SIR ERIC DRüMMûND, BRITAINtS AMBASSADOR TO ITALY, AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN CRISIS OF 1935-1936 Araceli Julia P. Gelardi B.S., Florida International University, 1982 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of His tory O Araceli Julia P. Gelardi 1998 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY March 1998 Al1 rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other rneans, without permission of the author. National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Otbwa ON KI A ON4 Canada Canada Your fi& Votre rélérem Our llle Notre reference The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distnier ou copies of this thesis in rnicroform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la foxme de microfiche/fïJm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété ddu copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d7auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts ~omit Ni la thèse ni des exitraits substantiels may be printed or othenivise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Abs tract This thesis examines the role Britain's Ambassador to Italy, Sir Eric Drummond, played on the formulation of British foreign policy during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6. Contrary to some past studies which ignore Drummond's impact on government decisions during the crisis, this thesis shows that he did play an important role in influencing many of the British goverment's decisions. This assessrnent has been arrived at by examining Drummondls tenure as ambassador during the crisis, and also by focussing on the perspectives of British governrnent officiais involved in the foreign policy decision-making process. These individuals include members in the Foreign Office such as the Permanent Under-Secretary and, in the political sphere, the Foreign Secretary. The thesis illustrates how Drummond played a key role during each phase of the crisis. Because of his position as arnbassador, Sir Eric was able to present British views and positions taken throughout the crisis to Mussolini and his aides. But, more importantly, Drummond was able to provide his colleagues and superiors in Whitehall with useful observations and, at times, convincing advice which aided the British government in formulating its policies in response to unfolding events. The thesis is based on an analysis of primary and secondary sources in English, both published and unpublished. The primary sources are comprised mainly of British documents such as those iii found in the Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Poli tical Files (F.O. 371) deposited in the Public Record Office at Kew, Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print and Reports, and the Documents on British Foreign Policy- Cabinet and Foreign Office memoranda were also examined, as were other material found in the published diplomatic documents of Canada, Germany, and the United States. This emphasis on Foreign Office, Cabinet, and other diplomatic sources is integral to the thesis because it is in these materials that Drummondlsopinions and advice can be found, along with his governmentlsresponses and policies. Since much of the crisis was played out within the League of Nations, League publications were also used in this study, as were British periodicals and rnemoirs. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1 would like to express my appreciation to my supervisory cornmittee for their help throughout my graduate studies. Many thanks go to Dr, Martin Kitchen for his advice and helpful comments. f am also very much indebted to Dr. John Stubbs for his invaluable suggestions and for his unfailing kindness. Many thanks are also due to my husband and parents for their encouragement and support- Finally, to my daughters, Victoria and Gabriella, for their unending patience and good humour, 1 dedicate this thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS Approval ...........O.............. ii Abstract .......................O. iii Acknowledgements ....................... v Chapter One: Introduction - Background to the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. ........................ 1 Chapter Two: A portrait of Sir Eric Drummond O.......8 Chap ter Three : British foreign policy and the decision-making process. 14 Chapter Four: The beginning of the crisis (Dec 1934-Sept 1935) Efforts by Britain, France and the League of Nations at finding a peaceful settlement ...... 23 Chapter Five: The middle of the crisis (October-December1935) War and more intensive efforts at resolving the conflict. 70 Chapter Six: The end of the crisis (January-July 1936) Efforts to end hostilities and discussions on the lifting of sanctions .....-. 97 Chapter Seven: Conclusion .....O.-.........108 ILLUSTRATION ........................ 117 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................118 vi Chapter One: Introduction - Background to the Italo -Abyssinian crisis During 1935-6 Benito Mussolini embarked upon his rnost ambitious plan for acquiring a colonial empire, the conquest of Abyssinia. Decernber 1934 marked the official beginning of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis with a clash between Italian and Abyssinian troops at Walwal, sorne sixty miles inside Abyssinian territory. The crisis ended in July 1936 when sanctions imposed by the League of Nations were lifted. By that time, Italian troops had entered the Abyssinian capital of Addis Ababa (in May 1936), and forced Ernperor Haile Selassie to flee into exile. Throughout the crisis, intense negotiations were pursued (both within and outside of the League) in order to resolve matters. In the end, Mussolini acquired his East African empire. However, it was a venture which had exacted a hea-vy price £rom many of the players involved. Mussolini's scheme to subjugate Abyssinia was in accordance with Fascist philosophy, for success in this endeavour would illustrate how glorious and powerful Italy and il Duce were by providing an empire rerniniscent of ancient Rome. However, the whole adventure was not to be a straightforward affair, for the crisis engulfed not only Abyssinia and Italy, but also affected Great Britain, France, and the League of Nations. By the end O£ Mussolini's adventure in July 1936, European relations had become severely strained. The Stresa front of April 1935 consisting of Britain, France, and Italy in opposition to Nazi Germany's increasing belligerence, had disintegrated. Moreover, the League of Nations1 inability to deal successfully with the crisis had also rendered the League a fatal blow. The Italo-Abyssinian conflict was therefore not merely a crisis of relations between Italy and Abyssinia, but was, above all, a grave crisis with international implications, Ample scholarly li terature theref ore exis ts on various aspects of the conflict, There are, for instance, studies on the devastating impact the crisis had on the League of Nations.' For contemporary accounts of the war itself, there are Pietro Badogliolsand Emilio de Bonolspro-Italian narrativesO2 Ange10 del Boca and Anthony Mockler have also written about the war, as has Thomas M. Coffey/ Coffeytswork places heavy emphasis on Abyssinia's emperor, Haile Selassie and presents a sympathetic account of him. Other aspects of the crisis can be found in works such as Franklin D, Laurens1 examination of French policy. He also analyzes the effect the crisis had on the French public as seen See for example: Elmer Bendiner, A Time £or Ansels: the ~rasicomic Historv of the Leaque of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975); F.S. Northedge, The Leaque of Nations: Its Life and ~imes(New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 19 86) ; F. P. Walters, A Historv of the Leasue of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 19 52 ) - Pietro Badoglio, The War in Abvssinia (London: Methuen Publishers, 1937) and Emilio de Bono, Anno XIIII: The Conquest of an Ern~ire (London: The Cressett Press, Ltd., 1937). These works of course are pro-Italian propaganda pieces published in English and aimed at British audiences and therefore need to be consulted with caution. They are also revealing in showing how Italy aspired to an -pire that was part of the British and French experience. Ange10 del Boca, The Ethiopian War 1935-1941 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Anthony Mockler, Haile SelassielsWar (Oxford University Press, 1984); Thomas M. Co£fey, Lion bv the Tail: the Storv of the Italian-Ethiopian War (New York: The Viking Press, 1974)- through newspapers, periodicals, and journal^.^ Brice Harris, meanwhile, details the role played by the United States during the crisis. He cites the great powersg lack of decisive leadership as a major contributing factor in Italyls ~ictory.~ For an overview of directions taken in Italian foreign policy through a seventy year period, C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari provide a detailed accountm6 Denis Mack Smith, an established historlan of Italy, portrays Mussolini as a driven man who sought prestige for Fascism and Italy through the acquisition of a colonial empire by means of a military conquesL7 Esmonde Robertson has produced a study of Mussolinifs foreign policy, highlighting his efforts at establishing Italian spheres of influence in Europe and Africa.' Several scholarly monographs have been published during the last thirty years on the crisis itself. Two examples focussing on the international dimension can be £ound in studies done by George W. Baer.g Frank Hardie has also written a thorough ' Franklin D. Laurens, France and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis 1935-1936 (The Hague: Mouton, 1967) . Brice Harris, Jr,, The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreicm Policv 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975) .