SIR ERIC DRüMMûND, BRITAINtS AMBASSADOR TO ITALY, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN CRISIS OF 1935-1936

Araceli Julia P. Gelardi B.S., Florida International University, 1982

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of

His tory

O Araceli Julia P. Gelardi 1998 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY March 1998

Al1 rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other rneans, without permission of the author. National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Otbwa ON KI A ON4 Canada Canada Your fi& Votre rélérem

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The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distnier ou copies of this thesis in rnicroform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la foxme de microfiche/fïJm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété ddu copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d7auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts ~omit Ni la thèse ni des exitraits substantiels may be printed or othenivise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Abs tract This thesis examines the role Britain's Ambassador to Italy, Sir Eric Drummond, played on the formulation of British foreign policy during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6. Contrary to some past studies which ignore Drummond's impact on government decisions during the crisis, this thesis shows that he did play an important role in influencing many of the British goverment's decisions. This assessrnent has been arrived at by examining Drummondls tenure as ambassador during the crisis, and also by focussing on the perspectives of British governrnent officiais involved in the foreign policy decision-making process. These individuals include members in the Foreign Office such as the Permanent Under-Secretary and, in the political sphere, the Foreign Secretary. The thesis illustrates how Drummond played a key role during each phase of the crisis. Because of his position as arnbassador, Sir Eric was able to present British views and positions taken throughout the crisis to Mussolini and his aides. But, more importantly, Drummond was able to provide his colleagues and superiors in Whitehall with useful observations and, at times, convincing advice which aided the British government in formulating its policies in response to unfolding events. The thesis is based on an analysis of primary and secondary sources in English, both published and unpublished. The primary sources are comprised mainly of British documents such as those

iii found in the Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Poli tical

Files (F.O. 371) deposited in the Public Record Office at Kew,

Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print and Reports, and the Documents on British Foreign Policy- Cabinet and Foreign Office memoranda were also examined, as were other material found in the published diplomatic documents of Canada, Germany, and the United States. This emphasis on Foreign Office, Cabinet, and other diplomatic sources is integral to the thesis because it is in these materials that Drummondlsopinions and advice can be found, along with his governmentlsresponses and policies. Since much of the crisis was played out within the League of Nations, League publications were also used in this study, as were British periodicals and rnemoirs. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1 would like to express my appreciation to my supervisory cornmittee for their help throughout my graduate studies. Many

thanks go to Dr, Martin Kitchen for his advice and helpful

comments. f am also very much indebted to Dr. John Stubbs for

his invaluable suggestions and for his unfailing kindness.

Many thanks are also due to my husband and parents for their encouragement and support- Finally, to my daughters, Victoria

and Gabriella, for their unending patience and good humour, 1 dedicate this thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ...... O...... ii

Abstract ...... O. iii

Acknowledgements ...... v

Chapter One: Introduction - Background to the Italo-Abyssinian crisis...... 1

Chapter Two: A portrait of Sir Eric Drummond O...... 8

Chap ter Three : British foreign policy and the decision-making process. . 14

Chapter Four: The beginning of the crisis (Dec 1934-Sept 1935) Efforts by Britain, France and the League of Nations at finding a peaceful settlement ...... 23

Chapter Five: The middle of the crisis (October-December1935) War and more intensive efforts at resolving the conflict. . 70

Chapter Six: The end of the crisis (January-July 1936) Efforts to end hostilities and discussions on the lifting of sanctions .....-. 97

Chapter Seven: Conclusion .....O.-...... 108

ILLUSTRATION ...... 117

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 118

vi Chapter One: Introduction - Background to the Italo -Abyssinian crisis During 1935-6 Benito Mussolini embarked upon his rnost ambitious plan for acquiring a colonial empire, the conquest of Abyssinia. Decernber 1934 marked the official beginning of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis with a clash between Italian and Abyssinian troops at Walwal, sorne sixty miles inside Abyssinian territory. The crisis ended in July 1936 when sanctions imposed by the League of Nations were lifted. By that time, Italian troops had entered the Abyssinian capital of Addis Ababa (in May 1936), and forced Ernperor Haile Selassie to flee into exile. Throughout the crisis, intense negotiations were pursued (both within and outside of the League) in order to resolve matters. In the end, Mussolini acquired his East African empire. However, it was a venture which had exacted a hea-vy price £rom many of the players involved. Mussolini's scheme to subjugate Abyssinia was in accordance with Fascist philosophy, for success in this endeavour would illustrate how glorious and powerful Italy and il Duce were by providing an empire rerniniscent of ancient Rome. However, the whole adventure was not to be a straightforward affair, for the crisis engulfed not only Abyssinia and Italy, but also affected Great Britain, France, and the League of Nations. By the end O£ Mussolini's adventure in July 1936, European relations had become severely strained. The Stresa front of April 1935 consisting of Britain, France, and Italy in opposition to Nazi Germany's increasing belligerence, had disintegrated. Moreover, the League of Nations1 inability to deal successfully with the crisis had also rendered the League a fatal blow. The Italo-Abyssinian conflict was therefore not merely a crisis of relations between Italy and Abyssinia, but was, above all, a grave crisis with international implications, Ample scholarly li terature theref ore exis ts on various aspects of the

conflict, There are, for instance, studies on the devastating impact the crisis had on the League of Nations.' For contemporary accounts of the war itself, there are Pietro Badogliolsand Emilio de Bonolspro-Italian narrativesO2 Ange10 del Boca and Anthony Mockler have also written about the war, as has Thomas M. Coffey/ Coffeytswork places heavy emphasis on Abyssinia's emperor, Haile Selassie and presents a sympathetic account of him. Other aspects of the crisis can be found in works such as Franklin D, Laurens1 examination of French policy. He also analyzes the effect the crisis had on the French public as seen

See for example: Elmer Bendiner, A Time £or Ansels: the ~rasicomic Historv of the Leaque of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975); F.S. Northedge, The Leaque of Nations: Its Life and ~imes(New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 19 86) ; F. P. Walters, A Historv of the Leasue of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 19 52 ) -

Pietro Badoglio, The War in Abvssinia (London: Methuen Publishers, 1937) and Emilio de Bono, Anno XIIII: The Conquest of an Ern~ire (London: The Cressett Press, Ltd., 1937). These works of course are pro-Italian propaganda pieces published in English and aimed at British audiences and therefore need to be consulted with caution. They are also revealing in showing how Italy aspired to an -pire that was part of the British and French experience.

Ange10 del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935-1941 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Anthony Mockler, Haile SelassielsWar (Oxford University Press, 1984); Thomas M. Co£fey, Lion bv the Tail: the Storv of the Italian-Ethiopian War (New York: The Viking Press, 1974)- through newspapers, periodicals, and journal^.^ Brice Harris, meanwhile, details the role played by the United States during the crisis. He cites the great powersg lack of decisive leadership as a major contributing factor in Italyls ~ictory.~ For an overview of directions taken in Italian foreign policy through a seventy year period, C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari provide a detailed accountm6 Denis Mack Smith, an established historlan of Italy, portrays Mussolini as a driven man who sought prestige for Fascism and Italy through the acquisition of a colonial empire by means of a military conquesL7 Esmonde Robertson has produced a study of Mussolinifs foreign policy, highlighting his efforts at establishing Italian spheres of influence in Europe and Africa.' Several scholarly monographs have been published during the last thirty years on the crisis itself. Two examples focussing on the international dimension can be £ound in studies done by George W. Baer.g Frank Hardie has also written a thorough

' Franklin D. Laurens, France and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1935-1936 (The Hague: Mouton, 1967) . Brice Harris, Jr,, The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreicm Policv 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975) . ' Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981) and Mussolinils Roman Empire (New York: The Viking Press, 1976).

Esmonde M- Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder: Europe and Africa 1932-6 (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977) - George W. Baer, The Cominq of the Italian-Ethiopian War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967) and Test Case: Italv, Ethiopia, and the Leawe of Nations (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976). account of the crisis. He interprets the actions of the European powers as the first steps taken towards the policy of appeasement,1° A substantial portion of Baer and Hardie's monographs are devoted not only to the Italian and French perspectives, but also to the British foreign policy aspects of the crisis.'' In addition to these books, several journal articles also highlight the dilemmas facing British foreign policy makers

during the period. R.A.C. Parker illustrates this well in his paper entitled, "Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis,

1935-36." It focusses on the differing outlooks and responses of the British and French governments to the conflict, whicn eventually led to exceedinçly strained relations.12 Though a number of scholarly works on the Italo-Abyssinian crisis and its relation to British foreign policy have been produced, very little work has been written thus far on Sir Eric Drummond. To date, only one book appears to have been written on

10 Frank Hardie, The Abvssinian Crisis (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1974).

l1 Some of the books which have portions devoted to the Abyssinian question as it relates to British foreign policy include: R.J.Q. Adams, British Politics and Foreiqn Policy in the-~qeof Appeaçernent 1935-9 (London: Macmillan, 1993) ; Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New York: Morros, 1972); Northedge, The Leacme of Nations; Gaines Post, Jr., Dilemmas of Foreim Policy in the Aqe of Appeasement 1934-7 (Ithaca: Corne11 University Press, 1993) .

l2 R.A.C. Parker, "Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935- 36," Enqlish Historical Review, volume LXXXIX, no. 351 (~pril19741, pp, 293- 332. him, It covers his tenure as the first Secretary-General of the

League of ~ations.l3 In addition, one graduate thesis has been completed on ~rummond.'~ It re£utes allegations that the Ambassador was, by the end of his tenure, a Fascist sympathizer, On the Abyssinian crisis itself, Donald Rotunda shows how Drummond maintained his British loyalties. The thesis, however, does not delve into detail regarding the role Drummond may have had on the formation of British foreign policy in response to the crisis. His

influence is only brief ly alluded to -15 Another study on Drummondrsambassadorial role was published

in 1953 .16 However, this article by ~elixGilbert (which is a comparative analysis of the British Ambassadors to Germany and

Italy) focusses on the later stages of Drummond's tenure as

Ambassador. Consequently, it does not thoroughly cover the role he played during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. Furthermore, a 1984 review article by Anthony Adamthwaite on war origins

describes The Diplomats, 1919-1939 as "though useful and still in

print, rit] is fast approaching middle age. "17 He calls for

13 See James Barros, Office without Power: Secretary General Sir Eric Drummond 1919-1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

l4 Donald T. Rotunda, "The Rome Embassy of Sir Eric Drummondu (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1972).

'' Ibid., Chapters 4 and 5, pp. 154-309-

l6 Felix Gilbert, "Two British Ambassadors: Perth and Hendersonw in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, eds. Felix Gilbert and Gordon Craig (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19531, pp. 537-54.

l7 Anthony Adamthwaite, "War Origins Again," The Journal of Modem Historv, volume 56, no. 1 (March 1984), p. 114. historians to produce needed works on such thernes as "the influence of the prof essionals (rneaning the diplomats) . This is a theme echoed recently by Wesley Wark. In an article on appeasement published in 1995, Wark notes that there is a dearth of material on senior British Ambassadors posted to Europe's major capitals during the 1930s. Biographies, for

instance, have yet to be written on any of them.lg Occasional references to Drummond during the crisis can be found in some books and journal articles. The secondary literature which does exist on Drummondtsrole in relation to the British goverrient acknowledges only a segment of his influential role2', ref ers to it in passingzl,or disregards it.22

la Ibid.

l9 Wesley Wark, "Appeasement RevisitedI1 International Historv Review, volume XVII, no. 3 (August 1995). p. 559- A recent study by D.C- Watt seeks to provide more detail in this area of diplornatic historv. See Donald Cameron watt, "Chamberlainls Ambassadors," in ~ipiomacvand ~or~dPower: Studies in British Foreiqn Policv 1890-1950, eds- Michael Dockrill and d ri an McKercher (New York: Cambridge University Press, 19961, pp. 136-170.

Baeri s two monographs, for example, ref er to Drummondl s in£luential role to a certain extent. See also Parker, "Ethiopian Crisis," pp. 303, 312, 314, 318-19.

*' Bendiner, A Time for Ansels, pp. 349, 355; J.A. Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare: a Political Biosraphv (London: Jonathan Cape Ltcï., 19771, p. 203; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, pp- 117, 124; A.R. Peters, Anthonv Eden at the Foreiqn Of fice, 1931-1938 (Aldershot: Gower, 1986) , p. 124; Post, Dilemmas of Foreisr. Policy, pp. 122, 200; James C. Robertson, "The Hoare-Laval Plan," The Journal of Contem~orarvHistorv, volume 10, no. 3 (19751, p. 437; Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder, p. 172-

22 Ian Colvin, None So Blind: A British Diplornatic View of the Orisins of World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace & world, Inc., 1965) ; F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant: Britain Amons the Great Powers, 1916-1939 (New York: Praeger, 1966) , Northedge, in his Leasue of Nations, discusses Drummondls earlier role as League Secretary-General and also has a chapter devoted to the Abyssinian question. However, no reference is made to any sort of influential role which Drummond could have had with his government during the Abyssinian crisis. The same can be said for Walters' Historv of the Leasue of Nations. He devotes some seventy pages to the crisis and also goes into detail about Drummond as League Secretary-General, yet no mention is made Therefore, a substantial gap in the literature exists concerning a detailed study of the role played by Sir Eric Drummond throughout these events, This thesis is thus an attenpt at contributing to the historical literature on the crisis by

bridging this gap. It will attempt to do so by systematically analyzing the Ambassadorlç role and illustrating how he helped London £rame its foreign policy initiatives with respect to the Abyssinian crisis. Before we analyze Drummondlsrole as Ambassador in detail, his earlier career at the British Foreign

Office as well as his tenure as the League of Nationst first

Secretary-General will be examined-

of any possible significance Drummond could have had for the British throughout the conflict. ~endiner'sA Time for Ansels also describes Drummondls early League role in detail as well as his ambassadorial role in Rome. His examination of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis however, has few references to Drummond, Chapter Two: A portrait of Sir Eric Drummond A little over a year be£ore the Abyssinian crisis broke, the British embassy in Rome saw a change of Ambassadors. In October 1933, after 12 years' service as Ambassador, Sir Ronald Graham departed frorn Rome and was replaced by Sir (James) Eric

Drwnmond. l Born in 1876 to a prominent Scottish family with connections to the crown2, Eric Drummond was educated in Eton. Thereaf ter, like others of his social standing and education, he sought a career in the diplornatic service where his fluent cornmand of

French and German could be placed to good use/ After passing the challenging entrance examination of the Foreign Office, he

was duly accepted as a clerk in 1900.' During the next nineteen years, Drummond showed himself to be a capable and dependable

Sir (Janes) Eric Drummond (1876-1951),became the 16th Earl of Perth in 1937, succeeding his half-brother, Upon succeeding to the earldom, Drummond also became Lord Drummond of Cargill and Stoball, 10th Viscount Strathallan, Lord Drummond of Cromfix, Hereditary Thane of Lennox, Hereditary Steward of Menteith and Stratheam, and Chief of the Clan Drummond. From Frank C. Roberts, comp., Obituaries £rom the Times 1951-1960 (Reading: Newspaper Archive Developments Ltd., 1979), p. 566.

The Drummond family czn trace their lineage to the 13th century. Ancestors include two queen consorts of Scotland. Queen Anabella (née Drummond), consort of Robert 111 of Scotland, was the ancestor of al1 succeeding monarchs of Scotland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom. The earldom of Perth was granted in 1605. Burke's Peerase, Baronetaqe & Kniqhtaqe (London: Burke's Peerage, 1970), pp. 2098. ' Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 55. Though he could read it, his Italian was not fluent. When Drummond conversed with uss soli ni or Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolinils son-in-lawand Foreign Minister, it was in French, Ibid., note 7.

Drummondls life between his departure from Eton and his arriva1 at the Foreign Office appears to be somewhat of a mystery. It would appear that he may have been educated further at home or travelled throughout the European continent in order to polish his linguistic skills. Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," pp. 55-6. individual, rising through the ranks and becorning the Private Secretary of Prime Minister Asquith (1912-1915)and Foreign

Secretaries Grey (1915-1916) and Balfour (1916 -1918). During his tirne at the Foreign Office, Drummond showed himself to be not only able and cornpetent5, but also influential with such individuals as ~alfour ." Drmond's abilities and dedication to his duties did not go unnoticed. When, in 1919, the time came to select the League of Nations1 first Secretary-General, the forty-two year old Sir Eric Drummond was thought to fit the role admirably- His discreet presence at Balfour's side and his own enthusiasm for the League had caught the attention of President Wilson during the peace negotiations in Paris, The President carne to value Drummond as a confidante. Wilson liked Drummondfs judgment and efficiency which he had seen firsthand, for Balfour allowed Drummond (whom he glowingly described as "the perfect Private Secretaryw) to handle most of the work dealing with the League.' Lord Robert Cecil, a keen supporter of the League and member of the British

That he was competent and had proven himself at the ~oreignOffice can be seen when Drummond was awarded a KCMG (Knight Commander of St- Michael and St, George) with the right to be styled as "Sir Eric Drummondu in 1916. Further evidence of Drummondtscapabilities cari be seen in his name being included among a list of respected individuals, for consideration to the important post of British Ambassador to Washington in 1919. Ian Malcolm (for A.J. Balfour) to Lloyd George, 25 February 1919, Lloyd George Papers, House of Lords Record Office, London. Henceforth, Lloyd George MSS.

Barros, Office without Power, pp. 12-13, 383-384, 387; Walters, Historv of the Leaque, p- 75. Evidence of Drummondls influence with Balfour can also be found in the correspondence between Drummond and Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), David Lloyd George's Private Secretam- See for example, Drummond to Kerr, 18 and 23 January 1919, Lord Lothian Papers, Edinburgh, Scottish Record Office. Henceforth, Lothian MSS. ' Bendiner, A Time for Anqels, pp. 133-4. delegation at the Paris Peace tafks, was also impressed with Drummond and had successfully persuaded ~avidLloyd George to support Drummondlsnomination for the post of Secretary-General.' Drummond was duly sworn in as the first Secretary-General of the newly fonned League of Nations. As Secretary-General, Sir Eric ~rummondheld the view that the League should develop as an international organization, open to al1 countries, despite objectionable characteristics of some regimesag He also understood the limitations that the League faced, owing to the absence of political and rnilitary support £rom the United States.'' Because he understood the coercive limitations of the League, Drummond consistently sought to foster international cooperation among the Leaguefsmembers.': One of the ways in which he sought to prornote international cooperation was by conducting a series of persona1 visits to various European

Lord Robert Cecil to Lloyd George, 21 April 1919, Lloyd George MSS.

Barros, Office without Power, p. 27.

la Drummond to Arthur Salter, Director of the ~conomicand Financial Section of the League Secretariat, 23 December 1929, viscount Cecil of Chelwood Papers, AD 51111, British Library, London, en ce for th, Cecil MSS; The Earl of Perth, "San Francisco Hopes," The Spectator, no. 6094 (13 April 19451, p. 330.

Barros, Office without Power, pp. 41-2. Moreover, according to Drummond, the League should work I1by persuasion, not by forcew and as such, the League "cannot irnmediately impose its will on a recalcitrant Party." Sir Eric Drummond, "The League of Nations, The Spectator, no- 5236 (3 November 19281, p. 639. capitals. It was during one such visit, to Rome, that Drummond

first met Mussolini in 1923 .'2 During his tenure as Secretary-General, Drummond typified the quintessential British civil servant through his modesty, discretion, and careful approach to innovation.13 Though at times Drummond appeared to lack charisma, he was invariably described as being an astute and circumspect ~ecretary-~eneral." He read al1 important documents, often late into the evening, returning them with his amotations to the writer within twenty-

four hours.15 He also had, as James Barros describes him, "the rare gift for conciliating divergent positions and in a modest and deprecating fashion offer a suggestion which would satisfy

both sides and enable the work to be resumed. "16 After more than a dozen years at the League's helm, Drummond decided that it was time to move on. It was a decision which he did not take lightly.17 Not only had thirteen busy years as

12 Barros, Office without Power, pp. 268, 276; Sir Ronald Graham to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 9 November 1923, Great Britain, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the ~oreisnOffice Confidential Print, series Fr Europe 1919 -1939, volume 5, Italy & Southeasten Europe, July 1921-December 1923, doc. 316, pp. 423-5. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, general editors, Christopher Seton-Watson, editor, University Publications of America, 1992. Henceforth, BDFA, series FI vol. 5.

l3Northedge, Leaque of Nations, p. 51.

l3 Barros, Office without Power, p. 26.

LS Rotunda, laRomeEmbassy, p - 91.

l6 Barros, Office without Power, p- 25.

" Dmond to Gilbert Murray, 1 February 1932, Gilbert Murray Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. Henceforth, Murray MSS. Murray, Professor of Greek at Oxford University, was a staunch supporter of the League throughout its existence and a rnoving force of the League of Nations Union. Secretary-General taken their toll on his health, Drummond also felt it necessary to leave for the League1s sake because he did not want the secretariat to become too associated with one individual.18 Accordingly, much to the regret of many, Drummond tended his resignation and requested to return to the British diplornatic service £rom which he had been seconded.lg Tributes to Sir Eric's professionalism and dedication were not short in

corning. 20 There were for instance, the sentiments expressed by Eamon de Valera, the Acting President of the Leaguels Council concerning the Secretary-Generallsresignation, He described Drummond as possessing ...unremitting industry, ...loyalty and devotion to the work of the League. . . (his) decisions will remain as an example to those who carry on in the years to corne... His judgment, tact, impartiality and unfalling courtesy are known to al1 who corne to Geneva ... (They) must recall occasions (on) which the solution of problems of great difficulty and delicacy was made easier by the efforts of the Secretary-General to find the highest comrnon rneasure of agreement.21

Il3 Drummond to Sir John Simon, 7 January 1932, Cecil MSS, ADD 51112.

l9 Rotunda, "Rome Embassy, ", p. 93; Barros, Office without Power, p. 381; The League of Nations, The Monthly Summarv of the Leaque of Nations, volume XII, no. 1, January 1932 (London: G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., League of Nations Department, 1932) .

20 Examples of tributes paid to Drummondls tenure as Secretary-General can be read in The League of Nations, Monthlv Summarv of the Leasue, vol. XII, nos- 8 & 9, August & September 1932, p. 245; Ibid., vol. XII, no- 11, November 1932, p. 364; Ibid., vol. XIII, no. 6, June 1933, p. 130- F.P Walters, a former Deputy Secretary-General of the League, in his Historv of the Leaque, was full of praise for Drummondis abilities as Secretary-General, pp. 558-9. *' Acting President of the Council to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the Resignation of the Secretary-General, 27 September 1932. Canada, Documents on Canadian Extenal Relations, volume 5 (1931-1935)- Alex 1. Inglis, ed., doc. 255, p. 275 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1973). Henceforth, DCER. Added to this was praise for his smiling patience in tirnes of difficulty, his perfect calm in the adjustment of differences, and above al1 the sense of moral and intellectual integrity with which he has inspired those who corne to Geneva in search of international peace and ~rder.~~

Drummond left the League on 30 June 1933 and took up his

post in October as head of the British embassy in Rome where he

served as the British Ambassador to Italy from 1933 until 1939.

2 2 League of Nations, Monthlv Summarv, vol, XIII, no. 6, June 1933, p. 153, Chap ter Three : British foreign policy and the decision -making process Before beginning an analysis of Drummond's role during the

Abyssinian crisis, it would be appropriate to digress and examine

the decision-making process in government as it relates to Great

ri tain in the mid 1930s. Though a number of government agencies

may have been involved in the process of creating a viable

foreign policy, it was the Cabinet which bore the primary

responsibility for the formation of foreign policy. l Within the

cabinet itself, there also existed at tirnes, a so-called "Inner Cabinet. Members of this select group tended to dominate

cabinet discussions due to the importance of their ministries, their political clout, or their personalities. Besides debating the issues at hand, the Cabinet also relied on a number of experts to guide them in order to arrive at

a decision- These experts could be found not only within the Foreign Office itself but also among the various inter- departmental comrnittees which were created as advisory b0dies.l

' AS head of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister also bore the ultimate responsibility for the formation of foreign policy. BymE. Carter, The Office of Prime Minister (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 296; Ivor Jemings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19611, p. 218; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, p, 38.

As Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald had such an Inner Cabinet £rom 1932-5 known as "the Six," which counted Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, as one of its members. Jennings, Cabinet Government, pp. 253-4, MacDonald's successor, Stanley Baldwin, often allowed discussions at Cabinet meetings to drift, providing Simon and his successor, Sir Samuel Hoare, opportunities to dominate at such meetings. John P. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1968) , p. 478.

One such example was the Cornmittee of Imperia1 Defence (C.I.D.), chaired by the Prime Minister. Gaines Post, Jr., IlThe Machinery of British Policy in the Ethiopian Crisis," International Historv Review, volume 1, no. 4 (October 1979 ) , pp. 522 - 3. Some of these Cabinet cornmittees were long-standing and permanent while others of an ad hoc nature were created to deal with a particular problem. Though the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues ultirnately made the final decisions on important matters dealing with foreign affairs, and hence, ultimately made policy, it was another Cabinet member, the Foreign Secretary, who was entrusted with the job of ensuring that the government's policy was presented and de£ ended in parliament .' Moreover, the relationship between the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary could have some effect on the conduct of foreign policy6, as was the case in the Abyssinian crisis. For instance, Ramsay MacDonald, who was ill, could defer to Sir John Simon (an effective speaker at Cabinet meetings7), on such issues. A sirnilar case could be made for Stanley Baldwin. Since he was

Hiram Miller Stout, British Government (New York: Oxford University Press, l953), p. 86.

Leo D. Epstein, "British Foreign Policy," in Foreiii Policv in World Politics, ed. Roy ~acridis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc,),

Mackintosh, British Cabinet, pp. 454-5; Carter, Prime Minister, pp. 296-7.

' Mackintosh, ~ritish Cabinet, p. 479. relatively indif ferent to matters of foreign policy8, his Foreign

Secretaries inevitably took leading roles in this sphere.9 Within the Foreign Office itself, the Permanent Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (PUS) assumed his duties as the administrative head of this important government department. As a career officer and non-political appointee carrying the rank of an ambassador, the PUS served as the chief official adviser of his superior, the Foreign Secretary," As PUS from 1930 to 1938, Sir Robert Vansittart was undoubtedly the dominant figure in the Foreign Office during the 1930s" and cornmanded at times within the Foreign Office, a large persona1

following. l2 Vansi ttart, however, was not exempt f rom

Baer, Test Case, p. 48; Carter, Prime Minister, p. 297. Anthony Eden, who succeeded Hoare as Foreign Secretary, reportedly found Baldwin of little help when handling issues related to foreign policy (Carter, Prime Minister, p- 297, note 2).

Though the Cabinet assumed final responsibility for policies, Sir Samuel Hoare (Simon's successor as Foreign Secretary), was given much leeway by Baldwin in the creation and execution of foreign policy. Baer, Italian- Ethiopian War, p. 176.

'O Epstein, "British Foreign Policy," p. 37 and W. Selby, "The Foreign Office," The Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 137 (19451, p. 5; Arthur Willert, IlThe Foreign Office Within," The Strand Maqazine, volume XC, (November 1935-April l936), p. 400.

Thomas H, Keene, "Sir Robert Vansittart and the British Foreign Office, 1930-1938," Proceedinss and Papers of the Georsia Association of Historians (1981), p. 80; B.J.C. McKercher, "The Last Old Diplomat: Sir Robert Vansittart and the Verities of British Foreign Policy, 1903-30," Diplornacy & Statecraft, volume 6, no. 1 (March 1995), pp, 2, 13.

l2 Rotunda, ''Rome Embassy, p, 244, Geof frey Thompson (an Abyssinia expert who at one time, was acting head of the Egyptian department at the Foreign Office) said what a great joy it was to work for Vansittart. This was so because according to Thompson, Vansittart "never dithered, nor did he ever fear responsibility," Geoffrey Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat (London: Hutchinson of London, 1959), pp. 86, 94. criticisms.13 Moreover, his forceful personality and strong anti-German views also ensured that the Foreign Office was not immune from interna1 discord.14 Throughout the Abyssinian crisis, Vansittart was a formidable PUS who was aliowed considerable latitude on foreign poficy decisions.15 It would thus appear that during the mid 1930s, the relationship between the Foreign Secretary and the PUS mirrored to some extent, that of the Prime Minister and Foreign

Secretary, In other words, just as the Prime Ministers -

MacDonald and Baldwin - had conceded some ground to their Foreign

Secretaries; so too, did the Foreign Secretaries - Simon, Hoare, and Eden - concede some ground to the PUS when it came to handling issues related to international relations.16 Simon and Eden listened to Vansittart at times, while Hoare, in particulâr, appears to have found the PUS persuasive in many instances."

13 Among Vansittart's detractors at the Foreign Office was Walford Selby, who later became the British ~assadorin Lisbon (1937-40)- Norman Rose, Vansittart: Studv of a Diplomat (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 19781, pp. 69, 267- The PUS also clashed at times with Sir Maurice Hankey (who, as Secretary to the Cabinet and the C.I.D., had a close working relationship with ~aldwinand the Cabinet), Ibid., pp, 72, 142, 147; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, pp. 131, 153. Though they sornetimes differed over Vansittart's running of the Foreign Office, Hankey also conceded that vansittart was a "very good" PUS and that Hankey owed him a lot. Rose, Vansittart, p. 181.

'' Post, "Machinery of British Policy," p. 527.

l5 Robertson, Empire Builder, p- 118; Neil Hart, The Foreisn Secretarv (Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton Ltd., 19871, p. 6.

l6 Rose, Vansittart, p. 105. Some have taken the argument further, B.J.C. McKercher, for instance, contends that Simon was bypassed at times for Vansittart by MacDonald who relied on the latter for guidance in the field of foreign affairs. B.J.C. McKercher, "Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1939," Diwlomacv and World Power, p. 104.

l7 Rose, Vansittart, pp. 164, 169; Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, p. 263. For Eden and Vansittart, see McKercher, "Old Diplomacy, pp. 105, 114. Though Eden and Vansittart might have differed at times during the crisis, it When Vansittart assumed his appointment as PUS in 1930, the Foreign Office had by then reclaimed its ascendancy and was again able to hold its own as the centre in the planning and execution of British foreign policy. Though much ground had been conceded by the Foreign Office in terms of shaping foreign policy during David Lloyd George's premiership, aftew the Prime Minister's £al1 and thanks to the dedicated efforts of successive Foreign Secretaries such as Lord Curzon, Ramsay MacDonald, and Austen Chamberlain, a reversa1 in fortunes had occurred. By the tirne of the Abyssinian crisis, the Foreign Office had been successful at re-securing its dominant role as the central authority in the creation and conduct of British foreign policy.'* In order to formulate policies, the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office relied on missions abroad to provide them with information and advice on a diversity of matters. Since shifts in policy needed to be discerned, reported, and acted upon q~ickly'~,it became of paramount importance for ambassadors to fulfil the two main duties of a diplomat. As head of a British diplomatic mission abroad who was under the direct control of the

was never really serious enough to prompt either one £rom resigning his post.

l8 McKercher, "The Last Old Diplomat," pp. 16, 17, 24, 25; McKercher, "Old Diplomacy," pp. 80, 87, 93, 98, 100, 114.

l9 William Strang, The Diplornatic Career (London: Andre Deutsch, 19621, p. 17. Foreign office2', Drummond had to be both a representative of his

government as well as a reporter to his government. 21 In this sense, British ambassadors were able to affect British foreign policy. They did so because the information they

sought and provided on the countries to which they were accredited were used by the Foreign Office and Cabinet to frame

Britain's foreign policy. It was a foreign policy which was

always dictated by national interests in peacetirne and in war, regardless of the political ideologies of the government in

power. A considerable sense of continuity prevailed in the

formation and execution O£ policies because it was necessary to

adhere to certain principles deemed to be in the vital interests

of national and imperial security. 22 Moreover, ri tish foreign

policy 'Iconsisted of achieving what was possible, and was rather

flexible in its execution. M23

2 0 William Strang, The Foreisn Office (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., l955), p. 60-

21 Donald G. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreiqn Relations (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 19611, P. 297. The main function of erbassies was to gather information. Though much of it was done formally through official meetings, much information was obtained informally as well through social functions among em'oassy staff and the local elite- See Zara Steiner, "The Diplornatic Life: Reflections on Selected British Diplornatic Memoirs Written ~eforeand After the Great Warli in Political ~emoi;: Essavs on the Politics of Mernorv, ed. George Egerton (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1994)t p. 182-

22 F.A. Voigt, "Opinion and ~olicy,"The Nineteenth Centurv and After, volume CXXVIII, no- 824 (October 19451, p. 145.

23 Keith Neilson, llOnly a d.-.d Marionette? The Influence of Ambassadors on British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914,uin Diplomacv and World Power, pp. 56-7- Also, whenever the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office enjoyed close ties (as was generally the case during the Abyssinian crisis), the Foreign Office inevitably played a central role in the formation and execution of foreign policy, This was so because as political appointees, Foreign Secretaries usually sought the advice of the diplomatic experts at the Foreign Office in order to corne to a decision on matters relating to foreign A myriad of information flowed on a daily basis between the Rome embassy and the Foreign Office in London during the entire Italo-Abyssinian crisis. After receiving reports from Rome, the Foreign Office ' s resources were, mobilized at high speed to bear on the problem (outstanding); the CO-ordinating activities of the Cabinet quickly employed to correlate the action of various ministries. The process (was) that of making a decision, and the best ski11 and knowledge (were) organized to make the decisions as effective as possible-.,24 Once information from abroad arrived at the Foreign Office, the administrative machinery went into action. Information would

make its way up from the experts at the Southern Department who, since 1934, were responsible for Italy. The volume of work at the Foreign Office during this time had risen tremendously due to the cri si^^^, so much so, that the Abyssinian department was created in 1935 with XI. Campbell (and later Maurice Peterson) as its he~d.~~Accompanying the rise in workload associated with the crisis, was a corresponding increase in expenditure at the Foreign Office for telephone and telegraph use. Düring 1936, it was estimated that some £70,000 was spent by the ~oreignOffice affairs, Strang, Diplornatic Career, pp. 14-5.

2C Philip W. Buck and art in B. Txavis, Jr., eds. Control of Foreign Relations in Modem Nations (New York: W.W. Norton & Co,, Inc., 1957), pp. 274-5. This was, of course, the ideal method to follow. Clashes did occur among (and within) the ministries, Cabinet members, and the Foreign Office. Compromise was understandably the key to securing agreements. Stout, British Government, pp. 83, 86-7; Carter, Prime Minister, p. 308; Mackintosh, British Cabinet, p. 455.

25 Thornpson recalls how the workload for Allyssinian crisis was so great that he would often return home on the last train at 10:48 p.m. Thompson, Front-Line Diolomat, p. 104, in telephone charges alone, an increase of about sixty percent from the previous year. The increase was attributed in large part to the crisis it~elf.~~ Within the Foreign Office, group consultation became the

ob j ective, with di£f erent grades studying and minuting their evaluations. This ensured that senior members of the Foreign Office hierarchy would be fully cognizant of al1 the possible consequences that might arise with each unfolding scenarioe2* Of ten, junior members of respective departments would make the initial comments to despatches. From there, the despatches would make their way up the grades. Those of major importance would be studied and carefully commented on by heads of departments, assistant under-secretaries, and then the PUS himself. From here, often after consultation with the PUS, the Foreign Secretary would arrive at a final de~ision.~'

Though reaching a consensus was the objective at the Foreign O££ice, this did not always occur. Divisions did arise among the experts as to the appropriate courses of action to take during

the crisis - mirroring to some extent, the opinions of the

27 Arthur Willert, "The King's Messengers: the Work of our Diplornatic Service AbroadrV The Strand Masazine, volume XC, May-October 1936, p. 15.

28 Ephraim Maissel, The Foreign Office and Foreiw Policy 1919-1926 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994), p. 31; Owen OIMalley,The Phantom Caravan (London: John Murray, 1954) , pp . 35 - 3 6; Willext, "Foreign Office, pp. 402-404; John Tilley and Stephen Gaselee, The Foreign Office (London: G.P. Putnamls Sons Ltd-, 19331, p, 169.

29 Maissel, Foreiqn Office, p. 57, Also, the decision taken might or might not go to the Cabinet. British Nevertheless, regardless of the debates among the diplomatic experts, in the end, a decision was usually

arrived at concerning policies to pursue which were then discussed with the Foreign Secretary. The PUS and the Foreign Secretary o£ten worked in concert and would decide upon what course of action to take. Their views were sometimes heard by the Cabinet who were then at liberty to debate the issue at hand, policies were then decided upon and

formally irnplemented by the governmeat .31 Various agencies and missions were accordingly informed of the official government position. Once a decision was made, London would then inforrn the British embassy in Rome about the goverment's position on a particular situation, thereby indicating what stand the Ambassador should take with the Italians. With changing scenarios occurring periodically, the ~talo-Abyssiniancrisis remained an ever fluid situation and presented a grave challenge to the British government.

3 O Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, pp. 187-188.

'' Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, The British Foreiqn Service (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1949), p. 50. Chapter Four: The beginning of the crisis (Dec 1934 -Sept 1935)

Efforts by Bri tain, France and the League of Nations at finding a peaceful settlement

Most O£ Sir Eric Drummond's first year as Ambassador to Italy was uneventful, He spent the time acquainting himself with his new post and with the country. Reports to London covered such diverse topics as Italian propaganda in Malta and a report on the Congress of Asiatic studentsl meeting in Rome.' However, by 1 October 1934, some serious concerns were already being raised about problems concerning the Italians and Aby~sinians.~ The Abyssinian crisis dorninated Drunisnondls tenure as British ~assadorto Italy during 1935-6, It was an era marked by Mussolini's pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy. From Mussolinils point of view, not only was war and an expansionist policy necessary to divert the Italian people's attention £rom

domestic ills3 such as unemployment, but war was also needed to carry on the idea of a dynamic Fascist statem4

' Drummond to Simon, 4 Novexber 1933 and 28 ~ecember1433, BDFA, series F, vol. 9, doc. 288, p. 387 and Ibid,, vol. 10, doc- 1, p. 1.

Drummond to Launcelot Oliphant, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 October 1934 in Rotunda, "Rome Embassy,It p. 154, note 2. See also Drummond to Simon, 12 October 1934, Great Britain, Public Record Office, F.O. 371/18025/~2438/18/1.

In 1934 Drummond sent a despatch to Simon noting the sad economic state of Italy saying, "conditions are such as to try any but the firmest confidence. The belt is drawn very tight..," Dnrmmond to Simon, 20 July 1934, BDFA, series F, vol. 10, doc. 31, p. 60. On the interna1 economic problems see also Drummond to Simon, 8 November and 7 December 1934, docs- 40, 42, pp. 76, 77 and Drummond to Simon, 30 April 1935, Ibid., vol. 11, doc- 25, p- 43.

Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars: A Political Historv (London: Lonqman, 1988) , p. 155; Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder, p. 93. This dynamic force, dominated by the psychology of ducismo and the need for struggle, also required Mussolini to seek prestige5 for his country and for himself, compelling him to acquire a colonial empire6 which would then give Italy the status befitting a great power. This Fascist expansionist policy culminated in the amexation of Abyssinia in 1936, According to the Minister for Colonies, General Emilio De Bono, plans to conquer and annex Abyssinia were already being

made in the autumn of 1933 .7 In his own written account, with an introduction by Mussolini, De Bono states that,

From this moment, the Duce was defini tely of the opinion that the matter would have to be settled no la ter than 1936,. . . .It was the autumn of 1933. The Duce had spoken to no one of the coming operations in East Africa; only he and 1 knew what was going to happen, and no indiscretion occurred by which the news could reach the public.' With these plans in mind, a pretext was therefore needed by the Italians to begin sending forces into Abyssinia on a massive

Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars, pp. 151, 155; Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 65; Stanley G, Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 233; Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 169.

Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreiqn Policv, p. 240; Ulrich von Eassell, German Ambassador in Italy to the German Foreign Ministry, 25 July 1934, Germany, Documents on German Foreiqn Policv 1918-1945, series C (1933 -19371, The Third Reich: First Phase, volume III (June 14, 1934-March 31, 19351, doc. 118, p. 295. Henceforth, DGFP. ' There were indications that Mussolini may have been preoccupied with Abyssinia since as early as 1925. Memorandum by J.H.U. Lambert, Second Secretary at the Abyssinian desk of the Foreign Office, 27 April 1936, Great Britain,-~ocumentsÔn British Foreiqn Policy,-1919-1939,second series, volume XVI (March 2 - Julv 30, 1936), W. N. Medlico tt, Douqlas Dakin, and M. E . Lambert, eds. (London: H~M.~tationer~ Office, 1976}, no: 276, p. 370. Henceforth, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XVI.

De Bono, Anno XIIII, p. 13. Italics in the original. scale. The opportunity came in December 1934 with a skirmish between Italians and Abyssinians at Walwal, sixty miles inside Abyssinian territory. The first phase (December 1934 to September 1935) of the crisis had begun- Foreign Office experts anticipated a serious crisis in the making. After reading what Drummond had to Say, the Southern Department head, Owen OIMalley,minuted that l'Sir Eric Drumrnond

has put his finger on a dangerous spot" and consequently "1 feel very uncornfortable aborrt the course which things seem to be shaping."1° Even harsher sentiments were expressed by Simon. Geoffrey Thompson recalls a very perturbed Simon telling him bluntly in January 1935, "you do realize, donft you, that the Italians intend to take ~b~ssinia?~~" During the very early stages of the crisis, attempts at a peaceful settlement ensued on the part of the Abyssinians through appeals to the League of Nations. 12 At the same time, Sir Eric

Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of t ri ter national Affairs 1935, volume II: Abvssinia and Italv (London: Oxford university Press, 19361, pp. 133-138; League of Nations, Monthlv Summan of the Leasue, vol. XIV, no. 12, December 1934 (Geneva: League of Nations ~nfomationSection, 19341, pp. 284-6.

Thornpson, Front-Line Diplomat, P- 95.

i2 League of Nations, Monthly SumarY of the Leaque, vol. XIV, no. 12, December 1934, pp. 284-6. ut before the issue could be discussed formally with the Leaguels Council, ~talyand Abyssinia agreed to arbitration under the terms of a 1928 treaty between the two countries. Baer, ~talian-~thio~ian w, pp. 104-5. Drummond also actively sought to effect a compromise between the

Abyssinians and ~talians.l3 Despite the protestations of Abyssinia and others, Mussolini nevertheless echoed the argument already presented to Drummond by other top Italian officials - that in their view, the

Abyssinians were the aggressors - l4 This exchange occurred during a meeting between the two on 14 January 1935." After his meeting with Mussolini, Drummond predicted that the British would find themselves in an increasingly serious situation as a result

of the Walwal incident. He told Simon that, "for the first time I feel £rom the language held to me by Signor Mussolini...that

situation is not only serious but is becorning threatening . 1116 Attempts to settle the dispute occurred amidst the backdrop of a rapprochement between Italy and France, formally embodied in the Franco-Italian Agreement of 7 January 1935.17 This agreement was concluded by Mussolini and Pierre Laval, the French Foreign Minister, during the latter's visit to Rome. The French, ever

13 Alexander Kirk (U.S. Chargé in Italy) to Secretary of Çtate, 18 January 1935, United States, Foreiqn Relations of the United States, Diwlomatic Papers 1935, volume 1, General: The Near East and Africa, doc, 911, p. 598. Henceforth, FRUS. Drummond also visited the Palazzo Chigi, home of the Italian foreign ministry, almost daily in his quest to find a settlement to the dispute, Rotunda, "Rome Embassy, l1 pp- 171-2.

" Drummond to Simon, 1, 3, 4 January 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, nos- 76, 80, 82, pp. 80, 83, 85-6, .

l5 Drummond to Simon, 15 January 1935, Ibid-, no. 104, pp. 105-7.

l6Ibid,, p. 107, References to the possibility of war in Abyssinia can also be found in Drummond to Simon, 26 February 1935, BDFA, series FI vol, 11,

l7 Drummond to Simon, 10 January 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 90, note 3, p. 92 and Drummond to Simon, 8 January 1935, BDFA, series Fr vol. 11, doc. 1, pp. 1-6. vigilant against a resurgent Germany, sought an alliance with the Italians to counteract what they perceived to be an increasing German threat to their national security. The Italians, still anti-German at this time, welcomed this alliance with the French.

Meanwhile, the British, (who knew through their own Ambassador in France that the French were keeping a close eye on

events ) 18, wi shed to encourage a Franco - I talian rapprochemen t while simultaneously aiming to maintain ties with the French and with the Italians. This stemrned in large part to British concerns over the threat posed by a revisionist Germany. Since at hast the days of Sir Eyre ~rowe'~,the notion of a serious threat coming from Germany held sway with many senior rnembers of the Foreign In order to counter this threat, it thus

became essential to try and maintain close ties not only with the French but also with the Italians. This British desire for close cooperation with Italy was evident even before the crisis erupted. In 1933, Sir John Simon wrote of his conviction that Italy was the key to peace in Europe and how "everything depends

on keeping Italy on the right path.. .l12' It was a view supported

1 a Sir George Clerk (British Ambassador in Paris) to Simon, 17 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 159, p. 153.

l9 Crowe was PUS from 1920 to 1925 and author of a famous 1907 memorandum, "On the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany.It This was an articulate analysis on the balance of power principle- Crowe saw France as a key to the containment of Germany and stressed the importance of the Royal Navy as a cornerstone to British foreign policy. McKercher, IlThe Last Old Diplomat, pp. 5 -6.

20 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 30; Maissel, Foreiqn office, pp. 38-9, 46, 50-3.

21 Letter from Simon to Austen Chamberlain, 7 September 1933 as quoted in Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Makinq of the Second World War (London: Unwin Hyman., Ltd., 1977; reprint, New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc. , by many in the British government including Sir Robert Vari~ittart.~~In mid-February, the Foreign Office received a stern warning £rom Drummond of what was in store. He had gleaned

some valuable information £rom a long-standing friend, the

Marquis Theodoli, who also happened to have close connections to uss soli ni.^^ Drummond reported that the details gathered amounted to "the first inside information I have had as to what is in Mussolinils mind." Drummond went on to Say that Mussolini ,..also felt that Italy was entitled to her place in the Sun. We and the French had taken alrnost al1 the dish - only the crumbs were left. It would be intolerable in the Duce's view if Italy were not allowed even to consume these crumbs. I remarked that this was al1 very well, but what about the League? This led to the reply that the League rnust not stop legitimate Italian aspirations. Drummond also added that the French "had definitely offered Italy a free hand in Abyssi~ia.~~~~In giving his analysis of the situation to Simon, Drummond explained how,

The situation is hateful, but as 1 see it the best chance to-day is for the Emperor to secüre,

22 Aaron L. Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittart's Search for Italian Cooperation Against Hitler, 1933-36," Journal of Conternporarv History, volume 9, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 93-5, 127.

23 The Marquis ~heodoliwas head of the League of Nations Mandates Commission for most of its existence and was also a former Italian Under- Secretary for the Colonies, Northedge, Leaque of Nations, p. 197, 220; Drummond letter to Simon, 16 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 160, note 3, p. 151.

Drummond to Simon, 17 Febr-cary 1935, F.O. 371/19105/J 973/1/1. According to Theodoli, this was what French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou (Laval's predecessor) told him personally. It is believed that the same impression was given by Laval to Mussolini during negotiations in January 1935 involving the Rome agreements, Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, pp. 78-83; Hardie, Abvssinian Crisis, pp. 60-62. as speedily as possible, the easiest terms he can. Otherwise 1 fear the worst and an Italy acting contrary to her League engagements and involved up to the hilt in adventures in Abyssinia is not going to be of much use to us in a critical moment of European affairs- The letter had an impact on Simon who found it to be "a very grave letter" and issued orders for it to be seen by the Prime Minister at onces2' Drummond1s report also struck a note with Vansittart, The PUS was fully aware of the consequences in store for Britain and Europe should a major quarrel erupt between Britain, France, and Italy over the Abyssinian crisis. This was demonstrated in his response to Drummondtsviews. ~ansittart wrote, This (meaning the views expressed by Drummond) is as we always expected. From the first the Foreign Office collectively has always interpreted the first rumbling at Walwal as the prelude to Ltalian expansion at Abyssinials expense. We may take this letter (Dirummondts) as the confirmation of our fears. We must now face the inevitable and frame our policy accordingly- Vansi ttart continued,

(1) We should endeavour to dissuade Italy £rom going the full length firstly because-..she ought to have her bands free for graver matters in Europe; secondly because of the further and perhaps deadly blow that this must deal the League; and therefore, thirdly on account of the consequent reaction on a large section of public opinion here, just at a period when we want and need, al1 of us, the most complete confidence and collaboration. Vansittart was also cognizant of the fact that,

25 Dnunmond to Simon, 17 February 1935, F.O. 371/19105/5 973/1/1 and Simon minute, 17 February 1935, Ibid- (2) . this must be done in the quietest, most friendly way. We must not be manoevred into playing an isolated and futile role of opposition. Both epithets are now certain, seeing the attitude of France ...we cannot af£ord to quarrel with Italy and drive her back into German embraces ... (3) 1 think the Secretary of State should expound these views ... and lay particular stress on (2) Let us hope that (1) will have an arresting effect on the Italians." Vansittart accordingly instructed Drummond to comunicate the British governmentlsgrowing anxiety in "the most friendly terms ...and rnannerw and to use his own discretion to "convey this

micable but real concern to Signor Mussolini. n27 This need to maintain Anglo-Italian relations on an even keel (a thene about which Drummond continually reminded his colleagues) was a view shared by many in the Foreign Office including such senior figures as Vansittart; Orme Sargent, the Assistant Under- Secretary; and Sir John ~irnon.~~Simon agreed with Vansittart and stressed to Drummond the need to exhibit caution in bis dealings with Rome, encouraging Drummond to, "approach the

I talian Government in the mos t f riendly way . . .u29 This notion of placating Italy was evident in the Stresa conference held in April 1935 among the British, French, and Italians. The main item on the agenda centred upon the

26 Vansittart minute, 25 February 1935 in response to Drulmondls despatch to Simon of 17 February 1935, Ibid.

27 Simon to Drummond, 26 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 178, p. 170.

*' Rotunda, IlRome Embassy,I1 pp. 189-190, 194.

29 Simon to Drummond, 21 February 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 171, p. 163. maintenance of a united front in support of Austria against

Germany in the face of conspicuous German rearmament,30 There was concern on the British government's part that Mussolini not experience British intransigence during the meeting? Otherwise, Italy might be enticed into the German camp. This thought haunted the British at Stresa and consequently prornpted them to keep discussions about abyssinia away £rom the negotiating table. The main British representatives present at Stresa were the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, Sir John Simon, and Sir Robert Van~ittart.~~Sir Eric Drummond was also present at Stresa.33 Thus far, Drummond had been following London's directives about expressing his government's I1friendly anxietytltowards Mussolini

and the 1talians .34 By April 1935, Italylsmilitary preparations had reached such a level that it was obvious that they were meant for a full-

3 O On 16 March Germany had announced military conscription in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.

3' Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession: The Autobiosraph~of Lord Vansittart (London: Hutchinson of London, 19581, p. 513.

'* Record by Geoffrey Thompson of the Abyssinian department of the Foreign Office, of a conversation at Stresa with Signor Guarnaschelli, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 230, note 1, p. 220.

33 Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 520 - '"~rummond to Simon, 1, 14, 30 March 1935, DBPP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 187, pp. 177-8; no. 203, p. 193; no. 222, pp. 211-12; Drummond to Vansittart, 12 March 1935, Ibid,, no, 201, p- 191. scale invasion of Abyssinia .3s At Stresa Drummond was insistent that Mussolini be warned in person by the British of their

displeasure with Italian actions and intentions to date. 36

However, this warning was never given. Mussolini himself had expected the British to bring up the

topic of Abyssinia and was prepared to discuss this with thern.37 Though there was some discussion about Abyssinia at Stresa arnong lower level of fi ci al^,^^ no mention of Abyssinia took place in

Mussolini l s preçence during the conf erence, a f act which sorne individuals later lamented-39

3 5 Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 122. In a rnemorandum dated 26 March 1935, by the Rome embassytsMilita- Attaché (H. Stevens) , it was estimated that 600,000 men were to serve in the Italian army by April. BDFA, series F, vol. Il, doc. 21, pp. 35-7. Furthermore, it was reported to the Foreign Office that #lit now seems to be quite clear that, unless prevented by European considerations of great weight, Italy intends to exploit her military strength in Eastern Africa at the expense of Abyssinia; and that, since nothing is to be gained by delay, she will act in the autumn as soon as weather conditions permit.. . Stevens memorandum, I April 1935, Ibid., doc. 24, p. 40 - Similar fears of an invasion were expressed to the League by the Abyssinian government. See League of Nations, Monthl~Sumrnan/, vol, XV, no. 3, March 1935, p. 62.

36 The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facins the Dictators (London: Cassel1 & Company Ltd., 19621, p. 179.

37 Ibid., p- 118

Record by Thompson of a conversation at Stresa with Guarnaschelli, 12 April 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 230, pp. 220-2; with Guarnaschelli and Vitteti, Ibid,, no, 231, pp. 220-2; Memorandum by Thompson, 13 April 1935, Ibid., no. 232, pp. 225-8; Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p- 97; Robertson, Empire Builder, pp. 130-1.

39 Vansittart conceded that Drummond "...urçed sensibly that we should begin (the meeting) by warning the Duce of our wrath, should he attack Abyssinia." But this recommendation was not followed. Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 520. According to Drummondtsown recollection, he thought that on the last dav of the conference Vansittart tried to ".,.broach the subiect with ~usçolini-buthe failed in his object, as Mussolini speedily rode off on another tack. The Earl of Perth, letter to the editor, The Spectator, no. 5996 (28 May 1943) . Back in February, Anthony Eden, then the British Minister for League of Nations Affairs, expressed his satisfaction with Drummondlsobservations about the possible impact the crisis would have on Britain- Eden noted how Drummond summarized,

in an acute form the responsibility of H.M. Government as a member of the League, and more particularly of the Council, in respect of recent developments in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute ....The impression that is left on my mind by al1 this is, 1 confess, that unless some hint - and a pretty strong hint - is given to the Italians that we should not view with indifference the disrnemberment of Ethiopia, then this dismemberment will take place...40 Why then, was Drummondls appeal not listened to at this important meeting? One reason for this can be traced to Simon1s interpretation of British policy. This meant that the British should avoid alienating Mussolini at almost any cost, otherwise there might be little hope of achieving a united Stresa front

agains t ~ermany,41 Another reason can possibly be traced to the personal antipathy which Ramsay MacDonald felt for Drummond. He appeared to dislike Drummond in particular due to the latter's conversion to Roman Catholicism years earlier. MacDonald felt that Drummondlsconversion was an unforgivable act by a fellow ~cot.'~ MacDonaldls animosity toward Drummond was a factor in MacDonald's

'O Edan minute, 26 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 175, note 4, p. 167.

Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 123.

'* Barros, Office Without Power, p. 15; Rose, ~ansittart,p. 69; Rotunda, ''Rome Embas~y,~~p. 98. rejection of Sir Eric's candidature for the post of PUS in 1929-

The pos t went ins tead to vansi ttart .43 Furthermore, when Drummond resigned from his post as Secretary-General of the League, MacDonald refused to grant him the ambassadorship to either Washington or Paris, Drummondls two original choices .*" Thus, it is also distinctly possible that Drummondlsadvice to the two British ministers at Stresa went unheeded due to MacDonald's intense persona1 dislike of Drummond. It must be noted that this is but one possible scenario of what happened at Stresa. MacDonald may have decided to remain silent for other

reasons .45 Vansittart may also have been anxious to keep Abyssinia £rom being discussed in Mussolini's presence in order to ensure that a united anti-German front be e~tablished.~~ Whatever the reason behind the lapse, the result was, instead of leaving Stresa with an admonishment from the British as he had expected, Mussolini interpreted their silence as tacit approval of his actions and future goals for ~byssinia.~~

3 3 Rose, Vansittart, p. 69; Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 97,

4"o~e, Vansittart, p. 69; Rotunda, "Rome Embas~y,~~pp. 97-99. In his letter to Simon reauestinq a return to the British foreign service, Drummond wrote, "Sir ~uçten-chambeGlain, to whom I had expressed iydesire to resign (from the League), told me that in 1929 he had gone so far as to submit my name to the King for the post of British Ambassador in Washington, but for various reasons this appointment was not proceeded with." Drummond letter to Simon, 7 January 1932, Cecil MSS, ADD 51112 ,

45 David Marquand, Ramsav MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977) , pp. 773-4. Eden (who was il1 and could not go to Stresa) also urged MacDonald to bring up Abyssinia at the conference.

" Rotunda, "Rome Embassyfn pp. 219-29, 240, 245; Marquand, MacDonald, p. 774.

47 Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p. 92, It was now evident that the British goverriment was in a precarious position, The Abyssinian crisis compelled Britain to try and balance two seemingly irreconcilable objectives. Not only did the British need to preserve cooperation with France and Italy, but they also needed to (or at least appear to), support the League of Nations and its Covenant advocating collective

security. 48 This commi tment to the concept of collective security obliged member states to treat "an attack upon another (member state) as an act to be resisted, by diplornatic pressure and disapproval, by economic sanctions or even by force.M49 Numerous warnings were being issued by the British to the Italians about the consequences of their Abyssinian adventure.'' These warnings took on official and unofficial forms. Drummond, for example, formally expressed his governmentls (specifically mentioned) concerns to Italian officiais such as Mussolini and Fulvio Suvich, the Under-Secretary O£ State for Foreign Affairs. But since he had also been allowed to use his own discretion in such matters, Drummond would also use his contacts with prominent Italians such as Theodoli both to warn them of the consequences

-1 a Parker, "Ethiopian Crisis," p. 296.

" David Dilks, Retreat From Power: Studies in Britainls Foreiqn Policv of the Twentieth Centun, Volume One 1906-1939 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 19811, p. Il.

In May 1935 Vansittart wamed the Italian Ambassador to Britain, Dino Grandi, about the potential problerns that might arise due to Italian policy towards Abyssinia - namely the negative effects this aggressive policy would bring upon the European situation and upon British public opinion. Simon to Drummond, 3 May 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol- XIV, no. 244, pp. 239-41. of their actions and to obtain information about the Duce's plans which the Ambassador would duly pass on to London.'' London was continually being told by their Ambassador in Rome about the seriousness of the situation. The Ambassadorls warnings about Italian intentions were creating serious concerns among his superiors in London. In a detailed secret memorandum to the Cabinet on the situation, Simon expressed his concerns about Italian military preparations for an offensive and its impact on the European scene." He pointedly remarked that Vtalyrs reaction (to British support for the ~eague)in Signor Mussolinils present mood, is in~alculable."~~With such unpredictable results, Germany would welcome the continued disruption to the European situation caused by the Abyssinian crisis, Throughout the crisis, Drummondts superiors continued to have confidence in Sir Eric's abilitie~.~~His observations

5 1 Drummond to Simon, 3 May 1935, F.O. 371/19110/J 2094/1/1.

52 '*TheItalo-Ethiopian Situation: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs," Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet Memoranàa, Il May 1935, CAB 24/255.

53 Ibid.

54 From the earliest days of the crisis, the Foreign Office allowed Drummond to use his discretion in his dealings with Rome. Simon to Sir Sidney Barton, British Minister at Addis Ababa, 8 Deceinber 1934, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, note 4, p. 49. Vansittart agreed that Drummond "should have a free handw in his dealings with the Italians, Drummond to Simon (note by Vansittart), 18 January 1935, Ibid., no. 123, note 3, p. 121. In Maxch, Dmond thanked Vansittart for expressing confidence in him and for aliowing hirn to use his own discretion in Rome as to whom he should talk about the Abyssinian crisis. Drummond to Vansittart, 12 March 1935, Ibid., no. 201, p. 191, Indications that Drummondls superiors continued to permit him some latitude in his dealings with the Italians were also evident in May and November 1935. Note by Vansittart for Simon, 13 May 1935, Ibid., no. 258, p. 257 and Hoare to Drummond, 8 November 1935, Ibid-, vol. XV, no. 197, p. 241. about Italian actions were conveyed by Simon to the abi in et.^' So alarmed was London about Drummond's reports on the escalating intensity of the situation that it was deemed necessary to take the serious step of summoning him home for consultations in order to show Mussolini British concern at the turn of e~ents.~~Sir Eric's views were eagerly sought by Whitehall and he was accordingly taken directly upon his arrival, to a Cabinet meeting on 17 May to apprise policy rnakers of his opinions on the crisis. Dusing the Cabinet meeting, Drummond spoke at length about various aspects of the crisis." The Ambassador advised the Cabinet that somewhere along the line, pressure would have to be put on Haile Selassie to acquiesce to Itafian ambitions for if that failed, Drummond feared that the British were in for trouble.58 He left London with instructions that Mussolini must be warned in person that Britain might have to choose the League over support for Italian policies. This was due to strong public opinion in Britain which was firmly pro-Geneva?

5 5 Drummond to Simon, 15 May 1935, Ibid., vol. XIV, no. 270, note 3, p- 268; Mernorandun by Simon on the Italo-Ethiopian situation, 11 May 1935, Ibid., no. 253, p. 250; and Drummond to Simon, 8 May 1935, Ibid., no. 246, p. 242.

56 Drummond to Simon, 15 May 1935, Ibid., no. 270, note 3, p. 268. Drummondlsrecall did not escape the attentions of the ~ritishpress who duly reported his meeting with the Cabinet. See The Times, 18 May 1935, p. 14. '' Simon to M, Ingram in Rome, 17 May 1935, DBFP, vol, XIV, no. 273, note 2, pp- 269-270; Cabinet Conclusions, Extract, 17 May 1935, F.O. 371/19110/5 1989/1/1-

Cabinet Conclusions, 17 May 1935, F.O. 371/19110/J l989/l/l.

59 Rotunda, "Rome Embassy,~p. 248.

37 The British public was of a pacifist60 bent and support for the League was considerably influenced by pressure groups such as the League of Nations Union (LNU). This organization kept the public informed on issues relating to foreign affairs and induced the British government to honour its commitments to the Covenant

of the ~eague. The LNU1 s principal methods in applying pressure on the government were through public mass meetings, letter writing campaigns to the Foreign Office, the Cabinet, and members of Parliament as well as producing a widely read pamphlet entitled, "The Tragedy of Aby~sinia."~~However, undoubtedly the most influential campaign that was organized by the LNU was the Peace Ballot of June 1935. The Peace Ballot was interpreted by many to be the public's view on what the governmentlsrole should be during the crisis; namely, a continuation of efforts at conciliation through the League- Though it had its opponents (such as Lord Beaverbrook, proprietor of The Dailv Express, whose readers were asked to tear

up the "ballot of bloodn), many others £rom al1 over Britain and

6 0 Here, the term 'pacifistl 5s used in very broad terms to mean a general opposition to war. For a detailed study on pacifisrn in Britain during this era as well as an explanation on the difference between @pacifismland lpacificism,lsee Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945: the Defininq of a Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Ceadel defines @pacifismlas a moral creed whose adherents view any type of war as wrong and therefore must never be resorted to. @Pacificismlis also defined as opposition to war, However, unlike 'pacifists, adherents of Ipacificism1 accept that war is sometimes necessary. Ibid-, pp. 3-5.

Paul Kemedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacv: Backsround Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980 (London: Fontana Press, 1989), pp. 243- 244. For a detailed study of the LNu, see Donald S. Birn, The Leaque of Nations Union, 1918-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) -

62 Denis Waley, British Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War 1935-6 (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1975), pp. 95, 101, 105. £rom al1 walks of life supported it. Three national dailies for instance - The Dailv Herald, The Manchester Guardian, and The News Chronicle as well as three periodicals - The Economist, The

New Statesman & Nation, and The Spectator, were among its supporters.63 Many were obviously galvanized by the Peace Ballot

and much weight was given to its outcorne. O£ the 11,500,000 people who responded, ninety-four percent said they were in favour of using economic and non-milita- rneasures to end aggression. The Peace Ballotts results persuaded the new Prime Minister, Stanley ~aldwin~',to declare the League as the "sheet-anchorof British p~licy."~~The Peace Ballot's effect would continue to be felt for months afterwardse6' Its immediate effect however,

6 3 Patrick Kyba, Covenants Without the Sword: Public Opinion and British Defence Policv 1931-1935 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 19831, pp. 146-7. Headwav, the official journal of the LNU, was of course, enthusias tic about the Peace Ballot s results (Headwav, vol. XVII, no, 7, July 1935, pp. 130-1; Ibid., no, 8, August 1935, p. 160). Headwav also derided the Beaverbrook and Rothermere press for being anti-League and accused Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere of cheering Italy to defy the League (Ibid., no, 6, June 1935, p. 102).

Dame Adelaide Livingstone, The Peace Ballot: The Official Historv (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1935), pp. 49-51. The votes cast in the Peace Ballot were close to fifty percent of the total eligible voters in the United Kingdom (Ibid. , p. 54) and aznounted to more than half of those cast in the general election held in November 1935 (Hardie, Abvssinian Crisis, p. 51). Most of those who voted in the Peace Ballot were also eligible to vote in the general election (Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p. 99).

65 June 1935 saw changes in the Cabinet. Besides a change of Prime Ministers, Sir Samuel Hoare replaced Sir John Simon as Foreign Secretary.

66 Toynbee, Survev of. International Af £airs, p. 53.

67 Its influence would manifest itsel£ to a certain extent, later in the year, in Sir Samuel Hoare's Septernber speech to the League. The Peace Ballot's effect would also resurface as the dominant driving force in the British general elections of November 1935. Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp. 53-4- was to prompt the British government to champion the League and

set it on a collision course with Italy. Upon his return to Italy, Drummond met with Mussolini. At

this audience on 21 May, Drummond dutifully followed the Cabinet ' s instructions and in£ormed Mussolini in strong terms of the British publicls increasing support for the League and collective security? ~ussoiiniresponded that he understood. However, he told Drummond that if, . . .It was necessary for him to resort to arms, in short go to war l , he would do so and he would send sufficient men to carry out his plan. This was his ~ill...~' Drummond warned ~ussoïiniof the consequences to the League,

to Europe, and to Anglo-Italian relations should he plan to carry

out his threat to wage war. Sir Eric noted, "my impression was that he (Mussolini) was controlled by, rather than controlling

his destiny. He mentioned ' fate1 two or three times. "'O It proved to be a very revealing interview and provided the British with evidence of the Duce's determination to conquer Abyssinia. Drummond emphasized this to Simon by following up his telegram with a private letter. In it, the Ambassador revealed how Mussolini, though outwardly calm, seemed "to be like a man driven

The Cabinet instructed Drummond to see to it that Mussolini understood that the British government needed to show more support for the League, Drummond carried out bis instructions diligently, reporting back to Simon saying that, used every argument 1 could think of; sometimes, even 1 was a fittle frightened myself at the things 1 said, but nothing had, as far as 1 could see, any effect on him (M~ssolini).~Drummond to Simon, 21 May 1935, DBFP, vol. XIV, no. 281, p. 281, note 10.

69 Drummond to Simon, cable, 21 May 1935, Ibid., no. 281, p. 280.

'O Ibid.

40 by fate." Drummond was now firmly convinced that a major offensive was definitely planned by the Duce.71 Some sort of plan was needed if war was to be averted. This could possibiy be achieved if Italian craving for territory were satisfied. This craving might be assuaged if the Zeila plan, which involved granting territorial concessions in Abyssinia to the Italians, were pursued. The British proposed that the port of Zeila in British Somaliland be ceded to Abyssinia in retum for territorial exchanges by Abyssinia to Italy in the Ogaden.72 Drummond played a rneaningful role in helping the British to

formulate and proceed with the Zeila proposal. On 1 June he sent a lengthy despatch to London suggesting the possibility of satisfying Italy at Abyssinials expense, should Britain and France not wish to take coercive measures against Italyls aggre~sion.~~This provoked a series of minutes £rom Foreign Office personnel intimately connected with the Abyssinian question. Geoffrey Thompson and Owen OIMalley were in general

7 1 Drummond to Simon, letter, 21 May 1935, ~bid-,note 10, pp. 281-282.

'' Parker, I1Ethiopian Crisis," p. 304. The proposed cessation of parts of the Ogaden was not considered a major concession on the part of the Abyssinians, nor was it a new concept. Prior to the outbreak of the Abyssinian crisis, Haile Selassie was willing to cede parts of the arid Ogaden region (thought to have little potential for economic development) in order to obtain, in return, a coveted port such as Zeila. The British, meanwhile, felt that the cessation of Zeila to Abyssinia was a "very generous proposal" on their part. Hoare to Drummond, message from ~ansittart,17 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 309, p. 318. They also felt that Abyssinia "in al1 essentials,..would gain more than she lost ..." if the Zeila proposal were accepted. Note by Vansittart to Hoare, 16 June 1935, Ibid., no. 308, p. 317.

73 Drummond to Simon, 1 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 296, pp. 296-302. The Ambassador suggested among other things, that Abyssinia could be turned into an Italian Egypt. Drummond also discussed the possibility of some form of Italian mandate over ~byssiniaas well as outright annexation by the Italians. agreement about not accepting Drummond's suggestiond4 Though Vansittart disagreed with Drummond's views that Italy might possibly be bought off by major concessions on Abyssinials part, he nevertheless agreed with Drummond that Italy needed to be placated somehow. If, at this stage, it was not to be at a great expense on Abyssinia's part, then surely it rnight be at Britainls own expense, concluded Vansittart. Therefore, on 8 June, Vansittart responded with his farnous minute, .-.Italywill have to be bought off - let us use and face ugly words - in some form or another, or Abyssinia will eventually perish That might in itself matter less, if it did not mean that the League would also perish (and that Italy would simultaneously perf orm another volte face into the arms of Germany, a combination of haute politique and haute cocotterie that we can il1 afford just now) .75 Anthony Eden disagreed with Vansittartls desire to buy off Italy and wanted Britain to stick firmly to League prin~iples.~' Had Simon stayed on as Foreign Secretary, then Eden's views might have been followed? However, with the arriva1 of Sir Samuel Hoare, it was Vansittart's views (somewhat shaped by ~rummond's), which prevailed. This was but one example of the divergence in views which grew within the Foreign Office during the course of

74 Thompson and OIMalley minutes, 11 June 1935 to Drummondls 1 June 1935 despaLch on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, F.O. 371/19111/J 2205/1/1.

'' Vansittart minute, 8 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 301, p. 308. Italics in the original.

Ibid., note 5, p. 309.

" Eden, for example, had recently managed to convince Simon that the Italians should accept arbitration for al1 incidents related to the crisis since last December. David Dutton, Anthonv Eden: A Life and Reputation (London: Arnold, l997), p, 46. the Abyssinian crisis, On the one hand there was Vansittart and

his supporters who were always preoccupied with the German threat and so sought ways to counter it, even if it meant having to compromise at times with League principles. Then there were those who actively espoused the League1scause, such as Eden, As the crisis wore on, Eden would corne to be viewed as a champion of the ~eague~~,so much so that, when Hoare was forced to resign

later in the year because of the Hoare-Laval pact, Baldwin and others felt that Eden had to be chosen as Hoare's successor in order, it was hoped, to bring some lustre back into an office

tarnished by the Hoare - Laval pact .79 Although Eden was unenthusiastic about it, Vansittartls views prevailed and were approved by the Cabinet. After studying Drummondlsproposals about satisfying Italy at Abyssinictls

expense, the PUS concluded : If therefore we cannot satisfy Italy at Abyssinials expense, we are, as bef ore, conf ronted with the choice of satisfying her at our own, (plus some eventual Abyssinian frontier rectification) or letting this drift on their present disastrous course.

78 This is how Eden was viewed by the LW in Headwav. See for example, their June 1935 issue. Headwav, vol, XVII, no. 6, June 1935, p. 102; ~bid., no. 8, August 1935, p. 143; Ibid., no. 9, September 1935, p. 163; Ibid-, vol. XVIII, no. 1, January 1936, p, 6.

'' Though differences of opinion did at times, set Eden apart from Vansittart, a recent study on Eden seeks to illustrate that Eden was far more in step with his governmentrspolicies during the Abyssinian crisis than was commonly believed by many. See Dutton, Anthonv Eden, pp. 44-53. This view is also echoed in Parker, "Ethiopian Crisis," p. 124.

Vansittart minute to Drummondts 1 June 1935 memorandum, 11 June 1935, F.O. 371/19111/~2205/1/1, Italics added for emphasis. The British accordingly decided to proceed with what became known as the Zeila proposal of June 1935. Vansittart was anxious to get Drummond's thoughts on this, asking him to comment on

whether or not the proposal was worth pursuing? In a message sent on 18 June, Vansittart urged Drummond to

Ifplease let me have your views on al1 this as soon as you can, 11B2

to which Drummond irnmediately reglied that, Ifinny view, (the) proposition is assuredly worth trying,It estimating that its

chances of success were "about fif ty-f if ty. u83 (Moreover), Iteven if it does not succeed, it will show our willingness to make concrete and serious sacrifices to help in a most difficult

situation.lf e4 Drummond was convinced that the proposa1 was worth trying, but he was also alert to the possibility that Mussolini's acceptance might be difficult to obtain." Accordingly, the

8 1 "1 would like to have your views upon its possibilities at the earliest possible stage, and 1 should also be glad of your advice as how best it can be put to the test ...1 should like to know whether you think such a proposal would prove attractive to Signor Mussolini," wrote Vansittart to Drummond, on 18 June 1935, F.O. 371/19112/5 2380/1/1,

e2 Hoare to Drummond with a message frorn Vansittart, 17 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 309, p. 319; see also Vansittart, Mist Procession, p. 530; Avon, Facinq the Dictators, p. 221.

83 Drmond to Hoare, message for Vmsittart, 18 June 1935, DBFP, vol. XIv, no. 312, pp. 323-4.

84 Ibid. , p. 324. In addition to this, Drummond sent another report in which he advised London that the Italian goverment was ready to collaborate with the British in finding a solution if the British were willing to get in torrch with Mussolini as soon as possible. Drummond to Hoare, 18 June 1935, F.O. 371/19112/5 2402/1/1.

a' Drummond to Hoare, 19 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 315, p. 326, British decided to proceed with the Zeila scheme after receiving Drummond1s reassurances that it was at least worth a tr~.~" The Zeila proposal was personally presented to Mussolini by Anthony Eden during a visit to Rome on 24-26 June. It was rejected by Mussolini because it simply did not go far enough for

hirn. " Mussolini, as has been shown above, was by now determined to win a war which would result in a triumphant Italy and avenge

the Italian defeat of 1896 at the hands of the Abyssinians at Adowa. Acceptance of the Zeila scheme would deprive him of that anticipated victory. The schemets collapse meant that the Abyssinian crisis rnight extend into something even more serious because should Italy proceed with an attack against Abyssinia (a fellow member of the League), then Article 16 would have to corne into effect. Arttcle 16 called for the use of economic and military sanctions based on the principle of collective security to deter an attacking member

state from hostile actions .8B Drummond was well aware, as the founding Secretary-General of the League, that in order for Article 16 to be effective, al1

Avon, Facins the Dictators, p. 221; Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, p. 192; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, p. 124; Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London: Collins, 1954), P. 155.

87 Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittartrnp, 116. Though he found the proposa1 unacceptable, it did not appear to upset Mussolini to any great extent, Drummond to Hoare, 24 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 320, p. 332.

88 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Department, Abyssinia and Italv (London: The Royal Institute of ~nternationalAffairs, 1935), p. 42; and Alfred Zimrnern, The Leaque of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935 (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., l936), p. 506. rnembers of the League should cooperate against the Covenant breaking member." Drummond knew that once League rnembers were required to act under Article 16 (Le., participate unconditionally in the severance of economic relations against the guilty state) , then they would be exposed to warlike actions by the offending tat te-^^ Therefore, serious consequences were in store for Britain should Article 16 be invoked, for doing so meant that the Cabinet would also have to contemplate the possibility of participating in a naval blockade. Such an undertaking troubled the British Chiefs of Staff because the burden of implernenting economic sanctions would fa11 on the Royal NavyIg1inflicting on the Chiefs of Staff, as the First Sea Lord,

Admiral Chatf ield put it, llimpossibleresponsibilities . lig2 They

8 9 His thoughts on this interpretation of Article 16 cari be found in a letter he wrote Cecil in 1925. Here, Drummond indicates his agreement with a mernorandum prepared by the Director of the League1sLegal Section, Dr. Joost van Haine1 analyzing Article 16. Drummond to Cecil, 22 January 1925, Cecil MSS, ADD 51110. Moreover, he admitted to Cecil that without American cooperation, economic and financial sanctions irnposed by the League could not work. Drummond to Cecil, 13 February 1925, Ibid. Drummondls views on Britain and Article 16 can also be seen in a lengthy letter he wrote to Alexander Cadogan of the Foreign Office. In it, Drummond tells Cadogan that it was highly unlikely that any British government would ever make a statement asserting that she is unprepared to car- out her obligations to the League stemming from Article 16. Drummond to Cadogan, 24 April 1930, Ibid.

Ibid.

'l 'l Arthur Marder, "The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36," Arnerican Historical Review, volume LXXV, (1970), no- 5, p. 1335; Report by the Joint Planning Sub-Cornmittee, "Military Implications of the Application of article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," Committee of Imperia1 Defence, Chiefs of Staff Sub-Cornmittee, Cabinet Memoranda, CAB 24/256, 7 August 1935.

92 Sir Ernle Chatfield, It Misht Happen Aqain: the Autobiosra~hvof Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, volume II: The Naw and Defence (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1947), p. 87. feared that an anticipated conflict in the Mediterranean would

weaken def ences amidst an increasing threat f rom ~apan.93 Chatfield warned Vansittart in August of the Servicest unpreparedness in the event of a conflict with Italy as a result of a policy of Treasury restraintOg" The Treasury advocated the pursuit of a deEence policy within a balanced budget. Achieving a balanced budget however, was attainable only at the expense of reduced military expendit~res.~~Chatfield also impressed upon Vansittart the need to obtain definite assurances £rom the French of their military These warnings were repeated in a memorandum prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Cornmittee of the Cornmittee of Imperia1 ~efence. '' Meanwhile, in rnid-August, at tripartite talks in Paris involving Britain, France, and Italy, Mussolini demanded through his representative, Baron Pompeo Aloisi, economic and political preponderance over Abyssinia. The British and French countered

93 George W. Baer, ttSanctions& Security: The League of ~ationsand the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936," International Orsanization, volume 27, (Spring 1973), pp. 165-179; Chatfield, The Nav-and Defence, p. 89-

94 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policv Between the Wars II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939 (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., l976), p, 252,

95 G.C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasuw: 1932-9 iEdinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), p. 67; Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacv, p. 235.

96 Chatfield to Vansittart, 8 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol- XIV, no. 431, pp. 470-1.

97 "Italo-Abyssinian DisputeIwCornmittee of Imperia1 Defence, Chiefs of Staff Sub-Cornmittee Memorandum, Cabinet Memoranda, 9 August 1935, CAB 24/256. with proposais which simply did not go far eriough for Mussolini, resulting in the talks failing to produce positive results ." With the failure of diplornatic talks and an upcoming League Council meeting set fox 4 September, it was deerned necessary to

cal1 a Cabinet meeting for 22 August. It was agreed here that support for the League must stand, an embargo on arms to Italy and Abyssinia must be continued, and close cooperation with France must be sought .'' Drummondfs reports to the Foreign Office during this period

emphasized Italian mili tary readiness for war. 'O0 This had been

evident to London since 1934.~' It thus appeared that it would only be a rnatter O£ time before some sort of conflict erupted where the Italians were concerned. It increasingly appeared that the time had corne. Again, the source of these suspicions emanated £rom the British embassy in Rome.

98 Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, pp. 262-267.

99 DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no, 493, note 2, pp, 534-5; The Times, 23 August 1935, p. 10. 1t was a special Cabinet meeting that was summoned, with many members hurriedly returning to London from their holiday. The meeting lasted nearly £ive hours,

'O0 See, for instance, Drummond to Hoare, 31 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 513, p. 556.

'OZ See, for instance, a despatch of 30 August 1934 where Mussolini is quoted as saying in a recent speech, "1t is . . .today that we mus t be pre2ared for war....we are becoming and shall continue to becorne, a military nation, for we wish it to be so.. .ln John Murray, Rome embassy to Simon, 30 August 1934, enclosing translation of a speech delivered by Mussolini to Italian army officers at the conclusion of military manoeuvres on 25 August 1934, BDFA, series FI vol, 10, doc, 33, p. 64. The same observation came from the ernbassyrs Military Attache, H. Stevens. Stevens to Murray, 19 September 1934, Ibid., doc. 35, p. 69 and Drummond to Simon, 19 September 1934 Ibid., doc. 36, p. 70. Easly in Drummondls tenure as Arnbassador, he had sent a despatch to London summarizing Italian pronouncements on the state of their navy. He reported that Italy "intended to build up to full 70,000 tons of capital ships,.." and noted that "never before have we seen such a modern and powerful assemblage of Italian war vessels at ses." ~fficialsin London also noted that by 1934 Italy had Itbuilt up a new fleet of 13 cruisers, 15

flotilla destroyers and 44 submarines..." while 6 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 4 torpedo boats, and 16 subrnarines were being constructed. Moreover, the Naval Academy, the fleet, and the naval bases were fused with the Fascist spirit and it was "the Fascist rule to assign to the most worthy the position of

Drummond reflected on al1 this and surmised that Philosophically and historically he usso soli ni) believed in the ultimate necessity and inevitability of war. Perhaps, he said, it was the tragic destiny that weighed on man, War stood to a man as maternity to a woman ....Were war...to break out, Fascist Italy would be prepared to confront it calmly and with discipline.lo2 It was indeed understandable why the British government were persuaded by despatches such as these from Drummond in 1934 and especially in mid to late 1935 to fear that British interests in the Mediterranean might suffer £rom Italian attacks. By the sumrner of 1935, it appeared that the time for war had finally

'O2 Drummond to Simon, 27 May 1934, BDFA, series FI vol. 10, doc. 17, p. 31.

49 arrived1O3,prompting the Foreign Office to compose a secret memorandum on problems likely to arise should war break out.lo4 Circulation of the memorandum to al1 governrnent departments was ordered.lo5 Hoare then ordered the rnemorandum circulated to the Cabinet, and warned them of "the increasing urgency of the situation. Based on Drumrnondls reports, not only did war between Abyssinia and Italy seem inevitable, but war between Britain and Itaïy also seemed to be a distinct possibility.lo7

The British government acted on these warnings £rom Rome and responded with somewhat confusing policies. The policies were confusing because they were intended to protect British interests but were perceived differently by the international community and were thus misunderstood. The two policies pursued consisted

'O3 By 1 June, Drummond was moved to caution Simon, "...that the situation is so grave, and the threat to the League so serious, that every effort should be made to assist Signor Mussolini in the difficulties in which he now finds himself." Drummond to Simon, 1 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 296, p. 296.

Io' Foreign Office memorandum, "Italo-Ethiopian Dispute," 13 August 1935, F-O-371/19125/W 7203/1/1.

los "1talo-EthiopiariDisputerti Major Webb of the C-I.D. to Sir George Mounsey, 18 August 1935, Ibid-

lo6 "Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the Italo- Abyssinian Dispute" attached to the Foreign Office memorandum circulated by order of Sir Samuel Hoare, Cabinet Memoranda, 13 August 1935, CAB 24/256.

'O7 This was the main reason why the Suez Canal was never closed to Italian vessels. In June, Drummond had warned Hoare that "in the prevailing temper here, such a move would not only be bitterly resented but might have the gravest consequences; in fact, 1 am inclined to hold, however foolish it may sound, that Italy might in such an eventuality even consider seriously the possibility of war with Great Britain.It Drummond to Hoare, 18 June 1935, F.O. 371/19125/~2401/1/1. Concerns about an impending war can also be seen in the Mediterranean Commander-in-Chieflsrequest for clarification from London on his assumption that a state of war would exist between Britain and Italy if Malta were attacked by the latter. J.S. Barnes to Foreign Office, 22 August 1935, F.O. 371/19125/5 3964/1/1. firstly, of the reinforcernent of the Royal NavylsMediterranean fleet and secondly, of an increasingly vociferous agitation on the part of the British to have the crisis resolved within the

confines of the League. The crisis was now entering a critical phase with the

reinforcement of the British Mediterranean Fleet between 29

August and mid-~eptember.'~~This course of action was taken primarily because of Sir Eric Drumondisinfluential reports from Rome- It was he who was responsible for advancing the idea of what became known as a %ad dog' attack by the Italians on British interests in the Mediterranean.

Its origins can be traced at least to July 1935 when Drummond sent Hoare a message on this very point and re-iterated

on 22 August:

1 venture to cal1 your earnest attention to my letter to Sir R. Vansittart of July 20th. 1 fear dangers set out in that letter have increased rather than diminished owing to state of mind prevailing here. los In response to this, Geoffrey Thornpson brought up the spectre of what could be in store if Mussolini unleashed a %ad dog actl. ~ecailingDrummondls letter of 20 July, Thompson noted that Drummond had I1warned us (then) of the possibility of some

'Oe Roskill, Naval Policv Between the Wars, vol. 11, p. 255.

log Drummond to Hoare, 22 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 486, p- 528. %ad dogi act such as a lightning bombing of Malta." This

assessrnent was backed by R, 1. Campbell .'Io On 13 August, Drummond told Hoare of Mussolini's plans to stage rnilitary manoeuvres involving half a million men in northern Italy. He went on to state:

1 need not stress again the fact, to which 1 have already called to your attention, that Signor Mussolini is determined to show the world Italy is capable of exercising great military strength in Europe, even though she may be engaged in colonial warfare on a big scale in East Africa . By September the reports coming out of Rome from Drummond were sounding desperate. In a strongly worded telegram, he warned Vansittart that, Ilin their present mood ...both Signor Mussolini and the Italian people are capable of committing suicide if this seemed the only alternative to climbing These fears were exacerbated by Drummond's continuous briefings about Italian press reports concerning the British. On 21 September, Drummond concluded that, "for at least £ive weeks Italian press had been conducting a violent campaign against the United Kingdom accompanied by threats."l13 Added to this were Sir

110 Drummond to Hoare, 22 August 1935, with Thornpson minute, 23 August 1935, Ibid., no. 486, note 2, p. 528.

'" Drummond to Hoare, 13 August 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. Il, doc. 41.

Drurnmond to Vansittart, 11 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 551, p, 593.

Drummond to Vansittart, Il September 1935, Ibid., no. 350, pp. 592-3; Drummond to Hoare, 20 and 21 Septernber 1935, Ibid., nos, 593 and 601, pp. 652- 3, 661-3, On 17 Septernber Drummond wrote to Hoare as well about press attacks on Britain and France, quoting one paper as saying, "If the English tear their hair at the thought of Italy installing herself in Ethiopia, this is a sign that we have chosen well ..." Drummond to Hoare, 17 September 1935, BDFA, series FI vol, 11, doc, 49, p. 81. Eric's earlier disclosures of an unstable Mussolini. Drummond revealed his concerns to London, noting that he doubted the

Duce's sanity and warning how Ilthe truth is that no one, 1 believe, knows how Signor Mussolini's mind is working and that is

the one and only factor which counts "Il4 Reports such as these £rom Drummond helped reinforce the impression of possible 'mad dog' acts hy the Italians on the British. In a message to Drummond in September, his Consul in Palermo told the Ambassador that he feared Mussolini "will commit sorne irretrievable folly, such as attacking Malta, without a

declaration of warou He continued, "there is a striking resemblance in all this to the Gemany of 1914 under the Kaiser and it fills one with great rni~givings.~~ll~These kinds of rnisgivings haunted policy rnakers at Whitehall in the summer."6 The British government decided to respond to Dxummondls reports. His continuous warnings throughout the summer of possible Italian attacks on British interests found a receptive audience within the Foreign 0ffice'17 and prompted the government

LI4 Drummond to Foreign Office, 31 July 1935, F.O. 371/19121/J 3327/1/1.

H. Dodds to Drummond, 13 September 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. 11, doc. 50, p. 82.

lL6 This fear of an impending Italian rnilitary campaign was voiced by Hoare. R. Atherton (Counsellor at U-S. embassy in London) to Secretary of State, 28 August 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 411, p. 640. According to Thompson, when tripartite talks failed in Paris in August, Vansittart and Eden knew that their next step involved the need to reinforce the Royal Navyvs Mediterranean fleet, Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, pp. 107-8.

'17 Evidence of this cm be seen in an interview Hoare had with the U.S. Chargé in the United Kingdom. The Foreign Secretary was reported to have admitted that Mussolini "was approaching a form of madness in which he to implement a policy which had a significant impact on how Britain was perceived by other League mernbers and the international community as a whole. In order to protect their interests in the Mediterranean, the British decided to proceed with plans to reinforce their Mediterranean fleet. In a letter to Hoare, Vansittart warned, .,.we shall have to take every precaution ....we now have no naval margin at all, and the loss of one or two ships even would be a very serious matter for us ....the Mediterranean fleet is probably at present too weak to look after itself vis-à-vis Italy, and if any serious trouble were possible it would undoubtedly have to be reinforced...there must always be the risk of a mad dog coup by Mussolini, and since we cannot in our present weakness afford the consequences of such a coup, we must obviously take every precaution to avoid it . Hoare heeded the conclusions of Vansittart, writing back "1 entirely agree with you.I1 He also told Vansittart that "-..Chatfield should be constantly following the situation and

taking whatever precautions he personally cari..-to preverit the possibility of a mad dog act giving the Italians any

advantage. 11119 Again, Drummond l s views were rnaking their mark with the PUS and the Foreign Secretary. Foreign Office views on this matter proved convincinq with the Cabinet, prompting them to

conceived he was going to reconstruct the Old Roman Empire and in fact ...England had lost its power and that Italy was going to be the new dominating force in Europe.-." Atherton to Secretary of State, 20 August 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 384, p. 633. Also, two days later, Atherton reported that llthere is growing conviction here (in London) that Mussolini is not bluffing ...II Atherton to Secretary of State, 22 August 1935, Ibid., doc. 391, p. 637.

Il8 Vansittart to Hoare, 7 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/~3614/1/1. Italics added for emphasis.

lf9 Hoare to Vansittart, 9 August 1935, Ibid. approve plans to reinforce the Royal Navy's Mediterranean

Eleet. 120

The reinforcement O£ the Mediterranean fleet was impressive. Tt consisted of the dispatch from various waters of the aircraft carrier Courageous, 2 flotilla destroyers, 1 submarine flotilla,

2 cruisers, 17 minesweepers, 2 divisions of destroyers, along with the battle cruisers Hood and The British sent every ship they could to the Mediterranean £rom South Africa, the West Indies, South America, and China.IZ2 The movement of ships

and men had made a strong impression on many, especially among

teague members .123 Drmond later con£irmed at the end of November and early December that in his view, despite the reinforcement of the fleet, the threat of a 'mad dogl attack from

Italy was still very real.12' With the Royal Navyls Mediterranean fleet reinforced, it now appeared that the ~ritishwere taking the lead in trying to solve the crisis by threatening the Italians with a show of military

120 "The Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Summary of precautionary measures taken since the Cabinet meeting of August 22nd 1935," Cabinet Memoranda, 20 Sepcember 1935, CAB 24/256.

lZ1 Ibid.; Marder, IlThe Royal Navy,'' pp. 1330, 1333.

122 Chatf ield, The Naw and Defence, p. 136; Marder, "Royal Navy, p. 1333.

12' Thornpson, Front-~ineDiplomat, p. 109.

12' Drummond to Hoare, 29 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 279, pp, 350-1; Drummond to Hoare, 6 December 1935, Ibid., no. 320, pp. 402-3; Drummond to Foreign Office, 13 December 1935, Ibid., no. 374, pp. 476-7. might.125 The other event which bolstered this perception of a British lead was Sir Samuel Hoare's famous speech to the League Assembly on 11 ~eptember.'~~It was becoming evident to the British that the crisis was escalating into an almost purely Anglo-Italian conflict and something had to be done in order to bring the conflict back within the League itself where it was originally played out- One way of doing so was to have the British Foreign Secretary speak to the League outlining his governmenttspolicies- In a speech to the League Assernbly on 11 September, Sir Samuel Hoare did just that. He stated the ~ritishgovernmentls unswerving support for

the League and for collective security. Hoare expressed .,.the support of the League by the Government that 1 represent and the interest of the British people in collective security ....In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations, the League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to al1 acts of unprovoked aggression. The attitude of the British nation in the last few weeks has clearly demonstrated the fact that this is no variable and unreliable sentiment, but a principle of international conduct to which they and their Government hold with firm, enduring and universal persistence- The speech went on to have an even greater impact on other League members, for not only did it serve to reaffirm British support for the League and for collective security, it also

125 The Abyssinians, for example, were profoundly impressed by such military actions on the part of the British. Engert (U.S- Chargé in Ethiopia) to Secretary of State, 26 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 102, p. 659.

'26 Parker, I8Ethiopian Crisis, p. 306. created the impressio~that Britain was now taking a leading role, both militarily and politically, among member states to xesolve the crisis. According to Hoare: ,-.one thing is certain, If the burden is to be borne, it must be borne collectively. If risks for peace are to be run, they must be run by all. The security of the many cannot be ensured solely by the efforts of a few, however powerful they may be, On behalf of His Majestyrs Government in the United Kingdom, I can Say that, in spite of these difficulties, that Government will be second to none in i ts intention to fulfil, wi thin the measure of i ts capaci ty, the obligations which the Covenant lays upon i t .L27 Hoare's words had an electrifying effect on the League and

were misinterpreted by many. The use of the word h collective^ was originally meant to emphasize French participation in implernenting the Leaguefs Covenant, thereby exonerating Britain

if League methods failed to stop Italian aggression. 12' Most,

however, understood Hoare's speech to mean that Britain was now

127 The League of Nations, Leasue of Nations Official Journal Special Su~plementNo. 138: Records of the Sixteenth Ordinarv Session of the Assemblv Plenary Meetinqs, Text of the Debates (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, 1935), pp. 43-4, 46. Italics added for emphasis.

Parker, I1Ethiopian Crisis, II p. 306; John Connell, The ltOfficell: the Storv of the British Foreiqn Office 1919-1951 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958), p.-185; See also Hoare to Clerk, 24 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 493, p, 535. Here, Hoare confides to Clerk that due to the pro- League feelings of the British public, "the League handl1 must be played out in September, "If it is then found that there is no collective basis for sanctions, that is to Say in particular that the French are not prepared to give their full CO-operation,..the world will have to face the fact that sanctions are impracticable ....It must be the League and not the British Government that declares that sanctions are impracticable and the British Government must on no account lay itself open to the charge that we have not done our utmost to make them practicable. A copy of this private and confidential letter was sent to Dxummond with Hoare's request for his "equally persona1 and confidential comments by telegram or urgent despatch.It Ibid., note 5, p. 537. taking the lead in the quest to stop Ital~.'~' Not surprisingly, the speech elicited gratitude £rom Haile ~elassie'~' and

un£ avourable cornments f rom the ~talians.131 Despite the emphasis on collective action, the French refused to commit themselves

openly to supporting or opposing ri tain, much to the latter's frustration. Firm French comrnitments hoped for by the British were short in coming despite Laval's public pronouncements on Hoare's speech. Before the Assernbly, Laval said, "...any attack on the

League would be an attack on our security...we are al1 united by bonds of solidarity which point the way to duty. Our obligations

are inscribed in the Covenant; France will not shirk them. u132 This did not, however, assuage British suspicions about half-

hearted French commitments .'33

129 See for instance, the report of the U-S-Minister in Switzerland who reported that "no one who listened to Hoare cm escape the conclusion that Great Britain is determined that Italy shall not conquer Ethiopia and is prepared to take the initiative toward collective action when the tirne cornes.'' Wilson to Secretary of State, 14 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 299, p. 648.

13' Barton to Vansittart, 13 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 560, p. 612.

13' Drummond to Vansittart, 13 September 1935, Ibid,, no. 559, p. 611.

132 The Leaçue of Nations, Official Journal: Record of the Sixth Plenarv Meetinq (Geneva: League of Nations, 1935), 13 September 1935, p. 66. The same sentiments were expressed by Laval in a speech to the Assembly on 10 October 1935 after Italy attacked Abyssinia, Ibid., 10 October 1935, p. 106.

These suspicions haunted the British thr~ughoutthe crisis. British exasperation at French actions were expressed by Eden. He felt that the British were at times, working far more for the benefit of France than of Britain. Wilson (U-S, Minister in Switzerland) to Secretary of State, 4 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 288, p. 641, Eden was also frustrated by Laval's evasiveness when the latter was requeçted to pledge support for Britain and the League during tripartite talks in August. Bismarck (German Chargé d'affaires in London) to German Foreign Ministry, 23 August 1935, DGFP, vol. IV, doc. 270, p. 573. ~lso,Vansittart wrote to Hoare that he held out Sir Eric Drummond periodically entreated London to rernember that a successful outcorne to the crisis required French parti~ipation'~~£or, as he understood it, Mussolini was prepared to see the war with Abyssinia go through. Drummondlssuspicions about French intransigence were not new and these views haunted him throughout the Abyssinian crisis. During his early years as League Secretary-General, Drummond had seen firsthand, French ambivalence towards the League. In a letter he wrote to Lord Robert Cecil, an advocate of the League and the driving force behind the League of Nations Union, Drummond vented his frustration saying, "We are going to

have trouble with the French as 1 hear on al1 sides that they are inclined to attack the League in order to weaken its position as far as possible.

Soon a£ter he penned these thoughts, Sir Eric followed it with more observations in a letter to Cecil marked "secret" where Drummond discussed, among other things , Germanyls proposed admission to the League, He told Cecil in confidence that should

little hope of a positive outcome in these talks because like R. Wigram, head of the Foreign Office's Central department, and Thompson, Vansittart did not trust Laval. Vansittart to Hoare, 9 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/J 3614/1/1- Thompson had harsh words about Laval, describing hirn in his memoirs as "a completely unsc~pulousopportunistI1 who was guilty of doublecrossing the British. Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, pp. 100, 105.

134 Vansittart to Edmond of the British delegation to Geneva, 12 September 1935 and Drummond to Hoare, 20 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no, 556, note 3, p, 609 and Ibid., no. 594, pp. 653-4. Eaving France as a key player in Italylsfuture was not new in Drummondlsreports to the Foreign Office. In 1934, for instance, he outlined a similar message, also reminding his colleagues of how Italyls European policies were subject to rapid changes. Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 152, note 145.

Dmond to Cecil, 22 June 1923, Cecil MSS, ADD 51099. there be no settlement on the reparations issue between Britain, France, and Germany, and Gemany applied for admittance, "the French present attitude is that if she were adrnitted, France would go out .. .of course, this rneant definitely tearing up the Treaty of Versailles. . . A year later, Drummond still despaired of France's lack of commitment to the League, saying how "...it seemed to me to be perfectly useless if the French Government while professing fervent support of the League turned dom every proposal made to utilize the League or its organs in concrete instances.n137 Five years later, Drummond again wrote to Cecil in confidence about his concerns over French attitudes towards the League and its goal of arms reduction. He told Cecil of his fears that this time they were seriously thinking of obstructing upcorning naval disarmament talks simply on the issue of French military prestige.138 AS far as Drummond was concerned, his sentiments over French ambivalence had just as much validity in 1935 as it

did in 1920s, prompting him to rernind London periodically to seek clarification from the French on where they stood during the Abyssinian crisis. These concerns were definitely making their mark and were reflected in the policy officially pursued by the British

136 Drummond to Cecil, 11 July 1923, Ibid.

Drummond to Cecil, 24 July 1924, Ibid., ADD 51110.

Drummond to Cecil, 27 November 1929, Ibid., AD 5lllî. It would appear that France was considering arguing the point that "she sees no reason why she should have a navy in£erior to that of Great Biiitain.l1 Ibid. government. In a meeting on 6 August, Baldwin, Hoare, Vansittart, and Eden concluded that in forthcoming meetings with the French, Eden, as Minister for League of Nations Affairs, "should do his utrnostu to keep the French in line with British attitudes on the 1talo-Abyssinian dispute- This was in keeping with the Cabinet's approval in July of a policy advocated by Drummond, in which discussions with the French must always be accompanied by the realization that both the British and French were obligated to act in concert throughout the cri si^.'^^ Drummond's periodic warnings on this matter were being heeded by Vansittart and Hoare- The PUS was moved to advise Hoare that the British must be careful in the way they treat Italy, even in conjunction with the French. Hoare concurred, wri ting back: 1 agree with you that we must be very careful how we show the big stick to the Italians. It can only be shown if both French and British hands are equally clenched upon it. Mussolini is no doubt trying his utmost to destroy the possibility of an Anglo-French cooperation. We must circumvent him and on no account let hirn find us in an isolated position.140

Drummondls influence on this matter can again be seen in the Cabinet meeting of 22 August. The Cabinet issued instructions to the British delegation at Geneva to ensure that they avoid any comrnitments (particularly regarding sanctions) which the French

139 nConclusions of a meeting held between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for League of Nations Affairs, and the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs," Cabinet Memoranda, 6 August 1935, Cm 24/256.

14' Hoare to Vansittart, 9 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/J 3614/1/1. were unwilling or were unprepared to assume.'41 Further evidence of Drummondls influence on British concerns over French cornrnitments can be seen in a reply given by Hoare to the French Ambassador to Britain with regards to future British attitudes in

the event of an infraction of the Covenant. Keeping in rnind what Drummond had advocated, Hoare retorted to the French Ambassador that his speech of Il September explained British policies and the absolute necessity for u..steadv and collective resistance to al1 acts of un~rovokedaaqression." Hoare emphasized further

that, "each word must have its full value. la2 Vansittart and Hoare were strong advocates of a united Anglo-French f rontM3 as was the cabinet Yet despite the critical need to cooperate more closely, the British and French continued to maintain a mutual suspicion of each otherfs motives

and actions.'45 It would appear that as far as the British were

lJ 1 I1Precautionarymeasures since the Cabinet meeting of Augrrst 22nd 1935," Cabinet Memoranda, 20 September 1935, CAB 24/256.

14' "Draft note in reply to the French Ambassador," Cabinet Menoranda, 23 September 1935, CAB 24/256. Underline in the original. ''' Hoare to Vansittart, 9 August 1935, F.0- 371/19123/5 3614/1/1; Marrriner (U.S. Chargé in France) to Secretary of State, 15 August 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 691, p. 627; Atherton to Secretary of State, 22 August 1935, Ibid., doc. 391, p. 636.

u4 Atherton to Secretary of State, 23 August 1935, Ibid-, doc, 397, pp. 637-8,

14' Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp- 73-74. Also, two weeks before Italy began the Abyssinian war, the U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Bingham, noted that the British were deeply concerned about the uncertainty of full French cooperation in implementing the Covenant. Bingham to Secretary of State, 21 September 1935, FRUS, vol. 1, doc. 462, p. 654. concerned, Drummond's worries about the French were not off the

mark, Meanwhile, within the League itself, the crisis took on a more dramatic tone. Though the dispute had been played out to some extent within the League through Abyssinials appeals to have the dispute examined, Italy, nevertheless, was successful in her attempts to avoid formal discussions at the Leaguets Council meetings through the use of defaying tacticç. These took the form of casual replies or downright silence to Abyssinian overtures to enter into negotiations as prescribed by the 1928 Italo-Abyssinian treaty of friendship. When the Italians finally agreed to engage in arbitration about the Walwal incident, Italy also deliberately delayed these talks from proceeding by insisting that Abyssinia's participants be limited to Abyssinian citizens. After relenting on this issue, arbitration talks proceeded and a decision was finally announced on 3 September.'46 The next day Italy then sought to advance her case formally within the League against Abyssinia by bringing forth cases of alleged slave-, torture, and aggressions perpetrated against f oreigners by the Abyssinians . The League responded by s tating

146 Baer, Italian-~thiooianWar, pp., 110-16,147-8. The arbitration commission concluded that the Walwal incldent was "due to an unfortunate chah of circurnstances~and that there was no guilty Party. Ibid., p. 302; Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp. 170-1.

14' Italy, The Italo-Ethiopian Disoute: Abstracts from the Memorandum of the Italian Government to the Leaq-ue of Nations (Rome: Società editrice de Novissima, 1935), pp. 8-11; The League of Nations, Memorandum by the Italian Government on the Situation in Ethio~ia (Geneva: League of Nations Publications, 1935), pp. 15-35; The League of Nations, The Monthlv Summarv of the Leasue of Nations - Supplement: Council Report on the Dis~uteBetween Ethiopia and Italv (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, 19351, p. 285. This was the first time Italy formally subrnitted her grievances against that "...the Emperor has done al1 that lay in his poweru to direct the abolition of slavery in a country that did not appear

to be as disordered as it was upon its admission as a League

member in 1923 .14' Furthermore, it would appear that Abyssinia was by 1935 "..,better organized and the central authority ...

better obeyed. "lqg In response to the Italian memorandurn, Teclé-Hawariathe of the Abyssinian deleqation, in an eloquent speech before the League, formally requested members to investigate Italian allegations. He argued that .,.Ethiopia is obliged..,to proclaim before this Assembly that she denies these unjust alleqations and denounces these mendacious documents and al1 this literature, designed as it is to show the unworthiness of a sister nation which is guilty only of having faith in the guarant&es of treaties and in the sanctity of pacts, but which refuses to condone ambitious designs under the cloak of justice ....Ethiopia asks for the imrnediate despatch of an international comniission of enquiry to ascertain the truth of the cornplaint brought agains t her . ,lS0 The charges brought against Abyssinia by Italy were overshadowed however, by Italyfs blatant aggressive intentions and e££orts at

Abyssinia before the League.

14' Italy had sponsored Abyssinian membership in the League of Nations,

149 League of Nations, Monthlv Sumarv of the Leaaue, vol. XV, no. 10, October 1935, p. 248.

Is0 The League of Nations, Documents and Publications 1919-1946. Official Journal, Records of the Assemblv, 1935: Records of the Fourth Plenary Meetinq, 11 September 1935 (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, l935), p. 51. circumventing Abyssinials appeals to the League.'" The charges brought against Abyssinia by Italy did not elicit much attention, unlike Hoarets speech of Il September. On 15 September the Italians first public response to Hoare1s speech appeared, Mussolini discounted it because he viewed it as "token sentimentsu and so was received with "greatest calmtgby the Italians. Therefore, Mussolini stated that they were Iaproceedingwith greater intensity on military preparations in Abys~inia.~~'~~It became increasingly evident to the British Ambassador that the Duce's desire to fight a war was reaching fever pitch, Warnings to London of war correspondingly escalated, On 17 September Drummond telegraphed the following observation to Hoare: III do not personally believe Signor Mussolini once he has started (a) campaign will be content with

anything less than conquest of the country. . . "lS3 Hoare was prompted to send Mussolini a persona1 message (passed on by Drummond), in which Hoare described hirnself as "an old friend of Italy." The Foreign Secretary tried to convey a conciliatory attitude and explained that precautionary measures

lS1 An indignant Vansittart vented his frustration to Orme Sargent, telling him that "Italy is such a rotten and unconvinced member (of the League)." Vansittart response to Sargent memorandum on the League of Nations, 5 September 1935, F.O. 371/19687/W 8174/2304/98,

lS2 As quoted in Baer, ~talian-Ethio~ianWar, p. 340.

Is3 Drummond to Hoare, 17 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 576, p. 633, in the Mediterranean were taken due to violent anti-British

propaganda coming out of 1taly. 154 But these efforts seemed to be to no avail. The Duce wanted war. After meeting with Mussolini on 23 September, Drummond reiterated to Hoare h us soli ni's Fascist philosophy towards war - how the Duce - . .believes in war as the means by which a country can be kept vigorous, Young, powerful and progressive- He believes also that ftaly is the heritor of the ancient traditions of the Roman Empire. He finds his country lacking space, raw materials and the place in the Sun he holds to be its due. These reasons combined have rendered him oblivious of other considerations such as economic and financial facts and have produced in his mind the impression that he is acting as a predestined instrument.,..and confirms rny own constant impression of a man who is the victirn, not the master of his destiny.15' By now the League was doing what it could to prevent the outbreak of war. The Council had appointed a Cornittee of Five to find a solution which would satisfy Italian dernands while maintaining Abyssinian independence. They tried to so by devising some large territorial concessions to Italy and by proposing an international mandate for Aby~sinia."~ Mussolini

154 Hoare to Drummond, 23 September 1935, F.O. 371/19137/5 5179/1/1.

lS5 Drummond to Hoare, 23 ~eptember1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no- 630, pp. 691-2. Vansittart £Lund the despatch "interesting" reading (Ibid-,note 11, p. 692). Copies of Drummondlssummary of this meeting were also sent to the King, Cabinet, and Dominions. Dnimmond to Vansittart, 23 September 1935, F.O. 371/19137/5 5180/1/1 and Drummond to Foreign Office, 23 September 1935, Ibid.

156 M. Epstein, ed., The Annual Reqister for 1935, vol. 177 (London: Longman, Green, and Co., ~td.,1936), p. 165-

66 rejected it. Accepting it would have deprived him of an African emp ireLs7acquired through war . During this time Drummond also disagreed with Eden's assessrnent of an Italy nearing collapse and infomed Hoare O£ this on 24 September .lSB Drummond could foresee the Fascist regimels imminent fa11 only in the event of "...a defeat in war or, in (the) drastic and universal (imposition of) economic He was also concerned that it might take longer than planned for Italy to feel the effects of sanctions if non- League rnembers like Germany, for instance, assisted the Italians. In a memorandum prepared by the embassyls commercial counsellor and forwarded by Drummond to London, it was noted that

Germany might just conceivably come to Italy's aid. An arrangement whereby Germany could act as a channel for Italian exports and in turn supply Italy with raw materials, could substantially curtail the effects which Italy might face should sanctions be imposed. In the ernbassy's view, "such a scheme would probably enable Italy to purchase at least the absolute essentials for national life and for carrying on a war,11160

Accordingly, Drummond cautioned Hoare, telling him, Y..I feel

157 Baer, Italian-Ethiopian War, pp, 342-7.

IS8 Drummond had also written a persona1 letter to Eden where, among other things, he told Eden candidly that "we are not popular here (in Rome) at present, nor are you." Persona1 note by Drummond to Eden, 16 September 1935, underline in the original, F.O. 371/19687/W 8582/2304/98.

lS9 Drurnmond to Hoare, 24 September 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 638, p. 699,

160 Memorandum by J. Garnett Lomax, undated, BDFA, Series F, vol. Il, doc. 52, p. 85. that it (the memorandum) should be attentively examined in the event of economic sanctions being contemplated at Gene~a."'~' With talk of economic sanctions increasing, Drummondls views on this matter added to British hesitancy about the complete imposition of sanctions (which would have entailed including oil) . The British government listened to their Wassador in Rome who warned that economic sanctions would not deter Mussolini from pursuing his goal of a subjugated Abyssinia.16* A sense of urgency to resolve the crisis servaded British ~entirnents?~ With the rainy season ended, Mussolini's troops were poised to begin their attack. On 3 October 1935 Italian planes bornbarded Addi Grat and Ad~wa.'~* The Italo-Abyssinian war had begun, just as many had feared, adding a new and alarming dimension to the crisis. Italytsactions now meant that sanctions needed to be imposed by the League on the offending membes by invoking Article 16. On 7 October, the League's Council had declared Itafy guilty of violating Article 12, a verdict endorsed by the Assembly two

- - -

161 Drummond to Hoare, 20 September 1935, Ibid-, doc. 51, p. 83,

162 Drummond to Hoare, 18 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XIV, no. 464, pp. 503-4.

16' British concerns about Italian capacity to fight a prolonged conflict can be seen in a despatch sent by Drummond in early August. Based on Italian gold reserves, Drummond concluded that Italy might possibly be able ".,.to maintain a campaign for well over two years without c~llapse.~Drummond to Hoare, 6 August 1935, F.O. 371/19123/~3546/1/1. Patrick Scrivener of the Abyssinian department commented that "even allowing for necessarily incomplete data..,this is a very valuable appreciation." Scrivener minute, 12 August 1935, Ibid.

16' Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp. 199-200. On details of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, see The Times, 4 October 1935, pp. 14-5. days later?' Sanctions were inevitable and were accordingly imposed at the end of October. The sanctions, which were

scheduled to take effect on 18 November, included an arms embargo, a refusal of credits and loans to Italy, a refusal of Italian imports, and an embargo on the export of key materials to

Italy (though oil was not on this list) .166 Because the imposition of sanctions could have led to war in the Mediterranean, efforts to resolve the conflict were intensified.

165 Article 12 prohibited members £rom resorting to war until at least three months after a decision was made by arbitrators. Also, ~lbania, Austria, and Hungary dissented from voting against Italy because of their close association with that country. Toynbee, Survev of International Affairs, pp. 206-10.

166 Secretary of State for Fzternal Affairs, Documents ~elatinato the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 19361, pp- 112-16; Epstein, Annual Resister 1935, p. 165; Toynbee, Survev of ~nternational Affairs, pp. 231-2. Chapter Five: The middle of the crisis (October-December 1935) War and more intensive efforts at resolving the conflict With the outbreak of hostilities, concerns about sanctions were now in the fore£ront, What were the views of the British Arnbassador in Rome about these measures? In Drummond's long held opinion, the imposition of sanctions would have minimal negative effect unless international cooperation could be attained. It was a view he held since bis days as Secretary-General when he questioned the wisdom of imposing sanctions and instead, pfeferred methods of persuasion over force,' Owing to the absence of the United States, Drummond came to see the League as an evolutionary organization more attuned to mediation and conciliation than coer~ion,~Because of his intimate association with the League and because of his position in Rome, added attention was thus paid to views expressed by Drummond on this subject after the Italian attack on Abyssinia began on 3 October 1935. Writing to Hoare on 10 October, Drummond surmised, What then can economic sanctions achieve? It is, of course, conceivable that economic pressure should be brought to bear of a character to destroy cornpletely Italyls economic life and render certain an ultimate - perhaps even an imrnediate - economic collapse; but this would entai1 a degree of economic unity both inside and outside the League which may not be forth~oming.~

Rotunda, "Rome Embas~y,~pp. 62-3. See also p- 10, note Il earlier in this thesis.

Barros, Office without Power, pp. 41, 50.

Drummond to Hoare, 10 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 65, p. 76. Moreover, Drummond showed that he understood Fascist

mentality and knew that this must also be considered in his analyses to London. Drummond added on 16 October that for Mussolini to yield now because of economic pressure, ...would in the present circumstances be regarded as a complete humiliation .... Italian policy today is governed not by reason but by emotion and passion and the latter is ruming high against us/

An alarming pronouncement by the Duce compounded these concerns. He exhorted the Italian people to remember that, Against economic sanctions we shafl set our discipline, Our frugality, our spirit of sacrifice. To rnilitary sanctions we shall reply with rnilitary measures, To acts of war we shall reply with acts of war. Let nobody imagine that we can be overcome without a fierce ~truggle.~ Drummondïs ominous accounts were making an impact on the Foreign Of fice and the Cabinet. In the Cabinet meeting of 16 October, orders were issued not to reduce the strength of the British f leet in the Medi terranean owing to the continuous attacks being perpetrated against Britain, particularly among the Italian press.

Dmond to Hoare, 16 October 1935, Ibid., no. 85, p. 102. Drummond was also aware since the early 1920s of the value Mussolini placed on prestige. Barros, Office without Power, pp. 190, 276-7.

Speech by Mussolini, 2 October 1935, BDFA, series Fr vol. 11, doc. 55, p. 90- This was forwarded by Drummond to Hoare with the comment, "he (Mussolini) is pledged to the Abyssinian adventure and must at al1 costs see it through-" Drummond to Hoare, 6 October 1935, Ibid., doc. 54, p. 89.

The Times, 17 October 1935, p. 14. The Cabinet also agreed Ifthat great caution must be exercised in the application of sanctions, and that it would be well to postpone the application of any new sanctions until the position with the French governent had been cleared up.,." Hoare to Edmond, 16 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 86, note 2, p. 103. On 31 October, the Ambassador passed on Italian press reports about how organized the Fascist state was for purchasing basic goods such as metals, cotton, coal, and wool.' Drummond followed up this report with another one the next day. Here he told London of how Mussolinils demeanour had changed during a speech, When Mussolini made allusions to Geneva, reported Drummond, "bis whole attitude altered. He had hitherto been calm and even jocular. He then became dernoniac in appearance and spat out his ~ords,~~~ These warnings £rom Drummond, along with ever evasive French attitudes towards their comrnitments to Britain and the League (despite Laval's continued public professions of fulfilling French obligations)', prompted the Cabinet to advise Eden in Geneva to exercise great caution in the application of sanctions.

Drummond to Foreign Office, 31 October 1935, F.0, 371/19157/J 7190/1/1. The Foreign Office and Drummond were also always aware of the propaganda element prevalent Li1 mos t Italian press reports, see for exaxple, Drummond to Hoare, 30 July 1935, F.O. 371/19121/J 3322/1/1 on the Italian press.

Drummond to Foreign Office, 31 October 1935, F.O. 371/19157/ J 7191/1/1. Launcelot Oliphant of the Foreign Office remarked that this sentence gave a decidedly ugly picture of the Duce (Vansittart concurred), Oliphant minute, 1 November 1935, Ibid.

The League of Nations, The Leasue of Nations Officia1 Journal, Special Supplement, no. 138: Records of the Sixteenth Ordinarv Session of the Assemblv, the Fifteenth Plenan Meetinq (Geneva: League of Nations Information Section, 1935), 10 October 1935, p. 106. Kere Laval is quoted as pledging, "France will meet her obligations,..my country will observe the Covenant .

Hoare to Edmond, 16 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XV, no. 86, note 2, p. 103, There are further examples of the British governmentls confidence in DrummondJsopinions based on his observations £rom Rome. The British, for example, followed through on Dsummondls reports that rumours were circulating in Rome about a British desire to go to war with Italy. He added that this view was held even in the highest circles and was fostered to a large degree by reports coming £rom France." Upon learning of this £rom Drummond, the British government set about implementing some fom of damage control. The British did not wish to encourage this type of thinking in Itaiy, for they were still preoccupied with trying to maintain ties with Itaiy, lest she side with Germany. Consequently, Vansittart immediately replied to Drummond, authorizing him to give Mussolini "complete... refutations of the dangerous libels that are being propagated in regard to Our views and intentions." Vansittart then elaborated on the steps the government planned to take based on the Ambassador's

observations : . . .I am arranging that notice shall be taken in the press here of what you rightly cal1 the dangerous and dirty game being played by the French press in this crisis. 1 am seeing to it that some sharp criticism appears in the course of these next days, beginning tomorrow, of these despicable tactics which apparently aim at increasing tension between England and Italy and are based on sheer and pe-merse mendacity. It may be useful to you to know this when you see Signor Mussolini. These misrepresentations are causing wide indignation here. The press here have behaved with very marked moderation in this respect so f ar, but they will react very shortly

Il Drummond to Hoare, 2 letters, 17 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, nos. 93-4, pp. 113-4. and very sharply against these unscrupulous tactics unless they cease. . ,12 After the outbreak of hostilities in October, Drummond's interviews with Mussolini increased.13 The British Ambassador continued to press his goverment's views on the Italians. He was increasingly employed by London as a conduit for their appeals to Mussolini to desist from further aggression. This was exemplif ied by a meeting the two had on 18 October. Here, Drummond's aim was to reassure Mussolini that ri tain had no desire to humiliate Italy or go to war (a view Drummond repeated to Mussolini on 29 October) and to report that some of the inaccurate statements of British intentions came £rom the French

press .l4 In this same meeting, Mussolini also told Drummond that If Italy were faced with the choice of being forced to yield or go to war, he would definitely

l2 Vansittart to Drummond, 17 October 1935, Ibid-, no. 99, pp. 118-9.

I3 Drummondrs interviews with Mussolini since the outbreak of the crisis were generally held at six to eight week intervals, sometimes longer. After 3 October, Drummond met more freqiiently with Mussolini - on 18, 30 October; and on 5, 12, 23 November. His meetings with Italian officials such as G. Guarnaschelli (Head of the African Department at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) early on in the crisis or with F. Suvich (Italian Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) in particular, throughout the crisis, were generally held often - averaging approximately every two weeks, depending upon the gravity of the situation at hand (information from DBFP, 2nd series, vols. XIV, XV). His occasional meetings with Suvich before speaking with Mussolini also appeared to pay dividends (Rome chance- to the Abyssinian department in the Foreign Office, 31 October 1935, F.O. 371/19157/J 7246). Mussolini appeared to have been accessible while he acted as Foreign Minister. Upon the appointment of Ciano to that post in June 1936, Drummond told London of his concern that heads of missions in Rome may lose regular contact with the Duce because when Mussolini was his own Foreign Minister, it was always possible to see hirn even during times of major crises (Drummond to Eden, 12 June 1936, BDFA, series Fr vol 12, doc, 41, p. 60). Moreover, Drummond appears to have been able to see Mussolini more frequently than most of his colleagues in Rome's diplornatic corps because the two were also able to talk informally during intervals at the opera (Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," p. 17, note 26).

l4 Sir George Clerk (~ritishAmbassador to France) to Hoare, 23 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 131, p. 158. choose war even if it meant that the whole of Europe went up in a blaze? According to Drummond, Mussolini was capable of carrying out his threats, especially when Fascist Italy's prestige was on the line. This was the impression he came away with based on his own first meeting with the Duce and with senior Italian officiais back in 1923. Then, Drummond concluded that "everything depended on his (Mussolini's) attitude, and if he said that he would do

anything, he always carried it out. ln'' The meeting Drummond had with Mussolini on 29 October 1935 was revealing. The Ambassador wrote a lengthy despatch to London of his impressions. He came away from the meeting convinced of Mussolini's wrath which appeared to be aimed increasingly at

Britain, prompting Drummond to remark, "indeed, sometimes 1 wondered whether it was Abyssinia or Great Britain which was

Italyls chief enemy. "17 Drummond went on to Say that for the Duce, economic sanctions meant that war could not be avoided between the two countries- Vansittart commented: "this is indeed

strong talk particularly by the head of state ..."18 In response, Thompson at the Foreign Office concluded that Mussolinils threats

1s Drummond to Hoare, 30 October 1935, Ibid., no. 161, p. 197. When they met four weeks later, Mussolini specifically asked Drvmmond to remernber this particular remark he had made to him in October and to take note of it again. Drummond to Hoare, 26 November 1935, F.O. 371/19165/J 8568/1/1.

l6 Drummond to Cecil, 7 November 1923, Cecil MSS, ZiDD 51110. He also told Cecil that "everything as regards Italian foreign policy seems now to be judged from the standpoint of prestige ..." Ibid., 12 November 1923.

l7 Drummond to Hoare, 30 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 160, p. 193.

l8 Vansittart minute, 30 October 1935, Ibid., doc. 161, note 8, p, 197. (particularly the one where he said he preferred a general war to yielding in Abyssinia) were not to be taken lightly because "events of recent months have shown that Mussolini can live up to his words."lg Lambert of the Foreign Office, meamhile, noted that Drummond's despatch "makes for singular reading and gives the impression that we are dealing with a man who is becoming completely imbalanced mentally."20 Throughout the meeting Dmmond tried to persuade Mussolini that economic sanctions did not have to lead to war, though it seemed to be to no availe2' Meanwhile, in meetings he had with the Duce on 5, 12, and 22 November, Drummond continued to press Mussolini. The British knew £rom their Ambassadorls reports £rom Rome that Mussolinils Abyssinian adventure meant that grave consequences were in store for the League and Europe. By 5 November Drummond reported how, unlike the past, the Italian people now stood solidly behind their leader. "The

threat of sanctions," said Drummond, "has unified the Italian people to a degree which has astonished many observer^."'^

19 Thompson minute, 4 November 1935 on Drurnmondlsdespatch of 30 October 1935, F.O. 371/19157/~7245/1/1. Initialled by Oliphant and Vansittart on the same day.

Lambert minute, 4 November 1935, Ibid.

21 Drummond to Hoare, 5 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, dot. 161, p. 198.

22 Drummond to Hoare, 5 November 1935, F.O. 371/19159/5 7493/1/1- Drummond also included reports by Naval and Air Attachés on the state of Italian military preparations. Twenty days later, Drummond made a similar report to London, noting that "£rom a13 the information which reaches me, unanimity of people in responding to appeals of the government (to combat sanctions) is remarkable." Drummond to Foreign Office, 25 November 1935, F.0- 371/19163/J 8350/1/1. Within the Foreign Office, Drummondtsreports were certainly of real concern as the following minute indicates: .--thedespatch gives us a profoundly depressing picture - that of a whole people organised militarily, economically, and financially for war,.-thedespatch seems-.. to illustrate the extraordinary dangers of the present situation £rom the European point of view. Mussolini has created and set to work a Frankenstein which, if it were unique, might only lead to disaster. But Hitler is busily constructing a similar monster which in time he will want to set to work - and when that time comes the bombs will not fa11 in Adowa, but much nearer home. Economic sanctions will not avail then.23 Sir Robert Vansittart was moved to order that Hoare be shown a copy of Drummondtsdespatch and 'the accompanying minutes.24 Vansittart added that it should then be seen by Baldwin. Upon

seeing the despatch, Hoare responded simply, "1 agree.~~~~Anglo- Italian relations were clearly headed for disaster if something was not done soon. In a confidential despatch of 12 November, Drummond told the Foreign Secretary of Mussolini's views on Anglo-Italian relations. Here, the Duce is quoted as saying, "1 am not so much afraid of the material effect of sanctions as of the moral

effects - of the damage that sanctions will do to Our relations

2 3 Thompson minute, 8 November 1935 to Drummondls despatch of 5 Novenber 1935, Ibid., F.0- 371/19159/5 7493/1/1.

24 ~ansittartminute, 11 November 1935, Ibid.

25 Hoare minute, 14 November 1935, Ibid. with en gland.'^^^ Drummond went on to Say that the Italian leader also brought up the spectre of an ever threatening Germany and the impact damaged Anglo-Italian relations would bring to the European situation. uss soli ni, he said, was concerned . .that this factor (Germany) increased his difficulties in understanding British policy- The Stresa front had been based on the comrnon recognition of a German danger, but now England had cracked the Stresa front through and through. He (the Duce) felt the necessity of opposing a check to German plans, but how was it possible to bring Italy into line with France and England in view of what was happening?27 It was therefore imperative for the British try to achieve some form of détente with Italy. So much was now clearly at stake - the future of Anglo-Italian relations, the Stresa front, the League, Abyssinia, and European peace in general. Drummondls reports were being lis tened to Vansittart acknowledged to Drummond that, ",,.every effort should be made to restore Anglo-

1 talian relations their old But British of a deténte was to no a~ail.~'The Duce was content in his

26 Drummond to Hoare, 12 November 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. 11, doc. 59, p. 102. In another despatch the week before, Drummond emphasized to Hoare that Mussolini "would like to see Anglo-Italian relations revert to n~rmal.,.~and to this end Mussolini "wouid be ready to start conversation^,..^ Drummond to Hoare, 6 November 1935, DBFP, vol. XV, doc. 188, p. 229.

27 Drummond to Hoare, 12 November 1935, BDFA, series F, vol. 11, doc. 59, p. 102.

28 Hoare to Drummond, despatch from Vansittart, 10 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 206, p. 250.

29 During early November, attempts were made by the British to reach a Mediterranean détente. Drummond to Hoare, 5 November 1935, F.O. 371/19159/ J 7494/1/1. An order was issued that copies of this despatch (which also contained Drummondls summary of his audience with Mussolini), be circulated to the King, Cabinet, and Dominions. Also, Drummond to Hoare, 6 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 188, pp. 228-30 and Hoare to Dmond, policies, and confident in their outcome as a result of information gathered £rom the British ernbassy by his intelligence service. Serious breaches in security such as the opening O£ the Ambassadorls safe (the contents of which had been photographed) were occurring at the Rome embassy. Successful Italian penetration of the embassy enabled Italians to gain access to important information and provided Mussolini with valuable intelligence material which he used to his advantage. Copies of British diplomatic documents were earnestly studied by the Duce. Thus, he was able to conclude, for example, £rom reading Britain's Maffey Report, that the annexation of Abyssinia would not seriously conflict with British interests in the regi~n.~' Mussolini ' s access to British diplomatic documents31was a major

factor in helping him pursue his expansionist policies. The available evidence suggests that the Ainbassador did not suspect at this time that ernbassy security had been cornpromised.

8 November 1935, Ibid,, nos. 197, 198, PP. 241-4-

'O The Maffey Report was drafted by a committee set up to examine whether British interests would be affected by the Italian amexation of Abyssinia, The committee consisted of members from the Colonial, ~orninions, Foreign, and War Offices as well as the Admiralty and Air Ministry. The Maffey Report, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, Appendix II, pp. 743-777. The cornmittee concluded in June 1935 that British interests in Abyssinia were almost non-existent. The main points of the report were published in Italy in February 1936. Baer, Test Case, p, 210.

3' Christopher Andrews, Secret Service: the Makins of the British Intellisence Comunity (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp- 403-5; Bendiner, Time for Ansels, p. 347; Colvin, None So Blind, p- 59; DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 539, note 6, p. 693; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 156-7; and Mario Toscano, Desiqns in Diplomacv trans. George A. Carbone (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp, 412-14; Rotunda, "Rome Embas~y,~p. 202, note 100; Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, pp. 104 -5. Drummond could not offer any explanation to London as to how the Maffey Report was leaked.32 It would appear that the Foreign Office was also unaware at this time of security problerns at the Rome embassy. This was not exposed until after Rome was occupied by Allied forces in 1944. It was then discovered that the Italians apparently obtained information between 1935-1940 £rom a Signor Constantini, a long tirne chancery servant at the British embassy. When he was ernployed by the British legation to the Holy See from 1940-1944, Constantini engaged in similar activities and was dismissed in 1944 when he was exposed. The British embassy and legation in Rome were not the only ones who experienced security leaks. Other embassies and consulates had also been successfully penetrated by the Italians? Oblivious to these serious breaches in security at the Rome embassy, the British continued to have confidence in their Ambassadorrs abilities and allowed him to continue in his sensitive role as a representative of and a reporter to his governrnent. During the Abyssinian crisis, there was never any evidence of mistrust show by successive Foreign Secretaries or

3 2 Drummond to Eden, 22 February 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 539, note 6, p. 693.

33 Ibid., note 6, p. 693; Thompson, Front-Line Di~lomat,p. 104. The Italians reputedly had the best secret service in al1 Europe. They were able to penetrate every embassy in Rome (except the Soviet one), tapping into soae eighty codes and intercepting 16,000 messages a year. Baer, Test Case, p. 10. Prime Ministers in Drummond's abilities as a negotiator or

advisor.34

Absent, for example, were the surreptitious manoeuvres practiced by Neville Chamberlain later in the decade. His distrust of the Foreign Office, coupled with a strong belief in his own abilities and judgrnent, led him to bypass the Rome embassy in his approaches to Mussolini. Instead, Chamberlain preferred to use other channels such as Lady Chamberlain, the widow of his brother Austen, or the legal adviser to the Italian embassy in London, Adrian Dingli as well as Sir Joseph Ball, the head of the Conservative Party's Research Department who also worked for MIS (the British Security Service) in the 1920~.'~No

such dealings occurred duxing the Abyssinian crisis under Ramsay MacDonald (despite his own persona1 antipathy towards Drummond) or Stanley Baldwin, Both Prime Ministers and al1 three Foreign

3 .: For example, besides seeking their Ambassadorls advice, Simon and Hoare had allowed Drummond much discretion in his dealings with Mussolini. For Simon, see Simon to Drummond, 26 February 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 178, p. 170. For Hoare, see Hoare to Drummond, 23 September 1935, F.O. 371/19137/~5179/1/1 and 6 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 317, p. 401- Eden too, came to value Drummondls advice. See Foreign Office minute, 19 February 1936, F.O. 371/20190/J 1580/1000/1. Satisfaction with Drummondtsconduct and abilities were not confined to these individuals. Vansittart sent Drummond a telegram in November wcongratulating and thanking" him on his "conduct of the con~ersation~~held with Mussolini on 29 October. Vansittart ta Drummond, 1 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 170, p. 208- In terms of exhibiting confidence in Drummondls judgments, evidence of this among senior Foreign Office personnel can also be seen in September 1935, A memorandum by Orme Sargent discussing the League1s future, elicited a response from Drummond in the form of a rnemorandum. This rnemorandum in turn, triggered a series of minutes £rom senior members of the Foreign Office who al1 expressed interest in Drummondlscomments. See memorandum by Sargent on the future of the League of Nations, 5 September 1935, F.0- 371/~8174/2304/98 and the series of minutes attached to the memorandum by Dmond to Eden on the League1sfuture, 16 September 1935, F.O. 371/W 8582/2304/98. Vansittart was particularly anxious to get the former Secretary-Generallsviews, saying, "by ail means, get Sir E. Dnimmondls full suggestions ..." Vansittart minute of 4 October 1935 to Drummondlsmemorandum of 16 September, Ibid-

3S Watt, uChamberlainlsAmba~sadors,~ pp. 140, 145. Secretaries - Simon, Hoare, and Eden, continually relied on Drummond both as their prirnary source of information regarding Mussolini and as their main negotiator and voice with the Duce? In Britain, a general election was called in November. Public opinion, so evident in the Peace Ballotls results, continued to play a role in shaping the governmentts policy. Victory in these elections was based to some extent on a platform supporting the League and collective se~urity.'~Baldwin reiterated that the League of Nations would Vernain ...the keystone to British foreign policy....there will be no wavering

in the policy we have hitherto pursued ...u38 The British government was clearly worried about the impact economic sanctions would bring to British interests, particularly since their implementation began on 18 N~vember.'~Sir Eric Drummond had continually informed his superiors about the

implications involved in such a move - how war was the likely scenario on the horizon. These warnings were reaching the highest levels of government. In a meeting of the sub-cornmittee of the Cornmittee of Imperia1 Defence on defence policy and

3 6 In a memorandum to the Cabinet entitled "The Italo-Ethiopian SituationIUSimon had among other things, acknowledged how Drummond exerted every effort at trying to convince the Italians of the dangers involved in their expansionist policies, Cabinet Memoranda, 11 May 1935, CA3 24/255.

37 The timing of the election was also due in part to other factors of an economic and political nature. For a detailed study, see Tom Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition: the British General Election of 1935 (London: Cxoom Helm, 1980) .

38 As quoted in Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 553.

39 League of Nations, The Monthly Summarv, vol. XV, no. 11, November 1935, p. 296. requirements, the minutes of which Baldwin orderêd circulated to the Cabinet, Drummondlsconcerns were reflected in a substantial portion of the meeting. Mernbers O£ the sub-cornmittee included senior members of the governrnent such as Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald, Eden, and Neville Chamberlain, the Service Chiefs, Vansittart, and the Treasury Secretary, Sir Warren Fisher. They despaired of the dangers facing Britain. Fears of Italian attacks were particularly worrying. So obsessed had the sub- cornmittee become on this particular issue, that Ramsay MacDonald felt compelled to tell his colleagues not to dwell excessively on such rnatters, Drummondls warning on French ambivalence was also in

evidence at the meeting. A concerned Baldwin confessed how "he had always felt that France would not corne in with us i£ real trouble occurred," The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell was in agreement, despairing how, "firstly there was a strong possibility of an Italian aggression, and secondly no possibility of French CO-operation in such an event." The sub-cornmittee concluded that collaboration between the French and British governments must be sought and secured4', echoing the Foreign Office line that some concrete assurances of support

should be obtained from aval ,41

40 Record of the 14th Meeting of the Sub-Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements, held on 26 November 1935, F-O. 371/19165/J 8655/1/1.

41 "Memorandum by the Foreign Office, 27 November 1935," Cabinet Memoranda, CAB 24/257. Meanwhile, within the League, a cornmittee was appointed to Graft a sanctions programme while another one was cxeated to promote conciliation between Italy and Abyssinia. The incompatibility of these two functions was only fully realized

soon after the Hoare-Laval debacle of Decernber 193%~~ Some of the main points of the Hoare-Laval pact were not new. Shades of it had already emerged some months before within the League, through proposals made by its Committee of Five- Moreover, there had been some preliminary talks during the last week of October between Peterson of the Foreign office and his French counterpart, St. Quentin of the Quai d'Orsay to see how far they could go with changing Abyssinia's b~undaries.'~ ~he Peterson-St. Quentin talks continued into November amidst Drummondtsperiodic warnings about ~ussolini~sadventure and the danger this pcsed for Britain and E~rope.~' These warnings were definitely taken seriously by the

Foreign Office. For example, in response to the War Office's appreciation of the situation, Thompson, the Abyssinia expert at the Foreign Office, was moved to comment:

4 2 Norton Medlicott, IlThe Hoare-Laval Pact Reconsidered," in Retreat £rom Power: Volume One, ed. ~avidDilks, p. 130. The sanctions committee came to be known as the Committee of 18, while the conciliation committee was referred to as the Cornmittee of 13.

43 Clerk to Hoare, 24 and 26 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, nos, 139, 150, 151, pp. 166, 178-82; Peterson to Scrivener, 25 October 1935, Ibid., no, 147, pp, 173-5; Clerk to Hoare, enclosing message £rom Peterson, Ibid,., no. 254, pp. 314-16; au ri ce Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain: an Autobiocrraphv (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1950), pp, 115-16.

44 Drummond to Hoare, 9 and 23 November 1935, Ibid,, nos, 203, 245, pp. 249, 305-6. There is another point - and to my mind one of great importance - which the general staff in referring to the attitude of Mussolini do not mention. It is that if fortune does not srnile upon him, if sanctions should be extended and prove really effective, the Duce, may quite well resort to some desperate act. It will be remembered that he has in fact said as much to Sir E. Drummond, who reported as follows in his telegram of no, 671 of October 29th (here Thornpson quotes Drummondts despatch in which Mussolini threatens to wage war even if Europe went up in a blaze) . . . ,when read in conjunction with the reports we are receiving of Italian preparations in the Dodecanese, the 1200% increase achieved in the production of military aircraf t etc. etc. this threat is perhaps not without ~ignificance.~~ Drummond also provided some incentive back in October for the Peterson-St. Quentin talks to continue into November. The Ambassador had detected a change in Italian attitudes which seemed to point towards some sort of possible settlement. During his 29 October audience with Mussolini, Drummond made the observation that sorne sort of accommodation with the Duce might be possible, perhaps at Abyssiniats expense. The Ambassador had reported that, .,.certain inconsistencies exist between Mussolini's strong belief that war is inevitable and his statement that if he can reach a general agreement with us Europe will breathe more freely. 46

as Thompson minute to War Office memorandum on the Italo-Abyssinian situation, 19 November 1935, F.O. 371/19163/5 8294/1/1. 1talics added for emphasis ,

46 Drru~ll~c~ondto Hoare, 30 October 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, doc. 161, p. 198. In another report sent the same day, Drummond told London that Mussolini appeared amenable to possible modifications in his position towards Abyssinia as long as Italy retained currently occupied territories. Ibid., note 14, Furthemore, Drummond also made a similar observation

towards the end of November. 47 But just how amenable Mussolini would be to any new proposals was anybodyrsguess-

Since Drummond had direct access to uss soli ni, it was he who was able to gauge the Duce's receptiveness to any proposals the French and British might corne up with to resolve the crisis. On 6 November, for example, Drummond warned his goverment yet again that Mussolini was adamant that full economic sanctions meant war with Britain, However, Drurnmond could also detect some room for diplomatic rnanoeuvring, reporting that Signor Mussolini was today in far better spirits; he looked healthy and appeared more hopeful. He clearly desires an improvement in Anglo- Italian relations but one of a lasting and not transitory character . He envisaged negotia tions of several weeks' length; but if certain general principles were agreed I believe he might r'avour early and concrete action on both si de^.^' To this, Vansittart sent his congratulations to Drummond on his conduct with the Duce.49 The Ambassadorts reports were making their msrk on the Foreign Of£ice and helped to keep the Peterson- St. Quentin talks afloat. Reports such as these £rom Drummond, coupled with worries of attacks on British interests bot to mention the fate of the League and European peace), prompted the British goverment to

4 7 Drummond to Hoare, 23 November 1335, Ibid-, no. 244, p. 304; Clerk to Hoare, enclosing message from Peterson, 25 November 1935, Ibid-, no. 254, pp. 314-15,

48 Drummond to Hoare, 6 November 1935, Ibid., no. 189, p. 232. Italics added for emphasis.

" Hoare to Drummond, enclosing message from Vansittart, 8 November 1935, Ibid-, no. 197, p, 201. seek an agreement with the Italians as quickly as possible. Though Article 16 had been invoked by the League, Whitehall knew this might not deter Mussolini £rom pursuing his goal of a subjugated Abyssinia. Reports £rom Rome drove this point home. The former Secretary-General made his concerns on this issue known. Drummond told the Foreign Office that in his nind, "Article 16 with its automatic sanctions ...places an intolerable

burden on the (League) members - a burden which they assuredly cannot fully carry out.lrS0 It was increasingly obvious that if an agreement was not reached, serious consequences were in store. Vansittart knew this and just the day before Drummond sent this message, adniitted that, "1 am al1 for grasping nettle~..."~~ Two weeks later Sir Eric Drummond sent two important despatches which would have a significant impact on the execution

of British foreign policy. It is worth quoting sornewhat extensively £rom them for they reveal much about the state of anxiety which was prevalent in ~ritishcircles. If shades of the Hoare-Laval plan could already be detected at this stage, then Drummondtstwo despatches of 26 and 28 November provided a major irnpetus for the British to seek, along with their French colleagues, some sort of compromise solution involving major territorial concessions by the Abyssinians to the Italians. The first despatch of 26 November reports on embassy conversations

5 O Drummond to Mounsey, II November 1935, F.O. 371/19688/~9917/2304/98.

Hoare to Drummond, telegram £rom ~ansittart,10 November 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no, 206, p. 252, with the Soviet Ambassador and the Marquis Theodoli. The Soviet Ambassador recounted his conversation with Baron Aloisi (the Italian representative to the League) who warned him that the Italian people felt humiliated by sanctions. Furthemore, should oil be added to the list, the consequences would be catastrophic. The same theme was echoed by Theodoli. He added an equally ominous warning, Theodoli disclosed how the whole Fascist Grand Council, including those considered moderate, had preferred desperate action to being strangled, and that "the extremists would have their way." Therefore, I1unless there was a real advance towards a settlement" by the next scheduled meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on 18 December, warned Theodoli, then

Britain was headed for war. Even though Mussolini knew that Italy could not annihilate British naval power, serious damage would nevertheless be inflicted before Italy was brought to her knees. The warnings were so serious and so full of invective that Drummond was cautious enough to confirn them from other reliable sources before passing on the information to London. Sir Eric Drummond added his own views and analysis to the above observations. He told London that the Italians had

instituted a large number of counter measures in order to deal with sanctions. He also elaborated on the ...degree of unanimity in this country behind the resistance to sanctions .... Indeed, the propaganda machine is so successful here that, in their present frarne of mind the Italian people could, 1 believe, be worked up to (commit) ..-.almostany act of folly. The Ambassador then advised his colleagues at Whitehall yet again, to seek an Anglo - French unders tanding right away because, ...there is the fact, ....of the belief held widely in this country, that should Italy attack England the latter could not rely upon the French to support her in the rnilitary sphere. If concrete French quarantees were not forthcoming Drummond warned, then "we must treat seriously the threat of an attack upon Our naval forces and bases iri, the Mediterranean." For, ...in the absence of a clear understanding by Italy that France's co-operation is assured, we cannot, exclude the possibility of some suicidal gesture on the part of the ~taliannation, and this irrespective of the question of an oil embargo. For it would, of course, be suicidal and this may even be realised by Signor Mussolini and his advisers themselves. It rnay be difficult for rational minds in London to admit the possi- bility of an act so foolhardy. But the rnentality of Italians to-day is irrational. They do not reason as we do and it would therefore be a mistake to attempt to estimate the future actions of Italy by our own yard-measure O£ sober judgment. It would equally be a mistake, in the circumstances 1 have postulated, to base the policy of His Majestyts Government upon the assumption that such a suicidal act can be de£ini tely excluded.52 Drummond's despatch made a significant impact on his government, The message in it was again deemed to be serious enough to have copies of it circulated to the King, Cabinet, and Dominions. To follow up on the despatch, steps were taken to get the French government to explain to the Italians that an attack on British interests by Italy would translate into war with al1 League menbers, including France,

-- '' Dnimmond to Hoare, 26 November 1935, F.O. 371/19165/J 8568/1/1.

89 Despite heeding Drumrnondlscal1 to try and get the French to commit themselves, the British were realistic enough to know that solid French quarantees might still be difficult to obtain. Evidence of this is seen in the minutes composed by senior members of the Foreign Office in response to Drummondgs despatch. Geoffrey Thompson noted that ...the state of French public opinion should not be lef t out of account (for)- . . - it would be a brave goverment that attempted to dragoon the French people into an unpopular war in the waging of which al1 too many would regard themselves as British cannon-fodder. After carefully studying Drummondls report, there was now no doubt, continued Thompson, that "if anything should happen, the znsuing struggle will be more Anglo-Italian than Italo-Leag~e.~~~~ A plan had to be devised very soon if al1 out war was to be averted. Something in Drummondgsdespatch of 26 November had caught the attention of the Foreign Office. In recounting Theodolirs tirade to London, Drummond revealed that the Italians appeared to be awaiting some sort of settlement- Theodoli also insisted that the proposed amount of territory io be ceded to Italy as a result of the Peterson-St. Quentin talks "was totally insufficient to satisfy Italian want~.~~~Drummond followed up his despatch with another one three days later. In it he reported some hopeful signs £rom sources such as Fulvio Suvich and Baron Aloisi that the Italians

53 Thompson minute, undated, on Drummond8s despatch of 26 November 1935, Ibid. Underline in the original.

5C Drurnmond to Hoare, 26 November 1935, Ibid. were now I1very anxious for a moderate settlement of (the)

Abys sinian question. llS5 Furthermore, the Italian government would be today ready to acceptn proposals involving Abyssinian territorial concessions. The Italians thought that the French

were considering western boundary rectifications of longitude 40° (or Abyssinia 's Ogaden region) . Drumrnond then reported that Suvich asked whether the western boundary could not be extended

further to longitude 37*.'= The Foreign Office decided to act on these observations by Drummond. Thompson proposed that

*.At follows that we rnay have to recornrnend to the League - lest worse befall - the basis of a settlement which, while not giving Italy nearly al1 she sought, may yet be more favourable than anything she could have secured purely by negotiation. While unfriendly critics rnight suggest that the exchange of Tigre as partial payment for an Ethiopian outlet to the sea would necessarily involve some compromising with the spirit of the Covenant, a slight sacrifice of principle would be a small price to pay to preclude al1 possibility of the Ethiopian war spreading to the Mediterranean - and perhaps beyond? After studying Drummond's report and the minutes to it composed by senior Foreign Office personnel, Sir Robert Vansittart gave his assent- Having failed to obtain what

55 Drummond to Foreign Office, 29 November 1935, F.O. 371/19165/ J 8614/1/1.

56 Ibid.

57 Thompson minute, undated, on Dnimmondvs despatch of 29 November 1935, Ibid. Drummond had always advocated, namely the ever elusive French guaranteesS8,the PUS concluded that

1 mut agree with Mr, Thompson- And 1 also agree with Sir Eric Drummond and his advisers that the risk is a real one. . .an Italian attack on us cannot be excluded in Sir E, Drummondts opinion as in mine, if sanctions go on any way, even without the addition of 0i1.'~ Vansittartls opinions were dated 2 Decernber, Sir Samuel Hoare concurred with his PUSfs opinions the next day, just £ive days before negotiations opened in Paris on what came to be known as the Hoare-Laval plan. The Hoare-Laval plan was an echo of a compromise solution involving exchanges of territory approved by the League in

September and accepted by Abyssinia s emperor, Haile ~elassie.60 The plan involved territorial changes in which Abyssinia was to cede to Italy occupied territory in Tigre; as we17 as a large zone in the south and southwest where Italy would have a monopoly on econornic development; plus a frontier rectification in the

58 Vansittart began his minute to Drummondlsdespatch with negative news on this front. The Foreign Office had just been told "that al1 the French really contemplate doinq is to defend themselves if thev are attacked. That of course is no earthly use to us," exclaimed an exasperated Vansittart. Vansittart minute, 2 December 1935, Ibid., underline in the original.

59 Ibid, Italics added for emphasis.

60 Goldman, "Sir Robert Vansittart,I1 p. 121; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis, p. 168. The difficulty of having to chose between partitioning Abyssinia arrd an "honourable and peaceful settlement of the dispute" was evident to the Cabinet at least as early as August 1935. "The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute: Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Cabinet," Cabinet Memoranda, 16 August 1935, CAB 24/256. eastern and southeastern parts. In exchange for this, Abyssinia was to receive an outlet to the ses? The desire to get Abyssinia to agree to Italian demands was not a concept new to the British. It had certainly been an approach advocated by Drummond since February and March and one which was personally presented by Drummond to the Cabinet in May- Back in March, after concluding an interview with the Duce, Drummond wrote to Vansittart, telling him how Mussolini was "playing for high stakesu and that, the best way we can help ...1 believe Abyssinia and Europe, is to try to persuade the Emperor to accept the Italian demands as quickly as may be- I know it is most difficult and probably not fair to the nbyssinians, but there it is .62 Drummond's views had supporters within the Foreign Office. Geoffrey Thompson minuted that he personally agreed --.entirelywith Sir Eric Drummond's considered view that the Ernperor could be well advised to seek the best settlement be can as soon as he can ...Aby ssinia-...is doomed, for no other country, when it comes to the point, will risk the life of one soldier in defending it...63 In June, when Drummond advocated that Italy be placated at Abyssinia's expense, he toLd London that . . .it may be objected, (that) it is wholly impossible for His Majestyls Government (or the French Government) to give way to what will

6 1 I1Disputebetween Italy and Abyssinia. Note by Sir Samuel Hoare for the Cabinet," 8 December 1935, CAB 24/257. The froniier rectifications were extended farther than what Drummond said the-Italians wanted- Instead of extending the western boundary to 37' longitude as Suvich had suggested, the Hoare-Laval plan extended the boundary to 35' longitude.

62 Drurmond to Vansittart, 1 March 1935, F.O. 371/19105/5 923/1/1.

63 Thornpson minute, 3 March 1935, Ibid. be represented as blackmail pure and simple and to assist Italy, or at least to put no spokes in her wheel, in attempting to wrest by threat of force £rom a small, defenceless country rights which she could not obtain by free negotiation. Undoubtedly the idea is highly repugnant. There are however, some situations in which one is only offered a choice of two evils, one greater and one less. "Quite true and this is such a case," wrote an equally realistic Vansittart in the margin of this de~patch.~~As it turned out, by the end of the year, neither he nor Drummond deviated £rom this view. The British Ambassadorts reports £rom Rome were proving in£luential a year into the crisis. By DecPmber, when Vansittart and Hoare devised an offer with Laval that might appeal to Mussolini, these types of sentiments had clearly made their mark and pervaded British thinking. To exacerbate matters, the British again became increasingly alarmeci that Mussolini might launch attacks on their Mediterranean inter est^.^^ As has been shown, even in early December, concerns about Italian 'mad-dog'attacks did not abate, owing to Drummond's continuous warnings. During the Hoare-Laval talks in Paris, the British Foreign Secretary made it a point to get

64 Drummond to Simon, 1 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 256, p. 297. Marginal comment by Vansittart, Ibid-, note 6-

This was certainly the conclusion arrived at by the pro-League paper, The New Statesrnan & Nation, 11 January 1936, p, 36, These fears were originating from Rome. On 13 December, for instance, Drummond related a story circulating in Rome that the Italian government "had 300 men who had taken solemn oaths to sacrifice themselves in case of necessity. They intended to make a surprise attack on the British fleet; they realised that many of these (Italian) aeroplanes would be destroyed, but they also expected to destroy half the British Mediterranean fleet." Drummond to Hoare, 13 December 1935, F.O. 371/19165/~9532/1/1, French support in the event of such a scenario happening? Because such fears were acutely felt by the British, senior officiais like Vansittart and Hoare £avoured a plan such as the Hoare-Laval one, as a last desperate attempt at appeasing ~ussoiiniso that the Italians would remain aligned with the British and French against Hitler.67 Nevertheless, when details of the plan were leaked6*, the public and political outcry was so great that it prompted the Cabinet to disavow the plan.69 The Hoare-Laval plan was perceived by the public to have been devised secretly, to the detriment of Abyssinia, especially after Hoare had announced the month before that "nothing is further £rom our

66 Hoare reported to the Cabinet that, " 1 thought it best .. .to raise with him (Laval) at once the main issue of French military support in the event of an Italian 'mad-dogf act." "Dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. Note by Sir Samuel Hoare for the Cabinet," Cabinet Memoranda, 8 December 1935, CAB 24/257; See also Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 10 December 1935, DCER, vol. 5, doc. 472, p- 424. Laval responded by agreeing to military talks between the two countries. "Note by Sir Samuel Hoare on his Conversation in Paris," 8 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 337, p. 428.

67 Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p, 109; Cross, Sir Sâmuel Hoare, pp. 256-8.

According to Thompson, who was in Paris at the time and privy to the negotiations, the source of the leaks was the French (Thompson, Front-Line Diplomat, p. 110). The U.S. Ambassador to France also reported that the source of the leaks was the French. U.S. Ambassador to France to Secretary of State, 29January1936, FRUS, vol. III, doc. 2499, pp. 101-2, Peterson, ~oth Sides, p. 120-

69 Letter from Mr. Low to Sargent, 12 and 16 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol, XV, nos. 365 and 386, pp. 467-8, 496-8; Waley, British Public Opinion, pp. 68-9. See also The Times, 16 December 1935, p. 8; Ibid., 17 December 1935, pp. 14, 18; Ibid-, 18 December 1935, p. 13; Headwav, vol. XVIII, no. 1, January 1936, pp. 4-5, 7, 10, 11; The New Statesman & Nation, 14 December 1935, pp- 924-5; Ibid., 21 December 1935, pp. 968-9; Ibid-, 28 December 1935, pp, 1004-5 denouncing the Hoare-Laval plan. Geoffrey Dawson of The Times had dekided it in an editorial infamously entitled as a "corridor for Camels-" The Times, 16 December 1935, p. 15. minds than to make and conclude an agreement behind the back of

the League . 70 Mussolini, who at first favoured the plan, eventually rejected it after the press leaks and hostile public reaction to itO7' The outcry £rom the British public was so great that it prompted the Cabinet not only to disavow the plan but to repudiate Hoare as well, Hoare resigned and was replaced as Foreign Secretary by Anthony Eden. Pierre Etienne Flacdin succeeded Laval (also a casualty of the plan) as Eden's French equivalent in Janua-rv 1936, With the arriva1 of the new year, efforts at settling the dispute once and for al1 were intensified, particularly after events in the spring would prove that the German problem was looming even more ominously in the horizon,

70 League of Nations, Monthlv Summarv, vol. XV, no. 11, November 1935, p. 209. It would appear that the British believed that the Hoare-Laval talks were not deliberate acts of deception, made behind the backs of the League and Abyssinia. This belief was based on a decision made by the Leaguels Coordination committee on 2 November. This committee had apparently approved and encouraged the League to entrust to Britain and France, the mission of seeking a solution acceptable to al1 three parties. The Hoare-Laval negotiations, it was thought, were in keeping with this spirit. Note by Thompson for Hoare, 2 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 291, pp. 366-7; Edmond to Vansittart, 3 November 1935, Ibid., 110. 178, pp. 218-19. Peterson, Both Sides, p. 116.

71 Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," pp. 293-4. Chapter Six: The end of the crisis (January-July 1936) Efforts to end hostilities and discussions on the lifting of sanctions The early months of 1936 were marked by continued discussions of an oil embargo on Italy. Recent reports from Rome of possible Italian attacks on British interests contributed to London's lukewarm pursuit of a policy entailing the inclusion of

oil to the list of sanctions,'

Two principles guided British policies wnen it came to

deciding whether or not to go ahead and advocate the addition of oil to the list of sanctions. The first was the extent to whlch

oil sanctions could become effective. On this, Drummond was

clearly giving his government details on Italy's ability and determination to survive the imposition of sanction^.^ The

' In February 1936, Drummond reported that Italian press criticisms of Britain ll.,-has of late become even higher in temperature." Drummond to Eden, 13 February 1936, BDFA, series FI vol. 12, doc. 9, p. 13. Drummond had also wamed the Foreign Office in Decernber about the consequences if an oil embargo materialized (Drummond to Hoare, 6 December 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol XV, no. 316, p- 400). His report that Italy would go to war if oil sanctions were imposed provoked Vansittart to tell Hoare that I1this (Drummond's despatch) confirms me fully in what 1 have felt and tried to express for some time past, that it would be suicida1 for us to proceed with the oil embargo until and unless we have corne to a full and concrete arrangement not only with the French but with other Powers rnilitarily concerned." Vansittart minute for Hoare, 6 December 1935, Ibid-, no. 323, p. 406-

In December, Drummond admitted to London that there were difficulties in obtaining information on Italyls capacity to face an oil embargo. He did emphasize however, that supplies could still be obtained £rom Brazil and other non-sanctionist states. He also stated that, "...other mernbers of my staff have reported to me conversations with their Italian friends suggesting that the country's visible and assured supplies are adequate for al1 reasonable requirements, and this was the impression 1 myself received by Signor Mussolini's behaviour in the course of my conversation with him on the 7th." Drummond to Hoare, 11 December 1935, BDFA, series FI vol. 11, doc. 62, p- 109. See also Drummond to Eden, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XV, no. 328, pp. 413-14. Drummond followed this up by saying, "making al1 due allowance for natural Italian desire at this moment to discount the effect of an oil embargo, 1 myself think that provided always that means of payment can be found, Italy believes that she will have little difficulty in finding the oil she needs at least for the next 6 months, perhaps even for the whole ensuing year." second principle guiding British policy makers was the extent to which League members could be counted upon in their rnilitary support should Italy attack a member for participating in economic sanction^.^ On this, Drummond had again, been consistent in his warnings to London that obtaining whole-hearted French support was necessary for sanctions to work. Drummondls cautious views on sanckions had stemmed in large part from his days as League Secretary-General. He held the opinion that sanctions were a show of meagre strength by a League constrained in its abilities to utilize them ef f ectively," Drummondtsopinions on these matters counted in the Foreign Office and were valued by many.5 When Eden asked Drummond in confidence about the probable effects of a League resolution to impose an oil embargo on 1taly6, Sir Eric responded that ...neither imposition of oil embargo nor resolution affirming readiness to impose it will affect Italian determination to continue war. Fresh attacks on sanctionist countries would follow which would be used to whip up interna1 morale ....Italian opinion will continue to follow Mussolini blindl~.~

Drummond tc Eden, 10 December 1935, Ibid., no. 345, p. 442-

' "Dispute between Italy znd Abyssinia, note by Sir Anthony Eden," Cabinet Memoranda, 9 January 1936, CAB 24/259,

Rotunda, "Rome Embassy," pp. 62-3, 285.

Ibid,,

Eden to Drummond, 19 February 1936, F.O. 371/20190/3 1580/1000/1.

Drummond to Foreign Office, 21 February 1936, F.O. 371/20190/ J l63S6/lOOO/l. The Cabinet took notice and in their meeting of 26 February, adopted a policy in keeping with what Drummond had said. It was decided that the Foreign Secretary would avoid taking the lead in seeking to impose an oil embargo at the meeting of the Leaguets Cornmittee of Eighteenm8 British policy continued on its cautious path. The British government had to tread carefully during the crisis because an adventurous foreign policy could not be pursued until its rearmament programme was ~ornpleted.~A rearmament programme was essential to counter the increasing menace posed by Germany's aggressive actions, One such action, the remilitarization O£ the Elhineland, was a blatant violation of the Versailles Treaty. The German remilitarization of the Rhineland in March played a dominant role in European affairs. This event intensified the British governrnent's conviction that relations with Italy must not be strained any further. It was more vital than ever to have Italy as a counterweight against Germany," especially since reports £rom Rome had shown that the Fascist regime was still

a Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Records of the Cabinet Meetinss, 26 February 1936, CAB 23/83. Henceforth, Cabinet Minutes. In early March the subject was broached in a meeting between Eden and Flandin, but the oil embargo never materialized. Edmond to Foreign Office, 3 March 1936, DBE'P, 2nd series, vol. XVI, no. 6, p. 15. -DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XVI, p. vii. Golàman, "Sir Robert Vansittart," p. 127; In November 1935 grave warnings had been sent by the British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, about what was in store, saying that "the present Ethiopian imbroglio is mere child's play compared with the German problem that will, in some not very distant future, confrcnt His Majestyls G~vernment.~Eden quoted this to the Cabinet, noting that dilemma is acute ." Eden memorandum, "Germany," Cabinet Memorandum, 3 February 1936, CAB 24/260. firmly entrenched in power.ll The main objective of the British governmentls policy was now clearly to avoid any chance of risking a war with Germany while being comrnitted militarily in the Mediterranean.I2 One way of achieving this desired harmony with Italy might be through the elirnination of sanctions. Because of this, Drummond's reports concerning the effectiveness of sanctions were closely studied by the British government. In April, he told his superiors that Italy was still coping with the hardships brought on by sanctions: ...the economic situation of the country, though in many ways deplorable, shows no sign as yet of breaking up under the pressure of sanctions. Measures imposed internally to counter the effect of sanctions have on the whole been effective, and the gaps in the League scheme filled by the non-sanctionist Powers have been made very full use of. Italians as a whole are now convinced that in the race between the efficacy of sanctions and the Italian amies in Abyssinia the latter cannot lose.13

It was increasingly clear to the British government that sanctions were not bringing the desired effect upon Italy soon enough. Furthemore, French support for the Italian position

11 Drummond to Eden, 13 February 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc. 9, p. 13 and memorandum by R.L. Nosworthy, Commercial Counsellor at the Rome embassy, 11 Febmary 1936, Ibid., doc. 10, p- 14 . This remained the case in the end of June with the regime still holding on to power easily- See Drummond to Eden, 28 June 1936, Ibid., doc- 42, p. 64.

l2 "C.I.D. memorandum by the Chiefs-of-StaffSub-Cornmittee," Cabinet Memoranda, 16 March 1936, CAB 24/261- The Royal Navy's forces in the Mediterranean at this time, consisted of 1 battleship, 2 battle cruisers, 2 8- inch cruisers, I 6-inch cruiser, 28 destroyers, 4 subrnarines, and 1 netlayer, Ibid.

l3 Drummond to Eden, 10 April 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc. 25, p. 34. Added to this was a nation united in its determination to win. As Drummond reported, Is,..the chests of the ~talianpeople are puffed out as they have not been in the last eighteen months-l1 Ibid., p. 33. appeared to strengthen, especially after the Rhineland crisis-l4 The European situation was deteriorating to such an extent that it became absolutely essential to bring the on-going Abyssinian crisis to an end, especially after Abyssinia's capitulation on 3 May 1936. Though the European powers £ailed to prevent the end of Abyssinia's independence, relations with Italy might still be salvageable. Something had to be done and done quickly if Anglo- Italian relations were to be revived in order to combat an increasingly menacing Germany. The opportune moment appeared to present itself after Abyssinials capitulation in May, The Duce had not only fulfilled his promise of avenging Adowa, but had in the process, also created an empire in East Africa by proclaiming the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, Emperor of Abyssinia. With the Italian annexation of Abyssinia now a fait accompli, it became increasingly urgent to rebuild Anglo-Italian relations. Sir Eric Drummond gave his views about the future state of Anglo-Italian relations to Eden in a despatch on 9 May.

At the bes t, the reconstruction of Anglo - 1 ta1ian friendship rnust take a considerable time, and 1 realise that there may be as many difficulties in England as there are here. So far as Italy is concerned, a very great deal must depend upon events of the next few weeks, or even of the next few days. A genuine détente would develop quickly, though not perhaps at once, if His Majesty's Govexnment were now to decide upon recognising the ltaccomplished

13 Baron Aloisi bluntly told Flandin that France could expect nothing from Italy unless Paris gave Rome its support in the Abyssinian affair. Flandin answered that as long as he was minister, there would be no sanctions against Italy. Gilbert (U.S. Consul at Geneva) to Secretary of State, 11 April 1936, FRUS, vol. III, doc. 114, p. 119. facttlthat will be proclaimed this evening (i.e. the proclamation of an Italian empire in East Africa) . A reluctance to do so, or a decision by the League to persist with sanctions, or to use them as a means of attempting anything that would be regarded here as a compromise solution, would certainly lead to a strong recrudescence of anti - British feeling, and possibly to more serious consequences. In any event, it would long delay the revival of those friendly sentiments which are necessary to useful c~llaboration.'~ It became increasingly evident to the British government that the lifting of sanctions by the League might have to be seriously contemplated in order to help normalize Anglo-Italian relations.16 The Ambassadorls observations £rom Rome regarding Italylsability to cope with the difficulties caused by sanctions made their impact on the Foreign Office. This is evident in a memorandum issued by them in early June analyzing the probable effects on Italy if sanctions were maintained. Italy would eventually face increasing difficulties if sanctions were maintained. Yet, the Foreign Office noted that .. .during the summer and autumn of last year Italy was laying in heavy stocks of metallic and textile raw rnaterials; the exhaustion of these stocks could hardly corne to be f elt, Sir E. Drummond considers, before June or July of this year at the earliest."

15 Drummond to Eden, 9 May 1936, BDFA, series FI vol. 12, doc. 30, p. 41- Italics added for emphasis. Drummond also passed on the observation of one of his consuls who notice? that in southern Italy "...there have been hints that the way is open to a rapprochement between Italy and Great Britain .... (and also how many Italians) wouid welcome a resumption of friendly relations (between the two countries)." G.A. Fisher to Dnunmond, 2 June 1936, Ibid., doc. 39, p. 55 .

L6 The idea of conciliation over sanctions was discussed in Cabinet in April. Cabinet Minutes, 5 April 1936, CAB 23/83.

" Foreign Office: ltMernorandum on Probable Effects of Existing Sanctions on Italy if maintained after June 15 next," 3 June 1936, BDFA, series FI vol. 12, doc. 37, p. 52. Taking into account Drummondls ctssessments, the Foreign Office concluded among other things, that, if existing sanctions were maintained, Italy's situation would not become substantially worse until at the very least, near the end of the year? Moreover, Drummond continued to notify London of unmistakable signs that Italy might be receptive to improving her relations with Britain. He told Eden on 12 June of "a welcome modification in the attitude of the Italian press towards Great

Bri tain. l9 He reported at length on the views of newspapers, both sympathetic and unsympathetic to the Fascist cause. Sir Eric repeated the message of the value in renewed Anglo-Italian relations, paraphrasing one writer by saying: It was surely to the interest of both countries not only that there should be a détente, but that when the moral question of sanctions had been removed the two nations should corne to a positive agreement and not merely a negative accord, so as to collaborate in facing the numerous problems facing Europe. This meant a change, indeed, a reversal, of Great Britainls present policy .20

la Ibid., p. 55. More evidence of the Foreign Office's faith in Drummondlsreports can also be seen in another aspect of the crisis, namely the ever-present British concerns over Italian 'mad doge attacks- In May, Vansittart replied to Chatfield's request about alleviating the Mediterranean fleet which had been on a state of alert for sometime, Vansittart replied that it was out of the question at this stage because, as he pointed out, in Drummond's view, Mussolini could still unleash such an attack. Vansittart to Chatfield, Il May 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XVI, no. 317, and note 1, pp. 421-2.

l9 Drummond to Eden, 12 June 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc. 40, p. 59. According to Drummond, there were signs in March as well that Mussolini was amenable to reconstructing the Stresa front provided the British cease in their support of sanctions, Drummond to Eden, 28 March 1936, DBFP, 2nd sexies, vol. XVI, no. 176, p. 237.

20 Drummond to Eden, 12 June 1936, BDFA, series FI vol. 12, doc. 40, p. 59. The Cabinet debated the issue of sanctions in May and June and decided that Britainlsmain objective was "...to prevent the European dictators £rom coming t~gether."~~London took notice of Drummondls assessrnent regarding the impact of sanctions on Italy. In his despatch of 30 May, Drummond agreed with his Consul's view regarding Italy and sanctions, saying that:

...1 share Mr. Leach's view when he remarks, with reference to the Italian capacity to withstand the strain of sanctions, that her future resistance Iseems to be conditioned by the willingness of the Italian people to face a falling standard of living, which, in turn, is dependent on the political factor of the internal regime.' My view (Le., Drummondfs) is that the internal prestige could withstand a very considerable further depression in the existing standard of living,22 More significantly, Sir Eric informed his superiors that it would take another eight months to a year before sanctions became truly effective in Ital~.~~This was too long, for Britain could il1 afford to wait that length of time to pressure Mussolini.

The Cabinet decided that, l1 the time factor was vital in Europe ...there was no time to loseM2"if Italy was to be prevented £rom drifting into the German sphere of influence. It

21 Cabinet Minutes, 27 May 1936, CAB 23/84.

22 Dmond to Eden, 30 May 1936, BDFA, series F, vol. 12, doc- 35, p. 47. Italics added for emphasis.

23 Cabinet Minutes, 27 May 1936, CAB 39(36). Drummond also notified Eden that there had been an intensity within Italy in the last months to achieve economic autarky through the production of their own food, industrial raw materials and their substitutes as well as ireducinq imports of coal and petroleurn products. Drummond to Eden, 16 May 1936, BDFA, series FI vol, 12, doc. 32, p. 43

24 Cabinet Minutes, 29 May 1936, CAB 23/84.

104 was also noted by the Cabinet that Drummond was in favour of lifting sanctions* It was not an unexpected view since the Ambassador saw firsthand the kind of impact they were having not only on Italy but also on the European scene in general- Within the Foreign Office meanwhile, divergent views had emerged among those who could be termed the 'pro-sanctionistsl and those who were the anti-sanctionists or the lrealists.l The lrealistslwere influenced by Drummondls views on the sanctions debate. Moreover, since many of the 'realists' were composed of senior Foreign Office personnel such as Sir Robert Vansittart, their views prevailed in the end.25 Drummondls assessment thus carried weight within the Foreign Office which, in turn, found its way to the Cabinet, This can be seen in the special Cabinet meeting of 29 May. Here, many members were in agreement with the views Drummond had been expressing and which had been supported by Vansittart and Eden. At this meeting, Eden argued the Foreign Office view (based in large part on Drummondls observations) that "sanctions would produce some effect but not decisive results for some time.H26 The Cabinet was persuaded and agreed with the views expressed by Drummond through Eden, The Cabinet was unanimous in the desire to remove sanctions since it now appeared that keeping them in place would only have the effect of antagonizing Mussolini

2 5 Rotunda, "Rome E3nbassy," pp, 300, 306-7.

26 Cabinet Minutes, 29 May 1936, CAB 23/84.

105 further in the near future.27 This was followed by Neville Chamberlain's public speech (he was then a prominent Cabinet member by virtue of his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer) on 10 June in which he called the maintenance of sanctions the

Wery midsummer of madness . "28 On 11 June, Eden gave the Cabinet his mernorandum on sanctions. In it, Eden States that continuing sanctions "will not exercise, Save as a slowly debilitating irritant, any great political influence on ~talianp01icy.l~'~ Should sanctions be maintained continued Eden, then "...the likelihood must be faced that Mussolini would go to war with this country. On this point,

His Majestyts Ambassador at Rome has warned us.u30 Eden then concluded that "His Majestyts Government should recomrnend the raising of sanctions, this being the course which in existing

circumstances 1 favour.~~' After studying the issue at hand and discussing the Eden mernorandum, the Cabinet decided to recommend the lifting of sanctions on 17 June 1936~~,realizing that the maintenance of

*' Ibid.

2a Drummond to Eden, 12 June 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XVI, no. 362, note 1, p- 501.

29 "The Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, Sanctions Mernorand~m~~by Eden, 11 June 1936, Cabinet Memoranda, CAB 24/262.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

'' Cabinet Minutes, 17 June 1936, CAB 23/84; Memorandum by Eden on the maintenance of sanctions in the Ztalo-Ethiopian dispute, 11 June 1936 and the Cabinet decision of 17 June 1936, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XVI, no. 360, note 7, p. 491. European peace far outweighed the damage which such a decision would bring upon the British governmentrsprestige and upon the fate of the League itself. In a speech to the League Assembly on 2 July, Eden explained how, "the realities have to be recognized ....that in existing conditions the continuation of

sanctions at present in force can serve no useful purpose. n33 Two days later, on 4 July 1936, the Assembly of the League of Nations followed suit and recommended a discontinuation of the sanctions imposed on Italy, marking an end to the Italo-

Abyssinian crisis. 34

33 The Times, 2 July 1936, p. 13.

3J The League of Nations, The Leasue from Year to Year, 1936 (Geneva: The League of Nations Information Section, 1936), pp. 61-62. Chap ter Seven : Concl usion This thesis examines and analyzes the influence Sir Eric Grummond had in helping his government formulate foreign policy during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6. In so doing, it provides a detailed study of the British Ambassadorls important role during this critical period, which has been an aspect frequently dismissed or overlooked in the existing historical literature. Since the source of the cxisis emanated £rom Rome with Mussolini's plans and actions, it was essential for the British government to try to acquire information and advice concerning his thoughts and strategies. The information and advice received by London £rom the British embassy in Rome was of great interest to those responsible for shaping British foreign policy- Thus, the role of BritaintsAmbassador to Italy, Sir Eric Drummond, was of significant importance to the British government, particularly as the gravity of the situation increased in intensity. Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure proved to have a profound effect on many, £or the Italo-Abyssinian crisis was not merely a dispute between the Italians and Abyssinians. It was a crisis which eventually put the relationships of Britain, France, and Italy to the test and also proved to be a disastrous blow to the League of Nations, Moreover, the Abyssinian crisis also had a significant impact on how foreign policy was conducted by Britain. By the time the crisis had entered its nineth month in September 1935, there was little doubt among the international comrnunity about who was taking a leading role within the League to resolve the situation. For various reasons Great Britain was perceived to have taken on this task. Given this perception and, to some degree, reality, decision makers in Whitehall were faced with seemingly insurmountable dlfficulties throughout the crisis.

The British government was thus con£ronted during this period with complex challenges which, after careful assessment, dernanded cautious policies and actions. It was a difficult position for Britain to be in, requiring her to consider and balance many, of ten incompatible, factors . Decisions made by the British government in response to events unfolding needed to be taken with great care. The role played by Drummond, during the crisis was therefore of great signif icance. Sir Eric Drummond had been an active and supportive Secretary-General of the League of Nations during i ts formative years. His years at the League conditioned hin to seek international coogeration among nations whenever possible. It was a principle that he tried to apply when he was Ambassador to Italy during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. Consequently,

Drummondtsresponse to the crisis rnust also be seen to stem in part f rom his experiences at the League- As an organization created with the hope of settling disputes among member states through peaceful means, but constrained in its coercive capabilities since its beginning by the political and military absence of the United States, disputes settled by conciliation wi thout resorting to economic and mili tary sanctions became absolutely essential. This realistic view was reflected to some extent in the advice Drummond gave to Whitehall during the crisis, Since he was hesitant about the effectiveness of

sanctions and intent on maintaining good relations with Italy (in order to prevent her drifting into the German sphere of influence), Drummond advocated the pursuit of conciliatory methods towards rtaly, Drummond did so because he was of the opinion that settling disputes between allies was best achieved through dialogue and conciliation. However, Drummond also gave advice of this nature because he was fully cognizant of Britainls predicament and of the limited room she had for diplornatic manoeuvring . There was, however, more to this, Not only was a grasp of the Leaguets coercive limitations along with an understanding of

his governrnent s position vis -à -vis the League and Europe necessary in any analysis of the crisis, Drummond as has been seen, also factored in Fascist mentality (along with Mussolinils volatile behaviour) when submitting his analyses to London. Al1 these views then, served to shape the kind of advice Drummond gave as Amba~sador.~~ As the British Ambassador to Rome, Drummond proved himself to be an active and conscientious transmitter of his governmentls views to the Italians while also dutifully reporting back to

London his thoughts and observations , It was at times, a

35 Since his days at the Foreign Office before becoming Secretary- General, Drummond was already aware of the influence his advice and opinions could have on his superiors. Barros, Office without Power, p. 384. thankless task which was e~oughto test the patience of rnost. Sir Robert Vansittart, the PUS at the ~oreignOffice knew this

and acknowledged it to Drummond, telling him how "1 often think of your difficulties and do sincerely sympathise with you-..~~~~ The same sentiments were expressed by Anthony Eden when he told Drummo~din a letter that "we al1 think of you so much in the very uncornfortable position in which you must be placed. As the chie£ representative of the British government, Drummond had the task of having to deal with Mussolini and his Fascist state. By adopting a conciliatory attitude towards Mussolini, Drummond was also following directives £rom the

highest authorities in the Foreign O£ fice. 38 In so doing, Britain hoped merely to apply enough pressure on an otherwise useful ally. The British goverment's adoption of a conciliatory attitude towards Fascist Italy was also in keeping with the principal long standing aim of British foreign policy, namely

"the establishment O£ peace on a permanent footingttchiefly through methods such as support for the concept of collective security as embodied by the League of Nations and adherence to

36 Vansi ttart ko Drummond, 26 July 1935, F.O. 371/19121/5 3332/1/1.

37 Eden letter to Drummond, 27 September 1935, F.0- 371/~8582/2304/98- Eden also acknowledged Drummondlsdifficult task in Facins the Dictators, p- 229. Evidence that the British were finding the Abyssinian crisis an ordeal can be found in a confidential letter sent by Hoare to Cferk, the British Ambassador in Paris. Here, Hoare expresses his sympathy with Clerkls situation but also adds, "al1 that 1 can Say is that it is equally tiresorne for Eric Drummond in Rome and for my poor self here." Hoare letter to Clerk, 24 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no, 493, p. 537.

38 Geoffrey Thompson acknowledged that "instruction after instruction was written or telephoned to Sir Eric Drummond and acted upon by the latter." Quoted in Rotunda, IlRome Embas~y,~p. 253. treaties such as the Locarno and Kellogg-Briand ~acts.3g It was a principle which Sir Eric Drummond was keenly aware of and kept in mind when tendering his advice throughout the crisis." In the early stages of the Abyssinian crisis in March 1935, MacDonald told Parliament that it was the National governmentls intention to "... pursue without intermission the national policy of peace by every practicable means and to take advantage of every opportunity, and to make opportunities to make peace more secure.lt4' This is precisely what the British government did. The pursuit of peace, particularly within Europe was of paramount importance during the Abyssinian crisis for Great Britain. As the crisis unfolded, Britainls emergence as the leading power in efforts to resolve it became a burdensome task, for Britain was constrained in her efforts to resolve the crisis. A legacy of Treasury restraint on military expenditure, for instance, had limited British responses. In addition to the need to rearm, the British also had to heed public opinion which was

Ig "Imperia1 Defence. Statement of Policy of His Majestyls Government in the United Kingdom." Presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament on 4 March 1935. Cabinet Memoranda. CAB 24/253. See also German Military Attaché in Britain to the Reich war ministry, 16 Seprember 1935, DGFP, vol. IV, doc. 299, p. 637; and Circular of the German Foreign Ministry. 30 September 1935, Ibid., doc. 313, p. 670

40 DLZimrnond~sunderstanding that British policy must be governed by the desire to maintain peace and by the need to pursue some sort of balance of power in Europe can be seen at least as early as 1921 when he was League Secretary-General. See Drunanond letter to Balfour, 29 June 1921. Lloyd George MSS .

"Imperia1 Defence,Il Cabinet Memoranda, 4 March 1935, CAB 24/253. overwhelmingly pacifist and pro-Leag~e.'~There were also concerns about protecting imperial interests amidst attempts to recover £rom the econornic crisis caused by the Great Depression.

Moreover, Britain had to factor in as well ~rnericanisolationism

and French ambiguity - al1 in the ever growing shadow of German expansionism, It became essential, more than ever, to ensure that the balance of power in Europe remained the raison dlstre of British foreign poli~y~~and central to this was an Italy strongly allied with Britain and France. This show of solidarity dominated British, French, and Italian thinking at the Stresa conference, Fears of a stronger, revisionist Germany haunted the British

at Stresa during the initial phase of the Abyssinian crisis. It did so to such an extent that Drummondlssensible advice about warning Mussolini of the consequences to his African adventure was not followed." However, during the rest of the crisis, a

" See for example, Hoare's letter to Sir George Clerk, 24 August 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no. 493, p. 535. Here, Hoare tells Clerk of the public's determination "...to stick to the Covenant and of anxiety to keep out of war- You will Say that these feelings are self-contradictory. At present at least the country believes that they can be reconciled. Most people are still convinced that if we stick to the Covenant and apply collective sanctions, Italy must give in and there will be no war, You and I know that the position is not as simple as this and that the presumptions that, f irstly, there will be collective action including full collective action by the French, and secondly, that economic sanctions will be effective are, to Say the least, very bold and sanguine," Italics added for emphasis-

43 B.J.C. McKercher, "Shield of Memory: The Memoirs of the ~ritish Foreign-Policy Making Elite 1919-193911in Political Memoir, pp. 199, 203, 204.

44 Some public figures in Britain regretted the omission of a warning to the Duce- Lloyd George, for example, called the omission uunforgivable." Bismarck to German Foreign Ministry, 23 August 1935, DGFP, vol. IV, doc. 270, p. 576, number of Drummondlsviews did, in fact, make their impact on British foreign policy- Though some of Drummondfsadvice may have helped his government decide to pursue policies which rnay have proven to be detrimental to the League and to Abyssinia, Drummond himself, was never a supporter of Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure, The Ambassador dismayed of the . . boas ting, the pos turing, the rampant nationalisrn, the gross misrepresentations of the British

attitude, the absurd egotism and concei t ( that) have been enough to turn the least Anglo-saxon st~machs.~" As Ambassador, Drummondtsoverriding concern had always been, and never ceased to be centred mainly on ensuring that Anglo-Italian relations

were not des troyed. 06 Throughout the crisis Drummond was keenly aware of the dilemma in which Britain found herself and periodically reminded his government of the need for French military and political support, His other views were also heeded during the crisis, as exemplified by the Zeila proposal and the influence Drummond had in convincinq his government of Italian threats of 'mad dog' attacks which led to the reinforcement of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet. Drummondrswarnings later in the year, of impending war with Italy, as well as signs of possible Italian acceptance of some sort of settlement, had some bearing on the

- --

45 Quoted in Rotunda, l'Rome Embassy,I1 p. 193, note 85.

46 Evidence of this can be seen in a message frorn Drummond to Simon, 1 June 1935, DBFP, 2nd series, vol. XIV, no, 296, p. 297. direction taken by his governrnent to proceed with the Hoare-Laval

plan. His views about getting Abyssinia to concede to Italian demands (unpalatable as they were to him but advocated only because they were "the lesser of two evilsU), were evident since the early days of the crisis. They were discussed within the Foreign Office and were to some extent, also reflected in the Hoare-Laval proposals. More significantly, there is evidence to suggest that Drummond's views on the effectiveness of sanctions appear to have been heeded by London. His calculations of a weaker but nevertheless determined Italy bent on surviving hardships, aided the British government in deciding to recornrnend the lifting of sanctions which led to the end of the crisis. Sir Eric Drummondlsobservations throughout the Abyssinian crisis undoubtedly made their mark on such dominant senior Foreign Office officiais such as Sir Robert Vansittart. His ability (as well as those of Foreign Secretaries such as Sir Samuel Hoare), to defend successfully at crucial moments, Foreign Office views in Cabinet, illustrate to some extent, the primacy of the Foreign Office in the execution of British foreign policy. Because of this, they also illustrate the influential role of Britainls Ambassador to Italy whose advice and warnings were not merely acknowledged, but were also acted upon in certain instances. Because Drummondls was a voice heard and listened to by the policy making elite, his opinions made an impact on the pursuit and execution of British foreign policy. Therefore, not only did Sir Eric Drummond's despatches £rom Rome prove to be informative, they were, at certain critical junctures, also influential in the formation of British foreign policy during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936. ILLUSTRATION

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