• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1981 Soviet command and control in a historical context. Kern, Jeffrey A. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/20672 our Ft* KNOX NAVAl POSTGI i DUATR SCHOOL MONTEREY. CALIF 039*0 JO"- NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL IN AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT *y Jeffrey Arthur Kern ?4arch 1981 Thesis Advisor: .Villiam Reese Approved for public release, distribution unlimited . T199006 Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE •*«« Dolo Kni.r.d) READ INSTRUCTIONS REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETING FORM 1 «PO»r SUMtM 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER 4. TITLE (mnd Suotltlm) S. TYPE OF REPORT 6 PERIOD COVEREO Soviet Command and Control Master's Thesis in an Historical Context March 1981 • • PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER 7. *jThO»(i/ • . CONTRACT OR GRANT NOMBERf., Jeffrey Arthur Kern J •tnfommiHG organization name anO address 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT ' TASK AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 939^0 II. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME ANO AOORESS 12. REPORT OATE Naval Postgraduate School March 1981 Monterey, California 939^+0 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 201 14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME * AODRESS<lf ZffeMHl taa Controlling Olttcm) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (of thlo report) Unclassified IS* OECLASStFI CATION/ DOWN GRAOING SCHEDULE 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol ;M» Ropott) Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (at tho obotrmct tnt»r*d In Block 30, It dltlotont tram Hoport) It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on roworto *io» II nocoamorr on* Itmntitf *r Mock wfcwj Soviet command and control Command and control .Vorld War II Soviet organization Soviet history 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on rovoroo •/<*• II nocommmwr ond idmultr *r mlock mmmkmr) An examination is made of the historical antecedents of present day command and control doctrine in the Soviet Union. The continuity of principal characteristics is demonstrated. The ideological determinants shaping the command and control system are first developed. These include centralism, collective decision-making, unity of command, and redundancy. Practical consequences of these are explored. The functioning of Soviet FORM do ,; AN 73 1473 EDITION OF I NOV • IS OBSOLETE Unclassified S/N 0102-014- 6601 I StCUBITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE (Whon Doto tntorod) ~ Unclassified mt* C\p «HI>'C«Tiow 9» tml »4MWw fV»»« »»—»» ABSTRACT (Continued) jnand and control during World War II is addressed in detail, ;h emphasis on the uniquely Soviet aspects. Current Soviet .raand and control concepts are addressed in a general way and iked to historical precedents and ideological precepts. Primary rce materials are open Soviet doctrinal and historical lications, in translation. ^n5„ 1473 \n Unclassified *— - ' HOiM&i-fcfiOl 2 »«eu«»" ct»wf«c*»««« •' *«•• *••** »••• Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Soviet Command and Control in an Historical Context by Jeffrey A. Kern Captain, United States Army S.S., Stanford University, 1970 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY - C2 from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCFOOL March 1981 ssr^ss^sr ABSTRACT An examination is made of the historical antecedents of present day command and control doctrine in the Soviet Union. The continuity of principal characteristics is demonstrated. The ideological determinants shaping the command and control system are first developed. These include centralism, collective decision-making, unity of command, and redundancy. Practical consequences of these are explored. The functioning of Soviet command and control during World War II is addressed in detail, with emphasis on the uniquely Soviet aspects. Current Soviet command and control concepts are addressed in a general way and linked to historical precedents and ideological precepts. Primary source materials are open Soviet doctrinal and historical publications, in translation. TAELE 01 CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 6 A. SCOPE e B. SOURCES 11 C. HISTORY 13 II. IDEOLOGICAL IACTCRS 16 A. CENTRALISM 19 1. Theater-Level Commands 21 2. Nuclear Weapons Control 23 3. Exceptions to Centralization 25 B. INITIATIVE 2? C. COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 35 D. UNITY OE COMMAND — 41 E. MULTIPLE LINES OE CONTROL 45 III. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN WORLD WAR II 52 A. COMMAND AND CONTROL CATASTROPEE: 1941 52 1. The Commanders 54 2. Police-State Command and Control 59 3. Ideological Impediment ia 66 4. Administrative vs. Operational Preparedness 75 E. WARTIME COMMAND AND CONTROL 65 1. Strategic Leadership 65 2. The General Staff 69 5 3. Organizational Flexibility 96 4. Centralization 109 5. Wartime Communications 121 C. POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS 1 T7 IV. SOVIET COMMAND CONTROL TODAY 138 A. TEE THEORETICAL MODEL 142 1. The Control System Model 142 2. The Military Hierarchical Model 145 3. Measures of Effectiveness 14£ B. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 150 1. Operational Precision 153 2. The Time Factor 155 3. Algorithmic Control 163 4. Stability of Control 171 5. Commander's Representatives 178 V. CONCLUSION 181 LIST OF REFERENCES 189 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 2?2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I gratefully acknowledge the patience and guidance of Prof William Reese. Without his kind assistance this thesis would be twice as long ar.d say half as much. I would also like to thank my Second Reader, Professor Paul Moose, for his helpful comments . A special appreciation goes to my wife Laura, both for the encouragement she gave me when I needed it most and for aided family burdens she bore during the writing. I. INTRODUCTION This thesis develops the distinctive philosophy and dominant characteristics cf the Soviet command and control system by examining the unique factors which have influenced its development. These factors are primarily ideological and historical. It will he shown that Soviet command and control has developed in accordance with the ideology of Marxism- Leninism. The control system is rationalized to conform to the ideology, which legitimizes and validates it. The system has been tempered and snaped by the Soviet experience in World War II. Wartime experimentation resulted in practical forms of command and ccntrcl which not only functioned effectively, but could also be reconciled with political dogma. To understand contemporary Soviet concerns in command and control, a historical and ideological context is necessary . A. SCOPE A study of the means of command and control exercised by the Soviets must cover much wider-ranging considerations than a comparable study of Western systems. 3ecause their political-economic system is itself a failure, the Soviet Armed Forces (and security apparatus) are the primary means of political control over the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union and over those nations which have fallen within the sphere of Soviet influence. The military officers thus serve both internal and external political ends cf the state leadership. While the U.S. has applied rigorous strictures to insure civilian control of the military, and have placed severe constraints upcn the political role which military leadership may legally play, the Soviets have done the reverse. Military leaders have been forced to act as political executives and to promote political activity within the military. In turn the military wields exceptional influence in the internal affairs and economy of the USSR. As Holloway [Ref. 1: pp. 1] points cut, The Polish sociologist J.J. Viatr has written that 'in place of the legal subordination of an Army by the civil power which is a distinct, isolated environment, we have to do [sic] with the conscious striving for organic union of the civil and military sphere of social life.' This organic union is based, morever, not on the militarization of civilian life, but on the politicization of the Armed Forces. The Soviet Armed Forces, integrated much more fully into the internal and external political schema of the country than our own, must serve simultaneously as the means to achieve both political and military ends. Indeed, to the Marxist- Leninist ideology there is no real distinction between the armed forces and the state in a socialist systerr. as put by a basic Soviet military text [Ref. 2 pp. 160] : The organization and development of the Soviet Armed Forces is directly bound up with the nature of the socialist state... The ideological and theoretical foundations of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces is Marxism-Leninism and its teaching en war and the army, and the communist ideology, which is the only ideology in the country. It fellows that the command and control system used by the Soviets is shaped as much by political, ideological, and sociological considerations as by purely military ones. To that end it is necessary to consider the sociological and political factors which influence the structure and functions of the Soviet command and control system. How totally different that system may be is implied by the following quotation from Oleg Penkovskiy, which might be apocryphal but would still be accurate [Ref. 3: pp. 252]: One thing must be clearly understood. If some one were to hand to an American general, and English ge neral , and a Soviet general the same set of objective fac ts and scientific data, with instructions that these facts and data must be accepted as unimpeachable, and an analysis made and conclusions drawn on the basis of the m, it is possible that the American and the Englishman would reach similar conclusions — I don't know. Bu t the Soviet general would arrive at conclusions whi ch would be radically different from the other two. Th i s is because, first of all, he begins from a comple tely different set of premises and preconceived ide as, namely, the Marxian concepts of the structure of society and the course of history. Second, the logica 1 process in his mind is totally unlike that of his West ern counterparts, because he uses Marxist dialecti cs, whereas they will use some form of deductive r eascning.

Load more

  419

Copy Link