candidates are nominated from among public servants in category A of the general status of public servants, police commissioners, or high-ranking military officers.
130 Mahamadou Nimaga
The national gendarmerie
The commander of the national gendarmerie is a general or superior officer of the gendarmerie, appointed by a decree adopted in the council of ministers. Like the national police force, the gendarmerie has administrative and criminal investigation missions, but because of its military status it is often entrusted with territorial defence operations. It may participate in combat as a constituted unit or alongside units of the defence forces as a provost corps. It has competence over the armed forces in matters of criminal investigation, that is, any violations committed within military premises or involving military personnel may be referred to it. Although the gendarmerie may be present in urban centres alongside the police, its main area of activity is the countryside where it provides coverage over the entire national territory. The gendarmerie is the only corps of the security forces that carries out multiple functions in policing (law enforcement, maintenance of law and order, protection of persons and property), criminal investigation (recording crimes and offences, contraventions, investigation to collect proof and identify perpetrators of violations, etc.), administrative police (intelligence, road traffic, border police, policing of ports and airports, crowd control, civil defence and emergency) and defence (military obligations). In peace time, it participates in the administration of joint armed forces bodies. In times of crisis, it participates actively in territorial defence through its intelligence services and by protecting the main sensitive civilian areas, as well as through immediate intervention. The various departments attached to the gendarmerie are the inspectorate, the schools command, the criminal investigation unit and the ministerial reserves unit group. The gendarmerie therefore has an inspectorate, similar to the inspectorate service that exists within the ministry of internal security and protection, which has responsibility for the police and civil defence forces.
The National Guard
This is a military type force, which does not carry out criminal investigations, but participates actively in administrative police missions through maintenance of law and order, surveillance of sensitive areas and intelligence gathering. This force has the most comprehensive coverage of the country; there is a National Guard unit present wherever the administration is represented. It is under the authority of the ministry of
Mali 131 defence and former combatants for its administration and under that of the ministry of internal security and civil defence for its deployment. It is organised into a staff in charge of coordinating the activities of the territorial groupings, which have platoons under their orders. The mandate of the National Guard includes ensuring the security of administrative and political institutions and authorities; public safety and maintenance of law and order; general policing of territorial authorities; operational defence of the national territory; border surveillance; participating in peace operations and humanitarian activities; as well as contributing to the economic, social and cultural development efforts of the country. The areas of competence with regard to internal security are clearly assigned by existing texts. The police and the gendarmerie work together and regularly organise joint patrols. In spite of the framework for cooperation, relations among these agents have not always been very friendly. There have been some unfortunate incidents involving the police and the gendarmerie or the police and the military.6 These have always been deplored by the political authorities who have indeed imposed sanctions in such instances. It must be pointed out, however, that such confrontations are due to personal conflicts among staff and are not the result of a poor distribution of the roles and missions of each of these corps.
The intelligence service
An intelligence service gathers, analyses and uses intelligence. However, only the Department of State Security and the military intelligence department are involved in both espionage and counter-espionage. Because of the secretive and confidential nature of their activities, there is very little information available about them. There are complaints about these departments from the general public who sometimes fall victim to abuse. Unlike the other components of the security sector, the intelligence service is rarely sanctioned for any possible misconduct. While intelligence is vital for sovereignty and the defence of state interests, it is also important to have qualified, professional personnel who are aware of the sensitive nature of their mission. To achieve this, the security services would need to be educated on the importance of heightened collaboration with the civilian population. These services would also need to be equipped with information technology equipment and qualified human resources. There have been instances of abuse and misconduct. It is however difficult to give concrete examples, especially as such instances are managed
132 Mahamadou Nimaga internally by the security and judicial authorities in charge of taking the necessary measures to sanction those found guilty. A few years ago, the security sector had very little knowledge about the concept of human rights; today, all military and police training schools provide teaching on the subject, as well as on international humanitarian law. Although the sector alone cannot guarantee that all its agents will respect human rights, it can nevertheless contribute to limiting instances of abuse.
Security privatisation
Many private companies providing watch and guard services, transport of funds and individual protection services were created just after the events of 1991; several others have proliferated in recent years. Under certain circumstances, they are authorised to provide their staff with firearms for the purpose of carrying out their surveillance and protection missions. There are no traditional or political militias in Mali. The country is however faced with acts of banditry carried out in the north by irredentists and rebel groups. Finally, as the country achieved independence through peaceful means, it has never had a liberation army. Arguably, the proliferation of private security companies cannot have a negative impact on the security sector because their activities are regulated by law and they cannot be set up without prior authorisation from the public authority. Indeed, the fact that there are private security companies does not in any way signify privatisation of the security sector as a whole, because the state still has the prime responsibility in this area. On the contrary, their increased numbers has made it possible to cover the deficit in individual security (night and day watch) to a certain extent. Private security agents, who for the most part are unarmed, are required to inform the security services or call on the latter for any offences that may come to their attention in their area of surveillance.
In summary, there has been a noticeable improvement in relations between the security services and the general population. With the creation of a ministry for internal security and civil defence, coordination of the activities of the gendarmerie, the National Guard and the police force has improved. In reality, these relations are defined according to a certain hierarchy, by the texts governing each organisation. In peacetime, each department functions according to the statutory regulation. In times of crisis, unrest and riots, the different services may be mobilised to maintain order and security. There is no difference between those involved at the national
Mali 133 level and those involved at local level but the hierarchy of the chain of command is defined according to regions, districts and communes. In areas where there is no police force, the gendarmerie and the National Guard are present. The same actors are found at both the national and local levels with of course different ranks, according to the degree of command in the unit, brigade, or platoon.
Security sector management and oversight
Compared to other countries in the sub-region, the security situation in Mali is quite enviable. This is due to the fact that over time, communities have learned to live in harmony and in a spirit of tolerance. Today, security sector oversight is carried out both by the executive, legislative and judicial powers and by civil society.
Instruments of civilian management and control of the security sector
It must be recalled that relations between civilians and the security sector were for a long time marked by suspicion and distrust. The armed and security forces were convinced that anything related to security was their sole responsibility. Today, serious efforts have been undertaken to bring the two camps closer together. Increasingly, civilians participate in seminars on security or human rights, organised by the ministries of defence and internal security. Civil society now has considerable influence in the area of security. The number of associations working in the area of peace and security is constantly increasing, as are the numbers of journalists wishing to focus on controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons or in protecting human rights. Cases of misconduct or abuse by certain agents have been sanctioned, following reports from civil society. The fact that the press shows real interest in the behaviour of security agents and also in the behaviour of magistrates and senior officials has an influence on their professional behaviour. Nevertheless, this type of control remains rather weak. It is quite clear that the 25 February 1992 constitution is the cornerstone of the separation of powers of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. In theory, each branch of power is independent of the others although there is not total independence, in particular between the legislative and the executive branches. Since government is obliged to render account
134 Mahamadou Nimaga to parliament and since the president of the republic has the power to dissolve parliament, both institutions are compelled to collaborate, in the interest of the nation. As indicated above, the rights and obligations of the security sector are defined by law and regulatory texts. Any acts of abuse and misconduct are thus brought to the attention of the hierarchy, which evaluates the facts. Perpetrators are therefore required to answer for their acts, either through disciplinary procedures, or before the courts. Finally, all rights and obligations are subject to administrative and institutional control (security services inspectorate). The ministry of security and civil defence and the ministry of defence, which are in charge of law and order and security, are responsible for implementing the national security policy and best practices, as well as ensuring that the armed and security forces comply with ethics and their code of conduct. The inspectorate department is also involved in this control mission. Finally, if an offenсe involves human rights violations, the case is brought before the prosecutor, who has the authority to initiate proceedings. The security sector is closely monitored by civil society. Human rights protection associations, NGOs and women’s associations are active in Mali. They are able to report irregularities through the media or by petitions sent to any authority that they believe capable of redressing the situation. And they have the right of oversight over all the activities of security agents, on condition that they observe the confidentiality of procedures and ‘defence secrecy’. It must be recalled that civilian control is not like police control. It is limited to noting, reporting and above all proposing solutions.7 Nevertheless, the quality of civilian control of the security sector remains inadequate, due to a lack of interest on the part of certain civilians in the security sector and also because of the often ‘secret’ nature of security issues.8 Because of the less than friendly relations that existed for decades between civilians and security forces, civil society has demonstrated less interest in the sector. Such interest is however growing with the emergence of pressure groups, associations and the media. There is a strong imbalance between civilian control and institutional control, as the latter has more resources and powers over the security sector. With regard to intelligence activities or management of certain cases, things are not always transparent. This situation is however accepted by some civilians who believe that sensitive issues related to state security must not be discussed in the public arena. This is one of the difficulties encountered in civilian control, since civil society does not have sufficient investigative
Mali 135 means. ‘Reasons of state’ or ‘defence secrecy’ are the factors often cited to avoid responding to requests for information as part of civilian control, thus often compromising transparency in the name of confidentiality. Both institutional mechanisms and legislative mechanisms are quite adequate, especially as the former are defined by the constitution. As to the latter, it is obvious that compliance is required. The real problem lies in actual practice, where there are often irregularities.
Parliamentary oversight
Oversight by the National Assembly is exercised through the government’s obligation to report to this body.9 To this end, the constitution stipulates that ‘the government is accountable before the assembly under the conditions and according to the procedures set out under articles 78 and 79.’10 In the security sector, parliamentary oversight is exercised through different means, in particular, through questions to ministers on topical issues or on issues of concern relating to security; these may be in the form of oral or written questions addressed to the ministers who are obliged to respond. It is quite fortunate to see that increasingly parliamentarians put questions to the authorities about ongoing security issues or policy. Article 26 of the constitution stipulates that national sovereignty belongs to the people as a whole, who exercise it through their representatives. Thus, since members of the National Assembly are the representatives of the people, there can be no reason not to subject government action in the area of security to the control of the national representation, not even for reasons of state secrecy.11 Given the current security environment, which is marked by the crisis in the northern part of Mali, most Malian parliamentarians show a keen interest in security issues, including at local level. The National Assembly's standing committee on defence and security is specifically responsible for reviewing all security matters and preparing draft bills on these matters for submission to members. It has been closely involved in resolving the crisis in the northern part of Mali, but does not have sufficient human, material and financial resources to propose draft bills. The National Assembly (the single chamber of parliament) has the right of oversight over the different activities of the executive and by extension over the security sector, since draft budgets must be submitted to and approved by its members. Adoption of the budget is one area where the parliament truly has influence and control. Members do not adopt the budget of specific sectors separately, but rather adopt an overall budget in the form of a finance law. Furthermore, parliamentary control and supervision of the
136 Mahamadou Nimaga security sector is also carried out through the procedure of convening members of government, including the minister in charge of security, to come and respond to questions by parliamentarians. Parliamentary authorisation is not required for deploying troops abroad within the framework of operations to maintain or restore peace.12 The parliament is not involved in any decision by government to send contingents abroad. Nevertheless, under article 71 of the Constitution, ‘declaration of war shall be authorised by the National Assembly meeting especially for this purpose’. Thus, the president in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces cannot engage Mali in a war without the agreement of the National Assembly. Similarly, it is the National Assembly that must approve an extension of a state of emergency or a state of siege beyond 10 days, in order to ensure that such an extension does not hamper public liberties. The statement that ‘the government does not systematically send reports to parliament, but cannot refuse to communicate them to us if we so request’13 quite obviously means that reports are not sent regularly to parliament. The executive cannot be blamed for this situation, in particular as parliament has real powers to obtain such reports. The passivity demonstrated by parliament with regard to receiving reports could also explain why its oversight over the security sector is weak. Although there is provision for parliamentary commissions and enquiries, such occurrences are rare. The use of such methods could also determine the level of parliamentary oversight of public action. It must also be acknowledged, however, that parliament could call on experts to assist it in enhancing its knowledge about specific security issues.
Judicial oversight
The judicial power has constitutional and legal prerogatives over the security sector. According to the code of criminal procedure, the criminal investigation department is in charge of recording violations (contraventions, offences, or crimes), gathering proof, seeking the perpetrators and bringing them before the courts. Criminal investigation services are under the authority of the public prosecutor, who has direct control over officers and agents of the criminal investigation department. The judicial power also has control over the armed forces through the military tribunal. There are numerous criticisms levied against security sector agents and just as many complaints about magistrates, who are rightly or wrongly accused by certain parties of being dishonest and corrupt. The system of
Mali 137 justice is truly an area of concern for citizens, but there are nevertheless honest, competent and upright magistrates. When the judicial system has to deal with unethical behaviour, the quality of legal decisions and judicial control is affected. Admittedly, the Malian justice system is truly engaged in a process of reform, which goes from recruiting magistrates to creating more courts and includes raising the moral standards of the extended legal family. Justice well rendered goes hand-in-hand with legal security and respect of individual rights. A national human rights commission was created by decree n° 06-117/ P-RM of 16 March 2006. Apart from a few well-informed individuals, the existence of this commission is little known to the general public and it is often confused with the Malian human rights association (AMDH). Another type of public control is the Democratic Question and Answer Forum (Espace d’interpellation démocratique) organised each year on 25 December. This is an innovative initiative similar to the ombudsman and is a unique opportunity for Malian citizens to ask the government and the security sector agencies questions about irregularities or human rights violations. During this session, the government responds to all questions and as far as possible, tries to provide immediate solutions. The jury, made up of foreign personalities, makes recommendations to government and a commission reviews implementation of past recommendations. Within the ministry of justice, there is the judicial services inspectorate, which is not under the authority of the hierarchy. It was established by ordinance n° 00-057/P-RM dated 28 September 2000 and its mission is to:
Ensure the smooth functioning of legal services and all other services under the ministry in charge of justice; Contribute to improving the working methods of magistrates and personnel of the public justice system; Inspect traditional services, with a view to improving the functioning of various institutions; Carry out, on the request of the minister in charge of justice, any investigations or specific missions within the framework of its attributions.
Police officers are under the authority of the public prosecutor, who has the right of oversight over their work. Also, it must be recalled that the public prosecutor decides on criminal proceedings. In this capacity, he has
138 Mahamadou Nimaga real control over the police force, the gendarmerie and other officers of the criminal police. The code of criminal procedure guarantees the right of defence. People who are arrested or accused have the right to be assisted by a lawyer at all stages of the procedure, right up to the ruling. Court-appointed lawyers are only provided in criminal cases. In Mali, this procedure is seldom used, because some lawyers do not take cases seriously when they are appointed by court.
Public oversight
Civil society, which is very proactive, is made up of several components: the media, associations and organisations that are active in combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons,14 the press, NGOs and academics. In addition to the dynamism of these different actors, there is the remarkable contribution made by religious and traditional leaders as well as other influential figures in resolving certain crises. The private press is prolific and covers all areas. There are however very few specialised institutes dealing with security questions alone, although the University of Mali does contribute to stimulating research on all subjects including security, by the topics that it offers to students. There are 103 officially declared political parties in the country, but only about 20 of them are active by their presence in decision-making bodies at both local and national levels. No less than 30 newspapers (magazines, daily newspapers, bulletins, etc.) are published each day, covering a wide range of issues. Undeniably, in spite of some problems of internal coordination, civil society remains very active. Indeed, civil society was a key player in the 26 March revolution and the subsequent inception of the third republic. If participation essentially means understanding the major thrusts of SSR, then it is not certain that civil society has fully assimilated the concept. This is quite understandable to the extent that the sector is a sensitive one, requiring a certain amount of caution. Nevertheless, it would be desirable for civil society to have a good knowledge of security matters so that they can provide a view different to that of security sector ‘insiders’. The organisation of seminars and workshops, as well as the regular consultations between civil society and security agents should make it possible to enhance the feeling of civil society being a real stakeholder in the security sector. Over the past few years, there has been a clear interest on the part of researchers, teachers and consultants on issues related to security. Many
Mali 139 studies have been published on topics such as conflict management, urban and road insecurity, small arms proliferation, terrorism and democratic governance of security. Although there are no institutions specialising only in these areas, most consultancy firms and several associations work on various similar subjects: the Malian Human Rights Association, the Women's Legal Clinic, the Association of Journalists for Peace and Security Issues and RASALAO Mali.15 Several non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam-GB, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Amnesty International have also commissioned studies on security in Mali. It must also be recalled that on the initiative of CONASCIPAL, a forum on civil society governance was organised for the first time in Mali in 2005. The event brought together political and administrative authorities, local authorities, representatives of the armed and security forces, as well as technical and financial partners who all engaged in fruitful dialogue: ‘This first forum enabled all those involved in security to establish communication, which is indispensable for any reasonable and effective action. This exercise in communication is no doubt a basic tool for consensus in the management of democratic security sector governance in Mali.’16 Looking back on the road travelled with respect to democracy, peace and security and in particular the inception of democracy and managing the conflict in the north, it is quite clear that the extremely positive contribution of civil society to social peace must not be underestimated. However, civil society organisations need to continue to strengthen their competences and experience. In order to exercise effective control, civil society needs the support of the armed and security forces, the political authority and the judicial power. Improved collaboration amongst all stakeholders would enable it to play its oversight role effectively and promote better collaboration. Its readiness to engage in dialogue and its dynamism prove its sense of responsibility. Indeed, civil society has always spoken out against infringements of democracy and freedom of the press. It has often supported the executive in implementing certain public policies (road insecurity, controlling small arms proliferation, etc.). Although it often receives funds from government or financial partners, it cannot be said that civil society is manipulated. Politicians regularly use the media to get certain messages across, but such contacts are not synonymous with manipulation.
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Challenges of security sector governance
Varied and sometimes complex problems remain to be resolved in Mali. They range from armed robberies to premeditated murders, transborder crime, organised crime, the acts of rebellion and banditry in the north, drug trafficking and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. These challenges are further compounded by some intra and intercommunity conflicts, as well as widespread corruption. Other problems include: inadequate territorial coverage for public security; the absence of a consistent, specialised border control system; inadequate operational capacities in the existing units; shortfalls in personnel numbers; insufficient infrastructure and equipment; daily recurrence of excesses within the forces, both in terms of moral conduct and professional ethics; the lack of a security orientation and programming law; poor coordination between the central management and local units (especially those based in the north); and the lack of coordination between the different security forces.17 We must not however overlook the fact that it is difficult for the state to control the entirety of its national territory and impose its authority, because the borders are extremely porous and the populations in the northern part of the country are nomads. The ‘great northern desert’, an area that is ideal for all sorts of illicit activity, is considered by some to be a ‘no man’s land’. In addition to this, the armed and security forces are insufficient in number and intervention capacity in all the sectors along the border with Algeria, although efforts are currently being undertaken to strengthen the patrols in the Kidal region. The security situation in the north of Mali and throughout the Sahelo- Saharan belt has long been a problem, due to the presence in the region of armed groups and traffickers. The events in December 2008 and January 2009, however, marked a turning point in security management, with the kidnapping of Canadian and European diplomats. The arrival of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb movement, which has found a sort of rear base in the north increased awareness in western countries on the security concerns in this part of the Sahara (with its attendant risks of terrorism and transborder crime). In addition to Algeria, which supports the Malian forces with logistics as part of the countries’ military cooperation, several European countries have decided to draft a security coordination strategy for the zone. The United States, for their part, are already engaged in joint exercises alongside the Malian military. This extremely worrying situation also led to
Mali 141 the intervention of other parties, in particular the signatories of the Algiers agreement and Libya. With respect to assistance received from outside Africa, the positive aspects are the transfer of competence and know-how, as well as assistance in building infrastructure. The negative aspects are the risks of interference in the internal affairs of the country and unhealthy competition, which would be harmful to Mali. Dependence on external aid provides the donor countries with an excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of beneficiary countries. It is up to the government to prove its capacity to resolve certain problems and only call on partners for development operations, if necessary. Security is at the heart of all discussions and mobilises actors on the international scene. On 11 November 2008, on the occasion of the ministerial meeting on peace, security and development in the Sahelo- Saharan space, Mali called on the countries involved to examine the security challenges and draft a plan of action, which would require considerable financial resources for its implementation. Partners would be asked to contribute to its implementation once the needs had been identified by the countries themselves. The aim of this approach is to minimise external interference.
The role of the state, the security sector and agents of democratic control
Roles are clearly defined by the constitution and other texts establishing or organising each of these services. Under the terms of article 53 of the constitution, ‘government shall define and conduct national policy’. To this end, it must be sufficiently and properly informed to be able to take the right decisions at the right moment. It appears that the fact that there is confusion about roles and that various sectors encroach on the competence of others is rather due to insufficient knowledge of these texts. Since the constitution clearly separates the executive, legislative and judicial branches of power, each has a means of action over the others.
Convergence of law and compliance with standards
The existence of multiple standards is no justification for disorder or violation of fundamental texts. In the Malian system, all standards must be in compliance with the law, which itself must be in compliance with the constitution. Failing that, such texts can be brought before the Constitutional Court, which rules on their constitutionality. However, duly ratified international texts are integrated into the national legal apparatus and take
142 Mahamadou Nimaga precedence over national laws. Therefore, in order to strengthen the convergence of law and compliance with standards, the capacity of the judicial power must be consolidated by providing it with the necessary means and resources.
Relations between security sector agents and citizens
The security sector is not very familiar to the general public, or may be of little interest to it. This lack of knowledge about the sector and its agents does not help to build trust. In order for confidence to be restored, all categories of society have to be involved. Also, a real dialogue must be established amongst the various agents and the missions and responsibilities of each have to be defined. Once the various stakeholders have understood that their role is to ensure human security in addition to that of the state, it will be possible to establish a certain level of trust. To this end, the new security policy in Mali has been organised around six main pillars, in order to adapt to the reality of the country:
Focusing on a policy of prevention; Laying the foundation for a neighbourhood police service; Clarifying and coordinating responsibilities in the area of security; Adopting a policy of rational use of the means available; Consolidating and strengthening the policy of openness to the outside; Adopting an appropriate communication strategy.
Speaking of restoring confidence suggests that it was lost at some point. However, although there may be some legitimate questions about the way in which certain situations were managed at the national level, it is not certain that security sector agents as a whole suffer from a negative image. If this were the case, however, communication would have to be improved and reasons given for some decisions taken. Feelings of frustration are often due to a lack of information or inaccuracy of such information. These are shortcomings that can be corrected. It must be recalled that, fortunately, the Malian Armed Forces are neither organised on the basis of ethnicity nor politicised, that is, they are not in the service of one clan, nor a single political party. Obviously, within the context of a democracy, they remain subordinate to the political authority. In Mali, members of the military are never recruited on an ethnic or regional basis. The only exception is when former rebels were integrated into the
Mali 143 different military corps following the 1991 rebellion and within the framework of implementing the DDR programmes.18 In addition, no ethnic group or region is predominant in the chain of command of the armed and security forces. This state of affairs has certainly helped the country to avoid civil wars.
Other challenges
The challenges with regard to SSR are enormous. They range from a lack of public trust in the security sector, to the need to improve the moral conduct of this sector, the need for capacity building, professionalism and the control of corruption – bribes or sourôfin.19 The renewed strong presence of the military in the Malian administration is also seen by some as a non- negligible problem. In spite of the political change and democratic progress, there appears to be a return of senior military officials in civilian garb to positions such as ambassadors, governors and directors of public departments. The appointment of a high ranking defence official (all army colonels) to every ministry has also led to some reservations on the part of the population, which is not happy to see the military in the spheres of administrative and civilian command. The security situation in the North, which is characterised by trafficking in weapons and drugs, remains an area of national and regional concern. The self-defence group, Ganda-Koy, has threatened to take back territory if the authorities do not accede to its demand to be involved in managing the crisis in the North. Given this situation, there is a need to find the right way of educating all parties to respect the Algiers agreements. Another point that needs to be raised is the recent interest shown by various partners in the Northern region. The US has been organising military exercises within the framework of the Pan-Sahel Programme and France intends to organise a meeting of ministers of defence of certain countries in the Sahelo-Saharan zone. The diversity and sometimes the antinomy of the ambitions of these different partners proves how important the issue of the North is for the region as a whole. Mali is aware of this and has opted for a regional approach, focusing on a process of integrated development. Security sector reform is just as important as the reform of the educational system, the public service, or inter-institutional relations. The public service is severely affected by corruption. However, considerable efforts have been undertaken to effectively control corruption, in particular with the establishment of the office of the Auditor General and a number of measures taken within the framework of overhauling government action.
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Other challenges to be met in terms of democratic governance of the security sector are in building capacity and enhancing professionalism. If a concept is not well disseminated, people are obviously reluctant to implement it. Similarly, if the main stakeholders are not involved in reform, opposition only increases. Obviously, reform has a financial cost that needs to be assessed. Whenever there is resistance to reform, it mainly comes from those areas in the sector where corruption is strongest. The best way to overcome such resistance is to adopt a participatory approach, which instils confidence in stakeholders and to clearly indicate the objectives of the reform. Furthermore, since excesses by these agents are often due to their poor wages and working conditions, reforms must necessarily include measures to improve their situation. The security forces’ budget is drafted within the respective institutions and then subjected, quite transparently, to the normal procedure for adoption within the national budget. There are several phases to the procedure: budget draft by the department concerned; adoption in the cabinet of the competent ministry; transmission to the ministry of finance; inclusion in the national budget; review and adoption by the council of ministers; transmission, discussion and final adoption by the National Assembly; and proclamation of the finance law by the president of the republic. There is therefore a whole series of stages at which the security forces’ budget may be screened, thus guaranteeing transparency. The success of a reform process can be measured by the relations established with civil society; the professionalism of agents in this sector (compliance with the rules of ethics and respect of human rights); the quality of services provided; and finally, the relevance of security sector control by civil society, the National Assembly and the judicial power.
Spaces for dialogue
Opportunities exist for formal or informal dialogue between the security sector and the general public; for example, open days and joint seminars on respect for human rights. The fact that various security services have now appointed officials responsible for communication demonstrates an awareness of the importance of such dialogue between civilians and the armed and security forces. Where training is concerned, Mali works in collaboration with several countries. There are trainee exchange programmes with national and sub- regional schools (Senegal, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroun). This platform could be used to set up a framework of
Mali 145 coordination through existing sub-regional organisations, in order to establish common rules and partnership agreements in the area of security (on the right of pursuit, for example).
Collective security mechanisms
Mali understood very quickly that its own security could not be guaranteed as long as that of its neighbours was threatened. This understanding has led the authorities to adopt a global and regional approach. Thus, a number of bilateral agreements covering international judicial cooperation and assistance, as well as transborder and military cooperation have been signed between Mali and its neighbours. This sub-regional cooperation includes tripartite or bilateral meetings on security and transborder issues. Furthermore, the country has ratified the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, adopted in Abuja in June 2006 and has acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, as well as the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. It is also a party to the CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) convention on a mechanism for conflict management, prevention and resolution. Mali's security policy is thus perfectly in line with the security objectives of ECOWAS, in particular regarding conflict resolution, the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the promotion of good governance and human security.
Assistance from outside Africa
Conflict prevention and peaceful resolution are the main pillars of Malian diplomacy. The positive results recorded by Mali in conflict resolution, its active participation in peace keeping operations and its involvement in resolving certain conflicts in Africa have enabled the country to mobilise additional resources for peace and for security sector reform. When requests for assistance are made on the basis of the country's needs, there is less likelihood of failure or a negative impact because the objectives are defined in common. Mali has received the support and assistance of bilateral and multilateral partners in the area of democratic governance. Financial and technical assistance is always well appreciated by the population who see it as a sign of dynamic cooperation. International organisations and technical
146 Mahamadou Nimaga and financial partners could also offer their assistance in setting up the enabling environment for institutional capacity building (justice, parliament, police, armed forces, gendarmerie, etc.). While national authorities are responsible for drafting a national defence and security policy that is designed to include human security, respect for human rights and legality, external partners or agents must accompany the process of SSR, by providing technical assistance and also by financing certain projects. In order to promote recognition of state authority and sovereignty, the government must educate and inform, promote relations between civilians and the military, ensure that legal norms are complied with and provide continued training to all stakeholders. As far as major reform programmes are concerned, Mali certainly needs external partners, but the latter should not be involved in identifying priorities or in drafting the plan of action. People would indeed be reluctant to accept SSR that has been dictated from outside. The population therefore has to be involved in identifying and defining the needs and partners must not be involved at this stage. Success is more likely if the roles are clearly defined between national stakeholders and external partners. If the latter are truly to be considered as partners, then they must be involved in the reform policy because their contribution is still essential for effective implementation. No reform is viable if all those involved do not have the same vision and understanding of the issues at stake. This is why reform has to be initiated using a participatory approach.
Conclusion
A number of problems need to be tackled urgently: promoting transparency in institutions and accountability of agents; controlling corruption and financial crime; and establishing a results and merit-based culture and respect of individual rights. Other issues including capacity building and setting up a dynamic policy to ensure that SSR is accepted by the population, who should be its principal beneficiaries. In addition to the points raised above, the following recommendations can be made:
Set up an independent structure for the organisation, consultation and coordination of civil society activities in order to support and accompany government in its efforts to establish democratic security sector governance;
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Set up a formal framework for collaboration between civil society and the appropriate government technical departments in order to enhance synergy in their efforts; Draft and implement strategies aimed at ensuring that civil society takes ownership of the new national security policy; Ensure that all components of civil society accept the concept of SSR; Establish an observatory on corruption and public liberties; Enhance the capacities of the National Assembly, by establishing a professional and effective parliamentary administration system; Enhance the capacities of the ministry of foreign affairs’ centre for strategic studies and establish partnerships between the centre and universities; Implement the recommendations of the estates general on corruption and financial crime, which were held in Bamako from 25 to 28 November 2008; Provide the intelligence service and criminal investigation department with professional training; Involve academics in drafting public policies on corruption, in particular through specialised reviews, investigations on financial transparency and symposia.
The adoption of the human security concept places the individual at the ‘heart of security’.20 It also emphasises the intrinsic relationship between security and development. This vision is certainly very much in line with the expectations of the population, because there can be no development without security and vice versa. In the Malian environment, there is a need to create mechanisms for consultation and dialogue in which the interests of all are protected; this should make it possible to enhance democratic governance. Only through dialogue and consultation with civil society can the legitimacy of security services and trust in them be strengthened. The best school for security agents, whether from the military, the police force, customs service, or magistrates, is the school of loyalty and respect for institutions and the public service. As far as the military is concerned, it must be noted that the regional peacekeeping school is based in Mali. It prepares officers to participate in peacekeeping operations. There are other schools in Mali such as the EMIA (Ecole militaire inter-armes), the EMA (Ecole militaire d’administration) and the OEGM (Ecole des officiers de la gendarmerie nationale) which also receive foreign trainees.
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Regional cooperation for security sector training should be encouraged through exchange of experience and training grants. This type of cooperation indeed already exists at regional (Ecole de maintien de la paix, Bamako) and sub-regional (War College, Nigeria, Ecole de la magistrature in Porto-Novo, Benin) levels. The police force, the customs service and the military all benefit from training outside the country, within the framework of bilateral cooperation. In Mali, security sector reform has become imperative if the requirements of democracy and good governance are to be satisfied. To this end, the international community, which seeks to promote SSR, must provide assistance in implementing the process that has already been initiated. Civil society, political parties, opinion formers and religious leaders must all be involved and active in this process. ‘In the light of the major undertakings that have been started in the ministry of security in recent years, security sector reform in Mali cannot be postponed.’21 It appears that the political authorities are determined to promote this reform, which will determine the effectiveness of good governance. Nevertheless, were this reform to be postponed, the consequences on democratic security governance, as well as the confidence of the population in the security sector would be enormous. Security sector reform is doomed to fail if there is not a strong political will, real commitment on the part of the actors involved and the support of external partners.
Notes
1 Syllabus, ‘Senior Leaders’ Seminar’ (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington D.C., 29 June - 11 July 2008), 931(French version). 2 Article 44, Title III of the Malian Constitution of 25 February 1992. 3 Decree no. 98-285/P/PRM from 7 September 1998. See Art. 2 and 3 on the composition of the National Defence Council. 4 Art. 49 and 50 of the Constitution. 5 Ordinance ratified by law no. 04-AN-RM of 28 April 2005. 6 An incident that occurred during a police patrol, which degenerated into a confrontation, at Niamakoro. 7 Zeïni Moulaye, Gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali: un défi au développement durable (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2005), 165. 8 Interview with a security sector journalist. 9 Zeïni Moulaye and Amadou Keïta, L’Assemblée nationale du Mali sous la troisième République: guide à l’usage des élus, des citoyens et des partenaires extérieurs (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2007), 96. 10 Art. 110 of the Malian Constitution of 25 February 1992.
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11 Communication by Pr Aliou Nouhoum Diallo, Member of the National Assembly, former Speaker of the National Assembly and the ECOWAS Parliament, during the first civil society forum on democratic governance of security in Mali. 12 Interview with the Chairperson of the National Assembly Standing committee on security and defence, 6 August 2008. 13 Ibid. 14 National civil society coalition for peace and control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (CONASCIPAL), Civil society and security governance: Actes du premier Forum de la société civile sur la gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali (CTB, 2008); Association des femmes pour les initiatives de paix (AFIP - Women’s association for peace initiatives). 15 West African Action Network on Small Arms. 16 Paul Van Impe, resident representative, Speech ‘Coopération technique belge au Mali’, 1st Civil society forum on security governance. 17 Zeïni Moulaye, Gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali. 18 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. 19 Malian expression for bribes. 20 Communication by the Inspector-General of police Mahamadou Niakaté, Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Defence, during the first civil society forum on security governance. 21 Interview with a police commander.
Chapter 7
Mauritania
Boubacar N’Diaye
Introduction
If a coup d’état is the ultimate proof that a country’s security sector is not functioning as it should, then Mauritania has demonstrated this twice in three years. First on 3 August 2005, then again on 6 August 2008, senior officers took over political power ‘on behalf of the armed and security forces’.1 The first putsch overthrew Colonel Maaouiya Ould Sid’Amed Ould Taya who himself had acceded to power through a coup on 12 December 1984. For 21 years, Ould Taya had maintained himself at the helm of affairs through repression and fraudulent elections. On 3 August 2005, the armed and security forces ‘unanimously decided’ to remove him from office. These were the terms used by the Military Council for Justice and Democracy (CMJD), in its first communiqué. This marked the start of a critical phase in Mauritania’s political evolution. Certain analysts qualified this coup d'état as unusual, both in terms of its form and the events that followed it.2 The sceptics felt, on the contrary, that it had little chance of bringing about the promised ‘justice and democracy’ and that it seemed too much like a palace coup that would certainly not be the last of its kind.3 On the other hand, the 6 August coup overthrew Mr. Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, the president who had been democratically elected by the country barely a year and a half before, after a transition that had too hastily been described as exemplary.4 This coup d'état ran counter to the political trend on the continent, now in favour of democracy and also to the desire of the African Union to see an end once and for all to unconstitutional regime changes, for which Africa holds the record.5 Setting aside the fact that coups d'état, in particular the last one, constitute flagrant violations of this common desire to turn the page on the political anachronism of overthrowing governments by force of arms, these interventions raised the whole issue of the role of the security sector in the functioning of a democratic state. This nth coup and its repercussions demonstrated that Mauritania still had serious
152 Boubacar N’Diaye obstacles to overcome, in particular with respect to defining the place and role of the security sector, as well as its links with republican institutions, civil society and the ordinary citizen. In order to understand better why the military interfered in political activity, especially after the first putsch and the democratic transition (2006- 2007) that had engendered such hope, these events must be examined in the light of the historical and socio-political context that led to the crisis that Mauritania has been grappling with since 6 August 2008. We will then review the organisation and the actors involved in a security sector that has been weakened by excessive politicisation and ‘ethnicisation’, monopolistic use of executive power and systematic human rights violations. This will give a clearer picture of the many challenges facing the country, as well as the means that have to be employed to overcome them. Finally, a number of recommendations will be made in order to bring about the much needed and long postponed security sector reform (SSR).
The security apparatus and security environment
The socio-political context
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania became a sovereign state on 28 November 1960, under the leadership of the young lawyer Moctar Ould Daddah, who enjoyed the support of the French colonial power against his internal political adversaries and the expansionist ambitions of neighbouring Morocco. The country has 3.2 million inhabitants of the Moslem faith and is made up of three ethno-cultural groups. The first, the ‘Negro-Mauritanians’, is made up essentially of four sedentary ethnic groups (the Halpulaar, the Soninke, the Wolof and the Bambara), who live mainly in the South and in the West, in urban areas. They represent about one third of the total population. These groups regularly attempt to have their (non-Arab) cultural identity recognised and demand a more equitable share in political and economic power, from which they are almost totally excluded. The second group, the Arab-Berber nomads (also known as Beydane, Bithaan or ‘white Moors’), live mainly in the North, centre and East of the country. They are organised in more than 150 distinct tribes and clans and also represent almost a third of the population. The Arab-Berbers dominate all institutions and exercise almost total monopoly over political and economic power. They identify mainly with the Arab world and insist on the Arab and Islamic nature of the country. Over the years, this monopoly has enabled them to
Mauritania 153 present Mauritania to the outside world as an exclusively Arab country. In recent years, a deliberate policy of reducing the links with West Africa has further enhanced this trend. The third group, the Haratine and the Abeed, probably the largest, is made up of descendants of black African slaves. They identify culturally and psychologically with their former Beydane masters with whom they share a language (Hassaniya, a dialect of Arabic) and the Arab-Islamic culture, as well as their tribal organisation. A notable recent development has been the emergence of Haratines on the political and social scene, despite the internal divisions that weaken them. Their demand for a greater share of political and economic power has nevertheless remained fruitless. Repeated droughts, soaring urbanisation and the policy of accelerated Arabisation have totally transformed Mauritanian society over the past 30 years. However, these divisions and the questions of coexistence that they raise, as well as the responses envisaged by different regimes continue to seriously affect the political evolution of the country, including with relation to all aspects of security sector management. Up until the time that he was overthrown in a bloodless coup d'état on 10 July 1978, the first president Moctar Ould Daddah had managed to forge a Mauritanian national identity. Through a measured ethnic policy and regional balance, he had cleverly succeeded in maintaining ethnic, cultural and political tensions within manageable proportions. He had also successfully laid the foundation for an internationally respected and viable state, as well as a promising social and economic development programme. He nevertheless committed the error of engaging his country alongside Morocco in the war to conquer Western Sahara, at the time under Spanish control, during which the army engaged in systematic plunder. Worn out by a war that seemed impossible to win despite the logistic support provided by France, due to the repeated assaults of the Polisario Front6 and a lack of popular support (at least psychologically), the military overthrew him and assumed power. In his memoirs, published posthumously, President Ould Daddah suggested that the coup d'état was sparked by the corruption of certain senior officers and their fears of being sanctioned.7 Whatever the real causes, this coup marked the start of a new era in civil military relations in Mauritania. The military were deeply convinced of their mission as the ‘repositories of national legitimacy’, according to the words used in the first communiqué read out on national radio by the late Major Jiddou Ould Saleck, one of the main instigators of the 10 July 1978 coup and a close relative of Colonel Moustapha Ould Mohamed Saleck, the head of the military committee for national recovery (CMRN). This committee steered the affairs of the country after the coup d'état. Quite
154 Boubacar N’Diaye obviously, the military has never really abandoned power since, in spite of the façade of democracy inaugurated in 1992. The original junta was transformed into the military committee for national salvation after the putsch led by Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif, who overthrew Colonel Ould Saleck. In December 1979, Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla seized power after the sudden death of Ould Bouceif in a plane accident off the coast of Senegal. Ould Haidalla was in turn removed from office by Ould Taya. These events continue to influence the way in which the security sector is organised.
The praetorian heritage and its effects
Over the years since it first took over power in 1978, the security apparatus has become one of the least effective in Africa and also one of the most delinquent. Up to that date, the military had kept a low profile and held itself apart from the racial, cultural, ethnic, regional and ideological divisions that already threatened the country. Soon after, probably following the 1984 coup d'état, these divisions began to appear within the armed and security forces, further aggravated by unrelenting personal rivalries. These trends were very quickly demonstrated by the falling professional standards of the armed forces (starting with the officers) and a contemptuous attitude towards civilians and their institutions, which go hand-in-hand with the uncontrolled exercise of power and sudden and unjustified acquisition of wealth. In the 1980s and 90s, Ould Taya shamelessly took advantage of these trends, as well as the dysfunctions that they had generated. He even exacerbated them. After the purge of non-Arab officers and men, following a conspiracy by some of this group in 1987 at a time of heightened ethnic tensions, he carried out an almost total Arabisation of all branches of the armed forces. To do this, he sent hundreds of carefully selected officers and public officials for training in military academies (and other similar establishments) in Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria, Morocco and Algeria. These training courses, which no doubt did not focus on principles such as professionalism, respect of human rights and the role of armed forces under the rule of law, further enhanced the politicisation of officers and non-commissioned officers, thereby diminishing the little consideration they had for these values. The result was a proliferation of nationalist Arab or Islamic ideologies and groupings (Nasserist and Ba’athist), not only within the army,8 but throughout all the security forces. After 2002, the armed forces were even more affected by the self- centred strategy pursued by Ould Taya, as he became increasingly
Mauritania 155 preoccupied with ensuring the survival of his regime, after both the civilian and military opposition became more radical.9 Following the coup attempt that ended in bloodshed in June 2003, he strengthened the independent presidential protection battalion (BASEP) and promoted loyal officers from his own tribe and those of allies from the north, thus enhancing what has been called the ‘vagrancy of the army’.10 These loyal officers were generally placed in strategic command positions, or at the head of major para-state establishments with almost official authorisation to help themselves to public funds as they wished. Such measures not only weakened the military institution, but also enhanced the bitter feelings among many senior and subordinate officers who were thus deprived of their deserved promotions and excluded from the largesse of the regime. One of the consequences of these divisions was that relations between the regime and the security apparatus that was supposed to support it were undermined. Indeed, the survival of the regime was now dependent on the loyalty of a handful of men; in particular the commander of the BASEP, Colonel Ould Abdel Aziz, whose cousin, another colonel, happened to be the director of national security. Both belong to the Oulad Bousbaas tribe, the same tribe that was well known for being prosperous in business and which was engaged in a passive competition with Ould Taya’s tribe, the Smassides, for control over the Mauritanian economy and in particular the newly discovered oil sector. When the two colonels took over power on 3 August 2005 as number one and number two of the junta, it was inconceivable that they would accept to cede it again without conditions. In their minds, even if they did not have full control over whoever succeeded them, it could only be another coalition (to replace the coalition set up by Ould Taya after he consolidated his power in the 1990s). Such a coalition could only be founded on tribal, commercial, regional, ideological, or other interests. This praetorian heritage, the tribal inertia, political moves and poor civil-military relations are all factors to be borne in mind when considering the security challenges facing Mauritania.
A failed transition
The armed forces refused to include civil society and political parties as full- fledged partners in managing the transition. They also refused to recognise the legacy of state violence, as well as the militarisation of political activity. Finally, the military regime did not take advantage of the opportunity provided by the coup d'état to reconstruct the framework for security sector governance and make a radical break with its former security policy and
156 Boubacar N’Diaye practices. They could have drawn lessons from the errors committed by the former Ould Taya regime. This crucial and sensitive reform process should have been undertaken by the civilian regime that succeeded the provisional military regime. The task was however difficult given the fact that despite being elected democratically after the 2005-2007 transition, the head of state owed a lot to the military junta and in particular to its most influential members. He therefore did not include SSR on the list of political priorities. Many were convinced that his election for a single term of office (because he would have attained the age limit at the end of his first term) was a way of enabling the head of the military junta to return to the helm of affairs through the ballot box. Mauritania was therefore very unlikely to experience any democratic reform of its security sector. In 2007-2008, the fact that the head of state was closely surrounded by many former members of the junta who had benefited from the status quo led to doubts about the possibility of any in-depth reform.11 The 6 August 2008 coup d'état gives the impression that the transition, instead of leading to the democracy that Mauritanians had been aspiring to since at least 1992, rather led to a political system that is the hostage of both the security and praetorian heritage and the political and social dynamics in place since the creation of the state of Mauritania, which were exacerbated by the Ould Taya regime. Indeed, the CMJD never gave up the power of initiative and was careful to maintain the ex-opposition political class and civil society in the role of secondary partners, who were sometimes consulted but generally placed before the fait accompli for major decisions. Under the impetus of the two colonels mentioned above, the CMJD gave itself every opportunity to maintain a central role in decision-making in the country, with or without the existence of a democratically elected government. This is the main problem with the security sector in Mauritania.
The security sector in Mauritania
The Mauritanian Armed Forces comprise the army as its central pillar, the National Guard, the civilian intelligence services (housed in the department of national security and attached to the presidency) and the gendarmerie. The other components of the security sector are the national police force, the customs service and the forest rangers.
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The armed forces
The army was initially made up of elements from the corps of colonial troops, the Goumiers, who used camels for transport. Up to 1976, there were only 3,000 men in the Mauritanian army. It was only during the Saharan war and after the July 1978 coup d'état that it entered onto the national political scene, where it has remained ever since. Mauritania’s army currently comprises 15,000 active members.12 The country has no reserve forces. The different branches (army, navy, air force and gendarmerie) are all managed by chiefs of staff, under the authority of the ministry of defence. The air force is very small, counting only 250 men and a small fleet of transport and reconnaissance planes. The navy, which is made up of about 600 men, is entrusted with patrolling and protecting the country’s immense fishery resources and is equipped with a few, appropriate vessels for this purpose. The greater part of the Marine Corps is based in Nouadhibou, with a few elements near Nouakchott. The gendarmerie for its part has its own staff, which is in charge of coordinating brigades and companies spread throughout the national territory. The gendarmerie is in charge of maintaining law and order, gathering and transmitting intelligence in all forms, as well as combating crime in particular through criminal investigation missions.
The presidential guard
The presidential guard (the famous BASEP) is part of the armed forces and is at the heart of the security apparatus, because its command is directly responsible to the president. For the past 15 to 20 years it has been under the command of General Ould Adel Aziz, the general who foiled two coup attempts, before carrying out the last two coups d’état himself and becoming president. Obviously this position has enabled him to ensure that the men in the BASEP are loyal to him and to take advantage of this to become the central leader of the security apparatus. One former minister recently qualified the BASEP as practically a private armed militia.13 It is rumoured that this battalion was trained and equipped by the Israeli secret service.14 Given the role that it has played in recent years, it is clear that any serious reform of the security apparatus must include a total overhaul of this battalion, including its personnel and a redefinition of its mission.
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The national police force
The national police force has become vital for maintaining the political order that was often threatened under the Ould Taya regime and after the 2008 coup d'état. Its numbers increased exponentially in recent years; the total number of police officers is confidential, but it is estimated that there are at least 3,000 men spread out among the regional security departments and their police stations. The accuracy of this figure is however disputed, given the (very high and secret) number of civilian intelligence agents who are part of the police force. There are so many policemen that in certain police stations, police officers only go to work every other day. The national security department is based in Nouakchott and its activities are guided by political concerns rather than fighting organised crime and protecting the state and its citizens. The police force is reputed for its corruption and influence peddling. There are numerous, often unauthorised, road checkpoints where police officers systematically extort money from unfortunate drivers. Indeed, there have been many studies on this endemic corruption.15 This state of affairs was noted again recently in a May 2009 report by the president of the Bar Association. According to him, ‘various sources are in agreement that torture is common practice’. At the height of the accelerated Arabisation process, it was not rare to find Arab Berber shepherds who were illiterate but could recite the Quran appointed overnight to the position of police inspector or even police commissioner, without having received any training. The current police force is the product of this past practice. Although there is a police academy, it is not very likely that the training provided there will change this situation much. As a result of the intensification of both open and concealed political repression since 1986, the police force and intelligence services have played and continue to play a leading role. President Ould Taya, himself a former military intelligence officer, politicised these forces to the extreme and instrumentalised them to the benefit of his regime. The changes that have taken place since 2005 have not modified this practice to any significant degree. The 2000-man strong National Guard is under the authority of the ministry of interior and regularly participates in law and order and other administrative police missions in rural zones.
The customs service
Like in many similar countries, the customs service is considered even more than the police to be a stronghold of corruption, because it is often managed
Mauritania 159 by army officers or officers from the gendarmerie who invariably become some of the richest men in the country. Given that its mission is to protect the national economy and collect customs duties which constitute a major part of the national budget, the customs service is obviously essential to the smooth functioning of the state. Any reform exercise aimed at improving its performance and reducing corruption can only be beneficial for the country.
The forest rangers
The forest rangers represent another paramilitary corps. They are in charge of preserving the fauna and flora of an essentially desert country that is affected by the huge advance of the Sahara. Despite being important for protecting the environment, the forest rangers seem to be the poor relations of the security sector.
Non-state actors
Since Mauritania has not experienced any open conflict, there are no armed groups outside of state control or who are seeking to overthrow the regime. Nevertheless, between 2003 and 2005 a group of former military personnel set up the Cavaliers du changement (Knights of Change) with the objective of overthrowing the Ould Taya government by force of arms. At the height of the repression against Negro-Mauritanians, another group made up of elements of the Front for the Liberation of Africans of Mauritania (FLAM) briefly took up arms and launched attacks on the Mauritanian Armed Forces from Senegal. Today, it is well known that there are Mauritanians in the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) group. As far as private security companies are concerned, although they have increased in number in recent years they have not yet reached the critical threshold that would make them major players in the security sector. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that there is no legislation on such companies. Compared to the size of its population, Mauritania has one of the highest ratios of men in uniform in the West African region; the total number of the security forces is around 21,000 men (including 5,000 in the gendarmerie), In comparison, Senegal and Mali, neighbouring countries where the population is three times higher, have 15,620 men including 5,000 gendarmes and 15,150 individuals, with an additional 4,800 other paramilitary forces, respectively.16 The human needs of Mali and Senegal, which have to deal with rebellions, appear to be more obvious, even if these rebellions are rather low key. As a percentage of GDP, the defence and
160 Boubacar N’Diaye security budget of Mauritania is much higher than that of its two neighbours.17
Security sector management and oversight
As indicated above, the president of the republic is the main actor in the security sector, a role that is conferred upon him by the constitution. Article 30 grants the power to conduct the defence and security policy of the country; article 32 grants him the power to appoint people to civilian and military office and article 34 stipulates that he is the commander in chief of the armed forces and ‘shall chair the higher defence councils and committees’. These constitutional bodies are not operational; the Dakar agreement that brought an end to the crisis used article 34 of the constitution as the basis for a new role for the military junta that had taken over power in August 2008. The practice of power has always gone well beyond the prerogatives granted to the president by the constitution. Given the importance accorded to security by all Mauritanian presidents since 1978, management of security issues has indeed become the exclusive responsibility of the president, although the constitution also stipulates that the government ‘shall be responsible for the administration and for the armed forces’ (article 43). As suggested above, this has contributed to the dysfunctions of the security sector by excluding other legitimate views and players such as parliament and civil society.
Parliament
The parliament is made up of the national assembly and the senate. Although the legislative power has never really been involved in security sector management, the Mauritanian constitution grants parliament (generally in addition to legislative power) a certain number of powers that make it an important element in security and defence. Article 57 for example stipulates that the general rules organising national defence shall be governed by law. The same applies to the decision to declare war or to determine the ‘fundamental guarantees granted to civil servants and members of the military’ in carrying out their missions. Like other African parliaments, the Mauritanian parliament has never fully exercised its constitutional prerogatives, in particular that of controlling government activity, as security is often left to the executive and more specifically to the head of state.
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Both chambers of parliament each have a standing committee in charge of justice, the interior and defence. Under the terms of article 19 of the rules of procedure of the national assembly, members may set up special commissions to study certain draft bills and proposals and article 20 grants the right to establish ad hoc commissions to examine issues that do not fall within the competence of a standing committee. These instruments are supposed to enable the parliament to carry out its oversight of government activity and contribute to the establishment of a legal framework within which defence and security policies must be applied. The 2005 coup d’état, which led to the election of a parliament whose membership made it possible to have a system of democratic control worthy of its name, also enabled the emergence of a timid culture of parliamentary oversight. However, the 2008 putsch brought an end to this episode, although it did not stand to reason that the legislature elected after the transition was really engaged in reaffirming its constitutional prerogatives. Prior to the putsch, unlike his predecessor, President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi had attempted to respect the powers and independence of parliament, as well as of the judicial power. However, the required steps were not taken to enhance the capacities of the two standing committees when the opportunity arose.18
The judicial system
Like the legislative power, the judicial power which under the terms of the Mauritanian constitution is stated to be ‘independent of the legislative and executive powers’ (article 89), has never been truly independent. The constitution does not grant any specific powers in defence and security to the judicial branch. As far as security is concerned, such power is limited to stating the law independently and protecting the constitutional rights of Mauritanians. And yet, since independence, the justice system has always been under the strict control of the president of the republic who often used it as an instrument against political opponents. Neither the endemic corruption in the security sector nor the numerous human rights violations have ever given rise to any legal sanctions. Up to the time of the coup d'état in 2005 the government had never managed to guarantee its citizens the individual and collective freedoms that are essential to any modern concept of security. During the 15 months of the democratic interlude, the country was able to experience to some extent what it meant to have an independent judiciary, but the 2008 putsch seems to have brought this to an end and renewed the practices of the Ould Taya regime. This is demonstrated by the fact that President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi swore his oath of office before the
162 Boubacar N’Diaye same constitutional council that had approved the coup d'état and the decisions of the junta although they were manifestly in violation of the constitution. It therefore seems that the worst practices of misuse of the legal system that existed prior to the 2005 putsch are back in full force. A report by the president of the bar association, published in May 2009, spoke about the ‘inhumane conditions in prisons, arbitrary sequestrations, flagrant violations of the rules of procedure, misuse of justice, excessively long periods of temporary detention and repression of demonstrators.’ He concluded that ‘the system of justice in Mauritania has no credibility and enjoys no trust’.19
Civil society
Given that the powers granted by the constitution to parliament and the judicial branch have never been exercised fully because of the pervasive presence of the executive, it is not surprising that democratic control of the security sector by civil society organisations and Mauritanians as individuals has not been possible either. Following the transition from 2005 to 2008, Mauritania experienced an unprecedented expansion of individual and collective freedoms, when compared to the period from 1992 to 2005, which started with the democratic opening in 1991. The massive human rights violations perpetrated in the country throughout the years and in particular between 1989 and 1992, led to the establishment of a large number of human rights organisations. In spite of an amnesty law promulgated in 1993, with the intention of sweeping all the killings and ethnic cleansing under the carpet once and for all, these ‘events’, which in Mauritania political jargon are called the ‘humanitarian deficit’, continue to pollute the political climate. A great number of civil society organisations have taken upon themselves the mission of getting the Mauritanian state to assume full responsibility for the human rights violations; guarantee compensation for victims and their successors and in particular work to develop a culture of respect for human rights. Among these are the National Human Rights Forum, the Collective of Victims of Repression, the Association of Victims of Events, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), the Assistance and Sharing Group and the Coordination of Former Mauritanians Soldiers in Exile. The objective of SOS esclaves, one of the oldest existing civil society organisations is to eliminate the after-effects of slavery. Other organisations that have developed exponentially include independent press organs and other more or less reliable associations that
Mauritania 163 have all contributed their views in the debate on political and security developments. It must be noted however that there are no indications in governing texts or in practice that civil society organisations are considered as legitimate partners in security sector management and oversight. It appears clear that the 2008 putsch has brought about a loss of some of the ground conquered starting from 2000.
External agents
Ever since independence, Mauritania has had to count on external partners (in particular the former colonial power France) to ensure its internal and external security as well as its stability. This cooperation (dependence, for some) was governed by the technical and military assistance agreement signed on 19 June 1961. According to the first article of this agreement, France undertook to provide Mauritania, with ‘the assistance of French military personnel to organise, supervise and train the Mauritanian Armed Forces’. In 1973, Mauritania demanded a revision of the agreement, but this did not prevent France from providing assistance to the military when it found itself in a difficult situation during the Sahara campaign, between 1975 and 1977. With the accelerated Arabisation process launched by the military regimes after 1978, cooperation with France gradually gave way to enhanced military and security cooperation with the Arab world. At the end of the 1980s, the regime resolutely turned to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which was at the time a rising power and whose pan-Arab discourse was just as attractive as the generous civilian and military assistance provided, including training of officers from all the armed forces. This was a departure from the policy of the previous leader Lieutenant Colonel Ould Haidalla, who had rather sought to draw closer to Colonel Gaddafi's Libya. As indicated above, for many years, security cooperation shifted entirely from France towards the Arab world, although France continued to remain in the picture through the presence of a few instructors in the military academies. Relations in the area of military cooperation between the two countries deteriorated considerably when the French legal system brought charges against a Mauritanian officer on training in France.20 Feeling threatened, Ould Taya attempted to move closer to the United States, in particular by focusing on the issue of the terrorist threat. Although relations with France in the area of security were subsequently restored, up until he was overthrown Ould Taya remained suspicious of this country. He seemed to count on the increasingly close cooperation with the United States and Israel for his protection.
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During the 90s, the Ould Taya regime came under pressure from both the international and the national community (the political opposition was at the time mainly clandestine) with regard to human rights issues. In an attempt to place himself in the good books of the United States, he established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999. Apart from a certain easing up in the Department of State’s annual reports on human rights, the regime also benefited from US economic and military assistance to combat terrorism, in the framework of the Pan-Sahel Initiative established by the American government to coordinate security operations by Sahelian countries. Later on this programme was transformed into the ‘Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership’, still with the same desire to encourage Sahelian countries to improve their control over the vast desert territory that they share and thus preventing this area from serving as a base for the terrorist acts of groups such as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Attacks in recent years against the Mauritanian Armed Forces, embassies and foreign nationals from Europe and the US give the impression that Mauritania is facing a terrorism threat. This view has been encouraged by the ploys of the various military powers to manipulate western countries into offering unconditional assistance, as confirmed by two very credible reports on the issue.21 In 2000, Mauritania withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The emergence of a sub-regional government that would include a certain oversight by the organisation on issues of governance obviously did not suit Ould Taya. During the transition, the debate about Mauritania's return to ECOWAS was stifled. Mauritania cannot therefore benefit from the instruments drafted by the organisation to help member states improve their individual and collective management of conflict factors and other effects of the dysfunctions of their political systems and security sectors. Nevertheless, because of its geographical situation and its human, economic and cultural links with the rest of West Africa, other countries in the sub-region cannot fail to be affected by the consequences of an instability that seems inevitable for as long as the underlying problems have not been resolved. In order to understand these problems better, the legacy left by the military, in particular Ould Taya, must be taken into account.
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Problems to be resolved
After the transition that followed the 3 August 2005 coup d’état, the armed and security forces had no intention of withdrawing from the political scene. It therefore did not come as a surprise when another coup d’état was organised less than a year after a president had been elected democratically, thus extending the country’s long praetorian night and making it even more difficult to carry out the needed security sector reform process. This reform has been postponed for so long that the intensity, urgency and complexity of the longstanding difficulties facing the country have only been exacerbated. The problems are numerous, including the politicisation of the security apparatus and the military in particular, with the monopoly held by the executive (in fact, the president); the emergence of terrorist activities; organised crime; drug trafficking; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; systematic human rights violations and endemic corruption. The most pernicious of these problems is no doubt the degeneration of one of the main components of the security sector: the military.
A ‘quite republican’ military?
During the transition, the head of the military junta had declared on Radio France International on 22nd November 2005 that the Mauritanian military was and would always be, ‘quite republican’ and that it was only concerned about proper management of the affairs of Mauritania. He tried to be reassuring and indicated that the future democratically elected president, would have nothing to fear from the military as long as he ‘managed Mauritania in the right way’ and for ‘all Mauritanians’. Without explaining what this ‘right way’ was, Colonel Ould Mohamed Vall who at that time literally embodied the armed security forces, also made it clear that this was the ‘only condition that needed to be fulfilled’ for the military to remain out of politics in the future. The political class, which still hoped that the end of the long execrated Ould Taya regime would lead to the start of a truly democratic era, did not seem to grasp the true meaning of his words. In reality, the military had positioned themselves to continue to cast a long shadow over the political system, even after the transfer of power to civilians following a transition that had been carried out largely according to their wishes.22 Contrary to the statement made by Colonel Ould Mohamed Vall, the Mauritanian military has long ceased to be the republican military that it was supposed to be when it was created ex nihilo at the same time as the state of
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Mauritania. Already during the first years of the republic, inspired by Guinea’s experience of a ‘people's army’, president Moctar Ould Daddah had imposed the model of a military that would be used as a political instrument, because it was made up of ‘militants in uniform’ in the service of development. This was the beginning of a process of politicisation that would only worsen through the grave ethnic and ‘racial’ incidents that rocked Mauritania in 1966. During this crisis, the first serious threat to his regime, Ould Daddah granted ‘full powers’ to restore order in Nouakchott to Captain Ould Saleck, by decree n° 66.028 of 10 February 1966. This showed that the politicisation of the military could lead to a takeover of power. This is what happened on 10 July 1978 after the disastrous episode of the war in Western Sahara during which, through the systematic plundering of the former Spanish colony, several officers and soldiers of the rank and file became fabulously rich and acquired a taste for luxury. Even under the best of circumstances, when the military exercises power, it generally leads to a breakdown of any attempt at professionalism or desire to respect the apolitical and republican nature of the military. In Mauritania, not only was political activity and the society in general militarised, but the coup led to a succession of coup attempts and counter coups, the most bloody of which occurred on 16 March 1981 and 6 June 2003 and which failed. These have often been the result of underlying ideological, identity and political rivalries which oppose many small groupings, for the most part Arab nationalists of all schools of thought. Like in other parts of Africa, the military regime led to the emergence of a military elite that rapidly grew wealthy through its control of state institutions and became more concerned about preserving its wealth, extending its influence and remaining in power than ensuring compliance with discipline and professionalism or maintaining the republican nature of the military. In fact, under the Ould Taya regime, the largesse granted to officers was the price paid for the strong determination to maintain close control over the security apparatus by increasingly concentrating its management in the hands of the presidency of the republic.
Security controlled by the regime
The presidential monopoly over all areas of security must be broken by democratising security management and oversight. In practice this means involving other actors such as parliament and civil society, but this will only be possible after a revision of the concept of security as it has existed this far and which has been limited to ensuring the security of the head of state and
Mauritania 167 his regime. Ever since the regime converted from a military to a civilian status in 1992, the tradition of systematically entrusting the ministry of defence to a loyal and dedicated civilian has once again been applied in the country. Nevertheless, it is well-known that the real powers of decision remain within the hands of the president and none other. The Mauritanian political system is a very strong presidential regime, which gives a predominant role to the president of the republic as commander in chief of the armed forces. However, security has also become ‘presidential’ so to speak, mainly as a result of the politicisation of the security forces and their own tendency to intervene, which represents a risk for the president of the republic (who took over power by force of arms himself). This is the proof of the attention that the president accords to the military and its corporatist interests, in particular those of senior officers, some of whom need to be reassured and protected. Indeed many of them were accused of participating in the ethnic cleansing within the different corps during which more than 500 black Mauritanian soldiers of all ranks were killed under horrible circumstances.23 This number is exceptionally high, considering the numbers of the Mauritanian military at the time and especially the non-Arab component. The military also played a role during the period of exception in the River valley, as well as during the 1989-1991 crisis between the Senegalese and Mauritanian governments when tens of thousands of black Mauritanians were humiliated and deported. The military had then ceased to be ‘apolitical’, ‘republican’, or even ‘national’ in nature. In the political jargon of Mauritania, these events continue to be described as the ‘humanitarian deficit’ of the Ould Taya regime. They significantly complicated the chances of normalising political activity and overhauling the armed forces.24 More recently, after the 6 August 2008 coup d'état, this deficit was worsened further when the new military regime had to repress the political forces that opposed its takeover of power by organising demonstrations and other acts of insubordination. For a long time now, the security services have been accused of systematically using torture.25 The frequent beating, humiliation, extortion and illegal imprisonment of Mauritanian citizens (generally black citizens) and citizens of sub-Saharan African countries, demonstrate that the armed forces and in particular the police have very little respect for individual rights, especially when such individuals have no social or political support. The renewed use of torture and maltreatment was confirmed by the president of the Bar Association of Mauritania in his recent report.
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Absence of human security
The protection offered by the state of Mauritania to its citizens has always been quite limited. Recently, human rights defence organisations protested about the degrading treatment meted out to sub-Saharan African aspiring emigrants in the internment camps of Nouadhibou.26 This coastal town has become the hub for illegal attempts to travel to Europe on makeshift vessels. The other components of the security sector also suffer from the same dysfunctions, as well as the excessive concentration of resources on the security of the head of state and his entourage. The coups d'état in 2005 and 2008 did not change much about this situation. On the contrary, the disastrous management of the security sector by a hard pressed Ould Taya, following the bloody coup attempt in June 2003, made the sector appear as a multipurpose political instrument rather than the professional, republican and apolitical apparatus described by Colonel Ould Mohamed Vall. There is no need to recall that this attempted coup was led by an officer who had been dismissed from the army.
Terrorism and crime
Terrorism represents another challenge. This is demonstrated by the three violent attacks on military patrols and outposts in the northern part of the country,27 the assassination of French tourists in the South at the end of 2007, the murder of an American in June 2009, as well as the attack against the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott at the beginning of 2008. In addition to this, all sorts of criminal activities are taking place. The abovementioned attacks are presumed to be the work of the GSPC, now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is active in the Sahelo-Saharan region where it carries out other illicit activities: kidnappings and trafficking in weapons and other goods such as contraband cigarettes. This vast desert area, which is shared by several neighbouring countries, is extremely difficult to control. It is also the theatre of armed rebellions in Mali and in Niger that have recently been revived by demands related to cultural identity and socio-economic factors. The activities of these groups seriously threaten stability in Mauritania. In recent years the country, like other countries in the sub-region has become a major transit point for drugs destined for Europe.28 So far, the national armed and security forces have been incapable of dealing with this situation. Their inertia is rather conspicuous, as was the case during the three attacks mentioned above. The only reaction by Ould Taya before his
Mauritania 169 overthrow was to adopt a constantly changing stance. His ‘counter-terrorist’ decisions appeared to demonstrate more of a desire to make the greatest use of the terrorist threat, for example by assimilating the political opposition (in particular, the moderate Islamist movement) to a terrorist threat.29 Under pressure from the international community, which was demanding a reestablishment of constitutional order, the leaders of the 6 August 2008 putsch also seemed determined to place themselves in the good graces of Washington by participating in the global war on terror in a region considered by the Bush administration to be of great strategic importance.
Conclusion
This description of the security sector in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania demonstrates that the evident dysfunctions are the logical outcome of over 30 years of disastrous management and political and ethnic manipulation of the sector. The fact that the security apparatus was used as a tool to maintain the military regime and indeed a single man in place, has had disastrous effects. These consequences appear very clearly today in the form of massive human rights violations; lack of representativeness of the armed forces and an absence of professionalism on the part of the officer corps. They also highlight the failed transition that followed the 2005 coup d'état and the stalemate caused by the return to power of the same people who had organised the putsch in 2008, thus exacerbating the numerous problems that the security sector and the political system as a whole must face: dysfunctional civil military relations, the ‘humanitarian deficit’ and terrorism. Against this backdrop, solutions have to be found and recommendations formulated. Quite obviously, the country missed a wonderful opportunity to reform its security sector at little cost after the 3 August 2005 coup d'état, which was considered redemptive. Another opportunity was no doubt missed when the democratically elected president Ould Cheikh Abdallahi took over power in April 2007.30 However, more than ever before Mauritania needs to totally overhaul its security system. All stakeholders have a role to play, but before that, the crisis sparked by the overthrow of the democratically elected president will have to be resolved. This requires the reestablishment of constitutional legality, thus signifying ipso facto the reversal of the putsch and marking the start of a new era in civil military relations in the country (and in fact in Africa as a whole).
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As long as this crisis is not resolved by applying the principle of subordination of the security apparatus to the democratically elected civilian authority, coups d'état will remain a possible form of political action and another opportunity to finally eliminate this kind of act (or at least strongly reduce the probability) will once more have been missed. This nth coup d'état had to fail, before any serious security sector reform could be envisaged. If the junta had managed to remain in power, this would have spelled the end of any reform for a long time. Even though it has been possible, through political agreements negotiated with the aid of the international community, to organise consensual elections (in part marking the failure of the coup), any regime that emerges from these elections will have to overcome the same obstacles, which have been aggravated by the crisis. The reestablishment of constitutional order provided another opportunity to deal with this issue diligently. The following measures should have been taken immediately: retire all those who have been involved in putsches automatically and dissolve the BASEP or at least reorganise it entirely and make it more professional, while finding the means to prevent its command structure from becoming as powerful as in the past. Subsequently, a methodical process of reorganising the security sector would have had to be undertaken, starting with a systematic review of all the security threats facing Mauritania, based on a redefinition of the very concept of security, the participation of national actors other than the presidency and increased transparency. Because of the role played by the BASEP in the last putsch, political negotiations had often stumbled over the insistent demand of opponents to the coup that measures must be taken to ensure that the battalion would never be able to act again. There is no doubt that after the elections of 18 July 2009, this issue is still on the table. In the final analysis, the armed and security forces will have to be transformed into truly national forces. They ceased to be ‘national’ after the ethnic cleansing of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which recently became tribal and regional, in particular, due to the policy of deliberate exclusion following the attempted coup in 2003 for which the Moorish tribes in the eastern part of the country were blamed. These forces, both officers and rank and file, must be entirely restructured and given theoretical and practical training to truly serve Mauritania once it has finally established a democratic system and turned its back on the practices of past regimes. A code of conduct for the armed and security forces should be drafted to symbolise the new way of conceiving their role within such a political system. Of course, this applies to other components of the security sector as well, in particular
Mauritania 171 the national police force and the customs service. They also need to be reformed to better represent the population. Training and restructuring of the armed and security forces, in particular the police, must focus strongly on a scrupulous respect of human rights. A specific code of conduct should be drafted and broadly disseminated for these corps on the basis of the models from certain African countries, dealing explicitly with the issue of corruption so that it becomes an offence that is easy to prove. The Mauritanian parliament will have a leading role to play in these reforms through the powers conferred upon it by the constitution and by law. Since the situation in the security sector cannot be dissociated from the grave infringements of human rights in past years, the parliament should start by abrogating law 93-23 of 14 June 1993, which prohibits any investigation or legal action related to the events that took place between 1989 and 1992. Given the role played by civil society in the area of human rights and the control of impunity, it is also important to establish a close link between parliament and civil society organisations. The need for collaboration to bring about a culture of human rights within the armed and security forces can be a good starting point to launch the process of SSR. In a spirit of reconciliation, but also as a duty to memory and state accountability, parliament will have to carry out investigations, following the example of countries that have experienced similar situations. This will also help to explain the need for reforming the armed and security forces as a whole, because if SSR has not been accomplished so far, it is also because the main stakeholders did not understand the justification for undertaking such reform. Also, members of the parliamentary standing committee on defence and security should undertake to build their capacities with the help of external partners in order to play their role fully in controlling the security sector. Such capacity building should take the form of material and financial assistance, but also intensive training workshops and seminars. These can serve as points of entry for external partners who wish to make a contribution to SSR in Mauritania. So far, civil society associations and groups have contributed quite well to fighting against impunity and protecting human rights and in doing so have paid a heavy price. Nevertheless, like parliament and all other actors who could legitimately have claimed a role in security sector governance, civil society organisations failed to demand this role and sacrificed it to the executive power through the generalised trend of deferring to the latter. This collective abdication of responsibility is one of the reasons why the security sector now finds itself in the present situation. Civil society organisations will have to be educated and informed in order to make them understand the
172 Boubacar N’Diaye role they can play in security sector management. External partners can also participate significantly in empowering Mauritanian civil society. Finally, external partners also have an extremely important role to play, even though some of them have been accused of having assisted and supported those who organised the August 2008 putsch in their efforts to impose their coup as a fait accompli. They contributed to restoring constitutional order, that is, the defeat of the 6 August 2008 putsch and will do so even more by supporting a hopefully democratic regime that emerges from the elections. Without the aforementioned defeat, it would have been illusory to speak of SSR, since the concept of the military as the ‘ultimate repositories of national legitimacy’ will still have held sway. On the other hand, the reestablishment of constitutional legality will make SSR possible, or maybe inevitable, with improved chances of success. The donor community, especially France because of its historic links, must insist in a coordinated manner for priority to be given to SSR. Its financial assistance to the democratic regime must be linked to the launch and strict implementation of a reform plan for the different military corps and the police. The first step towards a series of short and long-term reforms should be the holding of an estates general of the armed and security forces as soon as possible after a return of constitutional legality. A road map should be adopted to guide these reforms, based on as broad a consensus as possible. External partners should provide financial support in the implementation of the various stages of this road map, which should of course also include the vital issue of terrorism. This could be the obvious and legitimate point of entry for involving the international community in the SSR that must necessarily accompany the country’s democratisation. After all, the international community has been involved in this democratisation process since 2005 and the end of the Ould Taya dictatorship that marked the start of the process.
Epilogue
More than a year has passed since this chapter was first written. Since then, the international community and a large part of the political opposition who fought with determination against the coup d’état of 6 August 2008, consider Mauritania as having returned to ‘constitutional normalcy’ since the elections that took place on 18 July 2009. However, the fact that the instigator and principal beneficiary of the coup, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, is now the President of the Republic suggests that in reality, the
Mauritania 173 coup d’état was a success. With the support of the security apparatus, which he made sure to leave in control of the state after his ‘resignation’ from the army, as well as the complicity of certain members of the international community, he managed to be re-elected in the first round with 52% of the votes.31 This development suggests that the perception of the dominant role of the army within the political system and society has prevailed. This also means that a thorough reform of the security sector which would assure its oversight through democratically elected civilian authorities, as well as the institutionalisation of democratic control and accountability, will not be undertaken as long as Ould Abdel Aziz is in power. The exacerbation of the terrorist threat posed by AQIM and the decision by Ould Abdel Aziz, supported by France, to counter it by military means, including by attacking AQIM’s bases in Mali, suggest that the threat of terrorist attacks, although real, is being used to avoid engaging in any true reform of the security sector in Mauritania. The dysfunctions described in this chapter are certainly not going to disappear by themselves.
Notes
1 It must be indicated that the terms ‘armed and security forces’, ‘military’, and ‘army’ will be used as synonyms designating the whole of the national security apparatus or system. 2 See Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Variation sur l’usage du coup d’Etat en Mauritanie, Le Monde-Diplomatique, no. 620 (November 2005): 8-9. 3 See Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and democracy, or just another coup?’ African Affairs 105, no. 420 (July 2006): 421-441. 4 Daniel Zisenwine, ‘Mauritania’s Democratic Transition: A Regional Model for Political Reform?’ The Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 4 (2007): 481-499. 5 These are the 1999 Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2000 Lome Declaration on a Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, adopted in 2002, and the 2003 Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. 6 The military movement that was engaged in an armed struggle to obtain the independence of the territory, a former Portuguese colony. 7 Moctar Ould Daddah, La Mauritanie contre vents et marées (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 19. 8 Anthony Pazzanita, ‘Mauritania’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Protection’, Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 2, (1992): 288-300. 9 After their failed attempt, the leaders of the June 2003 aborted coup d’état established a clandestine armed movement, the Cavaliers du changement, whose objective was to overthrow the Ould Taya government by force. 10 The army, which had been the initiator of the attempted coup in June 2003, as well as the other corps, were deprived of the material resources they needed to function and
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prevented from engaging in training manoeuvres. Access to weapons for example, was also closely monitored. 11 Anonymous and Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania’, in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa, eds. Alan Bryden et al., 205-223 (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008). 12 See Military Balance 2009. 13 Mr. Isselmou Ould Abdel Kadr did so during a television broadcast. As a result, the military regime charged him with ‘attempting to undermine army morale and lying’. 14 Mounir B., ‘Coup d’Etat en Mauritanie: Le Mossad, le GSPC et Ould Taya’, Le Quotidien d’Oran, 4 August 2005. Available at: http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/mil/mauritanie.htm 15 See for example Giorgio Blundo ‘‘Graisser la Barbe’, Mécanismes et logiques de la corruption en Mauritanie’, commissioned by the European Union Representation in Mauritania, February 2007 (unpublished version). 16 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008 (London: Routledge, 2008), 254-255. 17 CIA Factbook. 2008. Accessible at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/mr.html 18 For example, the standing committees failed to take the opportunity to participate with their franchophone colleagues in the workshops offered free of charge by the African Security Sector Network (an NGO specialising in security sector governance issues) in July and August 2008. 19 Ahmed Salem Bouhoubeyni, ‘Rapport mensuel du Bâtonnier sur l’État de la justice,’ May 2009. Available at: http://www.ufpweb.org/fr/spip.php?article2278 20 See Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘The Effect of Mauritania’s ‘Human Rights deficit: The Case against ‘To Forgive and Forget’’ African Journal of Policy Studies 8, no. 1 (2003): 17-35. 21 See International Crisis Group, ‘L’islamisme en Afrique du Nord IV : Contestation islamiste en Mauritanie: Menace ou bouc émissaire?’ Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord, no. 41, (Le Caire/Bruxelles, 11 May 2005). See also Abdoulaye Diagana, Aboubakr Ould Maroini, and Abdel Nasser Ould Yessa, ‘Impasse politique et réflexes sécuritaires en Mauritanie. Comment fabriquer du terrorisme utile’, (July 2005). See also Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Au bout de la transition, une démocratie sous tutelle militaire?’ Unpublished essay. Contribution to the on-going debate on the military transition in Mauritania. 23 See Human Rights Watch/Africa, ‘Mauritania’s Campaign of Terror: State Sponsored Repression of Black Africans’, (New York, 1994); Mahamadou Sy, L’Enfer d’Inal (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998). 24 N’Diaye, The Effect of Mauritania’s ‘Human Rights deficit’, 2003. 25 In 2001, Captain Ely Ould Dah was arrested and charged by a court in France for acts of torture against his black brothers in arms in the Mauritanian army. He escaped and was sentenced in absentia, setting off a serious crisis between Mauritania and France. More recently, a commissioner, Head of State Security under Ould Taya, was also charged in France after a Franco-Mauritanian academic who was at the time the leader of a clandestine opposition organisation lodged a complaint against him for acts of torture. 26 See Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: ‘Nobody wants to have anything to do with us: Arrests and collective expulsions of migrants denied entry into Europe’’. AI Index: AFR 38/001/2008 (London, 1 July 2008). See also Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: Torture at the heart of the state’. AI Index: AFR 38/0092008 (London, December 2008). Both
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reports are available at: www.amnesty.org 27 These attacks took place in April 2005 in Leigheity, in June 2006 in El Ghallaouya, and in August 2008 in Tourine. There was also an attack on four French tourists on 24 December 2007, not far from Boghe. 28 In 2004, a spectacular seizure of a large quantity of drugs at the airport at Nouadhibou, the economic capital of the country, made headlines. Popular rumour has it that the various security services, such as the police and customs were involved in this trafficking as it would be impossible without the complicity of their highest authorities. 29 Diagana and his colleagues concluded emphatically that ‘the Mauritanian regime, either through its political police or through influential smugglers, is attempting to create or spark off terrorist acts on its territory’ in order to ‘legitimise a posteriori the 2003 text governing control of mosques and justify today, the new ‘counterterrorist law’ that limits the few liberties that exist in an environment that is already affected by State terror’ (see EN. 13). 30 In November 2007, and again in February 2008, the author of this chapter sent a confidential memo to the democratically elected president, drawing his attention to the urgent need for security sector reform. The memo also warned him that neglecting this need could compromise his political project of establishing the rule of law, and included concrete proposals for starting the process. Even if his cabinet had ever acknowledged receipt of this memo, there is no way to be certain that Mr. Ould Cheikh Abdallahi ever personally read it. 31 During a visit to Nouakchott as a mediator for the African Union, Colonel Gaddafi openly declared himself in favour of maintaining General Ould Abdel Aziz as Head of State well before the Dakar Agreement. While the Mauritanian opposition to the coup and the Commission of the African Union both insisted on the strict application of the AU’s resolutions, which prohibits the instigators of coups from presenting themselves at elections held after the coup, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner suggested that the general should be allowed to present himself for election if he agreed to resign from the army 45 days before it was held.
Chapter 8
Niger
Anonymous
Introduction
On 18 February 2010 in Niger, a military junta overthrew the regime of President Mamadou Tandja, who was seeking – in violation of the constitution – to remain in power beyond his second term. The military regime suspended the constitution, and the country entered a period of transition whose stated purpose was to allow the drafting of a new constitution and the organisation of free and transparent elections. The junta, which took the name of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, declared that they were acting solely for the purpose of reinstating democracy. In spite of the significant progress made in democracy since 1990, this was the third coup d’état experienced by Niger in the last fifteen years. The current situation in Niger gives greater significance to any study of the issues involved in prospective security sector reform. As important as it is for the military transition to be successful, its political achievements will be even more important. The question is how are political leaders going to resolve the problem of chronic political instability and how do they intend to ‘confine’ the military to the barracks, eradicate the culture of coup d’états, and avoid having the military constantly play the role of arbiter of political and institutional affairs? Niger attained independence on 3 August 1960 and experienced a period of relative social stability until the time of the first coup d’état in 1974, which brought General Seyni Kountche to power. The military regime then became a single party (State Party) and remained in power until 1989. Beginning in 1989 with the wave of democratic renewal in francophone African countries, the National Conference organised in Niger in 1991 confiscated power from the State Party, conducted a two-year civilian transition, and organised free elections that entrenched a return to full- fledged democracy in 1993. Very quickly, however, in 1996, the elected
178 Anonymous president, Ousmane Mahamane, was overthrown in a coup d’état. The head of the junta, General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara remained in power after organising elections in 1998 whose credibility was generally questioned by the whole of the political class. In April 1999 General Maïnassara was killed during a coup d’état organised by the head of the presidential guard, Squadron Leader Daouda Mallam Wanké. The army stated that it was acting in the interest of democracy, and in the space of a short nine-month transition, free elections were organised. The newly elected president, Mamadou Tandja, head of the former State Party, the Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement, remained in power at the end of his second five-year term of office, in violation of the constitution, which limits the number of presidential terms to two. He was overthrown less than two months later on 18 February 2010. In Niger, coups d’états have always taken place in a situation of such political turmoil that they have often been welcomed, at least within the country. Thus, in 1974, the country had just been seriously affected by a major drought: in addition to the totalitarian shift of the First Republic, the country was experiencing a famine. The reigning party was setting itself up as a single party. Political parties were abolished and the main opposition party (the Union des Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie et le Progrès) had been persecuted and declared illegal. In 1996, the president’s party had just lost the majority in the National Assembly. The country was therefore experiencing a period of ‘political cohabitation’ during which the relations between the President and the new Prime Minister, a member of the new majority, had deteriorated to the point where the country found itself in a political stalemate. In 1999, General Maïnassara had created a political party following his coup d’état and wanted to hang on to power by organising rigged elections. Finally, in 2010, President Mamadou Tandja had attempted to remain in power beyond the constitutional limit of two terms, in spite of the disapproval of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court. This tradition of ‘redemptive’ coup d’états has imbued Nigerien officers with the sense that it is the de facto mission of the military to ‘rescue’ the population when the political class fails. In fact the military sees itself as more mature than the political class. Officers have demonstrated this maturity by bringing an end, since 2002, to the very frequent mutinies experienced in the 1990s. As a result, one can now expect a coup d’état whenever the country finds itself in a political impasse or simply in a complex political situation. This is of even greater concern as the situation is not completely stabilised: suspicion, internal divisions, and aspirations to stage a coup still persist within the military, while the political climate is
Niger 179 marked by poor governance and mismanagement that make the situation structurally volatile. At the same time as the political upheavals, Niger has also experienced a situation of chronic instability with waves of rebellions by the Tuareg (1991 to 1996; 2007 to 2009) and Toubou (1993 to 1996; 1998 to 2001) minorities in the north and the east of the country, respectively. Although a peace agreement has been signed with the rebels, the situation in the northern and eastern parts of Niger remains volatile, in particular with the establishment of various mining exploration and operating companies since 2009. These represent targets that could lead to renewed rebellions. The zone remains dangerous due to the presence of mines that were planted during the last armed rebellion. The ethnic rebellions in the north and the east of the country bring to light the issue of latent ethnic divisions, which translate into the ‘regionalist’ configuration of political parties. The issue of ethnicity has insidiously led to the development of a system of ‘weighing the ethnic balance’ through the attribution of positions of responsibility in all administrative services to avoid this reality that constantly resurges in public political debate. In Niger it is euphemistically called ‘ethnic dosing’.1 In the vast southern and desert regions that share borders from the east to the west with Chad, Libya, Algeria, and Mali, the already unstable domestic situation is further undermined by the resurgence of acts of armed banditry perpetrated by former rebels who have converted to armed robbery, the persistence of illegal emigrants crossing the desert to travel to Europe through Algeria and Libya, and the emergence of various types of trafficking, in particular drugs. Due to poor surveillance of the zone, it has been dangerously easy for terrorist groups to settle in this area, especially the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, and more recently Al Qaida in the Maghreb, which has had a growing number of highly intense skirmishes with the Nigerien army. Finally, the strong demographic concentration in the southern strip of the country, the porous borders, and in particular the influence of the northern Nigerian Islamic states that apply Sharia law, as well as inadequate government means of control, pose a real threat of the development of small groups in favour of pro-Al Qaida fundamentalist movements. While the potential or real risks of external aggression are very low, domestic governance for its part remains a burning issue. It is characterised by embezzlement of public funds, illicit wealth acquisition, political discourse that focuses on ethnic divisions, social conflicts over the scarce arable land, rising urban and rural insecurity, inadequate public
180 Anonymous administration and social services, as well as poor political leadership, all of which make Niger a fragile and unstable country. In the conclusion, a number of recommendations are made for measures that can move beyond these dynamics and lead to the introduction of sound security sector governance.
The security apparatus and security environment
The security apparatus comprises four forces, broken down into two categories: the first includes forces that have military status and are under the authority of the minister of national defence (The Niger Armed Forces (FAN) and the national gendarmerie). The second includes civilian security forces that fall under the authority of the minister in charge of internal security (the national police force and National Guard).
The armed forces
The FAN is made up of the army and the air force. It was established in 1960 and counts 12,000 members, about 2% of whom are women in administrative and support positions. The army is organised in eight defence zones that correspond to the eight administrative regions. It carries out the ‘traditional’ missions of defending the integrity of the national territory by deploying in battalions, companies, and outposts throughout the territory, including in the desert zones in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country. The air force was created in 1961. Its missions include territorial surveillance and support to army troops. It is 1,000-man strong, with no women at all.
National gendarmerie
The gendarmerie also falls under the responsibility of the ministry of national defence. There are 5,395 gendarmes, including about 200 women who for the most part are confined to administrative and subordinate positions. The gendarmerie is a force constituted to ensure law enforcement throughout the territory and in the armed forces. In particular, it is in charge of military police functions. Most importantly, however, it has exclusive responsibility for day-to-day police activities in rural areas.
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Up to 1993, the head of the gendarmerie corps received orders from the armed forces chief of staff. Today, the gendarmerie has an independent command structure (high command), which is directly under the authority of the minister in charge of national defence. The national gendarmerie is the only corps that is both a defence force and a security force.
National police force
The national police force was established in 1960 and comprises 8,500 members, 5% of whom are women. Unlike women in the armed forces, they are not restricted in any way with respect to employment and access to positions of responsibility. The national police force is deployed within urban and peri-urban centres, while rural areas are under the territorial authority of gendarmerie brigades.
The National Guard
The National Guard, which was first called the republican guard, then the national intervention and security force (FNIS), is a civilian force of 10,000 members, with 3% women. The National Guard is a substitute back-up force that is used by the administration to provide security to authorities and public buildings, as well as to maintain law and order. The National Guard is a fully autonomous force, which is always under the command of a senior army officer. According to the statute governing the National Guard, its members also have the attributions of a criminal police force, but due to lack of adequate training, they do not carry out these functions. Above all, the National Guard could not carry out such functions without encroaching upon areas of competence that are already attributed to the police and the gendarmerie. The case of the National Guard is rather specific and atypical: it is a civilian force whose staff have the same training as the military (same schools and qualifications) and which have highly varied missions ranging from protecting personalities and public buildings, to maintenance of law and order, and including strictly military style missions of controlling certain zones, and territorial defence.
Other arms-bearing forces
Alongside these law enforcement forces are two other uniformed corps whose members bear arms: the customs service and the water and forestry service.
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The national customs service is under the authority of the ministry of finance. The customs general directorate is made up of roughly 2,500 agents. For its part, the water and forestry department comprises about 2,000 agents. Unlike the other forces, customs and water and forestry agents enjoy the right to form trade unions. Customs and forestry agents are rarely involved in dealing with security issues. They may be called on strictly on a temporary basis and in specific regions, generally where there is an armed rebellion and where the region is covered by an administrative ‘caution’ measure, or following coup d’états, when they may participate locally in security patrols. They may also be mobilised in case of war, or to defend the national territory. In addition to their specialised training, they are given brief military training in the army or gendarmerie training centres, to enable them deal with armed threats such as rebel attacks, highway bandits, armed smugglers and poachers.
General organisation and responsibilities
The breakdown of responsibilities among the defence and security forces is clearly defined by the constitution and by law. These texts determine in particular how security is organised according to the specific and exceptional situations stipulated under the constitution (war, state of siege, state of emergency, alert). In such situations, all of the defence and security forces are placed under the control of the army. Under normal circumstances investigative police work is subject to the rules of the code of criminal procedure and carried out under the authority of the public prosecutor, while law and order fall under the responsibility of the (civilian) administrative authority. Decree n°66- 082/PRN of 9 March 1966 defines the rules relating to law and order, public security, and public protection. It specifies which forces are in charge of these missions, and which administrative authorities can call on them. This decree is supplemented by Ministerial Instruction n°42/PRN/MDN of 27 September 1966 on the participation of the armed forces (including the national gendarmerie) in public law and order operations. This text stipulates that for military forces to be involved in maintaining law and order there must be a written requisition from the administrative authority, specifically authorising the use of force and, if necessary, of arms. Units of the gendarmerie, the National Guard, and the national police force often operate together in maintaining law and order. The law however stipulates an order of intervention: the police and the National Guard are first category forces, while the gendarmerie and the FAN are respectively the
Niger 183 second and third category forces. They intervene progressively, only upon written request and only when the lower category forces are overwhelmed. This arrangement is aimed at avoiding ‘blunders’ by limiting the participation of the armed forces in maintaining public order and postponing their intervention as much as possible. The general arrangement of defence and security forces is quite consistent and functions well as a whole. However, the National Guard cannot carry out its investigative police duties without encroaching on the areas covered by the police and the gendarmerie. This could lead to conflicts of jurisdiction and exacerbate latent rivalries between the police, the National Guard, and the gendarmerie.
Internal oversight of defence and security forces
Oversight is the task of the inspectorate divisions of the various forces. Both the armed forces and the police have an inspectorate division, but the National Guard does not. The armed forces and gendarmerie inspectorate-general is under the direct authority of the minister in charge of national defence. The armed forces and gendarmerie inspector-general is a general officer who ranks above the military joint chief of staff and the gendarmerie high commander. In addition to checking internal malfunctions, the police inspectorate service (IGSP) is in charge of reviewing complaints lodged by people who have been victims of police abuse. It is worth noting that the attributions of the armed forces and the gendarmerie’s inspection services do not include reviewing complaints by individuals; they only deal with internal malfunctions. Although these attributions are limited, they truly act as a deterrent.
Militia and rebel forces
In spite of the armed rebellions that have flared up sporadically over the decades, and the self-defence militia that they have spawned, no rebel forces have been active in the country since 2009.2 In 1995, all the rebel groups in Niger joined hands with the aim of wielding greater influence in the prospective peace negotiations. The agreements were signed in several waves, and by 1998, all the Tuareg movements had signed a peace agreement with the government of Niger.3 Peace also came to neighbouring Mali around the same period. In both countries, the peace process was facilitated by Algeria, Libya, and Burkina Faso.
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In 2007, some former leaders of the 1990s Tuareg rebellion started a new rebellion in Niger. The return of an armed rebellion had already been foreshadowed by attacks waged between 2003 and 2005 by small groups that claimed to be part of the Front de libération de l’Aïr et de l’Azawagh. The Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) engaged in an armed struggle for two years. In June 2009, Aghaly Alambo’s MNJ was wracked by a wave of secessions that led to the creation of the Front Patriotique Nigérien led by Aklou Sidi Sidi, and the Front des Forces pour la Rectification headed by Rhissa Ag Boula and Mohamed Aoutchiki Kriska. These three movements negotiated together in all the agreements that were concluded under the auspices of Algeria, Burkina Faso, and especially Libya. The most recent Tuareg rebellion has led to grave concern about the real causes of this armed struggle. Indeed it would appear that many members of the MNJ who are strongly suspected to be involved in drug trafficking have launched this rebellion simply to increase the level of insecurity, which serves their purposes. The area has become a major transit point for drugs and emigrants headed to Europe. The region is also highly favoured by the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb terrorist group, which is seeking an inaccessible region to serve as their rear base and a reservoir of members. The Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali include a very strong transnational dimension: as the situations in both countries are closely linked, the negotiations must also take into account the regional perspective. The situation changes in tandem: each rebellion in one country leads to a twin rebel movement in the other country. Furthermore, the Tuareg rebellions have inspired the Toubou, a minority nomadic community found in Niger, Chad, and Libya to also take up arms. During the first wave of rebellions, the Nigerien government encouraged and support the creation of ‘self-defence militia’ in the Arab communities. The largest of these militia, the Comité de Vigilance de Tassara (CVT) fought alongside the regular army, which provided it with logistical support. Other Peulh militia have also been set up to the west of Niger to combat the Toubou rebels. The multiplicity of rebel groups combined with the establishment of these self-defence committees have contributed to weapons proliferation in the region, and continued armed banditry on the part of the ex-rebels. The issue of reintegrating ex-combatants is a vital one. In spite of the fact that a high commission on re-establishing peace has been set up for this purpose, one of the demands of the MNJ has been precisely for the effective
Niger 185 and fair implementation of the agreements signed between 1995 and 1998. The basic problem seems to be the lack of resources to finance the redeployment of former combatants. Nevertheless, the question still remains as to the possible resurgence of rebel groups in Niger. Is this a consequence of poor governance and inequalities among Niger’s regions and ethnic groups, or is it a demonstration of the authorities’ structural inability to create a framework for integrating minorities? Quite obviously, where Niger is concerned, there is a clear link between poor governance, the democratic deficit, and resorting to armed struggle.
Security sector performance
Neither the police nor the gendarmerie has been able to set up a system that provides an adequate response to the threats that jeopardise the security of individuals. These threats include armed robberies, in particular on the country’s highways; juvenile delinquency; drug consumption and trafficking; sexual and domestic violence, etc. In particular, striving to prevent Islamist terrorist groups from infiltrating the territory remains a major challenge. Sporadic successes cannot hide the many deaths from within the ranks of the armed forces caused by these confrontations. Objectively, the Nigerien military does not have the logistical capacity required to effectively control the vast desert areas in the north. The existence of these armed rebellions has had a strong impact on the capacities and objectives of the defence and security forces, especially locally. Activities are definitely geared towards force protection rather than providing security to individuals. Faced with attacks on their positions, vehicle thefts, and rebels planting mines, the priority of the defence and security forces has been to prepare and implement post facto responses to such phenomena. Beyond an inability to ensure the security of citizens, there are also instances in the field where forces exceed their mandate. This very often takes the form of wrongful or even illegal arrests carried out by the police force, the gendarmerie, and the National Guard; of people being held in custody beyond the legal period, and by harassment of travellers on the main roads and in urban centres. Very often such acts stem from a desire to make easy money. During the armed rebellions, and also during the military operations to pacify the rebel areas, the army carried out some illegal arrests and seizures of goods. The political excesses of unconstitutional and non democratic regimes also lead to arbitrary and illegal arrests.
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Generally, there are only isolated cases of abuse, which are usually sanctioned by the authorities or dealt with by the courts. The exception is when these acts are ordered by the existing political authority. Nevertheless, the defence and security forces do have a good knowledge of human rights and individual freedoms, which are generally observed, but not considered a priority. State security is indeed systematically considered to have priority over individual and private considerations.
Security sector management and oversight in Niger
Civilian oversight of the security sector
Niger has never enjoyed a truly democratic regime. As a result, it has no experience with the principle of ‘separation of powers’, without which it is not possible to envisage genuine democratic oversight. The regimes that succeeded each other up to 2010 all gave exorbitant powers and excessive importance to the executive branch, thus undermining the separation, balance, and mutual control of the various branches of power. Under the First Republic (1960-1974), the presidential regime inherited after the period of French colonisation gradually gave predominance to the president of the republic, to the detriment of all other institutions. The executive has always had far-reaching prerogatives with respect to security, while the legislative and judicial powers have failed to play their role as counter-balance, even during the various regimes that occupied power up to the coup on 18 February 2010. The executive power has over time developed a system of exclusive management of the security apparatus, in order to protect itself from the frequent coup d’états. This confirms a certain conception of power and security that makes the armed forces the symbol and the spearhead of the regime. Indeed the way in which public powers in the area of defence and security are organised is quite revealing: the president of the republic is the head of the executive branch, the guardian of territorial integrity, and also the head of the armed forces. He appoints the main officers in the military command, upon the proposal of the minister of defence and the high council on national defence. The high council on national defence is an advisory body chaired by the president. It was established by the 18 July 1999 constitution to assist the latter in the task of appointing officers to the military command. The council was set up with the aim of ensuring that civilian management of the military
Niger 187 institution did not become a source of conflict both between the military chiefs and the civilian authorities, and between political parties and those in charge of making appointments and granting promotions within the armed forces (head of state, prime minister, and minister of defence) The attributions of the ministers of defence and interior are clearly defined. In the area of defence, the prime minister plays a limited role, except with respect to decisions related to budget preparation and execution where the minister of finance also has real power over the defence and security forces.
Parliamentary oversight of the security sector
The oversight role of parliament in the area of defence and security was totally inexistent until 1991, but has grown since it was enshrined in the constitution of the Third Republic. Under the terms of this constitution, defence agreements must be ratified by parliament, whose authorisation is also required to declare war or dispatch troops abroad. It passes laws, including those on defence and security, as well as authorising allocations to the defence and security forces within the general government budget. The national assembly’s standing committee on defence and security may launch investigations and address written or oral questions to members of government, including the prime minister and/or the minister of defence, on general issues of defence and security policy, or on specific and targeted problems related to defence and security. However, even for parliament, security issues remain almost taboo; there is hardly ever any debate and the government does not submit any reports on the issue to parliament. The powers of the defence and security committee remain limited to examining the budget when the finance law is to be passed. Enquiry commissions do not carry out any investigations on defence and security matters as these are the prerogative of the head of state as commander in chief of the armed forces. Furthermore, the parliament typically has little capacity, due to the fact that a great number of its members are illiterate. The parliament has also lost credibility due to the scandal that broke out following the news that members had allocated themselves additional allowances at a time when most citizens were grappling with the high cost of living.
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Judicial oversight
The credibility of the Nigerien justice system has been seriously tarnished by the inequality of citizens before the law and by the grave and repeated malfunctions within the system. The judicial system is undermined by a lack of independence, corruption, and influence-peddling. It is not very accessible because it is physically remote from a population that finds it difficult to understand why its procedures are so slow and complex. The final report of the ‘Analysis and description of the general framework for the reform process and the programme of support to judicial reform (PARJ) in Niger’, which was drafted in 2003, highlighted the malfunctions in the judicial system in Niger. In particular, it condemned the lack of accessibility; its bias and cooption by the executive power. These points had been condemned even more severely by the 2002 annual report of the ANDDH, while the 2004-2005 report indicated that ‘most inter- community conflicts emerge or degenerate as a result of the non- enforcement or inadequate enforcement of court rulings’. Written law and customary law exist side by side in Niger’s legal system. Indeed, in 1962, the legislative power granted judges the liberty of applying either written or customary law, and if necessary, of deciding between different customs if ever there was a conflict, because customs are diverse, unwritten, and sometimes changing. Rulings by judges are just as unpredictable, due to the corruption and influence-peddling that sometimes guides such decisions. The plurality of laws makes it possible to use both sources of law jointly, alternatively, and/or successively and thus have the possibility of an almost infinite quantity of choices that may be applied according to what is at stake. Nevertheless, pre-eminence is given to written law and customary law only applies in civil cases. Although a judge may set aside custom, this can further enhance the feeling of confusion and the poor perception that a population that is largely illiterate and deeply attached to traditional values has of its judicial system. Extrajudicial methods of dispute settlement are used so often that in practice, tradition is the leading source of law in rural areas. This has quite significant consequences because issues related to family law (divorce, repudiation, inheritance) and land tenure often lead to particularly violent disputes. They are a leading source of antagonisms that can quickly find expression not only through individuals but, by solidarity, through communities as a whole. However, the rulings of the customary justice system are couched in such a way that they tend to foster a situation where religious rules are taken as customary rules. In this sense, the traditional system of justice opposes the establishment of the rule
Niger 189 of law because as long as ‘law’ and religion are seen as being the one and the same, no one can dispute the ‘rulings of justice’, since such an attitude would be considered an act of heresy. The system of justice in Niger lacks resources. There are not enough magistrates and clerks of court, and the material resources and infrastructure are pathetic. The geographical spread of courts and tribunals on the national territory is unsatisfactory. As a result, there is little control over the activities of the departments in charge of criminal investigations (police and gendarmerie). Nevertheless, criminal police activities are carried out under the management of the public prosecutor, under the supervision of the attorney general.4 In theory, magistrates may visit police stations and brigades of the gendarmerie to assess and sanction the behaviour and results achieved by officers of the Criminal Investigation Department (OPJ). Although field visits are quite rare, documentary reviews are carried out almost routinely. The prosecutors do have real authority over both police and gendarmerie OPJ, and the latter no longer dispute instructions from magistrates. In fact, magistrates are actively involved in training the OPJ. Police and gendarmerie units are quite clearly well spread out geographically on the national territory. The crime rate is low but is constantly increasing while the performance of investigative police units remains relatively poor as a result of the insufficient numbers of criminal investigation officers and lack of equipment (radio links, vehicles, specialised investigation equipment, etc.). In remote areas where there are no magistrates and few controls by supervisors, and also because lawyers are only found in the capital city, irregularities easily occur in police stations and brigades of the gendarmerie: non-compliance with the legal period of custody, and physical and moral abuse. There have however been remarkable changes in the right of detainees in Niger: in 2003, 2004, and 2007, the reform of the code of criminal procedure consolidated the rights of defendants by introducing significant measures to protect people in custody, in particular the right to a lawyer during the period of custody, and to a compulsory medical exam after an arrest.
Inadequate defence (lawyers)
Article 17 of the 9 August 2009 constitution stipulates that ‘any individual accused of an act or omission shall be presumed innocent until such time as their guilt shall be legally proven in a public trial during which all the
190 Anonymous guarantees required to ensure their defence freely shall be provided to them’. The law governing the code of criminal procedure also stipulates that in Niger individuals shall be ‘free to choose their defence and their counsel’.5 It also stipulates that persons held in custody are entitled to appoint a lawyer from the 24th hour of custody in a police station or a gendarmerie brigade. The right to a fair trial,6 that is, where independence and impartiality are guaranteed, including the freedom to choose one’s counsel, is enshrined in the constitution and in the laws of Niger. In practice, however, access to a defence is inadequate. There are very few lawyers in Niger, and 80% of them are found in the capital city. The majority of people do not have the means to pay for the services of a lawyer. Furthermore, although this is obligatory, the police and the gendarmerie do not always inform individuals of their right to defence.
The penitentiary system
There are 37 detention centres, including a high security prison, two vocational rehabilitation centres, and a correction centre for minors. There is no longer any distinction between ‘civilian prisons’ (for detainees) and ‘criminal camps’ (for condemned prisoners). All categories of individuals are held together, including minors and women, with hardly any separation among them. The facilities are obsolete and inadequate; they are in such a state of deterioration that for 22 of them there is no alternative but to demolish them. Prisons are highly overpopulated, the conditions of detention are deplorable, and detainees suffer from malnutrition and lack of health care. There are about 7,000 detainees in Niger, for a capacity of 2,500 prisoners. Detainees frequently escape. The prisons administration falls under the responsibility of the ministry of justice; management of prisons represents 40% of the ministry’s budget. Prisons guards are actually members of the National Guard who are neither specifically nor effectively trained to guard prisons. The ANDDH annual report for 2009 recommends the reactivation of prisons surveillance committees in order to guarantee satisfactory conditions of detention. Each penitentiary institution is supposed to have a surveillance committee.7 They are made up of the mayor of the commune as chairperson, the public prosecutor, the sector judge or deputy judge, and members of human rights associations and charity associations. Their mission is to supervise the facilities, the conditions of hygiene, the work of the detainees, the records, and the conduct of the prison staff.
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The military justice system
Since 2003, the legal system in Niger includes a military code of justice to control indiscipline and mutinies. This was prompted by a particularly serious mutiny in 2002. The military tribunal is made up of civilian judges and military assessors and has relatively limited jurisdiction in peacetime. It was initially feared that the military justice system would become a source of impunity for the military, but in fact the military justice system was finally criticised more for the exorbitant powers that the military code of justice confers on the minister in charge of national defence: the decision to prosecute, the right to close a case without prosecution, reduce a sentence or waive it, etc.
Public oversight
In Niger, issues of security sector governance are generally not discussed publicly. Defence and security issues are sensitive matters that are so shrouded in secrecy and confidentiality that it is commonly accepted that these can only be discussed publicly if the aim is to undermine cohesion and national security. Nigeriens generally still consider that it is dangerous to talk about defence and security matters, and it is not unusual for a room to empty when the discussion turns to security or ‘military matters’, for fear of reprisals. In spite of much progress in other areas, civil society has deliberately neglected security issues, which have become a sort of intellectual niche under government monopoly. Indeed, for civil society and political parties, concerns related to the defence and security forces are limited to the behaviour of their men and institutions with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. In fact in Niger, the concept of ‘security sector’ is not seen in its holistic sense. The terms used are ‘defence forces’ to describe the military, ‘security forces’ to designate those in charge of public security (gendarmerie, the police force, and the National Guard) and finally, more commonly, the ‘defence and security forces’ for all the military and paramilitary forces, including customs and forest rangers.
Associations and NGOs
Starting from the 1990s, associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have developed exponentially. They are governed on the one hand by the law on associations8 and on the other hand by a 1992 decree,9 which
192 Anonymous makes the distinction between associations and NGOs. The latter have all the characteristics of an association, but in addition they are required to sign a memorandum of understanding with government and be subject to control by the ministry of finance, which evaluates and monitors projects implemented by NGOs ‘whose vocation is to support development through social and/or economic activities’. The associations and NGOs that work specifically in the security sector are human rights associations, grouped together in two umbrella organisations, the Grouping of organisations for the protection of human rights and democracy (CODDHD) and the Nigerien network of development NGOs and human rights and democracy associations.10 The CODDHD has observer status with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It is also a member of the Inter-African Union for Human Rights. The group was founded in 2000 and comprises 26 associations and NGOs, including the ANDDH, which is the most active human rights organisation, working in partnership with many international NGOs and external partners. The ANDDH and the CODDHD, as well as most of the major human rights protection associations, provide legal assistance services to the population. Associations and NGOs have been instrumental in bringing about progress in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, through their sustained reporting, complaints, criticisms, and advocacy activities. These NGOs and associations are however financially dependent on grants from international organisations, and their inability to provide for their own needs is a serious handicap. Although this dependence places them in a situation of ‘neediness’ and thus makes them susceptible to be manipulated by the organisations or persons that provide them with the required funding, the NGOs and associations still remain relatively independent. They demonstrate a certain lucidity in understanding political developments and are honest in their struggle against human rights abuse and attempts to restrict fundamental freedoms.
The media
Ever since independence, the only press in Niger has been the public press. Private media only developed during the transition to democracy in 1991. The government media include a national radio station, the national television service, with two channels, and daily, weekly, and monthly publications entitled respectively Le Sahel, Sahel Dimanche, and Nigérama.
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Private media include four television stations and 32 radio stations, of which the most important are Anfani, R&M, Souda, Ténéré FM, Tambara FM, and Radio Saraounia. There are roughly fifty private newspapers that are published very sporadically. The first of these were Haské, Le Paon Africain, Le Démocrate, and the satirical newspaper Moustique. The most stable in terms of their publication are Alternative, Le Démocrate, Le Républicain, Anfani, Le Citoyen, le Témoin, Le Flic, l’Enquêteur, Le Témoin, La Roue de l’histoire, etc. Increasingly, newspapers are found on the Internet, in particular on sites for the diaspora, and some have their own internet sites. Finally, there are also about one hundred community radio stations that play a very valuable role in informing, educating, and raising awareness among rural populations. These community radio stations, which are organised in a network, RURANET, broadcast mainly in national languages on development issues and topics of local interest. They are financed by NGOs, United Nations agencies, and by various intergovernmental bodies. For many observers of political life in Niger, freedom of expression is demonstrated in the headlines of the private newspapers. These are tangible proof of the country’s vibrant democracy, in spite of some obstruction by the authorities and a few isolated cases where professionals have failed to comply with ethics and the principles of good conduct. Nevertheless, the media in Niger are faced with numerous problems that undermine press freedom. During the Fifth Republic, press freedom came under serious attack, with journalists being subjected to intimidation and arrest, as illustrated by the increased prosecution of newspapers, radio stations, and journalists. Many radio stations, including RFI, were suspended on several occasions. An additional weapon used by the regime to temper the criticisms of the free press was to subject them to tax adjustments. Where finances are concerned, with the exception of those media that have a partnership agreement with international radio stations or NGOs, the majority are unable to cover all their costs. Under such circumstances, the positions adopted by certain newspapers and radio stations are not always innocent. Indeed, faced with their economic uncertainties, certain media have given in to temptation and are known mockingly as the ‘bread and butter’ press. In addition, the political leanings of both journalists and owners of private media sometimes affect their objectivity and tarnish their credibility. The military junta that has been in power since February 2010 is probably the best advocate of press freedom in Niger. After re-opening the press centre, the military junta promoted the organisation of the Estates-
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General of the press in May 2010. The most significant achievement has been the subsequent decriminalisation of breach of press laws, in June 2010.
The weight of religious institutions
Religious institutions wield considerable influence in Niger, in particular in rural areas where people are often illiterate. The ideas that they relay are generally well accepted. In broad terms, people will accept or oppose decisions by the authorities according to the instruction of religious leaders. Although their influence is generally limited geographically to their respective communities and they are only interested in topics that affect their spheres of influence, religious leaders enjoy the deep respect of the population, and are remarkably able in mobilising the population. Because they are well established within society, and thanks to the networks they have built, they naturally play a significant role in raising public awareness and in conflict prevention and management. They play a major role informally in social and family conflicts: divorce and reconciliation, farming disputes, intercommunity and interreligious disputes, strikes and labour movements (workers, students), etc. The major concern relates to the growing Islamic fundamentalism in Niger and the physical, cultural, and religious closeness of states in the north of Niger where Sharia law is applied. There is also some concern about the sources of funding of Muslim associations, which are increasingly penetrated by the generosity and extremist ideologies of Saudi Wahhabis. In the northern part of the country, although the activities of the Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb group do cause concern, they do not mobilise the local population. However, with porous borders and strong migratory flows, Niger is highly exposed to the growing fundamentalist movements. The Christian communities, which are mainly made up of foreigners, are too few in number and spread out in too many different churches to make a difference nationally.
Academies and universities
There are very few academies and universities in Niger. There is only one major university, with branches in the hinterland, that provides two years of university education. There are no private universities, and the courses taught in many institutes, schools, or university-level training centres focus on technical and specialised training. Debate on the security sector is only of marginal interest to those in academia.
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On the other hand, the subject is of interest to students and researchers of the Niamey Abdoul Moumouni Dioffo University and the Ecole Nationale de l’Administration et de la Magistrature (ENAM). The University of Niamey, through its law, sociology, management, and philosophy faculties, and the ENAM where magistrates and civilian administrators are trained, could show an interest in issues of security sector governance. However they only do this piecemeal and in a limited way, as they have no knowledge of the holistic conception of the security sector. And yet these two entities would be the best entry point for introducing the concept of SSR to the country’s future senior officials. To promote the introduction of SSR in the university and the ENAM a number of international bodies (United Nations, AU, and ECOWAS) and NGOs could fund studies on topics of security sector governance and also provide study grants or prizes and awards. These incentives would be even more useful if they could also be extended to senior officials of the defence and security forces.
The concept of security sector reform and its application in Niger
Generally speaking, people are unfamiliar with the concept of SSR in Niger. Neither the public authorities nor security sector institutions are familiar with the holistic nature of security sector reform. The issue of reform in security sector institutions is seen as sector-specific and fragmented and short term. And yet the need for reform of security sector institutions has been clear since the Third Republic. However, changes have always been made sector by sector and in isolation. Reform in the 1990s was mainly related to reorganising the national gendarmerie, which at the time was under the authority of the armed forces chief of staff. The National Guard was then reformed in 1996, following the signing of the peace agreements with the Tuareg rebellion. The agreements included the establishment of special Sahara security units within which the ex-rebels were to be recruited. In April 2010, the National Guard, which until then had been called the FNIS, was given its current appellation. In 2003, an organisational audit of the armed forces and the gendarmerie was carried out, with a view to adapting the structure and mode of functioning of the military. Although the audit revealed a number of major malfunctions, recommendations only focused on the need to adopt a multi-annual military programming law. The advantage of this option was at least that it allowed for some visibility, transparency, and the possibility of control over military spending, which is
196 Anonymous now part of a five-year plan that is included in a single document approved by the parliament. It is however unfortunate that this audit did not lead to greater changes in the method of functioning of the armed forces, and in particular that it only covered those forces that are considered a military force (army and gendarmerie). Subsequently, the police force and the National Guard also initiated a process to draft a five-year programming law. Also, within the framework of the PARJ, the judicial system launched its own ambitious reform programme, including in particular the creation in 1999 of a professional prisons administration system, which has still to be established. Nevertheless, far from being a handicap, the multiplicity of isolated, sectoral reforms are rather an advantage, if a true SSR programme is ever implemented. Indeed, although reforms have been limited in scope they have nevertheless constituted significant progress in terms of efficiency and good governance and have thus produced a ‘transitional mutation’ effect. In addition, conducting the reforms has enabled these organisations to acquire experience in bringing about change, while at the same time demonstrating their ability to implement reform programmes. This learning experience will be useful in ensuring the successful implementation of a more ambitious, general reform programme. The emergence of the concept of SSR in Niger will be facilitated by the fact that these institutions are ready for change, and because the principles drafted by the United Nations have been endorsed by regional and sub regional organisations such as the African Union and ECOWAS. This convergence will make it easier to bring together the goodwill required within a credible and relevant framework. Where the military is concerned, standards can be disseminated very effectively within the general framework preparing contingents for deployment on peacekeeping missions or as part of establishing the standby force. They can also be disseminated through peacekeeping operations training centres in national schools with a regional dimension (ENVR), which have been developed within the framework of French military cooperation. The other components of the security sector can also be included in the training and awareness-raising sessions in the peacekeeping training centres or in the ENVR. The SSR concept nevertheless remains highly political and ideally must begin at the highest institutional level before reaching the operational level. This approach is even more political as issues of good governance, in particular in the area of defence and security, are sensitive and tend to be avoided. This is why there is a need to establish a forum for consultation to define a standardised framework for SSR, based on an African perspective.
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Ideally, this could be conducted by the African Union in consultation with the various sub-regional organisations, which would further strengthen the process of ownership. ECOWAS could play an important role as a forum for exchange of experience and a platform for debate on SSR. ECOWAS has already made significant progress in drafting democratic standards to govern the behaviour of member states, with the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security;11 the 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which in particular sets the standards for the responsible use of armed and security forces, and the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. Under article 72, member states are enjoined to ‘ensure the emergence and consolidation of, accountable, transparent, and participatory security systems in Member States’. In other words, member states of ECOWAS have undertaken to reform their security systems (sectors), with a view to regional harmonisation of security policies and arrangements. In addition to monitoring the transposition of these agreements within member states’ domestic systems, a binding surveillance mechanism needs to be put in place, but this remains a problem. In the domestic arena, the absence of a structured and permanent space for dialogue on issues related to SSR represents a handicap for the dissemination and assimilation of these standards. From time to time NGOs and associations, in particular the ANDDH, have organised seminars on the place and role of the military within the context of a democracy. The largest of these was the symposium on ‘Armed forces and democracy in Niger’, which was organised in 1999, and which led to the establishment of a committee to monitor the implementation of its recommendations. Due to lack of support, this monitoring committee was unable to become a permanent and stable framework for dialogue and research on issues related to the armed forces and democracy. It could, however, have been the most appropriate framework since it brought together politicians, the military, associations, and academics. Today, associations and NGOs are the only actors likely to serve as a framework for analysis of SSR, even though they have little knowledge of these areas. External assistance has an undeniably important role to play in Africa within the context of security sector governance. The experience acquired in designing and conducting SSR processes represents a platform for exchange and can help to save vital time. Nevertheless, situations may be different and when assistance comes from outside, it is no doubt necessary to keep in mind the fact that the circumstances and factors that contribute to success
198 Anonymous may vary. Past relations and mutual obligations between security institutions and citizens, as well as the conception of power and the place of citizens as individual rights-holders, are some of the key elements that can have a decisive impact on the nature and degree of change and on reform strategies. A very detailed analysis and assessment of the political and socio-cultural environment is essential to ensuring the relevance of reform strategies.
Challenges of security sector governance
While it may not appear absolutely necessary to review the respective roles of government, security sector institutions, and agents of democratic oversight (parliament, judicial system, general public, etc.), other challenges remain with respect to democratic security sector governance. These challenges relate first and foremost to eradicating the culture of coup d’états within the Nigerien armed forces; including non-state actors in the process of SSR, and depoliticising and establishing a formal framework for security sector reform. Other challenges arise in the more ‘operational’ areas: indiscipline within the armed forces, the problem of insecurity in the Northern desert area, and capacity building to control new threats facing the country (e.g. Moslem fundamentalism and terrorism, drug trafficking, and trafficking in human beings).
Eradicating the culture of coup d'états
In the light of the many coup d'états that Niger has experienced and the peculiar circumstances under which each of them took place, the fundamental issue in security sector governance is the recurring intervention of the armed forces on the political scene in times of serious political crisis. How can army officers be convinced to set aside the (deep-seated) conviction that they are invested with a mission to save the country and democracy in times of stalemate? What is the alternative to the armed forces? This is one of the issues that the political class must inevitably tackle. SSR in Niger certainly includes a political and management dimension that goes beyond the defence and security forces and relates closely to the efficiency of political leaders, because it appears that the reasons for these coup d'états is not so much a question of the force of arms as the shortcomings of the political class. Indeed, their proven inability to
Niger 199 manage these political crises is a cruel reminder of the fact that Niger still remains a deeply feudal country. In each instance, it is only by force and not by law or political consensus that a solution has been found. At the time of the most recent political crisis in 2009, the whole system of checks and balances functioned correctly. Parliament, the political parties, the judicial system, and civil society each played their role fully. They spoke out against the violation of the constitution by the president, but they did not have any real means to correct the situation, even with the mediation attempt by General Abdou Salami of Nigeria. Even the condemnation of the international community, from ECOWAS to the European Union did not have any real effect. It was only through the force of arms and thus a coup d'état that order was re-established. Quite obviously, in the absence of convincing arguments, the military has assigned to itself the more or less institutional role, if not in the minds of the Nigerien people, at least in that of officers, of ‘guardian of democracy and institutions’. This idea derives in large part from the fact that when full democracy was established from 1991, it did not include a strategy to depoliticise the army. Indeed, following the first coup d'état in 1974, the military was established on the political scene for fifteen years of a non-constitutional regime, marked by the domination of the ruling military junta. Then in 1988, following the death of General Seyni Kountche, Niger initiated a timid process of easing political tensions. The 1989 constitution in particular established the single party and enshrined and legitimised the political role of the national armed forces, which ‘being integrated in all sectors of public life... may hold political office in the same way as any other members of the national society’.12 The 26 December 1992 constitution was the fruit of protest against the military regime that led to the national conference and the transition towards total, pluralist democracy. It radically affirmed the principal of a total withdrawal of the armed forces from the political scene. Indeed, all the institutional arrangements of the Third Republic confirm this option: according to the terms of the Charter of political parties, members of the military and security forces are prohibited from carrying out political activities and holding political office, while the electoral code makes them ineligible for political office unless they resign from the forces. The military statute included the same prohibitions and recommended political, philosophical, and religious neutrality. Members of the military were also prohibited from making any oral or written statement without prior authorisation from the minister of defence. It is precisely at this time that a
200 Anonymous mechanism for depoliticising the army should have been designed and established. After the inception of democracy, the Niger Armed Forces intervened three times in political life organising three coup d'états in fifteen years, respectively in 1996, 1999, and most recently in February 2010.
The first coup d'état took place following a political stalemate in 1996, only three years after the elections that had consecrated the establishment of democracy; The second coup d'état took place in 1999, following non-democratic and highly disputed elections. The objective then was to re-establish democracy by organising a short transition of nine months, followed by free and transparent elections; Finally, the third coup d'état, in 2010, was organised following the autocratic shift of President Mamadou Tandja who had dissolved all oversight institutions (parliament, constitutional court) to ensure a third term of office for himself, beyond the two terms allowed by the constitution.
A review of the political circumstances surrounding the coup d'états leads to some disheartening conclusions about the democratisation process in Niger:
The apparent inability of the political class to ensure a sustainable democratic process; The omnipresent role of the military, which has appointed itself as the arbiter of the political game.
It is important to note that these coup d'états have always taken place in situations of political stalemate; the issue is not so much the force of arms as the weakness of the executive. The political class has been incapable of establishing a functioning conflict resolution and crisis management mechanism. In general terms, although remarkable democratic process has been achieved in Niger, the underlying question of democratic governance still demands a response. It is not so much the institutional arrangements as political practice that have caused the failure of the democratic process in Niger. The fact that the political class has failed to preserve the advances of the democratic process can be attributed to the inadequate political discourse and culture, the regional and the ethnic division of political parties, and the failure to ensure good governance within parties themselves. Under such
Niger 201 conditions, the intervention of the armed forces is seen as beneficial, and even salutary for the reestablishment of democracy. It can therefore be assumed that as long as the political classes have not truly found a means of managing power in such a way that crises do not necessarily lead to a stalemate, the military and coup d'états will remain a part of Niger's political landscape.
Developing a less politicised and ‘ethnic’ security sector
In Niger it is not possible to talk about the politicisation and ethnic organisation of the security sector without running the risk of an implosion of national cohesion. National debate has so far only focused on depoliticising public administration with the adoption of ordinance n°99-87 and decree n°99-466/PCRN/MFP/T/E of 22 November 1999, which carefully avoid the ethnic issue. But when one is familiar with the ethnic nature of political parties in Niger, it is clear that politicisation goes hand-in- hand with organisation along ethnic lines. In any case these texts, which make a distinction between political positions and technical positions, have never been applied. Any discussion of these or other issues such as corruption and influence peddling in security sector institutions will certainly be extremely delicate. Fortunately independent national commissions, associations, and NGOs, in particular the anticorruption association of Niger, Transparency International, and the ANDDH all publish reports on these issues, which could serve as an entry point to start the debate and which, in addition, are independent and credible instruments for assessing any future reforms.
Discipline within the defence and security forces
Between 1992 and 2002, eight mutinies were recorded in Niger. The first of these broke out on 25 February 1992 during the democratic transition that followed the holding of the sovereign national conference. The first demand of the mutineers was for payment of salary arrears as well as various allowances, and improvement of their living conditions. This first mutiny, which was called the ‘movement of the troops’, was quickly contained and resolved peacefully, thanks to the mobilisation of society who saw this as a strategy to destabilise the transitional authorities and the democratic process, but mainly thanks to the commitments made by the Prime Minister, Cheffou Amado, who organised the Estates General of the armed forces. This forum
202 Anonymous offered an opportunity to define the role and new status of the armed forces within the new democratic environment. The most serious mutiny was the one that started on 29 July 2002 in N’Goutry, in the extreme east of the country before extending to various garrisons. While the uprising in Niamey was quickly controlled, those in the Eastern part of the country did not end until 7 August 2002 leaving two dead, two injured, and 224 soldiers under arrest (224 according to government sources, 253 according to private press agencies).
Establishing a formal framework for security sector reform
There is a need for a formal framework bringing together security sector institutions and non-state actors (associations, NGOs, external partners, etc.) at policy level to disseminate the concept of SSR, carry out analyses, and make recommendations. This will make it possible to develop new relations among the different stakeholders and thus enable dialogue since, for many years, they have focused on their differences as a factor of opposition. This should be an independent, permanent framework managed by members of civil society, to guarantee its independence and sustainability because civil society members tend to be more stable than those from the political sector or public administration. Furthermore, NGOs and associations have amply demonstrated their involvement and their ability to defend the progress made in the area of human rights and individual security.
Including civil society in defence and security issues
This highly inclusive process raises the question of involving civil society in defence and security issues that are traditionally left (exclusively) up to the discretion of the head of state, the commander in chief of the armed forces. By doing so, the whole conception of power would be called into question. This approach does indeed call for a an in-depth paradigm shift with respect to security, by giving citizens and civil society a new role in designing and controlling the national security apparatus. Such a vision would appear eminently subversive and even seditious in the eyes of some of the institutional stakeholders, who are likely to resist the reform. It must be noted, indeed, that in the final analysis, SSR redistributes the cards between institutions and within institutions, as well as among the actors on the ground. It is therefore a clearly political process that the existing regime could see as having a destabilising effect, which could lead to some resistance. Only strong political will and careful awareness-raising can help
Niger 203 to improve relations over time and alleviate the tensions related to the cultural differences between the different camps.
Conclusion
Security sector reform in Niger is not aimed fundamentally at changing structures, but rather at resolving purely management issues. The mindsets of the people in charge of the administration and institutions need to be changed so that they effectively apply the laws and rules of administrative management, rigorously implement their respective mandates, and ensure that oversight bodies are effectively functional at all levels. There is also the question of the means available for their operation as most institutions lack the necessary resources to carry out their missions.
The priority issues to be addressed are as follows:
Establishing an inclusive national framework on security sector reform; Ensuring the independence of the judicial system; Designing mechanisms for including citizens and civil society at all levels in resolving security problems, and in drafting and implementing defence and security policies; Drafting a defence and security policy; Drafting and implementing a national policy to control corruption and nepotism, and depoliticise the security sector; Drafting a multi-year law for equipping security sector institutions.
Whatever measures are planned as part of the reform process, the most important aspect is the credibility of institutions and the confidence of citizens. Credibility depends on the ability of institutions to overhaul themselves and establish a transparent system of sanctions. The confidence of citizens depends mainly on the accountability of institutions and their members. To this end, a vast anti-corruption and anti-impunity programme is essential. A major refresher and training programme on institutional and individual accountability is required. Schools and training centres have a vital role to play and the latter could go further to develop joint (or converging) programmes, and even create joint regional schools similar to the national military schools with a regional dimension. With new
204 Anonymous communication technologies, it should be possible to design distance learning programmes for regional training courses, in particular for senior officials, or on specific topics such as human rights, child rights, etc. External actors can contribute significantly to the training structure by creating or renovating training centres, providing them with equipment, and supplying the telecommunication infrastructure required for the distance learning joint courses. In implementing the recommendations related to SSR, attention must be paid to ensuring their relevance. The risk is that they could be ‘oriented’ towards political ends or by greed, which could lead to unnecessary expenditure, or having infrastructure established in a given site purely on the basis of ethnic and regional considerations. Furthermore, the cost of reform must be reviewed in the light of the country’s financial capacity and its socio-economic difficulties, in order not to compromise investments in other sectors. For a country like Niger, SSR must not take precedence over the essential needs of a population that sometimes has to deploy considerable prowess simply to survive.
Notes
1 The population of Niger is estimated at 15.4 million inhabitants (Figures from the 2001 general population census), and comprises several ethnic groups: the Hausa (56%), Djerma (22%), Peulh (8%), Tuareg (4%), and the Kanuri, Toubou, Arabs and Gourmantche who make up between 2 and 3%. Growth rate is 3.7%. 95% of Nigeriens are Muslim, with a minority of Christians and practitioners of local ‘animist’ religions. 2 The successive rebellions that occurred in Niger starting from 1992 were mainly Tuareg movements. The Tuareg are a nomadic people spread across the northern parts of Niger and Mali, and the south of Algeria and Libya. Tuaregs are also found in the North of Burkina Faso. The Tuareg rebellions broke out in Mali soon after independence. 3 The 24 April 1995 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement; the 28 November 1997 Algiers Protocol, and the 21 August 1998 N’Djamena Peace Agreement. 4 Article of the Code of criminal procedure. 5 Article 3 of Law no. 2004-050 of 22 July 2004. 6 Article 17 of the 9 August 1999 Constitution. 7 Article 10 of Decree no. 99-368/PCRN/MJ/DH dated 3 September 1999. 8 Ordinance no. 84-06 of 1 March 1984 (amended by Law no. 91-006 of 20 May 1991 and Decree no. 84/49 of 1 March 1984). 9 Decree no. 92-292/PM/MF/P of 25 September 1992. 10 See www.roddadh.org 11 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, 10 December 1999. 12 Article 79 of the 24 September 1989 Constitution.
Chapter 9
Senegal
Niagale Bagayoko-Penone
Introduction
Senegal has long been seen as unique in West Africa for never having been subjected to the yoke of military rule. And yet, the country’s political history1 since acceding to independence in 1960 has not been without a certain number of upheavals. The Socialist party founded on the eve of independence by Leopold Sedar Senghor, the first Senegalese head of state, exercised power almost exclusively. In the first years after he became president in 1981,2 Abdou Diouf continued along the same lines as his predecessor, while gradually reducing the authoritarian manner in which power was wielded. Over the years, the government turned to the military to intervene during political conflicts. The military was sometimes suspected of conspiring to organise a putsch, but it always maintained a strictly republican posture.3 The political change in 2000 marked the arrival to power of the historical opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade and his opposition coalition ‘sopi’. Senegal has not been spared internal instability either: the conflict in Casamance, which opposes the separatist MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance) group to the central authorities has been destabilising the southern part of the country since 1982.4 While troops have been stationed permanently in Casamance, government has oscillated between a hard stance (Abdou Diouf opting for the repressive approach) and negotiation (the option preferred by Abdoulaye Wade). Whatever the approach adopted, however, the Senegalese authorities have always excluded any possibility of real autonomy for this province, a move which it felt would lead to the dismemberment of the country. The Casamance situation is far from being limited to the domestic political scene; it is also a question of foreign policy, as relations between Senegal and its neighbours the Gambia and Guinea Bissau are to a large extent determined by the confrontation with the MFDC.5 206 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone
With its highly effective diplomatic apparatus, the state of Senegal has managed to portray itself to the international community as a haven of peace, in spite of the conflict in Casamance, but also as a model of democracy despite the excesses that have been experienced to varying degrees under each of the three regimes that have governed the country since 1960. Even today, the country enjoys a positive image, despite a rather worrying deterioration in the political and institutional situation over the past few years. In the unanimous opinion of the Senegalese media, civil society representatives and the political opposition, President Abdoulaye Wade has indeed turned out to be ‘an autocrat dressed as a democrat’ who personalises the management of national affairs to the extreme, almost to the level of a personality cult. Currently, there is an authoritarian shift within the government, which could in the long-term compromise the undeniable progress that has been achieved in the area of security. Indeed, while certain components of the security system are increasingly governed according to the principles of professionalism and democratisation, within each sector, reform has been conducted in an isolated manner. The resulting dysfunctions illustrate the need to implement a holistic process of security sector reform (SSR). This chapter begins by describing the current situation of the Senegalese security sector before going on to examine the roles of the various actors in charge of its functioning. It then analyses the challenges to be met and proposes some recommendations in conclusion.
The security apparatus and its environment
With regard to the institution and its organisation, the Senegalese security apparatus, which was largely inherited from the colonial period, is very similar to its French counterpart. Security policy is defined by the president of the republic, who is in charge of the general and military management of defence, in line with article 45 of the constitution adopted by referendum on 7 January 2001. The Higher Council on Defence and the National Security Council, both under the authority of the President, are entrusted jointly with the management of defence and security issues. These bodies do not however have a predominant role in decision-making.
Senegal 207
The armed forces
The armed forces are under the authority of the minister of the armed forces who is currently a civilian, as has always been the tradition in the country.6 In reality, the role of the minister of defence (who does not have the rank of minister of state and is often limited to administrative functions and force support), appears to be secondary to that of the chief of joint military staff (CEMGA). Indeed, decisions are highly centralised in the hands of the CEMGA and the president, who work closely together. The current gendarmerie major commander also has a lot of influence with the head of state, in the same way as the chief of the private presidential staff. Two particularly important departments have been attached directly to the office of the CEMGA:
The Military Public Relations Department (DIRPA), which was established in 1993 and which is made up of three branches: media and strategy, audiovisual production and archives. This has become a highly developed department endowed with sophisticated resources, whose mission is to promote internal communication within the military and also to provide information to the public and the media.7 The Military Health Services Department, which is aimed at promoting and restoring the health of military personnel as well as their family members, within the framework of support to the armed forces. This department also renders a public service through its efforts to improve the health of the Senegalese population (medical care and consultations, medical evacuation, etc.) and to promote access of the general public to military hospitals, which are considered as the best equipped in the country.
The army, which was initially set up in 1960, represents the largest component of the armed forces with more than half of the total personnel. The Senegalese territory is divided into military zones that are often similar to the administrative constituencies. They are placed under the authority of a military commander who is in command of territorial combat and support units. The navy is made up of three corps: the naval operational group, the navy support group and the maritime and river surveillance group. It is in charge of the defence, protection and surveillance of maritime borders and also contributes to economic defence, in particular by participating in the protection of maritime resources (surveillance of fishery resources, pollution control). The air force for its part is made up of two divisions and, in 208 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone addition to its mission of protecting national air space and airport zones, is also expected to contribute to protecting fishery resources, as well as to search and rescue missions at sea. One major characteristic of the Senegalese armed forces is that since the beginning of the 1960s they have participated in a number of peace missions under the auspices of the United Nations, ECOWAS and the OAU/African Union.8 Today, the Senegalese military is contributing significantly to the integration of the Western Brigade of the African Union (AU) standby force, within the framework of ECOWAS. Furthermore, by tradition, each of the three armed forces has always been closely involved in socio-economic activities to support development.9 In the area of training, the armed forces have a number of schools and specialised training centres that provide training at different levels and in various areas of specialisation.10 Each year, officers and non-commissioned officers are recruited through competitive entrance exams to major military academies, either abroad or in Senegal. The rank and file are recruited on a voluntary basis through itinerant commissions that travel throughout the country.11 Military professions have only been open to women since 2007. Finally, the armed forces have a rather elaborate social service system under the joint army social high committee. In the eyes of the general population, as well as human rights organisations, the media, other public servants and even representatives of foreign partners, the Senegalese armed forces appear to be professional and eminently republican forces. The army has indeed been described as being well-educated, democratic, well run and close to the population and its interventions in humanitarian and development areas are unanimously recognised. The army acquired its reputation as a republican army during the December 1962 crisis and has constantly maintained it since. In spite of certain examples of favouritism, recruitment into the military seems to be quite well balanced and transparent. There is no ethnic imbalance in the composition of forces. Unlike most Francophone African armed forces, the Senegalese military since independence has always been a professional military because its operations have taken place both externally, within the framework of peace missions and domestically, in the Casamance region. This characteristic has been both a strength and a weakness; because they are constantly deployed, the forces are not sufficiently trained and peacekeeping operations require a high level of rotation of contingents and military leaders,12 thus mobilising the best staff officers. The staff of other nations and the administrations of multilateral organisations increasingly call upon the skills of Senegalese officers, while their absence increasingly affects Senegal 209 training programmes and organisation of the military within their own country.13 President Wade’s decision to grant the military the right to vote14 through a constitutional amendment led to sharp criticisms, both from civilians and the military. There are fears that this right might lead to the politicisation of the armed forces, which could bring about a breakdown of military discipline in the barracks and compromise the neutrality that the military has always demonstrated. President Wade has also been accused of seeking to win over the military for his own purposes by promoting officers to the rank of general.15 Some see these decisions as a way for the president to gain the favour of the military and thus its support.16 Others see this as a desire to prevent any coup attempts, following rumours in the press that two former military officers had attempted a coup d'état in July 2004.17 While the practice of rapid promotion within the military is quite unusual in the country, military officers have nevertheless always enjoyed a number of material advantages (such as cars and comfortable official housing) and are seen by some as benefiting from the widespread corruption.
National gendarmerie
The gendarmerie is under the authority of the gendarmerie major commander, who within the armed forces has the same rank and prerogatives as the CEMGA and is also in charge of military justice.18 The gendarmerie has four types of missions defined by decree n° 74-571 of 13 June 1974:
Police functions (administrative, criminal investigation and military): ensure public security through preventive and repressive measures; maintain law and order and protect individuals and their property; ensure observance of laws and regulations; National defence: provide continuous surveillance of the national territory; gather intelligence; in peacetime, participate in military exercises and manoeuvres; in wartime, participate in combat; Public service: protection of state institutions and high authorities; Participation in peacekeeping missions.19
Senegal is closely involved in the establishment of the Organisation of African Gendarmeries (OGA).20 This project, which was launched in 1999 and finally ratified in 2008 by 16 signatory countries, is aimed at establishing an institution similar to the European Gendarmerie Force. The objective of the OGA is to promote exchange of expertise among African 210 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone gendarmeries and in the long term to create information flows that will make it possible to manage transborder crime jointly and coordinate public security operations. The gendarmerie has always been close to the political power, which considers it as an institution that can be relied upon in times of serious upheavals. Before the change of power in 2000, the gendarmerie’s ‘Brigade Thiong’ was known for carrying out investigations of a political nature. This practice seems to have ceased. Today the gendarmerie is a highly respected and effective institution, both in controlling crime (which is, however, quite limited in Senegal) and in maintaining law and order. It is managed by top- quality officers and non-commissioned officers, although there are very few of them (42 officers for 5,700 gendarmes). The small numbers however highlight their efficiency. The numbers mobilised for the purposes of peacekeeping operations are sorely missed by the gendarmerie in seeking to effectively fulfil its mission of internal security. The gendarmerie is highly centralised around the major commander, which leads to administrative bottlenecks but does not necessarily make it possible to have effective control over activities carried out in the provinces by local commanders who sometimes act very independently.
The national and municipal police force
The history of the Senegalese police force has been more eventful than that of the armed forces. Indeed, in 1987, the police force was totally dismantled and all police officers were excluded from the public service.21 This collective dismissal created enormous social problems, as the personnel concerned found themselves without any resources or social benefits. To make up for the disappearance of the national police force, a municipal police force was established and together with the gendarmerie, it carried out most of the criminal investigation and law enforcement functions. Once the national police force was re-established in its role, there was some friction among these three police forces. It would appear however, that these have been overcome since then. Within the ministry of interior,22 the national police force is under the authority of the General Department of National Security (DGSN). The director general supervises the criminal investigation department, the department of public security, the department of air and border police, the territorial surveillance department, the department dealing with foreigners and travel documents and the national police academy and continuing professional training department. Other operational units are also directly Senegal 211 under his responsibility, namely, the drug control unit (in charge of centralising all cases of drug trafficking within the country), the intervention brigade, the brigade specialising in covert intelligence (in charge of controlling corruption) and the public relations office. At the local level, the central police stations are in charge of coordinating the activities of all the public security stations within each region, but central police stations do not currently have any organic links with the regional agencies in charge of intelligence. In order to do away with this isolation among the different hierarchies, regional directors are going to be appointed to head each of the police departments in the provinces. As part of this reform, the director general will become an inspector-general and the public relations office will be transformed into a department, just like the multipurpose intervention brigade. A major plan to modernise and equip the Senegalese police force was adopted for the period 2004-2010, with a budget of FCFA 23 billion. The national police force, which is made up of 5,000 men, is affected by its insufficient numbers and is also poorly distributed throughout the national territory. Some regions have only one police station in charge of public security.23 The staff composition became imbalanced when soldiers were integrated into the police force to participate in maintenance of law and order. Since they did not have training in crowd control, these individuals often lost control. The recent integration of members of the Calots bleus (see below), the Senegalese Democratic party’s (PDS) security contingent, which was created by Abdoulaye Wade, also disrupted the balance in personnel and the pyramid of ranks since these new recruits were automatically given officer status (captain or commanding officer). A more positive factor, however, is that women were admitted into the police force starting from 1982. The collaboration between the police and the gendarmerie seems rather satisfactory, with both corps leading many joint operations. Nevertheless, the image of the police is not as positive as that of the gendarmerie. The former’s relations with human rights organisations and the media are more tense and it is regularly accused by these bodies of using excessive force in repressing public demonstrations, abuse of power and beating people held in police custody. The opposition parties, journalists and human rights organisations have all spoken out against the emergence of a political police force, which never existed under the previous regime. One department in particular has been condemned; this is the Criminal Investigation Division (DIC), which replaced the famous Brigade Thiong and is now under the criminal investigation department. More and more frequently, the DIC arrests journalists, political leaders and businessmen and 212 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone interrogates them often well beyond the regulatory custody period, without any charges being brought against them. The police force is also sometimes reproached for taking too long to intervene, or being reluctant to venture into certain neighbourhoods at night. Just like in the military, political appointments to command positions in the police have increasingly been condemned, with the minister of interior often replacing the director general of national security and the directors of different departments. Also, it is very difficult for the police to investigate any members of the PDS. It is however acknowledged that when the police agree to get involved they are very efficient. Finally, we must note the existence of the municipal police services, which are under the responsibility of the local mayor. Due to a fall in recruitments, the role of this police service is diminishing. Indeed, some of its members have been integrated in the various units and departments of the DGSN.
The intelligence services
The intelligence services are attached to the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police force:
Within the military two departments, both under the authority of the CEMGA, are in charge of intelligence: the joint staff operations unit (equivalent to the Direction de Renseignement in France) and an office under the military security department; The gendarmerie intelligence service (Section de recherche) is officially under the authority of the territorial gendarmerie, but in reality it is attached de facto to the high command; Within the police force, the Direction de la surveillance du territoire and the Direction de la police aux frontières are in charge of intelligence.
The customs administration (attached to the ministry of finance) and the forestry department (under the ministry of environment), as well as staff working in the infrastructure sector (ministry of equipment and transport), also provide intelligence. In 2006, a decree was passed by the government of Senegal, establishing a department in charge of centralising security information from all the ministries: it is called the strategic orientation centre (COS) and began its activities in 2007 with staff from various security organs (police, military, Senegal 213 gendarmerie, the judiciary and diplomacy). The centre is under the direct responsibility of the presidency of the republic and replaces the national intelligence centre, which had been attached to the prime minister's office. This new institution is an analysis bureau with no operational mandate, but which provides advisory opinions. It is run by a director-general (currently a former bodyguard of President Abdoulaye Wade) and works in close collaboration with the intelligence services of the different ministries. Increasingly, intelligence activities are seen as a way of settling political accounts by reporting others, in particular within the PDS. In addition, there have been recent incidents opposing the COS to the gendarmerie’s Section de recherche, which contests the authority of the centre over its activities. Finally, the national assembly's standing committee on defence and security is supposed to supervise the activities of the intelligence services, but in reality, only the presidency has access to the work of the COS and other departments.
The prisons sector
In Senegal, prison guards are all civilians. They fall under the authority of the ministry of justice, but are trained by the police. The prison sector is affected by the gravest dysfunctions. Journalists and human rights organisations often complain about the difficulties they encounter in having access to prisons because of the cumbersome procedures.
Private agents
Before acceding to power, the PDS had set up a security service specially dedicated to protecting its head, Abdoulaye Wade. This service was made up of young supporters of Wade, known as the Calots bleus and was considered a veritable political militia. The Calots bleus were officially dissolved in 2000. Some of them joined the presidential security services, but most of them joined the police force. In 2007, violent confrontations (including brawls with bricks and machetes) opposed the henchmen of different political parties, including many former Calots bleus. Human rights organisations believe that these services and indeed the security services of other political parties, are still very active and they often condemn the fact that politicians use these violent elements to supervise their rallies. In addition, there are a large number of private security companies, often created by retired gendarmes or policemen. These companies (such as Sagam, Eagle, Phoenix Sécurité and Dakar Intérim) specialise in guard and 214 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone watch activities and are especially active in rich neighbourhoods. It is interesting to note that the most frequent complaints against them come from their own staff. Many of these employees contact human rights organisations to express their dissatisfaction with the low levels of remuneration, unjustified dismissals and the poor treatment they experience. A certain number of community initiatives also bear witness to the dysfunctions of the security system. Thus, some village communities in the countryside have set up self defence committees and surveillance brigades. These militias, which are set up by the population, are in charge of providing security to individuals and their property, in particular cattle. In cities, including Dakar, neighbourhood committees have also been established to make up for the long delays in intervention by the police force. In Casamance, in certain zones that have been deserted by the Senegalese administration, including the military, the population has also organised itself to deal with the criminal groups that control multiple areas with no presence of law enforcement. Some of these popular self-defence groups often use a summary form of justice: in Yoff and Ouakam for example, thieves caught red-handed are no longer taken to the police, but are placed in canoes by the neighbourhood committees and thrown into the sea. The authorities seem to remain very passive in the face of such practices.
The MFDC rebels and criminal groups in Casamance
The hardliners in the movement reject the peace agreement signed in 2004 between the MFDC and the Senegalese government.24 Members of the MFDC military branch called Atika (warrior in the Diola language) have been accused by human rights organisations of committing numerous acts of abuse, violations and exactions against civilians. Others complain about the inability of the Senegalese government to reinsert the demobilised members of the MFDC, even though the peace agreement included a number of provisions on this issue. Furthermore, given the multitude of links with drug traffickers operating from Guinea Bissau, the distinction between rebellion and banditry is becoming increasingly tenuous.
Senegal 215
Security sector management and oversight
Parliamentary oversight and supervision of the security sector
The 2001 constitution is not much different from previous constitutions, especially since a reform was adopted in 2008, which reinstated a bicameral parliament in Senegal, with a national assembly and a senate. Parliament does not have an exclusive monopoly for initiating laws, since the executive may also introduce draft bills under the terms of articles 67 and 76. In addition to the oral and written questions that parliamentarians may address to ministers in charge of defence and security under the terms of article 85, the assembly may also create standing committees to carry out investigations, as long as the facts under investigation are not already the object of legal proceedings. It may also set up ad hoc fact-finding missions, under the terms of articles 32, 45, 62 and 85. According to article 24 of the rules of procedure of the assembly, the committee on defence and security, which is made up of 30 members, is in charge of all issues related to national defence, preserving territorial integrity, international military cooperation, military and paramilitary establishments, armed forces civilian and military personnel, public security and safety, the gendarmerie and military justice. It is also in charge of drafting a report on the paragraphs of the finance law that are related to security issues, for submission to the finance standing committee. The police force submits weekly reports on the national security situation to this committee. It therefore has competence for examining all internal and external security issues and their budgetary aspects, both generally and in crosscutting terms. And yet, the assembly hardly uses all the prerogatives conferred upon it. For the moment, the current committee on defence has not carried out any fact-finding missions in the field.25 Its meetings are convened irregularly, when there is a draft bill to be voted, or when a member wishes to submit a draft bill. Its members have no specific competence in the area of security and have never introduced any legislation. Under the previous legislature, questions were put to the minister of defence only on three occasions and they only had access to the defence budget on two occasions. Parliament has also questioned the government several times about corruption in the police force and yet no legislation has been initiated to tackle this phenomenon. Recently, most of the debate has rather focused on the ratification of the ECOWAS Convention on the circulation of small arms and light weapons and the deployment of Senegalese soldiers in Darfur. On the latter point, it is important to note that the decision to deploy troops abroad is the sole responsibility of the executive. 216 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone
The current political situation in Senegal contributes to further reducing the role played by parliament in security sector oversight. In reality, as was the case under all previous regimes (except at the end of the Abdou Diouf regime), parliament remains under the sole control of the executive. It is indeed monochromatic now, with 113 seats out of 150 in the national assembly held by the PDS,26 because opposition parties boycotted the 2007 legislative elections in protest against the lack of transparency during the presidential election leading to the re-election of Abdoulaye Wade. Both the standing committee on finance and the committee on defence and security are therefore made up exclusively of members from the presidential majority and cannot be considered as a counterbalance to government. Indeed it appears that the parliamentarians who sit on these committees have a very positive view not only of the military and security forces, but also of the way in which the executive manages security issues: in particular they feel that they have no difficulty having access to the budget or in participating in its drafting. And yet opposition parties and the media regularly speak out against the opacity surrounding management of public funds and the drafting of the state budget. The executive often decides to reallocate funds by passing decrees, or sometimes even simply without decree. Decisions regarding the budget are not published systematically in the official bulletin, which itself is not published regularly.27 In addition and this is of even greater concern, Abdoulaye Wade has managed to have an institutional reform establishing the Senate adopted. According to the text, this second chamber has precedence over the national assembly; 65% of its members are appointed by the president of the republic and 35% are designated by local authorities, whereas members of the national assembly are elected by direct universal suffrage. This measure contributes to weakening the parliament, which refrains from taking any initiatives in the area of security sector oversight.
Judicial oversight
According to article 88 of the constitution, the judicial power is independent of the legislative and executive powers. The judicial system has undergone a number of reforms, the most important of which were undertaken in 1992 and 2008. The constitutional council, which was established in 1992, is in charge of ensuring that laws are in conformity with the constitution. The organic statute n° 2008.35 of 7 August 2008 established the Supreme Court, a merger of the former Council of State and the former court of cassation. In 1999, following a UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) Senegal 217 directive, the court of accounts was established. There are also two courts of appeal,28 located in Dakar and in Kaolack. A number of regional courts are attached to each of the courts of appeal and are located in the regional capitals: the regional courts in Fati, Kaolack, Tambacounda and Kafi are under the jurisdiction of the Kaolack court of appeal, while the regional courts in Dakar, Saint-Louis, Thies, Ziguinchor and Djourbel fall under the court of appeal in Dakar. The district courts located in each département are each attached to a regional court. Where criminal proceedings are concerned, the district courts only sit on minor offences (such as robberies and petty thefts). Appeals on their rulings may be brought before the regional courts. The more serious offences (armed robberies for example) are referred to the regional courts and appeals may be made to either of the two courts of appeal. Crimes are tried before the criminal court. The criminal court was initially attached to the court of appeal in Dakar, but it now tends to hold its hearings in the regional capitals (Thies, Saint-Louis, Ziguinchor and Kaolack). As part of criminal proceedings, the prosecution, represented by the public prosecutor, orders investigations to be carried out by the police and gendarmerie criminal investigation departments. When the public prosecutor considers that additional investigations are required, he can refer to the examining magistrate, the judge in charge of carrying out the investigation for the court. In some rare instances, a case may be referred to the examining magistrate when a complaint has been lodged and civil action taken. In criminal cases, that is, all cases that fall under the competence of the criminal court, the involvement of the examining magistrate is obligatory. The Senegalese legal system is overburdened and suffers from serious delays in dealing with cases. Although the numbers of staff have doubled in fifteen years, they are still insufficient. The executive power is accused of regularly interfering in the conduct of investigations and there have been many reports about the lack of independence of the legal system when it comes to political cases. In addition, some traditional authorities play a role in resolving common law disputes. This is the case for example with the Lebou community in Dakar whose head, Serigne Dakar, has the powers of a qadi and serves as a mediator in order to avoid certain minor cases being brought before the courts. In Casamance, King Oussouye plays a similar role.
218 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone
Public oversight
During the 1990s, a particularly dynamic civil society emerged. The independent media played an absolutely vital role in ensuring the transparency of the 2000 presidential elections. Today they occupy a central position on the Senegalese political scene and the economy of the sector is becoming increasingly complex. In addition to the independent newspapers and radio stations such as Sud Radio and Sud Quotidien, Walfajiri Radio and Le Quotidien, there are now electronic media and private television channels such as Radio Dunya Vision, Walf TV and Canal Info and major press houses have been established. President Wade, who was very close to the press before acceding to power but was apparently surprised that they continued to play their role as critics, now considers the press and radio as the main spearhead of the opposition. Some worrying practices are developing. Journalists are increasingly being prosecuted and even harassed; some have been sentenced to several years of imprisonment without remission.29 Furthermore, members of government and the presidential majority are getting increasingly involved in the audiovisual arena by creating or purchasing press houses. Finally, the public media (Le Soleil newspaper and the RTS) are now completely controlled by the executive and only broadcast information that suits the latter. Journalists also complain that it is extremely difficult for them to cover the conflict in Casamance. The press itself is not exempt from criticism about how information is treated, in particular the way in which they cover defence and security issues. Some media indulge in sensationalism when dealing with such issues and do not always verify the information that they broadcast. Journalists however unanimously welcome the fruitful cooperation established through the workshops organised by the DIRPA to train civilian journalists on defence matters. They also emphasise the fact that the military have never filed suit against the press and deplore the fact that relations with the police and the judiciary are not as cordial.30 Senegal’s network of civil society organisations is extremely active and well structured. The Rencontre africaine pour la défense des droits de l’homme (RADDHO) is particularly interested in the behaviour of the defence and security forces with respect to citizens. The organisation emphasises collaboration and works with the gendarmerie and the police force to educate them on the citizens’ rights that they are bound to protect. It also intervenes with the military hierarchy to relay the complaints of inhabitants affected by the conflict in Casamance. RADDHO was designated as the guarantor organisation for the peace agreements signed between the Senegal 219 government and the MFDC and is also in charge of the civilian component of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) in collaboration with the Red Cross. The DIRPA and RADDHO jointly organised training seminars on DDR for ex-rebels from Casamance, as well as ceremonies where decommissioned weapons were symbolically destroyed. Where the police force is concerned, human rights organisations and the ministry of interior jointly organised training seminars on human rights and human security for police commissioners and also for trainees in the police academy and gendarmerie training school. RADDHO is currently drafting a guide intended for security agents, entitled Guide du citoyen et de l’agent d’application de la loi (Guide for citizens and law enforcement agents). Another association involved in security issues, the Mouvement contre les armes légères en Afrique de l’Ouest (MALAO), is a network of Senegalese NGOs specialising in controlling the proliferation of small arms and antipersonnel mines. The network is particularly active in the provinces of Senegal where it carries out awareness-raising campaigns in schools and local communities by distributing educational comic strips. It is the focal point that coordinates the Senegalese small arms action network. MALAO is also an advisor to the national assembly and the Senate on these issues and supports the work of the national commission established by government as part of the ECOWAS programme to control small arms and light weapons (SALW).31 The network has also set up ‘training of trainers’ programmes to train parliamentarians, jurists, journalists and religious bodies to disseminate issues related to SALW in Senegal (legal aspects of weapons possession, dangers of SALW and gender aspects) and thus move beyond the purely administrative approach to the issue. It has also managed to foster an inter- ministerial and civil-military approach to the issue by bringing together the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, interior, justice, economy (for customs) and the environment (for water and forestry), with each administration explaining their activities to the others. MALAO has also collected funds from the Canadian government and from Oxfam, which were then provided to the transborder grassroots communities in Senegal, Guinea Bissau and The Gambia. Senegalese and Bissau-Guinean law enforcement forces were involved in the programme, which made it possible to collect and destroy the weapons held in the village communities. The activities undertaken by MALAO are of interest because they have opened the way for the Senegalese government to accept civil society participation in an area initially reserved to the former. The principal opposition parties, the Socialist Party, Moustapha Niasse’s AFP and the LD/LPT are now grouped together in a coalition 220 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone known as ‘Siggil Senegaal’ (Straighten up Senegal). While defence and security issues may not have pride of place on their agenda, some politicians like Abdoulaye Bathily, the spokesperson of the coalition, do have an excellent knowledge of the security sector.32 Finally, the university produces very few works covering defence and security issues. Only the Conseil pour le Développement de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales en Afrique has published any such works.
Challenges of security sector governance
In institutional terms, the competences of the various security organs comprising the Senegalese security sector are quite clearly defined and each one respects the prerogatives of the others. Furthermore, the system guarantees not only the separation of powers, but also democratic control of the defence and security forces by parliament, the judiciary and the public. However the situation in the country shows that the institutional framework is not sufficient to guarantee real democratic security sector governance; there are still a large number of issues to be resolved. The first and no doubt the most important of these is to avoid the security system becoming contaminated by the authoritarian drift of the current regime. While the institutional framework has enabled a certain democratisation of the workings of security organs, it nevertheless appears that the presidential regime, which is conducive to a concentration of power, could in the long run serve as justification for an authoritarian misuse of security organs if the current autocratic trends continue. The increase in the number of acts of abuse of power committed by the DIC seems to be the first symptom of this phenomenon. In addition, there is still a high degree of corruption among the security organs, especially the police and judicial institutions. The security forces also lack human and material resources. Equipment is sorely lacking and where it exists is often obsolete or unusable. The insufficient number of personnel is not only a difficult problem to resolve, but also leads to an increase in crime. The disastrous situation of public finances and the growing impoverishment of the general population could also compromise the efforts undertaken to improve the defence and security forces. The way in which the military is handling the conflict in Casamance still remains a taboo subject. Currently, almost one third of army personnel are apparently deployed in the region. Some observers feel that it is in the Senegal 221 interest of a certain number of military agents to at least maintain the current freeze in the situation, if not to actually continue the conflict, because they supposedly benefit from the increasingly worrying rise in cocaine trafficking from Guinea Bissau. Soldiers deployed in the field are also suspected of being involved in numerous robberies reported in the area. Journalists and human rights organisations have denounced the disappearance of some members of the MFDC, for which they blame the army. Some geopolitical developments also give further cause for concern. According to Senegalese intelligence service analysts, the country is becoming a transit zone for Islamist militants who are active in the Maghreb or Mauritania. But even more than terrorism, drug trafficking seems to be the new scourge. Senegal is extremely ill-equipped because the customs service has only one scanner for the whole country and no sniffer dogs at all. Senegal is one of the African countries that has benefited the most from foreign development cooperation33 and the results obtained lead one to say that there has been a positive syncretism of the different influences. However, since foreign partners do not all have the same priorities, the Senegalese security system could suffer from this lack of uniformity in the current political context. Priority is often given to counterterrorism or lucrative investments, to the detriment of encouraging a policy that focuses on better respect for human rights. Also, none of the foreign partners is truly contributing to promoting SSR as such.
Conclusion
This review of the Senegalese security system has made it possible to highlight a number of positive points. Obviously the first point to be emphasised is the fact the Senegalese military is democratic and republican. The armed forces could serve as an effective starting point. The positive practices implemented within the military could serve as an example for reform in other sectors and could be disseminated outside the country.34 The future reform of the police public relations department should for example draw inspiration from the activities of the DIRPA and such a department should also be set up in the ministry of justice. It would also be a good idea to develop contacts between the security forces, in particular the police force and the military so that the latter can take advantage of training seminars to share their experience about how they earned public respect and appreciation. Along the same lines, it would be helpful to extend to all security sector stakeholders the spaces of dialogue that now exist between 222 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone the armed forces and bodies such as RADDHO, MALAO and the media who have been able to establish constructive relations. The police force is currently the weak link in the Senegalese security system, where the reform effort needs to focus. Whereas there are a number of cooperation programmes for the armed forces and the gendarmerie, as well as regional, national and foreign training centres, training of the police force has been somewhat neglected. Foreign partners should make sure that they concentrate more cooperation efforts on the police force. One way of controlling the endemic corruption that affects this corps, which has been neglected by the public authorities since the unfortunate episode in 1987, would be to encourage the establishment of a police social service system, similar to that of the ministry of defence. The nature of the threats that the country will be confronted with increasingly in the future, mainly the criminalisation of trade (trafficking in drugs and weapons) also justifies deploying additional efforts for the benefit of the police force. It would indeed be desirable to intensify police cooperation partnerships and exchange of information with the police forces of other ECOWAS states. Also, the breakdown of competence between the gendarmerie and the police force, with the police being mainly in charge of urban areas, while the gendarmerie is in charge of rural areas, is becoming increasingly only theoretical. There appears to be a need to rationalise this arrangement while ensuring that both corps are maintained, because the gendarmerie has clearly demonstrated the importance of its existence, as well as its effectiveness. This process must nevertheless take into account the highly militarised nature of the Senegalese gendarmerie, which appears as a military force with police functions, whereas their French counterparts are seen more as a civilian police force that has a military status. This strongly military nature could make a rapprochement between the gendarmerie and the police force difficult, unlike what is found in a certain number of Francophone countries, including France. The prisons sector also deserves increased attention. One initial measure could be to encourage the Senegalese authorities to simplify the procedure for granting access to prisons so that national and international human rights organisations could tour these establishments to take stock of existing conditions. There is also a need to encourage the adoption of measures governing the role of the popular self-defence committees. Given the lack of resources of the Senegalese government, it would be illusory to expect that these groups could be abolished in the short term, because they offset some of the shortcomings of the security forces in the provinces and in the suburbs. It is Senegal 223 however necessary to regulate the relations between these groups and law enforcement agencies and sanction any acts of abuse that they might carry out. It is absolutely essential that parliament recover its supervisory role; however this will be difficult to achieve, given the deliberate attempts by the current government to undermine this institution. The most realistic approach could be to provide financial support to the standing committee on defence and security in its fact-finding missions on the state of the security sector (for example, on the means available to the police force in the provinces) and also to organise training sessions for its members, most of whom have no technical knowledge of the sector. Another possibility would be to finance the position of a specialised parliamentary attaché. In the absence of real parliamentary control of the security apparatus, support to the media and human rights NGOs should be enhanced, as these organisations have already demonstrated their ability to influence democratic developments in the country. Training sessions should be organised to enable them to increase their contribution to establishing standards of democratic security sector governance, while financial support could allow them to carry out lobbying campaigns both regionally and internationally to condemn police practices that infringe on human rights. Furthermore, the Senegalese authorities should be encouraged to implement the components of the 2004 peace agreement that relate to the reinsertion of MFDC rebels. To this end, the resources of the national agency for recovery of economic activities in Casamance, which is theoretically in charge of this issue but which has been rather disappointing so far, should be enhanced. Finally, it is important to ensure that there is a real awareness about the need for SSR in Senegal, so that local stakeholders realise that in the absence of such a process the current unfortunately antidemocratic trend, which is developing in the country, will most likely be worsened.
Notes
1 Coulibaly Mamadou Abou Latif, Le Sénégal à l’épreuve de la démocratie (Paris: L’Harmattan - Collection Etudes africaines, 1999); Hesseling Gerti, Histoire politique du Sénégal: Institutions, droit, société (Paris: Khartala, 1985); Diop Momar-Coumba and Diouf Mamadou, ‘Sénégal: par-delà la succession Senghor-Diouf’, in Les figures du politique en Afrique: des pouvoirs hérités aux pouvoirs élus, eds. Diop Momar-Coumba and Diouf Mamadou, 139-189 (Dakar: CODESRIA-Karthala, 1999); Coulibali Abdu Latif, Cinquante ans de lutte au sein du parti socialiste (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995). 224 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone
2 Following the resignation of Senghor, Abdou Diouf became President of the Republic of Senegal on 1 January 1981 and was re-elected president in 1983, 1988 and 1993. 3 During the December 1962 crisis, president Senghor called on the army parachute commando to put an end to the revolt organised by his rival Mamadou Dia, President of the Council and Minister of Defence, who had mobilised the gendarmerie in his support. The principle senior officers refused to intervene, leaving it up to the civilians to resolve their political differences. In 1968, Senghor, whose government was destabilised by a wave of popular demonstrations, once again attempted to hand over power to the military, but this offer was refused once again by the military high command. During the period of tension in 1988, General Tavarez de Souza, Chief of Staff at the time, was suspected of conspiring to overthrow Abdou Diouf and was removed from office. 4 Sonko Bruno, ‘Le conflit en Casamance: une guerre civile oubliée?’, CODESRIA Bulletin, no. 3&4 (2004): 35-38. 5 The Gambia and Guinea Bissau have always served as a fallback base for the MFDC, which led Senegal to intervene on the Bissau-Guinean territory as part of the Gabou Operation carried out jointly with the Republic of Guinea in 1999. On the basis of a defence agreement existing between the two countries, Senegal used this pretext to provide support to the then president Nino Vieira, the mediator in the Casamance conflict, who was facing the threat of a mutiny led by his Chief of Staff. Neither this intervention nor the ECOMOG intervention that followed was able to maintain Nino Vieira in power. 6 The armed forces are governed by Law no. 84.62 of 16 August 1984, supplemented by law no. 89.02 of 17 January 1989 on the general organisation of the armed forces. 7 Within the military, officers and non-commissioned officers are given training in various communication and audiovisual professions (drafting press communiqués, press relations, public relations, journalist-reporters, cameramen and computer artists), in partnership with various specialised civilian centres (CESTI, ISIC, Média-Centre). The DIRPA also organises numerous training seminars to familiarise civilians (journalists, NGOs) with the workings of the military institution: the objective is to enable them to get to know each of its units (missions, organisational structure and infrastructure). 8 Senegalese troops were deployed with the ONUC in Congo/Zaire in 1960, with UNEF in Egypt from 1973 to 1976, with UNIFIL in Lebanon from 1978 to 1984, with UNAMIR II in Rwanda from 1994 to 1995, with MINURCA in the CAR from 1998 to 2000, with MONUC in the DRC from 2001 to date, with UNMIL in Liberia and with ONUCI in Côte d’Ivoire since 2004. They also deployed personnel in observation missions in Iraq, Angola, Cambodia, Uganda, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan/Darfur. Both the former and the present CEMGA held command of ONUCI, and a Senegalese general was appointed to head the MONUC in the DRC. 9 The concept of a military engaged in development has always been particularly important for Senegal. The Senegalese military has always been considered the backbone of national development. Since independence, the military, in particular the engineers’ corps (under the responsibility of the CEMGA), has contributed to constructing or repairing collective infrastructure (roads, bridges). The importance of CIMIC (which in Senegal is called ACM for actions civilo-militaires) is demonstrated by the fact that the armed forces ensure that they provide assistance to the population each time they undertake manoeuvres or interventions on the national territory (transport of food, de-pollution programmes, demining and village reconstruction operations in Casamance, implementation of the civil defence response plan [ORSEC] and medical evacuation). Senegal 225
10 The Military Academy (prytanée militaire), which takes in children from the age of 14; the 12th training battalion, which trains new recruits to the contingent; the National Officers’ Academy (ENSOA), the National NCOs Academy in Thies (ENOA), the Military Health School, the Infantry Training School (EAI) and the Air Force Academy. 11 With a view to facilitating their subsequent reintegration into civilian employment, in addition to their combat and technical training for the specific needs of the armed forces, young soldiers of the contingent are given professional training geared towards the needs of the civilian labour market (civil or mechanical engineering, driving, hotel management and food technology, office technology, health). This training, which leads to the delivery of a practical certificate, is carried out in partnership with the Dakar trades council. The DIRPA puts these personnel in touch with businesses through the social integration agency. 12 A battalion of a minimum of 600 men is engaged in each external operation. Because of the pace of rotations, a single theatre mobilises 1,200 men each year. 13 While Senegalese officers earn an average of FCFA 700,000 per month (a salary that is similar to those paid in the civil service), they can expect an income of as much as FCFA 5 million if they work for a multilateral organisation. 14 The 1962 crisis politicised the gendarmerie and the military with each corps supporting one of the two political camps. This polarisation within the armed forces led to the establishment of a constitutional prohibition of the right to vote for all agents of military and paramilitary bodies (police, customs and forest rangers). 15 Fall Madior, ‘Trois corps d’armée, deux divisionnaires, dix généraux de brigade: inflation d’étoiles au sein de l’armée nationale’, Sud Quotidien, 2007; ‘L’armée et les urnes au Sénégal / Projet de loi sur le vote des militaires sénégalais : Jeu et enjeu des pouvoirs politiques’, Le Quotidien, 2006. 16 The promotion of some young officers (in particular, the CEMGA and gendarmerie major commander) to the rank of general seems to have created frustrations among many more experienced and initially higher ranking officers who had previously held command over these newly promoted officers. 17 The news that certain senior officers had been plotting to overthrow Wade to bring an end to the excesses of his regime only appeared in the press about a year after the fact. See Digne Madiambla, ‘Tentative de coup d’Etat contre Wade: deux personnes arrêtées’, Le Quotidien, 17 juin 2005; Coulibali Abdu Latif, Wade, un opposant au pouvoir: l’alternance piégée (Dakar: Editions La Sentinelle, 2003). 18 The military code of justice, defined by Law no. 94.44 adopted on 27 May 1994, governs both military and paramilitary personnel who are tried by common law courts; there are no military magistrates in Senegal. Cases are tried by a civilian judge assisted by two advisers who are either from the military police, customs, or forest rangers, according to the corps that the person tried belongs to. The court of appeal, the criminal court and the Dakar regional court, as well as the special tribunal are competent to rule on military cases. 19 The Senegalese gendarmerie is also very much involved in peacekeeping operations: 1/10 of the personnel of the gendarmerie (that is almost 600 men) are today deployed outside the country (Haiti, DRC, Côte d'Ivoire and Darfur). 20 The executive secretariat of the organisation will be located in Senegal for three years. 21 The force was dissolved after a series of demonstrations by Senegalese policeman, in protest against the sentencing of two of their colleagues for a police blunder. The 226 Niagale Bagayoko-Penone
government called on the gendarmerie to quell the demonstrations, but the gendarmes refused to shoot at the police. 22 The position of Minister of Interior has been held frequently by an army general. Nevertheless, these ministers, in particular two who held the position under Abdou Diouf, General Lamine Cisse and General Niang, were highly appreciated by the general public for their attachment to the rule of law and are often attributed, rightly or wrongly, with the victory of the coalition for change in 2000. 23 Only the Dakar, Kaolack, Thies and Saint-Louis regions have more than one police station. The other regions have only one police station, which is often in the regional capital. Police stations in the cities of Touba, Tuaoune and Ambake were established only recently. 24 The government does not have an interlocutor since the passing of Father Diamacoune Senghor (the political representative of the MFDC) in 2005. 25 Members of the committee intend to organise a fact-finding mission on prisons. 26 The other Members of the Assembly are often independent candidates or belong to groups that are close to the majority; they are however not represented in sufficient numbers in the Assembly to be able to constitute parliamentary groups. 27 There are also conflicts among the texts, because those adopted by the National Assembly are sometimes revised by the Presidency. 28 In 1998, other courts of appeal were created in Ziguinchor and Saint Louis, but they have never been active. These courts are expected to become operational very soon. A court of appeal is also expected to be opened in Thies. 29 Amongst the most serious recent events are the expulsion of the journalist from RFI who was covering the conflict in Casamance, the three-month imprisonment of the editor of Le Quotidien newspaper, the sentencing of the journalist Malick Seck to 3 years imprisonment, and the destruction of the offices of L’As and 24 heures Chrono newspapers on the orders of Faraba Senghor, the Minister of Transport. 30 In 2001, a meeting was organised in Mbour bringing together the press, magistrates and the police, to facilitate media coverage of justice and insecurity issues, but there was no follow-up to this meeting. 31 The leading source of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Senegal was the war for independence in Guinea Bissau. This war mobilised a large, uncontrolled arsenal that has ended up in the hands of the MFDC rebellion in particular. The Senegalo-Mauritanian conflict and the different Tuareg rebellions that followed have also contributed to the circulation of weapons in the Northern part of the country. In the South East, conflicts in the Mano River region, as well as the practice of poaching in the Niokolokoba region have encouraged militarisation of the society. All these zones come together during the major religious migrations towards the region of Touba, which often serve as a cover for weapons trafficking in various forms. Locally manufactured weapons may also be found on the markets of major cities like Diaobe or Mbacke. In The Gambia, the Basse Santafu/Georgetown-Médina Yoroufoulah axis is also a supply route for traffickers. Maritime and river routes are also used for this purpose. 32 Abdoulye Bathily is the co-author of the reference work Military and Militarism published by the CODESRIA in 1998. 33 France played a major role in establishing and structuring the Senegalese armed forces following independence, and the French military cooperation services still have a very strong presence in the country through their permanent technical advisers. Senegal has nevertheless diversified its partnerships, not only with other parties from outside the Senegal 227
continent (the US ACRI/ACOTA programme, cooperation with Germany, and increasing its cooperation with China), but also with African partners (military cooperation with Mali, Mauritania, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau and the Republic of Guinea). Military cooperation with Morocco started in 1968 and the ties are still close. Cooperation with Saudi Arabia has developed since the engagement of Senegalese troops in Operation Desert Storm in 1990. Also, many countries are involved in the training of the gendarmerie (France, Italy, Jordan and China). 34 The positive evolution in certain sectors of the Senegalese security system could serve as an inspiration for a number of Francophone African countries where SSR is often denounced as a process that seeks to impose exogenous principles. Implementing SSR processes in Africa based on the positive experience of an African country (in particular that of its military) can only serve to give SSR greater legitimacy in the eyes of local stakeholders.
Chapter 10
Togo
Comi M. Toulabor
Introduction
Throughout his long reign (from January 1967 to February 2005), General Gnassingbe Eyadema exercised very strict control over the security sector in Togo. With a few changes, Faure Gnassingbe, his son and successor, has strived to follow the same example. The concept of security cannot be separated from its opposite: insecurity. It covers very broad areas and even extends to the right to life. In Togo both concepts are unequally distributed between an extremely small, dominant minority and the dominated classes that are subject to all sorts of tribulations. The security/insecurity pair occupies a central position and plays a vital role in the development of public policy within a holistic framework that encompasses both public and private security. Starting from 1990, the Eyadema regime began to use paramilitary militias and sometimes also an armed guard service to counter the demands for democracy and the strong protest movements. The security of the government was largely supported by the Kabye elite (president Eyadema’s ethnic group from the North of the country). Security sector reform (SSR) is now a major challenge for democracy and a constantly recurring subject in political debate, especially during elections and in particular the presidential elections of August 1993, June 1998, June 2003 and April 2005. This was also true of the general elections in October 1997 and the presidential elections in February 2010, as shown by the General Political Agreement (APG) signed in Ouagadougou on 20 August 2006 between the existing regime and the opposition.1 In addition, the 29 October 2009 memorandum for transparent elections in 2010 in Togo,2 drafted by the Union des forces du changement, the main opposition party, focused on the security dimension of what these actors themselves called the ‘Togolese crisis’. Development policies, recruitment to the public services and to para- state companies, as well as promotions, are all marked by the ‘ideology of revenge’ of the populations of the North over those in the South of the 230 Comi M. Toulabor country who are purported to have benefited from the advantages of colonialism and the Olympio and Grunitzky3 regimes, thus creating an artificial, but deeply rooted and sustained bipolar vision of the two sub- regions of the country in the collective imagination. This has been the backdrop to state policy and is reflected in the mode of functioning of the security sector. It also undermines the theories of the creation of nation- states that were commonly held between the 1960s and the 1980s, which claimed that African militaries were the only organised and truly national institutions and should therefore serve as the vector for constructing, developing and modernising the state.4 These theories were by nature optimistic and neglected to include the component of sociological dynamics, which would have highlighted the balance of power and conflicts of interests that characterise them and often place them in opposition to the overall society. When he succeeded his father, Faure Gnassingbe stated his intention of reforming the paternal heritage, whose pivotal component had been the security sector, by presenting himself as the ‘man with a new spirit’, or to quote Montaigne on La Boetie: ‘He is he and I am I’. This apparent intention might not go down well with his internal interests and supporters, consisting of the military, the Togolese People’s Rally (RPT) and his family clan; these supporters are divided between the ‘hawks’, who are attached to the authoritarian and repressive heritage and the ‘doves’, who are in favour of a compromise with the opposition. At the same time, Faure Gnassingbe is bound to uphold the 22 undertakings made by his father before the European Union on 14 April 2004, under article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement, which makes respect for democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law the underlying principle of the new partnership.5 In the same vein, within the framework of the APG, he undertook to set up constitutional and institutional reforms and above all to review security matters and the issue of widespread impunity, which has been plaguing political life for decades. Torn between these contradictory interests, will the Togolese president be capable of convincingly undertaking in-depth reforms in the security sector without setting up his own allies against him and without giving in to the prevailing mood? In this chapter, we will be looking at the security apparatus beyond its purely institutional nature, as a vital part of security sector governance. We will then go on to show how the security ideology sways constantly between regime security and human security (the right to protection of property and physical integrity), which occupies only a limited place within the political system. Finally, we will examine the need to reform this sector and the inevitable resistance to be encountered. We Togo 231 shall conclude with some food for thought and a series of recommendations, which should be included in any serious reform process.
The overall state of the security apparatus
The security apparatus in the strictest sense of the term comprises the armed forces (FAT), the gendarmerie and the police force; in a broader sense it includes militias and private watch companies. They work together in synergy. The FAT, which resemble more a private than a public institution, are the central axis around which the late General Eyadema built his dictatorship, starting from 1967. In such an environment, public and civilian control of the security apparatus is very tenuous, especially as the existing regulatory institutions such as the National Assembly, the legal system and civil society function very poorly. In the organisational structure of the security apparatus, the army – the largest body – is at the top of the pyramid with its specialised units such as the presidential guard’s commando regiments, the paratroopers and above all the formidable rapid intervention force. The army staff has set up a training unit for militiamen, but the ethnic composition of this unit is such that it blurs the statutory lines between the regular army and guard companies. Human rights organisations often refer in their reports to this collaboration within the FAT as the ‘militiamen in army fatigues.’6 The security sector is no doubt the only public service where the principle of territorial continuity is effectively applied, with its comprehensive coverage of the national territory and in particular the capital. This is in contrast to other services such as education, health, water, electricity, infrastructure and transport, which are quite neglected.
The Togolese armed forces
The FAT represents the historic nucleus of the security sector. They are the heart of the political system, relegating the RPT, the former single party, to an auxiliary role.7 There are many portions of RPT statutes and programmes where it appears that the party is a derivative of the military, which is clearly above the former.8 As Dominique Bangoura recalls,9 in postcolonial African countries, the military was the institution that in structural and ideological terms (with regard to both physical and symbolic violence, as shown by Mathieu Rigouste10) most closely resembled the colonial state. 232 Comi M. Toulabor
The FAT increased greatly after General Eyadema took over power. While it is difficult to determine the exact number of its personnel, it is certain that it represents the lion’s share of the state budget.11 In 2006 for example, 25% of the budget was allocated to the FAT, which is by far the highest item of government expenditure.12 At the same time, the ethnic component in the FAT was developed strongly, in the name of the ‘ideology of revenge’. Indeed, 77% of the personnel are from the northern part of the country, with the remaining 23% from the South. Out of the 77% from the North, 70% are Kabye, including 42% who are from Pya, the president’s home town, whereas the Kabye only represent between 10 and 12% of the population.13 In addition, the hierarchy is almost entirely in the hands of the Kabye and not one of the command units that make up the architecture of the FAT is entrusted to a Southerner. This ethnic configuration of the military hierarchy is one of the most noteworthy consequences of the system of recruiting along ethnic lines for enrolment in officer schools.14 Whereas the recruitment policy launched by Faure Gnassingbe between 2005 and 2007 considerably increased the number of women in the gendarmerie and the police force (by 90 and 178, respectively), it did not diversify them ethnically.15 This wave of female recruitment was a return to a former policy that had been abandoned in 1985, when female police officers were the first to experience a fall in their numbers following the implementation of structural adjustment plans. What remains to be defined, as we shall see, is whether this staff increase contributes to or corresponds to the quality of security demanded by the APG signed in Ouagadougou in 2006 and even before that by the 1991 national conference, which made a distinction between the mission of the FAT to defend national integrity and the law and order and public security missions entrusted to the gendarmerie and the police.
Paramilitary militias
These originally started out as pro-regime students’ associations and unions, but in a wave of overzealousness, they shifted to armed support in order to counter the demands for democracy and the various disturbances that General Eyadema had to deal with at the time. In an authoritarian regime with little room for liberty and autonomy, universities are considered as potentially dangerous environments that need to be controlled and monitored. This requires the establishment of a number of hired relays, some of which, like the Togolese national students and interns’ movement, the Association of Togolese Students of Benin and above all the Northern Togo Togo 233
Students’ Club, were practically created at the same time as the university in 1972 and are branches of the RPT youth movement. In spite of the sponsorship of General Eyadema, the highly controversial Northern Togo Students’ Club was torn apart by conflict and division and in 1990 the radical wing founded the High Council of Students’ Associations and Movements, more commonly known as HACAME, and placed itself in the exclusive service of General Eyadema. Later on, in April 2005, it played an important role in enabling the son of the late dictator to accede to power, alongside other militias created by his clan. On the campus, the ‘Hacamist’ movement included a number of small groups with rarely more than a hundred members, such as the Togolese League of Students and Interns, the Togo Students’ Union and the Federation of Students and Pupils of Togo. In fact, members of HACAME were most often school dropouts, the unemployed, petty criminals, soldiers from the ranks of the regular army and above all, veterans.16 During the October 2007 general elections, both the militia and the security forces refrained from getting involved, thus making it possible to have a ‘peaceful’ election, a condition required by the European Union as a prerequisite for resuming the cooperation that had been suspended since the 1993 presidential election because of the ‘democratic deficit’. The phenomenon of militias is deeply rooted in Togo's political history. In the southern part of the country for example, traditional self defence brotherhoods such as the Abrafos and the Zangbetos were set up to protect people and their property.17 What is new in the current situation is the degree of militarisation, which makes the HACAME appear not only as an armed group with military supervision, but also as an organic branch of the FAT. The unclear status of this group, between formal and informal and somewhere between public and private, gives it additional room for manoeuvre in the acts of violence carried out against political protesters and the so-called ‘internal enemy’.
Watch and guard companies
The third and final pillar of the security apparatus are watch and guard companies. Not surprisingly, they began to emerge at the beginning of the 1990s at a time when demands for democracy were increasing, with in particular the Société africaine de sécurité-Togo. About a dozen companies, all established in Lome, currently share this very lucrative private security market. 234 Comi M. Toulabor
These guard companies have links with the political authority, which grants them the authorisation to set up business. They recruit their staff mainly from social groups such as retired soldiers, veterans wishing to supplement their income and sometimes para-militia members. The explosion of acts of delinquency and crime led to a strong demand for security by individuals and companies. The supply of such services also increased proportionately, leading to an explosion of the market. After the political and legal trials of Robert Montoya, which tarnished the reputation of his different watch and guard companies (Société africaine de sécurité- Togo)18 and the death of Eyadema’s military advisor, Jeanou Lacaze, in August 2005, who also owned a security company (L’assaut veille), the market leader is now Germain Meba, a multimillionaire with more than one string to his bow and a personal friend of Faure Gnassingbe. It is rumoured that elements of his company, Optimal Protection Services19 lent a helping hand to the FAT during the 2005 presidential elections.
Beyond the institutional aspects of security
Historically and institutionally, the security sector has been constructed around the FAT (in particular the presidential guard, the parachute regiment, the gendarmerie and the rapid intervention force). Whenever there are public demonstrations, elections, or any other event considered a security risk, elements of these different corps are mobilised. The ‘non-violent’ general elections in October 2007 however demonstrated that the military and para- militia forces that had been prepositioned to intervene could be controlled. Since the outcome of these general elections was not very important, the RPT could afford to leave a few seats to the opposition without losing the essential part of its power, namely, the presidency of the republic. Even more importantly, in doing so it could easily comply with the demands of the European Union, which had conditioned the resumption of its cooperation on the organisation of non-violent general elections. This financial condition – non-violent elections for subsidies or more generally, democratisation for money – gives the feeling that the reformist commitment of the Togolese president has been extracted under moral constraint and that without that reforms may not have been pursued. Fiona Hall, the head of the European Union election observation committee noted the following when she presented her final report to the Togolese authorities on 3 December 2007:
Togo 235
The October 2007 general elections marked a major step in pluralist and peaceful democratic construction. Through their strong participation on election day, Togolese voters have expressed their desire to participate fully in the ongoing democratic transition. Despite certain shortcomings, the conditions in which the CENI (independent national election commission) organised the electoral process enabled voters to express their choice. Nevertheless, a number of reforms need to be adopted to enable the next elections to truly reflect the will of voters.20
In other words, in the electoral domain like in other areas of reform, Faure Gnassingbe has given the impression that reform is taking place when in fact the object of the reform has remained the same. The February 2010 presidential election campaign highlighted concerns by the military, police and even the militia groups about being instrumentalised under the pretext of a process of clarification, institutional modernisation and reconciliation of the Togolese with their institutions. Let us demonstrate this by describing two significant events: The ‘Kpatcha case’, named after the president's half brother, former minister of defence and then a member of the National Assembly, who sparked a wave of violence during his brother’s take-over of power in April 2005. Relations between the two men further deteriorated when it came to sharing the family inheritance. Kpatcha was accused of incompetence and lack of authority, his ‘biological’ legitimacy was called into question and he was suspected of plotting a coup d'état as well as an assassination attempt.21 In order to do away with this fratricidal rivalry, he was arrested by the gendarmerie in front of the US Embassy on 15 April and has been held in prison since.22 A year before, the body of Atsutse Kokouvi Agbobli, the very popular leader of the MODENA, an opposition party, was found on the beach in Lome on 15 August 2008. Before any investigation could take place, the minister of security and civil defence released a communiqué announcing Agbobli’s ‘death by drowning’, which was repeated by the public prosecutor. Faced with a public outcry, the latter ordered an autopsy, which invalidated the official theory and concluded that the death was due to ‘drug intoxication’. Under pressure from public opinion, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) took up the case and ordered a second autopsy, to be carried out by a United Nations expert. This autopsy invalidated both conclusions.23 More than a year later, this suspicious death seems to have been forgotten. These two events show the discrepancy between the apparent desire of the Togolese authorities to carry out reform and institutional practices which 236 Comi M. Toulabor are characterised by several instances of infringements of law and legal process. And yet, in theory, the government has the tools available within the gendarmerie to carry out investigations: the anti-crime brigade, the research and investigation brigade, the processing and research centre, the intelligence and investigation department, as well as the criminal investigation department, a division of the general police directorate (DGPN). In 1992, decree n° 92-090 of 8 April 1990 was passed to reorganise the latter, which now includes five departments (public security, criminal investigation, general intelligence, territorial surveillance and joint services) and define its attributions.24 The DGPN covers all police departments and is under the authority of the ministry of interior. It is a paramilitary force whose mission is to protect individuals and their property, maintain and restore law and order, defend territorial integrity by gathering and using intelligence within the framework of internal and external state security, control drug trafficking and consumption and contribute generally to security and civil peace. Its attributions are in competition with those of the gendarmerie as defined by decree n° 95-064/PR of 13 October 1995, reorganising the national gendarmerie.25 The latter carries out administrative police functions, criminal investigation and serves as a military police force. Throughout the national territory, it has the responsibility for ensuring law and order in terms of public security, safety, tranquillity and peace. It is placed under the authority of the ministry of defence, but because of the nature of its functions it is also attached to the ministries of interior and justice and the attorney-general’s office. Within the organisational structure of the security sector, the police force occupies a subordinate place beneath the gendarmerie, which is itself beneath the military. There are however two unwritten rules that structure the relations among the three corps: 1) a police officer may never stop a gendarme, or even less a soldier for a check and 2) no police officer can ever be appointed as the head of the DGPN. In terms of the popular sociological definition shared in the barracks, a police officer is first and foremost a ‘fat civilian’ (in military jargon) and can never wield any authority over a gendarme or a soldier in the exercise of their duties. On the other hand, when it comes to corruption, the military, gendarmes and the police are able to come to an understanding and are indeed involved in a corrupt game with customs officers and drivers’ unions and with respect to roadblocks, which have become a real ‘cash cow’ where insecurity wears the face of racketeering and bureaucratic red-tape.26 The seminar on the Togolese police and corruption,27 organised by the public Togo 237 authorities in May 2009, shows for the first time that they are aware of this visible and real phenomenon. Nevertheless, it does not deal with the thorny issue of the link between the gendarmerie, the police and the military within the security context, nor does it deal with the continued absence of statutes governing the internal organisation of the police force. In this area, there are complementary or sometimes competing initiatives undertaken by donors such as the Reform and Governance Support Programme and the Institutional Capacity Building Support Project, which held a number of seminars in June and September 2009. Both are aimed at supporting ‘the efforts of the [Togolese] government in the area of modernising public administration and consolidating macroeconomic and budgetary management, as well as economic and financial administrative bodies’.28 The Court of Accounts, which was enshrined in the 1992 constitution and strongly demanded in 2002 by the West African Economic and Monetary Union was finally established in September 2009, but many remain unconvinced about its effectiveness.
‘Modernising’ the FAT
The FAT is not noted for its republican character or its sense of discipline. In fact, this is a mono-ethnic army. It however played a vital role in the succession between February and April 2005. The problem is to determine how to reform an institution that is torn between clans and sub-clans and between hawks and doves. The various crisis resolution agreements, in particular the August 2006 APG, prepared the ground for instituting SSR and finding a solution to the burning issue of impunity. Following the report by the United Nations Human Rights Commission on the electoral violence of April 2005, it was decided to replace all the heads of the army corps which had caused problems.29 Thus, in October 2005, the commanders of about twenty corps and specialised units were changed; some who were thought to be too close to the former minister of defence were either dismissed or appointed to other positions four years later, in July 2009, following the ‘Kpatcha case.’30 Just before that, the beginning of 2008 had been marked by a series of decisions concerning the uniformed corps. A number of decrees were passed, one after the other, reorganising the army (decree n° 2008-007 of 25 January 2008); the navy (decree n° 2008-009 of the same date); the air force (decree n° 2008-014 of 11 February 2008) and also defining the specific status of the army corps (decree n° 2008-013 of the same date). A higher military council was established (decree n° 2008-011 of 25 January 2008) 238 Comi M. Toulabor and the attributions of the army chief of staff and the director general of the national gendarmerie were defined by decree n° 2008-006 of 25 January 2008. For its part, decree n° 2008-012 of 11 February 2008 defined the functioning of investigative councils involving the military, etc. A detailed look at these texts shows however that while they resolve practical, internal issues, they do not touch on questions of substance, namely the links between the security sector on one hand and society as a whole, or human rights in general on the other. For the Togolese military, any manoeuvres that bring them in contact with their foreign counterparts are an opportunity to assess their status, which is sometimes less favourable; at the same time, their principal and humanitarian objective is to provide assistance to populations affected by conflict. In this vein, increasing numbers of Togolese soldiers are now participating in exercises within the framework of the RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix) programme, which prepares them for UN and peacekeeping missions in particular in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), in Burundi (AMIB) and also in Darfur (UNAMID). These exercises are led by France and take place in different regions of the country: in 1997 in Nangbeto, in 1998 in Dapaong, in 2001 in Kara and in 2008 in Zio.31 It was during these RECAMP manoeuvres and UN missions abroad that Togolese soldiers became aware of their condition and started to demand a real military status, a demand which had initially been put forward during the earliest mutinies in the 1970s.32 While these reforming decrees are welcome, they are too timid to uproot the deep-seated unease in the Togolese military, which is itself a victim of ineffective security sector governance. Also, by appointing his ‘own’ men, some of whom have been accused of human rights violations and other crimes including drug trafficking,33 to head strategic military and gendarmerie units, the president has failed to give the general public a clear signal of a break with the past and the credibility of his reform action is being undermined. Furthermore, while in the past the FAT had sometimes intervened to provide assistance to populations affected by small-scale natural disasters, after the floods in July 2008 and in particular in 2009, which were the most serious that Togo had ever experienced, the humanitarian and modern image that the military sought to portray was seriously tarnished. This image was enshrined in the new defence partnership agreement signed between France and Togo on 13 March 2008. However, the floods in 2008 and 2009 with their wake of deaths and disappeared, broken bridges, damaged roads and Togo 239 devastated houses and farms, etc. demonstrated the negligence of the armed forces.34 This was offset by the support provided by France through its Licorne operation in Côte d'Ivoire and by Ghana, China, the European Union and the United Nations.35
Security sector management and oversight
Security is a state of mind that is both subjective and objective. The weak point of the security ideology has been its human security dimension and prevention of threats, incivility and infringements on the life of ordinary citizens, their property and their well-being.36 As a result, there is a palpable increase in insecurity in all forms (material, psychological, environmental and moral) in cities but also in villages. The 2002 constitution enshrined this fundamental right under its article 49, which stipulates that ‘the mission of security and police forces, under the authority of government, shall be to protect the free enjoyment of rights and freedoms and guarantee the security of citizens and their property’. Given the security gap, it is quite clear that for the majority of the population this article is far removed from their reality. Faced with increasing crime, the general public feels unfairly treated and abandoned and has decided to take their security into their own hands. The methods used can be just as summary as those of security agents, as illustrated in the press, where there are reports of thieves who are burned alive in front of witnesses who only express general approval and satisfaction over ‘a job well done’.37 They do not seem to share the point of view expressed by General Eyadema in a public statement in October 1979 where he established a scale of priorities between ‘material’ rights and grand principles in the following terms:
This group of men [the Third World], is denied the most basic right: the right to life, whereas the same right is recognised for animals who are entitled to protection. Do human rights mean the right to die of hunger, ignorance and disease? What does freedom of expression mean, when one cannot read or write? No, it is time that we substituted this theoretical notion of human rights, which is understood as the ability to do anything that is not prohibited even when you lack the means do so, with the concrete right to dispose of the minimum required to live.38 240 Comi M. Toulabor
Attempts at judicial and parliamentary oversight
The State’s security ideology has reached a point where the problem is no longer security, but rather the insecurity and impunity that it brings about. Thus, in February 2006, in a report on the topic, the United Nations underlined ‘the need to bring an end to the culture of impunity, which had prevailed during the 38 years of the reign of the former president of Togo’.39 Achieving this would have meant placing security policy under institutional control, in particular of the National Assembly and the legal system. In spite of being a subject of grave concern, the combination of security, insecurity and impunity has never been the subject of any official debate to date. Indeed, none of the 81 members of the National Assembly (of whom 31 are opposition members elected in October 2007) has ever dared to put either written or oral questions on security to the executive, although opportunities have been provided by a number of events such as the suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of the leader of the Movement for National Development discussed above. The National Assembly has been criticised for never calling the government to account about the difficulties facing the general population, especially as it is not a monochromatic assembly. The assembly is very poorly organised, making it ineffective, with an administrative staff that is insufficient in number and poorly qualified or not qualified at all. It has no clear legal framework, as there are several overlapping rules of procedure and financial and administrative rules, with the result that they are never applied. The budget allocated to the assembly is so insufficient that members have no means to carry out their missions either within or outside the country. There is no organisational link between members of the National Assembly, their Parliamentary groups and their political parties, which is why they never take any legislative initiative. The electorate is neglected and even forgotten and increasingly, members seem to aspire to adopt the attitude of civil servants, whose status is seen as more gratifying and more secure than the uncertain status of people's representative that prevails among most assembly members.40 In addition, some members of parliament are not very comfortable using French, the official language, to engage in political debate, which is the very essence of parliamentary life. All this negatively affects the ability of parliament to control the activities of the executive, which can demand the cancellation of the parliamentary immunity of any member at any time, in particular those of the opposition. Furthermore, government does not feel compelled to enforce Togo 241 the few laws that are passed (barely 20 a year). It is doubtful that the numerous seminars organised for members of parliament by international institutions in order to develop their ‘skills in parliamentary work’ will truly change this order of things. The National Assembly may be pluralist in terms of party representation, but its structural and ideological mode of functioning is monochromatic and still bears the mark of the single party system. On the other hand, where judicial oversight is concerned, the analysis of a former prime minister is quite clear:
The system of justice is an instrument used for political purposes and subject to the untimely intervention of special decrees. Thus, honest citizens are held quite illegally well beyond the legal custody period without any legal assistance, while others are sentenced to heavy prison sentences by an invisible hand that does not hesitate to corrupt magistrates in order to overcome their resistance against the ignominy of such iniquity.41
And yet article 113 of the constitution stipulates that the judicial power is independent of the executive and the legislative powers and that as the guarantors of ‘individual liberties and the fundamental rights of citizens’, ‘judges shall be subject only to the authority of the law in discharging their duties’. Political influence over the judiciary dates back to colonial times and worsened at the beginning of the 1990s, at the time when the regime was extremely weakened. Between 1990 and 1993, General Eyadema readily promoted law students who were activists in the RPT and HACAME and its various offshoots. After a short training period and without any prior experience, these students were appointed to positions of responsibility, in violation of the requirements of the profession. In order to counterbalance the weight of the South in the judicial apparatus, most of those promoted were from the North. They took control of the presidencies of the courts, the courts of appeal and the position of deputy public prosecutor and prosecutor, not to mention the strategic bodies such as the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and the higher council of the judiciary (CSM), etc.42 By their sheer numbers, they dominate the professional association of Togolese magistrates, the APMT, by far the most important association of judges, which has been considered as the judicial arm of the regime ever since its establishment in 1996. The role of the CSM is to regulate the judicial power by assisting the president of the republic in his constitutional role as the guarantor of the independence of the judiciary. It also acts as a disciplinary body for magistrates and is required to give an opinion on nominees proposed by the 242 Comi M. Toulabor
Keeper of the Seals and minister of justice for appointment as judges to the courts, by decree adopted in the council of ministers. The CSM comprises nine members appointed for a term of four years and is chaired by the president of the Supreme Court. The clause that stipulates that ‘sitting magistrates shall neither hold other positions of public office nor carry out private lucrative activities other than those prescribed by law, nor engage in political activities’43 is often disregarded and for many years now the judiciary has been viewed by the general public as one of the most lucrative (and also one of the most discredited) in the public service, after the customs service. In December 2006, with the support of the European Union, the UNDP and France, the authorities drew up a very ambitious project for the modernisation of the justice system, with the aim of enhancing the capacities of all actors in this sector. The overall cost of the project is 15 million Euros,44 but by April 2007, only 1.5 million Euros had been received from France for training the judges of the two courts of appeal in Lome and Kara on administrative justice.45 All the other components of the programme, such as consolidating the rule of law, human rights and the establishment of a reliable legal environment are moving ahead, although the progress made is slower than planned. In the meantime, a constant succession of seminars, evaluation meetings and validation workshops are being organised. In order to demonstrate his will to ‘modernise the system of justice’, on 12 December 2008, to the surprise of all, the head of state appointed the former president of the Lome court of appeal, Abalo Petchelebia (who had been named and publicly condemned by the president of the Constitutional Court, Aboudou Assouma, as the ‘most corrupt’ judge46) as President of the Supreme Court, the country’s highest judicial body. Reflecting a general feeling at the time, one newspaper wrote: ‘The crisis within the APMT that some hoped would enable magistrates to carry out some self-criticism and allow the authorities to clean house was only a storm in a teacup or even a pure and simple diversion.’47
Attempts at political and public oversight
One phenomenon that has always characterised the political history of Togo is that political parties (94 recorded to date) and NGOs and associations (over 500) have not been deeply committed to or involved in fighting for the right to security and good governance in the security sector. From this point of view the case of the CNDH and the association Ligue togolaise des droits Togo 243 de l’homme (LTDH) is quite exemplary;48 their history is closely tied to this struggle, which is also the reason for their existence. The CNDH was created in 1987 and up to 1992 it contributed significantly to raising awareness about human rights violations lato sensu within the population. Then in November 1992, the government directly took over control, after its president, who was considered to be in the opposition, fled into exile. The commission thus lost its credibility and the number of complaints brought before it began to go down steadily, especially as its activity reports too often spared the perpetrators of acts of violence and those guilty of causing insecurity. On the other hand, its competitor, the LTDH, which is seen as independent, was highly successful right from its establishment in 1990, because it worked hand in hand with the CNDH, which would send sensitive and compromising cases to them in an attempt to escape the vigilance of the regime. This was the glorious period for human rights as demonstrated by the major social movements and collective action that were undertaken throughout the country. However, in the face of constant harassment and threats and following a serious crisis within their ranks, these movements practically disappeared from the public eye. The LTDH and the CNDH define the expression of the need and the right to security, as well as the way in which their action is recognised, which may vary according to the political situation of the time and their own leaders. The first, which is a non-governmental organisation with limited resources, derives its credibility from its critical and independent spirit as well as the quality of the work that it carries out and its international partners (the International Federation for Human Rights of which it is a member, Amnesty International, the World Organisation Against Torture and the International Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture and Reporters Without Borders). On the other hand the second, CNDH, does not even attempt to change the image it has had right from its establishment; that of a governmental agency endowed with considerable resources. Its local partners are often associations set up by the regime and its foreign partners are too often governmental or intergovernmental institutions. While it enjoys the support of government, the CNDH is nevertheless practically the only association that systematically promotes human rights throughout the country through the media and schools and organises seminars and awareness-raising campaigns for target groups. These are supposed to serve as relays with the population – prefects, mayors, traditional chiefs and religious leaders, etc. It is worth noting that this policy is limited mainly to topics that are considered less sensitive, such as women 244 Comi M. Toulabor and children's rights and HIV/AIDS control. Two thirds of its activity reports cover these topics while other issues related directly to security are neglected. Political parties for their part do not consider the right to security to be a particularly important part of their combat, which hardly ever exceeds the quite legitimate emotion that is keenly felt when such rights are violated. This is understandable on the part of the former single party, which is still in power. The main opposition parties compete with each other, at best through communiqués that are quickly forgotten or at worst by a silent wait-and-see attitude. Of course, this is a bit more than the former single party, which prefers to maintain a certain distance from issues related to insecurity. The opposition did not support the group of associations against impunity in Togo, which was set up following Faure Gnassingbe’s succession to power to encourage victims to lodge complaints against the perpetrators of acts of violence and exactions committed during the election period. Although the premises of the association were robbed on several occasions and its computers carried away in 2008 and 2009, both the association and most serious humanitarian organisations do agree that there has been a relative improvement in freedom of expression and movement since Faure Gnassingbe took over power. There was not much mobilisation around the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission that was set up in April 2008 after the APG, which brought together various political actors to end forty years of human rights violations. This commission, which has the blessing of the international community, found it difficult to start its work following the presidential elections and indeed is viewed with suspicion by most Togolese people who are not readily inclined to believe in the good intentions of a regime that is considerably removed from the life of the ordinary citizen.
Challenges of security sector governance
All these obstacles to SSR show how much the country is sorely lacking and remains incapable of managing administrative affairs. This government receives poor support from weak institutions and has limited sovereignty. Thus, legitimate reforms that it has not decided itself are imposed upon it and are implemented without the benefit of an assessment of previous reforms.49 While there appears to be a consolidation of the security ideology, the public administration in the sense of public service (that is, service to the majority) is gradually disappearing.50 This dynamic first stifled and then eliminated the middle classes, who are supposed to be the vector of Togo 245 democracy and social progress. Security sector reform would require taking into account this deep-rooted pathology, which has been identified since the post colonial period.51
Resistance to reform
SSR was included on the political agenda in July 1991 during the national conference. Its Commission VI, ‘Defence and Security’, underlined the fact that the armed forces had been created ‘for the exclusive protection of a single individual’ and emphasised ‘its excessive politicisation and ethnic nature, as well as the fact that nepotism [remained] the golden rule.’52 The commission's recommendations that the military be overhauled were met with hostility by General Eyadema and fear by many soldiers. In particular, a recommendation was made for ‘improved military training’ and a reduction in numbers in order to bring the military within a ‘dimension proportionate to the size of [the] country’. The gendarmerie was also to be redesigned to give it its initial vocation of being an auxiliary service of the justice system.53 These recommendations were poorly received and the FAT rose up against the population, plunging the country into further turmoil and emphasising the old divide between the military and the nation that had obviously not been bridged with the various reconciliation days. Towards the end of his regime, an ill and weakened General Eyadema and the military hierarchy, accepted if not to reform, at least to organise seminars. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa regularly organised such seminars for example, between October 2001 and May 2002. The general's son, Faure Gnassingbe took up the baton in March 2007 and in March and August 2008, when the military and political parties met to debate their ‘partnership’54 under the auspices of the American centre for civil-military relations, the German Konrad Adenauer foundation, the United Nations Population Fund and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In the lead up to the presidential elections in 2010, many training workshops and seminars were organised, as well as awareness raising campaigns on democracy and good governance: dialogue with the security and presidential forces; consolidating the competence of magistrates and even parliamentarians and lawyers, on electoral issues and a refresher from the West African Network for Peacebuilding, to remind them of their ethical duties. Without the same means of resistance as his father and under pressure from the international community, Faure Gnassingbe accepted a reform that was not likely to offend the military that had placed him in power. Thus, the 246 Comi M. Toulabor draft bill adopted in February 2007 on the status of military personnel restates the republican and apolitical55 nature of the armed forces, which is not new because this is already stipulated in the 1992 constitution. The most important new aspects are the inclusion of women in the military and the new statutes of the military corps, including the subsidiary material benefits, not to mention the fact that the delay in formalising the police statute was also taken into account.56
Potential entry points
Reform can only be successful if the actors concerned are fully involved. For this purpose, the remaining members of the Association of Democratic Soldiers who spoke out against the practices of their institution at the national conference could be the foundation stone of any potentially credible security sector reform.57 They represent the ‘silent majority’, which is also found within the gendarmerie and police force and whose spokesperson is the commander of the gendarmerie, the former minister of interior and security. His refusal to give his stamp of approval to the election in April 2005 that brought Faure Gnassingbe into power forced him into exile and made him the central figurehead of the ‘democratic military’. Within the highly dispersed community of civil society organisations, the Jeunesse unie pour la démocratie en Afrique (JUDA), the group of associations against impunity in Togo and the Groupe de réflexion et d’action pour le dialogue (GRAD), created respectively in 2003 and 2005, have been making their voices heard. They have published reports on various topics to educate the general public, question the regime and have adopted bold positions on a number of sensitive subjects such as corruption, insecurity, impunity, the high cost of living and youth unemployment. They have also organised highly successful lecture fora, with external support. These organisations seem to be playing the traditional role of trade unions, which are practically prohibited from organising strikes (the last significant strikes date back to 1992-1993) and are stating demands that the regime has acknowledged as being justified. JUDA achieved something for the general good when in March 2008 it condemned the hounding and harassment inflicted on certain private radio stations and newspapers by the high authority on audiovisuals and communication, which is in charge of regulating the media.58 This was also the case when it drew the attention of the general public and public authorities to cases where law enforcement agencies shot individuals and then presented them to the media as criminals without any proof.59 These recurring allegations of extrajudicial executions Togo 247 put the abolition of the death sentence, adopted on 10 December 2008 and welcomed by the international community, into a different perspective. Needless to say, in the coercive environment of a regime that needs a safety valve, the very existence of the GRAD and JUDA demonstrates the need for security sector reform and indeed a reform which goes well beyond this sector alone. Mention must also be made of the analysis and action group Femme, démocratie et développement (GF2D)/Centre de recherche d’information et de formation pour la femme (CRIFF), one of the longest existing civil society organisations, which was established in 1992 and is still active. The GF2D/CRIFF, whose members are women from various professional and political backgrounds, is a network that is working slowly but surely to promote and defend women's rights and an improved status for Togolese women.60 It carries out in depth work to promote civic education for rural and urban populations and attempts to raise awareness among the political authorities and decision-makers in Togo and other African countries ‘of the need, as democratic societies are being established, to make the participation of women in managing public affairs a reality; to educate and mobilise political parties for the same cause, [and to strive] for the emergence of women decision-makers in all areas of national life, etc.’ Its field of activity is awareness raising and empowering women by educating the public on the electoral process, an extremely sensitive subject. Through its information campaigns and by disseminating publications and handouts, it provides information to the general public on the right to vote and the use of this right. This is also one of the rare existing NGOs that requests that the population assess the impact of its activities. The regime is therefore understandably suspicious of its activities and exerts pressure on its members through all sorts of intimidating manoeuvres. Its credibility was however seriously undermined when it was co-opted into the different governments of Faure Gnassingbe, who has managed to stifle its thus far highly appreciated actions.
Conclusion
Security sector reform is an immense, highly complex and long-lasting undertaking. The major obstacles to be overcome are the predominant role of the elite and the absence of any institutional control or a social counterbalance. This relates in fact to the separation and balance of powers so dear to Locke and Montesquieu, which are necessary steps in moving 248 Comi M. Toulabor away from the political archaism that has been aggravated by the manifest lack of political will. SSR must go hand-in-hand with an overhaul of the public administration system, which is quite deficient, if not inexistent and must be done both overall and sector by sector. This requires real determination on the part of the main national actors (particularly the head of state who is also the head of the armed forces), as well as France whose role in this area cannot be underestimated, without neglecting the most important issue: financial means. This way, it would be possible to avoid a repetition of the case of the ministry of administrative reform, which was established at the beginning of the 1970s and has since become a vast graveyard of reforms.
Educating society
Because it is lost within the broader context of human rights, associations fail to make specific demands for the right to security. The concentration of forms of violence (physical, symbolic, state and societal), has led the enjoyment of this right to be considered marginal, in a society where the leaders have brought the population down rather than building it up. It would be helpful if the few associations that work on the specific topic could consider coming together to pool their logistic, human and financial resources, thus doing away with repetitions and needless competition. This would also enhance the visibility and credibility of their mission focusing on security rights, which require specific awareness raising campaigns targeted at the population. There is no doubt that through this, collective action will finally be effective. This ‘ideological’ work within society is just as important as the economic aspect of security sector reform.
Short term steps: initiate and carry out security sector reform
The following measures need to be adopted urgently:
Abolish specialised units of the army such as the rapid intervention force and the presidential guard, as well as militias, which have no legal existence; Ensure closer monitoring of the activities of private security companies, which must not become auxiliaries of the public security forces; Apply constitutional standards to the military, namely, submitting to the ‘regularly established constitutional political authority’ and ensure Togo 249
that it complies strictly with its assigned functions: territorial defence and carrying out works of public utility. Overlapping functions between the gendarmerie and the police force must be clarified; Increase the numbers of police officers, who must be better trained and equipped to be able to carry out their missions of ensuring law and order and security and draft a statute governing the police force; Reduce the numbers of the gendarmerie, which could be transformed into an elite intervention unit to deal with cases of armed crime and an auxiliary service for the justice system, for criminal investigations; Group the intelligence services together in two distinct departments; one under the army for military security and the other under the police force for civilian security. In this case, soldiers and gendarmes must no longer occupy civilian or political positions as continues to be the case in spite of a succession of decrees.
The longer term: undertake an in-depth reform of the FAT
This overhaul would include various areas of intervention but must be led by a ‘rightsizing’ programme:
Establish a five-year freeze on recruitment of ordinary soldiers, many of whom are currently retiring after 20 years of service, aged only between 40 and 45 years on average and without any training. Between 3,000 and 5,000 men are expected to retire during the period under consideration. They risk to further increase the number of armed criminals in the country in order to make a living, if they are not dealt with properly; At the same time, if they were encouraged to go on early retirement with the payment of some money, it can be estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 people would be interested;61 Over the next five years, establish a policy of reorganising and professionalising with recruits learning both a military and a civilian profession, which is not the case at the moment.
Security sector reform in Togo is an immense undertaking that cannot be separated from reform of the state, without which an overhaul of the sector would be meaningless. The security sector is faced with several internal challenges that have resulted from the tensions caused by the ‘privatisation’ and ethnic exclusivity of the military institution. These 250 Comi M. Toulabor tensions affect the security/insecurity pair differently for different actors, in some cases drawing its components closer and in others pulling them apart, in a situation made even more complex by the reigning impunity. However, while security sector reform is required, it can only be achieved effectively with the participation of its actors and the reestablishment of institutional and social counterbalances. The 40-year dictatorship of General Eyadema, whose legacy remains pervasive, was based principally on the security sector. How then can the sector be reformed when the leaders who derive the greatest benefit from it have no interest in change and only undertake reform without any conviction, due to international pressure? To quote Michel Foucault, the effects of the security sector are insidiously, silently, inscribed on institutions, on political pluralism, on the balance of power, on bodies and in minds.
Notes
1 The full text of the agreement is available at : www.icilome.com 2 The memorandum is available at www.togocity.com/article.php3?id_article=4250 3 Wen’saa O. Yagla, a former professor at the University of Lome and the ideologist of the regime, develops and justifies this ‘ideology of revenge’ throughout his book, L’édification de la nation togolaise (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1978). 4 See for example Dimitri G. Lavroff, ‘Régimes militaires et développement politique en Afrique noire’, Revue française de sciences politique 22, no. 5 (October 1972): 973-991; and especially Bernard Asso, Le chef d’Etat africain: l’expérience des Etats africains de succession française (Paris: Albatros, 1976), 382. 5 European Council Decision 2005/599/EC of 21 June 2005 (Cotonou Agreement). Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ 6 For example, Amnesty International, ‘Togo: Immunity for killings by the military’. AI Index: AFR 57/13/93F (London, October 1993); Amnesty International, ‘Togo: Rule of terror’. AI Index: AFR 57/01/99/F (London, 5 May 1999). 7 Pepevi A. Lodonou, Le Rassemblement du peuple togolais (RPT): instrument de légitimation du pouvoir militaire, Phd. Thesis (Bordeaux: S.N., 1988). 8 Ibid. 9 Dominique Bangoura, Les armées africaines: 1960-1990 (Paris : CHEAM, 1992). 10 Mathieu Rigouste, L’ennemi intérieur. Généalogie coloniale et militaire de l’ordre sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine (Paris, La Découverte, 2009). 11 The strength of the FAT stricto sensu is estimated at between 7,000 and 14,000, with the army and the gendarmerie alone representing the majority and occupying pride of place, well ahead of the air force with its 250 men and the navy, with 200 men. There are about 2,300 to 3,000 police officers and about 400 prefectural guards, 130 forest rangers and 5,000 men who have joined the veterans’ association at the end of international peacekeeping missions to which Togo contributes regularly. See ‘Togo’ in The Military Balance 2009 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009); ‘Togo’ in Togo 251
Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments (London: Jane’s, 2009); Tido Brassier, ‘Togo- FMI: à propos des consultations 2007’, available at: www.letogolais.com 12 Tido Brassier, ‘Togo-FMI: à propos des consultations 2007’. Available at: www.letogolais.com/article.html?nid=3072 13 Ayayi Togoata Apedo-Amah, ‘Le tribalisme dans l’armée’ (Presentation at the national conference, Comité d’action contre le tribalisme et le racisme (CATR), Lome, August 1991). 14 Ibid. 15 See ‘Les forces de sécurité togolaises renforcent leur effectif’, available at: www.presidencetogo.com 16 These former combatants are young enough to blend easily into the student population, some of them with fake student identity cards. 17 Nicole Kanhonou, Les Zangbeto, gardiens de nuit (Bordeaux: IEP de Bordeaux, 1992). 18 Gérard Davet and Fabrice Lhomme, ‘Robert Montoya, un ‘plombier’ en Afrique’, Le Monde, 11 January 2006; Thomas Hofnung, ‘Robert Montoya rattrapé par ses trafics d’armes en Afrique’, Libération, 16 December 2005. 19 See La lettre du continent, 563, 23 April 2009. 20 European Union, ‘Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union européenne au Togo. Elections législatives du 14 octobre 2007. Rapport final’. Available at: www.eueom- togo.org 21 Christian Dubois, ‘La guerre des frères Gnassingbé est ouverte’, 15 April 2009. Available at: http://www.africatime.com/Togo/ 22 Dimas Dzikodo, ‘Présentation du supposé corps du délit : des armes et beaucoup de questions sans réponses’, Forum de la semaine, 20 April 2009. 23 E. Pablo, ‘15 août 2008-15 août 2009: Atsutsé Agbobli’, Liberté Hebdo, 15 August 2009. 24 Journal officiel de la République togolaise, 2 May 1992. 25 Journal officiel de la République togolaise, 5 January 1996. 26 See the Report of the Observatory on Abnormal Practices along the transport corridors linking Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Togo: ‘Observatory of Abnormal Practices on Inter-State corridors’, Results for 1 October to 31 December 2008, Accra, 2009. 27 Watch the video at http://www.youtube.com/user/TOGOISBACKTV#p/search/0/RGPQTQ9njjQ. 28 Lambert Attiso, ‘Projet PARCI : Le document validé mardi lors d’un atelier à Lomé’, Savoir News, 30 September 2009. Available at: http://www.icilome.com 29 La Lettre du continent, 479, 6 October 2005. 30 ‘Faure Gnassingbé coupe des têtes au sein des Forces armées togolaises’. Available at : www.focusinfos.com 31 Luc Abaki, ‘Ali Nadjombe : « Préparer nos soldats pour le Darfour »’, République Togolaise, 20 February 2008. Available at: www.republicoftogo.com 32 ‘Fronde des lieutenants’, Politique Hebdo, 25 March 1971. 33 Dimas Dzikodo, ‘Analyse du rapport Gnofame. Le cœur du pouvoir est-il impliqué dans le trafic de drogue ?’, Forum de la semaine, 6 July 2006. 34 See ‘Togo-inondations: incurie du gouvernement qui prend l’eau de toutes parts!’, 17 July 2009. Available at : http://togo-presse-liberte.over-blog.com/article-33930039.html 35 See Communiqué from the Council of Ministers, 7 August 2008. Available at: http://www.tvt.tg 252 Comi M. Toulabor
36 See the various definitions of this concept in Fen Olser Hampson, John B. Hay et al., ‘The Many Meanings of Human Security’, Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 37 A few headlines from the local press: ‘Vive les voleurs et hommes à la machette’, Tingo Tingo, 15 October 2008; ‘Deux braqueurs arrêtés et brûlés vifs’, Le Canard, 7 November 2008; ‘Hier à Totsi, un voleur a échappé à la mort’, L’Indépendant Express, 11 November 2008; ‘Quatre présumés voleurs soumis à la vindicte populaire’, Xinhua; 17 March 2009. 38 General Eyadema, as quoted by Minister of Interior Théodore Laclé, in Livre Blanc, La vérité sur les complots contre le people togolais et son guide le général Eyadéma (Paris: ABC, 1980), 9. 39 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights - Impunity, Report of the Secretary-General, Document No. E/CN.4/2006/89, para. 41, 15 February 2006. 40 See an article by D. Sylvestre in L’Union, 30 August 2008, which describes the dysfunctions of the Togolese parliament. 41 See Agbeyome Messan Kodjo, ‘Déclaration d’Agbeyome Kodjo: Il est temps d’espérer’, Le Togolais, 2 July 2002. Available at: www.letogolais.com 42 See M. A., ‘Turbulences à la justice de Lomé’, Liberté Hebdo, 13 November 2008. 43 See ‘Le Pouvoir Judiciaire togolais’, available at: www.presidencetogo.com 44 See ‘Appui au Programme de Modernisation de la Justice (APJU)’. Available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr 45 Raphaël De Benito, ‘Togo: le don que l’œil de la justice ne verra sans doute pas’, Billet d’Afrique et d’ailleurs, no. 158, May 2007. 46 See ‘Leurre: la réforme de la justice togolaise selon la logique du système RPT’, Forum de la semaine, 17 December 2008. 47 See ‘Politique: la réforme de la justice togolaise à l’épreuve de la duplicité du pouvoir’, Forum de la semaine, 18 December 2008. 48 For further details on the CNDH, see Human Rights Watch, ‘Les Commissions gouvernementales des droits de l’homme en Afrique: protecteurs ou prétendus protecteurs? Togo. Commission nationale des droits de l’homme’, 2001. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/hrc/togo.html. 49 Dominique Darbon, ‘De l’introuvable à l’innommable: fonctionnaires et professionnels de l’action publique dans les Afriques’, Autrepart, no. 20 (2001): 27- 42. 50 See Nadim Michel Kalife, Pourquoi le Togo va si mal? Un schéma de sortie de crise (Lomé: Roitelet d’Afrique, 2008). 51 On these issues, see ‘Réformes des Etats africains’, L’Afrique politique 2001 (Paris: Karthala, 2001); See also Achille Mbembé, De la postcolonie: essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine (Paris: Karthala, 2000). 52 See Banafey Assih, ‘Conférence nationale souveraine’, La Nouvelle marche, 16 August 1991. 53 Ibid. 54 Alain Nococo, ‘L’Etat de droit au Togo: partis politiques et forces armées en séminaire de formation à Lomé’, AgoraPress, 25 August 2008. Available at: http://togoforum.com 55 See http://www.republicoftogo.com/central.php?o=5&s=79&d=3&i=272. 56 R. Kédjagni, ‘Maintien de l’ordre public: statu quo sur les réformes de la police nationale togolaise’, Liberté Hebdo, 20 August 2008. Togo 253
57 See ‘Conférence nationale souveraine: l’horreur à son comble’, La Nouvelle marche, 9 August 1991. 58 JUDA, ‘Restriction inacceptable à la liberté d’expression au Togo’, Communiqué, 6 March 2008. 59 JUDA, ‘Des exécutions sommaires et extrajudiciaires au Togo’, Statement, 20 February 2009. 60 GF2D/CRIFF, Etudes d’impact des services juridiques du GF2D en direction des femmes au Togo (Lomé, June 1999). 61 Applying these two measures to the plethoric army of 12,000 men will bring about a minimum reduction of 4,000 men (3,000 and 1,000), i.e. a corps of 8,000 men and a maximum reduction of 6,500 (5,000 and 1,500); i.e. 5,500 men in military service. Over five years, the complement of the military would be reduced to between 5,500 and 8,000 men, a relatively acceptable size in line with the size of the country’s population. This number is more than enough to carry out its national defence functions and additionally participate in UN peacekeeping missions. This would also make it possible to provide quality equipment to this army that is vulnerable in all ways and lacks just about everything.
Chapter 11
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Introduction
This volume represents a first opportunity to analyse security sector governance (SSG) dynamics within and across Francophone states in West Africa. As reflected in Chapter 1, the framework of SSG provides new ways of looking at these cases and, most importantly, of highlighting potential avenues to support security sector reform (SSR). This, in turn, can assist the important work of diverse national, regional and international stakeholders seeking to promote more effective, well-managed and democratically governed security sectors within these countries. Sharing the French language, a common colonial history, inherited institutions and similar political structures and cultures, these states can most certainly be considered an important category for analysis in their own right.1 Yet we also seek to move beyond the unhelpful notion of a ‘divide’ – linguistic or otherwise – sometimes portrayed as running through the region. Instead, this volume attempts to build bridges by shedding light on security- related issues that have not received attention within the countries in question nor have they been the subject of critical analysis as part of the SSR discourse. In recent years, many states have become less able to provide basic security to their population or to fend off opportunistic challenges by armed groups. In addition to the more prominent crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, low intensity armed conflicts persist in Mali, Niger and Senegal, despite continuous efforts to resolve them. These conflict dynamics are exacerbated by threats ranging from the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, an increase in organised crime, cross-border trafficking in drugs, counterfeit products, human beings and weapons. In effect, while many challenges confronting West Africa cut across geographical and linguistic boundaries,2 unquestionably, certain dynamics may be particular to contemporary 256 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Francophone contexts. Three brief examples are illustrative. First, in Côte d’Ivoire the delicate work of integrating two armies has been further complicated by the bloody post-electoral crisis culminating in the overthrow of former President Gbagbo in April 2011. Second, in the wake of political turbulence and flagrant human rights abuses by elements of the security sector, Guinea has become the focus of international attention to develop options for SSR. Implementation of the recommendations contained in a report submitted by a multi-stakeholder commission to the Guinean authorities should guide the country in its SSR process. And third, after the 18 February 2010 coup d’état, which was justified by its leaders as a legitimate response to the undemocratic practices of the former president, Niger is now at least in a position to undertake the necessary reforms. The new, democratically elected president must make SSR a priority in order to break the vicious cycle of military intervention in national politics. These snapshots highlight the complexity of reform settings in which technical and political considerations are intertwined. SSG concerns are thus particularly important as part of sensitive processes of democratic transition. This concluding chapter begins by mapping key security actors identified in the various country case studies. In order to move beyond formalised notions of the security sector, particular emphasis is placed on how individuals and communities experience security. It then considers how the political dynamics of security sector governance impact on the space for civil, democratic oversight over the security sector. Challenges to and entry points for SSR are assessed. The chapter concludes by drawing out key insights from this analysis and identifying elements of a future policy research agenda.
Mapping the security sector in Francophone West Africa
A superficial overview of how security is provided in different Francophone West African contexts would demonstrate a high level of uniformity across actors, their mandates and roles. However, applying a people-centred perspective leads to a qualitatively different set of questions and responses by considering how men, women, girls and boys actually experience security. This section considers evidence from the different case studies that helps us to move beyond ‘blueprint’ notions of the security sector by fleshing out the actual roles of state and non-state security actors in providing security to citizens. Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 257
Understanding the security sector in a broad sense helps to highlight a gap between the holistic concept outlined in the introductory chapter to this volume and the reality that important security actors may be marginalised, under-resourced or otherwise disempowered. This reflects a common trend of governments investing in the armed forces (or a portion thereof) to fulfil both external and internal security roles at the expense of domestic law enforcement capacities and other key functions such as corrections and customs services. The cause of this practice is the onus to shore up regime security, resulting in the entrenchment of a political hierarchy in relations between the army, gendarmerie and police (typically in that order) while disregarding the security of individuals and communities. The estrangement from the interests of communities and individuals that results from the focus on regime security is aptly illustrated in comparing police reforms in Mauritania with those in Benin and Burkina Faso. In Mauritania, as N’Diaye notes, there has been additional investment in the police, notably visible through increased recruitment levels. This process has followed a logic based on racial (i.e. pro-Arab) and clan affiliation. Additional capacities thus reflect and exacerbate the cleavages within Mauritanian society, fitting the purpose of increasing the ability of the police force to suppress political opposition. In contrast, Loko points to the significance in Benin of the development of a national security vision document that places strong emphasis on public service delivery in the role of the police. A direct outcome of this human security-driven approach was the elaboration of a policy of decentralisation with the goal of building up municipal police capacities closer to the needs of communities. A similar approach – also consciously adopting the language of human security – is reflected in the creation of Burkina Faso’s police de proximité. Beyond state security providers, a profusion of armed non-state actors including private security companies (PSCs), militias, vigilantes, or even religiously inspired terrorist groups, as recently observed in Mauritania, demonstrate the inherent complexity of national security architectures. In Côte d’Ivoire a generalised sense of insecurity has favoured the exponential rise of largely unregulated security companies in addition to often ideologically driven or ethnically based militias. This diversity of, at best loosely coordinated, actors complicate any solution to the crisis. In Guinea under Sekou Touré, Bangoura links the creation of the first popular militia to the need to provide balance against potential plotters in the armed forces. In Togo, like Côte d’Ivoire, university students’ associations have been politicised and securitised, reinforcing the central role in providing regime 258 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye security played by the armed forces and further blurring the boundaries of the de facto security sector. The post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire has starkly illustrated the grave consequences of instrumentalising the country’s youth in this way. In other countries, even with lower levels of insecurity than the cases described above, PSCs have proliferated. In general, this development has been welcomed as a commercial means to fill gaps in public security. Yet across the region these entities – whether nationally or foreign owned – operate in a regulatory vacuum. Details of their size, activities and work methods are unclear so it is impossible, for better or worse, to gauge their impact. Informal and commercial actors present challenges for security sector governance. Yet, it is evident that across the region non-state actors play an important role in providing security to citizens in the absence of such provision by the state. From a human security perspective, complementarity as opposed to approaches that ignore legitimate non-state security provision therefore offers a more promising principle that reflects the hybrid nature of many societies. Finally, if the state is unresponsive to the security needs of its citizens, it is inevitable that they will take measures into their own hands through commercial or informal arrangements. However, although only anecdotal examples are cited by some contributors, references to the growth of mob justice and vigilantism are nonetheless significant. Public lynching of thieves is perhaps a logical response to the vulnerabilities experienced by citizens (sometimes at the hands of the security sector itself). But it is also indicative of a wider breakdown in national governance systems.
Political dynamics of security sector governance
If the nine cases studied in this volume reflect political, economic and social trajectories that are, of course, distinct, our main (although not exclusive) focus is on post-authoritarian democratic transitions. Some states retain highly authoritarian political systems while others are governed by more democratic dispensations. If a number of states were spared the devastation of armed conflict, others are recovering from war and instability or are struggling to prevent the start or aggravation of latent conflicts. Nevertheless, there is also a remarkable consistency across the nine cases in relation to the political dynamics underpinning security sector governance. One basic reason is that SSR, through challenging the status quo in this most Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 259 sensitive area of public policy, inevitably implies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Contributors closely in touch with local realities identify resistance to change among national elites as the key obstacle to meaningful SSR processes at the national level. In order to better understand these dynamics, this section focuses on questions of political will for and against reform across the nine cases. From the early years of independence, West African states struggled to be reconciled to their newly formed status within an international system with its own dynamics and logic. This was evident when choices had to be made on the very form of the state, economic development strategies and so forth. Then as now, a particular challenge has been in the degree of commitment shown by political leaders to carry out reforms that challenge the vested interests of national elites. With respect to security, arguably the central issue for many African states, these difficult steps include reversing policies, practices and privileges that serve key actors within the security sector. For this reason, the nature of national security decision-making has consistently disempowered citizens. While this has proved a constant feature of a number of states that became captured by authoritarianism or cycles of conflict, it is also significant that this has been the case for others, despite wider processes of democratisation that began in the 1990s. Thus, the establishment of democratic security sector governance has remained an elusive aspiration across most of the states analysed in this volume. In many contexts, politicisation and the manipulation of ethnicity within the security sector pose significant challenges. In states with ethnically plural societies and armies with historical legacies of politicisation, ethnic or regional rivalries, this problem has been particularly acute. The consequences of such a Faustian bargain are illustrated by Raphael Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire. Civilian elites who came to control the state have politicised and instrumentalised the armed forces. In return, the regime is captured by the same interests that keep it in power. Consequently, there has been no imperative within the government to reform the security sector since the start of the rebellion in 2002. Following the end of hostilities, the various agreements to conduct disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and SSR have not been matched by a genuine political commitment to relinquish tight executive control of the security establishment. The presidential election supposed to end the long term political stalemate was finally held but only served to throw back the crisis into violent conflict. This dynamic makes SSR even more necessary. It remains to be seen whether President Ouattara and his government will at last initiate this process and make it a national priority. 260 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
In Mauritania, the distinct ethnic/cultural overtones that the security sector displays and the thorough politicisation and Arabisation of the military hierarchy likewise present a major obstruction to any effort to introduce serious reforms. The strong ethnic bias towards the president’s clan in the Togolese military – a consideration which shapes all promotions and turns the official military hierarchy on its head – is particularly tenacious because it taps into deeply rooted historical prejudices. Thus, according to Toulabor, ethnic bias is legitimised as ‘the North’s turn’ after perceived favouritism towards ethnic groups from the South of the country under earlier heads of state. Unsurprisingly, all contributors point to a conspicuous lack of political will to truly carry out necessary reforms in the security sector and its governance. Mauritania and (until recently) Guinea, are clear cut examples of military regimes. N’Diaye and Bangoura argue that reform is stymied because the military leaderships do not necessarily see reform as in their narrow interests. In Togo, where a civilian leader has succeeded his long reigning father, General Eyadema, Toulabor finds continuity in the tight links between the Togolese security establishment and the political regime. Yet although still hard to clearly discern, he identifies movements toward altering the status quo and addressing the problematic nature of regime security dynamics within a country that claims to be democratic, or at least in a process of democratisation. In Burkina Faso, a country that has remained mostly stable, the regime has succeeded in the delicate balancing act of projecting the image of a tolerant and open democratic political system while not ceding an inch on its unquestioned control over the security sector. Positive dynamics can also be found. Bayala explains the general ethnic harmony found in Burkina Faso as in large part due to a culture of preserving good relations between different groups through customary means. The absence of inter-ethnic or political tensions within Benin and Mali represent an important advantage according to Loko and Nimaga. These positive dynamics seem to echo the South African experience with its emphasis on transforming the ‘culture’ of security. Common to these cases is that difficult political decisions were accepted as a result of a genuine willingness among political and security elites as well as citizens to accept change in a spirit of wider national interest. Thus, the 1990 national conference in Benin was not just a forum for constitutional change but involved the conscious withdrawal of the armed forces from political life as a vital pre-condition for multiparty democracy. This is quite in contrast to the ‘controlled’ democratic openings briefly experienced in Guinea and Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 261
Togo. However, even in countries such as Benin and Mali, where progress toward more accountable government has been noticeable, it has remained remarkably difficult to carry out far reaching SSR. Senegal is conspicuous as the only country to have avoided overt praetorianism, demonstrating a long tradition of remarkably good civil- military relations and the cultivation of a certain level of democratic accountability. Yet within this propitious institutional framework, Bagayoko-Penone points out that the country has witnessed unmistakable authoritarian tendencies that have tended to instrumentalise security organs. In the case of the national intelligence service, although changes have been brought to its structure and orientation, she observes that reforms were enacted without input from the parliament under the tight control of the president. Bagayoko-Penone also points to the suspicion that a political militia may have been formed by security services affiliated with the party of President Abdoulaye Wade. Thus, even though Senegal is undeniably progressive in its approach to security sector governance, close ties between the executive and key security actors exist that are incompatible with the necessary democratic control of the security sector. In summary, despite significant changes in the political landscape of the Francophone part of the sub-region, a conception of security continues to predominate that conflates the security of the regime in power (or more narrowly that of the head of state) with national security. Important moments have in some cases been seized to reshape relationships and build confidence between different stakeholders. Yet, in large part, a lack of participation in security decision-making has only served to perpetuate cleavages between executives, security providers and citizens.
The space for democratic oversight
Evidence from across the cases points to a singularly weak culture of free speech on security issues, translating into a deficient knowledge base on SSR and SSG. The limited discourse in many Francophone countries coupled with a residual suspicion toward the SSR concept make it necessary to raise awareness and create opportunities for dialogue between different national stakeholders in order to build trust and avoid stereotype perceptions. This section builds on insights into the political dynamics of security sector governance by focusing on the character of security sector oversight and accountability in Francophone West African states. 262 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Following the example of Senegal discussed above, it is objectively the case that for every one of the nine countries considered in this volume, intelligence services remain shrouded in the most opaque veil of secrecy. It would be a suspicious breach of protocol to even invoke them and, even worse, propose subjecting them to some level of transparency and accountability as would be perfectly normal in a democracy. By the very nature of their work, intelligence services are inevitably the most obscure branch of the security sector. However, it is nonetheless indicative of a much wider malaise that the promotion of democratic oversight can be not only a somehow inappropriate occupation but also hazardous. Culturally ingrained patterns of security sector non-governance are thus major considerations that seem particularly prevalent in Francophone contexts. National parliaments are widely acknowledged as key actors in holding the security sector, and the executive branch as a whole, more accountable to citizens. This is particularly true in respect of the rule of law and human rights. Oversight of the use of funds is an important weapon in the arsenal of parliamentary oversight functions over the security sector. Through an inherent lack of transparency, the security sector is notably vulnerable to accusations of corruption in relation to weapons and equipment acquisitions for the armed forces. Contributors identify a number of weaknesses in the actual oversight role played by parliaments. Essentially, responsibility for security issues has largely been left to the discretion of the executive branch. This is evident as an issue of impunity (parliamentary committees rarely take the executive to task on security issues) and as a fiscal issue (no real power of the purse is held by parliaments). These challenges are evident in all the countries studied. If the withdrawal of parliamentary immunity on the say of the executive may explain this dynamic in Togo, even Senegal, a country with an otherwise deep-rooted parliamentary culture, has essentially abdicated this responsibility in the security sphere. A lack of influence is compounded by the capacity and resource gaps faced by parliaments. On one level, many parliaments suffer from inadequate budgets and a lack of parliamentary staffer support. On another, it must be acknowledged that an absence of security literacy may in some cases be less a problem than analphabetism (or a lack of understanding of the French language). Judicial oversight is also constrained through both political interference and resource constraints. Toulabor points to the debilitating effect of the appointment of very junior party loyalists to senior positions within the Togolese judiciary. Bangoura highlights how the credibility of the Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 263
Guinean judiciary was undermined by the fact that no independent judicial inquiries followed the acts of murder and rape committed by members of the armed forces against unarmed civilian protesters in September 2009. Civil society organisations in many parts of the world contribute expertise on security issues while also playing important security sector oversight roles. National civil society organisations and the media in Francophone West Africa have not focused on SSR. However, human rights abuses and other examples of mistreatment of citizens by the security sector are a frequent preoccupation, especially in strongly authoritarian regimes. This issue therefore provides a potential entry point for discussions on SSR. According to Nimaga, an image of the armed forces as endemically corrupt is widely held in Mali, notwithstanding its positive record of civil- military relations. Increasing transparency and moving beyond the reflexive utilisation of ‘secret defense’ can thus help re-orient negative perceptions of the security sector. It is also important to acknowledge that both civil society and media organisations have sometimes themselves been politicised and instrumentalised to ‘justify the unjustifiable’ as Ouattara describes the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. In the more propitious environment of Senegal, Bagayoko-Penone notes that political influence has eroded the ability of the media to question government behaviour. The re-orientation of values and roles must therefore involve security providers, management and oversight bodies.
Windows of opportunity for security sector reform
The analysis of the nine Francophone West African states makes it evident that SSR processes are not likely to ‘just happen’. It is also clear that for SSR to become a reality, a well-judged sense of timing and shrewdness in seizing opportunities are required. Some entry points are therefore context- specific and time bound. This section addresses entry points that require the seizing of such a propitious moment. A military coup took place in Niger in February 2010 as this volume was being completed. This was justified by parts of the military as a means to ‘save’ the country from political stalemate. Paradoxically, it may also provide a unique opportunity to carry out, or at least to initiate reforms as a crucial part of wider efforts to address the conditions that led to the coup in the first place. In order to move on, the military transitional regime could have critically examined the culture of coups d’état that seems to have taken root in Niger’s security sector. This did not happen. It is now for the new, 264 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye democratically elected authorities to acknowledge and act on the need for SSR which recent events certainly demonstrated as necessary. In Mauritania, N’Diaye points out that unravelling the August 2008 coup by General Ould Abdel Aziz was a pre-condition for SSR to have a chance of success. Mauritania’s window of opportunity therefore seems to be closing with the legitimisation of the authors of the coup that ended its democratic experiment. However, one entry point could be the prime minister’s recent declaration about the willingness of his government to carry out ‘a modernisation and professionalisation of armed and security forces’ of the country.3 While it is not clear what was meant by the phrase in the context of a regime led by a former commander of the state security body (the BASEP),4 such a declaration of intention should certainly be seized upon as a possible entry point to engage Mauritania on the road to a much needed SSR process. Efforts to end the political and military crisis in Côte d’Ivoire seem to present national actors as well as the wider international community who played an unprecedented role in the resolution of the 2010/2011 post- electoral crisis with an opportunity to integrate SSR as a necessary part of any enduring political settlement. Certainly, a reorientation of the mission, objectives and values of the security sector within a new national and regional security policy framework is a critical requirement. Restating the internal and external security roles of different formal actors and standing down the various informal ‘patriotic’ militias will be essential. Most importantly, there is an urgent need to initiate a national dialogue process in order to build confidence and heal divisions that have emerged in all walks of national life. Peace agreements can help to resolve crises through introducing the necessity of SSR as a logical corollary to DDR.5 Even in low intensity conflicts that still afflict parts of Mali, Niger and Senegal, political solutions can be designed that include an SSR component. In Guinea, thanks to the providential 15 January 2010 Ouagadougou Declaration that afforded the country a way out of its political and security crisis, a blueprint for SSR was arrived at with the help of the international community.6 This document, adopted by all stakeholders after an inclusive national debate, constitutes a ready entry point for all willing to help its implementation. States such as Benin and Mali were able to gain a head start on SSR by taking advantage of a balance of power favourable to reformers during their respective conférences nationales. Assisted through the critical role played by civil society, they were able to create antecedents that still help shape the role, management and oversight of the security sector. While these Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 265 countries also have their own SSR needs, the dynamic created by this propitious environment should be emulated, for example taking advantage of the états généraux de la sécurité Francophone states organise when a security crisis or malaise warrant it. The political opening and rearrangement that seems to be taking place in Togo could certainly benefit from the experiences of Benin and Mali in altering the relationship between the military and the political class and civil society more broadly.
SSR entry points
Many dynamics across the nine cases offer opportunities to build synergies in promoting SSR across the countries of the sub-region. This sub-section draws on the different contributions to highlight broader entry points for SSR in Francophone West Africa.
1. Expanding the SSR knowledge base
As many contributors have pointed out, there is a need to foster a broader discourse on SSR issues at the national level. Gaps in knowledge and appreciation represent a serious challenge to any attempt to mainstream SSR. Francophone African countries have already lost ground on their Anglophone counterparts through a hesitation to acknowledge the pertinence of the SSR discourse. A clear French policy position on this issue was only forthcoming in late 2008, closely followed by the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). Since then, most Francophone West African states have embraced SSR, at least in principle. Misunderstandings by opponents and supporters alike remain a serious impediment to SSR taking a more prominent place in national political discourse. Opponents continue to misrepresent SSR as an externally imposed construct that disempowers those best equipped and prepared for security decision-making. Some supporters misconstrue SSR as an opportunity to demonise the security sector. They too fail to acknowledge the necessity of a sound security apparatus that is efficient and accountable yet enjoys respect and a certain degree of autonomy. Mainstreaming a governance-driven approach to SSR can help to bring these actors together and thus move beyond ‘stovepiped’ approaches to different elements of the reform agenda. The essential task of education and sensitisation can be supported by the increasing number of think tanks and academic organisations and institutions that are networking their support for SSR. Francophone West 266 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Africa may lack research and advocacy capacity specialising in security and defence matters. However, a large number of civil society organisations have accumulated valuable experience in human rights and international humanitarian law matters. While not understood as ‘SSR’, the work of civil society in these areas point to opportunities to shape curricula for training and development to focus on the ethics of professionalism and service to the citizen. Such activities thus constitute valuable entry points to support an SSR agenda. Sponsorship and capacity building can help carry out activities that include security sector education, sensitisation, and training.
2. Building space for oversight
The need to build trust between state institutions, security services and citizens is a common theme that runs through all the country case studies. Contributors unanimously identify empowering formal and informal oversight bodies as a means to embed a wider appreciation of security sector governance concerns in the national political discourse. A critical institution still struggling to narrow the knowledge, skill, and capacity deficits in many areas vis-à-vis the executive branch, the parliament is a natural conduit for SSR language, programmes, and activities. Indeed, its constitutionally defined role makes it an indispensable entry point. Results from the training, sensitisation and needs assessment programmes in West Africa carried out by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) in conjunction with the OIF point to wider opportunities within the sub-region. Similar efforts can be undertaken to target ECOWAS parliamentarians and help the pursuit of SSR at the regional level. Contributors highlight support for civil society organisations as a critical entry point. This can introduce and institutionalise the language and policy of SSR at the national level as well as at the regional level where the concept has already gained some traction. Civil society actors have been active in pushing for more accountability from the security sector, often at great risk to their individual members. The September 2009 massacre in Guinea is perhaps the most visible recent example of the cost of protest. Yet as Bangoura notes, it is also important to recognise that the national assembly subsequently lifted the state of emergency through fear of repercussions from citizens. In other words, there is power within civil society even in the most constrained environments. In many Francophone countries, civil-military relations commissions or committees exist that are active in furthering dialogue and interface between civilians and members of the armed forces. Often led by former Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 267 high-ranking military officers, they are trusted by the executive and security sector hierarchies. These bodies often lack means to function and could be supported as assets for the development of an SSR agenda.
3. Filling public security gaps
While acknowledging the key responsibility of states in initiating and guiding SSR processes, it becomes evident, particularly the further one moves from capital cities, that non-state actors play a major role in providing security and justice services to citizens. As discussed above, the positive development of creating municipal police units in Benin and Burkina Faso that can bridge formal and informal sectors at local level is undermined in practice by the lack of available state funding. While acknowledging the practical challenges of democratic oversight in relation to informal security actors, seeking ways to link up these actors with state security providers may be both cost-effective and offer the greatest pay offs in terms of improving the security of individuals and communities. A number of issues must be addressed in order to identify synergies between state and non-state security actors as a component of SSR policies and programmes. First, there is an insufficient level of detailed information. Mapping the range of influential security and justice providers is therefore a necessary precondition for designing effective reforms. Second, in some cases a laissez-faire attitude to commercial security providers is apparent: if private security companies fill gaps left by the state then this represents a useful service. Such facile assumptions need to be critically examined through additional focus on the accountability and oversight of PSCs. This may point to the need for tighter national regulation or training. And third, while solutions will always be context specific, approaches that seek to promote the human security of individuals and communities must avoid a commercial logic that establishes islands of safety for those that can pay, surrounded by wider insecurity for those that cannot.
4. Recasting national security frameworks
SSR processes need to be embedded within relevant policy and legal frameworks. New national security policies, sectoral reviews, the revision of existing but inadequate legislation and inter-agency cooperation mechanisms all fall under this category. This is a challenging undertaking because where policy frameworks do exist they have often remained frozen due to the sheer complexity of the law making process, public sector inertia and, more 268 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye specifically, the reluctance of parliamentarians to engage in the security field. Revised policy frameworks are particularly important in order to facilitate changes in security sector governance in contexts where authority has traditionally been narrowly channelled through the head of state. Yet even where this has not been the case, as in Burkina Faso and Mali, executive organisational capacity for security sector management and oversight is inadequate. Long traditions of security sector ‘self-control’ have resulted in passive parliaments, executives unused to oversight and disengaged civil societies. It is critical that the roles of the various components of the security sector are clearly delineated, codified and respected. A result of the mutually dependant relationships that have developed between executive authorities and different security actors is the absence of cooperation and coherence across security sector entities. Blurring of roles and responsibilities as well as unequal resource allocation has contributed to dynamics of animosity or competition particularly prevalent between armed forces, gendarmerie and police. In Benin and Burkina Faso this has resulted in an unhealthy spirit of competition between the army and public security forces. Such dysfunctional relations reached their nadir in Guinea with the armed forces used to aggressively suppress protests by the police over terms and conditions.
5. Investing in professionalisation
The civilian political class has a critical role to play in building an apolitical, professional security sector. This means resisting the temptation to appeal to the military to resolve political disputes and abstaining from injecting ethnic manipulation or other patronage-based approaches into their relations with the security sector. If the pernicious effects of politicisation and ethnicisation within the security sector are to be reversed, there is a need to focus on professionalisation at all levels. Criteria for recruitment must be reviewed in nearly all the countries studied. First and foremost, it is essential to instil a sense of professionalism and apolitical attitude and behaviour among the senior ranks within the security sector to avoid recurring military coups and the involvement of high ranking officers, formally or informally, in the partisan political process. As Toulabor points out, in Togo a silent majority of soldiers, gendarmes and police exist that are deeply unhappy about the erosion of professionalism as a result of politicisation. The exposure of ever increasing numbers of West African soldiers to external influences through training abroad or Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 269 participation in peacekeeping missions also lends a fresh perspective to conditions at home. This represents fertile ground from which to build reforms. On a different level, professionalisation has been adversely affected by the absence of decent and fair working and living conditions for security sector personnel. Particularly within the lower ranks, dismal working conditions are often rationalised to explain unprofessional behaviour and poor treatment of citizens. It is therefore essential that both national authorities and international partners make every effort to ensure the financial sustainability of reform programmes.
6. Mainstreaming gender
Gender inequalities continue to be a major challenge throughout West Africa. Therefore, mainstreaming gender considerations in SSR can provide an important contribution to reform processes that reflect the human security needs of all elements of society. To be sure, there are wide disparities when it comes to taking this issue seriously into consideration.7 Uniquely, Mauritania does not yet have a single female in the armed forces or the gendarmerie and only recently started recruiting female police officers. All the countries studied still have much in common, however, in part because of the cultural traditions of society at large as well as, more importantly, because of the institutional cultures of the security sector bodies themselves. For example, while Cape Verde recently appointed a female minister of defence and Liberia is making significant steps forward in mainstreaming gender within the armed forces and police, the prospect of such developments does not seem imminent in any of the Francophone countries in the sub-region. Differentiating the security needs of men, women, girls and boys is essential in order to understand the causes of insecurity in a given context as well as to identifying the wide range of actors (including women’s’ organisations and traditional security providers) that should be understood as part of the security sector. Security sector sensitisation and training activities are required to emphasise the practical benefits for coherence, morale and effectiveness of utilising the full range of available human resources, regardless of gender. In this respect, South-South experience sharing with African security actors that have made steps forward in gender mainstreaming can provide an important avenue to help shift entrenched attitudes. 270 Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
7. Operationalising a regional approach to SSR
Sub-regional harmonisation of the language, expectations and objectives of SSR can help reinforce this agenda at the national level. All West African states (with the notable exception of Mauritania, which withdrew from the organisation in 2000) have taken steps towards a coherent regional security framework within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). While the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) contains an explicit commitment to SSR, its implementation requires political commitment at the national level. A significant force multiplier effect of regional norms and standards can be in helping to expand the space for discussion by reform advocates at the national level. The ECOWAS Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces offers important pay offs because of its integrationist dynamic. The Code can help address key challenges identified in this volume through its emphasis on fostering relations between armed and security forces as well as on confidence building between civilians, the media and security actors. With both the code and the ECPF moving from policy development to operational phases, practical implementation of national political obligations within states is essential. Regionalism in West Africa has often foundered in the past on the fraught relations between individual states. The ECPF provides a means to reinvigorate a more coherent regional approach based on addressing common security needs and challenges. Moreover, the commitment of the OIF to the SSR/SSG agenda could provide a vehicle to promote a common regional language that cuts across linguistic or other boundaries.
Conclusion
The case studies in this volume confirm that the challenges of security sector governance facing Francophone countries are real, numerous and in some instances, daunting. But they can and must be met. Even with the requisite political will to engage in SSR, capacity gaps have meant that a comprehensive, sustainable reform process could not be constructed without the material and financial support of development partners. Yet no SSR process, regardless how well supported by donors, will be sustainable if not locally owned and driven.8 The SSR approach therefore should be understood as representing a break from past forms of security assistance that have focused more narrowly on training and equipping security Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 271 providers. A shared characteristic of Francophone countries in West Africa is that since their independence, France, as the former colonial power, has played a key role in their external and internal security policies. In some cases, this role went well beyond cooperation and assistance to influence the orientation and the choices made in the security domain.9 This highlights a frequent tension between sovereignty and intervention that can undermine externally-supported SSR. While local ownership remains a contested concept,10 at a minimum it means that national stakeholders have the opportunity and capacity to design and implement the SSR process. A major challenge is to find a convergence between ownership and appropriate international support. Obstacles to achieving this balance in practice are both political and technical. The bottom line is that development partners must apply SSR principles in practice and focus on capacity building activities that can contribute to more transparent, accountable and effective security sectors. The cases analysed in this volume demonstrate a number of common features in relation to institutional frameworks and organisational design.11 However, perhaps the most striking feature common to all West African contexts is a culture of security sector ‘non-governance’. Regardless of the available political space, which of course varies significantly from context to context, there is a general lack of engagement by parliaments, the media, civil society organisations and citizens on security matters. At the same time, Francophone states offer significant, under-analysed examples of transformation in relations between the security sector and citizens. This apparent contradiction points to the need to further develop a discourse on security sector governance within the region as a necessary pre-condition for reform. Concretely, this means reinforcing the knowledge base and capacities of those same formal and informal oversight actors that have not played their rightful role to date in promoting transparency and accountability in the security domain. It also means engaging in confidence building activities that seek to bring citizens and security actors closer together. SSR requires the manifestation of political will in individual countries. It also takes the collective determination of states to operationalise and rapidly start implementing the pertinent dispositions of the ECPF, singularly its article 72 which explicitly lays down objectives regarding security sector governance. These objectives are determined to be:
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[i] to eliminate threats to individual and group rights, safety, life, livelihoods, and property, and the protection of the institutions and values of democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law under a human security umbrella; [ii] to orient the focus and capacities of individuals, groups and institutions engaged in the security system to make them responsive and responsible to democratic control and adhere to basic human rights and the rule of law; [iii] to ensure the emergence and consolidation of accountable, transparent and participatory security systems in Member States.
There is no doubt that these are indeed commendable objectives and that the sub-region is in dire need of a political and security environment in which they are genuinely and vigorously pursued. Supporting the national level implementation of the ECPF and related initiatives such as the ECOWAS Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces represent important steps towards realising these objectives. While primarily seeking to understand dynamics particular to Francophone contexts, this volume underlines both old and new security sector governance challenges for the region as a whole. The burgeoning top down and bottom up privatisation of security represents a phenomenon whose effects are neither recognised nor addressed across West Africa. A necessary first step is therefore to map these actors and their roles in different national contexts. This analysis will help to identify specific requirements and options that may run from regulation to relationship- building between public and private security providers. An individual and collective sense of urgency is required and must be reflected in determined efforts by West African stakeholders. This will determine the success of SSR. However, the donor community, which has a stake in SSR as a conflict prevention and political stabilisation mechanism, must be involved. Concrete support will also be critical, even as it acknowledges the imperative of local ownership. All actors must seize on entry points that empower local actors and facilitate the start of pertinent, timely processes and activities. Small and steady victories will contribute towards the ultimate goal: a durably stable and peaceful West African community of states and peoples with democratically governed security sectors.
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa 273
Notes
1 See Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Francophone Africa and Security Sector Transformation: Plus Ça Change…’ African Security 2, no. 1 (2009): 1-29. 2 See Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye & ‘Funmi Olonisakin, Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008). 3 See ‘Le premier ministre présente la Déclaration de Politique Générale du gouvernement devant l'assemblée nationale’. Available at : http://www.mauritania.mr/fr/ 4 Battalion pour la Sécurité Présidentielle. 5 See Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2009). 6 An SSR evaluation team of experts supervised by General Lamine Cissé on behalf of ECOWAS and led by Professor Boubacar N’Diaye hammered out a consensus report that was formally and officially handed to General Sékouba Konaté, Head of State and President of the Transitional Authority that resulted from the Ouagadougou Declaration. The report outlines a comprehensive, far-reaching security sector program for Guinea. Its full implementation awaits the end of the transition. 7 See Miranda Gaanderse, Security for All : West Africa’s Good Practices on Gender in the Security Sector, DCAF Report (Geneva: DCAF, 2010). Available at: www.dcaf.ch 8 For an authoritative definition of and argument for local ownership, see Laurie Nathan ‘The Challenge of Local Ownership of SSR: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice’ in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais, 19-36 (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008). 9 See N’Diaye, ‘Francophone Africa…’, 2009. 10 Timothy Donais, ‘SSR Ownership: Theory and Practice’ in Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais, 9 (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008). 11 For a detailed analysis of Francophone African institutional and organizational particularities see: Kossi Agokla, Niagele Bagayoko and Boubacar N’Diaye, eds., La Réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, 2010.
List of Contributors
Niagale BAGAYOKO-PENONE has been a researcher at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at University of Sussex (UK) and a lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (IEP). She has conducted extensive field research on the security-development nexus in several francophone countries in Africa with a special focus on the institutional architecture of the security apparatus. She has worked as an expert with, inter alia, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the United Nations and the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) on questions relating to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Dominique BANGOURA is president of the Observatoire Politique et Stratégique de l’Afrique (OPSA) at Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and an international consultant specialising in peace, democracy, security and international relations in Africa. She was Secretary General of the Institut africain d’études stratégiques in Libreville, Gabon (1982-1990), lecturer in political science at Sorbonne (1992-1998) and director of the Institut des hautes études francophones in Paris.
Jean-Pierre BAYALA is a retired military judge, expert on international humanitarian law and the founder of the military justice system in Burkina Faso. He is a judicial advisor to the national Red Cross and a supporting lecturer at the Ecole nationale d’Administration et de Magistrature, as well as the Police, Gendarmerie and Military Academies in Burkina Faso. From 2005 to 2008, he was the UN coordinator responsible for drafting and implementing the law on the Congolese national police reform. He is currently working as an independent consultant for security sector reform and is a member of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP), the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo, Italy), and the consultative organ on humanitarian principles and diplomacy at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Geneva, Switzerland).
Alan BRYDEN is deputy head of research at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
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Théodore C. LOKO, career diplomat, is now ambassador of Benin to the Holy See. He also teaches law and political science at the University of Abomey Calavi and the University of Parakou in Benin. He was a visiting researcher at the Centre for International Law of the Université Libre, Brussels and is a member of the Société Française pour le Droit International. He is an expert in state theory and international politics in the domain of human security.
Boubacar N’DIAYE is an associate professor of political science and pan- African studies at the College of Wooster, Ohio. He has consulted with African, US and international agencies and organisations such as the African Union, the UN, ECOWAS, SIPRI, ACSS, and the Social Science Research Council’s Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. He is a member of DCAF’s International Advisory Board and holds similar positions in other organisations. He is widely published, specialising in civil-military relations and security governance. Recent work focuses on military affairs and democratisation prospects in African politics, pan-Africanism and interracial relations in America.
Mahamadou NIMAGA is a Councillor in international affairs with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mali. He holds a Masters degree in law from the Ecole Nationale d’Administration du Mali (1998), a diploma from the Ecole National d’Administration de Paris (2005) and a specialisation in post conflict management. Previously he was an assistant lecturer at the Ecole de Maintien de Paix Me Alioune Blondin Beye in the Faculty of Law and Politics of the University of Mali. In October 2009 he was called to the Permanent Representation of Mali to the African Union (Addis Ababa) as second councillor.
Raphaël OUATTARA is resident senior programme director (Mali and Guinea Conakry offices) of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and professor of psychology and quantitative methods at the University of Abidjan. He was president (1997-2002) of the Côte d’Ivoire branch of the International Association for Democracy in Africa, an NGO which promotes democratic values and is well-known for its conflict management and civic education work in Côte d’Ivoire. He is also one of the founders of the National Elections Observatory in Côte d’Ivoire.
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Comi M. TOULABOR is a researcher at the Centre d’Etude d’Afrique Noire (CEAN) at Sciences Po Bordeaux and a former editor in chief of Politique africaine (1992-1995). His research focuses on different political cultures, as well as the relationship between religious movements and democratisation in Africa in general, and in Ghana and Togo in particular.
About the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. To this end, the Centre develops and promotes appropriate norms at the international and national levels, determines good practices and relevant policy recommendations for effective governance of the security sector, and provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes to all interested actors.
Detailed information is available at www.dcaf.ch
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Rue de Chantepoulet 11 PO Box 1360 CH-1211 Geneva 1 Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 741 77 00 Fax: + 41 22 741 77 05 E-mail: [email protected]