National States and International Science: A Comparative History of International Science Congresses in Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, and

Osiris 2005

Doel, Ronald E. Department of History (and Department of Geosciences), Oregon State University

Originally published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society and can be found at: http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=osiris

Citation: Doel, R. E. (2005). National states and international science; A comparative history of international science congresses in Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, and Cold War United States. Osiris, 20, 49-76. Available from JSTOR website: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3655251 National States and International Science: A ComparativeHistory of International Science Congresses in Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, and Cold WarUnited States

Ronald E. Doel, Dieter Hoffmann, and Nikolai Krementsov*

ABSTRACT

Priorstudies of modem scientificinternationalism have been writtenprimarily from the point of view of scientists, with little regardto the influenceof the state. This studyexamines the state'srole in internationalscientific relations. States sometimes encouragedscientific internationalism;in the mid-twentiethcentury, they often sought to restrictit. The presentstudy examines state involvementin international scientific congresses, the primaryintersection between the national and interna- tional dimensionsof scientists'activities. Here we examine three comparativein- stancesin which such restrictionsaffected scientific internationalism: an attemptto bring an internationalaerodynamics congress to Nazi Germanyin the late 1930s, unsuccessfulefforts by Soviet geneticiststo host the SeventhInternational Congress in Moscow in 1937, and efforts by U.S. scientists to host international meetingsin 1950s cold warAmerica. These case studieschallenge the classical ide- ology of scientificinternationalism, wherein participation by a nationin a scientist's fame sparesthe scientistconflict betweenadvancing his science and advancingthe interestsof his nation. In the cases we consider, scientists found it difficultto si- multaneouslysupport scientific universalism and elitist practices.Interest in these congressesreached the top levels of the state, and access to patronagebeyond state controlhelped determine their outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

Internationalism has been a focus of attention for historians of science for many years. They have examined the rapid "rise" of international science in the decades preced- ing World War I, its "disruption" during the war, and its slow "restoration" after the

*RonaldE. Doel, Departmentof History,Oregon State University, 306 MilamHall, Corvallis, OR 97331; [email protected] Hoffmann, MPI fur Wissenschaftsgeschichte,Wilhelm- straBe44, D-10117, Berlin, Germany;[email protected]. Nikolai Krementsov,Senior Re- searcher,Institute for the History of Science and Technology, St. PetersburgBranch, Russian Acad- emy of Sciences, 5/1 Universityemb., St. Petersburg,Russia, 198036; and Institutefor the Historyand Philosophy of Science and Technology, Universityof Toronto,91 Charles StreetWest, Toronto,ON CanadaM5S 1 K7; [email protected].

2005 by The History of Science Society. All rightsreserved. 0369-7827/05/2001-0003$10.00

OSIRIS2005, 20: 49-76 49 50 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV end of hostilities.' International scientific institutions, research centers, associations, philanthropic support, and prizes (from the International Research Council to the and the Nobel Prizes) have all come under close scrutiny.2 Previous studies, however, have analyzed international science primarily from the point of view of scientists. The inflammatory German "Appeal to the Civilized World" in 1914, as well as the subsequent decision by French, British, and U.S. scientists to exclude German researchers from international scientific unions following World War I, have received special attention.3 These interconnected episodes have often been viewed as significant breaches in the then-prevailing ideology of republic-of- letters internationalism, perpetuated by scientists themselves, that science was a transnational activity uncontaminated by the sordid realm of politics.4 Much of this literature assumes that international relations constitute an essential feature of "nor- mal" science: in the absence of major disruptions such as world wars, international science persists because scientists actively seek "internationalization." In this study, we examine the state's role in international scientific relations. In in- vestigating how states shape the practice of science, we focus on international con- gresses, since they are the most explicit intersection between the "national" and "in- terational" dimensions of scientists' activities. Scientists from various countries negotiate the locations, program contents, and accompanying exhibitions of the con- gresses. At the same time, they provide avenues for host country scientists to advance local agendas and to enhance the visibility of their disciplines in the eyes of domestic patrons (hence the often fierce competition among national communities for the chance to host the congresses). Specifically, we examine attempts to host an international congress in applied me- chanics in Germany in the 1930s and early 1940s, an international genetics confer- ence in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and an international astronomical congress in the United States in the 1950s. In the German case, a proposed 1942 meeting of the

See, e.g., Seigfried Grundmann,"Zum Boykott der deutschen Wissenschaft nach dem ersten Weltkrieg,"Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der TechnischenUniversitat Dresden 14 (1965): 799-906; Daniel J. Kevles, "IntoHostile PoliticalCamps: The Reorganizationof InternationalScience in World War I," Isis 62 (1970): 47-60; Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus,"Pas de Locarno pour la science: La cooperation scientifique internationaleet la politique etrangere des Etats pendant l'entre-deux- guerres,"Relations Internationales46 (1986): 173-94; and ElisabethT. Crawford,"Internationalism in Science as a Casualtyof the FirstWorld War," Social Science Information27 (1988): 163-201. 2 For an entryto this literature,see Paul Forman,"Scientific Internationalism and the WeimarPhysi- cists: The Ideology and Its Manipulationin Germanyafter World War I," Isis 64 (1973): 151-80; Wolf- gang Biedermann,"Zur Finanzierung der Instituteder Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaftzur Forderung der WissenschaftenMitte der 20er bis zur Mitte der 40er Jahredes 20. Jahrhunderts,"in Wissenschaft und Innovation: WissenschaftsforschungJahrbuch 2001, ed. Heinrich Parthey and Gunther Spur (Berlin, 2002); GeorgeW. Gray,Education on an InternationalScale: A History of the International EducationBoard, 1923-1938 (Westport,1978); and RobertM. Friedman,The Politics of Excellence: Behind the Nobel Prize in Science (New York,2001). 3 See, e.g., StefanL. Wolff, "Physicistsin the 'Kriegder Geister':Wilhelm Wien's 'Proclamation,"' Historical Studiesin the Physical and Biological Sciences 33 (2003): 337-68; andJurgen von Ungern- Sternbergand Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg,DerAufruf "Andie Kulturwelt!"Das Manifestder 93 und die Anfinge der Kriegspropagandaim Ersten Weltkrieg(Stuttgart, 1996). 4 ToreFrangsmyr, ed., Solomon's House Revisited:The Organizationand Institutionalizationof Sci- ence (Canton, Mass., 1990); Elisabeth T. Crawford,Nationalism and Internationalismin Science, 1880-1939: Four Studies of the Nobel Population (New York, 1992); Elisabeth T. Crawford,Terry Shinn, and Sverker Sorlin, eds., Denationalizing Science: The Contexts of InternationalScientific Practice (Dordrecht,1992); ReinhardSiegmund-Schultze, Rockefeller and the Internationalizationof Mathematicsbetween the WorldWars (Basel, 2001); and FrankGreenaway, Science International:A History of the InternationalCouncil of Scientific Unions (Cambridge,1996). NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 51

InternationalCongress for Pure and Applied Mechanics (ICPAM),sought by the leader of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft(KWG) Institute for AeronauticsRe- search,was rejectedby foreign colleagues because the National Socialist state for- bade the attendanceof Germanand foreignJews. In the Soviet case, the government canceled the scheduled 1937 Seventh InternationalGenetics Congress in Moscow becausePolitburo leaders doubted the congresswould provide the anticipatedpropa- ganda windfall.Finally, in the U.S. case, the state sought to preventscientists from "unrecognizedregimes" (particularly Communist ) from attendinga scheduled meetingof the InternationalAstronomical Union in Californiain 1961. In each case, we explore the continuousnegotiations over the issues of these congresses between the scientistsof the host countryand theirstate patrons on the one hand,and between the scientistsand their foreign colleagues on the other. Despite the differencesin time periodsand scientificdisciplines, all of these case studies shareone significanttrait: the overridinginfluence of the state as patron.5In the 1930s, the Germanand Soviet states were the primarypatrons for science within those nations.By the 1950s, the samehad become true forAmerican science. All three cases demonstratehow the influenceof state patronageundermines the classic for- mulationof the ideology of scientificinternationalism-that "theparticipation of the nationin the scientist'sfame sparesthe scientist any conflict between advancinghis science and advancingthe interestsof his nation."6 Althoughlocal, political, and ideological contexts vary significantlyamong these cases, other similarities may be noted. Both the German and U.S. governments stressedideological issues of greatnational concern at the time (racialpolicies in Ger- many, anticommunismin the United States). The prestige value of science caused leadersin two of these states (JosephStalin and Dwight D. Eisenhower)to become directlyinvolved in the issue of internationalcongresses. In all cases, scientistspro- moted "nationalistic"advantages for hosting scientific congresses to state officials, recognizingthat the statecould encourageor limit "internationalscience," depending on its concretegoals. (The Politburofirst endorsed, then canceled,then reinstatedthe genetics congress;the U.S. government,after the launchof Sputnikin October1957, encouragedincreased interaction with Soviet scientists even as it sought to isolate CommunistChinese researchers.) The threecases thatwe considerhere have remainedpoorly understooduntil now. To shield evidenceof politicalcompromises from foreigncolleagues, and to preserve the illusion that core values of "internationalism"had not been compromised,top leaders of the respective disciplinarycommunities generally kept these stories to themselves.This articleis thereforebuilt on intensivearchival research.

GERMANY

As the Weimarera closed with Hitler'sappointment as Germanchancellor in January 1933, bringingthe NationalSocialists to power,German scientists began experienc- ing profoundchallenges in maintainingcontacts with colleagues in othercountries.

5 On state influence on scientific practice, see Michael Gordin,Walter Grunden, Mark Walker, and Zuoyue Wang,"Ideologically Correct Science," in Science and Ideology:A ComiparativeHistory, ed. MarkWalker (London, 2003), 35-65. 6 Forman,"Scientific Internationalism" (cit. n. 2), 152; Nikolai Krementsov,International Science between the WorldWars: The Case of Genetics (London, 2005). 52 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV

The passage of the civil service law of April 7, 1933 (formingthe basis for discrimi- nating against all individualsat universitiesand researchinstitutes who were even partly Jewish or "politicallyunreliable"), affected all scientific fields in Germany, causing a mass exodus from the countryof scientific workers.7These developments buffetedGermany's scientific standing and its role withininternational scientific bod- ies, heighteningthe nation'spostwar isolation following the InternationalRelations Council's 1919 decision to ban Germanand Austrianmembership and the hyper- inflation of the reichsmarkin 1923.8While Nazi officials recognized that hosting internationalevents could enhancethe prestigeof the new government-for instance, the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin-the state saw little value in promotinginterna- tionalscientific activities. After Germany left the Leagueof Nationsin 1936, the state forbadeits scientistsfrom any contactswith the league's scientificprogram.9 The challenge of maintaininga Germanpresence in internationalscience was es- pecially felt within the InternationalCongress for Pure andApplied Mechanics,the scientificbody for researchersworking on turbulencetheory, theoretical aerodynam- ics, dynamicalmeteorology, and applied flight dynamics.Rising anti-Semitismhad inspiredthe Hungarian-bornTheodore von Karman,the turbulenceexpert who had headedthe AerodynamicsInstitute at Aachen,to acceptCaltech's 1929 offer to direct its newly establishedGuggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory.0l In 1933, Richardvon Mises of the Institutefor Applied Mathematicsat Berlin, a leaderin the GermanSo- ciety forAppliedMathematics and Mechanics (GAMM), ran afoul of theprofessional civil service law. Althoughvon Mises could have securedan exemption,he left Ger- manyto acceptan endowedprofessorship in Istanbul.These emigrationsleft only one seniorGerman representative on the InternationalCommittee (IC) of the ICPAM:the Gottingen-basedaerodynamicist Ludwig Prandtl. Prandtlhad long sought to bringan ICPAMmeeting to Germansoil; the congress had met formallyin Delft in 1924, Zurichin 1926, and Stockholmin 1930. Founded in 1922 by Prandtl'sformer protege von Kairmain,by 1924 the ICPAMhad severalna- tional adherents,including Holland (150 members),England (59), Germany(103), Italy (37), the UnitedStates (17), andthe Soviet Union (10)." Aviationdevelopments dependedupon such critical disciplines as fluiddynamics, turbulence theory, and pure and appliedmechanics. Although the Treatyof Versailleshad limited Germanavia- tion to lighter-than-airships, its industrieshad begun developingfixed-wing aircraft by the early 1930s. Germany'sbasic and applied mechanics research was world renowned.12

7 Ute Deichmann,Biologists underHitler (Cambridge,1996), especially 11-24. 8 Kevles, "IntoHostile Political Camps"(cit. n. 1); A. G. Cock, "Chauvinismand Internationalism in Science: The InternationalResearch Council, 1919-1926," Notes and Recordsof the Royal Society London37 (1983): 249-88; and Biedermann,"Zur (cit. n. 2). of 9 Finanzierung" Dieter Hoffmann,"Zur Teilnahme Deutscher Physiker an den KopenhagenerPhysikerkonferen- zen nach 1933 sowie am 2. KongreBfur EinheitderWissenschaft, Kopenhagen 1936," NTM 25 (1988): 49-55. 10 Michael H. Gorn, The UniversalMan: Theodorevon Karman's Life in Aeronautics(Washington, D.C., 1992). " Prandtl,letter attachment,13 March 1934, IIIAbt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2146, Archiv zur Geschichte der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft(MPGA), Berlin; "InternationalCongress on Mechanics MembershipList, 1924,"Box 46, folder 12, Theodorevon KarmainPapers (hereafter cited as von KarmanPapers), Cal- tech Archives, Pasadena. 12 MoritzEpple, "Rechnen,Messen, Fuhren:Kriegsforschung am Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institutfur Stro- mungsforschung(1937-1945)," Vorabdruckeaus dem ForschungsprogrammGeschichte der Kaiser- NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 53

In 1934, Prandtlbegan workingto bring the 1938 appliedmechanics congress to Germany.Early that year, he had sharedhis desire to do so with officialsin the Reich PropagandaMinistry. While many ICPAMmembers wished to meet in Germany, Prandtlargued, new raciallaws threatenedthis plan:foreign Jewish colleagues, even those "extraordinarilyqualified," would be barred.Prandtl successfully secured an exemptionfor all internationalICPAM members. Hosting this meetingwould "show- case the new Germany,"the ministrydeclared, and "working under the flag of science would bring us successfully to our goals."13However, just before the 1934 ICPAM meeting convened at CambridgeUniversity, the bloody "nightof the long knives" purgeoccurred. Prandtl realized the congress'sIC-its Westernmembers already dis- tressedby swelling ranksof refugeeJewish scholars-would likely rejecta German invitationas a result. He thus presentedthe invitationfor the 1938 conferencewith little fanfare,intending Germany to be the leadingcontender for the subsequent1942 meeting. Perhapsby then, he explained to a Swiss colleague, some of Germany's racialproblems "that are difficultin the momentcould be smoother."14Showcasing Germanachievements in aerodynamicshad not been his only motivationin attempt- ing to bringthe congressto Germany:as he advisedthe ForeignMinistry in Decem- ber 1933, nationalaeronautical research would be endangeredby yielding to Reich officials convinced that Germanyneeded to avoid foreign meetings entirely rather thanmeet with foreignJewish scientists.15 In Cambridge,the IC indeed declined Germany's1938 invitation.It also declined von Mises's offer to meet in Turkey,preferring a U.S. proposalto meet at MIT.Fol- lowing past practices,IC membersformally placed Prandtl'sand von Mises's appli- cationsin its files, expressinghope thatthey would be renewedlater.16 Pleasedby the IC's vote, Prandtlbegan planning for the 1942 congress.During the mid-1930s, Prandtl'sstanding within Nazi Germanysteadily increased. President of the influentialLilienthal Society for AeronauticsResearch, recipientof numerous nationalawards, Prandtl was nearingthe zenith of his career.As Germany'sleading expertin fluid dynamics,he gained new responsibilitiesas the Air Ministrybecame more openly engagedin formerlysecret military aviation. Self-confident, nationalis- tic, andwell-connected, Prandtl became a criticalfigure in the emergingnexus of aca- demic scientists,arms technologists, and the state's war ministries.In 1937, Prandtl, then sixty-two,became head of his own independentKWG Institute for Aeronautics Research.'7Despite his expandingpolitical authority, however, he foundit difficultto prepareGermany's bid for the mechanicscongress. Material shortages and statecon- trol of foreigncurrency were two problems.The biggerchallenge he faced, however, was persuadingthe GermanEducation Ministry to acknowledgethe value of interna- tional scientificcooperation.

Wilhem-Gesellschaftim Nationalsozialismus,2002; see also MoritzEpple, Andreas Karachalios, and VolkerR. Remmert,"Aerodynamics and Mathematicsin NationalSocialist Germanyand FascistItaly: A Comparisonof ResearchInstitutes" (this volume). 13 Reichsministerfur Volksaufklarungund Propagandato Prandtl,16 May 1934, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2146, MPGA. 14 Prandtlto E. MeiBner,14 May 1934, and Prandtlto Reich Foreign Ministry, 13 June 1934, both III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2146; and Prandtlto R. Grammel, 29 Nov. 1933, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2145, MPGA. 15 Prandtlto Reich ForeignMinistry, 4 Dec. 1933, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2145, MPGA. 16 Prandtlto Reich EducationMinister, ca. Oct. 1936, IIIAbt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2148, MPGA. 17 Epple, "Rechnen,Messen, Ftihren"(cit. n. 12), 18, 37. 54 RONALD E. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV

Five months before the next IC meeting, scheduled for the start of the 1938 as- sembly,Prandtl again turned his attentionto Germany'sinvitation for 1942. Initially, he seemeddiscouraged. The centralquestion remained: Would Germany's racial poli- cies preventall Jewishscientists-foreign andGerman-from participating?Prandtl felt especially troubledby the case of HansReissner. Reissner's forced resignation in 1936 fromtwo distinguishedposts (headof the GermanAviation Committee and dis- tinguishedprofessor of engineeringin Berlin) deeply worriedhis non-Germancol- leagues.'8Another looming problem was a proposedmerger between GAMM and the GermanEngineering Society (VDI). VDI leaderswere stronglyanti-Semitic and wantedto oust the remainingJewish membersfrom GAMM.19Prandtl had opposed removing Jewish engineers from his own institute, and he seemed personallydis- tressedat the fate of the Jewishengineers he knew.Yet he madeno strongstand against these decisions; indeed,he triedto smoothover relationswith the powerfulVDI and quietly allowed the names of JewishGAMM members to be deleted.20 Prandtlwas especially perturbedwhen state actions threatenedto become public andvisible, thusundermining his hopes for Germany'srole in 1942. Privately,Prandtl voiced frustrationwith the VDI, which refusedto printor acknowledgebooks writ- ten by non-Aryans-a viewpoint proudly advertisedin their publications.Even in 1938, GAMM'smembership remained more than 32 percentforeign, and its journals sold well in foreigncountries. The idea of not readingan importantbook simply be- cause of an author'srace, Prandtl wrote a friend,was a failed policy-and awful pub- licity.21In May 1938, Prandtlinformed GAMM's president that he would cease try- ing to bring the 1942 congress to Germanyif the VDI persistedin its efforts, since these underminedfundamental requirements for internationalmeetings. "I wonder about what kind of a profit we might gain with the Congress underthese circum- stances,"he lamented.The VDI's actions recalledto him unpleasantmemories from twenty years before, when similar declarationshad forged a Westernbloc united againstGermany.22 Unknownto Prandtl,opposition to Germany'shosting of the 1942 congress was growingoutside the country.The chief opponentwas Prandtl'sformer student, Theo- dorevon Kairman.Appalled by NationalSocialist politics andhimself an emigre,von Kairmanhad a special awarenessof the flight of Jewish scientistsfrom Germany.Al- though he did not seem particularlyconcerned about the 1942 meeting plans until March 1938, this may have been because he knew little aboutPrandtl's efforts until then. While von Karman(along with MIT aeronauticalengineer Jerome Hunsaker) sharedresponsibility for organizingthe 1938 Massachusettsmeeting-and von Kar- man had correspondedwith Prandtlabout such issues as symposiumspeakers and transactionpublications-the sensitivetopic of the 1942meeting venue had not come up. Nor did von Karmanhave directknowledge of recentGerman developments. Al-

18 Prandtlto Reissner, 11 April 1938, Nr. 2150; and Prandtlto Dahnke, 1 June 1938, Nr. 2155. Both III Abt., Rep. 61, MPGA. 19Prandtl to Dr. Ude, 4 April 1938, and VDI to Prandtl,29 April 1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2003, MPGA. 20Prandtl to Willers, 11 May 1938, Grammelto Prandtl,10 May 1928, andWeber to Prandtl,18 May 1938, all III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2003, MPGA; see also Epple, "Rechnen,Messen, Fiihren"(cit. n. 12), 39. 21 Prandtlto C. Weber,6 May 1938, andWillers to Prandtl,3 May 1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2003, MPGA. 22 Quoted in Prandtlto Weber,6 May 1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2003, MPGA. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 55 thoughAdolph Baumker, director of aeronauticsresearch in HermannGoering's new Air Ministry,wanted him to returnto Germanyas a consultant,von Kairmanhad not visited his formerhome since 1934 and had little contactwith key Germanaeronau- tics researchers.23 In seekingto derailthe anticipatedGerman invitation, von Karmainnever impugned the qualityof aerodynamicresearch in Germany;nowhere in his correspondencedid he suggestthat pure or appliedmechanics had been intellectuallydamaged by the rise of NationalSocialism. Instead, he declaredthat the deliberateexclusion of Jews from the practiceof science and engineeringperverted the ethical foundationsof science. For von Kafrman,the exclusion policy meant as well that the state had become too deeply intertwinedwith scientific affairs.(Unlike Prandtl,von Kairmandid not con- tact any governmentalbody about the ICPAMconferences, including the U.S. De- partmentof State. In his opinion, internationalscience undertakingswere handled best between scientificgroups.) Von Karmanmost clearlyexpressed his frustrationsin a May letterto his Harvard colleague J. P. Den Hartog.Having just learnedof von Mises's intent to formally invite the ICPAMto Istanbulin 1942, von Karmanglumly predictedthat Biumker wouldcertainly "present a very officialinvitation to Germany"-an untenableoption. Yethe could see no happyalternatives. Congresses had alreadybeen held in Holland, Switzerland,and Scandinavia.Belgium and Italy had little interestin aerodynamics. Austriawas now out, since it "was absorbedby Germany."France posed a problem becauseof its growingconflict with Germany.For that reason, von Karmandemurred, despite Turkey'sremoteness, "it seems to me that the Turkishproposition is not so bad."24 Respondingseveral days later,Den Hartogthanked von Kairman"for letting me in on this conspiracy."Den Hartogalso preferreda congress in Turkey.Nor did he see any choice other than Turkeyor Germany,because of well-establishedprecedents. Like von Kairman,Den Hartogdid not perceive stronganti-Nazi feelings among the ICPAM'sleaders and worriedthat the 1938 vote could indeed tilt towardGermany. Den Hartogthought the IC memberssplit almost evenly into pro-Germanand anti- Germancamps. The Stanfordengineer S. P. Timoshenko(a U.S. IC member)had "sufferedat the hands of the Bolsheviks and thereforehe is now ideologically in sympathywith the anti-Cominternpact. Of the Dutchpeople, I know thatBurgers is a Communist,and aboutBiezeno I know nothing."The issue was hardlydecided for Germany,Den Hartogconcluded. However, "it is evidentlya questionof ideologies, on which most people have theirminds madeup in advance."25 Den Hartograised an idea in his letterthat von Karmanimmediately seized upon: that von Mises's invitationfrom Istanbulbe nongovernmentalto distinguishit from the formalinvitation anticipated from the Germangovernment. On June9, von Kair- manadvised von Mises thatheightened political tensions made it preferable"that the Congressshould be non-political,and would preferan invitationfrom scientific in- stitutionsrather than the government."In this way, von Karmanhoped to defeat the "somewhatpro-Nazi leaning" MIT-an unmistakablereference to Hunsaker.26

23 VonKarman to vonMises, 9 June1938, von Karman Papers, Box 46, folder6; andTheodore von Karman,The Windand Beyond(Boston, 1967), 146. 24 VonKarman to DenHartog, 31 May 1938,Box 46, folder6, vonKarman Papers. 25 DenHartog to vonKarman, 7 June1938, Box 46, folder6, vonKairman Papers. 26Von Karman to vonMises, 9 June1938, Box 46, folder6, von KarmanPapers. 56 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV

Von Karman'sletter to von Mises had an immediateimpact. Living on the U.S. West Coast, von Karmanhad a physical isolation from Hunsakeronly slightly less than that from foreign IC members.Von Mises swiftly wrote Biezeno and Burgers, leadersof the Dutchdelegation and among the IC's most seniormembers, who in turn sent a forcefully-wordedletter to Hunsaker.Burgers and Biezeno declaredthey would vote against "everyCountry where the membersof our Congress will be treatedin differentways, and where they will be subjectedto considerationswhich have noth- ing to do with the only real point:their scientific competency."Their referencewas unmistakablyto NationalSocialist treatment of Jewishscientists. Yet they also argued againstTurkey, which was "ratheras remoteas America,"noting theirpreference for a meeting "in the centre of Europe."By writing they sought to "avoidpolitical dis- cussions which menacethe InternationalCooperation that, up to now, has been main- tained."27 The letterfrom Biezeno and Burgersmarked a turningpoint in this emerging,un- precedentedconflict among IC members.Forced to respond,Hunsaker for the first time consideredvenues other than Germanyor Turkey.In contrastto Den Hartog, Hunsakerallowed that the ICPAMwas an "informalbody" and thus had few restraints with regardto futuremeetings. His "personalview" was that "a Congressin Turkey wouldnot be well-attended,but one in Germanywould be. However,"he added,"I be- lieve moreAmericans would go to France."He also saw (independentlyof von Kar- man) "seriousobjections to an invitationfrom a government"rather than from a uni- versity.28 In Germany,Prandtl's main concernremained demonstrating to otherWestern na- tions his country'swillingness to allow Jewish researchersto take part in ICPAM activities. On June 1, Prandtlagain asked the ForeignOffice of the EducationMin- istryto guaranteethat Reissner could travelabroad. His presenceat the MITcongress, Prandtldeclared, would show thatnon-Aryans continued to workunder National So- cialism andhelp persuadenon-Aryan IC membersto select Germanyfor 1942. Were Reissnernot allowedto travel,Prandtl repeated, Germany's chances of success would plummet.29To his close colleague, the Dresden mathematicianFriedrich Willers, Prandtldenounced new anti-Semiticdeclarations from the GermanEngineering So- ciety: "Forthe VDI, the primarything today seemingly is politics and not science."30 In a stem letterto the directorof the VDI, Prandtlobjected to thatorganization's new call to purgeforeign non-Aryansfrom its membershiplists. His objection,however, came not from a principledstand, but, as before, from anxietyover appearances.Be- cause Germannon-Aryan members would no longerappear at pure-Germanscientific meetings anyway,"fearing political difficulties,"Prandtl demanded that the VDI re- frainfrom actions thatmight harmGermany's chance to host the 1942 congress and thus damageGerman prestige. Apparently confident that he could forestallor at least postpone the VDI's plans, Prandtloptimistically queried the VDI's directorabout whetherBerlin or Munichwould be the meeting'sbest venue.31

27 Biezenoand Burgers to Hunsaker,11 July1938, Box 47, folder7, vonKarmain Papers. 28 Hunsakerto Burgers,29 July1938, Box 47, folder7, vonKarman Papers. 29 Prandtlto Dahnke,I June1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr.2155, MPGA.Reissner did travelto the UnitedStates in 1938but did not return to Germany. 30 Prandtlto Willers,7 June1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr.2003, MPGA. 31 Prandtlto Ude,6 June1938, and Willers to Prandtl,10 June1938, both Nr. 2003; and Prandtl to Rektor,Technical Hochschule Berlin, 17 June 1938, Nr. 2152. All IIIAbt., Rep. 61, MPGA. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 57

Whateveroptimism Prandtl had aboutGermany's future role in hostingthe ICPAM ebbed before he sailed to Americain late summer 1938. Increasingly,Prandtl found his primaryfrustrations not with the VDI's pro-Nazileadership but with the state.In his dealings with Nazi ministries,Prandtl urged them to downplayactions based on Nazi race policies thatforeigners might notice. On June 15, he sent the ForeignMin- istry a letterarguing that the internationalstructure of the exact sciences could not be managedin the same way as Germandomestic politics. Angrily,Prandtl contended thatwinning the rightto host the 1942 ICPAMconference was criticalto Germany's internationalscientific prestige and to its continuedaccess to the special skills of for- eign aerodynamicists.Advances in science dependedon cooperationbetween na- tions: hence, editing out the legitimatecontributions of non-Aryanswould hurtthe state even thoughit conformedto Nazi policy. Because internationalcooperation in science was "a living necessity for Germany,"Prandtl demanded the chance to ad- dress this issue with the fiihrer'sdeputy "or also speak to the Fuhrerdirectly."32 Instead,the governmentsent him more political instructions.The GermanCongress Office (establishedin 1934 as a branchof Goebbels'sPropaganda Ministry to control internationalmeetings inside Germany)demanded that Prandtlcome to Berlin at soonest convenienceto be briefedon methodsto turnthe proposed1942 conference "intoan instrumentof Germanculture-propaganda."33 Prandtlclung to one remaininghope: if the state guaranteedthat all participants could attend,IC membersanxious to gain access to Germany'sburgeoning aerody- namics researchwould welcome the Germanproposal. Since he had secured this promisein 1934, Prandtlpressed Reich ministersonce again. (He wrote,as he appar- ently did with all state officials,using his authorityas a seniorprofessor at Gottingen andIC leaderrather than as a KWGdirector.) Two midsummerdevelopments buoyed his optimism.He receivedfrom the presidentof the SupremeCourt of the Reich, the politicallymoderate Erwin Bumke, a declarationthat all foreignattendees at interna- tionalcongresses within Germany's borders would be treated"with expected interna- tionalpoliteness." Relieved, Prandtl quickly forwarded a copy to Biezeno. He also felt moreconfident after receiving news fromGrammel, recently returned from a meeting with Biezeno in Holland.Grammel now felt convincedthat the mood of the IC was "wholly favorable"to a meeting in Germany"if assuranceis given in compulsory form that the Congresswould be open to each expertwho wantedto take partin it, withoutregard to race, not only for foreign membersbut also Germannon-Aryans." On August 7, 1938, Prandtldispatched another long letterto the EducationMinistry requestingsuch a statement.34 In fact, bothGrammel and Prandtl had badly misread the mood of theirforeign col- leagues.While Prandtlbelieved thatBumke's declaration would reassureGermany's critics in westernEurope and America,it had the opposite effect. On August 5, two days before Prandtl'sappeal to the EducationMinistry, Biezeno had writtenPrandtl for the first time about the 1942 conference. His views (sharedby Hunsaker,von

32 Prandtlto Dames, 15 June 1938, III Abt., 61, Nr. 2003, MPGA. 33 Rep. Deutsche KongreB-Zentraleto Prandtl,22 June 1938, Nr. 2152; and Prandtlto Deutsche KongreB- Zentrale,4 July 1938, Nr. 2153. Both IIIAbt., Rep. 61, MPGA. Prandtlapparently succeeded in dodg- ing this meeting, claiming he had too little time before setting sail for the United States. 34 Prandtlto Ministeriumfur Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung, 7 Aug. 1938, IIIAbt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2153, MPGA. For Bumke's declaration, see Prandtl to Ministerium fir Wissenschaft, Erziehungund Volksbildung,23 Aug. 1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2153, MPGA. 58 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV

Karman,and von Mises) were not what Grammelhad inferred."The 'Aryan-non- Aryan' difference that now has universal validity in Germany-as the pamphlet enclosedwith yourletter attests, where it statesthat non-Aryan foreigners will be wel- comed in the same manneras Aryans-stands for us in contrastto the ideals thatin- terational scientificcongresses must strivefor in theirutmost." Biezeno andBurgers thusfound it impossibleto supportholding the next mechanicscongress in Germany.35 So deeply did Prandtlbelieve thathe was a progressive,moderating figure within the ThirdReich thathe continuedto hope, even afterreceiving Biezeno's letter,that he could neverthelesspersuade the IC to hold the congressin Germanyin 1942. (Ever moreisolated from his foreigncolleagues, Prandtl also remainedunaware of growing Americanopposition.) Despite his strongbelief and determination,Prandtl failed to sway even the state to formallyrenew its 1934 pledge to permitnon-Aryan experts, both foreignand German,to attendthe proposedcongress. On August20-less than two weeks before his scheduled sailing from Bremerhaven-he received from the EducationMinistry a curt note. Because "theJew-problem in Germanyis an exclu- sively inner-Germanissue," foreign non-Aryanscould enterGermany, but "German science in internationalcongresses can be representedonly throughGermans, not howeverthrough Jewish scientists."36Striking an exclamationmark besides this sen- tence, Prandtltried one last time. "Thankyou for your swift response.Unfortunately, the answeris so wrongheadedthat the exclusionof Germannon-Aryans would elimi- nate the chancesof bringingour invitationto success,"he wrotebefore he arrivedon Sunday,September 10, in Massachusetts,where he wouldbe Hunsaker'shouseguest.37 Von Karmanseemed jittery as the IC meetingopened. Nevertheless Prandtl almost certainlyrecognized his proposalwas doomed.On Wednesday,September 13, sitting in the president'soffice at MIT, IC membersreviewed three invitations:Turkey's, Germany's,and a new one, deliveredby M. Metral(representing the Frenchapplied mathematicianJules Drach),from the Societe Francaisedes Mechaniciensin Paris. The fourteenparticipating IC membersaffirmed their vote for Francewithout dissent. As Hunsakerlater explained, the Frenchinvitation was "exactlyin the formpreferred by the Committee,i.e., from the French membersto meet in Paris in 1942.... It seems the consensusof opinionthat the Sixth Congressshould be held in an academic ratherthan in a governmentalatmosphere."38 National Socialist racial policies ulti- mately became the decisive factorfor IC membersdetermined to scuttle Germany's bid for the 1942 congress.By September1938, probablyno IC memberoutside Ger- manybacked Prandtl's plan. Prandtlhimself seemed to recognizethat his nationno longer supportedscientific internationalism.After returninghome, Prandtlproceeded to defend conditions in Hitler'sGermany and its foreignpolicy. He also gave some anti-Semisticresentments free reign,likely keepingthe MunichAgreement and National Socialist letter censors in mind."On the Jewishquestion," he wrote,"one cannot speak without stressing that

35 Biezeno to Prandtl,5 Aug. 1938, IIIAbt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2153, MPGA. Biezeno nonethelessthanked Prandtlfor his efforts to supportGerman Jewish scientists. 36Wacker to Prandtl,20 Aug. 1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2153, MPGA. 37Prandtl to Hunsaker,7 Oct. 1938, and Prandtlto G. I. Taylor,29 Oct. 1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 1654, MPGA. 38 Hunsakerto Emile Jouguet, 26 Sept. 1938, Box 47, folder 7, von KarmanPapers; Fifth Interna- tional Congress for Applied Mechanics, Unconfirmedminutes, [ca. 13 Sept. 1938], III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 2153, MPGA. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 59

Germanyis not so far removedfrom becomingjust as subjugatedby the Jews as the Soviet Union was subjugatedby them many years ago. Over the years one can see with ever more clarity that the Jews, Communists,and Free Masons (masonry)are workingtogether to instigateunrest among the people, in partopenly, in partin secret, but all workingin the same direction.Why? With the Communists,it is obvious that they are led by the Jews.... Anyhow,the fight, which Germanyunfortunately must lead againstthe Jews, is necessaryfor its self-preservation.It is regrettablethat a great manyJewish scientists, who had no partin this oppression,have to sufferfrom it, and manyin Germanywish thatthings had not gottento so harsha point."39Thus despite his contributionsto a technologicalfield centralto the state's nationalsecurity, the concessionsPrandtl ultimately won for scientificpractice were minimal.International prestigedid not sway the NationalSocialist state.

THE SOVIETUNION

Startingin 1930, the Soviet Union hosted a numberof internationalscientific meet- ings, including the Second InternationalCongress of Soil Scientists (1930), the FourthInternational Conference on Hydrology(1933), and the SeventeenthInterna- tional Geological Congress (1937). The Communistattitude in the Soviet Union towardscientific meetings thus stood in sharpcontrast to the Fascist attitudetoward them in NationalSocialist Germany.The Soviet governmentlavishly fundedeach of these gatherings,and the Soviet presscovered them at every turn.The fate of the Sev- enth InternationalGenetics Congress scheduledto meet in Moscow in late August 1937 provedentirely different. Soviet geneticistshad been tryingto invite the genetics congressto Moscow since the first postwarone convened in 1927 in Berlin. The Soviet governmenthad con- stantlyendorsed their efforts. Finally, in spring 1935, the Norwegiangeneticist Otto Mohr,chairman of the InternationalOrganizing Committee (IOC) for GeneticsCon- gresses (composedof representativesof fifteen countries),notified the Soviet repre- sentativeNikolai Vavilov that the IOC was readyto considerthe invitation.Vavilov immediatelybegan lobbying variousstate agencies. As a resultof his efforts, in late Julythe highestgoverning bodies of the CommunistParty-its Orgburoand its Polit- buro, presidedover by Joseph Stalin-gave permissionfor the USSR Academy of Sciences to host the congress. They also instructedthe Science Departmentof the party's CentralCommittee to preparesuggestions regardingthe organizationand membershipof the congress.40 At the end of August,Vavilov informed Mohr that he had securedthe government's support.That November,the IOC voted unanimouslyfor holding the congress in Moscow. By year's end, with the Politburo'sapproval, a local organizingcommittee hadbeen set up to includeleading geneticists: Nikolai Vavilov (vice chairman),Niko- lai Kol'tsov,Georgii Karpechenko,Solomon Levit (executive secretary),Aleksandr Serebrovskii, and Hermann J. Muller (head of the program committee).4'The committee also included a numberof officials from the Academy of Sciences-its

39Prandtl to G. I. Taylor,29 Oct. 1938, III Abt., Rep. 61, Nr. 1654, MPGA. 40 E 17, op. 114, d. 590, 1. 49, and op. 3 (Politburo),d. 970, 1. 9, Russian State Archive of Socio- Political History (hereaftercited as RGASPI). 41 On Muller's work at Vavilov's institute in Moscow, see Elof A. Carlson, Genes, Radiation,and Society: The Life and Workof H. J. Muller (Ithaca, 1970). 60 RONALD E. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV soon-to-bepresident Vladimir Komarov (vice chairman)and its "CEO,"Lenin's for- mer secretaryNikolai Gorbunov-and from the Academy of AgriculturalSciences (VASKhNIL)-PresidentNikolai Muralov(chairman of the committee),Vice Presi- dent Georgii Meister, and a notorious young academician,Trofim Lysenko. The committeewent to work at once. OnApril 23, 1936, the committeeheld a meeting,prompted by the requestof more thanthirty American geneticists who had asked the organizersto include in the pro- gram a "discussionof questionsrelating to racial and eugenic problems."42The re- quest presenteda certain problem for the organizersbecause in the Soviet Union eugenicshad come underheavy political attack and had been bannedin the late 1920s. In 1930, both the Russian Eugenics Society and its oracle-the RussianJournal of Eugenics-had been dismantled.43Not surprisingly,the organizersdecided that "re- ports on the disciplines relatedto genetics"should not be includedin the program. They agreed,however, that the last session of the congress should be devotedto the discussionof "humangenetics and race theory," omitting any mention of eugenicsand "eugenicproblems" altogether.44 In September,the governingbody of the Academy of Sciences-its presidium- listenedto Muralov'sreport on the actionsof the organizingcommittee and approved its plan of preparationsand a preliminaryscientific program.45 A few days later,Mu- ralov and Levit sent a lengthy memorandumon the congress's scientificprogram to the Science Department.46The memorandumlisted six majorsubjects to be discussed at the congress:(a) evolutionin light of genetic research;(b) plantgenetics and breed- ing; (c) animal genetics and breeding;(d) genes, mutations,and structuralbases of ;(e) distanthybridization and polyploidy;and (f) humangenetics and racial theories.It also namedSoviet andforeign geneticists invited to deliverplenary reports on these subjects.The Science Departmentendorsed the program.By mid-October, the organizingcommittee had received responsesfrom nearly 900 geneticists from almost forty countries.The United States delegation(369 members)was the largest planningto come, followed by Britain(83), then Germany(82), Canada(32), Japan (25), Sweden (22), Holland(20), China (16), France(15), Switzerland(15), (14), and India (13).47 Everything seemed to be going smoothly. Suddenly,on December 14, 1936, the New YorkTimes published a "wireless"dis- patch from its Moscow correspondent:"The Seventh International Congress of Ge- netics which was to have been held here next August... has been canceledby order of the Soviet Government,it is learnedunofficially."48 The newspaper'sinformation was correct.Exactly a monthbefore the publication,on November 14, the Politburo hadcanceled the congress.The dispatchcovered more than just the cancellation,how-

42 American geneticists to Levit, 2 April 1936, F. 201, op. 5, d. 2, 11.35-7, Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (hereaftercited as ARAN). 43 On Russian eugenics, see Mark B. Adams, "Eugenics in Russia,"in The WellbornScience: Eu- genics in Germany,France, Brazil, and Russia, ed. MarkB. Adams (New York, 1990), 153-216. 44 F. 201, op. 3, d. 3,11. 19-21, ARAN. 45 F. 201, op. 3, d. 16,1. 17, ARAN. 46 Muralovand Levit to the CentralCommittee's Science Department,28 Sept. 1936, E 201, op. 3, d. 2,11. 1-5, ARAN. 47 See F. 5446, op. 18a, d. 192,1. 46, the StateArchive of the RussianFederation (hereafter cited as GARF). 48 "Moscow Cancels Genetics Parley"New YorkTimes (hereafter cited as NYT), 14 Dec. 1936, 18. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 61 ever. It also announcedthat the presidentof the forthcomingcongress, Vavilov, had been arrested,and the congress'sgeneral secretary, Levit, had come underheavy crit- icism by partyofficials. The Timesprovided what seemed to be the reasonsfor can- celing the congress:"An interesting story of a schism amongSoviet geneticists,some of the most prominentamong whom are accusedby Communistparty authorities of holding GermanFascist views on genetics and even being shieldersof 'Trotskyists,' lies behindthe cancellation.The fact thatso many of the Soviet Union's most distin- guishedgeneticists are under fire is believedto be motivefor the governmentaction." The "schism"the article referredto was an ongoing controversyon the "issues of modem genetics"between two groupsof Soviet agriculturists,each led by a member of the congress's organizingcommittee-Vavilov and Lysenko.49The controversy had been going on for almost a year and was coming to a head exactly at the time of the New YorkTimes publication: on December19 an open discussionbetween the two groupswas to begin at a session of VASKhNIL. The news spurredWestern (particularly British and American) geneticists into im- mediateaction. They sent lettersto Soviet ambassadorsand askedtheir own stateof- ficialsto exertpressure on the Soviet authorities.Although both British and American diplomatsdecided to stay clear of the issue, their Soviet counterpartsimmediately forwardedall the lettersto Moscow, wherethis active campaignapparently made an impression.On December22, the New YorkTimes reprinted an editorialfrom a cen- tralSoviet newspaper,Izvestiia, which statedthat the congresshad not been canceled but merely postponedat the "requestof a numberof Soviet geneticists"and thatVa- vilov had not been arrested.It also claimedthat the USSR was the only countrywhere scientistswere trulyfree. Unbeknownstto its readers,Izvestiia's article had been ed- ited by Stalin himself. In the following months,Soviet geneticists securedthe Polit- buro'spermission to host the congressin Moscow a year later,in August 1938. Soon thereafter,however, the IOCdecided to relocatethe congressto Britainand to hold it in August 1939. What interestsdid the Soviet state pursuein hosting the genetics congress?Au- thoritieshad initially been veryenthusiastic about the congressand had been prepared to spend4-5 million rubles(roughly $160,000 1935 U.S. dollars)on its organization. The majorgoal of such spendingwas certainlynot geneticsper se, butpropaganda. In the 1930s, the Politburopromoted international scientific meetings in the USSR to showcaseabroad the advancesof the firstsocialist countryin science, education,and medicine. Scientistswere well awareof this goal and used it extensively in theirne- gotiationswith theirpatrons in the party-stateapparatus. For example, in his reportto Molotov in summer 1936, Muralovrecounted the benefits the Soviet Union would reapfrom hosting the congress, particularlythe "greatimportance of informingfor- eignersabout the statusand advancementsof science in the USSR."50 So whatcould havehappened that induced the Politburoto cancel the congressand thereforemiss the opportunityfor extensivepropaganda? The full text of the Novem- ber 1936 Politburoedict read:"to revoke the decisionof the CentralCommittee of Au- gust 2, 1935, andto cancel the convocationof the VII internationalgenetics congress

49 Detailed analysisof the firststage of the so-called Lysenkocontroversy appears in David Joravsky, The Lysenko 1986); and in Nikolai Krementsov,Stalinist Science (Princeton,1997). 50 Affair (Chicago, E 201, op. 3, d. 2,11. 6-9, on 6, ARAN. 62 RONALD E. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV in the USSR in 1937, due to [its] obviousunpreparedness."51 What was it exactly that, in the Politburo'sopinion, was "unprepared"?Perhaps this decision referredto the paperworkfor the congress,such as draftsof decreesof the Councilof People's Com- missars (SNK), which should have been agreed upon by all the state agencies in- volved. Judgingby availabledocuments, there were severalproblems, at the least, of this sort.For instance, the Commissariatof Finance(expectedly) could not agreewith the organizingcommittee's estimates for the congressbudget. Similarly, Gosplan (the StatePlanning Administration) also raiseda numberof objectionsand sent back sev- eral draftsprepared by Muralovand his staff.52 It is possible,however, that what was unpreparedwas notjust the paperworkbut the entire"genetic show." A centerpieceof the show was supposedto be a brand-newIn- stitute of Genetics of the Academy of Sciences, whose constructionhad begun in Moscow in April 1936. However,according to a letterthe institute'sscientific secre- tarysent to Gorbunovin November,"The buildings and greenhouses will not be ready on time and this will underminethe majormaterial base of the Congress.... These circumstances'could createa bad impression,'namely, that in a socialist society sci- ence develops 'worse' than in a capitalistone."53 Another very importantpart of the show was supposedto be the All-UnionAgricultural Exhibition, meant to presentthe advancementsof the Soviet Union's widely proclaimed"collectivized" agriculture andagricultural sciences, includinggenetics. The exhibition-Vavilov servedas head of its scientific program-was scheduledto open at the beginningof August 1937, just a few weeks priorto the congress.The opportunityfor the congress'sparticipants to visit this exhibitionhad been widely advertisedfrom the very momentthe decision had been made to hold the congress in Moscow.54Yet the exhibitionwas not nearly ready.Characteristically, a few days afterthe Politburohad decided on transferring the congressto August 1938, they also approveda new openingdate for theAll-Union AgriculturalExhibition-August 1, 1938.55It seems likely that it was the "unpre- paredness"of these institutionsthat inspired the Politburo'sdecision. Althoughthe unpreparednesswas probablya majorreason for canceling the con- gress, it was certainly not the only one. In their communicationsto Westerncol- leagues, Soviet geneticists repeatedlydenied the New YorkTimes statement that the cancellationof the congress had in any way been relatedto their disputes with Ly- senko and his supporters.Yet Lysenko'scampaign against "formal" genetics (which reachedits peakat the DecemberVASKhNIL discussion), particularly his personalat- tacks on its leaders,Vavilov, Kol'tsov, Levit, and Serebrovskii-all membersof the congress's organizingcommittee-might well have played anotherrole in creating within the Politburoboth an atmosphereof doubt regardingthe "readiness"of the congressand a mistrustfor its organizers. As Vavilov suggested in his letterto Mohr in January1937, one more factormay have influencedthe Politburodecision: the inclusionin the congress'sprogram of the

51 F. 17, op. 3, d. 982,1.40, RGASPI. Molotov personallydrafted this decision, and otherPolitburo memberssimply put "I agree"on Molotov's draft.Markedly, the signatureof Joseph Stalin is absent from the originaldocument; see E 17, op. 163, d. 1128,1. 21, RGASPI. 52 See E 5446, op. 18a, d. 192,11.42-4, GARF 53 Prokhorovto Gorbunov,16 Nov. 1936, E 2, op. 1-1935, d. 83,1. 101, ARAN. 54 See, e.g., Otto Mohr,"The Next InternationalGenetics Congress,"Science, 13 Dec. 1935, 565-6. 55 F. 17, op. 163, d. 1141, 1.8, RGASPI. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 63 discussion on "humangenetics and race theory."96At that time in the newspeakof partyideologists the very words"race theory" had clear "Fascist"overtones, and the whole issue of humangenetics acquireda "Fascist"veneer in the eyes of partyoffi- cials. At the time of the New YorkTimes publication, several Soviet geneticists, no- tably Solomon Levit, became targetsof severecriticism by the partyofficials for ad- heringto "Fascist"views on humangenetics. One of the most ardentcritics was Ernst Kol'man,head of the Science Departmentof the Moscow City PartyCommittee, who publishedin Underthe Bannerof Marxisman articleviciously attackingLevit andhis coworkersat the Instituteof Medical Genetics.On November5, 1936, Kol'manalso sent (outsidechannels) an extensive memorandumto Molotov with "informationon the situationon the scientific front."57The memorandum'scentral theme concerned "therecent sharpening of the class struggleon our scientificfront." As a majorprob- lem, Kol'manlisted "thefascisization of scientifictheory" and namedLevit as one of the mainproponents of such "fascisization."He explained,"This has a particularsig- nificancebecause Levit is the secretaryof the organizingcommittee of the interna- tionalgenetics congress." Kol'man continued, "The convocation of this congresshere in 1937 is absolutelyunprepared for a betterhalf, the congress'scomposition prom- ises to be Fascist,and there is a completetheoretical disarray among our geneticists." Molotovattentively read Kol'man's memorandum and underlined with redpencil the above quotedpassages. Perhapsthis denunciationalso played a role in deciding the fates of both the congressand its generalsecretary.58 Whateverreasons Politburo members had for cancelingthe congress,they clearly did not expect their decision to do more harmthan good by igniting a wide critical campaignin the foreignpress and inspiringthe geneticscommunity into bombarding Soviet officialswith inquiriesand angry letters. During January-March 1937, the com- missarof foreignaffairs, Maksim Litvinov, the head of the Science Department,Bau- man, and the SNK head, Molotov, repeatedlyconferred with Academy of Sciences officialsregarding the issue. In the end, the Politburopermitted geneticists to hold the congressin Moscow in August 1938. However,this decisioncame not withoutcost- both the local committee'smembership and the scientificprogram were completely "reorganized."Officials removed from the committeeall the geneticistswho hadbeen targetsof Lysenko'sattacks at the DecemberVASKhNIL discussion (except Vavilov). They droppedthe whole section on "humangenetics and race issues" from the pro- gram.The officials revised the list of speakers(both Soviet and foreign) invited to deliver plenaryreports. All these changes were made in the name of "showingthe strengthof Soviet science"and "upholdingthe state'sinterests at the congress."59 Why then did the IOC decide to move the congress to Britain?Basically, the rea- sons behindthe decision wereWestern geneticists' perceptions of whatwas going on

56 Vavilov to Mohr,4 Jan. 1937, F. 318, op. 1-1, d. 1436, 11.58-58 reverse,Central State Archive of Scientific TechnicalDocumentation. 57 Kol'man to Molotov, 5 Nov. 1936, E 5446, 29, d. 30,11. 185-90, GARF 58 op. Duringthe autumn,Levit was severaltimes called to the partycommittee for explanationsand re- cantations,which eventually(on Dec. 5) resultedin his expulsion fromthe CommunistParty. (See F 2, op. 1-1935, d. 83, 1. 100, ARAN.) During the GreatTerror, this was a common preludeto arrestand a firing squad. Levit indeed was arrestedthe next winter and shot as an "enemy of the people." See Mark B. Adams, "Levit, Solomon Grigorevich,"Dictionary of Scientific Biography 18, Suppl. II, 546-9. 59 Ia. Iakovlev to Stalin and Molotov, F. 82, op. 2, d. 408.11. 40-41, RGASPI. 64 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV in Soviet geneticsand the Soviets'motives for cancelingthe congressin the firstplace. The news of the congress's cancellationstirred quite a commotionamong Western geneticists,but their reactions to the news variedsignificantly, according to individual political sympathies,scientific interests, and institutionalagendas. For a start,the cancellationprovided an opportunityfor some othernational group to host the congress. Not surprisingly,several European communities tried to seize this opportunity.60Francis A. Crew'soffer to host the congressat his Instituteof Ani- mal Geneticsin Edinburghproved successful, despite the initial oppositionby many Britishgeneticists, including the Britishrepresentative on the IOC,J. B. S. Haldane.61 Crew's efforts to have the congress in Edinburghwere certainly motivatedby his desire to improvehis own and his institute'srather modest and peripheralstanding withinthe Britishgenetics community.62 An entirelydifferent set of motivesshaped the IOCacceptance of Crew'sinvitation. In September1939, reportingon the congress's work in Edinburgh,Crew observed: "The chief qualificationsdemanded of those who undertakethe organizationof an internationalscientific conference in these days would seem to be an unwarrantable optimismand a completedisregard for currentpolitical events."63 Yet in theirattempts to set up the internationalcongress in Moscow, geneticistshad found themselvesre- peatedly caught in the "force field" of political tensions among Hitler's Germany, Stalin'sRussia, andWestern democracies. ManyWestern geneticists viewed the situationin Soviet geneticsthrough the prism of Germangenetics and consideredthe situationin both countriesvery similar.As prominentU.S. geneticistRobert Cook notedin his letterto Soviet ambassadorAlek- sandrTroyanovskii: "We cannot avoid expressingour regretthat Soviet Union scien- tists seem in danger of being exposed to the same kind of mental crucifixionthat Germanscientists have recently sufferedunder the Nazi regime."64Many Western geneticists saw the political regimes in both countriesas dictatorshipsunder which "academicfreedom" could not, and did not, exist. They also saw (in both countries) theirdiscipline becoming a "red-hotpolitical issue."65 Since Hitler'sascent to power,many geneticists had watchedin alarmthe growing deploymentof "genetics language"in National Socialist propagandaand political programs,as well as the mountingusage of the Nazi rhetoricof Aryanrace by certain Germancolleagues. This was why when the Germanemigres Julius Schaxel and Wal- ter Landauerhad requested that the Moscow congress'sprogram include a discussion on "genetics as related to race theories,"leading British and American geneticists eagerlysupported this initiative,as did theirSoviet colleagues.All of them obviously wantedto distancetheir discipline from "Fascistnonsense." In the mid-1930s, however,genetics became a politically chargedissue in the So- viet Union as well, largelydue to Lysenko'sattack on Mendeliangenetics. Lysenko's

60 See A. L. Hagedoor to Mohr, 27 April 1937, and T. Tammesto Mohr, 19 June 1937, both Otto Mohr Papers(hereafter cited as Mohr Papers),Anatomical Institute of Oslo. We thankGuil Winches- ter for copies of Mohr'scorrespondence. 61 See Haldaneto Mohr,23 July 1937, Mohr Papers. 62 Which he accomplished:before the congress opened,Crew had been elected to the Royal Society. 63 F. A. E. Crew,"Seventh International Genetical Congress," Nature, 16 Sept. 1939,496-8, on 496. 64 Cook to Troyanovskii, 19 Dec. 1936, Archive of RussianForeign Policy, f. 192, op. 3, d. 53, papka 24,1.57. 65 H. S. Jenningsto L. C. Dunn, 24 Dec. 1936, L. C. Dunn Papers(hereafter cited as Dunn Papers), AmericanPhilosophical Society Library. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 65 supportersaccused their opponents of practicalsterility, of having"Fascist views" on humanheredity, and of the incompatibilityof "formal"genetics with Marxism.Given the Soviet militantantifascist policies at the time, the accusationof "Fascistsympa- thies"was particularlyvenomous. Characteristically, as a way to remedythe situation, Russianemigre geneticistTheodosius Dobzhansky suggested in December 1936: "it might be good if some Americangeneticists would compose a sort of shortpopular treatiseon the subject'genetics is the oppositeof a Nazi theory,'and send such a trea- tise to Moscow."66 The Decemberdiscussion betweenVavilov's and Lysenko'ssupporters seemed a decisive factorin moving the congress to Britain.An accountof the discussion, ap- pearing in Nature, characterizedit as "an attack on modem genetic theory."67By Mohr'sown admission:"the only thingwhich gave me a realbase for the coursetaken was the Bulletin from the [VASKhNIL]congress of which Vavilov sent me a copy. When I had had it translatedI realizedthat Moscow could not possibly be the proper place for a congressnow."68 Mohr's position as the IOC chairmanand the point man in communicationswith the Soviet committeegave much weight to his opinion.Cer- tainly it affectedother members of the IOC.69 Why did Lysenkoscare Mohr so much?Obviously, not all membersof the genet- ics communityshared this fear.The U.S. representativeon the IOC,Rollins A. Emer- son, for instance,suggested to Mohrthat "it would be perfectlyproper to have both sides of the disputepresented in the papersand discussions at the Congress."70The answerlay in what, for many geneticists,Lysenko's attack signified: namely, the in- fringementby the Soviet political authoritieson the sacralfreedom of science. West- ern geneticistsassumed that Lysenko's position was supportedby the Soviet authori- ties and representedan "officialview" on genetics.As one Americangeneticist put it: "Itis a real disasterthat [the Soviets] have decidedto join Germanyin prescribingof- ficial doctrinesto science."7 In the wake of the "troubles"with the congress in De- cember1936, theAmerican Society of Naturalistsvoiced this concernin a specialres- olutionthat lamented"an increasing tendency in certainparts of the worldto require of investigatorsthe conformityof their researchto officially prescribeddoctrines." The resolution furtherstated, "This society wishes to emphasize that intellectual progressis compatibleonly with perfectfreedom in the conductof investigation."72 In the Soviet case, however,the governmentpaid for this "perfectfreedom." Since the 1917 Bolshevikrevolution, the statehad been the sole patronof Russianscience. Westernscientists knew verywell thatthe remarkablegrowth of science underthe So- viet regime resultedfrom the lavish fundingthe regime affordedits scientists.They repeatedlycited the Soviet examplein theirlamentations about the meagerconditions underwhich they themselvesoften worked.73They wantedtheir own governmentsto

66 Dobzhanskyto Dunn, 21 Dec. 1936, Dunn Papers. 67 "GeneticTheory and Practicein the USSR" Nature, 30 Jan. 1937, 185. 68 Mohr to Muller, 26 Nov. 1937, H. J. Muller Papers,Lilly Library,University of Indiana,Bloom- ington. 69 Mohr made known his adverse opinion in two memorandahe sent to all the IOC members in spring-summer1937. There are numerouscopies of these memorandain variouscollections. See, for instance, Dunn Papers. 70 Emersonto Mohr, 19 April 1937, Mohr Papers. 71 Jenningsto Dunn, 22 Dec. 1936, Dunn Papers. 72 "ScientificFreedom;' Nature, 30 Jan. 1937, 185. 73 See, e.g., Haldaneto Mohr,[pre-27] June and 13 Oct. 1937, Mohr Papers. 66 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV

support science and to assist them in their pursuits. Yet they could not accept govern- mental interference in their "internal"affairs. In his letter to the U.S. secretary of state, the eminent American geneticist and founder of the U.S. Eugenics Office Charles Davenport remarked: "Men of science have two loyalties, one to their country and one to their science." Following the classic formula of scientific internationalism, how- ever, he insisted that the latter takes precedence over the former: "it is by loyalty to their science that they are best able to make discoveries and advance knowledge which is of so much value to their country."74 The Soviet government obviously thought differently. The Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, Ivan Maiskii, stated in his answer to British biologists, published in Na- ture: "The prevailing view in the USSR is that science must not consider itself a demi- god with the right to choose its own course without any reference to the needs and requirements of the people [that is, the state]. On the contrary, the primary object of science is to serve as faithfully as possible the needs of the people."75Indeed, during the second half of 1936, through a public "patriotic" campaign against "servility to the West," the government unambiguously demonstrated to its scientists that loyalty to the Soviet Union was of much greater importance than loyalty to their science.76

THE UNITED STATES

During the mid- and late 1930s, the U.S. government did not restrict international meetings of scientists within its borders. Participation in scientific meetings enhanced America's standing among nations and "carried the march of civilization forward," Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr declared in 1937. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States provided few funds for these gatherings; private fund-raising generally met expenses.77 But the state encouraged its scientists to attend scientific conferences in the USSR, including the Seventeenth International Geological Con- gress in Moscow in 1937, and placed no restrictions on visiting foreign participants when the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics met in Washington, D.C., in September 1939, the last major multinational congress held before World War II.78 After the war ended, American scientists eagerly joined their European colleagues in resuscitating assemblies of the major international scientific unions. U.S. scientists

74 Davenportto the Secretaryof State, 17 Dec. 1936, C. B. DavenportPapers, American Philosoph- ical Society Library. 75 "Science in the USSR,"Nature, 6 Feb. 1937, 227. 76 The campaignbegan in the summerof 1936. The pretextfor organizingit was the accusationthat the eminent mathematicianand memberof the USSR Academy of Sciences Nikolai Luzin had pub- lished his work in foreign periodicals instead of Soviet ones. As recently discovered documents demonstrate,Stalin personally endorsed the campaign. During the early autumn,the campaign sub- sided, only to pick up steam a few months later when two prominentchemists refusedto returnto the Soviet Union afterforeign trips. On the "Luzinaffair," see Alex E. Levin, "Anatomyof a Public Cam- paign: 'AcademicianLuzin's Case' in Soviet Political History,"Slavic Review 49 (1990): 90-108; S. Demidov and B. V. Levshin, eds., Delo akademikaNikolaia NikolaevichaLuzina (St. Petersburg, 1999). On Ipatieff and Chichibabin, see V. Komarov, "Akademiki nevozvrashchentsy,"Pravda, 21 Dec. 1936, 3; "Nedostoinyegrazhdanstva SSSR," Pravda, 6 Jan. 1937, 2. 77 WilburJ. Carr,"A Report upon the Participationof the United Statesin InternationalConferences, Congresses, Expositions, Fairs, and Commissions,"20 June 1937, folder "US Participationin Inter- national Enterprises,"25; John A. Fleming to Albert L. Barrows, 3 Aug. 1936, folder "International Unions 1930-1939, Geodesy and Geophysics: Activities," both National Academy of Sciences Archives, Division of Foreign Relations 1919-1939. 78 Greenaway,Science International(cit. n. 4). NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 67 supportedmeetings in war-ravagedWestern European countries, aware that scarce travelfunds would otherwiselimit participation.Indeed, through the late 1950s, vir- tuallyall meetingsof the majorscientific unions convenedin Stockholm,Oslo, Paris, andother European capitals.79 Yet tensions soon resurfaced.U.S. astronomersinitially embraceda Soviet proposalto host the 1951 GeneralAssembly of the International AstronomicalUnion (IAU) in Leningrad,but rising cold war tensions, the Korean War,and publishedcondemnations of Americanastrophysicists as "learnedlackeys of imperialism"by prominentSoviet astronomers(part of Stalin's anticosmopolitan campaign)inspired Western IAU leadersto derailthis assembly.It was subsequently rescheduledfor Rome.80 What is noteworthyin this instance is that scientists themselves, ratherthan the state, scuttledthis planned 1951 assembly.In July 1950, despite the escalatingcold war,Truman's Department of Statehad told theAmerican astronomer J. J. Nassau,di- rectorof the Warnerand Swasey Observatoryin Cleveland,Ohio, thatit "didnot see anyreason why you shouldnot continueto makeplans for attendanceat the Leningrad meeting."81Yet American astronomers interpreted the politicalstatements by theirSo- viet colleagues as evidence that,as with Soviet genetics, Soviet astronomyhad been corruptedby ideologicalincursions from the state.Many of theAmericans had agreed with a 1949 New YorkTimes editorial declaring "the Politburo, whose behest the So- viet Academyis following, is systematicallycarrying the struggleagainst capitalism into every culturalfield, science included."82While anxious aboutthe fate of Soviet colleagues they knew personally,U.S. scientistsinitially sought above all to rekindle theirrelations with WesternEuropean researchers, even Germanones. This was the last time for many years that American scientists would reject an opportunityto meet with theirforeign colleagues. By the startof the Eisenhowerad- ministrationin 1953, manyhad grownconcerned that the Departmentof State,under attack by Congressionalconservatives, might now restrict internationalscientific gatherings.Their suspicions soon provedjustified. Although Eisenhower was a po- litical moderate,his election had placed conservativesin influentialposts for the first time since FranklinD. Roosevelt's election in 1932. New Departmentof State ap- pointeesvigorously enforced the McCarranAct of 1950 (passedover Truman's veto), which allowed the governmentto exclude "politicallysuspect individuals."These appointeeswere deeply suspicious of U.S. scientists who maintainedcontacts with scientistsbehind the IronCurtain. Their suspicions grew after Julius and Ethel Rosen- berg were executed in 1953 for sharing nuclear secrets with the Soviets.83Many extendedtheir suspicions to internationalscientific activities. Soon afterJohn Foster Dulles became Eisenhower'ssecretary of state, unnamedinsiders attackedthe de- partment'sfledgling science office in an article in the sympatheticU.S. News and

79 See AdriaanBlaauw, History of the IAU: The Birth and First Half-Centuryof the International AstronomicalUnion (Dordrecht,1994); and T. Younes, "SeventyYears of IUBS: Assets, Constraints, and Potentialfor InternationalCooperation," International22 (1991): 2-9. 80 RonaldE. Doel and RobertMcCutcheon, "Introduction [Astronomy and the State in the U.S.S.R. and Russia],"Journalfor the History ofAstronomy26 (4) (1995): 3-20. 81 WarrenKelchner to J. J. Nassau, 25 July 1950, Bertil LindbladPapers, Swedish Academy of Sci- ences, Stockholm. 82 "SovietAstronomy," NYT, 15 July 1949, 18. 83 SpencerR Weart,Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge,1989); Jessica Wang, Science in an Age of Anxiety:Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999), 274-9 and 289-95. 68 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV

World Report. Their unsigned article labeled the office an "out and out stink hole of Communists." Though editors later printed a retraction, the smear campaign suc- ceeded. Dulles allowed the Truman-era system of science attaches to wither, and science affairs in State came to be handled by a lone, harried career diplomat lacking science training.84 Washington's actions alarmed American scientists. State efforts undercutting sci- entific internationalism challenged the universalist ethos of science, and there is no doubt that vehement protests voiced in the 1950s were rooted in this ideal. This was not the most pressing motivation, however. Through the late 1940s, U.S. scientists be- lieved that little competitive research was underway in Western Europe, and their be- lief that ideological distortions affected Soviet science made sustained contacts with Eastern Bloc scientists of uncertain value. In the early 1950s, however, U.S. scientists realized the foreign landscape was changing rapidly. Competitive new scientific in- stitutions, such as the high-energy physics laboratory CERN, were taking shape, and many former research centers returned to prewar strength. International meetings thus became particularly attractive again.85 The so-called Soviet offensive following Stalin's death in 1953 also troubled American scientists. In a sudden, dramatic policy shift, the Soviet government formally joined the international scientific unions. When Soviet leaders in 1954 hosted a lavish international rededication ceremony of the Pulkovo Observatory (destroyed in the siege of Leningrad in 1941)-and again in- vited world astronomers to meet there with no political restrictions-U.S. as- tronomers grew especially anxious. What they feared most was loss of professional standing. If American researchers were barred from international scientific activities, Eastern Bloc scientists might gain control of the international scientific unions, reduc- ing U.S. influence while limiting the ability of the Americans to remain at the cutting edge of their disciplines. They also knew that U.S. visa policies reminded many West- ern European scientists "of the German 'master race' attitude."8 In the early 1950s, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) organized the Committee on Visa Prob- lems to investigate limitations on international scientific meetings planned for the United States. It also lobbied the state to resist conservative claims that limitations on international science strengthened the nation and demonstrated individual loyalty. Yet visa denials multiplied. By 1955, four international unions planning U.S. meetings had relocated them. Leading American scientists worried that these developments threatened to damage "incipient scientific relations between East and West."87

84Scott Alan Rausch,"McCarthyism and Eisenhower'sState Department, 1953-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Washington,2000); and Brian Schefke, "Moralityand Materialism:American Conserva- tives and Science, 1945-1964" (MA thesis, Oregon State Univ., 2000). On the science office, see ChalmersM. Roberts, "New AttackArouses State DepartmentOfficials," Washington Post, 20 Dec. 1953, M6. 1. 85 WalterS. Adams to Otto Struve, 13 Oct. 1952, Box 2, Otto StruvePapers (hereafter cited as Struve Papers),Univ. of ,Berkeley; W. Miller to A. Vyssotsky, Box 23, Vyssotsky Papers,Univer- sity of Virginia,Charlottesville. 86 Karl Weber, [untitled reportto the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC)], 21 Dec. 1960, Box 50, National Archives (hereaftercited as NA), National Science Foundationrecords; Pol Swings to Struve, 14 April 1954, Box 3, StruvePapers. 87 So wrote VictorWeisskopf to John von Neumann, 28 Oct. 1955, NationalAcademy of Sciences Archives, NAS/NRC Policy files, folder InternationalRelations, General.On the FAS's actions, see David L. Hill to Alden Emery, 20 Jan. 1954, and J. H. Hildebrandto W. E. Meyerhof, 3 May 1955, both Libraryof Congress,Washington, D.C., Box 31, AmericanChemical Society records(hereafter cited as ACS). NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 69

Even afterthe launchof Sputnikin October1957 had shockedthe nation,and ele- vatedscience's statusas a symbolof nationalprestige, American scientists faced con- tinuedrestrictions on internationalcongresses. In contrastto earliervisa denialcases, however,not many people knew aboutthese new conflicts. One reasonwas thatcer- taingovernment efforts to underminescientific internationalism were done so stealth- ily thatmany scientistswere clueless aboutthem. In September1956, U.S. ambassa- dorWalter P. McConaughyJr. learned from the Americanembassy in Barcelonathat a special committee session for the forthcomingInternational Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (IGY) meeting in Spain would include scientistsfrom the People's Repub- lic of Chinabut not the ChiangKai-shek government in .A politicallyconser- vative China specialist who sharedDulles's view that supportfor Taiwanformed a cornerstoneof UnitedStates Far Eastern policy, McConaughy immediately contacted Taiwanesescientists, insisting that their government demand to join the IGY.At first, McConaughy'splan nearlybackfired: his contactsconfessed thatthe fledglingisland nationcould contributelittle to the IGY.But they soon saw the light.When Taiwan ul- timatelyjoined the IGY,Mao Tse-tung(Zedong) angrily withdrew his nation,thereby denying Chinese scientistsaccess to the largestinternational science undertakingof the twentiethcentury. Communist China's pullout from the IGY resultednot from intra-Chinesebickering, as Westernscientists suspected, but from a cleverdiplomatic ploy by the United States.88 A similarinstance of stateinterference involved the proposed 1961 meetingof the InternationalAstronomical Union in Berkeley,California. The IAU was one of the strongestand most active membersof the InternationalCouncil of ScientificUnions (ICSU), critical to the practice of astronomy(more than biology or chemistryfor theirs).Astronomy had become a suddenlyprominent field afterSputnik. In the mid- 1950s, the IAU's ExecutiveCouncil had acceptedproposals for back-to-backmeet- ings in the Soviet Union andthe United Statesin 1958 and 1961, afterthe Soviet and U.S. governmentspledged to admitscientists from all nations.Otto Struveof Berke- ley and Leo Goldbergof Harvard,lead organizersfor the 1961 meeting, sought as- surancethat astronomers from the PRC could fully participatedespite the absenceof politicalrelations between Washington and Beijing. U.S. astronomersrecognized that mainlandChina-not Taiwan-was the undisputedhome of Chinese astronomical research.Mainland China's Purple Mountain Observatory on the outskirtsof Nanjing employed dozens of researchersand possessed instrumentssimilar to Harvard's. Westernastronomers shared personal ties with several mainlandChinese astron- omers,some of whomhad trained in the UnitedStates. Initially, American astronomers had not worried about the "Chinaquestion," naively believing that since Taiwan was virtuallybereft of astronomicalresearch, political questions would not arise. Furthermore,when plans for the 1961 GeneralAssembly had been announcedin the mid-1950s,Taiwanese officials had not responded.89 Struveand Goldbergfailed to appreciatethe passion of Departmentof State lead- ers who believed (particularlyafter CommunistChinese forces began shelling the

88 Chia-huato Sydney Chapman,1 Nov. 1956, and Chapman,Taiwan & IGY, 8 Feb. 1957, Box 31 ChapmanPapers, Rasmusen Library, Univ. of Alaska, Fairbanks;McConaughy memo of understand- ing, 5 Sept. 1956, and McConaughy,Memo of conversationwith Dr. S. H. Tan, 28 Jan. 1957, Box 11, RG 59, Entry 1549, Records of the Office of Science Advisor, NA. 89 In October 1956, Goldberg confidently expressed, "I know of no recognized observatoryon Formosa";see Goldbergto AndreC. Simonpietri,25 Oct. 1956, Box 3, StruvePapers. 70 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu in 1958 to test Eisenhower's resolve to defend Taiwan) that the United States was entering a hot war in the Far East. After learning about the proposed Berkeley IAU meeting, U.S. diplomats adopted McConaughy's strategy. Walter S. Robertson, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, pressed the issue with the department's new science adviser, Wallace R. Brode. A chemist and foreign-science expert politically in tune with Dulles, Brode worked to locate Taiwanese scientists able to help Robertson. By April 1958, Brode had identified six researchers in relevant disciplines who had fled mainland China with Chiang Kai-shek, including Tsiang Ping-jen, a meteorologist formerly affiliated with the IAU. Taipei's Academica Sinica, now better attuned to Washington's desires, swiftly swung into action, demanding that Taiwan represent China at the Berkeley meeting. Brode then stunned Struve and Goldberg by instructing them, as official members of the U.S. IAU delegation, to vote to exclude Communist Chinese scien- tists "on any technicality."90 The growing crisis weighed heavily on America's leading astronomers. "I shudder to think of the consequences," Goldberg wrote Struve, "if it becomes known to the IAU that our invitation is conditioned upon the admission of Formosa."91Their dilemma: canceling the planned U.S. meeting would cede leadership of the IAU to their Eastern Bloc colleagues; but arguing against Taiwanese scientists would go against long-cherished notions of scientific internationalism. Neither scientist wanted mainland Chinese astronomers to bolt the IAU, and neither thought Taiwanese re- searchers had anything to offer contemporary astronomy. Tensions between elitist and universalist values boiled over at meetings of the IAU Executive Council in 1959. IAU vice presidents from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia urged their colleagues to reject Taiwan's application because of the island's paltry astronomical work. Yet most council members sided with Leiden Observatory director Jan Oort, then IAU presi- dent. "Certainly the astronomical activity in this territory appears at present to be very limited," Oort declared. "But this is no reason for refusing admission."92Subsequently Y.-C. Chang, president of the Astronomical Society of the People's Republic of China, broke mainland China's ties with the IAU. While this decision almost certainly came from Communist Party officials (the insult provided an opportunity to advance their nationalist Great Leap Forward campaign), Chang's private anger flashed through China's official statement. Admitting Taiwan to membership "is a thing which goes far beyond the scope of 'science,"' Chang declared, "and reduces the IAU into a mere tool in the political intrigue of the 'two Chinas.' This result deeply pained Struve (Chang was his former graduate student), and Goldberg was later tormented by the chilling silence of his Communist Chinese colleagues after the Cultural Revo- lution began. While both men publicly defended the principle of scientific universal- ism, neither felt certain they had made the right choice.93

90 U.S. Embassy Moscow to Otto Struve,3 July 1957, and Leo Goldbergto , 30 Sept. 1958, Box 23, StruvePapers. 91Goldberg to Struve, 10 June 1958, Box 3, StruvePapers. 92 Oort to Chang, 2 Dec. 1959, and Oort to Chang, 5 Feb. 1960, Box 309, folder 8.1.1958, Jan Oort Papers(hereafter cited as OortPapers), Leiden UniversityLibrary, Leiden; Goldbergto Struve,6 July 1961, Box 10, folder 83.17, Leo GoldbergPapers, Archives. 93 Chang to Oort, 20 Nov. 1959, Box 309, folder 8.1.1958, OortPapers; Blaauw, History of the IAU (cit. n. 79); L. Goldberg,"China and the IAU,"draft, ca. 1986, GoldbergWorking Files, Smithsonian Institution,National Air and Space Museum,Washington, D.C. (We thankDavid DeVorkinfor access to this document). NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 71

By late 1958, many senior U.S. scientistshad perceiveda growingcrisis over in- terational scientific relations.Eyeing the IAU strife, membersof the International Union of Biological Sciences' ExecutiveCommittee voted againstadmitting Taiwan, declaringthat such a step would "separatefrom membershipat least one important scientificcontributor," and two internationalunions planningU.S. meetingsabruptly shifted them to Canadaand WesternEurope. At the same time, the Departmentof State brokea forty-yearprecedent by refusingto pay U.S. dues to any international scientificunions that admitted members from "non-recognizedregimes." The United Stateswas "losing[its] internationalscientific prestige and leadershipbecause we are not able to participatein the work of the internationalscientific unions as our scien- tific stature would justify," warned Rockefeller Institute presidentDetlev Bronk. "This is tantamountto arbitraryabdication of scientific leadershipand prestige in favorof the Soviet Bloc."94Another leading U.S. scientistpenned a "statementof po- litical non-discrimination"affirming the rightsof scientists "of any countryor terri- tory to adhereto or to associate with internationalscientific activity withoutregard to race, religionor politicalphilosophy." The NationalAcademy of Sciences quickly affirmedit. Yet the Eisenhoweradministration initially ignored these protests.95 Why did Americanscientists fail to make theircase aboutscientific international- ism? One reasonwas thatnot all U.S. scientistsagreed about its value.Vocal support for Departmentof Statepolicies came from chemists,members of the largestprofes- sional scientificdiscipline in the United States.American chemists had won the bulk of Nobel Prizesin chemistrysince WorldWar II, andinternational chemical abstracts suggested their productivitywas twice that of their Soviet counterparts.96Chemists also were more involved in industrythan membersof any other discipline, and the AmericanChemical Society (ACS), the world'slargest scientific organization, had a stronglynationalistic orientation. (The ACS charterrequired members to aid "thede- velopmentof U.S. industriesand [add]to the materialprosperity and happiness of our people.")More politicallyconservative than their colleagues in physics and biology, many chemists were quick to disparagework by Communistresearchers. In 1954, Joel H. Hildebrand,a Berkeleychemist then servingas ACS president,had declared, "A 'scientist'who joins the Communistparty is an enemy of the profession."When the Federationof AmericanScientists had askedthe ACS to join in its protestof state policies towardinternational scientific meetings,ACS executive secretaryAlden H. Emerydemurred, noting thatthe ACS "neverhas had the slightestbit of difficultyin getting into this country those persons who were to contributeto our program."97 Many U.S. chemists clearly valued the ACS more than the InternationalUnion of Pureand Applied Chemistry(IUPAC), then one of ICSU's weakerand less cohesive

94 See Bronk, "InternationalScientific Unions," 28 Dec. 1959, Box 16, Rockefeller Univ. Papers (Detlev Bronk) (hereaftercited as Bronk), RockefellerArchive Center,Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. 95 Greenaway,Science International(cit. n. 4), 93-4; PSAC meeting record, 15 Dec. 1959, Box 11, White House Office of the SpecialAssistant for Science andTechnology (Killian/Kistiakowsky) (here- aftercited as Eisenhower/S&T),Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas. 96 "Chemistsof U.S. SurpassSoviets," NYT, 3 Aug. 1958, 22. U.S. petroleumgeologists also voted strong supportfor U.S. cold war policies; see Wang,Science in an Age of Anxiety(cit. n. 83), 203. 97 Hildebrandto Emery,29 Dec. 1955, Box 26, and Emery to Meyerhoff,4 Jan. 1956, Box 31, both ACS. In 1953, the ACS had voted to exclude Nobel laureateIrene Joliot-Curiefrom membershipbe- cause of herCommunist sympathies; see Linus Paulingto FarringtonDaniels, 28 Oct. 1953, folder SCI 14.004a.4a.4, Collection, OregonState University; and Hildebrandto A. Nixon, 19 May 1954, Box 26, ACS. 72 RONALD E. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV bodies. In a major 1960 speech cleared by the Department of State, Brode argued that the ACS could, if necessary, take over the IUPAC's functions for Western Bloc scien- tists. (International scientific organizations, Brode wrote in his diary, "are a minor fac- tor of insignificant importance to the strength of world or national science and do not contribute appreciably to understanding between nations or peoples. It is not in our national interest to promote such organizations excepting where our political interests may profit by such.")98U.S. chemists certainly supported international science as a general principle. However, early in the cold war other professional issues concerned them more. While many chemists tacitly supported restricting scientific internationalism as a necessary sacrifice to win the cold war, other leading American scientists in the late 1950s more successfully challenged U.S. foreign policy. Aiding their campaign was an influx of politically moderate scientists within the White House after the launch of Sputnik shattered global faith in America's leadership in science and technology. Re- sponding to cries for federal action, Eisenhower had created the President's Science Advisory Committee, whose leadership included Bronk, MIT president James Kil- lian, and Manhattan Project leader George B. Kistiakowky. Their internationalist leanings diminished the influence of longstanding Eisenhower advisers and Atomic Energy Commission chair Lewis Strauss, whose deep suspicions of the Soviet Union left them little inclined toward international cooperation.99An- other reason was that senior U.S. scientists now saw strength in Soviet science. The Nobel laureate I. I. Rabi (who had interacted with Eisenhower a decade before at Co- lumbia University) boldly declared in 1959 something unthinkable just five years be- fore: Americans needed to face "the fact that we may never again be as strong scien- tifically in comparison to the USSR." U.S. foreign policy thus was best served by involving the Soviet Union "in cooperative activities in such a way that we learn more about Soviet science and technology." Not all Eisenhower administration officials ac- cepted Rabi's judgment, yet White House analysts admitted that Sputnik had greatly altered the landscape of international competition. Although science and technology had always been symbols of national prestige, one wrote, what was new "is the ex- plicitness with which they are recognized as political factors."100Finally, Killian and Kistiakowsky knew that not all federal agencies opposed international science and adroitly exploited interagency conflicts. While long-term FBI director J. Edgar Hoover despised the international outlook of scientists, CIA leaders backed multina- tional meetings, keenly aware of the vital information they provided for national se- curity.101In the late 1950s, the Ford Foundation-sympathetic to the CIA's broader cultural concerns-began underwriting new international scientific programs and

98 Brode, "InternationalScientific Cooperation,"draft ms., 5 Feb. 1960, Box 25, Wallace R. Brode Papers(hereafter cited as Brode Papers),Library of Congress,Washington, D.C. 99Zuoyue Wang,American Science and the Cold War:The Rise of the U.S. President'sScience Ad- visory Committee(Ph.D. diss., Univ. of California,Santa Barbara,1994); PatrickJ. McGrath,Scien- tists, Business, and the State, 1890-1960 (ChapelHill, 2002); and David M. Hart,Forged Consensus: Science, Technology,and Economic Policy in the UnitedStates, 1921-1953 (Princeton,1998). 100D. Z. Beckler to E. Skolnikoff, 18 Dec. 1959, Box 11, Eisenhower/S&T;U.S. Information Agency, "U.S. and Soviet Science and Technology,"21 April 1960, Box 11, folder 355, JeromeWies- ner Papers,Office of Researchand Analysis, MIT,Cambridge. 101Ronald E. Doel, "Scientistsas Policymakers,Advisors, and IntelligenceAgents: Linking Diplo- maticHistory with the Historyof Science,"in TheHistoriography of the Historyof ContemporarySci- ence, Technology,and Medicine, ed. Thomas Soderqvist(London, 1997), 33-62. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 73 paidAmerican dues for internationalscientific unions blacklisted by the Department of State.102 This escalatingconflict over scientific internationalismreflected a clash between two well-definedand deeply opposing sets of values:support for East-Westcontacts as an expressionof democraticvalues versus insistence that defeatingCommunism requiredsacrifices consistent with total war. Both political traditionshad been nur- turedin early cold warAmerica: the centralquestion for both sides was whethersci- ence representedan exceptionalactivity that transcended U.S. foreignpolicy. In late 1959, Kistiakowsky,then Eisenhower'sscience adviser,successfully made "interna- tionalscientific cooperation" an actionitem to be consideredby the NationalSecurity Council(NSC), the nation'shighest policy-settingbody. Kistiakowskyforcefully ar- gued that unfetteredinternational scientific congresses aided U.S. nationalsecurity policy. In a secretdraft that circulated widely withinthe White House, the Pentagon, and among Cabinetofficials, Kistiakowskydeclared that scientific internationalism had eased political tensions,fostered "evolutionary trends" favoring democratic val- ues within EasternBloc nations,aided scientific intelligence-gathering,and height- ened U.S. prestigeworldwide. Killing supportfor organizations"of which Red China has become a member,"Kistiakowsky concluded, constituted "gradual abdication of scientific leadershipto the Soviet Bloc" and damagedAmerica's image abroadby suggestingthe United States restrictedfree speech. Speakingfor the Departmentof State,Brode vehementlydisagreed, charging that Kistiakowskyhad exaggeratedthe benefitsof internationalismwhile ignoringits detriments.Allowing Communistsci- entists to attendmeetings on Americansoil underminedU.S. foreignpolicy (by giv- ing scientistsspecial treatment)and undercut U.S. research(since Soviet science was so intimatelyconnected to Communistideology, formalcontacts invariably benefited Communistnations more).103 An NSC taskforce debatedthe issue at five separateses- sions in 1960. Duringthat time, Kistiakowskypenned a spiriteddefense of interna- tional contactsthat he placed in Science, and Brode'sPriestley Medal addressto the AmericanChemical Society rehearsedhis contraryview. Apartfrom these two pub- lications,however, neither of whichhinted at the ongoingNSC deliberations,the most importantdebate aboutU.S. internationalscience policy since 1945 was conducted entirelyin secret.104 Fallout shelters,outer space policy, weapons systems development,the proposed nucleartest ban treaty,and international scientific cooperation were amongthe issues that the NSC evaluatedin the Eisenhoweradministration's final year. International science was discusseda finaltime duringthe NSC's regular10 A.M. Thursdaymeet- ing on December 1, 1960, with Eisenhowerchairing the session. After final debate amongCabinet officials and agency representatives,the NSC votedto approveAction

102Alexis De Greiff, "SupportingTheoretical Physics for the ThirdWorld Development: The Ford Foundation and the InternationalCentre for Theoretical Physics," in American Foundationsand Large-Scale Research: Constructionand Transferof Knowledge, ed. Giuliana Gemelli (Bologna, 2001), 25-50; and John Krige, "The Ford Foundation,European Physics, and the Cold War,"Hist. Stud.Phys. Biol. Sci. 29 (1999): 333-61. 103D. Z. Beckler to E. Skolnikoff, 18 Dec. 1959, and Skolnikoff to Killian, 8 July 1960, both Box 11, Eisenhower/S&T;Brode, "InternationalScientific Cooperation,"5 Feb. 1960, and Brode to Loy Henderson,26 April 1960, Box 25, Brode Papers;"Briefing Note for PB [PlanningBoard] meetings," 11 May 1960, Box 3, Eisenhower,NSC Registry Series, NSC Staff, WH. 104George B. Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Affairs," Science 131 (1960): 1019-24; and Wallace R. Brode, "[PriestleyMedal Address],"draft copy, [April 9, 1960], Bronk, Box 16. 74 RONALD E. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV no. 2166-b-(15), which held that "[i]nternational scientific activities relate directly and increasingly to the national security objectives of the U.S."105The NSC's action, a defeat for Department of State conservatives, ended state interference with inter- national scientific meetings hosted by the United States.106NSC members endorsed Kistiakowsky's argument that American scientists needed to contain Communist ad- vances within the international scientific unions in the same way that the United States now sought to stem Communism by cultivating support in nonaligned countries from Southeast Asia to sub-Saharan Africa. The hosting of international conferences, at odds with U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s, once again suited state needs.

CONCLUSION

While the governments of National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union both im- posed restrictions on the hosting of international scientific meetings in the 1930s, the government of the United States did not begin to do so until the height of the cold war in the 1950s, after it became the leading patron of science in that nation.'07Neverthe- less, the parallel between these cases is not exact: the United States remained a democracy while Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s were classic dictatorships that employed the systematic and widespread use of terror. However, as historian Jessica Wang has argued, the United States in the cold war saw the rapid growth of loyalty investigations and self-censorship, repression of the political ac- tivities of scientists, and the creation of a social order that stressed "distrust, anomie and atomization." Hannah Arendt had these factors in mind in describing the police state aim of total surveillance, even if they were present at diminished intensity in 1950s America compared with Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union.'08 While scholars have shown how state agencies such as the FBI inhibited political dissent by American scientists during the cold war, other state agencies, including the Depart- ment of State and the National Security Council, played analogous though less well- understood roles in shaping the involvement of American researchers in international science activities.109In this instance, the U.S. democratic political system does not preclude comparisons with totalitarian regimes. No single political system or state proved more effective than another in limiting the ability of its scientists to host international meetings. Both National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union acted overtly in discouraging or postponing planned scientific meetings within their borders. Stalin's government sought greater political

105Untitled notes on the 468th meetingof the NSC, 2 Dec. 1960, Eisenhower,NSC series,Ann Whit- man file, Box 13. 106 This new policy persistedthrough the 1960s. A partialaccount of the conflict appearsin George B. Kistiakowsky,A Scientist at theWhite House: The Private Diary of PresidentEisenhower's Special Assistantfor Scienceand Technology (Cambridge, 1976). 107 Though, interestingly,not for astronomy,which throughthe mid-1950s relied primarilyon pri- vate patronage;see David H. DeVorkin,"Who Speaks for Astronomy?How AstronomersResponded to GovernmentFunding after World War II;" Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci. 31 (2000): 55-92. 108Jessica Wang, "Scientists and the Problem of the Public in Cold War America, 1945-1960," Osiris 17 (2002): 323-47, on 338; see also Richard Beyler, Alexei Kojevnikov and Jessica Wang, "Purgesin ComparativePerspective: Rules for Exclusion and Inclusion in the Scientific Community underPolitical Pressure"(this volume). 109Ronald E. Doel and Allan A. Needell, "Science, Scientists, and the CIA: Balancing International Ideals, National Needs, and Professional Opportunities,"Intelligence and National Security 12 (1997): 59-81. NATIONALSTATES AND INTERNATIONALSCIENCE 75 control over the organizationand content of sessions at the Seventh International GeneticsConference. National Socialist Germanywas cruderin its effortsto impose unyielding racial restrictionson Germanparticipation in internationalcongresses. Racism formedthe centralfixation of the National Socialists, and the state pursued this policy even at a cost. The UnitedStates, by contrast,employed subtler diplomatic efforts to control internationalscientific meetings. Yet its actions arguablyhad the greatestimpact: by the late 1950s, the U.S. governmenthad succeededin isolating CommunistChinese scientists from two of the most activeinternational scientific ac- tivities of that era, effectively shrinkingthe communityof internationalscience, be- fore post-Sputnikpolitical shocks alteredU.S. foreignpolicy goals. Ideologicalissues lay behindall state effortsto limit internationalscientific meet- ings, butthe kindsof ideologicalconcerns at stakevaried widely. In the Soviet Union, state concernabout providing ostensible political supportfor what Politburoleaders viewed as Fascist-ladengenetics (as opposedto Lysenko'sstate-supported Lamarkian views) helpedstimulate state efforts to postponethe 1937 Moscow assembly.By con- trast,National Socialist officials wantedscientific practices brought in line with the state's largercampaign to eliminateJewish participationin civic life and erase posi- tive memories of their contributions.American authoritiesremained unconcerned aboutscientific ideas but sought to purifyU.S. foreign policy by prohibitingformal contactswith politicallyunrecognized regimes. Anticommunism formed the ideolog- ical basis of U.S. foreignpolicy, butAmerican hostility toward internationalism in sci- ence more closely resembledGermany's fixation on racial identity than the Soviet Union's concernswith ideologically correctscience, the intellectualperils of genet- ics, and science's value for propaganda. Internationalscientific meetings became a concernat the highestlevels of the state. Stalinhimself edited the widely readIzvestiia editorial announcing that the Moscow conferencehad merely been postponed,and Eisenhowerchaired the NationalSecu- rity Council deliberationsover the futureof internationalscientific activities in U.S. foreign policy. Only in Germanydid the issue remainat the ministrylevel, perhaps because individualsat higherlevels of the NationalSocialist hierarchyshowed little appreciationof science. Statesthat elected to limit internationalgatherings did so be- lieving they facedminimal costs in doing so or thatsuch actionssupported larger state goals (in the Soviet case, the decision to postponewas arguablya bureaucraticmis- calculation).Only in Germanydid limits on scientific internationalismthreaten re- searchcritical to militaryand national security concerns at the time, althoughthat na- tion remaineda worldleader in aerodynamics,and informal foreign contacts persisted into the late 1930s. States were boldest in restrictinginternational scientific con- gresses for disciplinesremote from immediatemilitary applications. For their part,many scientists keenly wantedto hold internationalscientific con- ferencesin theirhome countries.They saw numerousadvantages in doing so: such a conferenceallowed them to dramaticallyincrease their participationand influence, helped secure leadershipposts in professionalbodies, gave them intimateaccess to the latestresearch news andgossip fromleading scientific competitors, and increased theiraccess to patronage.A failureto host such gatheringsceded those advantagesto other nationalscientific communities.Scientists also advocatednonscientific ratio- nales for hostingscientific meetings, including national prestige (in the UnitedStates, science'srole in promotingdemocratization). Short of totalwar, scientists were stead- fast in demandingthat their states allow internationalgatherings. Yet scientists had 76 RONALDE. DOEL, DIETERHOFFMANN, AND NIKOLAIKREMENTSOV few tools at their disposal to persuadereluctant states to permit such meetings and were trappedbetween their allegiance to scientificinternationalism and theirobliga- tions to the state.Access to patronagenot controlledby the stateclearly mattered. U.S. scientistssucceeded in overcomingstate oppositionpartly because they successfully securedprivate foundation funds. By contrast,Soviet scientistshad no such option; Germanresearchers, despite limited access to RockefellerFoundation grants, also re- lied primarilyon statefunds. Scientists sought to host internationalcongresses for anotherreason: to demon- stratetheir independence from nationalideologies at times when states soughtto im- pose ideologicallycorrect science. In the case of Germanyand the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the reactionof outsideWestern scientists was profoundlyshaped by theirde- sireto keep theirsciences "free"from state interference. By the 1950s, as the cold war intensified,this was no longeran optionfor Western scientists. For a few scientistsand scientificcommunities, this conflictdid not materialize.Old-guard physicists in Nazi Germany,such as JohannesStark, applauded "Aryan physics" and saw little benefitin maintainingties with foreignphysicists. Two decadeslater, U.S. chemistsalso down- played internationalcontacts but for differentreasons: they saw little scientificcom- petition overseas and agreedwith their state's cold war aims. However,most scien- tists (includingPrandtl, Vavilov, Struve, and Goldberg) fell in a fragilemiddle ground, needingsustained ties with elite colleaguesin othernations to keep theirresearch pro- gramscompetitive, even as they struggledwith state demands(and in Prandtl'scase, his own racialprejudices and politicalconvictions). Universalismand elitism both remainedimportant ideals for scientistsin the twen- tieth century,even when their nations veeredtowards ideological extremesand per- sonal contacts-the central glue of scientific internationalism-were damagedby long absences.Scientists were clearly loath to abandoneither ideal, but when forced to choose, contactwith elite, active competitorswon out over the more abstractno- tion of egalitarianaccess to internationalmeetings. Put another way, scientistswanted to keep tabs on the competition.In this sense, scientificinternationalism is an exten- sion of familiar community practices.