Russian Armies, 10 October 1944

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Russian Armies, 10 October 1944 Russian Armies 10 October 1944 1st Ukrainian Front: 3rd Guard Army: XXI Corps: XXII Corps: LXXVI Corps: CCX Corps: 58th Rifle Division 106th Rifle Division 149th Rifle Division 253rd Rifle Division 287th Rifle Division 329th Rifle Division 369th Rifle Division 81st Rifle Division 197th Rifle Division 218th Rifle Division 273rd Rifle Division 150th Armored Brigade 11th Guard Armored Assault Regiment 13th Army: XXIV Corps: XXVII Corps: CII Corps: 6th Guard Rifle Division 112th Rifle Division 117th Guard Rifle Division 121st Rifle Division 172nd Rifle Division 280th Rifle Division 309th Rifle Division 350th Rifle Division 1456th Assault Gun Regiment 71st Rifle Division 136th Rifle Division 162nd Rifle Division 181st Rifle Division 5th Guard Army: XXXII Guard Corps: XXXIII Guard Corps: XXXIV Guard Corps: 16th Guard Rifle Division 78th Guard Rifle Division 95th Guard Rifle Division 9th Airborne Guard Rifle Division 13th Guard Rifle Division 58th Guard Rifle Division 97th Guard Rifle Division 118th Guard Rifle Division 60th Army: XV Corps: XXIII Corps: XXVIII Corps: 1 CVI Corps: 9th Rifle Division 100th Rifle Division 302nd Rifle Division 322nd Rifle Division 336th Rifle Division 68th Guard Rifle Division 99th Rifle Division 107th Rifle Division 148th Rifle Division 246th Rifle Division 29th Guard Armored Breakthrough Regiment 1827th Assault Gun Regiment 38th Army: LII Corps: LXVII Corps: CI Corps: I Czech Corps: 14th Guard Rifle Division 70th Guard Rifle Division 1221st Rifle Division 127th Rifle Division 140th Rifle Division 183rd Rifle Division 211th Rifle Division 241st Rifle Division 304th Rifle Division 305th Rifle Division 340th Rifle Division Rifle Division 359th Rifle Division 1st Czech Brigade 2nd Czech Brigade 3rd Czech Brigade 12th Guard Armored Breakthrough Regiment 1228th Assault Gun Regiment 1894th Assault Gun Regiment Units whose assignment was not known 73rd Guard Rifle Division 214th Rifle Division 316th Rifle Division 335th Assault Gun Regiment 227th Assault Gun Regiment 713th Assault Gun Regiment 4th Tank Army: X Guard Armored Corps: 61st Guard Armored Brigade 62nd Guard Armored Brigade 63rd Guard Armored Brigade 29th Guard Mechanized Brigade 356th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 357th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 1545th Assault Gun Regiment VI Guard Mechanized Corps: 16th Guard Armored Brigade 2 17th Guard Armored Brigade 49th Mechanized Brigade 28th Armored Regiment 29th Armored Regiment 56th Armored Regiment 126th Armored Regiment 127th Armored Regiment 1st Guard Assault Gun Regiment 324th Assault Gun Regiment Attached: 93rd Armored Brigade 72nd Guard Armored Regiment 374th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 1536th Assault Gun Regiment 1st Guard Tank Army: XI Guard Armored Corps: 40th Guard Armored Brigade 44th Guard Armored Brigade 45th Guard Armored Brigade 27th Guard Mechanized Brigade 72nd Armored Regiment 399th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 1454th Assault Gun Regiment VIII Guard Mechanized Corps: 19th Guard Mechanized Brigade 20th Guard Mechanized Brigade 21st Guard Mechanized Brigade 1st Guard Armored Brigade 67th Guard Armored Regiment 68th Guard Armored Regiment 69th Guard Armored Regiment 100th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 354th Assault Gun Regiment Attached: 64th Guard Armored Brigade 293rd Guard Assault Gun Regiment 400th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 1024th Assault Gun Regiment 1464th Assault Gun Regiment 3rd Guard Tank Army: VII Guard Armored Corps: 54th Guard Armored Brigade 55th Guard Armored Brigade 56th Guard Armored Brigade 23rd Guard Mechanized Brigade 702nd Assault Gun Regiment 1419th Assault Gun Regiment 1836th Assault Gun Regiment VI Guard Armored Corps 51st Guard Armored Brigade 52nd Guard Armored Brigade 53rd Guard Armored Brigade 22nd Guard Mechanized Brigade 1666th Assault Gun Regiment 1835th Assault Gun Regiment 3 1893rd Assault Gun Regiment IX Mechanized Corps: 69th Mechanized Brigade 70th Mechanized Brigade 72nd Mechanized Brigade 53rd Armored Regiment 59th Armored Regiment 74th Armored Regiment 129th Armored Regiment 59th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 1507th Assault Gun Regiment 1831st Assault Gun Regiment Attached: 91st Armored Brigade Independent Corps: IV Guard Armored Corps: 12th Guard Armored Brigade 13th Guard Armored Brigade 14th Guard Armored Brigade 3rd Guard Mechanized Brigade 1451st Assault Gun Regiment XXV Armored Corps: 111th Armored Brigade 162nd Armored Brigade 175th Armored Brigade 20th Mechanized Brigade 41st Assault Gun Regiment 1829th Assault Gun Regiment XXXI Armored Corps: 100th Armored Brigade 237th Armored Brigade 242nd Armored Brigade 65th Mechanized Brigade 1244th Assault Gun Regiment 1548th Assault Gun Regiment 1st Guard Cavalry Corps 1st Guard Cavalry Division 2nd Guard Cavalry Division 7th Guard Cavalry Division 39th Armored Regiment 61st Armored Regiment 87th Armored Regiment 1461st Assault Gun Regiment Forces in Reserve 4th Armored Army: X Guard Armored Corps: organization unknown VI Guard Mechanized Corps: organization unknown I Guard Cavalry Corps: organization unknown 4th Ukrainian Front 1st Guards Army: III Corps: XI Corps: 4 XXX Corps: LXXIV Corps: CVII Corps: 30th Rifle Division 128th Guard Mountain Rifle Division 129th Guard Rifle Division 141st Rifle Division 155th Rifle Division 167th Rifle Division 226th Rifle Division 271st Rifle Division 276th Rifle Division 242nd Mountain Rifle Division 318th Mountain Rifle Division 31st Guard Armored Brigade 1st Guard Armored Breakthrough Regiment 18th Army: XVII Guard Corps: XVIII Guard Corps: LXXXXV Corps: II Corps: 2nd Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 8th Rifle Division 24th Rifle Division 66th Guard Rifle Division 138th Rifle Division 151st Rifle Division 161st Rifle Division 237th Rifle Division 317th Rifle Division 351st Rifle Division Assignment unknown 147th Rifle Division 395th Rifle Division In Reserve or Rear Areas III Mountain Rifle Corps: organization unknown in Crimea X Armored Corps: organization unknown 2nd Ukrainian Front: 46th Army: X Guard Corps: XXXI Guard Corps: XXXII Corps: 4th Guard Rifle Division 34th Guard Rifle Division 40th Guard Rifle Division 49th Guard Rifle Division 59th Guard Rifle Division 108th Guard Rifle Division 109th Guard Rifle Division 2259th Rifle Division 320th Rifle Division 353rd Rifle Division 394th Rifle Division 5 409th Rifle Division 53rd Army: XXVIII Guard Corps: XXXXIX Corps: LVII Corps: 1st Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 110th Guard Rifle Division 203rd Rifle Division 228th Rifle Division 243rd Rifle Division 297th Rifle Division 375th Rifle Division 5th Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 94th Panzer Brigade 25th Guard Rifle Division 27th Army: XXXIII Corps: XXXIV Corps: XXXXVIII Corps: CIV Corps: 1st "Freedom?" Division 3rd Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 4th Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 93rd Guard Rifle Division 78th Rifle Division 163rd Rifle Division 180th Rifle Division 202nd Rifle Division 206th Rifle Division 337th Rifle Division 27th Guard Armored Brigade 111th Rifle Division 7th Guard Army: XXIV Guard Corps: XXV Guard Corps: 6th Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 6th Rifle Division 36th Guard Rifle Division 53rd Rifle Division 72nd Guard Rifle Division 81st Guard Rifle Division 8th Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 40th Army: L Corps: LI Corps: 38th Rifle Division 42nd Guard Rifle Division 133rd Rifle Division 232nd Rifle Division 240th Rifle Division 54th Command Detachment 159th Command Detachment 173rd Armored Brigade 52nd Army: XXXXVIII Corps: 6 LXXIII Corps LXXVIII Corps 31st Rifle Division 50th Rifle Division 116th Rifle Division 213th Rifle Division 252nd Rifle Division 254th Rifle Division 294th Rifle Division 303rd Rifle Division 373rd Rifle Division 4th Guard Army: XX Guard Corps: XXXI Guard Corps: 7th Guard Air Landing Rifle Division 41st Guard Rifle Division 62nd Guard Rifle Division 69th Guard Rifle Division 80th Guard Rifle Division 6th Guard Tank Army V Guard Armored Corps: 20th Guard Armored Brigade 21st Guard Armored Brigade 22nd Guard Armored Brigade 48th Guard Armored Breakthrough Regiment 1458th Assault Gun Regiment 1462nd Assault Gun Regiment 1494th Assault Gun Regiment IX Guard Mechanized Corps: 2nd Mechanized Brigade 9th Mechanized Brigade 45th Mechanized Brigade 233rd Armored Brigade 46th Armored Regiment 54th Armored Regiment 156th Armored Regiment 166th Armored Regiment 252nd Armored Regiment 375th Assault Gun Regiment Independent Corps: XVIII Armored Corps: 110th Armored Brigade 170th Armored Brigade 181st Armored Brigade 32nd Mechanized Brigade 1479th Assault Gun Regiment 1694th Assault Gun Regiment VII Mechanized Corps: 16th Mechanized Brigade 63rd Mechanized Brigade 64th Mechanized Brigade 41st Guard Armored Brigade 58th Armored Regiment 84th Armored Regiment 177th Armored Regiment 7 237th Armored Regiment 240th Armored Regiment 1440th Assault Gun Regiment 1821st Assault Gun Regiment IV Guard Cavalry Corps: 9th Guard Cavalry Division 10th Guard Cavalry Division 30th Guard Cavalry Division 128th Armored Regiment 134th Armored Regiment 1815th Assault Gun Regiment VI Guard Cavalry Corps: 8th Guard Cavalry Division 13th Guard Cavalry Division 8th Cavalry Division 136th Armored Regiment 154th Armored Regiment 250th Armored Regiment 1813rd Assault Gun Regiment XXIII Armored Corps: 3rd Armored Brigade 39th Armored Brigade 135th Armored Brigade 58th Mechanized Brigade 1443rd Assault Gun Regiment 1501st Assault Gun Regiment V Guard Cavalry Corps: 11th Guard Cavalry Division 12th Guard Cavalry Division 63rd Cavalry Division 60th Armored Regiment 71st Armored Regiment 119th Armored Regiment 150th Guard Assault Gun Regiment 1896th Guard Assault
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