CEU eTD Collection IMPEACHMENT IMPEACHMENT IN SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Political THE INSTITUTION OF INSTITUTION PRESIDENTIAL THE -CASE STUDY OF ROMANIA- -CASE STUDYOF Supervisor: Professor Nenad Dimitrijevic Nenad Professor Supervisor: Department of Political Science Political of Department Valentina-Andreea Dimulescu Central European University European Central Budapest, Hungary SYSTEMS Submitted to Submitted Science 2009 By i CEU eTD Collection referendum on his dismissal. his on referendum by supported and Romanian the Constitutional by participated in Court citizensthe who the was system political in the role active self-proclaimed whose President, the sanction to majority parliamentary the permitted text constitutional the of ambiguity the where The features. countries Romanian thatdisplay case asituation semi-presidential represents in a common is practice not of head state of the impeachment the since impeachment of practice the and by semi-presidentialism caused between tensions the causal relationship against Traian B Traian against The methodology study is impeachmentof 2007Romanian casethe used the presidential his/herthroughout tenure canbewhich ashaving considered the violated constitutional text. president, bynon-institutional and such parliament factors PM–or the actions as president’s actors involved –the in betweenthestate mirrored interactions specific the arrangement institutional tothe particular beattributed can impeachment whetherof functioning the displaying asemi-presidential specifically, institutional it More design. addresses question the The present paperexamines institution the of presidentialin impeachment countries ă sescu. The principal finding is that it is difficult to point to a clear, mono- a clear, to point to is difficult it is that finding principal The sescu. ABSTRACT ii CEU eTD Collection research strategies. Also,we would like tothankMihail for hisChiru support. adviceimportant andthe regarding topic the theirSergiu GherghinaandStelaGarazfor Algis Krupavicius,Professorgratitude Weto our paper. express elaboration of present the the offered throughout Professor Carsten Schneider, Professor Ioan Stanomir, Irina Ionescu, We would like to thank Professor Nenad Dimitrijevic for the valuable guidance valuable the for Dimitrijevic Nenad Professor thank to like would We ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii CEU eTD Collection BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 81 CONCLUDING REMARKS...... 76 CHAPTER 3: THE 2007 SUSPENSION CASE...... 46 CHAPTER ...... 9 1: BASIC CONCEPTS ...... 1 INTRODUCTION LIST VI OF ABBREVIATIONS...... LIST OF TABLES...... V IV ...... TABLE OF CONTENTS III ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ABSTRACT...... II CHAPTER 2: ROMANIAN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM...... 19 3.7. 3.6. 3.5. 3.4. 3.3. 3.2. 3.1. 2.7. P 2.6. 2.5. 2.4. 2.3. 1.1. 2.2. 1.2. 2.1. 1.3. RESIDENT ...TePeietsmdainfnto n i oei atr ffrinplc ...... 72 3.6.4. The President’s and hisrole mediationfunction inmatters policy of foreign 3.6.3. The President-judiciary ...... 71 relationship 3.6.2. The President-Government ...... 70 relationship 3.6.1. The President-Parliament relationship...... 64 3.2.1. The Voiculescu Investigation Commission...... 47 2.5.3. The Parliament...... 40 2.5.2. The PM and the Government...... 36 2.5.1 The ...... 32 President T T T T T T C C C “T C F A A A C F AULTY SEPARATION OF POWERS RENCH SEMI RENCH HE REFERENDUM HE SUSPENSION PROCEDURE HE POLITICAL BACKGROUND HE HE NATURE OFTHE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HE ONCLUSION HARGES BROUGHT AGAINST THE AGAINST BROUGHT HARGES HANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DURING THEGAME DURING GAME THE OF THERULES HANGING ONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL ACTORS ONSTITUTION CONTESTED PRESIDENTIAL INSTITUTION DEFINITION OF IMPEACHMENT DEFINITION OFSEMI HE 1994 1991 2”...... 53 322” ...... 41 SUSPENSION CASE AGAINST CASE SUSPENSION C ONSTITUTION - ...... 74 PRESIDENTIALISM - DRAFTING CONTEXT ...... 60 - PRESIDENTIALISM TABLE OF CONTENTS OF TABLE ...... 23 ...... 47 ...... 46 ...... 9 ...... 17 ...... 27 P RESIDENT ...... 19 P RESIDENT iv ...... 12 ...... 25 ...... 63 I ON I LIESCU ...... 55 ...... 43 ...... 28 CEU eTD Collection Table 2: Types of parliamentary majorities and presidents (1990-2008) 43 Table 1: Romanian Presidents and PMs (1990-2009) 40 LIST OF TABLES OF LIST v CEU eTD Collection ECHR European Court of Human Rights CNI National Intelligence Community CSAT Supreme Defence Council SIE Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service SRI Romanian Intelligence Service C.S.M. SuperiorCouncil of Magistracy Alian PDAR Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania Party Labour Socialist The PSM PUNR The Romanian National Unity Party PL’93 The Liberal Party 1993 PER The Romanian Ecological Party PSDR The Romanian Social Democratic Party PAC The Civic Alliance Party PDSR The Party for Social Democracy in Romania PC The Conservative Party PRM Greater Romania Party UDMR Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania PLD Liberal Democratic Party PD-L Democratic Liberal Party PSD The Social Democratic Party PNL The National Liberal Party PD The Democratic Party PN CDR Romanian Democratic Convention PCUN Provisional Council for National Unity FSN National Salvation Front ğ -CD Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party Ġ a D.A. Justice and Truth Alliance LIST OFABBREVIATIONS vi CEU eTD Collection procedure received the necessary votes in the legislature to take effect and acting President effect acting and totake inlegislature votes the receivednecessary the procedure haveconsideredstatement to independence. curtailed judiciary’s the The second suspension violating IliescuIon principle of separation onthe powers grounds a political the through of Revolution.first wasunsuccessful suspension The in procedure and occurred 1994 against in years 1989 spanof initiated the byafter a time 17 suspension Parliament two procedures Puzzle tackling subject, this 2007Romanian the suspension case will serve as a case study. his/her the constitution. whichcanbe tenure ashavingviolated throughout In considered parliamentfactors suchand bynon-institutional PM–or the actions as president’s involved president, – the actors state the between interactions i.e. specific the setup, canbeby institution the for impeachment of looking accounted institutional particular atthe semi-presidential systems. Morespecifically, study this examines whether the functioning of Specific problem the president. dynamic between the different state institutions when deciding to use it against the personainstitutionalin impeachmentin its the setup, thus roletheconstitutional document the and of semi-presidentialis systems. Thepurpose an tooffer examination of placethe of presidential Topic The puzzling aspect about the Romanian case stems from the fact that there have been fact have that there from the casestems theRomanian about The puzzling aspect impeachmentinstitution in paper’s unitThe isthe of analysis of presidential present The topic of the present research is the institution of presidential impeachmentin INTRODUCTION 1 CEU eTD Collection president possesses at the formal level. Nevertheless, there is also a need to know how much how know to need a is also there Nevertheless, level. formal the at possesses president presidential enshrined constitution powers in seehow manythe to much and how the power arguments used in favour of insuspension Romanianthe case. Also,welook at the formal the and be suspended can president the which under conditions constitutional constitutions of country the under study.specifically, More weexamine which arethe as a impeachmentpresidential method of with dealing political conflict? theuseof favour tensions, and executive-legislative intra-executive for possibility its inherent time span, weask the question: following semi-presidentialthe does institutional with setup, Research question for unconstitutional behaviour. headstate againstthe of sanction it beconsideredasaparliamentary inkeeping mindthat can the to refer we will this paper in Therefore, of remainder the “impeachment”. is generally what asapresidential described includebelongingis Romaniancase(s)as say suspension to the article. wecan that safeto It same the under them place and offences criminal or treason high of those and Constitution the of violation a in consisting acts between adistinction such make not do texts constitutional more from (see details). for “suspension and“impeachment” section office” 1.1. Most between distinguishes text constitutional the that namely procedure, impeachment presidential duties. and powers own presidency’s the and judiciary the Government, Parliament, with his dismissal.The groundsfor his numerousandsuspension hiswere targeted relationship Traian B In order to answer this question, we analyze both the formal and the living the and formal the both analyze we question, this answer to order In short a relatively in procedures suspension two been have there that fact the of light In It isimportant aspecial to note feature of RomanianConstitutionthe tothe relating ă sescu was suspended for 30 days until the organization for a national referendum on national forreferendum organization a until the 30days for sescuwas suspended suspension procedure against Romanian by procedure the presidents 2 CEU eTD Collection executive so as to make available a reliable mechanism of resolving constitutional soasto makeexecutive mechanism constitutional available conflicts. of resolving a reliable of dual institutional the powers the clarifying regarding necessity of the constitutional debate ofa it theimportance from Furthermore, reasserted referendum hisremoval against office. in the voted his duties citizens the whoresumedafter president regimes: asuspended semi-presidential European inof functioning the a precedent constitutes since thiscase Relevance refuted by Romanian the Constitutional Court. majority successfully at the time on suspendvarious to the President which charges were points toa situation where the ambiguity of the constitutional text permitted the parliamentary TheRomanian case features. display semi-presidential that incountries common practice practice of by relationship caused between and the tensions institutional a semi-presidential the design presidential suspension since the impeachment of the head of state is not a a matter favoured by institutional design. a tension-prone or andpower abuseof text of constitutional the of a violation result was clearly the procedure suspensionthe moment. Theanswer to this towhether question points suspension the his until tenure deal had to throughout with he and conflicts hispower, the conduct came to inexamine1990 until political 2007. Inaddition, the hasto context which one president the well frequency thegravity constitutional thatRomania conflicts andfrom as of wentthrough In addition,powers. in configuration of as this tackling weassessthe reasonsquestion, for, the parties in parliament, the parliamentary majority andwith with the PM relationship despiteis his what i.e. the formal system, political the on has actually president the influence The This paper’s practical relevance is given by the implications the suspension scandal has had has scandal suspension the implications the by is given relevance practical principal finding is that it is difficult to point to a clear causal 3 CEU eTD Collection agenda of the House to which it has been forwarded if the Conference of Presidents of that House “declares that House “declares ofthat Presidents of Conference the if forwarded been it has which to House of the agenda included onthe agenda”.be In addition,not may and Article 39 (1)be inadmissible provides shall that Government Government, the to bills caninjunction an be rejectedcontained fromwhich or the confidence, of that“any reads resolution,draft whose rejectionoradoptionwould beconsidered by Government asanissue the before the National Assembly”. Thirdly, the Parliament has more control overits own agenda. Article 34-1(1) Ministers, make the passing of aFinance Bill orSocial Security Financing Bill an issue voteof a of confidence financial orsocial security to bills ordinances statingin that emergency of “The Prime practice the Minister limits may, 49-3 afterdeliberation Article Secondly, by the […]. Council of committees. two by the cast votes the not make an appointment when may the Republic sum ofof the the negative President The votes ineachassembly. committee each in committee represents standing at least three relevant the fifthswith of consultation public after be exercised shall Republic of the President of the of appointment power the Nation, ofthe life social and economic the or freedoms and rights the of guarantee the in importance of their account on […] positions, parliamentary chamber.each In in this sense,committee Article standing 13-5 reads: relevant “AnInstitutional the by Act shall rejected be now determinecan the posts Ombudusman or the and Magistrates of system. Firstly, the President’s prerogative to appoint members of the Constitutional Council, the Senior Council 1 more andmake accountable” “strengthen president the parliament reviseSarkozy’s 1958Constitution proposal the to Nicolas of favour in voting narrowly by move historic a made Assembly National French basedgovernment on a strong presidency and aratherlimited parliament. In July 2008, the isof a form of prototype the acountry that inFrance, institutionalized was legislature relation possibleto this thethat idea benoted must it tendency, of strengthening the In power. of balance democratic the protect officially, leastat as to, so president the challenge to right parliament’s the affirming of sense the in configuration parliamentary a towards move in thedynamicof Romanian the form i.e.semi-presidential government, of atendency to in particular. systems insemi-presidential and in general impeachment presidential of practice and functioning in to the relation conducted been has research little fact from the that stems PM and onthe other hand, the President supported by Constitutionalthe Court. The relevance the and Parliament the hand, one the on between evident was struggle power a of existence used by in struggle. institutional the apolitical actors Romanianpower In the case, the More specifically,is itimpeachment. to important see wayinthe which such a device canbe of presidential institution the examining importance of tothe points events recent these There are several changes made in order to strengthen the Parliament’s role in the overall semi-presidential overall the in role Parliament’s the strengthen to order in made changes several are There The implications of the present research refer to the examination of a possible change of occurrence the fact that inthe resides subject thepresent of relevance The scientific 4 1 in a manner that will generally will that manner a in 2 . CEU eTD Collection 100% objective as credible.and Source: Ibid,be regarded 375. can sources other the neither However, reveal”. they biases the of because precisely be interesting can documents such words, other In […] biased. is source documentary the ofwhether issue the raises credibility 6 public statements, parliamentary decisionspublic parliamentary private – Court Constitutional statements, or debates or official by produced documents authorities state the suchas of data, examination and thecollection since analysis used wasdocument approach words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data” usually emphasizes “a strategy that i.e. research research, ofqualitative under category the Research methods and data sources presidential mandate. 5 RiennerLynne Publishers, 2006), 45. 4 Political Science Review larger class of (similar) units”. Source: John Gerring,3 “What is a case-study and what is it good for?”, is Romania and (3) the chosen timeframe is the 2004-2007 period of isis B chosentimeframe of (3)the the2004-2007period Romania and Traian institution impeachmentinof presidential semi-presidential systems; space2) thegeographic backs constitution reform”, constitution backs President’sthe to right grant collective pardon is now limited toindividuals (Article 17). Source: ***, “France joint Houses ofParliament –which may be especially convened –via “the message” (Article 18). In addition, limited to two consecutive mandates of 5 years each (Article 6). Secondly, the head of state may now address the 2 changes-2008.htm, (accessed May 25, 2009). Frenchpolitical The Source: system, Court. Constitutional reform Constitutional the 2008,to AboutFrance.com, referred is bill http://about-france.com/constitutional-the then Presidents, of Conference the and Government the between disagreement a is there If ignored”. been Act have Institutional by the determined rules the system or regime, institution, event orphenomenon investigationdeals with a primarily ofaparticularthorough itbe entity,country, apolitical Research design time andof geographicspace 2) adelimitated namely: 1)aspecific period 3)aparticular subject; Aninteresting questionof credibility was raised by BrymanAlan in relationto suchsources: “The questionof Alan Bryman, Timothy Lim, John Gerring defined the case study as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a There are also a number of revisions regarding the presidency. Firstly, the President’s terms of office are of office terms President’s the Firstly, presidency. the regarding of revisions a number also are There 4 . Therefore, the present case study fulfils these characteristics: 1) the subject refers to the to refers subject the 1) characteristics: these fulfils case study present the . Therefore, The research methods that were used in the present paper may be said to fall maygenerally to bepaper said in present the used thatwere methods The research The research design chosen for the present paper is the case study. The case study Social Research Methods Doing Comparative Politics –An introduction to Approaches and Issues , Vol.98,, No.2,(May 2004): 324. BBC , July 21, 2008. , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 264. 5 3 . It is based upon three crucial elements, 6 – the Constitution, official reports, 5 . More specifically, the , (Boulder, London: ă American sescu’s CEU eTD Collection %ă inagainst Traian 2007 and in Ion Iliescu 1994against twice: was used suspension procedure Case selection involvedin actors case the study.under information on the more recent political developments and to examine the opinion of different Lastly,government. and printed newspaper online articles were usedin togatherorder inconsulted todrawadequate conclusionsorder functioning aboutthe of form this of presidentialism in general and with Romanian semi-presidentialism in particular have been semi- issue of deal the with that books and articles scholarly Moreover, in Romania. resolved havebeen conflicts constitutional mannerinwhich inspectthe majority to parliamentary the Parliament. Secondly, we examine the dynamics of interaction between the president, PM and vis-à-vis PM and the the formal powers regarding president’s the onwerethose concentrated Court’s ruling on suspensionthe proposal Traianagainst B suspension Romanianproposal the against President”. Also, weexamined the Constitutional Report of the “The Joint and President” Romanian the Investigation of office from suspension the for “Proposal i.e. proposal, Commissionsuspension the ofconcerning the Parliament Romanian Romanian the by issued acts legal the Constitution, Parliament as a result of the of Romanian versions the and 2003 1991 are the used inthis sources research primary data basis arobust for anddetailedstudy. presentationof caseunderthe upwith The coming representmassorganizations and virtual, media thinkthe and tanks, Internet outputs outputs parliamentary majority voted in favour of the President’s suspension. In the examination of examination the In suspension. President’s the of favour in voted majority parliamentary in a large suspension the 2007, rejected However, consideration proposal. and Parliament into inbutonly aspecttaken theaccusations, 1994wasthis negative regarding ruling sescu. In both cases, the Constitutional Court, which has only a consultative role, gavea which hasonly aconsultative Court, Constitutional cases, the In both sescu. The reason for which Romania was chosen is that it represents a case where the acasewhere itrepresents isthat waschosen Romania for which The reason 6 ă sescu. Theprovisions we CEU eTD Collection Constitution. An important aspect whichAn important aspect isConstitution.is mannerin considered the which French the prototypethe of semi-presidentialthe form of andgovernment the model for Romanian the is it that fact the of virtue in Republic, Fifth French of analysis an comprise also will chapter Carey Giovanni Robert Elgie(1992), Sartori (1994), (1999)andAlan This Siaroff (2003). andJohn Shugart Matthew Duverger (1980), such Maurice as literature, tothe contributors main the upon drawing by addressed be will Semi-presidentialism context. American impeachment as byAlexandertheorized (1788)and Hamilton its intransplantation North the of definition the to refer will We semi-presidentialism. and impeachment namely Structure of the paper design. institutional of particularities the way in whichonlydrawn examinenotas but such amodel also reasons for up so chosen to the was which it needwas to have adapted a clear understandingPresident the constituted chargesagainst brought himinApril is2007. However, there the toof the contextthe in Traian B nationalwhich the Romanian Constitution context, was regime. has democratic in acounty an that established thus leading stable democraticand country of point the isthis research toexamineimpeachment cases the to problematicRussiafrom andbecause atthatmoment President wasfar being Parliament a considered the between crisis constitutional Russian 1993 the consideration into take not did We context. European the instances within thesetwo between differences and thesimilarities out point President, Rolandas of Lithuanian impeachment 2004 the to references short make will we case, Romanian the Paksas, who was accused of high treason and breach of oath, so as to The first chapter offers a theoretical overview of the basic concepts in basicconcepts paper, this of the overview offerschapter The firstatheoretical As mentioned above, underis period study the 2004-2007tenure the of President ă sescu since it is within actionsisit the that of within sescu sinceanddeclarations the this timeframe 7 CEU eTD Collection constitutional institutionaland of particularities casethe under study. hand at issue to the surrounding dismissal the referendum. scandal the and proposal suspension the on vote the ruling, Court’s Constitutional the findings, its and commission investigation parliamentary the of establishment the Parliament, in suspension the proposal to leading up events of the account adetailed we will provide case.Therefore, of andconsequences this facts legal institutional and establish political, the itinto brackets. andplace institutions deal state with the articles that specific provisions, we will notinsist on the modifications, but we will point out the modified Sincebrought presentpaper. the substantial has not the 2003revision tothese changes for institutionsare ofinterest state that andthose activity powers of the provisions regulating mentionedWe analysis. willbedealing primarily with 1991constitutionalthe andtext the variables that account for the account that variables three Duverger’s sense, this country. In this post-communist particular to been adapted ingovernment topointout theproblematic order aspectsof institutional this asitdesign, has National Assembly. system is able to resolve the conflicts which appear between the President, the PM and the In the conclusion, will we reiterate the research question and give a systematic answer asystematic andgive question research the reiterate will we conclusion, In the to in order suspension procedure consiststhe inadescription of The third chapter The second chapter consists of an analysis of the Romanian semi-presidential form of . Also, we will synthesize the findings and examine theimplications of the de facto diversity within model this bewill usedfor the above- 8 CEU eTD Collection May 27, 2009). Inquiry,U.S.Government Printing Office,Washington, 1974, http://www.uhuh.com/Starr/rodino.htm,(accessed Watergare crisis which led to impeachmnet procedings against President Richard Nixon. 9 Richard President against procedings impeachmnet to led which crisis Watergare 8 AvalonProject, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed65.asp, (accessed 2009). May 27, the basis of which such a procedure could be initiated against an official was quite broad since occurred” imbalances when they redress andto government responsible and responsive more create to Parliament English the by used tools the oneof “was and tendencies absolutist King’s precisely the targeted practice impeachment the and King.Therefore, the Parliament legal between struggle intheand political accountable 7 establishedin 14 in impeachment particular. presidential overview of also 65.It adetailed No. offers Federalist practice on impeachment by drawing of roots the the debates among the Framers of the American Constitution regarding the the society society itself” the to immediately done injuries to chiefly relate they as POLITICAL, bedenominated propriety abuse or violation from words, the inother men, from public or, offenses of misconduct the whichproceed of some public account of trust.its historical origins. They asabrief aswell impeachment, notion of general the of offerdefinition a to is necessary are of a nature which may1.1. Adefinition ofimpeachment with peculiar The “Rodino Report on the Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment” was written in 1974 after the Alexander Hamilton, Alexander Rodino Report, Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment Hamilton points out that impeachment was a constitutional process which was In 65, FederalistAlexandrerthe No. Hamilton as “those impeachment defined it focusing Before form of government, of on semi-presidential the particularities the th 7 century century England amethod as of holding the King’s andministers advisors . The Rodino Report Federalist No. 65:The PowersSenate ofthe Continued CHAPTER 1: BASICCONCEPTS CHAPTER 8 report provides a very good analysis of the historical 9 , Report by the Staff of the Impeachment 9 . The definition of the charges on , March 7, 1788. Source: The CEU eTD Collection impeachable acts impeachable we notice that institutional design, having a semi-presidential whichareconsideredas European countries all displayHigh Court or State Tribunal. Also, if we look only ata the Constitutionsrather of East-Central impeachsuspend consultingisafter parliamentthe him/her aConstitutional/ to or entitled low offence, a criminal degreecommits or Constitution the violating of guilty found is state of head the of clarity when it comescommon law” at indictable to offences to listingpolitical constructionists, weapon,narrow against impeachment who regard asbeing limited these viewimpeachmentas a who constructionists, pittingbroad subject of debate, continuing is the phrase “[t]he that noted been has It manoeuvre. to room much Congress leaving thus offences, impeachable of qualification English ambiguous the of transplantation unfiltered sole powertotry impeachments”. Theproblem all Framers’the with approach was the legitimacythe and standingtojudge such issue,an Framersthe settled ontheSenate as “the effectively held Although debates accountable. occurredonwhichheated havebody was to be could presidency, the especially powerful executive, the make surethat wanted to of Representatives to take a decision to remove the President from office within a monthsince it was initiated office for acts of state treason and other2.1.). Article 88 ofthe Constitution of Republic the ofBelarus gravestates that “The President may section be (see removedfrom parliament” crimesto responsible are who […]The cabinet and failure aprime-minister alongside exists ofpresident term the Council of the Republic and House presidentialism, i.e. “A semi-presidential regime may be defined as the situationwhere a popularly elected fixed- 12 27, 2009). http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Senate_Impeachment_Role.htm,offences, of (accessedDefinition May Development”, 11 Parliamentcould impeach on the above-mentioned grounds. Source:Idem. duties, infringing of Parliament’s rights, corruptionand betrayal oftrust. Also, the Report points out that only indictments: misconduct,damage stateto the by mismanaging funds,abusing officialpower, neglecting one’s 10 Misdemeanours” the listed, treason it phraseambiguous and (high) misconduct, besides “high Crimes and Thefollowing list of countriesECE have beenchosenon the basis ofRoberElgie’s (1999) definitionof semi- “Historical 2 Chapter Role, Impeachment Senate’s The Procedures, and Powers Senate, States United The following the as Misdemeanors” and Crimes “high phrase the understanding the clarifies Report Rodino The Other constitutional texts base their impeachment clauses on the same principles: if impeachment becausethey the FoundingThe American imported Fathers provision 10 12 . . The same can be said about the French Constitution since Article 68 11 . 10 CEU eTD Collection 15, 2009). May (accessed http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=748 of Deputies, House Romanian Source: Senate. and 13 crime”. other or Verkhovna Rada the by office from of beremoved may UkraineUkraine of President “The by Constitution: the Ukranian ofthe 111 procedureArticle of impeachment, in the eventseriously that violates the law,he or he may shebe impeachedcommits by the National Assembly statebefore the Constitutionaltreason Court”;law as well: “If in the performance of hisoffice the President of the Republic violates the Constitution or Article 109 of the SlovenianConstitution provides that the President may be impeached forviolating ordinary Slovak Republic or inactivity aimed ateliminating the Slovak Republic's democratic constitutional system”;; from his post if the president is engaged in activity directed against the sovereignty territorialand integrity of is the Article provision 106 of theSlovakclearer Constitution:somewhat a “The National observed”; Councilwere charges of theSlovak the Republic advancing of can recall rules the the president that confirming Federation actions of the President of the in the Russian of crime Federation elements ofthe and by presence the on the conclusionFederation Russian of ofthe the Constitution Court Supreme of the Court of the Russianconclusion of the charges“The President of theof accountableRussian to the Tribunal of highState: the President of Federationthe Republic […]”; Article 93-1 of the Russian Federation: treason maycommitted by them within theirbe office orimpeached within its scope, the following persons shall be constitutionally by ortheand duties”; ArticleCouncil 198-1 of another the PolishConstitution: “Forofviolations of the theConstitution or ofFederation a statute Constitution: “The President is held accountable Macedonian onlygrave of the for 87-1 any Article violation […]”; of Constitutionthe Republic on ofthe President theexercising in the office from his/her remove basis rights members, Seimas crime, orupon the disclosureadvanced of the commitment of felony, the Seimas may, by three-fifths majority vote of all the of his duties”; Article 74 of the Lithuanian Constitution:by “For gross violation of thethe Constitution,breach of oath, of the Republic shall be Stateimpeachable President “The for any violation Constitution: of Croatian the Constitutionof the 104-1 hehasArticle committed inthe performance besuspended.”; shall prerogatives Duma President's Vice or and Courtconfirmed convict the President or Vice President of high treason, or of a violation ofshall makethe Constitution,the move invalid.”; the Article President's 103-3 of the BulgarianbyConstitution: “[…] Should thethe Constitutional If against thePresident. is suspension the passedby then proposal the legislative, the brought charges the on (CC) Court Constitutional the with consult must Parliament proposal, infringinggrave acts uponconstitutional provisions”.voting Before onthe suspension vote in from byamajority suspended having committed “incaseof office Parliament the may be by ofMPs suspensionthe maybeinitiated President thatthe and 1/3 procedure from office President the dismiss actually to judged neededinorder steps and the in chargesare manner which the the procedure, majoritiesfor againstthe headtheinitiation needed specific brought the state, of of indiffer procedures the indictments from Thesetwo and“impeachment” office. “suspension” in office”. hiscontinuing with incompatible patently breach than hisremoved term on thereof office duties any from other of duringa the grounds providesfollowing the nebulous “ThePresidentregulation: of Republicthe not be shall The following explanations are also takenfrom the Joint Sessions Rules of the RomanianHouse of Deputies As stated in the introduction, the Romanian Constitution makes a distinction between distinction a makes Constitution Romanian the introduction, in the stated As 13 . Article 95 of . Article stipulates 95of 1991Constitution the that 11 CEU eTD Collection 15 Political Research 14 presidency andand government” “figurehead presidencies” presidential systems and distinguished “all-powerful between “balancedpresidencies”, withinin of aredifferencesthere in degree power his the semi- presidential study that of by conditioned by vote confidencethe given parliament faces a PM that andhe“quite thirdly, powers” considerable has secondly, viasuffrage; is universal possesses elected executivecharacteristics embedded in Firstly, constitutional the framework. of president the republicthe and governmental three displayed that Fifth Republic French 1958 the incharacterizing Duverger Maurice power was by coined Theterm systems. and presidential theparliamentary between an alternative but whose stay in office1.2. Adefinition ofsemi-presidentialism is impeachment. which his/herSupremeor Court, exoneration decrees i.e. Romanian the and ofCassation Justice, Court General High informs the Prosecutor the then legislative, the by passed is proposal impeachment the If Parliament. of Chambers two commission upon examines by which is indictments voted which the and presents a report the aspecial Parliamentappoints Furthermore, againsthim/her. investigation broughtcharges explain the to before Parliament appear must President the initiated, was a proposal case such may by be i.e.numberimpeachment procedure majority. initiated of a higher MPs, a2/3 In for The against high Presidentthe procedure treason. the“impeachment” provides for 96 completion, In Article theParliament. for with repercussions nomandate his/her resume contrast, if the referendum In from is office. removed then President the is successful, referendum the If his/her removal. rejects Parliament’sPresidentis suspended for a 30 days period and awaits the results of a national referendum on suspension proposal, then the President can Ibid, 167-177. Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-presidential Government”, The modelsemi-presidential is considered ahybrid type institutional of arrangement, 8/2, (1990): 166. 12 14 15 . In . In addition, Duverger underlined . European Journalof CEU eTD Collection Presidents 19 18 Diego, (September2005): 3. Authority Shugart, S. Matthew Source: structure”. executive a on them between in somewhere continuum, located a semi-presidentialbeing or system types actuallypure the takes fromfrom both of the pure typesmanner […] foreach opposite portion ofthe in a dual survival and the other two systems. He stated the following: “[r]ather thansimply combining the two dimensions of origin 17 outcomes and of in semi-presidentialism, structure inherentthe are legislature andthe primeminister the since the focus should be on institutional design and on not behavioural outcomes that semi-presidential systems alternate between presidential and parliamentary ideal types 16 of rigidity the oftheoffice” character personal in unique and“the the term office vote, popular via legislature” the and presidency the of legitimacy “democratic semi-presidential out that sense, systems the Linz pointed with share presidentialism Juan majority parliamentary by the given of vote confidence origin and survival and, although government’s the varies, itsorigin survival depends on the in its of legislature the independent is office presidential the whereby “dual executive” the entity remains unmodified executive each of potential” “autonomy the as long as PM the and president the between majority.lead Fifth, parliamentary dual can tochangesinauthority thebalance of power a of vote theconfidence support and dependon and parliament’s the cabinet the PM ruleanddirectly. the he/sheFourth, or alone depend cannot support on parliament’s the state shares executive powerwith headof the Third,government. headdoesthe not of state headof the fact that the aresultof as isconfiguration executive adual there Second, office. of fixedterm for a vote popular indirect or adirect is by elected state of head the First, traits. JuanLinz, “Introduction: some thoughts onpresidentialism in postcommunist Europe”, in Ibid, 5. Regarding the characterizationof thissystem, Matthew Shugart pointed out that itmixes rather mirrors than Giovanni Sartori, Giovanni Along the same lines, Cindy Skach argued that the “tensions between the president, the between “tensions the that argued Skach Cindy lines, same the Along Matthew Shugart underlined that the important consequence of this system consists in consequenceconsists system of this important the underlined that Matthew Shugart identifiedfivemore Giovanni Sartori Duverger’s Complementary characteristics, to , (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), 132. Patterns , ed. Ray Taras, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4. , Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Comparative Constitutional Engineering: Aninquiry intostructures, incentives and 16 . 13 Semi-presidential systems: Dual Executive and Mixed 17 . Shugart disagrees Duverger with . Shugart 19 . Postcommunist 18 . In this In . CEU eTD Collection 20 permanent” are therefore parliamentary distinction”, 22 21 Fifth Republic starts to deteriorate institutional deadlockdifferent ifthePresidentand PMbelongparties to and their relationship majority consolidated governments mayhave todeal with serious thatcanlead conflicts to even that out points author The reshuffles”. government and coalitions legislative “shifting because of majority parliamentary andsolid is noclear where there government minority divided 3) majority; legislative opposing an with deal to has President the and the PM enjoy the support of legislativea majority; 2) divided majority government where 1)consolidated majoritygovernmental legislativewhere support: President government the presidential system is a is in system countries,there presidential thesame amongvariation various practical the asemi- designsettling constitutional been hasthe although that Duverger’s response power. shouldwith “significant”presidents only inacategory those which constitutional point to criterion since its ambiguity has lead to theconflictmore acute president-government charge that it placesof state since thisindicates a higher degreetogether of legitimacy. In turn, this makes the possibility of weak andhave that those to type this regime strong been arguedhas It bysubject. the scholarsin tackling difficulties further caused has semi-presidentialism such of theme as Sartori, the on variation the and definition Pasquinounique a on agreement little been has there Nevertheless, and Elgie that it would be fallsystem. to typeconstitutional this of arrangements whichareconsidered under better to limit of variety analysis the of more accurate as a to offer so has been reformulated concept Cindy Cindy Skach, Alan Siaroff, “Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and semi-presidential presidential, ofthe inadequacy The presidencies: “Comparative Siaroff, Alan Ibid, 16. Another problem refers to Duverger’s “quite considerable (presidential) powers” Duverger’s considerable (presidential) “quite to problem Another refers Since initial its exposure, Duverger’sdefinition has come criticism under and the , (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,2006), 15. Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French 21 . European Journal ofPolitical Research 20 . Skach presented three semi-presidential three semi-presidential according. Skachpresented subtypes to direct election by popular vote for afixed for the head term vote bypopular election 22 . 14 42,(2003): 291. CEU eTD Collection and Pacificand Studies, University of California, San Diego, (September2005): 7-8. 23 system. This distinction isbecause significant itpoints tothe possibility havingof deal to with Romaniafinds itselffirst in the category, not insist wewill president-parliamentary the on which body selectsinstitutional the that namely semi-presidentialism, of aspect important a very to point the government may not be the same as the one able to dismiss it. Since parliament” responsible to who are andcabinet aprime-minister alongside exists fixed-term bemay president elected as thesituation defined apopularly where constitutional following the proposes Elgie Therefore, of regime types. endeavour thecomparative undermines insubjectivity classification would benocommonly inventory of systems since accepted semi-presidential this there in full, be followed would criteria if Duverger’s Elgie argues, Robert as Nevertheless, results and theactual behaviour,butpolitical this does underminethe the notion’s validity presidential systems: Dual Executive andMixed Shugart, S. Matthew Source: majority. parliamentary the and president the to both accountable are cabinet PMand the subtype, “president-parliamentary” the in whereas majority, parliamentary the to accountable 25 24 Carey introduced the “premier-presidential” and “president-parliamentary” subtypes “president-parliamentary” and the “premier-presidential” introduced Carey concept. the illustrate to caseschosen the conclusions drawn about the outcomes of institutional choices differ because they depend on will be different indicators there since set of countries adifferent will comprise each is definition andthat Theresult process. different scores for the cases classification inthe of cases choice make asubjective to researcher force the they is that under analysis. In addition, constitutional i.e. The problem definition).Duverger’s provisions andactual approaches with powers, formal these of the (combination properties dispositional and relational of combination properties of democratic regime type only (on the actual powers of political actors) or on a Robert Elgie, Robert The “premier-presidential” subtype refers to the situation in which the PM and the cabinet are exclusively are cabinet the and PM the which in situation the to refers subtype “premier-presidential” The Ibid, 13 Among the theoretical “reformers” of Duverger’s criteria, Matthew Shugart and John Shugart Matthew criteria, Duverger’s of “reformers” theoretical Among the Elgie’s definition is preferable because it is better not to focus on the relational Semi-presidentialism in Europe , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 10-12. Authority 15 Patterns definition , Graduate School of International Relations : “A semi-presidential regime 24 . 25 which Semi- 23 . CEU eTD Collection 29 Dynamics 28 22. Schoolof International Relations and Pacific Studies,University of California, SanDiego, (September2005): 1- 27 Comparative Politics Regimes”, of Premier-Presidential comparison same?A the regimes semi-presidential all “Are Roper, see Steven 26 and the cabinet are responsible the to assembly.Theindicators of the power dimension popular 2)the some presidentpossesses PM 3) the election president; the powers; political of 1)the definition: Duverger’s drawsupon of premier-presidentialism concept subtype. The system by inkeeping mind Shugart Matthew and JohnCarey’s “premier-presidential” suspension case. Inlightof wewill aspect, this semi-presidential analyse Romanian the andrelationshipsbetween institutional majorthe their tothe dynamic in actors relation by state. headof the be dismissed cannot theand since latter PM the president between the conflict of incase deadlock a constitutional and the relationship between the president and the majority thepresident between and relationship the majority parliamentary the of nature the 3) regime; the of formation the surrounding events Duverger’s variables: constitutional three 1)the powers majorof the political2)the actors; concerning consensus scholarly is some there that states Elgie systems, presidential actors. institutional major the of powers constitutional review judicial for legislation referring and calling referendum initiative, legislative of right the add also We can assembly. veto can by be overridden inaction; presidential the is7) the by assembly dismissal triggered assembly vote of no confidence;dismissformsinvestiture;discretion PM; 3)cabinetthe without to on 4) restrictions the 5) Presidentialfollowingare the by Shugart discretion to dissolve the assembly; 6) the Robert Elgie, Robert Matthew S. Shugart, John M. Carey, Matthew S. Shugart, analysis Foran of problemsthe associatedwiththe scale presidentialof powers adopted and by Carey,Shugart Regarding the reasons which explain the variation in the functioning of in semi- functioning the of Regarding variation the which explain reasons the , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1992), 23-24. Semi-presidentialism in Europe , vol. 34, no. 3, (April 2002). Semi-presidential systems: Dual Executive andMixed 27 28 : 1) presidential initiative to name the PM; 2) presidential 2) PM; the name to initiative presidential 1) : . These will be addressed in the section dealing with the Presidents and Assemblies: ConstitutionalDesign and Electoral , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15-16. The goal of this research is to examine exactly examinethe exactly isto research The goal this of 16 29 . Authority Patterns , Graduate 26 used CEU eTD Collection Debates and Controversies direct election of the head of state was introduced, thus giving de Gaulle popular legitimacy givingGaulle popular wasintroduced, thus de state headof of election directthe lacks overall majority; 3) no majority (the seats are divided between the parties in parliament). Source: Ibid, 19. Ibid, Source: parliament). 32 in parties the between divided are seats (the majority no 3) majority; overall lacks majority with one dominant party,or abalanced coalition majority; 2) quasi-majority (a party has most seats but 31 University Press, 1999), 17-18. Elgie, Robert Source: president. ora weak a strong either to lead can which democracy towards phase a transitional to owing reasons 3) presidency; astrong to leading of a semi-presidential system: 1) symbolic reasons leading to a weak presidency; 2) governability reasons 30 (Articlein 44) committee previously a parliamentary debated amongpass which any ability ordinancesthe (Articleto object 38)and not amendment government control possibility the to legislativethe viaa process numberprovisions, of newConstitution the presidency the offered parliament-dependentandPM. Therefore, figurehead with form a hadlatter government hada of The parliamentary Fourth Republic. of the legislature andconflict-riven unstable the over of executive the thepower increase 1.3. French semi-presidentialism she belongs to the opposition or is an independent. he/ whether on majority and the of member an ordinary or is leader the president whether the presidential system a semi- havingadopted a country subsequentpractical configuration political within moment” of constitution place writing took is as a crucialregarded in factor the determining in “zero the which context and political The cultural legislature. and government state, of heads of powers constitutional in variation the via systems semi-presidential of diversity may not respect the constitutional norms, but it does allow for an initial assessment of the patterns of government support and overall political performance support andoverall political of patterns government bewould different result the Thus, in semi-presidential. each structure have adifferent can majority parliamentary the of nature the that given systems semi-presidential between For a more detailed analysis of the dual executive’s powers, see: Robert Elgie, Steven Griggs, Steven Elgie, Robert see: powers, executive’s dual the of analysis detailed a more For Parliamentary majorities canbe classified as: 1) absolute – monolithic (one party has majority), coalition Duverger identified three common types of environments or rationales which were conductive for the adoption The FifthFrench Republic camebeing into in when 1958 Charles de Gaulle sought to The first is considered to be of secondary importance since everyday political be importancepractice is everyday ofpolitical since consideredThe first to secondary 30 . Duverger considered that the third factor best accounts for the variation bestaccounts factor third the that considered . Duverger , (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 27-29. 17 Semi-presidentialism in Europe 32 . Furthermore, in . Furthermore, 1962, the 31 sinceitdepends on , (Oxford: Oxford , (Oxford: French Politics: CEU eTD Collection see:34-47. Ibid, models, of these examination detailed a For process. decision-making the behind drivers actual the are ministers there is a strict divisionof spheres of inflluence between the two actors; 4)ministerial government where the government shared where 2) the president PM and share the decision-making authority; cohabitation); 3) segmented government where PM(during the or president the either by controlled is executive the where government 35 2000), 29. 34 Comparative Politics Regimes”, of Premier-Presidential Acomparison same? the regimes semi-presidential all “Are Roper, Steven the president may ask a PM to resign even if the latter enjoys parliamentary support. increasingin executive, the of tension within that case established under semi-presidentialism within executive the during of periods cohabitation. Nevertheless, French the custom political dominate the thepolitical PMto because has permitted game configuration party the political executive” French the wellis thus not “institutionalizingdelineated, potential the conflictual at theheartof duality dual in consisting apowerfulbut andwhere executive PM, president the distribution power of 33 influence. spheres their own that of they Republicrespected strictly or Fifth the of existence the throughout decision-maker absolute of role the up taken has PM the or president eitherFrench argue that the cannot Hence, we climate. political general andthe one model of interaction to another depending also on the majorities existentin the legislature multipleactuallywhat interpretation are a better swings from bethat would notes occurs that treated as the foremost person in the State in both institutional and electoral be terms”to right the “gains president the whereby system government the of presidentialization the ledthisElgie is to which reason hasarguedthat the enjoyed by that parliament. alongside the Inthe literature onFrench semi-presidentialism there exist four models of executive politics: 1) monocratic Robert Elgie, StevenGriggs, Robert Elgie, In analysing dynamicthe between president,the PMandministers government Another important feature of the fundamental act was that it prescribed the existence of a Political Institutions inContemporary France, , vol.34, no. 3,(April 2002): 255. 34 . What also needs to be stressed is the parliamentary majority variable majority is parliamentary be the stressed needs to . Whatalso French Politics: Debates and Controversies 18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),114; , (London, andNew Routledge,York: 33 . 35 , Elgie , CEU eTD Collection 366. America andPost-Communist Europe andmanagedcreate itsis behaviour, since hegemonic important to moment theFSN, through claims and actions by of capture” by a revolution close to priorregimewere notchallengedthe ingroups who their others within society regime the Linzleadership,itself. not referstowhat This aspect “the called andStepan during the first momentsthemselves in eyesof the population,the insisting while on delegitimizing the prior of the transition.(FSN). The Its Front calledleadersfront” and the National Salvation a“popular mandate organizing revolutionary their emphasizing by vacuum power the fill to emphasizedmanaged officials communist second-rank their experienced a violent wentregime change. politically The through country European which “pivotal”was duringevident the old and regime itsduring in collapse 1989 sinceis it the only East- role in the Revolution so as to legitimize 36 opposition since there no was institutional pluralismautonomy or with a form of extreme patrimonialism, i.e. “sultanistic”, which had removed the threat of an period. transition the years of first andthe regime of communist the describeis some elements itto necessary themselves, 2.1. Constitution-drafting context semi-presidential systems willbe used toexamine case the under scrutiny. for between thevariation account factors that Duverger’s chapter, inmentioned previous the system, the dynamic between the different state institutions with a focus on the presidency.As Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, Alfred Linz, Juan Linz and Stepan characterize the Romanian communist system mixed system theRomanianas totalitarian communistLinz andStepan characterize analyze In ordertoConstitutions the and theRomanian constitution-making process aimsThe analysingpresent chapter of the nature at Romanianthe semi-presidential CHAPTER 2:ROMANIAN SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe,South , (Baltimore, London: Johns HopkinsThe University Press,344- 1996), 19 36 . Romania’s specificity CEU eTD Collection negative propaganda and slanderof oppositionmembers, national minorities and critical intellectuals to 39 and democratization in Romania 1989-2000) respectively by respectively especially PCUNExecutivethe Board because of their publicexposure. andprime minister president of for the offices candidates most appropriate the considered 38 http://www.pndro.ro/pdf/1989.pdf (accessed May 2, 2009). functioningthe of National Salvation Front Council territorialand ofthe councils ofthe FSN SalvariiNationale organizarea sifunctionarea ConsiliuluiFrontului Salvarii Nationalea consiliilor si teritoriale aleFrontului unfair be freebut generally bodies byforeign andwereconsideredto documented irregularities the eyes of vehicle vis-à-vis and which Iliescu’sappealhis in through political consolidated group own the public party in“narrow infavour of areavoided positions mindandaction” itunity served and asa notion whereby democracy” “original of Iliescu’s result as the considered The PCUNwas parties. historical political from newly the re-established representatives body accepted which for National Unity (PCUN) was organized – a de facto transitional government and legislative plurality andin principle February 1990 thewas Front dismantled andthe Provisional Council poseacredible threat. parties to for other early wastoo elections first the timingfact of the that into the moments addition transitional missing thechance toplay anda significant competitive role as an opposition during thefirst because Romanian civil and politicalinexistent forces were and organized very slowly, thus communist Ion president, Iliescu, inThis situation developed May 1990. unhinderedalso FSNthe in itself transformed into apolitical February party and delivered post- first the 37 power andmilitary legislative by monopolize interim governingrulingthe viadecree,assuming executive, structure The distortions ranged from politically biased media accounts and news broadcasts on national television, Irina Culic, Irina For the complete list of powers, see: FSN, 39 The first post-communist elections of May 20 Despite its tendencies, the FSN had to demonstrate its commitment to the political the to its commitment demonstrate FSN hadto the tendencies, its Despite . At the time, the FSN had the upper hand. At time, thethe campaignbecause FSNhad the throughout upper the it Câ ú (FSN, tig ă torii: elita politic Law No.DecemberDecree 2, 27, 1989regardingthe establishment, organization and 38 . At that delicate moment, Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman were 37 . Moreover, despite its declared status as declared its despite . Moreover, a provisional body, status ăú i democratizare în România 1989-2000 , (Cluj-Napoca:, Limes Press, 2002), 68. Decret-Lege Nr. 2din27 decembrie1989 privind constituirea, 20 th 1990weremarredbynumerous (The Winners: political elite ), CEU eTD Collection parties.Source: Ibid41, 96-143. towards bipolarity, i.e. FDSN vs.Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) – an alliance of Right-of-centre coalition mainly withthe GreaterRomania Party (PRM), the system remained pluralist but witha tendency 43 (accessed May 2, 2009). electionresults, http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=elc University of Essex, 42 Convention, 1989-2000) Conven 869.584 for the Senate. Source: Pavel, DanIulia Huiu, „ 41 Source:Ibid, 16. directed against opposition parties cast serious doubton the authenticity of the country’s democratic transition.”. but little, if any suchsupport, found its way into the coffers of the political parties [...] The systematic violencealso were monopolized by FSNthe government […] The electoral law provided forpublic campaignfinancing consistently biased toward the Front. Printing facilities and distribution networks fornewspapers and journals 40 Elections in Romania, Bucharest, Bac communist state. communist fall of the the after pluralism andpolitical governance engendering democratic step towards parliament inthe majority monolithic witha party” which enjoyed a dominant “pluralist-atomized has been system as characterized party resulting The interests. institutional and political their to according law fundamental former communists were able to control the constitution making process and to tailor the Transition National Democratic Institute and International RepublicanInstitute, supporters.their and For more candidates information parties’ onthe climate historical the during the against first Romanian abuses post-communist criminal and physical elections,and see: intimidation harassment, newspapers local and and national the networks radio television, state as the such communication disposed of larger amounts of campaign funds and control over the still centralized means of the popular vote while the FSN popularvotewhileinthe obtained the a2/3majority the Parliament the highthe invalid number was of enoughvotes raise doubton to correctnessthe count the of and Iliescu and FSN by the won percentage large very the Nevertheless, allegation. an such because there representatives foreign of eyes in the wasevidence substantiating no lacked opposition monitoringthe from or even a parallel voting system which could account for After the 1992 elections, when the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) won the elections but ruled in TheFSN 263 seats had (66.31%) in theChamberof and 91 seatsDeputies (67%) Senate.the in Source: The The numberof votes invalid was Presidency, 447.923forthe for the Chamber 1.117.858 of Deputies and The NDI/IRI report stated the following: “Television news coverage of the campaignwas blatantly and Ġ iei Democratice, 1989-2000(‘We succeedonly can together’- Ananalytichistorythe of Democratic The result of the 1990 elections was that Ion Iliescu won the presidency with 85% of ; Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Cooperation and Security on Commission ; 40 . Furthermore, the accusation of voting irregularities and electoral fraud coming andelectoral irregularities voting of accusation the . Furthermore, Political Transformations andthe ElectoralProcess inPost-Comunist Europe , (Bucharest:, Polirom, 2003), 58-59. ă u and Harghita Jude 43 . Overall, the 1990 elections were the first. Overall, werethe (flawed) 1990elections the 21 Nu putem reuNu putem Ġ , Timi Report on the Parliamentary andPresidential ú oara ú , Washington, May 30, 1990. i decît împreun Report onRomania’s Democratic 42 ă ”- O analiticistorie . Consequently,the , Romania- 41 ă . a CEU eTD Collection on September 25 September on 47 University, the Netherlands: DSWO Press, 1995), 164. 46 http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=7528 (accessed May 3, 2009). (Law 92/Decree March14,1990 fortheelection of Parliament andthe Romanian President), 45 (accessed May 3, 2009). 22 against the interim government and Iliescu and government interim the against members partiesnewspapers of andemptying city protesting the opposition andcentre their of democracy” Valley Bucharestto“restore historical byvandalizingthe headquarters the to from Jiu the coal-miners the calling of practice i.e.Iliescu’s occurred, “Mineriads” called among the 145 accepted amendments belonged to the opposition the belonged to accepted amendments among 145 the Commission and the officialIn December 1990,theDraftConstitution forwas submitted by debate Constitutional the Draft was presented toto becomeParliament a Constituent in Assembly July for1991 are Deputies Assembly of andthe Senate thethe that whichprovided and President” Parliament adoptionwhere ofonly the new39 Constitution (Article 80-1) 44 March 14 forwarded to the new Parliament which would also act as a Constitutional Assembly. On functioning of a drafting committee of the first post-communist Constitution. The draft was the Romanian people” that“[t]heasserted FSN’s is purpose the of establishment democracy,liberty forand dignity “Country Communiqué”political whichoutlined administrative Front’s and program.It the institutional 22 OnDecember dominance. FSN’sthe shapeleaders to of therules gamesince enjoyedtheir party political the and new political and constitutional shoulddesign beassessed by inmindkeeping the ability of These interventions occurred on January 29 January on occurred interventions These Tony Verheijen, PCUN, CFSN, nd 1989), IonIliescu’s bloghttp://ioniliescu.wordpress.com/media/comunicat-catre-tara-al-cfsn-22-dec1989/ at The circumstances described above lead us to underline the fact that the creation of a of creation the that fact underline the usto lead above described The circumstances Comunicatul c Decret LegeDecret nr.92 din 14martie 1990pentru alegerea Parliamentului th 1990, the PCUN issued “Law Decree No. 92 for the election of 92 for election No. issued the Romanian the of “LawDecree PCUN 1990,the th 1991 when they protested violently against the Roman government. Constitutional Pillars for New Democracies: The Cases ofBulgaria andRomania ă tre 44 . In order to uphold these principles, Articleimmediate uphold . In the 3settled principles, order to these Ġ ar ă al CFSN- 22 decembrie 1989 th , February 18 47 . nd 22 1989, the FSNthe Council issued 1989, so-called the th , andJune13-15 (The CFSN Country Communique– December Communique– Country CFSN (The 46 th 1990. fourth The Mineriad was . At the same time, the so- the sametime, . Atthe ú i aPre ú edintelui României , (Leiden , 45 . , CEU eTD Collection Preda, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Ioan Stanomir, Dan Pavel, Renate Weber, Irina Culic etc. following: Eleodor Foc Eleodor following: 49 52-54. the Ministry of Forign Affairs: The Konig-Jansson Report”), Konig-Jansson The Affairs: Forign of Ministry the Konig-JanssonReport, see: Weber, Renate “Memorandumul MAE:raportulKonig-Jansson” (“Memorandum of Convention European by forthe Protection the requested is of it Humanas Rights and Fundamental impartial and Freedoms”. independent are Forcourts alengthier Romanian analysis that of belief the the strengthen interfere in the judges’ decisions, it does not make it just. In addition, it was argued that “this practice will not 48 (see section 2.5.2.). legally (Article influenceallowing 73),thereby activity executiveto the themagistrates’ judges” “the and of caninvestigate abody professional C.S.M., the conduct which activity accession explicitly Council to the Europe of criticized thislawfor in allowing prosecutors aproblem branches. Thisconstituted Report inRomania’s on Konig-Jansson the 1993when state two these between power of imbalance the solidifies thus and provisions constitutional transfers andpenalties (ArticleLaw 92/1992 124-1). on Judiciarythe is based on these Furthermore,itforjudges’ prosecutors. not also (Article thepromotions, but controls 133), judges for appointmentby as Presidentandthe a acts “disciplinary judges” forcouncil of Magistracy (C.S.M.) proposes, in the presence of the Justice Minister, both prosecutors and under authority the Justicethe of (Article Minister 131-1).Inaddition, Superior the Council belong1991 Constitution, the is publicprosecutors (Article to Ministry Public 130-2)which the to according because, activity judiciary’s ininterfere the can executive the factthat the example pointed out by jurists, such as Lucian Mihai, Monica Macovei and Renate Weber, is the state institutions were designed2.2. The1991 Constitution in such a way that later proved to be problematic. An ministerial mechanism, responsibility powerof by-pass the governmentthe to normal the lack ofa the principle, of powers separation the of ambiguity the state, the of character number of problematic provisions of 1991Constitutionthe such as i.e. “national”,the ethnic, Among those who have criticized the context and/ or the end product of the 1991 constitutional debates are the The Report’s conclusion regarding the judiciary underlined that even though the law permits the executive to executive the permits law the even though that underlined judiciary the regarding conclusion Report’s The Several constitutional analysts and political scientists but model of 1958, as Constitution French took the a The framers of Constitution the ú eneanu, Lucian Mihai, Monica Macovei, Daniel Barbu, Cristian Pîrvulescu, Cristian Pîrvulescu, Cristian Barbu, Daniel Macovei, Monica Mihai, Lucian eneanu, 23 Revista român ă 49 de drepturile omului have drawn attention to a , no. 5,(1994): 48 CEU eTD Collection Press, 2002), 108-109. 1989-2000 organized on December 8 December on organized 51 politics and society in post-communist Romania) past”. Daniel Barbu, Daniel past”. empirical studies and surveys, have concentrated exclusively onideology onand mystifying the values of the legislative strategies of transitional societies, ona macroeconomic calculus, oncomparative law and politics, on solid institutional analysis, onthe study of constitutional traditions and Romanianpolitical culture, on the 50 form of concerninggovernment emerged there the that disputes framework. constitutional theRomanian weaknessesof the to point institutions that state between the and therelationship state of the organization tothe provisionsand related examinethose out point to is section present the of focus the tackled, be will criticisms these of some Although etc. parliament the of character bicameral the ordinances, emergency via process legislative no. 2 issued on 2issuedno. 27 December on Law Decree through unilaterally was decided form of government country’s the Moreover, the time havedid not enoughtime get to toknowand understand constitutional the since provisions between express haveConstitution. chargenot did citizens Another and the their wasthat the to opportunity opinion Draft the within themonarchy, constitutional i.e. Parliament’s alternative, an for allowing ofnot newleaders opposition the the accused thenewConstitution, debates regarding the approvalregarding the legitimacy andfunctionality Romanian Constitution.of 1991 the andandcontext the subsequent conflicts regarding the form governmenthaveof raised doubts the constitution-making the both mentioning because is referendumworth aspect particular This Constitution. opposition both during the constitutional anddebates Parliament the after had approved the was only 18 days The Constitutional Assembly adopted the Constitution on November 21 November on Constitution the adopted Assembly Constitutional The Daniel Barbu notes the following regarding this issue: “[…] the debates that should have been conducted on a conducted been have should that debates the “[…] issue: this regarding following the notes Barbu Daniel Before analyzing the content of the Constitution (The Winners: political elite and democratization in Romania 1989-2000) Republica absent th 1991.Source: Irina Culic, th 1989, which stated that Romania be 1- that is arepublic(Article which stated to 1989, ă : politic ăú , (Bucharest: Nemira Publishing House, 2004),157. i societate România în postcomunist 24 Câ ú tig ă torii: politic elita per se per , it is important to stress the factstress itthe is important to , st 50 1991 and the the 1991and referendum was between the FSN and the and FSN the between ăú i democratizare înRomânia ă (The Absent Republic: , (Cluj-Napoca:Limes At the onset of 51 . CEU eTD Collection the Romanian Communist Party and the President of the National Defense Council. Defense National of the President the and Party Communist Romanian the Republic of Romania”, in addition to holding the offices ofPresident of the State Council, General Secretary of 56 11. Approaches Graduatein Studies entitled Conference at the presented (paper Romania” and 55 Press, 1999), 193. 54 108. (The Winners: elite political and democratization in Romania 1989-2000) 53 Council and of the territorial councils of the FSN December 27, 1989regarding the establishment, organization and functioning ofthe National Salvation Front FrontuluiSalvarii Nationale siaconsiliilor teritoriale aleFrontuluiSalvarii Nationale powers establishnot of body, PCUN,which state andfunctioning the the role could office. presidential and bicameral 1990that establishedparliament 92/ the Law Decreeabovementioned No. 2.3. Acontested presidential institution 52 under asemi-presidential form of government. Romania subscribe would these semi-presidentialism, of definition a minimal to According freevote. and secret direct, equal, viauniversal, be elected to are of Romania President the and Parliament both that established 3 Article Also, 82-1). (Article Parliament of chambers is bythetwo the approved Presidentappoints stipulatedcabinet that the PM whose in 1991constitutional the incorporated regulations weresubsequently text FSN Council although thedecreewassupposed to 2), local to refer and national of the the only organization 1974 –among had beenstructures which Ceau thatsetupfor office specifically presidential constitutional institutional-draftingand since experience thecommunist and state power However, this argument is not accurate. Inexperienceisaccurate. wasnot reasonbehind underlying this the However, argument not In 1974, Ceausescu had further centralized power after being given the title “President of the Socialist of the “President title the given being after power centralized further had Ceausescu 1974, In Irina T Irina Tony Verheijen, “Romania”, in Eleodor Foc Eleodor FSN, 56 –had been abolished by Article 10of abovementionedthe Law Decree 2/1989. No. Decret-Lege Nr.din 2 27decembrie 1989privind constituirea, organizarea si functionarea Consiliului An extremely important act concerning the office of head of state wasthe headstate of office of actconcerning the important An extremely It has been It argued ăQă sescu, “The Presidency in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis between Poland between Analysis A Comparative Europe: Eastern and Central in Presidency “The sescu, ú 52 eneanu cited in Irina Culic, Irina in cited eneanu . Some have contested its legitimacy because it was issued by its legitimacy issued becauseita provisional havecontested was Some 55 , European Studies Centre, St. Anthony’s College 24-26 Oxford, May, 2002): Semi-presidentialism in Europe that this re-establishment of the presidency indicates apoor indicates thepresidency of re-establishment this that Câ ú tig ), http://www.pndro.ro/pdf/1989.pdf (accessed May 3, 2009). ă torii: elita politic 25 The Contours of Legitimacy inCentral Europe: New , ed. Robert Elgie, (Oxford: Oxford University ăú i democratizare în România 1989-2000 , (Cluj-Napoca:Limes Press, 2002), ( 54 Law Decree No. 2, . The act itself 53 ú , but its escu in CEU eTD Collection Fatalistic Political Cultures”, strong leaderand 81% favourin of a government of Source:experts. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi,“Revisiting technocratic government1993. in Incontrast, 2001 Eurobarometer a the revealed 30%were that favourof preferred in a have would 40% as much as and democracy representative than better is leader strong a that 60 University Press, 2001), 220. the in stability of element principal the as himself impose to “able was Iliescu Ion transition, persists especially among old people living in rural communities in rural living people old among especially persists mixtureMungiu have a Pippidi charismatic of traditional and authoritiesstill argued that (ed.), 59 Berghahn Books, 2004). Father:of the AnAnthropologythe End of inPoliticalAuthority in Culture”, and Society Romanian in Politics Paternalist and Ceasuescu Nicolae Undead: “The Kideckel, individual economic initiatives. Formore onRomanian paternalism during the Ceasuescu regime see David A. Romanianpolitics and economic relations, althoughlimited by the development of civil society, NGOs and 58 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 197. in “Romania”, Verheijen, Tony Source: office”. presidential strong of a creation the prevented […] consequences potential ofthe fears the model, presidential strong a communist experience and underlines that “[e]venthough the NSF controlled a large enough majority to impose 57 constraints constitutional existent the of irrespective making process in thedecision- role in stepactive an to take and – wasexpected president state/ of ruler/ head practices and discourse and paternalistic asbeing can be by apathy Romania’scivic considered characterized madeto political culture, Constitution (see section 2.5.1.). the with them institutionaladequate mechanisms the during provided system semi-presidential the Therefore, position. their consolidate further needed institution to wasexactly sense,they presidency the of office the them inIliescu’s addition to widespread popularity themid-wife as of new the In regime. this position legitimacyoffered power theirrevolutionary clearly and thepossibilities perceived leaders FSN The apresidential office. with state new Romanian the toprovide decision the role provided by Constitution the accepta morelimited Iliescu wasobligedlaw to inDecemberfundamental wasratified 1991, Regarding thepost-communist period, the World Values Survey showed 47%of that consideredRomanians Renate Weber, “Constitutionalism as a Vehicle forDemocratic Consolidation inRomania”, inJan Zielonka, contemporary in present still are leanings paternalist that argues Kideckel A. David professor Anthropology Tony Verheijen’s explanation regarding this limitationof presidential powers points to the traumatic Democratic Consolidation in Eastern EuropeVolume 1:Institutional Engineering In analyzing the existence of the post-communist presidential institution, references institution, presidential post-communist the of existence the In analyzing Romanian Journal ofPolitical Science 57 and this can be seen when compared to the 1958 French 1958 the to compared when seen be can this and 58 . The idea is that the central political figure – the 26 interim Semi-presidentialism inEurope , Vol. 3, No. 1, (Spring 2003): 101. , ed.JohnBorneman, (New Oxford:York, government. However, after the after However, government. 60 59 . In the first years of the . Scholars such as Alina as such . Scholars , (Oxford: Oxford (Oxford: , , ed. Robert Elgie, Robert ed. , Death CEU eTD Collection Romania”, in Romania”, 64 Zielonka, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 221. Powers: Proposals to Amend the Constitution, (the separation of powers principle) proves to be simply a scientific error […] state is power […]state error besimply ascientific to proves principle) of powers separation (the problem was that he also officially pointed out during the debates that “in this day and age “is inherent in the cooperative character of the activity of each institution” each of activity the of character in cooperative the “is inherent Committee, has argued that the principle was still valid and working in view of the factrevolutionaries’ in will 1989 that it democraticthe principles putforward bytheCommuniqué,act endorsed an the mannerin respecting bynot aself-interested Assembly Constitutional the acted argued that CC judge,a formerLucian Mihai, judiciary. legislative, and executive between of the powers separation the proposes document 2of this Article Assembly. Constitutional by the followed be established norms to Communiqué”legal democratic apolitical the act which and was “Country above,the Asnoted principle. of powers separation tothe clear reference 2.4. Faulty separation of powers 63 1999), 179. Paszkowska, “Poland”, inder van Ania Source: custom. political become would hoped he that precedents set to sought since he “did not62 want 73, http://books.google.com/books/semi+presidentialism+outside+europe#PPP8,M1to (accessed 2009). May 5, be a passiveEurope: AComparativeStudy figurehead61 but intended to play an active role in shaping policy” and presidential institution majority createaprecedentand managedto of personal involvementin via politics the FSN’s parliamentary the who controlled decision-maker absolute of an as that categorized personalities” political leading of deprived and majority aclear of absence the by majorities,action paralyzed government otherwise with of unstable context parliamentary Ion Deleanu cited in Renate Weber, “Constitutionalism as a Vehicle for Democratic Consolidation in Consolidation Democratic for Vehicle a as “Constitutionalism Weber, Renate in cited Deleanu Ion LucianMihai, “Separarea puterilorînstat: propuneri de modificare a Constitu Some similarities canbe found in the attitude of Polish President Walesa towards the otherstate institutions François Frison-Roche, “Semi-presidentialism in apost-communist context”, in One of the most controversial aspects of the 1991 Constitution was the absence of a of absence wasthe Constitution 1991 of the aspects controversial most One the of Democratic Consolidation inEastern EuropeVolume1: Institutional Engineering 62 Semi-presidentialism inEurope . , eds.Robert Elgie, SophiaMoestrup, (London, New Routledge,York, 72- 2007), 63 . Regarding this issue, Ion Drafting the of Deleanu, amember Ion issue, . Regarding this Revista român 27 , ed. Robert Elgie, (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, ă de drepturile omului , Vol., 2, (1993): 9. Semi-presidentialism Outside Ġ iei” (“Separationof State 64 61 . However, the However, . . His role was Meer Krok- , ed. Jan ed. , CEU eTD Collection Press, 2006), 12. Constitutional Law in WeimarGermany and the French Fifth Republic outcomes 67 66 Constitutional History: 1859-1991 a contradiction”. Source: Eleodor Foc Eleodor Source: contradiction”. a on based is theory Montesquieu’s that is conclusion the Therefore, power. state sovereign and a unique constitute to able are together them by bringing independent, and equal powers, three the that inconceivable is “It that: 65 government the and legislature isthere between the of sharing”“power that given powers noseparation or dependence” literature branches. on judicial and executive legislative, constitutional the into powers of separation and balance of principles the according to of framework constitutional and democracy beorganized within the power executive functioningthe of types the isit to connected where from 1958FrenchConstitution was imported the concept that givein executive tothe tendency the view factto preference of that the publicauthority the parliamentaryindicates power”, “state of instead i.e.“public authority” final text, used in constitutional the itis divisible.” only not therefore one, systems are based on “mutual Romanian form form Romanianand secondly governmentof 2.5. Constitutional powers and duties of the major political actors constitutional powers and duties of the Government (see section 2.5.2.). institutional andbalances, willbechecks section in explained the dealing with the issue of the along with judiciary. These, andthe executive the well asbetween as legislative, itinrelationship,bebutbetween alsotherelationship seen governmentthe the could and President-PM restricted to the not casewas in Romanian the of delineation powers this vague andNevertheless, PM. President the between power sharing presupposes structure executive Giovanni Sartori, Giovanni Ibid, 160. Also, Vasile Geonea, the vice-president of thecommissioncharged withwriting the draft Constitution, stated Why hasbe thisambiguity problematic? proven hasto been outin It pointed the The present section will firstly present some scholarly characterizations of the of characterizations scholarly some present firstly will section The present , (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994),101-117; Cindy Skach, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: Aninquiry into structures, incentives and ), (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1998), 159. 67 ú . Semi-presidentialism also faces this issue since the dual the since issue this faces also Semi-presidentialism . eneanu, 66 . In 2003, Article 1 was modified whereby the state must . In modified2003, Article wherebythe state 1was 65 Moreover, it has been argued that the terminology Istoria Constitu 28 delineate the constitutional powers of the three the of powers constitutional the delineate Ġ ional ă aRomâniei: 1859-1991 , (New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity Borrowing Constitutional Designs: ( Romania’s CEU eTD Collection presidentialism”), 70 Constitutional System”), it than the president. a PM. The process of dissolving parliament is cumbersome to the point that the legislature has more control over parliamentary systems. Also, the Romanianpresident must consult withthe parties parliamentin before naming government. The functionof “mediation” betweenstate institutions is actually givento president in 69 Publishing House, 2007),216. Constitu 68 Parliament the especially institutions, state other the of standing the increase to was aim the since semi-presidentialism of form parliamentarized” or “limited’ a as regime the Romanian type of semi-presidentialism. The framers of the Constitution qualifiedmustcaveat concerning bemade important model. an Fifth by However, Republic French the the new evolved throughout the post-communistyears. inrelationshipand President-Government-Parliament whichthe underline way has the powers these between interaction of dynamics the illustrate wewill In addition, Parliament. and Government i.e. President, the for this research, interest are of institutions that main state would point to a presidentialto would point element meetingsparticipate and (Article 87) presideand to Government right (circumscribed) the (Articlematters 86) urgent about consult Government with the to power only the argued that from legitimacy,popular butalso from several reinforcing constitutional provisions” derives strength whose and system) the of nature parliamentarian the change to enough strong political system isconstitutional limits. Giovanni followed Sartori “thesame linesbystating the that Romanian parliamentarian of number deal a has with to vote, popular by isdirect whoelected President, the Also, body. characterizedlegislative the of in front actions its for responsible is collectively it and by Parliament from a strong head of of confidence vote the receives state theGovernment that infact the rests element parliamentarian (but who is not Giovanni Sartori, “Alcuni Chiaramenti sul Semipresidenzialismo” (“Some Clarifications onSemi- Florin Bucur Vasilescu cited in Constan in cited Vasilescu Bucur Florin Sartori pointed out that several presidential prerogatives canbe attributed to a parliamentary form of Ġ As stated above, the members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee were inspired ional Comparat Studia Politica, Romanian Political Science Review Source: Giovanni Sartori, “Sul Sistema Constituzionale Romeno” (“On the Romanian Studia Politica, Romanian Political Science Review ( ComparativeConstitutional Law 70 . In analysing the impact a semi-presidential design has Ġ a C ă linoiu, Victor Duculescu, Georgeta Duculescu, Georgeta Duculescu, Victor linoiu, 29 ), Vol. 1, 4 , Vol.3, , no. 3, (2003): 618. th edition, (Bucharest: Lumina Lex Lumina (Bucharest: edition, , Vol., 2, no. 1,(2002): 10. 68 69 . The . Drept . He CEU eTD Collection of the Chambers had passed a bill “in a different wording from that approved by the other Chamber”. If the If Chamber”. other the by approved that from wording different a “in bill a passed had Chambers the of one case in committee a mediation for provided 76 Article Moreover, Chamber. other the to again forwarded and Parliament Chamber”. In case of a rejection, the bill would be sent back to the initial Chamber foranother debate 74 Communism: structure, culture and political psychology), (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2002), 42-46. 73 of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, SanDiego, (September2005): 9. 72 (accessed May 26, 2009). Elgie,Robert “VariationsSource: on atheme”, consolidation. of democratic path the on stay to managed it chosen have that countries stalemate, ministerial prime- powers”. and His conclusion presidential of balance wasa that, with although countries this type “semi-presidential is most and prone to intra-executivepresidents” ceremonial with conflict and countries 71 competencies 1991Constitution,the the problem thatthere wasnoclearwas delineation of Chambers’ balanced design of powers between the President and the PM a as government form of Romanian the categorized Elgie Robert consolidation, democratic on deadlock” responsibility. and in clearly institutions ofjoint conflicts favours not within areas state is the delineated Thus, and between theseparation that powers of is main idea Her byAlinaMungiu-Pippidi. done the system is institutions was state powersconferred tothe the to RomanianConstitutionthe in regards “overloaded with checkssystem. and balancesand, in is toacceptaweakerposition president thus, expected functioning of overall the the to the as the party political same the within from named is PM limit the when likely more is mandate of either wins parliamentaryfrom comes she he/ which from party majority if the implemented programme and views or political dominates in caseher his/ have of to a coalition. President Romanian the for easier much is it system, In addition, semi-presidential any a smooth legislature the to solely is responsible who PM the dismissing not but in selecting, has and theinitiative he/she wherevote by ispopular elected President the i.e. asystem where Article 75 stated simply that “bills or legislative proposals passed by one Chambershall be sent to the other Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Matthew Shugart, Matthew Elgie made a distinctionbetween “highly presidentialised semi-presidential countries”, “semi-presidential One of the most precise and simple descriptions of in Oneproblems of inherent of mostthe existent the precise and simple descriptions “premier-presidential”, as design Romanian of the result the has characterized Shugart 73 . An example would be the slow passage of laws in the bicameral Parliament. In Parliament. bicameral in the laws of passage slow the be would An example . 74 since these were designed to balance and check each other, a situation which Semi-presidential systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Politica dup JournalDemocracy of ă Comunism: structur 30 , Vol., 16,3,(2005):no. 98-122, http://doras.dcu.ie/64/ ă , cultur ú ă 71 . Authority i psihologie politic Patterns , Graduate School , Graduate ă (Politics after 72 . As in CEU eTD Collection by B Nechita, Mara Stefan, “Partidele parlamentare, naucite de ideile lui B lui ideile de naucite parlamentare, “Partidele Stefan, Mara Nechita, http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=6690&_PRID=ag (accessed May Beatrice26, 2009); Special 78 May 26, 2009). parliament”), ii-cadi-5458.html (accessed May Raluca26, 2009); Alexandrescu, “Parlamentulcel slab” (“The weak 267, January XVI,nr. 2009, http://www.revista22.ro/22-plus-anul-xvi-nr-267-o-constitutie-pentru-libertate-29, 4, 2006;Cadi Institute, “OConstitutie pentru Libertate II” (“A Constitutionfor Liberty”), bicameralismului romanesc” (“The cronic inefficiency of Romanian bicameralism”), Politica postcomunist” („After1989. Afew reflections onpost-communist Romanianconstitutionalism”), the Senate, as a first notified Chamber, for debate and adoption”. and 77 debate for Chamber, notified afirst as Senate, the agreements, as well and asbillstreaties of such of the organic laws implementation the […] The from other bills deriving or legislative measures proposals legislative the and shall be submitted agreements to international notified Chamber, shall debate and adopt the bills and legislative proposals forthe ratificationof treaties orother 76 ManchesterUniversity Press, 2008), 146-147. Semi-presidentialism inCentral and Eastern Europe 75 number has grownover years the due tothetheir political parties’albeit support (see 2.5.2.). ordinances, emergency of abuse executive’s the for account also might inefficiency institutional This commissiondid not solve issue,this then the bill would be sent to bothChambers fordebate a jointin session. to force through Parliamentthe organization of such a referendum (see section 3.6.1.) importantin view of factthe that one of the charges brought against B and negative aweakparliament perception popular a only created Romanian political Romanian andclass hepolitical that would pushforareferendum issueon this the of reformation the wouldlead to that parliament bea unicameral would solution best the that he underlined Therefore, deadlock”. “system overall an and inefficiency to led only modifications2003 clarify aimed to competenciesthe of Chambereach addressed from B addressed from 2005 byPresident time-period inaspecified itself debated since they can be if tacitly approved notified first not Chamberthe does pronounce be even not may these and another to Chamber one from passed being still are bills version, measures solved theproblemonlyhalfway becauseArticle according to 75of 2003 the these that stressed been has it However, commission. mediation a for necessity the erasing Public CommunicationDepartment of theRomanianPresidency, For more information, see: Ioan Stanomir, “Dupa 1998. Câteva reflec Câteva 1998. “Dupa Stanomir, Ioan see: information, more For Article 75-1 of the 2003 constitutional Tom Gallager, Viorel Andrievici, “Romania: political irresponsibility without constitutional safeguards”, version states the following: “The Chamber of Deputies, as a first ă sescu ’s ideas”), ă . television program, TVR 1 Romanian Political Science Review Revista 22 Adevarul , October, 11,2005, http://www.revista22.ro/parlamentul-cel-slab-2105.html (accessed , September 15, 2005. 77 . This particular problem of the Romanian Parliament was Parliament Romanian the of problem particular This , vol.VI,no. 1,(2006):161-165; AdrianIlie, “Ineficientacronica a ă sescu whohas declared legislative bicameral the that 31 , eds. Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, (Manchester: Moestrup, Sophia Elgie, Robert eds. , Traian B , October12, 2005, ă Ġ sescu ”, (“Parliamentary parties, baffled parties, (“Parliamentary ”, sescu ii asupra constitu asupra ii ă sescu ’sparticipation Edi inthe 75 . Consequently, one of the ă sescu was that he tried Curierul National Ġ ionalismului românesc ionalismului 76 22 Plus-Supliment in addition to 78 . This is This . , August Studia Ġ ie , CEU eTD Collection no.1, (2003): 141-161. Parliaments”), European Eastern and (“Central President. In the eventuality of a government reshuffle or vacancy in office, the President the office, in vacancy or reshuffle government a of eventuality the In President. candidatefor the office of PM (Article 102-1 [103-1]), but the ultimate decision rests with the President hasRomanian to Presidentthe for difficult consultis extremely it straightforward: is article this to of implication dissolve The 89). (Article withthe Parliament the proposals other two hasrejected latter and if the and reached agreement not has Parliament majoritytrigger early elections. winningcan dissolve his only if within ayear and Parliament 60daysof once the PM proposal Furthermore, parliamentarythe Romanian system, unlikein French the 1991Constitutionone, the states thethat President In limitedthe aremore his than counterpart. French powers category since thePresident’s group(s) topresidentialfall Romania would under the“balancedpresidency government” power, and propose a branches. state two these with particularly dealing in will be sub-sections the examined Parliament and Government the with relationship President’s The implications. practical its holder of presidential the itis office, onlyjust toexamine this particular and provision assess 80 has been used in 1994 andin2007 initiate to impeachmentthe procedureagainst the Article fact that Secondly,the inwere referredcase. considering to that 2007suspension the 2.5.1 The President chapter. ordinances. thelegislativementioned via dominate issuing tendency practice emergency the of to 79 playsrole asecondary Parliament system an within unstable environmentandpolitical blurry normsconstitutional in which the Jean Michel de Waele, Sorina Soare, Petia Gueorguieva, “Parlamentele din Europa Central Europa din “Parlamentele Gueorguieva, Petia Soare, Sorina Waele, de Michel Jean If we take into consideration Duverger’s distinction between the degrees of between degrees the distinction consideration Duverger’s into If take we In this sub-section, we will firstly describe those powers and duties of the President Another characterization of the Romanian system was that of a semi-presidential These ideas bewill explained and exemplified throughout remainderthe of this 79 . This situation is promptedby executive’s the above- Studia Politica, RomanianPolitical Science Review 32 ú ă , vol.III, i de Est” de i CEU eTD Collection of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, SanDiego, (September2005): 12. 81 October23, 2007. uninominal pe 25 noiembrie” (“Referendum for uninominalthe votul voteNovemberon pentru 25 “Referendum ***, Source: Party. Liberal-Democrat formed newly his favour to as so elections these manipulating as well as Decree, Presidential the in referendum the for date fixed no was there since Constitution B elections. Parliament European the day as same the during organized was referendum the because out broke scandal A class”. political the “reforming for amechanism providing of sense November2007 on the new uninominal electoral system that was considered an issue of national interest in the 80 President the to up left is issues such of interpretation the and 90) (Article interest national of issues on referendum for call to Parliament with consultation after right the has President the Nevertheless, right. veto no has but 77), (Article Court Constitutional the to it refer to or once only reconsideration for Parliament the to legislation return can President the addition, In 99). andbe (Articles91,92),butany defence has countersigneddecision to bythePM(Article right to co-initiate legislation or a veto right. In addition, he enjoys powers in foreign policy national interest –foreign policy, (Article andpublic not defence order have 87),butdoes the may of meetingsThe President overgovernmental onissues 85-2). proposal preside (Article must decide on the dismissal and appointment of Government members based on the PM’s thus sidesteppingthus and parliament government policy issues voters, Presidenthe/she the bypleading vital the canpropose deems directly to %ă have been used anindictmentas Romanianagainsti.e. two presidents, Iliescu in 1994and separately,can and or together clauses,either these specifically, suspension. More practice of intoaspect consideration totake when discussing thepresidential institution in the to relation above, Asan important Article by84represent been stated scholars. 80and several discussed preside over the Supreme Council of National Defence (C.S.A.T.) (Article 92). nominate ability the heads to intelligence national of the (Article65-2,h)agencies and to Matthew Shugart, Matthew A controversial use of the prerogative belonged to President B sescu in 2007. In the following lines, we will present the problematic aspects ofArticle 80thathave problematic aspects presentthe lines, wewill In followingthe 80 . Shugart argues that this right is similar to that of dissolution of Parliament since Parliament of dissolution of that to is similar right this that argues Shugart . Semi-presidential systems: Dual Executive and Mixed 33 81 . An important aspect of the presidency is the ă sescu who called for a referendum in Authority ă sescu was accused of ignoring the ignoring of accused was sescu Patterns th ”), , Graduate School , Graduate BBC Romania , CEU eTD Collection described above.thismust Consequently, function, performing Romanian while the President type the of inapotential intervening conflict of the possibility indicates term latter since the as“arbitration”be“mediation” out understood mustnot that whopointed former judge, CC themselves. betweenthepublicauthorities or society and authorities the public between inmight relationship the appear that minimizes conflicts the or prevents this particular aspect isinterpretation that The dominant etc. of NGOs, unions, trade parties, political parliamentary the President’s dutiesi.e. society, bodies and consideredasrepresenting leadersof those the groups parliamentary entitles him/ her to act in such a manner that between the State and society” State the between aswell inas “between asamediator State, the Powers acts the president the authorities, her role guardian asthe of Constitution the of functioning proper the and of publicthe of country the by suspension two triggering procedures. institutions is sinceextremely important it has affected constitutionalthe and stability political state the between mediating of function president’s the issueof the case, Romanian 90). overpreside government meetings dealing withcertain issues (Article87)or tocall fora referendum (Article (Article 133-1), to address Parliament by forcalling a jointsession two of the Chambers (Article 62-2, a),to public offices,as judges such public and prosecutorsproposal Council atthe Superior of the of Magistracy the once a law to Parliament or refer it to the Constitutional Court (Article 77-2 and 3), to make appointments to result of the function of guaranteeing the observance of the Constitution. These may be the right to return only 83 proposal. suspension in the President 82 displayed his provision,state of headbias unconstitutional towards party,PD the the B President against procedure suspension the office”. private or public other President of Romania may not be a member of any political party, nor may he perform any There are several practical actions, some of which have been referred to above, that can be undertaken as a as be undertaken can that above, to referred been have which of some actions, practical several are There For an analysis of this specific issue, see chapter 3, section 3.6 where we list the charges brought against the In regards tothiscaveat function, important has an beenmade by Deleanu, a Ion What isArticle Whatin soproblematic tohis/ that about states 80? This provision regards Article 84-1 of Article 84-1of Romanian the Constitution hisreads that“[d]uring term office, of the The reference to political parties has allowed the initiators of 83 . The function may consist in consultations with the with in consultations consist may function The . 34 ă sescu to argue that based on this basedargue that onthis particular sescu to 82 . In the In . CEU eTD Collection Science Review 1989. Afew reflections onpost-communist Romanianconstitutionalism”), entitled to act upon it and for the parliamentary political parties to accuse the head of state of state head of accuse the to parties political parliamentary for the and upon itact to entitled used “mediation” lacksboth a definition and an enumeration instancesof possible it be when can of theconcept because appearespecially balance. Problems institutional and a constitutional creatingaimed political at prescribes limited by articledetachment aforementioned which the constitutionally is institution this Nevertheless, Constitution. the and mandate electoral the of limits the within life in political involved become to legitimacy the has President representativeuniversal, equal secret, freeand popular vote, givingthus this institution legitimacy the a of body thatvia is direct, elected President the that fact the to refers This institution. of presidential the can claim Stanomir,to who has pointed out that there is a tensionembody which stems from “the original paradox” the will of theinvolvement President’s the with population.can be attained that compromises institutional demands public authorities between the conflict Therefore,function this that also: interpretation the “mediation” in the Romanian Constitution has permitted the development of the opposite public authorities via the function via public of function the authorities According to Article in presentFrenchConstitution.interpretation provision be compared tothe 1958 the can 5, the French President actively ensures the proper functioning of the 86 94. 2007): 85 (December 3, vol. Foundation, Iure Pro and Sciences Curentul Juridic, theJuridical Current 84 solution impose leeway a certain to give not him/hernecessary presidency does appease because the aconflict in to tools neutral fashion anduseconstitutional act a IoanStanomir, “Dup Cristian Ionescu cited in Ibid, 95. Roumanie”, la de President du role le sur considerations “Quelques Borsa, Gheorghe in cited Deleanu Ion 86 . Therefore, its vagueness leaves room for interpretation both for the President who is who President the for both interpretation for room leaves vagueness its . Therefore, Another analysis belongs to constitutional law expert and political scientist Ioan scientist political and expert law constitutional to belongs analysis Another , vol. VI, no. 1, (2006): 166 ă 1998. Câteva reflec 85 , Petru Maior University, Faculty of Economics Law and Administrative . includes Ġ ii asupra constitu arbitration the notion of arbitration since the resolution of a 35 . Of course, the ambiguity of the word Ġ ionalismului românesc postcomunist” („After Studia Politica . Romanian Political 84 . This . CEU eTD Collection character of the state” which can actin publicall domains.Source: Cristian Preda, Ibid, 189. 88 Nemira, 1998), 187-189. 87 consider them fora synonym “public authorities” society, there is and state andbetween powers the between state the mediation no the ensures and Constitution specification as guards theobservanceof thethe that Although President states thearticle special status. to what are the “Powers i.e. noclearly with category tothe asbelonging considered public authorities, of defined in the State” publicthe judiciary.literally, administration and the institution taken is Thus, presidential the or if we Government, the should President, the Parliament, the enlists Constitution the in authority” “public the term fact from that stems the problem The and“public authorities”? the“state” between “society”as “state”, and“public authorities” mediation and how much is intrusion? abusing his constitutional The powers. fundamental muchquestion would be:How is together with the MPs, may request the initiation of together with may initiation the against MPs, the request prosecutions criminal of a politically although(Article Parliament before responsible only 108-1[109-1]), President, the is collectively Government the Also, [103]). 102 (Article confidence of vote Parliament’s members listthe cabinet of andmust Government’s the program,seek political the of designates model, upon presenting semi-presidential who, the President both the PM the line management [102-1]).In of administration” with public 101-1 requirements (Article the implementation of the domestic and 2.5.2. The PM and the foreignGovernment policy of the country large. society at the represent and exerciseto entitled they are circumstances what in the and many how actors, general political which to as vague Cristian Preda argues that if this synonymy is the case, then it can be considered as an indication of “the total Cristian Preda, Cristian Another problem with associated deals article this with such notions ambiguity the of According to the 1991 Constitution, the role of the Government is to “ensureis the tothe Government 1991Constitution,the of role According the to Modernitatea Politic ú ă i Românismul 36 87 , ( . More specifically, what is the difference Political Modernityand Romanianess 88 . Also, the term “society” isextremely “society” term . Also,the ), (Bucharest: CEU eTD Collection no. 3(April 1996): 297-1022. “Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe”, 91 culture and political psychology),(Bucharest: Humanitas, 2002), 42-43. Pippidi, premier dupa1989”(“The President-PM couple1989”), after presedinte- „Cuplul Clej, Petru see: relationship, President-PM of the account short a For 1. see Table PMs, and occurred since N and Iliescu between N relationship The troubles. these Transportationat the time, severely criticized the Government’s activity Ciorbeaand blamed thePresident for relationshiplatteruncritically accepted the President’s political options. Incontrast, Emil Constantinescu had a conflict-riven with almost every PM. In 1998, Victor Ciorbea resigned after Traian B the the semi-presidential model presupposes a specialdynamic between institutionsthese 90 MPs. If this motion fails, then the bill is passed (Article 113). three days from thesession the Government assumesdate responsibility fora policy orbill beforethe Parliament. If this is the case,Government then after 89 assumed responsibility a motion of censure can be forwarded by the Iliescuperiod, enjoyed wideinfluence and the 1990decree gave thepresidency substantial interim the during above, argued As was office. from latter the dismiss to possibility the been Romanian context,the main issuein between conflicts the Presidentsand the PMshas the period parliamentary session (Article 112[113]) a single number MPs during of total by initiated the ¼ of ofnoconfidence a vote confidence. Constitution, PMandhiscabinetcanbe In Romanian the the following dismissed of its vote withdraw to Parliament the permits which censure” “motion of so-called isthe control legislative for mechanism important an principle, balances and checks the with answer any orinterpellationsfrom questions coming Inaccordance MPs (Article 111[112]). informationwith Parliament or andto any 110-1[111-1]) requested documents (Article provideis Government obligedto relationship. Government-Parliamentthe the Therefore, of parliamentary of control governmental is activity clearly in stipulated sectionthe regarding person membergovernment from Thenotion that suspend (Article and 108-2[109-2]). office Fora more detailed analysis of the president-PM relationship inEastern Europe, see Thomas Baylis, It has been noted that the relationship between Iliescu and Nicolae V Nicolae and Iliescu between relationship the that noted been has It parliamentary one during if be side-stepped can motions of censure number the to as imposed limit The 90 Politica dup The between relationship Romanian the andPresident PMin the post-communist is an extremely important issue that needs closer examination in view of the fact that fact the of view in examination closer needs that issue important extremely isan ă stase was also in a strong position as President of the PSD. For a list of Romanian Presidents ă Comunism: structur ă , cultur 89 ăú . i psihologie politic ă 37 stase was generally peaceful, but occasional clashes have clashes occasional but peaceful, generally was stase BBC Romania ăFă ă (Politics afterCommunism: structure, roiu was the most peaceful since the since peaceful most the was roiu , January Alina18, 2007; Mungiu- World Politics ă sescu, Minister of 91 , vol.48, . In the In . CEU eTD Collection cases provided for by the law”. Government shall cease upon resignation, dismissal, disenfranchisement, incompatibility, deathor in any other another memberof the Government as interim Prime Minister[...]”. Article 105 states that “Membership of the under Article 105,94 or in caseMay 15, 2009). of his inability93 to exerciseChamber of Deputies, http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=11160 (accessed May 2009).3, his powers,the accord the PresidentConstituent Assembly, to dissolve the Constituentof Assembly if the Constitution of was notthe passed in9months withRomaniathe Supreme Court of Justice,PM to govern by decree countersigned andshall by the PM, to call extraordinary sessionsthedesignate of the 92 Constituent Assembly of the two chambers of Parliament. Source: Romanian motives for dismissingPMwere the ArticleArticle 106-2and 105 powers the President cannotdismiss the PM from office (Article 107-2). that states specifically situation, Constitution Because of 2003revised the severity this the of a new PM. can appoint 106,then President the Article in with accordance Furthermore, thus leading “dismissal”, inmembership the caseof also government ceases article provides The latter that to the interpretationingoverning coalition the parties of lostthe support parliamentary that the perform to his because duties President 1)the majority hisof members cabinet had resigned and 2) he isargument presented by the President in Law Decree 426 was that PM Raduactually Vasile was unable Vasile from interimwas revoked Athanasiuoffice Alexandru and wasnamed as PM. The entitled todid notexplicitly prohibit the PM’s dismissalsack by the President. The fact of the matter was that the PM. lack to Thisof waspossiblesince of affairs support. theparliamentary state 1991Constitution step down,refused buteventually to insistedVasile who due onremoving PMRadu resigned resignation following thefourth “Mineriad” in September 1991. latter’s the with resolved was which Roman, and Iliescu between ensued a crisis Therefore, Decree 92/1990,didrefer possibility not tothe may thepresidentthat the dismiss PM. Law namely time,was in the at place that law The reform. economic of issue Roman,the on adopted an active role in domestic politics while entering intoconflict with the first PM, Petre Article 106, paragraph2 stipulates that “If the Prime Ministerfinds himself onein of the situations provided RADOR Press Agency, December14, 1999, http://www.ici.ro/romania/ro/stiri/arh1999/dec14.html (accessed According to Article 82 of Law Decree no. 92, the President had the right to appoint the PM and the judges of 92 Another such crisis occurred in December 1999, when President Constantinescu whenPresident in 1999, December occurred crisis such Another . After the elections, President Iliescu established a strong presidential office and presidential office astrong Iliescu established President elections, the . After 38 94 of of 1991Constitution.the 93 . The constitutional The . CEU eTD Collection 2009). (Winter-Spring 1999), http://www1.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num1-2/feature/romania.html (accessed May 23, 96 justice system 133-1and(Article 2). with a body of independence the chargedthe totheguaranteeingalso C.S.M., appointed are fiveversionprosecutors is addedthatpublic more, revised the What remained the same. 2003revisionthe has notmodified Constitution the reflectto this division since the essence law judicial the aforementioned from haveclearly separated bodies,power state other the but administrative demarcation unclear” demarcation administrative executive branch—and the inConstitution, its has form,original leftlines the of the of thumb underthe exclusively and more clearly are latter the (magistratura), magistracy (2004-2007), stated “[w]hilethat judges areclassified all and prosecutors asmembers of the Revista român stat: în propuneri puterilor de modificare“Separarea a ConstituMihai, Lucian Source: inspectors. above-mentioned the by and superiors their by made evaluation on an based promoted are judges the that 67 notes Article Also, executive. the to subordinated one chargein of controlling the activity of judges the all throughinspector-judges is ordelegate-judgesof Justice who are Minister the that states 34 Article example, for because, judiciary the and executive the between 95 former the check ability the latter to providing the without judiciary’s activity inthe interference executive’s positions Lucian intheC.S.M. that 1991Constitution the Mihai noted the permitted Minister, through the Public Ministry, has control over prosecutors who, in turn, can alsohold the example offered was subordination of the judiciary to the executive. Briefly, the Justice institutionalcommunist design imprecision the was separation the of principleof powers and Monica Macovei, “The Procuracy and its Problems”, its and Procuracy “The Macovei, Monica Mihai also argued Lawthat 92/1992 on the Judiciary furtherillustrates the faulty separationof powers In section 2.2, we mentioned that one of the problematic aspects of the post- ă de drepturile omului 95 . Regarding the same issue, Monica Macovei, former Justice Minister Justice former Macovei, issue, Monica . Regarding same the Ġ , Vol.2, (1993): 10-12. iei” (“Separation of State Powers: Proposals to Amend the Constitution, 96 . Macovei points out that the 1997 amendments to the to amendments 1997 the that out points Macovei . 39 East EuropeanConstitutional Review , Vol. 8, no. 1-2, CEU eTD Collection delegation and especially the use of irrespectivedelegationemergency theirextraordinary andespeciallytheuseof ordinances of executives, except the one headed by V Nicolae oneheaded the except executives, possible unconstitutionality, the effects would have already taken place. is until their passed on attheCC,but a ruling canbelegal These contested effect. immediate have andthat in are notdebated Parliament pass lawsthe is that to entitled Government the whereby circumstances andpolitical social urgent or exceptional to limited constitutionally is Generally, 144-4). useof such aprocedure legislative the (Article delegation emergencymechanismadoptvia to the namely Government’srightof ordinances the berelationship, can consequences seenin of a special Government-Parliament aspect the principle. powers separation the The of 1991Constitutionthe wasthe ambiguity of 2.5.3. TheParliament Prime-ministers. Romanian interim the indicate italics The Notes: Table 1:Romanian Presidents andPMs(1990-2009) Mandates 2008-present 2004-2008 2000-2004 1996-2000 1992-1996 1990-1992 A persisting problem in the Romanian case is the fact that all post-communist all that fact the is case Romanian in the problem A persisting of traits striking most that of the one we stated chapter, present the 2.4of In section Presidents Traian B Ion Iliescu (PDSR) Victor Ciorbea (PN Emil Constantinescu (CDR) Ion Iliescu (FDSN) Ion Iliescu (FSN) ă sescu (PD) 40 ăFă roiu, have abused the right of legislative of have the right abused roiu, Mugur Is Alexandru Athanasiu Radu Vasile(PN Gavril Dejeu Emil Boc (PD) Boc Emil Eugen Bejinariu Prime Ministers &ă Adrian N Nicolae V Nicolae V Nicolae V (independent) Stolojan Theodor Petre Roman (FSN) &ă lin Popescu T lin Popescu T ă ă ăFă ăFă ăFă rescu (independent) stase (PDSR/PSD) stase (PN roiu III(PDSR) (PDSR) roiu II roiu I (PSD) ă ă ğ riceanu II (PNL) riceanu I(PNL) ğ CD) CD) ğ CD) (PSDR) CEU eTD Collection 100 Presidents ordinance, the sin of every governmnet”), of every sin the ordinance, 99 decembre 2007 Français, Sénat provides legislative delegationfor the Government. For a more detailed examinationof its evolution, see: Le 98 Administrativeand Sciences and Pro Iure Foundation, vol.3, (December2005): 22-27. context”, transition Romanian the within Ordinance Emergency Government of the character political “The Palade, Constantin see ordinances, emergency executives’ ofthe nature and frequency the on information more For mandate. 97 and parties” the president the between relationship the and system minister with isof in support the largely majority the parliament on party the dependent of a system having President a predominance2.6. The nature of the parliamentary majority and its relationship with the of the ordinances” emergency or initiatives legislative president notor hishave cohabitation the “inpredominant Romania the majority with since executive tothe issubordinated still legislative the wasthat think-tank, Public Policy of laws rolearethe initiated primeof by initiative,beenthe 325 Government […] the Parliament inFranceIn 2007 hascontrast, thenumberof ordinances from government published 1984 to but doesthat oflargest numberof emergency ordinances outof all executives:other 730from 2008. 2004 to legislator for either Government character years – is this aspect important an since thePresident’s was role from enhanced 1990 to 2004 i.e. once every three days. Nevertheless, the T of emergency 2005 has from ordinances 1992 to have thatthere revealed been 1582 such acts, hasmade Astudy role as body frequency diminished. on the soleParliament’s legislative the being the that logical outcome only this the practice, have accepted parties generally Ramona Le Ramona This analysis was done only in relationto the ordinances issued underArticle 38 of the Constitution, which Also, every executive, except for V for except executive, every Also, Juan Linz, Juan “Introduction: some thoughts on presidentialism inpostcommunist Europe”, in This Parliament-President relationship is important since isimportant relationship This asLinzParliament-President argued:“the success According Constitution, in the 1991Romanian to thepresidency’s officeis4 term , ed. Ray Taras, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),10. 97 98 . What is more, favoured by parliamentary majorities or coalitions, the political the coalitions, or majorities parliamentary by favoured more, is What . . The conclusion drawn by Adrian Moraru, deputy director of the Institute for ú eanu, “Abuzul de ordonan de “Abuzul eanu, , http://www.senat.fr/ej/ej_ordonnance/ej_ordonnance0.html#haut (accessed May 28, 2009). Les Documents deTravaildu Sénat, Serie Etudes Juridiques, Les Ordonnances –Bilan au31 Curentul Juridic, the Juridical Current ăFă Ġ Curierul Na roiu, has increased the number of such ordinances at the end oftheir end the at ordinances of such number the increased has roiu, e de urgen e de Ġă Ġ ional 41 , meteahna tuturor guvernelor” („Abusing the emergency the („Abusing guvernelor” tuturor meteahna , ă riceanu government was the one that issued the 99 . , Petru MaiorUniversity, Faculty of Economics Law , March 4,2009. 100 . Postcommunist CEU eTD Collection 103 politics and society in post-communist Romania) the PNL and the UDMR supported by Aprilfrom Thus, PNLand 2007thefirstpost- the supported PSD. the UDMR the reshuffle March 2007through a government “All eyes turned toCotroceni”, eyes turned “All ***, Source: elections. Parliament European the postpone to decision government’s the rejecting for (Justice) 104 the dominant positionwithin the alliance, a factor that only contributed to the frictions betweenthe members. President B supportive of President’sinitiatives.the The traditional situation in changed 2005 when always wasnot majority who parliamentary on the less influence had and active than Iliescu ended upsplitting from alliance the during themandate differentparties failed which toreach becauseconsensus of opposing political interests and Convention (CDR), who won against the Social Democrats (PDSR), comprised ideologically The from situation in 2000). wasmore Democratic thatthe sense complicated 1996-2000 the coalition (Iliescu 1992-1994; 2000-2004)anda balancedcoalition (Constantinescu 1996- Parliamentwhen was there a monolithic majority dominant-party (Iliescu 1989-1992), 102 101 by Parliament validated creation is seenasapresidential while President, the Government against the for or parliamentary majority is actually majority”,a “presidential parties having toorganize either the that perception electorate’s Romanian the to led have and mandates Iliescu’s Ion on legacies the were life political personalized highly a and role and influence president’s However, the institutions of of constitutional the emphasizing that a guardian order. and Constitution stipulates that the President’s role is that of a neutral mediator between the state majority influence parliamentary the to candidate presidential the permitted to thanks legislative that organization elections simultaneous of andthe presidential We would not consider the CDR as a truly balanced coalition since after the 1996 elections the PN the elections 1996 the after since coalition balanced truly a as CDR the consider not would We The reshuffle targeted especially Ministers Vasile Blaga (Administration and Interior) and Monica Macovei Daniel Barbu Daniel The 2003 constitutional revision extended the President’s term of office to 5years (Article 83). Every has been president leaderthe him of partisanthe formation whosupported in ă sescu entered abitter conflict with PM T 102 , Republica absent . Nice o’Clock ă : politic , March 20, 2007. ú ă , (Bucharest: Nemira, 2004), 176. i societate în România postcomunist 104 42 resulting in a minority government between government minority a in resulting ă riceanu who ousted the PD ministers in 103 . Emil Constantinescu was less was Constantinescu . Emil 101 . Article 80 of . Article 1991 80of the ă (The Absent Republic: ğ -CD held -CD CEU eTD Collection http://books.google.com/books/semi+presidentialism+outside+europe#PPP8,M1 (accessed May 5, 2009). Moestrup, (London, New York, Routledge, 2007), 71, communist context”, in 105 oppositionjudicial ofgraveintrusion in breach proceedings resulting in of separation the the He wasaccused againstIon Iliescu. bytheparliamentary acting then procedure President as thenegativemade by ruling CC the thisregarding case. sub-section to the examination of the reason and arguments used against the President, as well inisit legal reserve a precedent Romanian and the necessary partof political practice, to this 2.7. The 1994 suspension case against President Ion Iliescu Table 2:Typesof parliamentary majorities andpresidents (1990-2008) partners. coalition communist cohabitation between ensuedin period Romania formerthe Alliance D.A. No majority Quasi-majority majority) coalition (true Balanced (true majority) party coalition Dominant- (true majority) Monolithic majority parliamentary Type of Takenand adapted for the case understudy from François Frison-Roche, “Semi-presidentialism in apost- As already mentioned above, Article 80was invoked in 1994suspensionthe ina establishing procedure suspension importance 1994 ofthe Because of the (T I, III) Iliescu Limited decider Dyarchy %ă 9ăFă Iliescu Limited powers Iliescu Absolute majority Head of the President Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: AComparative Study ă sescu riceanu I) roiu II) (V (Stolojan, (Roman) ruler ăFă roiu Regulator (T Regulator Regulator %ă Regulator Opposed ă sescu riceanu II) 43 Is Athanasiu, Dejeu, Vasile, (Ciorbea, Constantinescu Symbolic Symbolic Symbolic Symbolic majority Member of the ă rescu) , eds. Robert Elgie, Sophia 105 Regulator (N Iliescu Regulator Regulator Regulator Neutral Dyarchy ă stase) CEU eTD Collection Science Review 1989. Afew reflections onpost-communist Romanianconstitutionalism”), fact that the holder of the presidential office is entitled to express political opinions or to or opinions proposepolitical express to – entitled is not office imposepresidential the of – holder waysthe that fact of solving the issue at hand since his/ her statements are not passive,but toaid inbringing aresolution about toremain is not duty constitutional President’s the houses, nationalized of formerthe owners More explicitly,in the eventuality of a social conflict, such as the one between the tenants and such a way so as to diminishactin him/herto ofmediation obliges function 80, President’s Article the with accordance or prevent the appearance “graveprovisions” infringingConstitutional upon constitute acts of institutionalrulingIliescuagainstconcerning the indictment bystating that hisdeclarations donot or social conflicts.negative CCgavea The parliamentary debate. andstartthe toinitiate procedure the signatures “aby nationalization” it second calling ofnationalized houses the lawregulating status against the debates during the parliamentary government the for opposition the acensuremotion andprotested against called Furthermore, appear andhouses before the joint explain of Parliament accusationsthe against brought him. 109 (Bucharest: Polirom, 2003),166-170. 2000 (‘We succeed can only together’- Ananalytic history ofthe DemocraticConvention, 1989-2000) invitation madeinvitation by parties involvedpolitical –PN 107 of the Romanian President”), 106 been passed – and should not be implemented by the state administration houses,because areinvalid not havethey do alegal basis –since law inhada thissense not nationalized over ownership of rightthe recognized which judicial rulings, incontestable and final the that declaration official mid-May Iliescu’s was motive The principle. powers of Dan Pavel, Iulia Huiu, 108 „ Romanians Ioan Stanomir, “Dup ***, “President Iliescu faces impeachment”, faces Iliescu “President ***, office from suspension the is (“What Romaniei” Presedintelui a functie din suspendarea este “Ce Clej, Petru For a more detailed description of the debates and the full chronology of the 1994 suspension procedure, see The suspension wasThe suspension by initiated procedure PN the , vol.10, no. 7, July 1994. , vol. VI, no. 1, (2006): 167. Nu putem reu ă 1998 Câteva reflec BBC Romania ú i decît împreun , January 21, 2007. Ġ ii asupra constitu 107 The Free Romanian: Theorganof World the Unionof Free . Inlate June,gather parties the managed 167 to 44 ă ”- O istorie analitic 109 . The basis of the argument consisted in the consisted argument the of basis The . ğ CD, PAC, PSDR,PER, PL’93, PD– to Ġ ionalismului românesc postcomunist” („After ğ CD in Iliescu mid-June. refused an Studia Politica ă aConven 108 and underlined that in that and underlined 106 Ġ iei Democratice,iei 1989- . . Romanian Political , CEU eTD Collection 2009). (Winter-Spring 1999), http://www1.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num1-2/feature/romania.html (accessed May 23, 112 plat the Romanian justice system”), justice Romanian the “20.000.000 deUSD cost see:“Contribuabilii ***, împotriva României” (“The tax payers versus Romania”), theirright to private property to and a fairtrial had beenviolated by the Romanianstate. Formore information, over a million Euros after 10 lawsuitsto pay werevery large sums ofdecided money in restitution. In 2002 in favourthe press signalled that of the Romanianthe state former had to pay owners.and monetary compensation, onlyThe increasedECHR the number of recognizedlawsuits which, if successful, would obligethat the state houses nationalized of issue the regarding lawsuits of deal has hundreds with The had to Romanianstate thatthe outcome Supremethe Court. was 1997, housesin these weretaken away by thestate 1995 upto of decision with the accordance with beginning former Therefore, owners. been backtothe hadhouses given nationalized the Prosecutor General,the that is affairs of state atthis for the levelexplanation The (ECHR). Rights of Human of the Court European Supreme Court, annulled the judicial filedatthe lawsuits in Romanian state form of the the have affected that rulingsconsequences whereby 110 incould line intervene with Iliescu’s statements. general prosecutor sothe via prosecutors, judiciary’s activity ininterfere the to executive the jurisdiction’” appeal final in judgments passed bycourts criminal exceed […]‘when courts trials their general authority to “has theexclusive because theprosecutor possible this that situation was the suspension proposal against Iliescu majority the formed by at time,PUNR, PRM, and by PDSR, PSM votes PDAR, rejected 242 have onthe parliamentary the Ultimately, authorities. supposed to public effects anylegal 111 22 Monica Macovei, “The Procuracy and its Problems”, its and Procuracy “The Macovei, Monica Cristian Preda, Sorina Soare, “Un Executiv dualist-conflictual” (“A dualist-conflictual Executive”), dualist-conflictual (“A dualist-conflictual” Executiv “Un Soare, Sorina Preda, Cristian The 1999 The decisionin the , May 28, 2008. ă ” (“In the lawsuits against the former owners, the state has to pay”), The problem in the case presented here is that Iliescu’s statements have had legal had have Iliescu’s statements hereisthat casepresented inThe the problem 112 . Therefore, in virtue of the above discussion about the constitutional ability of ă gre Brum ú Capital elile justi ă rescu vs. Romania , February 1, 2001;***, “Inprocesele cufo Ġ iei române” (“20.000.000 USD price isthe for mistakesthe made by 110 . case, where the former owner was given back the house 45 East European ConstitutionalReview 111 . Monica Macovei has pointed out Capital , July 8, 1999. ú Adev tii proprietari,tii statul e bunde ă rul , July 11, 2002;***, , Vol. 8, no. 1-2, Vol.8, no. , Revista CEU eTD Collection president”), 114 %ă would keep the Government busy and characterized himself as a “player-president” himself asa characterized busy and the Government would keep withdrew from cabinetthe and Alliancethe lost parliamentary majority. conflictsinNevertheless, with Decemberdueto conservatives President,the the 2006, (PC) Parliament, in majority a form to In order in Parliament. seats most obtained had PSD the although the Alliance formed a coalition with the UDMR and the Conservative Party meant that he would follow Iliescu’s style of constant involvement in domestic politics by politics in domestic involvement constant of style Iliescu’s follow he would that meant population. Traian B population. Traian PNL and the PD, ran on a because strong Alliance JusticeFSN’s inheritor, the andTruth (Alian reform and anti-corruptionthe PSD, the against Revolution” “Orange as Romania’s characterized were These elections platform after 2004elections. the information context political regarding the offersome background that appealed to the 3.1. The political background Constitution. the of version 2003 the only mind in have will we text, constitutional articles the of the whenreferring chapter, violatingConstitution. to In present the the and abusing power was accusedof but security, state threatened of which corruption acts B Paksas’ situation, to Incontrast treason. high of was accused Rolandaslegislativeof the2004impeachment Paksas,who Lithuanian the President, after between the President and the PC, see: ***, “Traian B “Traian ***, see: PC, the and President the between prompted B 113 Oana Stancu, Monica Iordache, “B Iordache, Monica Stancu, Oana The PC joined the Alliance in Parliament although it had run with the PSD in the electoral campaign. This campaign. electoral the in PSD the with run it had although Parliament in Alliance the joined PC The sescu signs for the ‘immoral solution’”), ‘immoral the for signs sescu 113 , thus throwing the PSD and Greater Romania Party (PRM) in opposition. %ă In order to understand the reasons which led to the presidential suspension, we need to we suspension, presidential the led which to reasons tounderstand the In order Traian B Traian ă sescu declared that he wanted to be an active voice that, together with Parliament, with together voice that, be an active to he wanted that sescu declared Jurnalul Na sescu to characterize the PC’s move as “the immoral solution”. For adescriptionof the conflicts ă CHAPTER 3:THE 2007 SUSPENSIONCASE sescu was the second European leader to have been sanctioned by the havesanctioned been to leader European second sescu wasthe Ġ ional ă sescu nominated his running mate C mate his running sescu nominated , October10, 2004. ă sescu se vrea pre vrea se sescu Ziare.com , July 7, 2006. 46 ă sescu semneaz sescu ú edinte juc edinte ă tor” (“B tor” ă ă lin Popescu linT Popescu Ġ pentru ‘solu pentru a D.A.), which compriseda D.A.), the ă sescu was not charged with charged not was sescu ă sescu wants to beplayer- a to wants sescu Ġ ia imoral ia ă riceanu asPM riceanu ă ’” (“Traian ’” 114 . This . CEU eTD Collection February February 28, 2007, http://stiri.rol.ro/content/view/35995/2/ (accessed May 2009).25, anchetarea lui B lui anchetarea President the against brought indictments the reviewing of incharge Commission Investigation Joint special OnFebruary 28 suspension procedure. 3.2.1. TheVoiculescu InvestigationCommission impeachment with a large majority votingfor, namely 322 out of 465 MPs. the PD and PLD, while the UDMR abstained. Source: ***, ”Dan Voiculescu, 115 %ă in Traian cases invoked:and thisarticle 1994againstIliescu in2007against Ion when was havebeentwo There be viaapopular referendum. from must validated removal butthe office must by suspension parliamentary i.e. votes, be majority,an 235 procedure absolute passed legislature.2004-2008 The step consistsinconsultingnext CCafterwhosethe the ruling suspension if such a proposal is bymajority, supported a 1/3 i.e. 157MPs time at the of the infringing“grave Constitutional acts upon his/herprovisions”, theParliamentcan propose 3.2. The suspension procedure managed and two between the initiatein suspension to the Parliament. procedure advantage ill PSDtook February the blood in latterrefusedthe resign of the In 2007, 2005. to againstbrought him by suspension the proposal. His relationship with PMworsenedthe after support continuing PD.Thismain towasoneof the participation energetic the accusations “interest‘Mafia-likesupportingof of PM andmembers groups’”, and while government frequently criticizinginjustice theslowby blatantly department reform theaccusing and the proposal against Iliescu. However, in in Parliamentvoted Iliescu.2007, the However, proposal favourof B against 1994 was into aspectconsiderationthis taken Parliament sincethe rejected impeachmentthe The Commission’s formation received 258 votes for from the PSD, PRM, PC and PNL, 76 votes against from sescu. In both cases, the CC gave a negative ruling regarding the accusations, but only in only but accusations, the regarding ruling a negative both CCgave cases, the sescu. In On February 12 Article 95of in Romanian the Constitution that provides case the Presidentcommits ă sescu ” (“Dan Voiculescu, head ofB head Voiculescu, (“Dan ” sescu 115 . The legal basis for the formation of such a commission is found in th , 2007, 184 MPs,belonging, 2007, PSDandthe to PRMinitiated the the th , on the PC’s initiative, the Parliament established a established Parliament the initiative, PC’s the on , 47 ă sescu ’s investigatory commission”), investigatory ’s sescu ú eful comisiei parlamentare pentru Romania Online ă sescu’s , CEU eTD Collection voiculescu--comisia-de-anchetare-a-presedintelui-va-fi-obiectiva_46009.html (accessed May 18, 2009). president’s investigatory commissionwill be objective”), March1, 2007, http://www.realitatea.net/dan- 118 Nicolae Iorga (PRM); Dan VoiculescuDinescu, (PC); Mate Andras (UDMR)Valentin andIbram (PNL); Husseim(national Scutaru minorities). George Antonescu, Crin Nicolai, Norica (PSD); Iordache Florin Tudose, final report and transmitted to the High Court of to and of andJustice Court Cassation High the transmitted final report charges may also appearduringin the investigation, which case they will be annexed tothe itsthough mandate is toexamine if violatedthe Constitution, President’s actions the criminal i.e. iseven mandate Commission’s the “complex”, out that he In question”. pointed addition, the of isout vendetta “a political since objective and public be will activity Commission’s the that inconference apress opinion public assured Voiculescu charges, Regarding these against Commission. the voted that parties the from politicalpartisanship accusations of only prompted President, the of a staunch critic named Voiculescu, Dan was president numberrepresentatives of had each aproportional sothat party mandates had been violated. and hadidentify statements grave consequences constitutionaland to those provisions which actions would thePresident’s prove that data necessary by the gathering proposal suspension inbody had it toclarify was charged areport with which foundwriting accusations the in the proposal suspension decide the on to elements necessary the Parliament 117 http://www.ziua.ro/pics/2007/03/21/1174650600.pdf (accessed May 20, 2009). the against proposal suspension the of result a 116 B Traian of President attitudes actsand public was “analyze commission documents,mandate to (Article thedata, 67).The Commission’s investigation ajointcreate to theymay decide Parliament, the to forwarded proposal in enough theif suspension isnot evidenceclear thatthere establish MPsconsider the that articles 67andSessions Jointthe 68of Rulesof Houseof Deputies which the and Senate, Realitatea TV, “DanVoiculescu: Comisia de anchetare a presedintelui va fiobiectiva” (“DanVoiculescu: The The Commission members were the following: following: the were members Commission The as Parliament Romanian ofthe Commission Investigation Joint of the Report “The Parliament, Romanian The The membership in the Commission was established according to their shareof to according established was intheCommission The membership ù erban Nicolae, Doru Ioan T Ioan Doru Nicolae, erban 48 ă sescu” so as to offer the two Chambers of two offer the as to so sescu” ăUă 118 cil Romanian President”, ă . , Eugen Nicolicea, Mihai Nicolicea, , Eugen 117 116 . The fact that its . Therefore, this CEU eTD Collection investigationcommittee”), 120 Commission asks forPresident Traian B commission is not expressly forbidden, while the seriousness of the situation actually imposes theestablishmentof such a Moreover, special form investigatory or entitled to commissions. in Articleasserting asthe Parliament, oneunder 95,is thatconducting the such its duties, suspend basedThe Article by decide these CCrejected 95. on thearguments President to shall Parliament Chambers of joint the that itstates since a commission such of creation other bodies of public administration. Also, the Constitution itself does not provide for the institutionsthe in setdown Article 111 of 2003 Constitution,the i.e. Government the and the procedure of parliamentarya parliamentary it In commission. addition,was argued thethat presidency is notsubjectcontrol to through a commission to inArticle of not is and 88 messageasitthe 2003Romanian Constitution” stipulated the of since this right was limited institution “only via her against constitutional the him/ to chargesbrought as the explanations to give to is entitled sowishes, ifhe/she President, the Therefore, office. of presidential the problemsnation”,initiation of suchas the against the holder the suspension of the procedure political main the regarding opinions her his/ Parliament the to transmits President “the which “themethod through isearlier (Decision that of 1994) ruled message”the ruling Court the 87/ 119 Parliament’sinstitutional the overB Traian dominance certify to majority of anti-presidential the sanction oreffort the “invalidate to whose aim was case the representatives to the 15-member Commission,it also contested its legality at the CC, butlost parliamentary parties and the PD, which in addition to the fact that it refused to name its Ioan Stanomir, “Parlamentul, pre “Parlamentul, Stanomir, Ioan Cristina Stefan, “Comisia Voiculescu cere suspendarea Pre suspendarea cere Voiculescu “Comisia Stefan, Cristina The case presented on 6 March on presented The case The Commission’s existence was a matter oflegal wasmatter The Commission’s between a andexistence political debate all the 119 . The merely wassummonedsettle alegal,Court to issue not butaheavilypolitical Revista 22 ú , March 9, 2007. edintele edintele ă sescu ’ssuspension”), ú th i comisia de anchet de comisia i by the PD members was based on the fact that an fact that basedthe on members was PD by the 49 Ziua ú ă edintelui Traian B Traian edintelui sescu” ă , March 21,2007. ”, (“The parliament, the president and the and president the parliament, (“The ”, 120 . ă sescu ” (“The Voiculescu (“The ” sescu CEU eTD Collection ministry (Article 13-1). a permanent ora special by either commission made a report on based are minister a against charges of criminal commencement the regarding debates 126 121 yearsjail in up tothree amount thatcould charges authority Commission’s the recognize not does it since testify to called being ministers its approve not itdoes and PDdeclared The that SRI SIE. service bodies, of secret heads andthe the ministers with government March,hearings wereorganized continued Throughout activity. their commission the of members the ruling, CC’s the until suspended be Commission Voiculescu by evidence be mustcorroborated heavily against the state head of brought the charges since its creation 125 May 18, 2009). Parliament Government”, and http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_2&par1=3#t3c4s0a111 (accessed interpellation. Source: Constitutionof Romania, Title III “Public Authorities”, ChapterIV “Relations betweenexpress theirposition by carrying out a simple motionon domestic orforeign policy oronthe subject of an bound to answerthe questions or interpellations raised by MPs and that eachof the Chambers of Parliamentinformation may and documents so requested. Article 112 states that the Government and eachof its members is activity, the latter is obliged to provide the two Chambers of Parliament or aparliamentary committee with any 124 Parliament. The full textof lawthe canbe found at http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/115_1999.php questionsanswerthe addressed MPs by and to providethe any information anddocuments so by requested the others for the acts and activity of the Government. Article 3 states that Government members are obliged to responsible only to the Parliament. Also, each member of Government is politically accountable together with 123 http://www.realitatea.net/noi-audieri-in-comisia-voiculescu_48607.html (accessed May 18, 2009). Voiculescu” (“New hearings infront of the Voiculescu Commission”), March14, 2007, Constructionand Tourism Minister, Gheorghe Dobre. Source: Realitatea TV, “Noi audieri încomisia Macovei,or refused such toattend, asEuropean IntegrationMinister, Anca Boagiu, former and Transport, 122 2007, http://www.legestart.ro/Decizie-nr-266-din-2007-(MjQ1NDA0).htm (accessed 2009). May 18, Articles 67,68and 70 contained inthe Joint Sessions Rules oftheHouse of Deputies and Senate brought about these charges these about brought Commission the case, specific In this interpreters. of their occasional arguments the favour since it constitutes an example ofhow legal andconstitutional provisions can be used to well 111-1andas Articles 112-2of Constitution the Responsibility Ministerial on Law the violated Boagiu Anca Minister that Parliament Anotherobjection to the Commission’s act is that the Law onMinisterial Responsibility stipulates that the The The Constitutional Court, ***, “Raportul Comisiei Voiculescu” (“The Voiculescu Commission’s Report”), 111,paragraph Article 1 stipulates that according to the ofparliamentaryright control Government’s overthe The Law 115/1999 onMinisterial Responsibility, Article 2 states that the Government is politically ThePD ministers either motivated their absence from the hearings, such as Justice Minister, Monica Despite the request forwarded by the PD representatives that the workings of the of workings the that PDrepresentatives bythe forwarded request the Despite 122 . Consequently, the Commission announced in the final Report that it. Consequently,will announcedinthefinalReportthat inform Commission the 121 . Decision no. 266/2007regarding the constitutionality of provisions the under 126 by misinterpreting Lawthe both on Responsibility Ministerial especially charged with investigating the activity of the Government or a 50 125 124 . This particular occurrence is important is occurrence . This particular and was therefore subject to criminal Ziua , March 21,2007. , March 21, 123 , as CEU eTD Collection accusations brought against B accusations brought The by Report’s 3.6.). conclusion suspensionthe supported the arguingproposal that (seesection years his mandate of two thefirst throughout President the of activity the against ruledlegality its on identifiedfinal of the activity. Report establishmentThe and 19charges a result of the suspension proposal against the Romanian President”, pp. 2-3. pp. President”, Romanian 129 the against proposal suspension of the a result 128 boagiu-acuza-de-calomnie-comisia-voiculescu_50339.html (accessed May 19, 2009). Boagiu accuses theVoiculescu(“Minister CommissionVoiculescu” of slander”), comisia March calomnie de 22, 2007, acuza http://www.realitatea.net/ministrul-Boagiu “Ministrul TV, Realitatea Source: charges. criminal of parliamentary procedure the controloutside and that it didinformation not havedemanding the in authority to principle establishof powers individual separation accountabilitythe violated under Commission the that declared Integration European of Ministry the sense, this In ministry. certain of a functioning tothe regards in 127 his status of head of which state obliges him objectivity,impartiality,to responsibility” clause “only insofar as they hisrefer during to areuttered duties, hismandate and they respect by immunity bethe protected can andpolitical opinions statements these that considered law” of rule andthe of democracy immediate results or state of potential danger, bring about grave by their prejudiceswhich, and to texts the functioning and principles constitutional clear violate which recommendations affirmations, interventions, oractions, acts concrete those grave as it“may consider that means which disposal”, Parliament’s the at lies infringement of interpretation correct “the that Deleanu, Commission,Ion the considered citing Therefore, office. holder presidential of the against the canbeimputed “graveiswhich by meant acts” defines what specialized literature in the final Report was its recognition the over control parliamentary to the refer these because relationship of Parliament-Government the on the provisions constitutional the and fact that neither the Constitution, nor the administration authorities administration Idem. as Parliament Romanian ofthe Commission Investigation Joint of the Report “The Parliament, Romanian The The argument was that the holderof any ministerial officeis accountable to the PM theand Parliament only On March On March 21 underlined aspect important an Commission, the of functioning actual Regarding the st , the Commission presented its findings on the same day that the CC 127 . ă sescu are “real, corroborated by to and amountcorroborated sescu are“real,evidence 128 . Inaddition, the Report pointed out that the Commission 51 activity of of Governmentthe and public 129 . CEU eTD Collection section 3.6.). section one regarding thePresident’s abusive appointment of C 134 Voiculescu” (“Voiculescu’s bluff”), also not forwarded to the two Chambers of Parliament. Source: Adriana Du 133 from from the PNL in upon wasvoted favour andfour abstentions votes final andthe it eight received Report request tothe High Court, but onlyforward to itsfinal report to the Parliament inexistreport did any is andnot authorized not case theCommission addresssucha that to press nextday, the sourcesfrom revealed internal citing Commission,the this additional that presidential buttofocusonly office, firstyears on the two of his tenure negotiator”), Ghi Marian Tarata, George see: aspect, particular this on information placing this enterprise on the privatisation list, thus undermining national economic interests. For more undervalued privatisation of Romania’s sole aluminium plant, ALRO Slatina. B Slatina. ALRO plant, aluminium sole of Romania’s privatisation undervalued an around revolved scandal The enterprises. of state-owned privatisation the for Bank World by the initiated its mandateauthorized sinceitoverstepped was not B toinvestigate necessarythe present evidence in report a supplementary criminal investigations by Highthe of Court Cassation andandit Justice would that stated both before followed mandate andduring initiate hispresidential proposition by to the thatB was grave accusation Another committee. investigation parliamentary of a special creation the which deserves withouta warrantSIE and argued aserious thisthat constitutes infringementof human rights by done tapings phone illegal the knew about President the that fact tothe pointed Report the %ă 132 3. President”, Romanian 131 the against proposal suspension of the result a 130 violations of utmost Constitution,the gravity” displaying the Vasile the Is and during Emil Constantinescu’s mandate (1996-2000), aswell as supporthis forprivate economic interests. During The reason behind these abstentions was their objection asto some of the Report’s conclusions, especially the The promised request fora criminal investigationagainst European IntegrationMinister, Anca Boagiu, was Itwas arguedthatthe hearings thedocumentsand sent by “various private and juridical bodies” indicated Ibid, 6. as Parliament Romanian ofthe Commission Investigation Joint of the Report “The Parliament, Romanian The sescu’s involvement in ascandal about theprivatisation of a majorstate-owned enterprise, whichoccurred Ziua 134 ă , May 18, 2007. rescu governments, B andUDMRrepresentatives. ă sescu intervened in favour of certain private business interests business private of certain in favour intervened sescu România Liber ă sescu Ministerwas the of Transport and head negotiatorin aprogram ă , March, 23, 2007. 52 ă lin Popescu-Tlin 130 ă Ġ . Moreover, the final remarks of eanu, “Negociatorul zero” (“The first (“The zero” “Negociatorul eanu, 131 riceanu, PNL’sriceanu, president, asPM (see . However, the Commission ă sescu was accused of abusively accused was sescu ă sescu’s beforehis sescu’s acts Ġ ulescu, “Cacealmaua lui 132 . Nevertheless, the Nevertheless, . 133 . The form of CEU eTD Collection informatii-despre-judecatori_56039.html (accessed May 23, 2009). askedinformation for judges”), the on April18, 2007, http://www.realitatea.net/geoana--presedintele-a-cerut-sri- 139 political onthepressures Court’s judges exert to attempt any rejected CC categorically the SRIand the President, the expected, been As decision on “vitiated” wouldhave examination procedure. of suspension Court’s the the he demanded the President’sinformation extracted from their formerand political police, i.e. Securitatethe dossiers. Consequently, secret service heads’ resignation in addition to the re- accused B Court’s decision”), procedure left it “without a constitutional basis” constitutional a “without it left procedure ruling on suspension the Court’s the act since amerely wasnow political vote parliamentary well behaviour” of a“certificate constitutes this and active” be politically to obligation the has “who president he CC’s In the that constitutional underlined favouraddition,inabuse”. of a ruling argued early presidential elections early presidential suspension proposal in passes Parliament,the he will fiveminutes resign so astoprompt after 138 so grave as to necessitate asuspension grave astonecessitate so mandate duringthrough becommitted cannottheirhisand consequences considered content B regardingPresident theagainst suspension proposal minutes’”), 137 elections. presidential early organize must Government vacant –due to resignation, removal from office, impossibility to discharge his powers andduties ordeath –, the 136 curtii-constitutionale-in-cazul-suspendarii-presedintelui-traian-B 135 of Parliament and to the CC on March 22 3.3. “The 322” Realitatea TV, “Geoan TV, Realitatea ***, “Reac ***, Adriana Dutulescu,Romulus Georgescu, Vaida,“VoiIulia în 5minute” (“‘Iwill demisiona resignin 5 Article 97, paragraph 2 of the Romanian Constitutionstates that three months after the presidential office fell Forthe full e-text of the ruling, see The Romanian Juridical Portal, http://www.e-juridic.ro/stiri/-decizia- The scandal continued the following day when Mircea Geoan when day following the continued The scandal The Voiculescu Report was forwarded to the Permanent Bureaus of the two Chambers România Liber ă sescu of using the SRI to blackmail some of the CC members with delicate Ġ ia pre ia BBC Romania 137 ú edintiei la decizia Cur decizia la edintiei . The presidency supported B . The presidency supported ă ă , April, 18, 2007. : Pre : 136 ú , April 5, 2007. edintele a cerut SRI informa cerut a edintele and “bring in front of the electorate those who generated the Ġ ii Constitu ii 139 135 nd . . On sameday,the B . On April . OnApril 17 Ġ 53 ionale” (“The presidency’s reaction to the Constitutional the to reaction presidency’s (“The ionale” 138 . ă sescu’s by statements the declaring that ă Ġ ii despre judec despre ii sescu -1135.html (accessed May 15, 2009). th , the Court issued a negative ruling ă sescu by stating that the acts sescu bystating that the ă ă sescu declared that if sescu that declared the tori” (“Geoan tori” ă , president of of PSD, the , president ă : The President The : CEU eTD Collection of people took streets tothe for TraianB Dan Voiculescu. Source: Realitatea TV, “Sute de oameni au ie au oameni de “Sute TV, Realitatea Source: Voiculescu. Dan PC president, and Geoana Mircea leader PSD of pictures the burned even protesters some In Cluj, procedure. 144 April 19, 2007. pre of those who chose me” Source: Realitatea TV, “Traian B “Traian TV, Realitatea Source: me” chose who those of Presidential Cotroceni Palaceto sincereturn and he did not violate referendum the the win Constitution, will he that but respected present people “the obligationthe to He assured protect people”. the interestsRomanian declared that “I love he you people”, “the as to well! I’m returning connection special to you. his Iwill stillUnderlining be your voting. by president,views their the president convey to and calm of the remain to 143 suspension procedure (Article 95, paragraph 1). 142 Parliament”),April 18, 2007. 141 office”), Source: Lucian Gheorghiu, Cristian Oprea, “B Oprea, Cristian Gheorghiu, Lucian Source: were the following: out of 440 MPs who were present, 322voted infavour, 108 against and 10 abstained. 140 %ă President for 30 days until the referendum. On the other side of the political battlefield, Traian have only aggravated the political crisis at a time when the national interest demands in major cities around Romania %ă MPs voted with a large majority in favour of the President’s suspension from office organization. to his supporters this decision, B organization of a nationalvote referendum in on Parliamentthe parliamentary toexplainparties the chargesbroughtagainst him sub-section (see 2.7.) President’s dismissal isof Iliescu’s Presidentreminiscent in position 1994 whenhewasinvited by the on May 19was my leaders of for notto the parties” some parliamentary opinions, political followedelected by bythe Romanian a Parliamentrequest […] I was elected by the forwardedRomanians. I answer to them to the Government for the Traian B In his speech at the University square, he reignited the use of a populist rhetoric whereby he urged the people the urged he whereby rhetoric populist a of use the reignited he square, University the at speech his In Constitutionally, the President is not obliged to be present at the parliamentary debates regarding the Realitatea TV, “B 235 votes were needed in order for the suspension procedure to pass in the Parliament. The results of the vote ú sescu declared that he reconsidered his decision to resign and declared that this act would this resign his act that and declared heto decision reconsidered that sescu declared sescu declined to attend these parliamentary attend by to sescu declined these “Idebates parliamentary thefollowing: wasnot declaring edintele românilor” (“Traian B (“Traian românilor” edintele The parliamentary place The April parliamentary 19 debates took on on suspension the proposal On April 20 Cotidianul ă sescu ’ssupporters gatheredBrasov, in and Cluj Iasi onApril 19 ă , April 19, 2007. 143 sescu immediately “turned tothe people” and went tothe city centre tospeak ă sescu : Nu am de ce s . On the same day, similar protests numbering hundreds of people occurred th , the President of Nicolae V Senate, of Presidentthe , the ă sescu : I will still be your president, the president of the Romanian people”), Romanian of the president the president, be your still will I : sescu ă sescu ”),April 19, 2007. 144 ă merg în parlament” (“B , the laterPD denyingin anyinvolvement their ă sescu , suspendat din func din suspendat , sescu 54 ă sescu : Voi fi în continuare pre continuare în fi Voi : sescu ú it în strad în it ă sescu : I have no reason to appear before ă pentru Traian B Traian pentru ăFă th Ġ ie” (“B ie” to protest against the suspension roiu, was named interim was named roiu, ă sescu , suspended from suspended , sescu 141 ă sescu ” (“Hundreds ” sescu . This statement This . ú edintele vostru, edintele th . Following . th and the 142 . The . 140 . CEU eTD Collection Geoana: The present form of the law-the referendum is a target impossible to reach”), to impossible atarget is referendum law-the of the form present The Geoana: 149 148 Impeachment in Lithuania”, President’s ofthe Case “The Norkus, Zenonas Source: oath. an demanding office an for run never not 147 with its former enemy, the PSD. legislative elections.2008 Surprisingly, November the in the PD-L seats acceptedmost win to acoalitionmanaged government which –under (PD-L), PMParty Emil Boc Liberal (PD-L) – Democratic the formed B with merged PLD the 2007, In December PNL. the within faction a in resulted Stolojan namely to change the rules of the game during the actual game. “match” political changeequalizeas in it chances wasaneedto so the the to there of and in favour dismissal, votes million i.e. reach”,nine to a“target impossible law generated existentthe declared,that MirceaGeoan problem was, as The office. holderthe presidential of the against specifically in Parliament laws the modifying openly by aim political their accomplishing April. of initiator was this The project PSDwhothe sought toincrease probability the of constitutional after having rejected another version of the same law twice, i.e. in February and The best solution is for me to attend the referendum”), April 20, 2007. 20, April 146 referendum”), the attend to me for is solution best The the Court’s ruling on May 3 3.4. Changing therules of the game during the game suspendedimpeached from or president running in subsequent elections a prevent to as so law electoral the modifying in example Lithuanian the follow will parliamentary “anti-presidential coalition” formed by the PSD, PNL, PRM, UDMR and PC 145 tosolveitcooperate than rather conflict institutional the intensify to preferred who actors political Romanian as This yetanotherindicating scandalwasseenby thelowsome commentators quality of deniedand Bogdan accusations. Chamberof of the Deputies, president the both the Olteanu, stability D. Galantonu, “Mircea Geoana: Infoma actual Cristian Pîrvulescu, “Pre Pîrvulescu, Cristian In May In Lithuanianthe 2004, CC ruled that impeached an president forbreaking constitutional the oath may The PLD was established in December 2006 after increasing tensions between T between tensions increasing after 2006 December in established was PLD The Realitatea TV, “Traian B “Traian TV, Realitatea There is one aspect of this political imbroglio that deserves closer attention, namely 145 . B ă sescu and the Liberal Democrats (PLD) Democrats Liberal the sescu and 149 . Thisindicates statement the mannerin which PSDintendedthe play, to 148 . ú East European Politics and Societies ă edintele interzis” (“President Forbidden”), (“President interzis” edintele sescu : Cea mai buna solutie este sa ma prezint la referendum” (“Traian B (“Traian referendum” la prezint sa ma este solutie buna mai Cea : sescu rd 2007 that the changesthe Referendum brought 2007that tothe Law are ă alegii-un referendum cu o 55 , Vol. 22, no. 4, (November2008): 796. 146 Revista 22 also argued that the so-called the that argued also Ġ int , April, 27, 2007. ă imposibil de atins” (“Mircea Hotnews 147 ă riceanu and Theodor and riceanu . Mircea Geoan . Mircea , April 24,2007., ă sescu’s PD and PD sescu’s ă himself ă sescu : sescu ă CEU eTD Collection symmetrical regarding the voting majority needed to validate these two instances of democratic popularprinciplewill. in this case refers to the fact thatboththe choice of the head of state and his/herdismissal must be 151 Law”), Referendum the modified Committee Judicial take not may referendum a that provision the was rules referendum the to brought change of a runoff,the candidate receiving the simplemajority of votes cast shall be elected. Another Constitution, which refers to the election of the President and stipulates thatin the eventuality this judicial actwasbased on the symmetry principle applied have been would provision isthatthis issue regardingthis be clearly understood needs to wouldbeturnout into not considerationtaken in deciding thevalidity of What referendum.the the was that implication the Therefore, at referendum. vote the the actually whocast those candidates – which thewas deputies Traian providedB 50% + 1 of the total number of votersthat present on the electoral lists. The change decided onby if the Presidentin order for the dismissal wasreferendum of headthe of state to be valid, theelected majority necessary is in the runoffDeputies in voted favour between the two January on 29 However, below. be will presented main provisionsfor re-examination Parliamentreferendumexistent tothe becauseoftwo that rules L. Parvu, B. Blagu, “Deputatii din Comisia juridic Comisia din “Deputatii Blagu, B. Parvu, L. Source: debates. the left PLDrepresentatives the while minorities, the and PD UDMR, the from abstentions five 150 unconstitutional elements. several of identification first Court’s the after MPs the by made been have rules referendum the on law new this to changes subsequent is that detail in such is analyzed ruling majority and B the between conflict political the of arbitration CC’s the allof as as well sides involved, In the arguments presented by the president of the Chamber of Deputies, the use of the judicial symmetry judicial the of use the of Deputies, Chamber of the president by the presented arguments the In The modifications of the Referendum Law received ten votes in favor from the PSD, PNL, PC and PRM and Initially, January on 12 both of arguments constitutional and legal the present will we lines, following the In only for the referendum on the President’s dismissal. The argument used to legitimate ă sescu’s supporters in sescu’s supporters The Parliament. reason for which the Court’s February 150 modifyingof Article 10of Referendumthe Law which that stated th , President B President , ă sescu’s situation –, he can be dismissed by 50% + 1 of ă au modificat Legea referendumului” (“The deputies from the from deputies (“The referendumului” Legea modificat au Hotnews 56 ă sescu returned the new law on changing the changing on law new the returned sescu th , January , January 29, 2007. , the Judicial Committee of the House of 151 , as well as Article 81-3 of the CEU eTD Collection democracy cannot be expressed direct simultaneously. and Source: Ibid, 3-5. representative since logic” democratic any and against “absurd as well as citizens, the for confusing 154 21 modification and completion of Law onthe organizationno. 3/2000 andholding ofthe referendum 153 European Parliament elections. 152 according to which a referendum is to be held and holding of referenda and that there is no prohibition as to its ability to decide on theorganization pass haslegislative organic laws to theright regulate thewhich 2003 version, the rules Articleaccording constitutional the Chambersresponded that,73-3of to two of Parliament laws administrative or for criminal except future the for be applied Consequently, Article violated this ofthe Constitution stipulating law 15-2 the that shall only vote”. by he chosen popular moment was the at inplace one than the other President the dismissing of new a method regulates since“it character hadprovision aretroactive discriminatedduring against dismissal the referendum.itaddition,was In argued thatthis blatantly being is runoff the in chosen candidate the whereby legitimacy” of types two and [...] of presidents types two creates it“basically wasthat thecriticism votes, of number issuethe of the Regarding 90). call areferendum (Article to upon right 1) andthePresident’s Constitution relating to the exercise of national sovereignty through a referendum (Article 2- inbe to participate called upon a referendum. not could citizens the inNovember, elections andparliamentary place inJune take were setto local elections inyearwhen 2008, the be Therefore, scheduled. to were elections when other 5) place at the same time or less than six months earlier than any other type of election (Article simultaneously with elections,decided Constitutionthe other Court the prohibit thatnot does being not referendum aboutthe organized theprovision were unconstitutional.Concerning Furthermore, they both asserted that by holding a referendum at the same time as other elections would be would elections other as time same the at a referendum by holding that asserted both they Furthermore, st The Constitutional Court, and local parliamentary, presidential, the to were referring was provision new this elections of types The 152 , 2007,2, http://www.ccr.ro/decisions/pdf/ro/2007/D147_07.pdf (accessed May 2009).23, . The consequence was that the President could not call for a referendum during a yearcall a forduring not could areferendum Presidentthe consequence. The wasthat The CC concluded on February February 21 on The CCconcluded The PD contested this new lawby itarguing that violates several articles in the Decision147/2007 No. regardingconstitutionality the the of Law on the st that the changes brought to the Referendum Law Referendum the to brought changes the that 154 57 . 153 . The presidents of the , February , CEU eTD Collection Parliamnet”), decision on February 21st and received 198 votes in favour, 46 against and two abstentions from a total number total a from adoptat referendumului „Legea abstentions ***, two Source: and MPs. 256 of against 46 favour, in votes 198 received and 21st February on decision 158 157 Publishing House, 2008),256. Limits of theConstitution. About governance, politics and citizenship in Romania) 156 cannotbean law” affectedstate organic through of headof the position “the complex since and legislative the President betweenthe powers importantly, theprinciples have affected change would balance of separation this andof referendum of the Law on themodification and completion of Law 3/2000no. on the organization and holding of the Court, Constitutional The organized”. is referendum the date on the dependent becomes elections other dateof the (since) deadlocks constitutional cause “can it because 155 90) (Article areferendum call for to right limits above-mentioned the that cannot by legislature the changes. Hence, for inthese the senseargued andholding its organization asymmetrical” does notapply in the case of public law, constitutional and the latter being “by essence version version of law the President at the referendum, but erased the mention of the runoffirrespectivepresident of mannerthe in he/shewhich was chosen or appointed. and added the of to dismissal the regarding Article treatment judicial same the applies it if only Law Referendum 12, the canmodify legislature thatthe decided Court the Nevertheless, asinterim. named whether way viapopularinthe accordingor to he/shewas he/shewaselected vote which mannerin a presidenta different apply against sanction same cannot the one argument that the prompted runoff in the chosen one and ballot first in the chosen apresident between level.be orplaced on equated samejudicial vein,cannot In the same discrimination the the The changes to the new law on the referendum were made in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s Constitutional the with accordance in made were referendum the on law new the to changes The Ibid 155, 7. Ioan Stanomir, Ioan Radu Carp, Also, another motivation for rejecting the law was that this specific provision would forbid any referendum any forbid would provision specific this that was law the rejecting for motivation another Also, add to the constitutional text and impose through ordinary lawinterpretation constitutional impose addtothe such andordinary through an text Another crucial aspect outby pointed is the Court the judicial that symmetry principle In accordance with the Court’s decision, on March 21 , February 21 BBC Romania 157 . This means that the electoral choice and the dismissal of the President 158 st which kept the provision regarding the majority needed to dismiss the , 2007, 6. , March 21, 2007. LimiteleConstitu Ġ iei. Despre guvernare, politic 58 ă 156 Decision No.147/2007 regarding the constitutionality în Parlament” („The Referendum Law was adopted in adopted was Law Referendum („The înParlament” . st , the MPs voted for a new a for MPsvoted , the ú ă i cet , (Bucharest: C.H. Beck C.H. , (Bucharest: ăĠ enie în Româniaenie în (The 155 . More CEU eTD Collection Constitution. provisionsthe concerning the referendum’s timetable the and prohibition tohold a referendumchanging on the reconsideronly to have those MPs the provisions i.e. identified once, only by the President as problematic.re-examination for ThePresident toParliament law a had drawnreturn can attention President to the that states which Presidentby the whencalling upon a re-examination January,in violating Article thus 77-2of Constitution the 160 4 on themodification and completion of Law no. 3/2000 on the organization andholding of the referendum 159 unconstitutionality similar themodifications newlawand broughttothe of grounds on rejected 4 appealedwhich, April Democrats Court, tothe on again The Liberal three. months to of number the bylowering election of type other any than earlier version new changedthe Also, issue. an such constitute not does theConstitution the changing on prohibitionreferendum to hold referendafor a interest that calling and national of issuesbe considered can listed that which what at the same time or less than six months legislative the by limited be cannot important as considers he/she issues whichever on referendum a call upon to right thePresident’s that fact also the but timetable, referendum’s the regarding effects since these changes of procedure “do not affect previous judicial circumstances, but previouscircumstances, judicial affectnot “do procedure changesof since effects these itdiscriminatory.Also,longargued that law astheyarenot produce notthe retroactive does constitutional. The Court pointed out that the legislature has the rightmake to such changes as four-month long PD’s line of problematicreasoning of aboutthe nature thisappeals new law.The conclusion of these to the CC the with concurred opinion Government’s is the that aspect law. Theinteresting new of this occurredversion re-re-modified the from on removed been had May Constitution the changing on referendum 3 a calling regardingreferendum.of the prohibition timetablethe and provisions The Article 10whereby majoritythe neededdismiss to a suspended presidentin national the addedto of nature provision retroactive the and unconstitutional same asbefore:the grounds th In addition, the CC pointed out that the MPs also added and changed otherprovisions than the ones 2007, canbe foundidentified at http://www.ccr.ro/decisions/pdf/ro/2007/D355_07.pdf (accessed May 22, 2009). The full text of the Constitutional Court’s On March 26 160 . 159 th . The reasons were the same as those present in its February decision in its February present those as same the were reasons . The , the PD representatives again brought their objections to the CC on the on CC the to objections their brought again representatives PD the , Decision No.355/2007 regarding theconstitutionalityLaw ofthe 59 rd th , when the newlawwasdeemed , whenthe , accepted all the objections raised objections all the , accepted , April CEU eTD Collection Cotroceni on Thursday”), on Cotroceni April 26,2007; ***, “Traian B for the forthe President’s dismissal onMay 19”), MarinelaApril 25, 2007; Daju,„Referendum pentru demiterea pre and the referendum, see: Andreea Nicolae, “Suspendat la nesfâr la “Suspendat Nicolae, Andreea see: referendum, the and 164 (accessed May 22, 2009). dismissal ofthe Romanian President 163 România Liber date of the move madepolitical parties acontroversial subject “Decision 21/2007on inissuing the and nationalThe latter UDMR. PNL,PRM,PCand by the on voted and PSD’sinitiativeat the Parliament referendum 24 April on scandalstarted heated The most onin Parliament. majority” the“anti-presidential the of part the on play fair of lack of accusations dismissal of the3.5. Thereferendum Romanian President” representatives left the debate. Source: Andreea Nicolae, “Suspendat la nesfâr “Suspendat Nicolae, Andreea Source: debate. the left representatives 162 2007, at http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/420_2007.php (accessed May 2009).22, 161 procedure” will decideon “necessary the Parliament the then vote, to eligible those of 50%+1 reach not does turnout if the i.e. valid, legally not is referendum the that decides Court Constitutional if the that 3 in Article stipulated B Traian dismiss neededlower to themajority to main aim: PSD’s the with in modifiedaccordance validated” law is the after will only occur which those consequences invalid of an dismissal Another divisivereferendum. issue decisionwas the to of the constitutionalwhat is the actual procedure to be followed, this legal act was clearly political since Article 95 textparliamentary decision cannot be contested at the CC. doesbe repeated isto if will referendum decide the Parliament the not provide the legislative with the right to settle the modification and completion of Law no. 3/2000 on the organization and holding of the referendum For more information on the declarations regarding this issue both during and after the parliamentary debate parliamentary the after and during both issue this regarding declarations onthe information more For Parliament, Romanian The Decision 21/2007 received 238 votes in favour, one against and four abstentions because the PD and PLD and PD the because abstentions four and against one favour, in votes 238 received 21/2007 Decision The Constitutional Court, The campaign for the referendum on the President’s dismissal was also marred by marred was also dismissal President’s the thereferendum on for The campaign Apart from thefact that it does not mention what exactly can Parliament decide and ă sescu. ă , April, 25, 2007. BBC Romania Decision 21/2007on thesubject anddate ofthenational referendum on the ă Decision no. 420/2007 regarding the constitutionality of the Law on the sescuputea întorce s-ar joi Cotroceni” la (“Traian B , April 24, 2007,http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/21_2007.php , May 21, 2007. Polemika: Sapt 60 th ă , the cause being the decisions takenin cause decisions the , the being mânal de Analiz 163 ú it” (“Perpetually suspended”), (“Perpetually it” . The idea given to the press was that 161 ú edinteluidatade in 19mai”(„Referendum . Hence, the Referendum Lawwas Referendum the . Hence, ă 164 Politic ú . It must be noted that a that noted be must It . it” (“Perpetually suspended”), (“Perpetually it” ăú ă i Actualitate cultural sescu might return to România Liber 162 , May 3 which rd ă ă , , , CEU eTD Collection that if the dismissal proposal against the head of state is rejected through the referendum, then Articleinstitutional by Constitution stipulates conflict referring to 60-6of Austrian the which President-Parliament of type this particular to itsolution offered a that The motive was PD. Iorgovan’s loss latter’s the supportlegitimacy.of In to thisorder from line reasoning, a quote of Antonie indicated initiative legislature’s the of disapproval citizens’ the that were in favour presented rejected was reignited after Traian B wasreignitedTraian rejected after been had proposal dismissal its that show results referendum the if be dissolved should mandate. an fearend the Parliament to would that suspensionthe prolong and V favour supported Iliescu during the 1994 suspensionprocedure. 1992 to was judge1996 he the Constitutional a in Court, whichattracted the accusationthat heunlawfully of the form final the regarding fundamental law.criticisms He was also part of numerous the commissionhim dealing brought with theoffice 2003 This revision of the Constitution.Constitution. From Romanian new Constitution” because from 1990to was 1991 he coordinator the of commissionthe chargedwriting with the 167 at http://www.becreferendum2007.ro/document3/rez%20finale.pdf (accessed 2009). May 23, 166 25, 2007. against voted whoparticipated of B Traian those în campania pentru referendum” (“B referendum” pentru campania în television than his opponents, thus forcing him to use his own party’s allotted time to the number of mandates each party had in Parliament. Source: L. Parvu, “B Parvu, L. Source: Parliament. in had party each of mandates number the to airtime as wellon private radio and television. The airtime for the referendum campaign was allotted according that they were “overstepping their parliamentary mandate” when discussing the possibility of limiting B 165 will deal exclusively with him, Traian B because thereferendum This that settled party commission campaign. referendum during the political each for airtime the monitoring with charged commission parliamentary a create Antonie Iorgovan (1948-2007) was ajurist, law professor and politician. He was surnamed“the Fatherof the (BEC), Commission Electoral Romanian the of site on the be found can referendum of the results official The During the debates, the President of the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Company (SRR) cautioned the MPs the cautioned (SRR) Company Broadcasting Radio Romanian of the President the debates, the During 166 The public debate whichin The public question February on the had started debate Parliament whether The referendum took place onMay19 The took referendum . On May 23 167 “Treaty on Administrative Law” (2006) was brought to the public’s eye by public’sthe eye “Treaty to the Administrative Law”(2006)wasbrought on rd , the Constitutional, the validated Court referendumthe puttingresults, thus ă sescu , left without airtime in the referendum campaign”), referendum inthe airtime without left , sescu ă ă sescu was reinstated as president. The arguments The aspresident. reinstated sescu was sescu was to have less airtime on national radio and 61 th with a 44, 45% turnout, out of which 74, 48% out of 45% turnout, a44, with ă sescu’s dismissal, while 24, 75% voted in voted sescu’swhile dismissal,24, 75% ă sescu , lasat f lasat , sescu ăFă roiu’s temporary roiu’s ăUă timpi de anten de timpi Hotnews 165 . ă sescu ’s , April ă CEU eTD Collection that the President did not dispose of vetoa right in appointing government ministers, but that he/she may ask the experience foreignin affairs. Consequently, the CC was asked to solve this constitutional conflict and decided memberAdrian Cioroianu. President The refused toaccept his nominationby arguing that hedid possess enough 172 at http://www.presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date&id=9554&_PRID=search (accessed May 2009).24, any nomination if he considers that person professionally and morally unfit to serve in the Governmnet. Source: Governmnet. the in serve to unfit Public Communicationmorally and Department, professionally person that considers he if nomination refuse any will he that underlined he Also, prosecutor. a as career her in mistakes legal made had she that evidence 171 2007. 6, February be chosen”), must Parlaiment a new then referendum, the wins President the („If Parlament” nou Hotnews Parlamentul?” (“If the referendum does not dismiss the President, should the Parliament be dissolved?”), case Cioroianu Surprisingly, CC’s the February decision was opposite tothat given in the 2007 regarding accept appointment this refused to T resignation, Chiuariu’sinAfter February Tudor appointment the over of Minister 2008. Justice 2008 parliamentary is Astrikingelections. intra-executivethe example constitutional crisis Consequently, of President-Government-Parliament war continued tug the until Novemberthe be accepted. itself cannot text constitutional the outside interpretation since any Parliament since they 1991Constitutionreferred tothe zero” “equal to were hereached conclusions the andthat hypothesis” was only a“theoretical 170 referendum does not dismiss the President, should the Parliament be dissolved?”), in support” of withdrawal the to namely Parliament, a ‘vote forvote by of President’s to the against dismissal isequal censure’ to people the the Romanian Constitution,enshrines which sovereign the will of people,the “a possiblerefusal 169 Austria, http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/ATMaterials, (accessed May 24, 2009).Electoral Network, Knowledge Ace Electoral of Austria, Constitution Source: Representatives”. Rejection office. by his of the referendumexercise further of the the deposition from prevented is works as President a new Federal electionthe and vote, entails the dissolution Representatives of House of the Housea By of such […] so demands. Assembly Federal the if be held shall referendum The referendum. by deposed Article 60, paragraph6 statesthe following: “Before ofexpiry term of officehis Federal the President canbe 168 dissolved isautomatically legislative the In March 2007, after Traian Ungureanu resigned as Foreign Affairs Minister, the PM nominated PNL nominated PM the Minister, Affairs Foreign as resigned Ungureanu Traian after 2007, March In The President argued that there was a negative public perception regarding her activity as senator and senator as activity her regarding perception public a negative was there that argued President The For more information, see: George Florea, “Dac Florea, George see: information, more For George Florea, “Daca referendumul nu-l demite pe pre pe demite nu-l referendumul “Daca Florea, George Constitutionof Austria, ChapterIII Federal Execution, Part A Administration, Title 1 The Federal President, , February 8, 2007; Realitatea TV, „Boc: Dac „Boc: TV, Realitatea 2007; 8, February , All in all, provide Romanian the not Constitution fordoes dissolution the of ă 172 riceanu proposed PNL vice-president Norica Nicolai. President B President Nicolai. Norica PNLvice-president proposed riceanu by ruling that the President has the right to refuse a nomination refuse only to once a by Presidenthastherightthe that ruling Romanian President, Traian B 171 , prompting T 168 170 . It was argued that according to Article 2 of the ă referendumul nu-l demite pe pre pe demite nu-l referendumul ă . 62 referendumul este câ este referendumul ă 169 riceanu to appeal CCfor toappeal the riceanu arbitration.to ú , but Iorgovan pointed out that this idea this that out pointed Iorgovan but , edinte, trebuie dizolvat Parlamentul?” (“If the (“If Parlamentul?” dizolvat trebuie edinte, ă sescu ’s press statement, ú tigat de pre de tigat Hotnews ú edinte, trebuie dizolvat trebuie edinte, ú edinte, trebuie ales un ales trebuie edinte, , February , February 8, 2007. January 11, 2008, ă sescu CEU eTD Collection (accessed May 22, 2009). Romanian president, TraianB would theirlead accompanied to that necessary by evidence were not the Presidentagainst the 174 173 citizenship inRomania) would have similar results” have similar would whichcanor acts similar other modification or its would seek or order constitutional the liberties, restrictcitizens’the would and or public disturb rights authorities, would suppress mandatory decision whichthrough Romanianthe Presidentwould hinder functioning the of make a to refusal the or “decisions are those acts thatgrave itstated Therefore, comprise. may whatthese of indication provide any not does Constitution the since Article 95 of acts” inclarification madeby its Court the rulingthe regarded definition “grave of notion the of institutional design. institutions in toseeiforder conflictsthe thatarosewerefavoured by semi-presidential the state with tothePresident’s other the focuscharges on relationship lines,the related weshall following the In President. as role his and system judicial the Government, the Parliament, the category of acts and statements thatB statements ofactsand category into each six chapters, in thewerelistedanda suspension arranged proposal denoting guvernare, politic February on and12 deputies senators 3.6. Charges brought against the President thus obligingthus Presidentthe to comply.Stanomir, Source: Radu Ioan Carp, nominations, the on decides Parliament’s structure, Government the in change ample is there if that provides dismissal and appointment. The Court clarified that this is different from paragraph 3of samethe article which government reshuffle orvacancy of office, the PM nominates new ministers to the Presidentwho has the office.rightof PM foranother nomination if, basedThe onsolid grounds, the President shows that person islegally sourceunfit forthe of this conflict was Article 85-2 of the Constitution, which states that in the case of a Minister Justice providingafter solidmotives, thus obliging PMtoseek the another person for theoffice of The Constitutional Court, Ibid, 287. Before proceeding to this presentation, it must be noted that a very important a very that be noted must it presentation, this to proceeding Before This section will present the accusations brought against the President by Presidentthe against 182 the brought accusations presentthe will This section ú ă 173 i cet . , (Bucharest: C.H.Beck Publishing House,2008), 285-286. ăĠ enie în România (The Limitsof the Constitution. About governance, politics and Opinion5 no.1,April ă 174 sescu . The Court also pointed out that somealso out that . The Court chargesbrought of pointed the , p.2, http://www.ccr.ro/deciziitotal/pdf/2007/ro/avizconsultativ.pdf th ă , as well as the CC’s April 5 sescu had made in his constitutional relationship with relationship inhis constitutional made had sescu th , 2007, proposal on the for thesuspension from office ofthe 63 th Limitele Constitu ruling. The indictments The ruling. Ġ iei. Despre CEU eTD Collection Romanian president, Traian B 175 theirdecideParliament to on gravity examinedCourt leaving “hypothetically”, indictments Chambers the it the two up to in the Consequently, these that arepublicly known. suggests proposal becausethe conformation declarations towards any political party any declarations towards graveviolations of party cannot beconsideredthe as political opinions and attitude, the President’s that suspension case, ithad in1994 underlined, done as without any B objections.political About T the to of confidence vote the gave parties parliamentary the elections, 2004 the after rightly that Court observed the appointment, Regarding PM’s the of state. about urgent, extremely important matters” (Article 86) which are deemed as such by the head Government the with consult “may he/she but parties, parliamentary the or Government the within the Parliament and on the political scene, especially between the PM and the President. partiesdeadlocksother with thathave andmakingaccusations disdain to andconflicts lead neutrality clause in openly controlling supporting andpolitically the PD,while treating all constitutional 2)hethe will; violated disregardingi.e. electorate’s the majority, PSD,thus the %ă precisely,beginning reproachesthe More interest against chapter this the corrupt of groups. at it by of was accused by being Parliament’s accusing authority the of undermining controlled he Also, body. representative supreme as Parliament the of role the ignoring in and legislative between pluralism andthe relationsthe and the governing rules principle, presidency the 3.6.1. The President-Parliament relationship &ă he appointed when elections 2004general the asafter mediation, aswell for wasaneed there The Constitutional Court, sescu were that 1) he didnot consult the parliamentary political parties momentsat when lin Popescu-T The Court pointed out that the Constitution does not oblige the President tomeet with In the first chapter, the President is accused of breaking the rule of law, the political ă riceanu as PM without consulting the party consultingholding party riceanu parliamentary the the asPMwithout Opinion5 no.1,April ă sescu , p. 2. 175 . th ă , 2007, proposal on the for thesuspension from office ofthe sescu’s relationship with bodies, CC other the 64 ă riceanu Government CEU eTD Collection majority thatin Chamber. Following this ruling, the Court was accusedof favouring the PSD since the majority dismissed atthe request of parliamentarytheir group and be replaced witha member of the party which hasthe rejected themodificationon grounds of unconstitutionality and underlined that the Presidents canonly be dismissedThe alsonew UDMRAlliance, PCand signed viaprovisions D.A. the a political collaborationcomprising majority protocol parliamentary andmanaged new the to that themodify fact the to the Parliament’s referred Regulations. President the against made vote of stipulatedbackground50%+1 for thisMPs decisionthe PD andin was the T PNLeachthat after winning Chamber. the179 the 2004 electionsPresidentspolitical objectivity. Source:with Idem. theThe aim of gainingfall cannot underPSDthese the that immunity Report clause solebecauseCommission’s they Voiculescu referthe in to othercontestedand parliamentary entities Proposal the orin persons withoutof presented respecting arguments the the obligationrefuting of the majority. Senate The this178 actand constitutional judicial conflict betweenat the judiciary andthe Romanian Presidentand PM of the the Court, CC Constitutional Chamberwhich incharge of establishing body the that the and President’s abuses” or legalof pressures responsibility outside any from is the Romanian independence Supreme holder’s the DeputiesCourt.ensures which Source: Themandate the of could177 be entail objectivity since spirit the absolute “thiswould beagainst of Constitution”the Romanian president, Traian B %ă mandate immunity legal President the gives 84-2 Article same the ministers, former and acting as well as Iliescu, Ion made by Presidentagainstthe several figures, such publicas former PM,MPs,the president in the political program inin theenactmentof tocarrypolicies the present Parliamentout the majority order support of his/her party oridea behindcoalition. this interpretation of the constitutional text isIn that the Presidentaddition, is entitled to seek regarding the accusations 176 Chambers two of the presidents the dismiss to as so Regulations Parliament’s the change to majority parliamentary bemay a not he/she and that immunity mayclause Presidenthold thatthe notprescribes public anyother officeprivate or parliamentary his/her incompatibility and anyother with politicalThe party party. or with ties political all off cut to state of head the oblige not does latter the since Constitution This particular issue deserves some clarification because it indicates the political maneuvering attempted by attempted maneuvering political the indicates it because clarification some deserves issue particular This thus character, political a having as CC bythe considered were statements and opinions President’s The The Court stated inanearlier ruling that immunity is a“constitutional guarantee, alegal protective measure The Constitutional Court, sescu was accused of violating the legislature’s autonomy by asking the post-2004 byasking autonomy legislature’s violating the of sescu wasaccused Another type of charge referred to is the President’s relationship with Parliament. 178 . 177 as to the politicaljudgements and opinions, declarationshis madeduring Decision no.435/ 2006 on therequest forwardedthe C.S.M. by President tosolve the 179 , namely PSD members NicolaeV members , namelyPSD Opinion5 no.1,April ă sescu ă member riceanu’s refusal in 2005 to hand in his resignation as PM. The indictment , p. 3. of any political party of but party any (Articlepolitical not 84-1), this does th , 2007, proposal on the for thesuspension from office ofthe 65 ăFă roiu and Adrian N Adrian and roiu . ă stase. It was It stase. 176 . The . CEU eTD Collection Romanian president, Traian B 182 demisionat”, ca au parlamentarilor explicat le-au Fulga Fulga” (“Timofte and Fulga’s re-enthronement”), Fulga’s and (“Timofte Fulga” 180 based on the President’s proposal. For more information, see: Adriana Du Adriana see: information, more For proposal. President’s the on based resignation their on decides Parliament the only whereby h) 2, para. 65, Article violated President the arguing by directors services intelligence as Fulga and Timofte but reinstated acknowledged, Parliament The decision. forwarded their resignations to the President, who took legal notice and theninformed the Parliament about theirFulga (SIE),occurred suspected after OmarHayssam terrorist fled country the 2006. The twoin directors 181 %ă arbitrator or player?”), or arbitrator November22, 2005; Armand Go Lucescu, “Pre Lucescu, occurrence was highlighted as an abuse because there was no government crisis, i.e. no crisis, wasnogovernment there asanbecause abuse washighlighted occurrence “Eterni pecadavrul Constitu of the judges had been PDSR/PSD members or named by Iliescu. For more information, see: Laura Ciobanu, Government” both adversityits Parliament’sthe which affected activity relationship with […] and the and tension, distrust of “atmosphere general a and in deadlock resulted this act argued that that, as President, B asPresident, that, itif benecessary deems he/she changed directors that the request is to in entitled of matters defence, his powers with in constitutional President, accordance and the by theParliament that were acknowledgedagain resignations these Court argued that propose directors other by acceptinghis lawsinto to onnational security refusing resign. he65-2, h)bypressuring blackmailing wasaccused Also, them Parliament the to of appoints –based on heads President’sproposal the of intelligencethe – the services (Article Parliament the only that provision constitutional the and principle powers of separation decision. because majority’s legislative itthe President was ultimately the pointedbeimputedcannot Parliament’sthe functioning.out this that against The Court act had on has call thePresident’s consequence material the of example usedasan decision was reforms inviewmembership. of EU In suspensionthe proposal judicial this particular The Constitutional Court, The Romanian Parliament, Romanian The The scandal that prompted the resignation of the secret services directors, Radu Timofte (SRI) and Gheorghe and (SRI) Timofte Radu directors, services secret ofthe resignation the prompted that scandal The sescu , 6-7. The indictment of trying to force early legislative elections also referred to the fact the to alsoreferred elections legislative force early of to trying The indictment broke the headstate of the that charge the to in relation made was A similar argument ú edin 180 at a crucial time when parliamentary stability was needed in order to pass Ġ ii neatinsi, premierul bun de plat de bun premierul neatinsi, ii Revista 22 ă sescu publicly pressured PM T pressured sescu publicly Ġ iei” (“Eternal on theConstitution’s corpse”), Opinion5 no.1,April ă sescu Proposal forthesuspension from officeofthe RomanianPresident , November, 23, 2005. ú u, “CurteaConstitu , 4. România Liber th , 2007, proposal on the for thesuspension from office ofthe ă ” (“Presidents untouched, the PM must pay”), must PM the untouched, (“Presidents ” Ġ 66 Ziarul Financiar ional ă : arbitru sau juc ă riceanu to hand in his resignation. This handinhis resignation. riceanu to ă , July 28, 2006; Doina Anghel, “Timofte , August 2, 2006. Cotidianul Ġ ulescu, “Reînscaunarea lui Timofte Timofte lui “Reînscaunarea ulescu, 182 ă tor?” (“The Constitutional Court: . , November 22, 2005; Pavel 2005; 22, November , Cotidianul 181 , Traian . The . ú ú i i , CEU eTD Collection 186 duree-premier-ministre.htm (accessed May 26, 2009). Prime-Minister’s durationoffice?”), in a is ?”(“What politique en ministre Premier d’un vie de duree la est “Quelle ***, Source: Republic. Fifth French her widespread unpopularity.185 She was the first woman PM, but also the first with the shortest mandate in the Whittaker, of increasing numberof clashes withValery Giscard d’Estaing. Source: John Bell, Sophie Boyron, Simon ChabanDelmas, which ended inthe latter’s resignation in1973. Also,in 1976, Jacques Chirac resigned because 184 %ă 183 resigned” systematically Therefore, relationship president-PM of the deterioration “when the PresidentreasonsThe resign. to government of head the ask may president the that been has practice of political rangethe informal an Republic France, in Nevertheless, 8). (Article will own his/her at fromGovernment” the of decided aiming resignation the “tender must latter the since appointment PM’s the to terminate President the to part at withhavingresignation. The same canbe said aboutthe 1958 French allowConstitution, whichdoesnot the PM, thetheprohibit formerthe from asking the head of publicly government, privately,handor to in a lattersupportArticle 107-2that the Presidentmay dismiss not PMthroughthe a legal butitdoes not act, of in states a clearly Constitution Romanian The resign. to PM the on made parliamentarybeen had pressures resignationmajority (Article 89). PM’s initial the following President the by made proposals government other two rejects toit if dissolved be only can the Parliament Romanian the since times consecutive two confidence for very B difficulthave been would reforms above-mentioned for required the stability was government legitimate reason that would impose the PM’s resignation especially at a time when Ibid 184, 144-145. of because a year than less in resigned latter the but 1991, in Cresson Edith PM as named Mitterand Francois Differing political outlooks prompted a conflict betweenPresident Georges Pompidou and PM Jacques Parliament, Romanian The sescu , 7-8. Surprisingly, the Court did not comment on didSurprisingly,commenton theCourt the notthat unconstitutional accusation Principles of French Law 186 . Statistics show that in the French system the medium duration of duration medium the system French in the that show Statistics . Proposal forthesuspension from officeofthe RomanianPresident , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 145. Politique.net ă sescu to convince the legislature not to give a vote of vote give a to convince not legislature the sescu to , August, 14,2007, http://www.politique.net/2007081401- 67 184 and eventhe PM’s loss popularity of 183 . As a side note, it , Traian 185 . CEU eTD Collection 190 “pre-emptiveunwise strike”. Source: an Ibid,as 85. Assembly National the dissolved Chirac Therefore, electorate. the among unpopular increasingly 189 Press, 2006), 84. Constitutional Law in WeimarGermany andthe French Fifth Republic the National Assembly”. Source: Francois Mitterand cited inCindy Skach, Conforming withArticle Constitution 12of […] I the decree justsignedhave the pronouncing thedissolutionof consequences. the with deal to therefore, obligation, the I have […] well business his o conduct order he does not deem it possible efforts, ofhis to spite reunite in the and kind of solidassistance, and stableof necessary lack majority the to due which everythat, know me let government has Rocard] needs [Michel in Minister 188 premier-ministre.htm (accessed 2009). May 26, such a intradition the parliamentdissolving of with accordance a politicalopportunity Minister’s duration in office?”), Chirac.under Source: “QuellePremierministre enpolitique ***, est devieduree d’un la ?” (“Whatis aPrime- (1962-1968) under deGaulle, Raymond (1976-1981) Barre underd’Estaing and Lionel Jospin(1997-2002) 187 tensions with President Lech Kaczynski who named his twin brother as the new PM increasing tothe was attributed that a move inJuly 2006, resignation Marcinkiewicz’s Kazimir PM be Polish would space post-communist the from example recent cohabitation Chirac of longest between Lionel period Fifth Jospin the Republic and was the resultthe but elections, 1998 the after domination parliamentary secure his party’s to more fivepower than years in stay managed PM three only that and half a and years is two mandate a prime-ministerial legislative support Francois Mitterand dissolvedtheNational Assembly precisely toprovide his with government ensure support the to of in Suchwas executive’sthe policies. case the 1988when 1981 and majority legislative solid a of coagulation the attempt is to an act such of goal The elections. with the PMand the Presidents of the Houses of Parliament (Article 12) soas promptto early “consulting” may National after Assembly the majority, President the dissolve parliamentary inducewanting“governmental to ifa InFrance,crisis”. oropposing a facedwith poor of was accused President the casewhere with Romanian the becontrasted can itbecause ***,Poland’s prime-minister resigns”, were 1990s of the end the at Government Juppe Alain the by implemented policies economic and social The televised Ina appearance 1988,in Mitterand explained act by his stating thefollowing: “[…]But Prime the The three PM who managed to stay in office more than five years are the following: Georges Pompidou In the former communist countries that adopted In communistFrench countriesthe adopted model former the that semi-presidential The first reason for which the President may as the PM’s resignation isimportant may PM’sresignation asthe for whichthePresident reason The first 188 . Such a political move was also used by Jacques Chirac in 1997 in order 187 Politique.net . BBC News , August, 14, 2007, http://www.politique.net/2007081401-duree- , July 7, 2006. 68 , (New Jersey: PrincetonUniversity Borrowing ConstitutionalDesigns: 190 . 189 . A CEU eTD Collection Publishing House, 2008), 254. Limits of theConstitution. About governance, politics and citizenship in Romania) 193 Romanian president, Traian B 192 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997), 146-148. 191 propose to a choose may new President the then nomination, new PMno makes orlegislature if the but toconfidence, dissolve the Sejm on factthe the that 1992 “SmallConstitution” provided for aconstructive of no vote (Article 66) Walesa’s based proposing move Suchockaagainst the PM. Governmentwithout another was motion censure a passed narrowly (Sejm) Parliament Polish post-communist first the that constitutional of dissolvingright in the legislature 1993.The reason behind his decision was his used Lech Walesa President thePolish However, root. a solid taken not has calculus legislature. Therefore, the Romanian legislature has the upper hand against the hand against hasthe upper legislature theRomanian Therefore, legislature. its and legal final the character aredecidedupon consultative by on effects decision the noted legal not acts opinions, andpolitical proposals were referendum. These declared thatto forcethe Parliament a referendum he tried andnational security that and in alaw services intelligence initiative promoting on the did onnot transforming debate 2.5.2). on such the a lawParliament This was situationthe ledwhich tothe1999 constitutional incrisis Romania (see section or on the organizationinthe a PM’sunicameral resignation,prevent undemocratic but temptations. Theof Constitution does notproscribe only the President’sbody. a call for a forced ThedismissalConstitution was thatCourt no state institutionwithout is to receive too much power theover the others latter’s so as to willingness to resign. Ioan Stanomir, Ioan Radu Carp, The Constitutional Court, Krzysztof Jasiewicz, “Poland: Walesa’s legacy to the presidency”, 193 Another charge indicated that the President appropriated the right of legislative of right the appropriated President the that indicated charge Another that according to the Constitution, any referendum called by the President has only a only has President the by called referendum any Constitution, the to according that Opinion5 no.1,April ă sescu LimiteleConstitu , 4. Ġ iei. Despre guvernare, politic th , 2007, proposal on the for thesuspension from office ofthe 69 191 Postcommunist Presidents . The idea behind Romanianthe ú ă i cet 192 , (Bucharest: C.H. Beck C.H. , (Bucharest: ăĠ enie în Româniaenie în (The . Also, it has been , ed. Ray Taras, President in President CEU eTD Collection (“The key to the kidnapping lies withHayssam”), %ă 196 OmarHayssam posses as a victim”), Ca blundersthe made by Cotrocenithe crisis cell regarding thefate of kidnapped journaliststhe Iraq”),in that the president’s interventions presented in the suspension proposal cannot be interpreted as interpreted be cannot proposal suspension in the presented interventions president’s the that seam involvement inthe kidnapping and of terrorist activities. Formore information, see: Cornel Ivanciuc, “Dare de terroristwith groups throughOmarHayssam –aparty financialand member supporter – who was connections accused of had PSD the that press the in speculations the increase to as so basis a onregular mass-media the 135-1 and before (Article 2)and the equality rights law 16-1) the of free economy (Article competition on andfair based of principles market a free enterprise Transportation adoptlegalto in acts favour of businessprivate interests, thusinfringing the about thecase. Some received commentators information the have accusedprocessing B with charged were who services intelligence Romanian all from analysts B Iraq. in kidnapped been had journalists 195 promulgate the resulting statute withinfifteen days following the proclamation of the results of the vote.”favourable to the Government Bill orto the Private Members’ Bill, the President of the Republic shall 194 organisms, “the such Cotroceni as crisis cell” administrative parallel ad-hoc hecreated Furthermore, and investors. electorate the both of criticising theGovernment’s actionsits thus underminingin programs, and standing the eyes other bodies of public administration. In this section, B relationship ThePresident-Government 3.6.2. citizens via areferendum beis promulgated to by President the by the a decision taken provides that Article 11[1] where situation French tothe contrast provided by intelligencethe servicesand other bodies dealing with national security. information the analyzing with charged structure internal an as but body, administrative as an not by theCSAT CNIwasestablished the that makeand adecision as to so provided been hasnot cell crisis the information about sufficient replied that Court The President. the by headed (CSAT) Council Defence Supreme the to subordinated being latter the (CNI), The Romanian Parliament, Romanian The The “Cotroceni crisis cell” was established at the end of March 2005 after the news that three Romanian three that news the after 2005 of March end the at established was cell” crisis “Cotroceni The Article 11 [1] of the FrenchConstitution states the following: “Where the outcome of the referendum is sescu Ġ avencu ă despre , 12-13. The second chapter dealt with the President’s relationship with the Government and Government the with relationship President’s the with dealt chapter second The A severe accusation referred to B to referred accusation A severe , April 27, 2005; Ondine Gherghu ú ov ă ielile celulei decriz Proposal forthesuspension from officeofthe RomanianPresident ă Evenimentul Zilei de la Cotroceni cu privire la soarta ziari ă sescu stated in a press conference that this organism comprised organism this that conference press a in stated sescu Ġ , “Sirianul OmarHaymmsam pozeaz ă Evenimentul Zilei sescu’s pressures on the Ministers of Economy and of Economy theMinisters on pressures sescu’s ă sescuthat he intentionally withheld communicating with 70 195 , November 9, 2004; ***, “Cheia rapirii e la Hayssam” and the “National Intelligence Community” Intelligence “National the and , March 31, 2005. ă sescu was accused of repeatedly 194 . ú tilor r 196 . Again, the Court ruled ă ă învictim pi Ġ i înIrak”, (“Account of ă ” (“The Syrian Academia , Traian CEU eTD Collection office of the Romanian President Parliament, Romanian The Source: unconstitutional. were package reform CC’s activity as being “against the national interest” following its ruling that some provisions of the justice judges prosecutors and proposed by Justicethe withoutMinister consulting the C.S.M.; and of characterizing the criminal cases ingiving three individual pardons; influencing the C.S.M. vote onits president; naming some prosecutors, judges and wholethe justice systembeing inefficient of accusing and corrupt; appropriating the meetings; to right judge its over presiding when (C.S.M.) of Magistracy Council Superior the of members criminal cases whichinvolve members of parliamentarythe opposition; downgrading and intimidating the 198 Romanian president, Traian B 197 President has “to carefully observe the functioning of the state, to vigilantly supervise the way bethe should that interpretation Article 80-1 of correct the Furthermore, figurehead role”. and a symbolic under be subsumed cannot life in political presence his since role, active have andits to popular Romanian powers the President “oblige an democraticlegitimacy constitutional institution’s this Therefore, system. the within role President’s the clarify infringing uponthe judiciary’s independence B itself whereby 3.6.3. ThePresident-judiciary relationship %ă internal decision. is an ministries these from coming act legal any that and interest economic certain a favouring Government meeting Government inany toparticipate can choose he/she since presence limit not President’s the does extremely importantmatters” deemed as such by the President, the Court ruled that Article 87 of the Constitution states 86 (ArticleBecause Article 87-1). order” insurancepublic of and defence of country the the that policy, foreign to the regard “with interest head national of issues as establishes of Constitution the what state can consult the Government about “urgent, The examples given to corroborate these charges include the following: asking prosecutors to review some review to prosecutors asking following: the include charges these corroborate to given examples The The Constitutional Court, sescu abused his right of hissescu abused of meetingsparticipatingright deal inGovernment which not did with The Court’s analysis of these particular accusations is important since itThe thirdattempts chapter deals with the President’s to relationship with the judiciary and the CC that was Government the with relationship President’s the regarding charge Another ă sescu is accused of breaking the separation of principle andof powers of breaking separation the of is accused sescu 197 . Opinion5 no.1,April ă sescu , Traian B Traian , 5. ă sescu , 13-17. th , 2007, proposal on the for thesuspension from office ofthe 198 71 . Proposal for the suspension from CEU eTD Collection 788. President’s Impeachment in Lithuania”, 84-21 permits the President to citizenshipgrant to foreignnationals. Source: Zenonas Norkus, “The Case of the 202 January 23-24, 2009), http://www.venice.coe.int/WCCJ/Papers/LTU_Lapinskas_E.pdf (accessed May 2009).25, Justice-Its influence on SocietyandDeveloping aGlobal Jurisprudence onHumanRights the at presented report Society”, on 201 200 Romanian president, Traian B 199 foreignin andof his matters “overstepped obstructed sincethey powers policy” contradicted campaign Russianbusiness man Yuri forBorisov the financial latter’s supportduring theelectoral grantedcitizenship to accepted Paksas unconstitutionally chargethatthe where Court the the President’s traditional is pardons since granting motivate this decision notobliged is to state headof the ruled that entitlement. This aspect can be contrasted constitutional the only order undermines disrespectful attitude to the Lithuanian case bodies targeted legal on havethe consequences anymaterial measures which he/sheobservations and regardingcritiques reforms the public authorities’ functioning, propose and considers as upholdingimmunity clause and that he/shethe “can express politicalnational opinions and options, formulate interest” by isthe protected President the that again out pointed Court The respected”. normsand are seeing as these principles Constitutional the that and of […] toguarantee public lifeact theactors in which do not 3.6.4. The President’s mediation function and his role in matters of foreign policy unconstitutional byhisgrounds presidential throughoutpredecessors mandates their citizenship have over 700peopledoublegranted outthat on been andpointed standards by B brought of accusations the even that though labelled President’sstatements the can be views, aspolitical itdisapproves AlthoughArticle 12 of the Lithuanian Constitution does not allow the existence of dual citizenship, Article Kestutis Lapinskas, “Some Aspects of the Influence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania Ibid, 6. The Constitutional Court, Regarding the accusation of abusing the right to grant individual Court the pardons, to grant right the abusing accusation of Regarding the The indictments presented in refer B fifth presented chapter The indictments the to 201 . This was a controversial issue because Paksas accused the Court of of displaying Court Paksas accusedthe because issue a . This was controversial Opinion5 no.1,April ă sescu , 5-6. World Conference on Constitutional Justice, Influential Constitutional East European Politics and Societies ă sescu against various public authorities since this since public authorities various sescu against th , 2007, proposal on the for thesuspension from office ofthe 72 199 200 . Nevertheless, the CC did state . , Vol. 22, no. 4, (November 2008): (November 4, no. 22, Vol. , ă sescu’s statements which sescu’s statements , (Cape Town, 202 . CEU eTD Collection Romanian Parliament, Romanian The Source: class. political the and press the between conflict the settle to unwillingness his Land; Szeklers’ PM, the the between Minister conflicts the in of non-intervention his Justiceaffairs; foreign and and education thejustice, of C.S.M.; ministers the and his lack of interest in preventing the referendum205 on the autonomy of ratifiedthe according to the procedure set up by law”. within a reasonable time limit. The other treaties and international agreements shall be concluded, approved, or international treaties negotiated by the Government, and thensubmit them to the Parliament forratification, 204 %ă 203 strife of actingnot asahead should of state under oflaw rule the byactually provoking andfuelling specifically, hewasaccused in More a biased between public authorities. critic conflicts the by ignoring his presidential andduties his of role mediator between institutionsstate by being policies its conduct to ability Government’s the hindered not have these that and relations foreign Romania’s on have didnegative not consequences any judged President’s the statements Court political that image international Romania’s undermined and policies official Government’s the foreign policy,but not to a grave violation of the constitutional text of lack inmatters coherence a ofconsensusand to would point conflict This intra-executive political attitude. for violating adifferent exhibiting Constitution the be accusedof cannot infringe foreign attributesin execution ofthe Government’s the on country’s the policy, if he/she not did President, the a disagreement, of incase Technically, by Government? the be:if Whathappens President’s the andopinionsstatements donotfollow the policy lines set state, butits is implementation Therefore, the the Government. would shared with question foreign functionsof is forpolicy overlapping theheadof a inmatters the area that reserved The examples given in the suspension proposal include his passivity in solving the conflicts between the PM Article 91-1 of the Constitutionstates the following: “The President shall, inthe name of Romania, conclude Parliament, Romanian The sescu 205 , 19. The of sixth chapter suspension the proposal accuses B This particular charge to points one of problemsthe of i.e. semi-presidential systems, . The CC stated that this indictment was not accompanied by the required evidence – evidence required by accompanied the not was indictment this that stated CC . The Proposal for the suspension from officeof the Romanian President 204 . Proposal forthesuspension from officeofthe RomanianPresident 73 ă sescu ofviolatingArticle 80-2 per se . , Traian B Traian ă sescu 203 , . The . Traian , 21. CEU eTD Collection 2009). and PM, PresidentC.S.M. solveto constitutional the judicial conflict between judiciary the andtheRomanianPresident Court, Constitutional The Source: representatives. authorities must avoid public producingthe that atense relationship emphasized it betweenNevertheless, themselves throughthe independence. statements judiciary’s of the their upon infringe which decisions legal or acts concrete by followed unless deadlocks constitutional generate not do executive the from coming amount to a political interference in its activities. Regarding this case, the CC reiterated that political opinions deadlock”.In addition, these bothdiminishinstitutional citizens’ the an and international even Romanian trustinthe judiciary and and powers State’s the between imbalance “an produce they that is reforms to resistant statements” made by the President along withthe PM about the justice system being incompetent, corrupt and Decision no. 435/2006. This conflict was brought about by the C.S.M.’s claim that whichthecould effect have beenincluded of the in“generalizingthe conflicts that need presidential mediation, was settled by the Court in its 206 %ă dismissal’s success. involvement President’s for the andthenecessity conflicts these of andsocial outcomes legal, the political especially therefore neutralizing the scope of this activism. Furthermore, he notes that the inability of the ithisadded scene, that donothave political andstatements opinions legal consequence, on political the role active in an adopting right President’s the although it that recognized Stanomir has underlined that there is one aspect of the CC’s ruling that is ambiguous, namely in for behaviour the argue Constitution. tothe gravity relation President’s the Ioan of in considered interpretation or evidence awrong order to of asgiving constitutional the text B of limitation the law and referendum investigation commission its boundaries,which overstepped modifications the brought tothe an of majority establishment – the by parliamentary undertaken the and actions CC. The the 3.7. Conclusion The CC underlined that the disagreement between the Government and the President against the C.S.M., the against President the and Government the between disagreement the that underlined CC The sescu, we can conclude that the charges were either not substantiated by the necessary by the substantiated not either charges were the that conclude we can sescu, From the analysis of the CC’s ruling on the suspension proposal against Traian The suspension scandal opposed the Parliament and the Government to the Presidentto the theParliamentandGovernment the The suspensionopposed scandal May 2006, http://www.legestart.ro/Decizie-nr-435-din-2006-(MjAwOTc5).htm26, (accessed May 25, 206 . ă sescu’s airtime – were clearly intended to ensure the to intended clearly –were airtime sescu’s Decision no.435/ 2006 on the request forwarded by the 74 CEU eTD Collection Publishing House, 2008), 283-184. Limits of theConstitution. About governance, politics and citizenship in Romania) 207 by prompted 2007suspensionthe procedure. tohave order mechanism a reliable constitutional of suchastheresolving one conflicts in executive dual of the institutional powers between the borders establish clear needto the whichemphasized for aconstitutional debate hecalled followinghis reinstatement, Therefore, by betext. ofavagueconstitutional majority, basis attacked on the opposition the could which his state, theparliamentary interpretation asheadof antagonized andpractice duties of proposals has prompted aseries ofinstitutional thatresultedconflicts in suspensionthe Romanian President to dissolve the legislature and to promulgate referendum-endorsed Ioan Stanomir, Ioan Radu Carp, All in made suspension all, it 2007presidential the B that apparent LimiteleConstitu Ġ iei. Despre guvernare, politic 75 ú ă i cet , (Bucharest: C.H. Beck C.H. , (Bucharest: ăĠ enie în Româniaenie în (The ă sescu’s own 207 . CEU eTD Collection %ă between relationship subtype, the is conflict-prone least although this the Nevertheless, in legislature.were supported differentthe belongingparties, despite to President, becauseAllianceheldmajority and both PM the parliamentary government” D.A. the and the majority after “consolidated Romaniathat was in a 2004elections, the of situation decided approve to his suspension. vision his and powers, his constitutional of towards legislature PMand the the attitude own aspect pointed out in the suspension proposal. The semi-presidential design can account to a enough to justify the President’s removal, the parliamentary majority, vexed by by B vexed majority, parliamentary the removal, President’s the justify to enough despite the fact that the majority relationship especially PM.Consequently, with CC parliamentary the and with the ruled that the charges institutions haveaffectedhis state the political hisbluntaccusations in and other style against the suspension proposal suchasB aspects, Informal President. the against suspension procedure are not grave Traian B President and setup of institutional viaa its practice 2007suspension the case study of Romanian acting ithas specifically,within impeachment systems.place the the presidential More of examined that dealing with political conflicts. in favour semi-presidential usearrangements, the impeachment of presidential asamethod of occur to likely are which president, and government parliament, between tensions the context, sescu and T solely If we apply Skach’s three subtypes of semi-presidentialism to Romania, we can say The present paper has dealt with the issue of presidential impeachment in semi- The answerstraightforward univocallybecause is wecannot argue tothis question not inwhether, Romanian referredto the chapter intheintroductory The question posed the semi-presidential system, ithas as been designedin the prompted Romania, ă riceanu became increasingly hostile resulting in institutional hostile an riceanu increasingly resulting ininstitutional became conflict, ă sescu. CONCLUDING REMARKS 76 ă sescu’s sescu’s conflictive ă sescu’s CEU eTD Collection the Parliament’s own decision. own Parliament’s the as considered ultimately was move this although Chambers, two the of presidents the change to in order regulations internal Parliament’s change to majority parliamentary 2004 the asking B accused when situation Parliament 208 power out of presidential impotence in the wake of a legislative minority, not out of a position of is “itoften thefollowing: she argues majority. Therefore, parliamentary the with relationship by headof timestate’s the isdetermined over inpowers variation the usingpresidential that instating Carey and Shugart from disagrees Skach same The parliament. and PM the of those 3.1.). (see section integration view of in EU necessary reforms the push forward soasto scene political a sayonthe have to powers his constitutional use actively he would that meant which be a“player-president”, may conflict” lead into type fully,the tensions the herpowers exercise to determined is president the when or [...] minister prime the to yield to willing not is and underlines, this moresubtype is toclashes prone because “if presidentthe has her own agenda i.e.government”, aPNL-UDMRminority by supported government PSD.As the Skach suspension, T by majority.was threatened at the time Presidentthe when 2007, parliamentary March In which withoutfrom left in splitwas government, the breakpointoccurred PC 2006when the Constitution,hand in refused 2005to in his President’s Another resignation at the request. by the PM,supported the since forof thedeterioration relationship this certain extent 209 Fifth Republic B where inRomania, situation Cindy Cindy Skach, Idem. per se Regarding of the actual powers Romanian the presidency, balanced these with are , (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,2006), 17. , thatpresidents begin constitutional pushingbeyond limits” ă riceanu ousted riceanu ousted PD from the government. The resultwas a “divided majority Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in WeimarGermany andthe French ă sescu declared from the beginning of his mandate thathe will his mandate beginning of from the sescu declared ă sescu of breaking the separation of powers principle by principle powers of breakingseparation the sescu of 77 208 209 . This was the . This was the CEU eTD Collection Publishing House, 2008), 272. Limits of theConstitution. About governance, politics and citizenship in Romania) limits the president’s room for manoeuvrelimits room political president’s the in a dynamic of making –andformalwhich attitude use their the powers text constitutional adopt to choose may presidents which to –according constitution living so-called the between is adisconnect that there more clearly shown has case suspension 2007 the Therefore, institutional – and Court deadlock. Constitutional the by settled of are not role advisory the conflictive relationship withinthe dual leads thatconstitutionalexecutive to crises – some that a is result The mandate. presidential the of completion fruitful a for necessary mechanisms sense that it allows for the direct electionto adifficulty theinstitutionalwithin Romaniandesign. is Constitution The in problematic the of the head of state but falls short of providing the proposal. suspension in the President refusal institutional ensuing an conflict which was among the charges broughtagainst the latter’s the with resign, butwasconfronted PMto the bypressuring elections parliamentary 211 2009). Analysis ofLithuania and Poland 210 consideration of intoby has underlined Krupavicius aspects that cohabitation taking the and French the case indissolve i.e. have to presidents contrast fewer powers the parliamentto survival”, “separate of estimates havegreater Poland and inLithuania parliaments arethat estimates analysis the design in an overall regime typology in and relation to the French model. From Shugart’s using model Shugart’s of wecan presidential institutional the power, place post-communist presidentialism, outin Pugaciauskas hispoints examination Lithuaniaof andPoland that by difficult for the president to make such a political move. make B apolitical to such for president difficult the Vykintas Pugaciauskas, Vykintas Ioan Stanomir, Radu Carp, Limitele Constitu The frequency of constitutional crises, i.e. in almost every presidential mandate, points Regardingrelationship the president-parliamentin post-communist semi- 210 . The same can be said about Romania since it has been shown that it is very Semi-Presidential Institutional Models and Democratic Stability. A Comparative , 1999,6,, http://www.geocities.com/Vykintas/ltupol.pdf (accessed 26, May Ġ iei. Despre guvernare, politic 78 211 . Political science professor Algis professor science Political . ă sescu attempted to provoke early to sescu attempted ú ă i cet , (Bucharest: C.H. Beck C.H. , (Bucharest: ăĠ enie în România (The CEU eTD Collection can add Lithuanianpresident Ronalas Paksas (2004) and Romanian president Traian B in Lithuania”, president RohMoo-hyun (2004). Source: Zenonas Norkus, Case “The of President’sthe Impeachment in Philippines (2001), Albert Zafy Madagascar(1996),in Paraguayanpresident RaulCubas (1999),Korean South president Carlos AndresPerez (1993),Colombian president Ernesto Samper (1996),Joseph Estrada the in 213 212 regimes” political conflicts between president-parliamentthe more frequently in semi-presidential resolve might be usedto procedures impeachment “the separation ambiguous powers, of stage, but is an avenue for future research since one cannot ignore the importance of importance ignore the cannot one since research future for is avenue but an stage, early very a in is currently impeachments presidential comparative of field the Therefore, democratization wave of third the hadundergone that in countries impeachments but as Lithuanian which institutional design, displays in such casesoccurred apresidential States, United the sociology professor Zenonasaggressive Parliament. attitude towards Norkusand behaviour intimidating an displayed has latter noted, the when office presidential the of there have by andactionsholder the accuse undertaken statements the MPs the to which a niche through been a offered has text series constitutional ambiguous the is that explanation alternative An ofsuspension. tendencies form of and semi-presidential the governmentof ofpresidential the practice suspension measures. Therefore, forand occurrence 2007 of the 1994 the blamedesign institutional cannot exclusively the we cannotwe majority, parliamentary hostile a with deal point to having while mandate his/her out carry to a strict causal relationshipbetween betweenthe president, the parliament and governmentcan stopespecially the president via the institution of impeachment. when the headlegislature the Consequently, free tactic of the riding. majority can and adopt parliamentary of state has to doesnotenjoy increasesa of head of support state the the once andpresident parliament Recentpresidential impeachments include Brazilianpresident Fernando Collorde Mello (1992), Venezuelan Algis Krupavicius, e-mail message to author, April 22, 2009. Presidential impeachment has not received substantial scholarly attention sincemost received impeachment hasnot scholarly attention substantial Presidential In conclusion, although semi-presidentialthe system is conflicts predisposed to 212 . This would happen because the political becausebetween political competition. Thiswouldandconflictthe happen the East European PoliticsandSocieties , Vol. 22, no. 4, (November 2008): 789. Also, to this list we 79 ă sescu (2007). 213 . CEU eTD Collection and semi-presidential systems. and semi-presidential conducting especially such studies with increasingnumberof the within cases presidential 80 CEU eTD Collection Gallager, Tom, Viorel Andrievici, “Romania: political irresponsibility without constitutional without irresponsibility political “Romania: Andrievici, Viorel Tom, Gallager, Elgie, Robert, Elgie Robert, Elgie Culic, Irina, Culic, &ă Borneman, John, ed., Alan, Bryman, Barbu, Daniel, Ball, Whittaker Simon, John, Boyron Sophie, Books: Literature http://www.ccr.ro/deciziitotal/pdf/2007/ro/avizconsultativ.pdf from office ofthe Romanianpresident,from B Traian The Constitutional Court, http://www.ziua.ro/pics/2007/03/21/1174650600.pdf. Parliament aresultthesuspensionproposalagainstRomanianPresident, as of Parliament, Romanian The President The Romanian Parliament, Constitution http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371of Romania (2003), Constitution of http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/act_show?ida=1&idl=2Romania (1991), resources Primary linoiu, Constan Sophia Moestrup (eds.),Sophia Manchester: Moestrup Manchester University Press, 2008. in safeguards”, Press, 2003. Limes Press, 2002. Winners: politicaleliteanddemocratization inRomania1989-2000) ( Publishing 2007. House, New York, Oxford: Berghahn 2004. Books, 1999. Absent Republic:politicsandsociety inpost-communist Romania) University Press, 1998. Comparative Constitutional Law , Traian B Semi-presidentialism inEurope Câ Political Institutions in Contemporary France, Social ResearchMethods Republica absent ú Ġ tig a, Duculescu, Victor, Duculescu,Georgeta, a, Duculescu, Victor, ă ă sescu, Death of theFather: AnAnthropologythe of End inPolitical Authority torii: elitapolitic Semi-presidentialism in Central and EasternEurope Semi-presidentialism in Central Opinion no. 1, April 5 Opinion no.1, The Reportof theJoint Investigation Commissionthe Romanian of http://www.psd.ro/newsroom.php?newi_id=169 Proposal for the suspension from office ofthe Romanian office thesuspensionProposal for from ă : politic BIBLIOGRAPHY ú ă , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. ), Vol. 1,4 ú ă i democratizare înRomânia1989-2000 , Oxford: Oxford University 1999. 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