Fizzling the Plutonium Economy: Origins of the April 1977 Carter Administration Fuel Cycle Policy Transition
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Fizzling the Plutonium Economy: Origins of the April 1977 Carter Administration Fuel Cycle Policy Transition The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Williams, Peter King. 2010. Fizzling the Plutonium Economy: Origins of the April 1977 Carter Administration Fuel Cycle Policy Transition. Master's thesis, Harvard University, Extension School. Citable link https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37367548 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Fizzling the Plutonium Economy: Origins of the April 1977 Carter Administration Fuel Cycle Policy Transition Peter Williams A Thesis in the Field of History for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies Harvard University May 2010 © 2010 Peter Williams Abstract This study examines the scientific advocacy that shaped President Carter’s April 1977 policy decision to block the domestic implementation of so-called “plutonium economy” technologies, and thereby mandate the use of an “open” or “once–through” fuel cycle for U.S. nuclear power reactors. This policy transition was controversial, causing friction with U.S. allies, with the nuclear power industry, and with Congress. Early in his presidential campaign, Carter criticized the excessive federal financial commitment to developing plutonium-based reactors and adopted the view that the weapons proliferation risks of plutonium economy technologies were serious and needed to be addressed. President Carter announced his intention to implement these policy views through statements in April 1977 that defined his administration’s policy to forgo so-called “plutonium economy” technologies. This study traces the origins of President Carter’s once-through fuel cycle policy via a close analysis of the networks that channeled policy advice on this matter to Carter. A key finding is that Carter’s opposition to the plutonium economy technology program represented a purposefully nuanced compromise within the larger context of his nuclear power and national energy policies. While Carter was very much the author of this position, key scientific advocacy efforts framed the policy debate and reinforced his confidence in the technical, economic, and diplomatic feasibility of his fuel cycle policy. Frontispiece © Robert Mankoff/The New Yorker Collection/www.cartoonbank.com iv Dedication For my family, with love – This work is as much a product of your support and encouragement as my effort. v Acknowledgements First and foremost, I thank my wife Lisa and my daughters Erica and Grace for their support and forbearance during the time that I worked on this proJect. I have drawn heavily on reservoirs of good will that I hope now to refill. I offer thanks for the supervision and indulgence of Dr. Donald Ostrowski and Professor Everett Mendelsohn in guiding me through the process of selecting a suitable topic and then completing this proJect. It has been my great good fortune to meet both of you. Thanks also to Peter O’Malley and Kerry Buchannan for their advice and assistance at critical points in my transit through the ALM program. Thanks also to my fellow ALM program students. I gained insight and encouragement from our monthly group sessions with Don Ostrowski. It would have been more difficult to glean new insights into this topic had I not been able to interview many of the protagonists. I would therefore like to heartily thank the following busy people for so generously agreeing to be interviewed and for encouraging me in my task: Dean Abrahamson; Peter Bourne; Joe Browder; Chris Brown; Albert Carnesale; Thomas Cochran; Stuart Eizenstat; David Freeman; Richard Gardner; Spurgeon Keeny; Joe Nye; Gus Speth; Steven Stark; Lynn Weaver; and Mason Willrich. While I benefitted enormously from the insights I derived from my interactions with all of the people mentioned above, any error in interpreting or presenting their views is my own. In this context, it is important to mention that I was unable to arrange interviews, despite attempts to vi do so, with several persons significant to these events. The most notable such omission was President Carter, whom could undoubtedly shed much light on his influences and motivations in these matters. I have had to therefore rely on analysis and inference to form my conclusions and build my narrative, as is usually the case in historical scholarship. I apologize to President Carter in advance for any misJudgments that derive from this approach. A brief encounter with Professor David Hackett Fischer was decisive in influencing the structure of this work. In following Professor Fischer’s example, I wrote a series of analytical appendices to help make sense of persons, events, and connections before I made final decisions about how to structure the narrative chapters. I therefore thank Professor Fischer for his example and advice. I would also like to thank David Stanhope, Jay Hakes, and Bert Nason of the Carter Library in Atlanta for their hospitality and assistance. Thanks particularly to Mr. Nason for helping me make the most of research opportunities while there. After meeting Mr. Hakes, I enJoyed reading his recent book, A Declaration of Energy Independence, which educated me on the history of the idea of energy independence in U.S. political discourse. I spent many productive hours in Harvard’s Widener Library and thank the staff there for many episodes of assistance and for maintaining such a magnificent research resource. vii Table of Contents Dedication ..................................................................................................................................................... v Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................................vi List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................viii List of Figures .......................................................................................................................................... xiv I. Introduction..............................................................................................................................................1 Carter Campaign Platform on Nuclear Power..................................................4 Ford Administration Response on Reprocessing Policy..............................9 The Ford/MITRE Study........................................................................................... 10 Carter Nuclear Policy Statements of April 1977 .......................................... 13 Rethinking the Origins of Carter Administration Fuel Cycle Policy..... 18 II. Background to the Plutonium Economy Policy Debate..................................................... 21 The Nuclear Subgovernment ................................................................................ 26 NASA Challenge and the 1962 Report to the President ............................ 28 The Great Bandwagon and the Plutonium Economy ................................. 37 Nixon Administration Budget Contests............................................................ 39 President Nixon Promotes the LMFBR............................................................. 41 Emergence of Opposition to AEC Reactor Programs.................................. 43 Adversary Science and Technology Assessment.......................................... 48 viii Dismantling the AEC................................................................................................. 50 1973 Oil Shock Effects ............................................................................................. 52 The U.S. Enrichment Capacity Crunch .............................................................. 54 1974 Indian Test ........................................................................................................ 56 Issue Networks and the Nuclear Subgovernment....................................... 57 III. The Anti-Plutonium Issue Network.......................................................................................... 60 NRDC Origins ............................................................................................................... 62 SIPI versus AEC Lawsuit ......................................................................................... 64 NRDC Plutonium Economy Policy Analysis.................................................... 67 Contesting the Uranium Shortage Assumption ............................................ 68 LMFBR Program Misallocates Federal Resources....................................... 70 “Hot Particle” Theory of Plutonium Toxicity ................................................. 71 Plutonium Diversion and Civil Liberties.......................................................... 72 Confederates in Anti-Plutonium Economy Advocacy ................................ 74 NRDC Intervention in LMFBR and GESMO EIS Proceedings................... 79 NRDC Role in Framing Plutonium Policy Choices in Early 1975 .......... 83 NRDC Involvement in the Carter Campaign................................................... 85 IV. Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project 1972-1974.........................................................