President Carter's Korean Withdrawal Policy
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Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 1989 President Carter's Korean Withdrawal Policy Tae Hwan Ok Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Ok, Tae Hwan, "President Carter's Korean Withdrawal Policy" (1989). Dissertations. 2713. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2713 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1989 Tae Hwan Ok PRESIDENT CARTER'S KOREAN WITHDRAWAL POLICY by Tae Hwan Ok A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy November 1989 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation was initiated and completed during my five years of study as a graduate student at the History Department of Loyola University of Chicago. The greatest debt I owe is to Professor Theodore J. Karamanski. As director, Dr. Karamanski has been intimately associated with my dissertation throughout the course of the study. He has generously given his time. His discussions, clarifications, and suggestions through the course of various drafts were especially fruitful. I wish to thank other members of the committee, Dr. Sheldon s. Cohen and Dr. Mark A. Allee, for their helpful suggestions and comments. I am especially indebted to my wife, Kyung Hee Ok (Mok), and my daughter, Justine Mina, for their encouragement and sacrifices. I would like to extend my thanks to the following people for their invaluable assistance in this undertaking: Dr. Joseph A. Gagliano, Dr. Thomas L. Hogan, Dr. Bonnie Oh, Dr. James L. Penick, Dr. Barbara H. Rosenwein, Dr. Henry Cohen, Lorna R. Newman, and In Sik Imm. ii VITA The author, Tae Hwan Ok, is the son of Nam Oh Ok and So soo (Yoon) Ok. He was born on December 27, 1947, in Jin Dong, Kyung Sang Nam Do, Korea. His elementary education was obtained in the public schools of Jin Dong and Masan, Korea. His secondary education was completed in 1966 at the Masan High School. After graduating from high school, he studied in the History Department of the University of Sung Kyun Kwan in Seoul for one year, and then transferred to the English Literature Department of Yon Sei University in Seoul. When he was a junior, he became the chairman of the student senate. In that same year, he joined the Army. After three years service as an artilleryman, he continued his studies at the university. After graduating, he worked at the Oriental Fire & Marine Insurance company in Seoul for 5 years as an assistant manager of the Marine & Aviation Department. In January 1985 he received a Master's degree in history from Roosevelt University in Chicago, Illinois. In September 1985, Mr. Ok was granted an assistantship in history at Loyola University, which enable him to complete Ph.D. in history in January 1990. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii VITA . iii LIST OF TABLES iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vi Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ......................... 1 II. ORIGINS OF THE WITHDRAWAL PLAN ....... 11 III. THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA 20 IV. THE WITHDRAWAL DECISION PROCESS 26 v. THE SINGLAUB AFFAIR 40 VI. CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES vs. LIBERAL DEMOCRATS; THE SINGLAUB HEARINGS ..... 65 VII. HABIB AND BROWN'S TRIP TO SEOUL 85 VIII. THE BYRD AMENDMENT 93 IX. THE TENTH ANNUAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE 99 X. SAMUELS. STRATTON AND CONGRESSIONAL OPPONENTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . • • • . 109 XI. MILITARY OPINION • . • . 122 XII. SCHOLARLY OPINION 135 iv XIII. NEWSPAPERS VIEWS 151 XIV. PUBLIC OPINION 169 xv. KOREAGATE AND KOREAN MILITARY AID PACKAGE 180 XVI. PRESIDENTIAL RECONSIDERATION 199 XVII. SOUTH KOREAN REACTIONS 209 XVIII. CARTER'S TRIP TO KOREA AND SUSPENSION OF THE PULLOUT • . • . • . • . 2 3 9 XIX. JAPANESE REACTIONS 250 xx. CONCLUSION 266 BIBLIOGRAPHY 275 V LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CP Cleveland Press CSM Christian Science Monitor CST Chicago Sun Times CT Chicago Tribune CQWR Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report DN Detroit News DSB Department of State Bulletin FEER Far Eastern Economic Review HP Houston Post LAT Los Angeles Times NYT New York Times PPP Public Papers of the Presidents SFC San Francisco Chronicle SLPD st. Louis Post Dispatch USNWR U.S. News & World Report WCPD Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents WHCFSF White House Central File, Subject File WP Washington Post WSJ Wall Street Journal vi CHAPTER :I :IHTRODUCT:IOB The Korean peninsula has been geopolitically critical to the neighboring three great powers in the Far East - China, Russia, and Japan. The peninsula has been regarded by them as either a defensive barrier or a dangerous exposed flank. Therefore, each of these three great powers have over the centuries made strenuous efforts to keep the Korean peninsula under their control.1 Unlike these three great Asian powers, the United States, located about 6, 000 miles away from the peninsula, showed little interest in Korea except for missionary activity after opening official diplomatic relations in 1882. 2 In 1901 Admiral Frederick Rogers urged the United States Government to negotiate for a naval base in Korea in order to check the Russian and German fleets in that area. However, the proposal 1. Richard G. Stilwell, "The Need For U. S. Ground Forces in Korea," The American Enterprise Institute Defense Review (May 1977), 15. 2. James William Morley, "The Dynamics of the Korean Connection, " in The U. S. South Korean Al 1 iance Evolving Patterns in Security Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), 10-1. 1 2 was rejected by the General Board of the United States Navy because Korea was located far from the American Naval base in the Philippines and was too close to Russian and German naval bases. 3 The following year, the United States government again considered building an American naval base at Masanpo in Korea, but the plan was canceled because of the General Board's opinion that "a Korean base would be superfluous if Japan were an ally. With Japan an enemy, it would be untenable. 114 In 1905 the United States consented to Japan's control over Korea in accordance with the Taft-Katsura Agreement. The Japanese victory over Russia had aroused considerable uneasiness over the security of the Philippines.5 The United 3. William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific. 1897 - 1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), 131. Immediately after the Spanish American War, the U.S. Navy urgently needed a body to study newly gained overseas possessions. So, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long established the General Board of the Navy in March 1900 under the presidency of Admiral George Dewey. The body had no executive function but played a purely advisory role. The Board generally made recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy on policies, war plans, naval bases, etc .. 4 . Ibid., 134. 5. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Meredith Corporation, 1969), 519. Howard K. Beale said in his book Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power that in his effarts to end the Russo-Japanese war, Roosevelt sacrificed Korean independence. Meanwhile, Tyler Dennett argued in his book Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War that the United States did not sacrifice Korea for the sake of the Philippines. Instead, Korea herself had consented to the establishment of a virtual Japanese protectorate during the Russo-Japanese war. 3 states also believed a strong Japan could check Russian expansion in the Far East and would help to maintain the balance of power in that area. The agreement over Korea was a small price to pay for good relations with Asia's most powerful nation. After 1905 Korea became a forgotten nation for the United states. America's ignorance of Korea continued through-out world War II. The United States•s relations with the Korean people were reopened in September 1945, a month after World War II ended, when American forces landed in Korea in order to accept the surrender of Japanese forces south of the 38th parallel. The United states agreed to let the Soviet Union perform the same function in the rest of the peninsula.6 In addition to disarming Japanese military personnel, the occupation forces under General John R. Hodge had another mission, to keep order in the nation until the Koreans could organize their own government.7 In 1948, President Harry S. Truman decided to withdraw American troops from South Korea, partly because the occupation forces completed their mission when the South Koreans formed their own government through free elections in 1948 and partly because his National Security Council 6• Suk Bok Lee, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 4. 7 • Ibid., 7. 4 recommended the evacuation of American troops. The Joint chiefs of staff had decided that "Korea was of little strategic value to the United States and any commitment to u.s. use of military forces in Korea would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of the potentialities of the overall world situation."8 In the middle of September 1948, a month after the birth of the south Korean Government, American units began to pull out. The withdrawal of about 45,000 soldiers from South Korea was completed by the end of June 1949, leaving only a token United States military presence.9 The heavy military imbalance between South and North Korea and Secretary of State Dean Acheson's declaration of 5 January 1950 that South Korea would not be included in the United States new defense line encouraged Kim Il Sung and Soviet premier Joseph V.