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73-9163 LENOIR, Nancy Ruth, 1938- THE RUHR IN ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY: R M THE BEGINNING OF IHE OCCUPATION UNTIL THE BO OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE. The Ihiiversity of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1972 History, m o d e m University Microfilms, A XEROX Company. AnnAiIbor, Michigan 0 1973 Haney Ruth Lenoir ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFIIMED EXACITLY AS RECEIVED. THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE THE RUHR IN ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY: FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE OCCUPATION UNTIL THE END OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY NANCY RUTH LENOIR Norman, Oklahoma 1972 THE RUHR IN ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY : FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE OCCUPATION UNTIL THE END OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE iPVtED BY DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have Indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company PREFACE On January 11, 1923, French and Belgian engineers and officials, accompanied by one French cavalry and two infan try divisions, as well as a Belgian detachment, entered the Ruhr district, industrial heartland of Germany. The previ ous day the French government had informed the German gov ernment and the Ruhr population that a Mission of Control was to supervise German resources and insure execution of the reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. France and Belgium, requesting German cooperation in the endeavor, justified their action by reference to the Reparation Com mission's December 26, 1922, and January 9, 1923, declara tions of German default in the delivery of reparations timber and coal. The German government, however, forbade the Ruhr populace to assist the invaders, and Germany began a massive program of passive resistance, which, in turn, resulted in an extension of the occupation zone and a rigid military operation. Upon Germany the economic impact of the struggle was disastrous; after inflation reached unprece dented levels, Gustav Stresemann, the new Chancellor, on September 26 issued a decree ending passive resistance. Germany's economy lay shattered. The occupation had also iii Iind a detrimental financial effect upon France and Belgium, which received less German coal and coke in 1923 than in 1 9 2 2 . Furthermore, the occupation had unfortunate politi cal repercussions for France because it had, in engaging in a military occupation of the Ruhr, acted in defiance of official British opinion and thereby antagonized the Brit ish government. After the Ruhr experience, France would not pursue an independent foreign policy in the face of British opposition, and in the 1930's this French deference to British leadership was to produce cataclysmic conse quences for the people of Europe. Since the Ruhr occupation has been termed a turning point in inter-war Anglo-French diplomacy, a detailed exam ination of relations between the two countries during the crucial period of January 1 to September 26, 1923, is of value. Many points need to be considered and questions an swered. First, the Ruhr occupation must be placed in his torical perspective by determining how closely the French and British governments cooperated in making and enforcing the Treaty of Versailles, over what basic issues they dis agreed, and what combination of events in the 1919-1922 period led the French government to take independent action against Germany. Then France's motives for occupying the Ruhr must be examined. Once the occupation was in progress, did the British government encourage Germany to pursue pas sive resistance or did it attempt to make the occupation iv difficult for France and thus encourage it to evacuate the Ruhr? Finally, what was the effect of the occupation on the issues of reparations and security, and why did it mark the end of an independent French foreign policy? As the fiftieth anniversary of the Ruhr occupation approaches, the historian can point to myriad articles and books which mention the occupation. Almost all of the works, however, were written either during the period of the occu pation or within ten years after the evacuation of the Ruhr, and most of them are polemical and nationalistic. Recently, two books and two dissertations have ap peared which consider some aspect of the Ruhr struggle. Eric Roman's "The Ruhrkampf in History" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. New York University, 1965), is a general sur vey of the occupation through September, 1923» Focusing upon no particular aspect, it is based almost exclusively on secondary sources and is poorly written. Roman's brief discussion of Anglo-French relations is drawn entirely from previously-printed materials, and to him France is an impe rialistic aggressor. Very similar to Roman's work in many ways is Royal J. Schmidt, Versailles and the Ruhr : Seedbed of World War II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I9 6 8 ). It, too, is badly written, lacks unity, and is based almost en tirely upon secondary works. Schmidt's approach was also basically anti-French and his study of British policy su perficial. Neither of the two authors utilized the three French Documents diplomatiques volumes published in 1923. Alfred Emile Cornebise's "Some Aspects of the German Re sponse to the Ruhr Occupation, January-September, 1923" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Car olina , 1965)1 though a work of fine quality, deals prima rily with internal German affairs and mentions Anglo-French diplomacy only peripherally. The excellent work by Jean- Claude Pavez, lÆ Reich devant 1'occupation franco-belge de la Ruhr en 192J3 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1969)1 is, like that of Cornebise, based upon German documents. It also focuses almost exclusively upon domestic events in Germany during the occupation period. No French or English book or article located in this study considers in detail Anglo-French diplomacy during the Ruhr occupation. Although a portion of Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1924 (London: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1 9 2 8 ) does discuss the May 2 to August 20, 19231 segment of events, the work is based almost entirely upon the few documents published in that year by the French, Belgian, and British governments. No published work on the Ruhr venture is based upon the Anglo-French diplomatic cor respondence contained in the Public Record Office in London. These records are vital to any study of the Ruhr in Anglo- French diplomacy, for the small collection or documents published by Britain and France in 1923 covers only the pe riod after May 2, 1923. Thus the correspondence exchanged vi between Britain and France during the critical first four months of the occupation has not been utilized in earlier works dealing with the Ruhr. This manuscript deals exten sively with those indispensable documents. The labors, thoughtfulness, and concern of many peo ple have enabled me to complete the course of graduate study at the University of Oklahoma and the preparation of this manuscript. Although I now express sincere gratitude to all of them, I feel that there are several persons to whom I am especially indebted. Three members of my committee have closely supervised the preparation of this work and have given much valuable and constructive criticism; for this assistance I thank Pro fessors Robert A. Nye, Gordon D, Drummond, and William H, Maehl, Jr. An extra word of appreciation must, however, be given to Professor Gordon D. Drummond, who gave most un selfishly of his own time in order to aid me in meeting cru cial deadlines and without whose aid completion of the man uscript would have been delayed. To Mrs. Marjorie Bradley, Assistant to the Dean, Graduate College, The University of Oklahoma, I am grateful for constant encouragement, advice, and numerous acts of kindness freely given since my arrival on this campus in September, I9 6 6 . Several people who made significant contributions during the course of my research in Europe in 1971 deserve vii special mention. R. R. Mellor, N.B.E., Records Branch, Library and Records Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, made available ten indispensable volumes of Foreign Office Correspondence which had been removed from the Public Record Office. During the time I was researching in his office, he not only showed much interest in my work, but also provided a pleasant place to work and led me to other valuable material. The staff of the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Université de Paris, Nanterre, was extremely cooperative and provided ex cellent typing facilities which greatly accelerated the pace of research in their fine collection. To Mademoiselle Suzanne Guyotat of that staff I am especially grateful, for after introducing me to the Library she served as trans lator when I needed one, showed concern about my progress, and at times extended hospitality after work hours ended. From the day of my arrival in England, my new friend, Patricia A. Gajda, Garfield Heights, Ohio, gave most help ful hints about researching in the Public Record Office and other facilities in London, as well as an introduction to the city itself, and she has also answered many questions during the course of the writing of this dissertation. While I am Indebted to numerous relatives, friends, and colleagues, several of them merit individual recogni tion. My family has throughout given encouragement and ma terial support, as well as understanding ; for this I am viii deeply thankful. Especially during my first year in Norman, Jerold A. and Josephine Wilke were a source of encouragement and aid, and all during my stay at the University I looked forward to Saturday evenings in their home. In addition, I must express appreciation to Jo for helping me proofread this manuscript. To Edwin A. and Beverly Graeter, of Wies baden, Germany, I am extremely grateful for giving both as sistance and inspiration during the period of my research in Europe; furthermore, to my dear friend Beverly I am particu larly indebted for constant concern, interest in my prog ress,- and priceless moral support— even at the times 1 failed and became most discouraged.