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Table Sov RD mobilisation Created by Nigel Askey, 12/08/2008 Soviet rifle divisions Mobilised and Deployed (MD), and Mobilised and Not Deployed (MND), after 22nd June 1941 (excluding militia rifle divisions) FILARM Rifle division Start Formation Primary source of Amount Start Completed Deployment Where Comments class- designation formation region personnel & equipment of strength formation (D) Deployed ification date reserves when date (assignment) (D) used^ Deployed date (assigned) (D) (assigned) 1 248 27-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 7-Jul-41 7-Jul-41 24th Army 1 131 3-Jul-41 SW Front 131st Mech Division 1/3 1/3 10-Jul-41 10-Jul-41 5th Army 743rd Rifle Regiment added from reserves 1 246 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD Reserves/NKVD 1 1 17-Jul-41 10-Jul-41 31st Army Approx 1500 NKVD personnel in original cadre 1 249 26-Jun-41 Urals MD NKVD 1 1 10-Jul-41 10-Jul-41 31st Army 1 242 27-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 10-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 30th Army 1 243 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD Reserves/NKVD 1 1 10-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 29th Army Approx 1500 NKVD personnel in original cadre 1 245 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 13-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 29th Army Assigned to 34th Army in late July 41 1 250 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 17-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 30th Army 1 251 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 13-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 30th Army 1 252 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD Reserves/NKVD 1 1 17-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 29th Army Approx 1500 NKVD personnel in original cadre 1 254 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 12-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 29th Army Assigned to 11th Army in late July 41 1 256 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 7-Jul-41 13-Jul-41 29th Army 1 244 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD Reserves/NKVD 1 1 17-Jul-41 15-Jul-41 31st Army Approx 1500 NKVD personnel in original cadre 1 247 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 22-Jul-41 15-Jul-41 31st Army 1 257 25-Jun-41 Moscow MD Reserves/NKVD 1 1 10-Jul-41 15-Jul-41 34th Army Approx 1500 NKVD personnel in original cadre 1 262 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1 1 10-Jul-41 15-Jul-41 34th Army 1 259 5-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 30-Jul-41 31-Jul-41 34th Army 1 272 10-Jul-41 Leningrad MD Reserves 1 1 30-Jul-41 31-Jul-41 7th Army 1 236 25-Jul-41 T Cauc MD 236th Mech Division 1/3 1/3 30-Jul-41 1-Aug-41 47th Army 177th Rifle Regiment added from reserves. Div joined Caucasus/Crimean Front Dec 41. 1 268 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD General Res/NKVD 1 1 14-Jul-41 1-Aug-41 8th Army 1 223 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 2/3 2/3 2-Aug-41 3-Aug-41 SW Front Weak formation on 3 August 41 1 261 18-Jul-41 Odessa MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 6th Army Assigned to 12th Army on 1st Sept 41 1 264 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 30-Jul-41 5-Aug-41 26th Army 264th shipped West by 30th July, assigned to 26th Army 5th August 41. 1 265 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD NKVD 1/3 1/3 5-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 23rd Army Very Weak formation on 5 August 41. 1 266 26-Jun-41 Moscow MD General Res/NKVD 1 1 17-Jul-41 5-Aug-41 21st Army Approx 1500 NKVD personnel in original cadre 1 269 13-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 5-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 24th Army Assigned to 3rd Army in late Aug 41 1 271 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 5-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 51st Army 1 277 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 5-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 21st Army 1 279 2-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 24th Army Assigned to 50th Army on 15th Aug 41 1 280 2-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 24th Army Assigned to 50th Army on 15th Aug 41 1 289 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 26th Army 1 295 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 5-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 37th Army 1 298 2-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 2/3 2/3 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 24th Army Weak formation on 5 August 41. Assigned to 13th Army in Sept 41. 1 301 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 38th Army Assigned to 26th Army in Aug/Sept 41 1 304 12-Jul-41 SW Front 109 Mech Division 1/3 1/3 1-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 38th Army 807th Rifle Regiment added from reserves 1 305 2-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 NW Front 1 309 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 5-Aug-41 24th Army 1 212 29-Jul-41 SW Front 212 Mech Division 1/3 1/3 5-Aug-41 6-Aug-41 38th Army 692nd Rifle Regiment added from reserves 1 211 5-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 4-Aug-41 10-Aug-41 43rd Army 1 276 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 10-Aug-41 10-Aug-41 51st Army 1 303 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 9-Aug-41 10-Aug-41 43rd Army Assigned to 24th Army in late Aug 41. 1 312 10-Jul-41 Cen Asia MD Reserves 1 1 10-Aug-41 10-Aug-41 52nd Army 1 316 12-Jul-41 Cen Asia MD Reserves 1 1 10-Aug-41 10-Aug-41 52nd Army 1 284 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 8-Aug-41 12-Aug-41 37th Army 1 297 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 12-Aug-41 12-Aug-41 38th Army 1 300 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 12-Aug-41 12-Aug-41 38th Army 1 281 10-Jul-41 Leningrad MD Reserves 2/3 2/3 13-Aug-41 13-Aug-41 N Front Weak formation on 13 August 41. Assigned to 8th Army in Sep 41. 1 240 6-Aug-41 Khar MD 240 Mech Division 1/3 1/3 13-Aug-41 13-Aug-41 2/6th Army 931st Rifle Regiment added from reserves 1 220 21-Jul-41 32nd Army 220 Mech Division 1/3 1/3 5-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 49th Army 376th Rifle Regiment added from reserves 1 253 10-Jul-41 Odessa MD Reserves 1/3 1/3 15-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 S Front Very Weak formation on 15 August 41. 253rd Disbanded 19 Sept 41. 1 258 10-Jul-41 Cen Asia MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 50th Army 1 260 2-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 2-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 50th Army 1 267 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 10-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 52nd Army 1 278 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 10-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 50th Army 1 283 15-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 15-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 Briansk Frnt Assigned 3rd Army in October 41. 1 287 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1/3 1/3 15-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 Briansk Frnt Very Weak formation on 15 August 41. 1 288 13-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 13-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 52nd Army 1 299 10-Jul-41 Orel MD Reserves 1 1 15-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 50th Army 1 307 12-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 15-Aug-41 15-Aug-41 13th Army 1 290 12-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 1 1 16-Aug-41 16-Aug-41 50th Army 1 291 12-Jul-41 Moscow MD Moscow Militia 1 1 13-Aug-41 17-Aug-41 23rd Army Initially 11th Moscow Mil Div but almost immediately designated 291st Rifle Division 1 274 10-Jul-41 Odessa MD Reserves 1 1 20-Aug-41 20-Aug-41 12th Army 1 296 2-Jul-41 Odessa MD Reserves 1 1 16-Aug-41 20-Aug-41 9th Army 1 292 2-Jul-41 Moscow MD Reserves 2/3 2/3 24-Aug-41 24-Aug-41 52nd Army Weak formation on 24 August 41. 1 270 10-Jul-41 Odessa MD Reserves 1 1 11-Aug-41 25-Aug-41 2/12th Army 12th Army (2nd formation) in Aug 41. 1 293 10-Jul-41 Khar MD Reserves 1 1 29-Aug-41 29-Aug-41 40th Army 1 226 15-Jul-41 Odessa MD Reserves 1 1 29-Aug-41 31-Aug-41 2/6th Army 6th Army (2nd formation) in Aug 41. 1 230 10-Jul-41 Odessa MD Reserves 1 1 31-Aug-41 31-Aug-41 2/6th Army 6th Army (2nd formation) in Aug 41.
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