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Destruction of Army Group Center by ER Bick

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Destruction of Army Group Center by ER Bick Layout: Chris Cummins Battleplan, Report 003 Photos: ER Bickford October 2009 World at War #9 – Destruction of Army Group Center By ER Bickord Historical Scenario surrounded in entrenchments This campaign is set in the northern half of the along the Berezina River. Using eastern front, beginning in late June 1944. There are air support, the Soviet 65th Army nine weekly turns, culminating at the end of August and a cav-mech group manage 1944. The scale is 16 miles per hex and the units are to reduce the panzers. Just to corps-sized. Victory and defeat balances on Soviet VP, the north of Mogilev, Soviet which are collected by capturing towns and cities. In 31st and 33rd Armies attack 39th order to win the Soviets need 31 VP. Two of the large Panzer Corps, which is forced VP awards are for Koenigsberg and any coastal hex to retreat. Then 11th Guards and west of Riga. They each yield 10 VP. another cav-mech group push the th The German player has decided to pull back as weakened 27 Corps into Orsha. th th much as possible, because the front line is too vast to The 5 Army and 5 Guards Tank rd defend. That won’t be easy, though, as the Soviets will attack 53 Corps with Soviet air support. That forces th attack relentlessly and try to maintain contact with the the Germans to retreat. The 9 Infantry Corps is pushed th retreating Germans. to the north of Borisev. The 6 Shock Army attacks the Turn One, 23-30 June 1944 fortified town of Polotsk, which falls easily for another VP. The Soviets have the initiative and the burden of The Germans receive Korps Gruppe Saucken as attack. On turn one a number of special rules are in reinforcement just south of the Dvina River. (KG must force. Only units within range of the Bagration Center be placed atop a friendly unit within stacking limits.) of Gravity marker [4004] activate and attack, though The one replacement step goes to 27th Corps in Orsha. with a positive column shift. Following the plan, the German units try to retreat to The opening attacks, during the pre-movement create a shortened front. No counterattacks are launched. combat phase, have mixed results. All the Bagration The Soviets have saved four air armies to perform in- units are mandated an attack. One air support marker terdiction missions against retreating units. (All units in is used for close ground support, while the rest are an interdicted hex have a variable movement rate equal reserved for the post-movement combat phase. (The to a die roll.) Several retreating units don’t move as far Soviet player must also determine how many air armies as was hoped and are left exposed. to reserve for interdiction against German units that at- tempt to run.) Two of the attacks in the south result in Turn Two, 1-7 July nd th st attacker eliminations, which flips a full-strength unit to The Soviets receive 2 Tank Army, the 47 and 1 its reduced side. Another attack is bogged down into an Polish Armies along with six replacement points. Only AS (attack stalled), while the rest are successful. Two two RP are used and the rest are lost. Soviet armies and a cav-mech group get the blood bath Starting on this turn, Soviet shock armies get a result, which reduces the 11th Guards and the German favorable column shift in combat. The Soviets attack 27th Corps. The fortified locality of Vitebsk falls to the with overwhelming strength and capture the towns of Soviets, and the first of the many VP needed is gained. Mogilev and Orsha. (two VP). Pskov also falls, for The rest of the attacks produce defender retreats. another VP. An attack is launched against Narva, which rd During movement the Soviets manage to surround is held by the German 43 Corps. The Soviets commit two German units in the porous area in the south near an air army for support and have the combat benefit of nd Minsk. In post-movement combat, the Soviets use three 2 Shock Army (a one-column right shift). The result air armies for close support. The 41st Panzer Corps is is a bloodbath. The German corps and the shock army BATTLEPLAN are reduced in place. To the south of Bobruyesk, two will allow additional flexibility during movement. Also Soviet units attack 41st Panzer Corps. Using air support, KG Weidling and KG Hartnek are deployed south of the the Soviets crush the German panzers. Dvina River. One replacement is received and used to st During movement, several Soviet armies are out of bring back 41 Panzer Corps in a reduced state. Along supply due to the Pripyat Marsh rules. Those units roll with those reinforcements, the German player may now a die to determine their movement allowance. The 69th use his Armor Concentration marker once per turn to Army captures the town of Kowel (one VP). A major support an attack. breakthrough is made in the north near Lake Pskov, and No German attacks are made, however, as the German three Soviet armies are just about to outflank that entire player is still following his original plan of trading space German position. for time. Soviet air interdiction continues to hamper the The 28th Corps is surrounded at Pskov, and a blood- retreating forces in the north while the partisan areas bath results in losses to both sides. Ten more attacks are in the south also serve to slow the retreat. At this time made along the German line. The 6th SS is surrounded the Soviets have 11 VP (31 are needed for a victory). about a hundred miles south of Pskov. With no retreat Turn Three, 8-14 July path, it’s reduced in place. The Soviet 4th Shock Army The Soviets receive the 1st Ukrainian Front in the and the German 9th Corps both lose a step to the north south. That organization has three infantry armies and of Borisov, which falls to the Soviets (one VP). The at- two cav-mech groups. Those units are allowed only a tacks in the area of Minsk have partisan effects in favor limited area of operation. Only cav-mech may trace sup- of the Soviets (a one- column shift). That allows the ply through the Western Pripyat marshes. The Soviets Soviet player to conserve his air armies for interdiction. also get five RP, which are used to restore depleted units German 6th Corps is reduced. Bobruyesk falls to the to full-strength. Group Pliyev (the cav-mech group that Soviets (one VP) and finally, on the north flank, Narva was reduced and OOS last turn) receives replacements. falls (four VP). The German player pulls a powerful The 11th Guards Army is also replenished. The 2nd and panzer corps out of Narva for the important mission of 4th Shock Armies are also replenished. anchoring the flank on Riga. During pre-movement combat the Soviets attack The German army receives one RP and three KG some German units have been caught out-of-supply. units. Korps Gruppe Kleffel is deployed in the north On the south flank German 55th Corps is destroyed. with 10th Corps, which isn’t in an enemy ZOC. That Then 6th Corps is eliminated to the west of Orsha. The 2 003 9th Corps is eliminated north of Borisov, and 28th Corps with a Soviet infantry army in a bloodbath result. Two to the south of Pskov. The Soviets are getting column armies attack 12th Corps near Slutsk with the support shifts for attacking OOS German units. of aircraft and partisans. That German infantry unit is First Ukrainian Front overruns its area of operations reduced. Group Pliyev is stalemated by the fortified th virtually unopposed. As a result they capture Chelm locality. In the rear area east of Daugavpils, 6 SS Corps th (one VP). The Soviet units that are OOS in the Western is eliminated. The 38 Corps is reduced west of Pskov, Pripyat mostly remain stuck due to poor movement die and KG Kleffel is pushed back just to the south. rolls. Other Soviet forces from the south advance to the The Germans have one RP, which is used to rebuild outskirts of the town of Slutsk and manage to engage 6th SS Corps at reduced strength. The German player German 12th Corps. The Soviet player establishes a solid launches a limited counterattack against Soviet 2nd Tank line on the eastern side of the Berezina River, anchored Army to the south of Tartu. The Armor Concentration in the north at Borisov, where cav-mech forces have Marker is successfully committed and 2nd Tank is forced nearly flanked the German position. (Cav-mech units to retreat. Then the Germans continue to pull back to the represent elite and highly mobile formations. They west. The Soviets use air interdiction (four markers). have reduced movement costs in forest and marsh, and The Soviets have 13 VP. therefore have the best chance at catching or outflank- Turn Four, 15-21 July ing enemy units.) The Soviets have no reinforcements and can only In the center the Soviet attackers have pushed forward commit two of their four RP. During the pre-movement th as far as the Minsk-Daugavpils line. The 6 SS Corps combat phase, 53rd Corps is attacked. The German unit (reduced) has been surrounded in the Soviet rear area. is surrounded and is easily dispatched. In the north the Soviet forces continue to push into the The 8th Army advances to the Baltic and captures Tal- retracting German line.
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