Lp,ISHINGTHE DocsoF'WtR CoxFLICT M,tx,tcEMENT TNADtvtDEDWonLD

Edited by Cltester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and PamelaAall

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS Washington, D.C. SrnrpMnKrNG, Srnrp BnBnKrNG, AND SrnrnEmLURE

MohammedAyoob

TATE BREAKING AND STATE MILURE, sources of conflict, is confirmed by the latest both unavoidable accompaniments of data presented in the ,S/PRI Yearbook 2005. the state-making process, lie at the root These data demonstrate that all nineteen ma- of most conflicts that the international system jor armed conflicts thatwere recorded rn2004 has witnessed since the end of World War II. were classified as intrastate in character. How- The veracity of this assertion is demonstrated ever, the report makes clear that "[i]n a reversal by two generally accepted facts. The first is the of the classic spill-over of conflict from intra- incontestable reality that the overwhelming to inter-state, developments in Iraq during majority of conflicts since the end ofWorld 2004 raised the prospect ofan international War II have been located in the postcolonial conflict creating a firlly fledged civil war.'z lraq, countries that constitute the Third World. The therefore, stands out as the exception that second is the equally incontrovertible fact that proves the rule. In the previous year,2003, most such conflicts either have been primarily SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace intrastate in character or have possessed a sub- Research Institute) had identified nineteen stantial intrastate dimension, even if they ap- major armed conflicts as well, but had noted pear to the outside observer to be interstate that two of them, the conflict between India conflicts.l This means that problems of in- and Pakistan over Kashmir and the invasion ternational and domestic order have become of Iraq by the United States and the United closely intertwined during the current era and Kingdom, were interstate in character.3 While are likely to remain so well into the foresee- both Kashmir and Iraq continued to figure in able future. the 2004list, the basic character of these con- The validity of both these assertions, that flicts was perceived as having been changed is to say, the concentration of conflicts in the by the amelioration of the India-Pakistan di- Third World and the primacy of domestic mension of the Kashmir conflict on the one

95 96 MoHelauBo Ayoos hand and the "success" of the U.S. invasion on augmented the impression that there are ac- the other. tually two distinct zones in the international Almost all of the conflicts in 2003 and2004 system-the zone of peace in the North and were located in the old or newThird World, the zone of turmoil in the South-and that as had been the case in previous years. The new the two work according to different logics, a Third World refers to states in Central Asia, Lockean one in the former and a Hobbesian the Caucasus, and the Balkans that emerged one in the latter.s out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union However, this dichotomous representation and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. In ofthe First andThirdWorlds hides the essen- terms of their colonial background, the arbi- tial similarity in their process of state making, trary construction oftheir boundaries by ex- which has been (and is) crucial in determin- temal powers, the lack of societal cohesion, their ing the political trajectories of states. This recent emergence into juridical statehood, and point becomes clear if one compares the cur- their stage of economic and political develop- rent situation in the Third World, not with ment, the states of the Caucasus and Central that prevailing within and among the indus- Asia and of the Balkans demonstrate oolitical. trial democracies today, but with the situation economic, and social characteristics that are in from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century manyways akin to those of the Asian, African, in Western Europe, when the eadiest of the and Latin American states that have tradition- modern sovereign states were at a stage of ally been considered as constituting the Third state making that corresponded with the stage World. There are abundant data, therefore, to where most Third World states find them- support the conclusion that the overwhelming selves today.b majority of conflicts in the international system Youssef Cohen and colleagues have most since 1945 have been "a ubiquitous corollary succincdy defined the process of state making of the birth, formation, and fracturing of as "primitive central state power accumula- Third World states."4 tion."7 Thus defined, state making must in- clude the following:

SrerB MaruNG rN THE THrRD WoRLD r The expansion and consolidation of the The events since the eady 1990s, by removing territorial and demographic domain under the SecondWorld from the intemational equa- a political authority, including the imposi- tion, have helped present the dichotomy be- tion oforder on contested territorial and de- tween the global core and the global periphery mographic space (war) First and o -the World the Third World-in The maintenance of order in the territory very stark terms. By eliminating the Cold War where, and over the population on whom, overlay from Third World conflicts and thus such order has already been imposed (po- exposing their fundamental local dynamics, iicing) the end ofbipolarityhas also demonsffated the o The extraction of resources from the terri- close linkage between these conflicts and the tory and the population under the control dlnamics ofstate making (and its obverse, state ofthe state, resources essential not only to breaking and state failure) currendyunderway support the war-making and policing ac- in the global periphery. The proliferation of tivities undertaken by the state but also to conflicts in the periphery, when compared maintain the apparatuses of state necessary with the image of relative tranquillitywithin to carry on routine administration, deepen and amity among the industrialized countries the state's penetration ofsociety, and serve ofWestern Europe and North America, has symbolic purposes (taxation)8 SrerB MarrNc. Srem BnpexrNc. eNo SretB Ferlunr 97

All three broad categories of activities out- nineteenth and twentieth centuries.lo So'ter- lined here, however, depend on the state's suc- eign and relatively centrahzed states that have cess in monopolizing and concentrating the performed successfully over a long period of means of coercion in its own hands in the ter- time-and have therefore knit their people ritory and among the population it controls. together in terms of historical memories,legal That is why the accumulation of power be- codes, language, religion, and so forth-may comes so crucial to the state-making enterprisel evolve into nation-states or at least provide the more primitive the stage of state building, the necessary conditions for the emergence of the more coercive the strategies employed to nation-states, but they are not synonymous accumulate and concenffate power in the hands with the latter. Historical evidence has con- ofthe agents ofthe state. Cohen and colleagues vincingly demonstrated that in almost all stated in a seminal article published in 1981, cases in Europe, with the exception of the "The extent to which an expansion of state Balkans (an exception that may provide the power will generate collective violence depends clue to the current violence and strife in that on the level of state power prior to that expan- region), the emergence of the modern sover- sion. . . . The lower the initial level of state eign state was the precondition for the for- power, the stronger the relationship between mation of the nation.11 the rate of state expansion and collective vio- This generalization applied as much to late- lence."e One needs to be reminded that the comers such as Germany as it did to the ear- violence generated during the process ofstate liest examples of modern states, such as En- making is the result of actions undertaken gland and France. Without the central role both by the state and by recalcitrant elements performed by the Prussian state, Germany within the population that forcefi.rlly resist the would probably have remained nothing more state's attempt to impose order. than a geographic or cultural expression. The The inherent similarity in the logic of the similarity betvveen the German experience on state-building process provides us explana- the one hand and the French experience on the tions for the current replication by Third other has been summed up well by Cornelia World states of several dimensions of the early Navari: "When Hegel insisted that it was the modern European experience of state making. state that created the nation, he was looking Simultaneously, the difference in the pace at backurards to the history ofFrance, not for- which state building has to be undertaken and ward to the history of Germany. When Ger- completed in theThirdWorld and the dramat- many was unified'from above'in 1870 and ically changed international environment in the Reich was formed, this way of proceed- which Third World state making has to pro- ing did not appear to most Germans to be at ceed explain the divergence in other dimen- variance with the experience of their Western sions from the earlier European model of state neighbors-a substitution of Union'by force' building. The similarities and the differences for the brganic growtti of France and England. are equally important, as is the bearing they It appeared to be a repetition ofit, differing have on problems of authority and governance only in that it was less bloody. Here, as there, within Third World states. the state was moving outwards into diverse It should be noted that in most of Europe, feudal remnants of the old order, dissolving state making usually antedated the emergence them, making all obedient to the same law."72 of nations and nation-states by a couple of The chronological sequence of the estab- centuries. This is why it is essential not to con- lishment of the sovereign state and the evo- fuse the building of modern sovereign states lution of nationalism in theThirdWorld bears with the emergence of nation-states in the very close resemblance to that of modern 98 MoHewro Ayooe

Europe, with the state taking clear historical state in regions where it faces, or has faced, precedence over the nation. As Anthony major challenges. Smith has put it very succincdy, "[T]he west- In order to replicate the process by which ern model is essentially a'state system'rather relatively centralized modern states are cre- than a'nation system'; and this has been its ated, Third World state makers need above all fatefirl legacy to Africa and Asia." Smith goes two things: lots of time and a relatively free on to point out that despite the differences in hand to persuade, cajole, and coerce the dis- geopolitical and cultural terms between Eu- par^te populations under their nominal nrle to rope and the Third World, "the central point accept the legitimacy of state boundaries and . . . of the western experience for contemporary institutions; to accept the right of the state to African and Asian social and political change extract resources from them: and to let the has been the primacy and dominance of the state regulate the more important public as- specialized, territorially defined, and coercively pects of their lives. Unfortunately for Third monopolistic state, operating within a broader World state elites, neither of these tvyo com- system of similar states bent on fulfilling their modities is available to them in adequate mea- dual functions of internal regulation and ex- sure. This is because, unlike European states, ternal defence (or aggression)."13 postcolonial states have to build states and na- In this context, it is instructive to note tions within limited time spans, thus forcing Charles Tilly's point that "the building of them to collapse sequential phases ofstate and states in Western Europe cost tremendously nation construction into one mammoth phase. in death, suffering,loss of rights, and unwill- They have no alternative because their failure ing surrender of land, goods, or labor. . . . The to accomplish in decades what European states fundamental reason for the high cost of Eu- took centuries to do is likely to hold them up ropean state building was its beginning in the to international ridicule and consign them to midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social permanent peripherality in the international structure. Building differentiated, autono- system. Simultaneously, contemporary inter- mous, centralized or ganizations with effective national norms demand that postcolonial state control of territories entailed eliminating or elites treat their populations humanely and subordinating thousands of semiautonomous according to codes of civilized behavior, thus authorities. . . . Most of the European popu- restraining their capacity to use force in the lation resisted each phase ofthe creation of pursuit of state making and nation building. strong states."l4 Tilly's description of condi- The lack of adequate time and normative con- tions in Europe at the birth of modern sover- straints imposed on state makers make their eign states has an uncanny resemblance to task very difficult and encourage the emer- present conditions in manyThird World so- gence of secessionist movements that chal- cieties. It thus helps to explain why, if one lenge the state's authority and lay the basis for arranges the current state-building strategies intrastate conflict.i5 employed in the Third World on a contin- The point regarding the availability of time uum ranging from coercion to persuasion becomes clear if one examines the amount of (with the two ends representing ideal types), time it took for the states ofWestern Europe even those states like India that fall relativelv to emerge as firll-fledged sovereign states, en- close to the persuasive end of the continuum jon"g the habitual obedience of their popula- rely on significant amounts of coercion-as tions, basically secure in the legitimacy of their witnessed over the past several decades in Pun- borders and institutions, and, therefore, in a jab, Kashmir, and the northeastern states-to position where they could respond positively entrench and consolidate the authority of the to societal demands, since these demands no Srern MAxrNG, SrATn BRnATNG, RNo Statn FRrluns 99 longer ran counter to the logic of state building applied particularly to the states of Germany and the accumulation of power in the hands andltaly,which emerged as unified sovereign of the state. It was not until the beginning of entities only in the closing decades ofthe nine- the twentieth century that the states of West- teenth century and were immediately faced em Europe and their offshoots in North Amer- with the pressures of mass politics. In fact, it ica emerged as the responsive and representa- can be argued that the emergence of Italian tive modern states that we know them to be Fascism and German Nazism was a result of today-the end products of the state-making the Italian and German state elites'inability in process that had unfolded for at least three or the first two decades of the twentieth century four hundred years. It is instmctive to remem- to respond successfully, in a context of mass ber that the survival of the American state in politics, to the accumulated crises threatening its present form hung in the balance in the their respective states.l8 1860s, only 150 years ago, and it managed to If this was the case with Germany, which survive only after a bloody civil war that left had the well-established Prussian state at its millions dead. Although leading historians of core, one can well imagine the enormity of the state building in Europe differ about the exact challenge faced by the postcolonial states of dating of the origins, in the sense of begin- the Third World. The latter's problems have nings, of the modern sovereign state, there is been compounded by the fact that they are litde argument about the fact that "it took four under pressure to demonstrate adequate state- to five centuries for European states to over- hood quickl/i to perform the task of state come theirweaknesses, to remedytheir admin- making in a humane, civilized, and consensual istrative deficiencies, and to bring lukewarm fashion; and to do all this in an era of mass loyalty up to the white heat of nationalism."16 politics. The inadequacy of the time element Unfortunately forThird World state mak- and the consequent fact that several sequential ers, their states cannot afford the luxury of phases involved in the state-making process prolonging the traumatic and costly experi- have had to be telescoped together into one ence of state making over hundreds of years i mammoth state-building enterprise go a long la Europe. The demands of competition with way toward explaining the problems of author- established modern states and the demonstra- ity and governance faced by the Third World tion effect ofsocially cohesive, politically re- states today.le Given the short time at the sponsive, and administratively effective states disposal of state makers in the Third World in the industrialized world make it almost and the consequent acceleration in their state- obligatory for Third World states to reach making efforts necessary to demonstrate that their goal within the shortest possible time. they are moving speedily toward effective The pioneers of European state making (al- statehood, crises erupt simultaneously and be- though not the latecomers like Germany and come unmanageable as the load they put on Italy) were remarkably free from systemic the political system outruns the political and Dressures and demonstration effects. because military capabilities of the state, thus further th. leading contenders for statehood- eroding the legitimacy of the already fragile England,"[ France, Spain, Holland-were basi- postcolonial state. cally in the same boat, trying to navigate the same uncharted sea. Where European states INtBnNettoNALNoRMS oF did not have this luxury and had to compress SretBHooo AND HUMAN Rrcnrs some of the sequential phases that together constituted the process of state building, they In addition to these internal factors, the work- suffered from a "cumulation of crises."17 This ings of the international system, especially the MoHevuBo Avooe policies adopted by the superpowers during exist as sovereign entities, even if many of the Cold War era, have complicated the pro- them (especially in Africa) did not possess cess of state making in the Third World. With "much in the way of empirical statehood, dis- the export of superpower rivalry to the Third closed by acapacity for effective and civil gov- World in the form of proxywars, both inter- ernment.'21 This change has meant that, while state and intrastate, and the transfer ofweapons this international norm has protected the legal to governments and insurgents in fragile poli- existence of postcolonial states without regard ties in volatile regional environments, the to their internal cohesiveness or the eflective- bipolar global balance during the Cold War ness of their domestic control, it has been un- era gready accentuated the insecurities and in- able to solve the security problems that such stabilities in theThird World. Numerous cases states face as a result of the contradictions in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East attest to present within their boundaries and inherent the veracity of this statement.2o in their statemaking process. Equally important, certain international It is worth noting here that this guarantee norms that have crystalJtzed relatively recendy encompassing juridical statehood and territo- have also had mixed effects on the security rial integrity has begun to weaken in the post- and stability of Third World states. The first Cold War era. This has been witnessed in a of these norms relates to the inalienability of whole host of cases, ranging from northern juridical sovereignty or statehood once con- Iraq to Kosovo, where the international com- fered by international law and symbolized by munity, led by the major Western powers, has membership in the United Nations.The sanc- intervened in contravention of the principles tity of the borders ofpostcolonial states forms ofstate sovereignty and the territorial integrity the logical corollary to this norm. While this of established states. However, this change in international norm has done much to preserve intemational norms, if consolidated, is unlikely the existence of several Third World states to alleviate the Third World's security predica- that may have otherwise been unviable, it has ment. In fact, it is likely to worsen that situa- also, paradoxically, added to the security pre- tion considerably and to add to the prevalent dicament of theThirdWorld state.This point instability and disorder in the Third World, can best be understood by recalling that the because it has become linked to the issue ofthe elimination of states considered unviable, ei- right of ethnic groups to sel-f:determination. It ther because oftheir internal contradictions or appears, therefore, that the Third World is because their existence did not suit great-porver caught in a no-win situation as far as this set aspirations, was perfectly acceptable to the of international norms is concerned. European international community virtually A second set of international norms that through the end of World War I. The Prus- has affected the security of theThirdWorld is sian annexation of several Germanic princi- related to the issue of human rights, with pri- palities in the 1860s and the periodic disap- mary emphasis on civil and political rights. pearance and reappearance ofPoland in the While the modem conception of human rights eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are prime can be traced to the natural law approach de- examples of this phenomenon. veloped in eighteenth-century Europe, the re- The international consensus on the alien- cent normative force that human rights have ability ofjuridical statehood began to change acquired in the international arena is the result during the interwar period and crystallized of the acceptance by the vast majority of states after World War II in the context of the de- of the existence and validity of such rights for colonization ofAsia and Africa. Colonies, once all human beings, regardless of their status as granted independence, acquired the right to citizens of particular states.22 Srero MerrNc. Srarn BneerrNc. eNo SrerB Farunp

The changing attitude toward human rights to their populations, because they are reason- as a legitimate concern of the international ably secure in the knowledge that societal de- community meant that they needed to be mands will not run counter to state interests brought within the ambit of international law and will not put state structures and institu- and rescued from their status as the exclusive tions in any gravejeopardy. preserve ofsovereign states in relation to their While norms regarding human rights have own citizens. This led to their inclusion in the been a touchstone of civilized behavior on the Preamble and Article 1 of the United Nations part of states for almost half a century, a simi- Charter and to their codification in the Uni- lar status has begun to be accorded to demo- versal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted cratic governance since the 1990s. The rheto- in7948,and the two International Covenants ric emanating from Washington and other on Human Rights, which were opened for Western capitals and the political conditional- signature and ratification in 1966 and became ities attached to International Monetary Fund operative in7976,This was a major develop- andWorld Bankloans to developing counffies ment in the evolution of norms that govern since the 1990s have privileged political par- the international system, for it acknowledged ticipation and encouraged democratic transi- more clearly than ever before that individuals, ti.on in postcolonial countries. One cannot deny as well as states, could now be considered sub- that the policy of promoting democratic gov- jects of international law. It also signified the ernance has innate merits. However, in the international acceptance of the principle that short run such a policy has the capacity to im- individuals and groups have rights that are in- pede state- and nation-building activities by dependent of their membership in individual putting constraints on state elites'pursuit of states and that derive not from their national these goals.This is especially the case in multi- status but from their status as members of the ethnic societies,where the transition to democ- human species. racy often accentuates ethnic cleavages and The major problem with the implementa- sharpens competition for access to the privi- tion of human rights in the Third World is leges of power.The danger of systemic break- that the concept of human rights owes its em- down becomes particularly acute when de- pirical validity to the existence and successfi.rl mocratizatton becomes equated merely with functioning of the indus trialized, representa- procedural or electoral democracy and not tive, and responsive states ofWestern Europe much attention is paid to putting in place con- and North America. These states set the stan- stitutional and judicial constraints that would dards for effective statehood. as well as for the prevent majorities from riding roughshod over humane and civilized treatment of their citi- minority opinions and interests. In divided zens.They do so by their demonstrated success societies. such as those in the Third Worli, in simultaneously meeting the basic needs of democracies can easily turn into majoritarian the large majority of their populations, pro- polities where parties engage in competitive tecting their human rights, and promoting chauvinism thatwidens societal fissures to such and guaranteeing political participation. But an extent that divisions become irreversible. these states have, by and large, successfully Sri Lanka is the classic case in point, but Iraq completed their state-building process, are seems to be moving in the same direction.23 politically satiated and economically affluent, What are currently considered in the and possess unconditional legitimacy in the West to be norms of civilized state behavior- eyes of the overwhelming majority of their including those pertaining to the human populations.They can therefore afford to adopt rights of individuals and groups as well as liberal standards ofstate behavior in relation democratic governance-are, in the Third r02 MoHavuBo Ayoos

World, not infrequently in contradiction with imum degree ofpolitical order-as in Lebanon the imperatives of state making.These imper- for the fifteen years of civil war, or as currendy atives, as has been pointed out more than once, in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and, above not only sanction but also frequently require all,Iraq,where dozens ofpeople are killed every the use of violent means against recalcitrant day-the concept of human rights remains domestic groups and individual citizens. Fur- nothing more than a pure abstraction. In such thermore, the international norm upholding a context, the human rights ideal is impossible human rights runs direcdy counter to the norm to implement even minimally, because in the that prescribes the inalienability of luridical absence of an effective sovereign a trulyHobbe- statehood for Third World states.24 While the sian state ofnature prevails, and the very sur- latter is uncompromising in upholding the le- vival of large segments of the population can- gality of the existence of Third World states not be assured. within their colonially constructed boundaries, These comments should not be taken as an the former undermines the political legitimacy apologia for authoritarian regimes in theThird of these same states by prescribing standards World that ostensibly emphasize order at the and yardsticks in terms that mostThird World expense ofbothjustice and political partici- states, struggling to perform the minimum pation. Authoritarian regimes quite often con- tasks of maintaining political order, will be in- tribute a great deal to the creation and aug- capable of meeting for many decades to come. mentation of disorder in Third World states Moreover, the simultaneous but contradic- despite paying lip service to the objective of tory operation of the two norms contributes to maintaining and promoting order. Iran under the creation and augmentation ofinternal dis- the shah, the Philippines under Marcos,Zure content within Third World states. It does so under Mobutu, Nicaragua under Somoza, and by, on the one hand, forcing all the diverse and Zimbabwe under Mugabe-to cite but a few dissatisfied elements within Third World states instances-all provide good examples of this to remain within their postcolonial bound- tendency. aries and, on the other, encouraglng these very It is also tme that most regimes in theThird elements to make political, administrative, and World attempt to portray threats to their economic demands on the states that these regimes as threats to the state. Discerning an- states cannot respond to successfirlly. The states alysts must, therefore, carefirlly distinguish be- cannot respond either because they lack the tween issues of regime security and those of capabilities to do so or because doing so could state security. However, in many cases, given seriously jeo pardize their territorial integrity. the lack of unconditional legitimacy both One can make the argument on behalf of of the regime and of the state structure in the ThirdWorld states, sti1l struggling to translate ThirdWorld and the close perceptual connec- their juridical statehood into empirical state- tion between regime and state as far as the hood, that the case for human rights (whether majority of the state's population is concerned, of individuals or of groups) and against the the line between regime security and state secu- state's use ofviolent means to impose order is ritybecomes so thin, and the intelplaybetween not as morally unassailable as it may appe^r at the two so dense, that it is virtually impossible first sight. This point can be made most ef- to disentangle one from the other. As one fectively in the context of the failed-states perceptive scholar pointed out in connection phenomenon,where state structures have com- with the Middle East, "[T]hose who rule pletely collapsed.2s In these cases, it can be must attempt to encourage loy"lty to the state, demonstrated that in the absence of even ofwhich they hope themselves to be the chief rudimentarily effective states to provide a min- beneficiaries, while at the same time seeking Srerp MexrNc. SrerB BReerrNc. eNo SrerB Ferluno 103 to disguise the fact that their system ofpower, fragmentation of international society into and thus the identity of the political structure hundreds of independent territorial entities is itsel{, frequendy owes more to the old ties of a recipe for an even more dangerous and anar- sectarian and tribal loyalty."26In many such chic wodd."27 countries the fall of the regime is likely to A major problem with ethnonational self- signal the failure of the state as well; any stu- determination relates to the definition of the dent ofTudor England or Bourbon France ethnic self that is seeking to determine its fu- will find this phenomenon very familiar. Iraq ture. The self:perception and selFdefinition of provides the latest testimony to the veracity of ethnicity is usually subject to change, depend- this proposition. ing on the context in which it operates at any point in time. This is what Crawford Young has referred to as "the dynamic and changing SELF-D EtrrNoNeuoNAL Btnwnqetlou character of contemporary ethnicity: Far from The human rights issue raises a further prob- representing a fixed and immutable set of lem. Given the multiethnic nature of most static social facts, cultural pluralism is itself Third World states, if human rights are in- evolving in crucial ways and is in major re- terpreted as group rights and, therefore, are spects contextual, situational, and circumstan- seen to include the right to ethnonational self- tial.'28 Therefore, to link such a potent ideology determination, they are likely to pose grave as that of self-determination to a malleable threats to the territorial integrity andjuridi- idea like that of ethnicity-and then to legit- cal statehood of postcolonial states, once imize this combination by reference to the again pitting one set of international norms principle of human rights ofgroups-is bound against another. The legitimation of the notion to inffoduce even greater disorder in the Third of ethnonational self-determination, how- World than is akeady present, because it en- ever partial and selective, following the end of dows the demands of everydisgrunded ethnic the Cold War-symbolized by the prompt group with the legitimacy of the ideal of na- recognition accorded to the successor states to tional self-determination. The danger is that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the sep- this is exacdy what the renewed popularity of aration of Slovakia from the Czech Republic the idea of ethnonational self-determination of -is likely to have encouraged demands for may end up achieving, to the great detriment ethnic separatism in the Third World. Given both order and justice in the Third World. the latent tensions between ethnicity and The problem is fi.rther confounded by the state-defined nationalism even in functioning fact that, given the ethnic mixtures of popula- federal polities like India and the clear contra- tions in most countries, hardly any pure ethnic diction between ethnonationalism and state- homelands still exist. This fact contradicts the defined nationalism in much of the Third ethnonationalists' assumption that "the earth's World, any development anywhere in the in- entire population, or most of it, divides into ternational arena that may encourage ethnic a finite number of distinct, homogeneous separatist demands in the context of state and peoples.It follows that the world's ideal con- regime fragilities prevalent in the Third World dition consists of that finite number of nation- is bound to add to the great strains already ex- states."29 Attempts at ethnonational self- istingwithin these polities.The effects of such determination are, therefore, bound to run into a contagion spreading have been summed up resistance from ethnic minorities in presumed in a Council on Foreign Relations study that ethnic homelands. As William Pfaff has suc- concluded that "while the creation of some cincdy put it, "The ethnic state is a product of new states may be necessary or inevitable, the the political imagination; it does not exist in reality. . . . The idea of the ethnic nation thus is support was the transfer of large quantities a permanent provocation to war."30 Such con- of relatively sophisticated arms to friendly flict is expected to result either in virulent forms regimes. In several instances, such arms trans- of ethnic cleansing or in the carving out of fers led to countervailing transfers ofweaponry microstates from the ministates established on by the rival superpower to forces opposed to the basis of ethnic nationalism. or both. the central authorities. Afghanistan during the 1980s came to epitomize this action-reaction phenomenon.33 Srerns,qNo ERlno Srerns Quesr Past superpower policies of pouring arms Related to the issue of ethnonational self- into fragmented polities have, however, be- determination is the failed-states phenome- come a major source of instability and disor- non. Jack Snyder has described the link be- der in the post-Cold War period. The presence tween the two bydescribing ethnic nationalism of large quantities of relatively sophisticated as "the default option." According to Snyder, weaponry (ranging from AK-47s to Stinger ethnic nationalism "predominates when insti- missiles) and the withdrawal of superpower tutions collapse, when existing institutions are support to weak and vulnerable regimes- not firlfilling people's basic needs, and when support that was essential to prevent the cen- satisfactory alternative structures are not read- tral authorities from being overwhelmed by ily avai1ab1e."31 While this may not provide domestic rivals who, in turn, were divided the total explanation for the revival of ethno- among themselves-created near-total anar- nationalism, it does capture avery major in- chy in countries like Afghanistan and Soma- gredient that has contributed to the recent lia, where central authority completely col- popularity of the ethnonationalist ideology, lapsed, thereby turning these quasi states into namely, the lack of effective statehood. This is failed states. true not only in the case of the components of Furthermore, the failure of the international the former Soviet Union and of the Former community, principally the major powers and Yugoslavia but also in many parts of the Third international organrzations, to prevent and World. The lack of effective statehood was re- control the flow of small arms, which are re- sponsible for the emergence of what Robert sponsible for the majority of deaths in current Jackson has termed "quasi-states" in the Third conflicts, is exploited by private arms dealers World.32 These quasi states can now clearly and transnational criminal cartels as well as be seen as precursors of failed states in the states interested in making fast money in the global South. murky area of arms trade. This unregulated The end of the Cold War has had an im- armsbazaar not only adds to the misery of the portant impact on the transformation of some populace but also undermines state authority of these quasi states into failed states. This is in countries and regions most vulnerable to especially true in the case ofthose states that internal conflicts.34 had witnessed high levels of superpower in- The relationship between state failure and volvement in the military sphere, including internal conflict is, however, not a one-way the arena of arms transfers, during the Cold street, with the former inevitably leading to War era. At the height of the Cold War, the the latter. The relationship is in many cases superpowers attempted to strengthen client circular, as the two phenomena feed on each governments in internally fragmented states, other, with state weakness providing the polit- each often seeking to maintain a semblance ical space for the intensification of conflicts of stability within countries that were allied among political factions and/or ethnic groups, with itself. One maior instrument of such and the conflicts in turn further eroding the Srero MeruNc. Srere Bnoerrxc. eNo SrerB Ferlune 105 capacity of the state to maintain order and one faction succeeds in by and large subjugat- provide security to its citizens. Suffering from ing the others, it usually dons the mantle of acute insecurity, individuals often turn to po- the state in order to legitimize the concentra- litical factions, ethnic groups, and even criminal tion of coercive power in its hands. gangs (and sometimes it is difficult to distin- Similarly, if one views conflict and war as guish among the three categories) to provide process and not merely in terms of final out- them with protection in exchange for their comes, one can conclude that there are usually loyalty and contribution-financial, physical, groups, factions, and individuals that benefit or both-to the "war effort." economically, as well as politically, from the There is another dimension of state failure prolongation of such wars. They come to ac- that has amalor impact on the level of conflict quire a vested interest in perpetuating such within societies. Alex de Waal has pointed this conflicts. This is why "fc]onflict entrepreneurs, out with great clarity in relation to Africa. He as well as conflict victims, must be part of any has argued that economic crisis in Africa has anallxrcal frameworld' devised to study what meant that "governments find it more dfficult has been termed "complex political emergen- to sustain and control armies,which then turn cies."37 Such a perspective can help unravel to local sources of provisioning.These include the rationality behind what appear to the out- requisitioning, looting and taxing populations, side observer to be totally irrational conflicts. involvement in commerce, and diverting hu- manitarian aid. Though the causes of war in DBnaocnetlZArIoN Africa and the aims of the combatants are still INTHETHIRDWORLD almost exclusively phrased in terms of achiev- ing state power and affecting constitutional It may seem obvious to the lay observer that change, the realities on the ground reflect more the principal method to prevent state making intense predatory behaviour by soldiers."3s from being transformed into state failure is to This search for "survival" on the part of un- grant greater political participation to those paid or poorly paid soldiers, who command sectors of society-whether ethnic or socio- great coercive power in relation to the rest of economic-that have heretofore been er

of the main ethnic groups; the presence or ab- of the political order that only a strongly en- sence ofexternal ethnic allies; and the ethnic trenched state can provide. Democratization, composition of the military."39 therefore, must complement rather than con- There is, however, another side to the de- tradict the process of state making; without mocratizatton coin. The demands of state the political order that can be provided only by building and democratization can be recon- effective states, the gains of democratization ciled only if the demo $atizing state in the cannot be sustained. Anarchies-as the exam- Third World is credibly able to monopolize ples of Somali a, LTberia,Afghanistan, and Iraq the instruments of violence within its territo- clearly demonsffate-are no respecters of dem- ries, thus preventing dissident groups from at- ocratic values and human rights. tempting to change the state's boundaries when However, the reconciliation of the two im- political controls are relaxed. This monopoly peratives of the consolidation of state power over instruments of violence is essential be- and democrainationis not, and will not be, an cause "often the first act offorces liberated by easy task even if tremendous goodwill is pres- the introduction of democracy is to seek some ent on all sides. Major tensions are bound to permanent escape from the state they see as arise between state elites and their ethnic and having oppressed them."4o political opponents who would like to put sig- This is where the most severe problems are nificant curbs on the power ofthe central state. likely to arise, even if democratic political sys- In addition, where separatist insurgencies are tems become the norm rather than the excep- already under way, major problems between tion in theThirdWorld. Democratic and (even separatists and democrattzng central govern- more important) democ raiirngregimes can- ments are likely to revolve around two basic not afford to be seen as weakwhen confronted questions: What is the guarantee that groups by separatist challenges and cannot, in the final espousing separatism will indeed surrender all analysis, give up their right to lay down and arms and reconcile themselves to autonomous enforce the rules (even if some of these have or semiautonomous status that will continue been negotiated with the opponents of the to be essentially dependent on the good faith state) by which the game of politics is to be and the continuing political sagacity of the played within the boundaries of states over central government? What is the guarantee which they preside. Otherwise, the "demo- that central authorities, after persuading sepa- cratic center may be questioned for its ineffi- ratist ethnic groups to lay down their arms ciency in creating or its weakness in handling and thus having overcome immediate internal the secessionist crisis, opening the way for security crises, will continue to abide by their military intervention."4l commitment to popular political participa- This point is inadequately understood by tion, the constitutional protection of minority many proponents of democratization in the rights, and regional autonomy? Third World, who tend to equate democratic The answers provided by theThirdWorld's states with weak states on the assumption that historical record to these questions do not leave strong states are bound to be autocratic by much room for optimism. Furthermore, if one nature. By making this assumption they fail goes by the eadier European experience, one to learn from the European experience that is likely to conclude that the historical junc- democracy emerged as the final stage of the ture at which most Third World states find state-building process and not at the expense themselves today is unlikely to permit a great of state building. Even in todays context, when deal of ethnic accommodation and political democratyzation cannot wait until state build- participation. These two processes usually ing is completed, it cannot tfuive in the absence run counter to the overriding imperative of Srnrn MexrNc. SrarB BnBer

Nicaragua, where it armed and equipped the al Qeda to the Saddam regime.as The U.S. Contras against the socialist Sandinista gov- invasion oflraq created the conditions for the ernment, to its venture in Afghanistan, where debilitation and potential dismemberment of it once again aimed at destabilizing and inca- the Iraqi state by destroying the Iraqi state ap- pacitating a regime that was a Soviet ally.a3 In paratus and failing to put in place an alterna- the process, it set up Afghanistan for state tive structure that would be both effective and failure but this time of a much more dire sort legitimate. Equally important, according to and with enoffnous unforeseen and unintended Robert Malley and Peter Harling, "Washing- consequences. ton's conviction that the Bdathist regime was The Soviet military intervention in Afghan- essentially Sunni (it was not) and that large istan began in earnest in December 7979,to numbers of Sunni Arabs therefore were inher- save a tottering client regime that had come to endy opposed to its overthrow (theywere not) power in April 7978but was riven with dis- became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearing re- cord and was at the same time reeling under sistance in Sunni Arab areas before it actually the pressure ofan insurgency supported by the materialised, US forces treated them harshly. United States and Pakistan.The United States This helped heighten hostility from Sunni responded to the direct Soviet intervention by Arabs who increasingly, albeit reluctantly, ratcheting up its support to the insurgents and identified themselves as such."46 The con- launching what amounted to a full-fledged sequent alienation of Sunni Arabs from the proxy war in Afghanistan billed as a jihad emerging post-Saddam structure helped cre- against godless communism. This jihad not ate a hospitable environment for the transna- only facilitated the ingathering of transna- tional jihadis to operate in. tional jihadi elements in Afghanistan but also It would be wrong to equate the Iraqi launched that country on the slippery slope of insurgency merely with transnational jihadi state failure. Following the Soviet withdrawal activities.aT However, faulty U.S. policies pro- from Afghanistan rn 1989, U.S.-armed jihadi vided crucial momentum and operating space factions fought each other brutally, destroying to shadowy organizations, such as the al- whatwas left of the state infrastructure.Thus, Zarqawi-led al Qgeda in Iraq, to prepare for they succeeded in creating a political vacuum and conduct acts of terror both within lraq and that facilitated the creation by transnational in neighboring countries.a8 The U.S. invasion jihadis of a safe haven from which they could thus created conditions that not only seemed to launch their global campaign of terror.aa It be pushing lraq toward disintegration but also is indeed ironic that the terrorist attacks of helped provide transnational jihadi terorists, 9/77were in large part the direct consequence who had lost their safe haven in Afghanistan of the externally induced collapse of the state following the U.S.{ed invasion of that country in Afghanistan, for which the United States in2007-2,with a new base from which they bore much of the responsibility. It was the ab- could operate.It is no wonder that President sence of political order in Afghanistan that George W. Bush's repeated declaration that provided al Qgeda with the opportunity and Iraq had become the center for international the space to plan and execute the attacks on terorism became a self-firlfilling prophecy. the United States. The blowback for the United States from These terrorist attacks triggered a U.S. re- the Iraq invasion is likely to be far greater than sponse that targeted not onlyAfghanistan but that from the U.S.-supported war against the also Iraq as part of the Bush administration's Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This will "war on terror." Iraq was targeted despite the be the case because, as Peter Bergen and Alec fact that there was little evidence connectins Reynolds have pointed out, "Fighters in Iraq 110 MoHelruBo Ayoos

are more battle hardened than the Afghan garding human rights mentioned earlier have Arabs, who fought demoralized Soviet army led from the early 1990s to a dramatic increase conscripts. They are testing themselves against in cases of humanitarian intervention under- arguably the best army in history, acquiring taken by major powers in the name of the in- skills in their battles against coalition forces ternational community. Some of these, such as that will be far more useful for future terrorist in Haiti, Bosnia, and EastTimor, were author- operations than those their countelparts leamed izedby the UN Security Council; others, such during the 1980s."aeJust as many of the lead- as the one in Kosovo, did not receive UN Se- ing lights of the current generation of Islamist curity Council authorization but were under- militants are veterans of the Afghan war, the taken nonetheless under the aegis ofregional insurgency in Iraq is likely to produce the lead- organizations such as NAIO. Yet others, such ership for the third generation ofjihadis, who as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, were under- are likely to pose major threats to Muslim taken unilaterally by the lone superpower, the regimes allied to the United States. According United States, with the token help of allies to Bergen and Reynolds, "fT]he blowback and camp followers in the teeth of opposition from Iraq is likely to be as painful for Saudi by most states, including the majority of the Arabia as the blowback from Afghanistan was permanent members of the Security Council. for Eglpt and Algeria during the 1990s."s0 These multifarious types of interventions Afghanistan and Iraq provide grave warn- have raised critical questions about who has ings to major powers and international insti- the right to act on behalf of the "international tutions that they should desist from undue in- community."Sl The sidelining of the Security terference, especially of the military kind, in Council, as in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq, the domestic affairs of developing countries has detracted enormously from the authority currently in the early stages of state making. of the United Nations as well as from the le- Given the fragile and contingent nature ofthe gitimacy of the interventions themselves. These state-building exercise, such intervention has latter interventions have also raised the sDecter immense potential to become the proverbial of externally assisted state breaking: Kosorro, last straw that may break the camel's back, thus virtually independent of Yugoslavia, and Iraq, leading to state evaporation. Both Afghanistan in the throes ofa brutal insurgency, are candi- and Iraq demonstrate that the disintegration dates for state failure or dismemberment or or collapse of states, even those initially not both. Such military interventions, even if un- considered important actors in the interna- dertaken for humanitarian reasons,which most tional system, often possesses the capacity to people doubt, especially in the case of Iraq, are affect the strategic interests of great powers in likely to be counterproductive and end up cre- direct and indirect ways, thus turning such ating greater disorder in the international sys- states into major issues of global concern and tem.52 The invasion of Iraq should, therefore, primary sources of systemic destabilization. act as a dire waming that the intemational com- munity, acting through the Security Council, should prevent the recurrence ofunilateral in- TsB INrnnNnrroNAL ColanatDqrTy terventionism even if contemplated by the AND HT]MANITARIAN INTBRVCNTTON lone superpower. These warnings are particularly relevant today since humanitarian interventions have come into vogue since the 1990s. The U.S. invasion CoNcrusroN of Iraq has also been justified post facto as It is in order to conclude with some policy humanitarian. The normative chanqes re- prescriptions. International norms and the SrerB MarrNc. SrarB BnrexrNc. eNo Srerp FerlunB 111 policies of international actors-lrimarily great Finally, major powers, but especially the powers and international institutions-can United States, must desist from intervening in play a crucial role in preserving international the domestic affairs of even those states that order ifthey are used sagaciously to persuade may have unsavory or hostile regimes unless domestic protagonists to make deals with one the latter directly threaten them militarily. another without violating the sovereignty of ex- The doctrine of preventive assault, as distinct isting states. Above all, the international com- from the preemption of imminent attack, munitymust strengthen the juridical status and espoused by the current U.S. administration, bolster the political authority of Third World derogates from international order not merely states by refusing to countenance secessionist because it provides a strong justification for demands while trying to persuade all parties many future interventions by many states in to accept the notion that self-determination many locales. It is very deleterious from the must be delinked from secession and should perspective of both politicai order and politi- be defined in terms of empowering those seg- cal development of targeted states because it ments of the population that have been de- ends up creating greater disorder and under- nied access to political and economic power. mining the legitimacy of established states. In other words. self-determination should be Furthermore, it can also be extremely counter- perceived as synonymous with democratiza- productive and end up creating real threats to tion (and its attendant power-sharing arrange- the security of the intervenor rather than ame- ments), rather than with the breakup of exist- liorating any presumed threats. Iraq provides ing states. an eminent example of all these outcomes oc- Such an attitude, ifadopted by the interna- curring simultaneously. tional community, will send clear signals to all The Iraqi state today is in a shambles, and concerned that the sovereign existence ofpost- the United States is widely blamed for turning colonial states is an essential prerequisite for it into a failed state where life is "poor, nasry the creation and maintenance ofboth domes- brutish, and short." The severe deterioration tic and international order. It will also signal in state cap^crty resulting from the U.S. inva- that regimes that do not demonstrate a will- sion has transformed Iraq into the largest and ingness to democratize must be ready to face safest haven for international terrorists whose international opprobrium, pariah status, and principal aim is to target the United States even sanctions. Such a stance on the part of and its allies. It has also led to a precipitate in- the international community is necessary to crease in hostility in the Muslim world toward prevent the Third World from sliding into the United States, thus helping create a reser- greater anarchy. For, above all, it must be recog- voir ofpotential terrorists that is likely to pose nized that the oroblem of order in the Third an increasing threat to U.S. interests world- World can be iackled, not by trying to tran- wide if not to the U.S. homeland itself. The scend the Westphalian model (a world made major lesson one should draw from Iraq is up of sovereign states), but by attempting to that, while it is easy to destroy state capacity by strengthen it. The root cause of disorder in the the use of overwhelming force, it is next to Third World is linked to the inadequacy of impossible to resurrect such capacity except state authority and not to the excessive use of over a long period and after great travails. state power. The augmentation of authority Moreover, there is no assurance that such a re- usually leads to a decrease in the reliance on vived state will not turn revanchist and revi- force by the state because, as Robert Jackman sionist once it has attained appropriate capa- has argued, power without force is the true bilities. State making has to be an indigenous measure of the political capaciry of states.53 process in order for the final product to be at tt2 MoHeuupo Avoon peace with itself. External intervention, even 7. Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. when undertaken with the best of intentions Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: usually it is not-has the The Violent Creation of Order," American Political -and distinct po- tential to lead to state disintegration or state Science Reztieus 7 5, no. 4 (7981): 902. failure with highly negative consequences for 8. For expanded discussions of the process of both domestic and international order. state making and its relationship to organized vio- lence, see KeithJaggers, "War and the Three Faces of Power: War Making and State Making in Europe No:rBs and the Americas," Cornparatirte Political Studies 25, no. 1 (April 1992):26-62; and Charles Tilly, "War This chapter is adapted from the author's chapter in Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Betueen De,uelopment and Destruction: An Enguiry Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Die- into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States, ed. trich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Lucvan de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Paul Scia- Cambridge University Press, 1985), 769-191. rone (London: Macmillan, 1996). 9. Cohen et a1., "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making," 905 (emphasis in the original). 1. Kalevi J. H olsti, Th e S tate, Wat; and the State of War (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. The distinction between modern sovereign 22, table 2.1..The table provides data on armed con- (or, as Charles Tilly would call them, 'hational") states flicts by qpe and region from 7945 to !995. Accord- and nation-states has been highlighted byTilly, who ing to Holsti's tabulation, which does not include has defined the former as "relatively centralized, dif- anticolonial wars ofnational liberation, 77 percent of ferentiated, and autonomous organizati on s success- the wars during the fifty-year study were internal in fi.rlly claiming priority in the use of force within large, character. If one includes anticolonial wars, the pro- contiguous, and clearly bounded territories." Nation- portion is likely to be considerably higher, probably states, on the other hand, are those "whose peoples somewhere around 90 percent. share a strong linguistic, religious, and symboJic iden- tity." Charles Trlly, Coercion, Capital, and European 2. Renata Dwan and Caroline Holmqvist, "Major States,AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Black- Armed Conflicts," in SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (New well, 1990),43. York Oxford University Press,2005), chap.2. 11. For details of this argument and the data on 3. Renata Dwan and Micaela Gustalsson, "Major which it is based, see CharlesTilly, ed., The Formation Armed Conflicts," in SIPRI Yearbook 2004 (New of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ.: York Oxford University Press,2004), chap. 3. Princeton University Press, 1975). See also Cornelia 4. Kalevi J. Holsti, "International Theory and Navari, "The Origins of the Nation-State," in The War in the Third World," in The Insecurity Dilemma: Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics, ed. National Securit! of Third World States, ed. Brian L. Leonard Tivey (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), Job (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 7992),38. 13-38. 5. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real 12. Navari, "The Origins of the Nation-State," 34. World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Conflict (New 13. Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation in York Chatham House, 1993). See also James M. tbeThird World (NewYork St. Martin's Press, 1983), Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two 1.1.,77 . Wodds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War 14. Ttlly, "Reflections on the History of Euro- Era," International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring pean State Making," in The Forrnation of National 7992):467-49I. States in Western Europe, TL

6. For greater detail on this argument, see Mo- 15. For details of this argument, see Mohammed hammed Ayoob, "The Security Predicament of the Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Making, Regional Conflict, and the International Sys- Comparative Perspective," in Holsti, The Insecurity tern (Bo'ider,Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), especially Dilemrna,63-80. chap.2. SrerB MexrNc. Srerp BnnerrNc, RNo Sr:ern Farlune 113

16. Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of versity Press, 2004); for lraq, see Larry Diamond, the Modern State (Prilceton, NJ.: Princeton Univer- Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the sity Press, 7970),57. Bungted Efort to Bring Dernocrac1 to lraq (New York: Times Books,2005). 17. Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Forma- tion and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm for 24. As Seyom Brov'm has pointed out, the intel- Research on Variations within Europe," in The For- lectual position that "servicing . . . basic human rights mation ofNational States in Western Europe,586. is the principal task of human polities-and that the worth of any polity is a function of how well it per- 18. For theoretically informed accounts of the forms this task-has put the legitimacy of all extant "cumulation of crises" in Italy and Germany, see the polities up for grabs, so to speak. Whether particular chapters on Italy and Germany by Raymond Grew nation-states, and the prevailing territorial demarca- and John R. Gillis, respectively, in Crises of Political tions, do indeed merit the badge of political legiti Development in Europe and the United States, ed. Ray- macy is, according to this view, subject to continuing mond Grew (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University assessment; accordingly, neither today's govemments Press, 1978). nor todayt borders are sacrosanct." Seyom Brown, 19. The earliest modern states of Western Eu- International Relations in a Changing Global Slstem: rope were able to complete their state-making pro- Tousard a Theory of the World Polity (Boulder, Colo.: cess three phases: (1) establishing the in near-distinct Weswiew Pre ss, 7992), 726. cenffalized, "absolutist" state at the expense of a feu- 25. For a discussion of failed states, see I. William dal order that had begun to lose much of its economic Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The Disintegration and and political utiliry (2) welding together the subjects Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder' Colo.: ofthe centralized monarchy into a people with a com- Lynne Rienner,L995). mon history legal system, language, and, quite often, 26. Charles Tripp, "Near East," in Suferpozuer religion (in the sense of Christian schisms), thus lead- and Security in tbe Third World, ed. ing to the evolution of a national identity and the Competition Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, (Cam- transformation of the centralized monarchical state Jr' bridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988)' 113. into a nation-state, and (3) gradually extending rep- resentative institutions (dictated by the necessity to 27. Gideon Gotdieb, Nation against State:A Ness co-opt into the power structure new and powerfirl so- Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sooer- cial forces that emerged as a result of the industrial eignty (New York Council on Foreign Relations, revolution), over decades, ifnot centuries. Above all, 7993),2. as Stein Rokkan has pointed out, "what is important 28. Crawford Young, "The Temple of Ethnicity"' is that the western nation-states were given a chance World Politics 35,no.4 (July 1983): 659. to solve some of the worst problems of state building 29. Charles Tilly, "National Self-Determination before they had to face the ordeals of mass politics." as a Problem for A11 of Us," Daedalus 122, no. 3 Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation (Summer 7993):30. Building," 598. 30. William Pfaff, "Invitation to \Mar," Foreign 20. For details of this argument, see Ayoob, The Afairs72, no. 3 (Summer 1993):99,107. Third World Security Predicarnent, chap.5. 31. Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis 21. Robert H. Jackson, "Qrasi-States, Dual ofthe Post-Soviet State," Suroiaal35, no.1 (Spring Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International 7993):72.

Jurisprudence and the Third World," International 32. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, Organization 4t, no. 4 (Autumn 7987): 529. International Relations and the Third World (Cam- Cambridge University Press, 1990). 22. R. J. Vinc ent, Human Rights and International bridge: Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 33. For details of the situation in Afghanistan in 7986),19-36. the 1980s during the height ofsuperpower involve- 23. For Sri Lanka, see Neil Devotta, Blottsback: ment in that country's civil war, see Ohiet Roy, Islam Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic and Resistance in Afghanistan, 2r,d ed. (Cambridge: Conflict in Sri Lanka (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Uni- Cambridge University Press, 1990). rt4 MonelruBo Ayoos

34. Michael Renner, Snall Arms, Big Impax: The 45. Richard A . Clarke,Against All Enemies: Inside Mxt Challenge of Disarmamenr (Washington, D.C.: America's War on Terror (NewYork: Free Press, 2004); Worldwatch Institute, 7997).See also British Amer- and Scott Ritter,Iraq Confidential:The Untold Story of ican Security Information Council, Stopping the the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Spread of Small Arms: International Initiatioes, rcport Overthroro Saddam Hussein (NewYork Nation Books, of a seminar held at the United Nations, New York, 2oos). September 25, 1998. 46. Robert Malley and Peter Harling,'A Counter- 35. Alex de Waal, "Contemporary Warfare in intuitive Strategy for Iraq," Financial Times,Novem- Africa: Changing Context, Changing Strategies," ber 22,2005. IDS Bulletin27,no.3 (7996), 6. 47. For the complex nature ofthe Iraqi insurgency, 36. L William Zartman, "Introduction: Posing see Ahmed S. Hashim, "Iraq: From Insurgency to the Problem of State Collapse," in Collapsed States,8. Civil War?" Current History 704, no. 678 (January 37. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, "From 2005): 10-18; and Ahmed S. Hashim, "Iraqt Chaos: Wars to Complex PoJitical Emergencies: Understand- Why the Insurgency Wont Go Awayl' Boston Re- ing Conflict and Peace-Building in the NewWorld vieu, O ctoberNovember 2004. Disorder," Third World Quarteily 20, no. 1 (February 48. A number of stringent critiques of the U.S. 1999):19.The authors provide examples from Sudan, invasion oflraq, the subsequent failure in putting to- Liberia, and Afghanistan to demonstrate that conflict gether a viable system in the country and the impact entrepreneurs benefit from intemal war and thus pos- of both these factors on the war against terrorism sess a vested interest in their indefinite continuation. have been published recendy. The following are among 38. Democratization is used in the sense of move- the best: George Packer, The Assassini Gate:America ment toward democracy; the latter is perceived as the in Irag (NewYork Farrar, Straus and Girorx,2005); desired goal, while the former is the process through Larry Diamond, Squandered lictory: Tlte American which this goal is achieved or at least approximated. Occupation and tbe Bungled Efort to Bring Democracy 39. Ren6e de Nevers, "Democratization and to Irag (NewYork: Times Books,2005); and Daniel Ethnic Conflict," Surztioal 35, no.2 (Summer 1993): Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The J I-JZ. Failure of the War on Terror and the Strategy of Getting It Right (New York 40. John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Times Books, 2005). Parochialism," Survival 35,no. 1 (Spring 7993): 168. 49. Peter Bergen and AIec Reynolds, "Blowback 41. Larry Diamond,JuanJ.Linz, and Seymour Revisited: Today's Insurgents in Iraq Are Tomorrowt Martin Lipset, "Introduction: Comparing Experi- Terrorists," Foreign Afairs 84, no. 6 (November ences with Democracy," in Politics in Dneloping Coun- December 2005): 4. tries: Comparing Experiences taith Democracy, ed. 50. Ibid.,6. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin 51. Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Inter- (Boulder, Lipset Colo.: Lynne Rienner,7990), 29. vention and International Society," Global Gooernance 42. Mohammed Ayoob, "Security Problematic of 7, no. 3 ( July-September 2001) : 225-230; and Mo- the Third World," World Politics 43, no.2 (Jantary hammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and 7997):257-283. State Sovereignty," International Journal of Human 43. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim. Bad Mus- Rights 6,no. 1 (Spring 2002):87-702. lim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror 52. Mohammed Ayoob, "The War against Irag: (New York Pantheon, 2004). Normative and Strategic Implications," Middle East 44. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil Policy 70, no.2 (Summer 2003): 27-19. and Fundamentalism (New in Central Asia Haven, 53. Robert W. J ackman, Pozoer ut i th o u t Forc e : Th e Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000). Political Capacity of Nation-States (Ann Arbor: Uni- versity of Michigan Press, 1993).