John W. Dower. Embracing Defeat. in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999. 676 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-393-04686-1.

Reviewed by Mark Selden

Published on H-Asia (October, 1999)

Embracing Defeat, John Dower's magisterial refashion another society as a democratic nation. chronicle of Japan under U.S. occupation, is the "Initially," Dower tells us with characteristic inci‐ summa of his four important studies of twentieth- siveness and irony, "the Americans imposed a century Japan and the U.S.-Japan relationship.[1] root-and-branch agenda of 'demilitarization and Its sweep is ambitious, ranging from political and democratization' that was in every sense a re‐ diplomatic history to innovative attempts to lo‐ markable display of arrogant idealism-both self- cate the Japanese people in the fow of change, in‐ righteous and genuinely visionary." (p. 23) Draw‐ cluding the frst eforts to chart cultural and social ing on a wealth of archival, documentary and dimensions of the era. Central to the work, and to published sources to illuminate kaleidoscopic Ja‐ the continuing debate about the occupation, are panese and American perspectives, he highlights three intertwined political issues whose resolu‐ MacArthur's arrogance and peccadilloes while tion would profoundly afect Japan's postwar positively assessing American contributions to an course: the emperor, the constitution and democ‐ enduring democratic political transformation. ratization, and the war crimes tribunals. In taking "Never," he concludes, "had a genuinely demo‐ discussion of these and other issues far beyond cratic revolution been associated with military the ofcial record, Dower ofers fresh social and dictatorship, to say nothing of a neocolonial mili‐ cultural perspectives on Japan and the U.S.-Japan tary dictatorship . . ." (pp. 80-81). relationship, perspectives that cut through domi‐ The work is at its very best, however, in nant images and stereotypes on both sides of the showing the hybrid and contested character of the Pacifc, and from Washington and to broad occupation. For if MacArthur ruled with the abso‐ strata of each society. lute authority of a military dictator who brooked The early occupation emerges in these pages no criticism, it is Dower's achievement to reveal as the boldest, yet in many ways the most Quixot‐ how the Japanese people, from the highest levels ic, attempt at social engineering ever attempted to of imperial and state power to the grassroots, H-Net Reviews speaking not in a single voice but expressing great MacArthur was critical not only to the sur‐ diversity, shaped many of the outcomes. They did vival of the imperial institution and the Showa so at times by reinforcing, at others by subtly sub‐ emperor's continued reign until his death in 1989, verting, the vision and plans of their American but to the creation of a contradictory imperial military rulers through the skilled, even brilliant, democracy-one of many intriguing oxymorons use of gaiatsu tactics that were facilitated by the that run through this study. "[T]he occupation au‐ American decision to rule indirectly through the thorities," Dower astutely observes, "chose not Japanese government.[2] merely to detach the emperor from his holy war, "Much that lies at the heart of contemporary but to resituate him as the center of their new Japanese society-the nature of its democracy, the democracy." (p. 278) intensity of popular feelings about pacifsm and MacArthur emerges from these pages alter‐ remilitarization, the manner in which the war is nately bigger than life, as in the iconic photograph remembered (and forgotten) derives," he ob‐ of the proconsul towering over a subservient Hi‐ serves, "from the complexity of the interplay be‐ rohito, and ludicrously nave and out of touch with tween the victors and the vanquished." (p. 28) Japanese thought and society. In the end, howev‐ Half a century later, both achievements and a er, it is the elusive fgure of the emperor that at‐ host of unresolved problems of the occupation tracts the author's interest. Together with Herbert continue to shape Japan, the U.S.-Japan relation‐ Bix's innovative research on the wartime role of ship, and the political economy and strategic con‐ the emperor, and his forthcoming biography of fgurations of the Pacifc. , Embracing Defeat brings the emperor Why did MacArthur, that democratic Caesar, out of the shadows and into the spotlight as a personally assure not only the preservation of the supremely shrewd and powerful actor.[3] "The monarchy, but also the continued reign of Hirohi‐ more one studies twentieth century Japan," Dow‐ to, who bore ultimate responsibility for Japan's er observes in a recent article in the journal Sekai, brutal war with Asia, and subsequently with the "the more the Showa emperor emerges as the na‐ United States and its allies? Dower shows that "re‐ tion's most interesting and infuential political ac‐ spectful appraisal of the emperor's benign poten‐ tor. He was, without question, a cautious and con‐ tial and virtually totalitarian 'spiritual' control servative man. He was also intelligent, well edu‐ over the Japanese psyche would become the cated in military as well as civilian matters, opin‐ bedrock of postwar [American] policy" (p. 283). ionated, and obsessed with detail. He used people While U.S. policymakers believed that Hirohito and knowingly allowed himself to be used by was indispensable to preserving stability and eas‐ them. He was extremely well informed about ing the task of the occupying forces, Embracing what was going on at the top levels of policy mak‐ Defeat reveals the existence of broad Japanese ing."[4] Among those he used so efectively were popular, and even substantial ofcial, sentiment MacArthur and the occupation leadership. In par‐ in favor of deposing Hirohito, and in some cases, ticular, the Americans were quick to accept the of abolishing the monarchy. Indeed, at three criti‐ contrived and self-serving image of the emperor cal points SCAP stepped in to suppress mounting presented to them by Japanese ofcials, and by pressures for the emperor to accept responsibility the emperor himself, as both peacemaker and for the war and retire: at the start of the occupa‐ democrat. tion in 1945, at the close of the war crimes tri‐ Dower's most trenchant political criticism of bunals in 1948, and at the end of the occupation the emperor and the Japanese political system is in 1951-52. highlighted in his Sekai article. There he under‐

2 H-Net Reviews lines the lasting signifcance of the emperor's fail‐ Breaking sharply with the image long culti‐ ure, whether by apology or by stepping down vated both by Japanese and American ofcials of from the throne, "to take even moral responsibili‐ Hirohito as a passive fgure (the sole exception be‐ ty for the 'Great War' that devastated ing self-serving claims of his dramatic initiative to Asia and his own subjects . . ." The result was si‐ end the war), Dower ofers one particularly telling multaneously to preserve the imperial mystique example of imperial activism in the early occupa‐ and to prevent apology, still less responsible criti‐ tion. This was Hirohito's intervention to recast the cism, of Japanese colonialism or the death of imperial rescript of New Year's Day 1946. While twenty million Asians and three million Japanese many have taken the document as a "sweeping as a result of Japan's ffteen year war. To do so 'renunciation of divinity,'" Embracing Defeat would imply the unthinkable: criticism of Hirohi‐ shows that "Through the use of esoteric language, to, who bore ultimate authority for these acts. The Emperor Hirohito adroitly managed to descend issues continue to haunt Japan more than half a only partway from heaven. . . [T]he rescript seized century after the end of the Pacifc War. The is‐ the initiative for the throne by identifying it with sues are best approached comparatively. Whereas a 'democracy' rooted neither in the reformist poli‐ German apologies and reparations have enabled cies of the actors nor in popular initiatives from that nation to overcome historical hostilities and below, but in governmental pronouncements dat‐ to provide leadership in the European Union, ing back to the beginning of the reign of Hirohi‐ Japan's inability to lay to rest wartime issues con‐ to's grandfather, the Meiji emperor." (p. 308) tinues as a source of tension in contemporary Again, in 1951, in afrming his intention to re‐ Asian politics.[5] main on the throne at the conclusion of the occu‐ In an interview with the reviewer, Dower pation, Hirohito scotched the language of an earli‐ points to Hirohito's pivotal initiative in sacrifcing er draft stating "I deeply apologize to the nation Okinawa and the Okinawan people to American for my responsibility for the defeat." (p. 330) "For strategic designs by ofering the U.S. virtually un‐ the defeat," but not, of course, for the lives lost, restricted military use of the island and continu‐ whether Japanese, Asians, or others, and certainly ing U.S. colonial rule long after the main islands not for the atrocities committed in the name of were returned to Japan. It was a shrewd ploy for the emperor. But even that phrase was too much. reducing U.S. demands for bases in the home is‐ There would be no imperial apology. lands and encouraging the U.S. to expedite the Among the most signifcant contributions of end of the occupation. It was also thoroughly con‐ Embracing Defeat is the attempt to overcome ob‐ sistent with the Japanese military's sacrifce of the stacles to the writing of a social history of the oc‐ Okinawan people, one-fourth of whom perished cupation era, that is, one attentive to the experi‐ in the fnal great battle of the war. ences, thoughts, and contributions of the Japanese In buying into and perpetuating the myth of people. What's the problem? In his Sekai essay the peace emperor, and in protecting him from Dower spells out what he calls "collusive Oriental‐ prosecution, the U.S. made a mockery of any ism." This was the condescending notion that the claims to even handedness in the Tokyo Tri‐ Japanese people were an "obedient herd", inca‐ bunals. It thus placed the exclusive onus for war pable of independent thought and democratic ac‐ crimes on Hirohito's subordinates while shielding tion. The Americans were not forced to rely on the Emperor not only from prosecution but even their own feverish imaginations. They could easi‐ from ofering testimony. ly point to ofcial Japanese slogans such as the one hundred million acting as one (ichi oku is‐ shin) to reinforce their own orientalist images

3 H-Net Reviews and deny the Japanese people the capability of ins, and the loss of three million Japanese lives in self-government. The New Deal reformers who the war by and large embraced, and continue to constituted the heart of the occupation leader‐ embrace, the pacifst principles enshrined in the ship, nevertheless pressed forward with their Constitution in the face of repeated attacks on Ar‐ "revolution from above" which presumed that, ticle 9 by the Japanese government and Japanese given the opportunity, the Japanese people would rightists. If Dower is on familiar ground in follow‐ embrace fundamental democratizing changes. At ing the reverse course interpretation, his work re‐ the same time, however, Dower points to an "oxy‐ inforces and adds rich detail to that interpreta‐ moronic democracy" created under the occupa‐ tion. Above all, it illustrates his point about a peo‐ tion, referring both to the SCAP military dictator‐ ple whose ideas and commitments may place con‐ ship and to the immense power that SCAP invest‐ straints on the actions of those who rule in their ed in the Japanese bureaucracy. name, and about the diversity of views among Ja‐ In shielding Hirohito from prosecution, ab‐ panese. solving him of responsibility for Japan's aggres‐ Even in drafting the constitution, an ostensi‐ sion, and burnishing the image of the peacemaker bly American afair, collusive actions were criti‐ who acted decisively and selfessly to end the war cal. While excluded from drafting the initial Eng‐ and save the nation, the U.S. played a pivotal role lish language document, in creating the Japanese in establishing imperial democracy. In an act of text that became the constitution, Japanese of‐ extraordinary hubris, Japan's democratic constitu‐ cials successfully undermined key democratic tion was drafted secretly in a one-week "Constitu‐ precepts of the English language original. In place tional Convention" by the occupation's Govern‐ of a polity that derived its ultimate strength and ment Section with no input from, or even consul‐ legitimacy from the people (jinmin), for example, tation with, Japanese authorities. Its basis, Dower they substituted language that strengthened the explains, was three principles advanced orally by authority of the emperor and the state (kokumin). MacArthur: the Emperor is the head of the state; Summing up the ironic results, Dower concludes war as a sovereign right of the nation is abol‐ that "No modern nation ever has rested on a more ished; and the feudal system of Japan will cease. alien constitution-or a more unique wedding of Interestingly, not one of MacArthur's three princi‐ monarchism, democratic idealism, and pacifsm; ples specifed either the democratic principles and few, if any, alien documents have ever been that, together with the no-war clause, were the as thoroughly internalized and vigorously defend‐ fnest achievements of the Constitution. ed as this national charter would come to be." (p. In one of the supreme ironies that are sprin‐ 347) In this as in so many ways the ambiguous kled liberally through Embracing Defeat, the U.S. legacy of the occupation, particularly its crafting created the world's only unequivocal peace con‐ of a 'symbol emperor', continues to cast its shad‐ stitution only to reverse course almost immediate‐ ow over the national identity. ly with the victory of the Chinese revolution and Embracing Defeat highlights the surprisingly the outbreak of war in . At the heart of the democratic and progressive character of the U.S.- reverse course was the decision to rearm and drafted Constitution and numerous early occupa‐ reindustrialize Japan as a subordinate Cold War tion policies, from zaibatsu dissolution to the en‐ partner. Nevertheless, the Japanese people, in re‐ franchisement of women, even as it exposes the sponse to their own sufering during the Pacifc irony and the limits of the gift of imperial democ‐ War, particularly American saturation bombing racy from on high. and the atomic bombing that left the nation in ru‐

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In short, Dower's nuanced appreciation of the which he maintained a splendid isolation from Ja‐ achievements of the occupation in creating lasting panese society in ways that invite comparison bases for a democratic, peaceful and capitalist with the cloistered lives of Japanese emperors. Japan, goes hand in hand with a withering cri‐ MacArthur's perspective drew on American clichs tique of the chauvinism and misunderstandings of the simple, even childlike character of the Japa‐ of elites on both sides. Of the bold action ordering nese as incapable of independent thought, even as the secret drafting by SCAP's government section it reversed the wartime vision of a people capable of the Japanese Constitution, he concludes, "The of fendish cruelty while eliding all notions of the line between Supreme Commander and Supreme complexity of Japanese society. As Dower sug‐ Being was always a fne one in MacArthur's mind. gests, such a perspective was reinforced by mech‐ In these momentous days of early February 1947 anisms of "collusive Orientalism." In the coming he came close to obliterating the distinction en‐ decades, "MacArthur's children" would prove tirely." (p. 361) Similarly, Dower lays bare the self- themselves to be supremely apt pupils in seizing serving actions of the Emperor, court ofcials, the economic opportunities opened by the occu‐ and much of the military and business elite: in pation, to challenge American economic suprema‐ disguising the Emperor's responsibility for the ac‐ cy in ways unimaginable to occupation leaders. tions of empire and war committed in his name, Perhaps the greatest contribution of Embrac‐ in attempting to sabotage the democratic provi‐ ing Defeat lies in the alternative view it ofers of a sions of the Constitution, and in plundering the complex postwar Japanese society and the Japa‐ national treasury for private proft in the immedi‐ nese people. While recognizing the continued ate aftermath of the surrender. The Japan that strengths of the reactionary elites that earlier led emerged politically and socially transformed from Japanese ruling groups to embark on the savage the ashes of defeat was, then, far from an Ameri‐ conquest of Asia and the subjugation of their own can creation. Rather, it was the product of a com‐ people as well, and that allowed these past mas‐ plex and often contradictory synergy of Ameri‐ ters of sophistication to deftly undermine some of cans and Japanese. Building on an American vi‐ the goals of their American masters, what sion, both its achievements and its faws also rest‐ emerges most forcefully here is the author's admi‐ ed on the complementary roles played by Japa‐ ration for the democratic and pacifst spirit and nese people and elites, including both prewar eco‐ common sense among the Japanese people. nomic and institutional foundations and the As in War Without Mercy, Dower is at his best democratic aspirations of the Japanese people. in transcending American chauvinism by high‐ In War Without Mercy: Race and Power in lighting the sometimes jarring conjunctures of Ja‐ the Pacifc War, Dower provided a memorable im‐ panese and American perspectives . . . there to ex‐ age that anticipated the sea change about to take pose the racist roots on both sides (but most dev‐ place in American perceptions of Japan and the astatingly on the U.S. side) that help to explain the U.S.-Japan relationship in the aftermath of the ferocity of the Pacifc War, here to highlight the battle of Okinawa, the nuclear bombing of Hi‐ multiple ironies of the occupation within an over‐ roshima and Nagasaki, and Japan's surrender. all framework of positive assessment that never‐ The cover of Leatherneck's September 1945 issue theless remains attentive to unresolved legacies displayed a battered and vexed but loveable mon‐ that continue to haunt contemporary Japan. Dow‐ key cradled in the arms of a large smiling GI er's great achievement is to shine a light into pleased with his new pet. It was that childlike im‐ many of the myriad dimensions of postwar Japa‐ age of the Japanese people that MacArthur cher‐ nese society to illuminate a patchwork of hope ished throughout his Japan years, a period in

5 H-Net Reviews and despair, poverty and corruption, fatalism and al issues that Embracing Defeat points the way to dynamism, including its powerful aspirations for the next generation of occupation scholarship. democratic, labor, and women's rights, its rich Dower's research in archival, published, and and complex culture, and above all the persistent graphic sources is exhaustive and meticulous. eforts of a people so devastated by war and os‐ Particularly in opening research in the area of tensibly powerless in the thrall of their con‐ popular culture and society an in attempting to querors to build a society on new foundations. listen to and convey the voices of diverse non- Embracing Defeat is a judicious and probing elite strata and individuals, he goes far beyond summation of the voluminous documentation and conventional archival and documentary sources scholarship on the postwar decade in Japan and to call attention to the realm of popular culture in the United States. Like no earlier study, it brings to its myriad forms. He has also made signifcant use the fore the ironies and contradictions of the era of individual testimony, drawing for example on and critically reassess the great issues of Japan's 's wide-ranging interviews with occu‐ postwar constitution, U.S.-Japan relations, democ‐ pation authorities in preparation for his docu‐ ratization, and the role of Japan in the making of mentary "Pacifc Century," and on citizen's letters the U.S. hegemonic order in Asia and globally. to Asahi Shimbun. <6> I wondered why, however, Dower sheds important new light and author‐ the master of nuance and language subtlety had itatively addresses political issues that have been chosen not to undertake his own interviews with thoroughly researched by American and Japanese those Americans, Japanese, and others who lived scholars, providing what is likely to stand as the through and shaped the era. I asked him whether defnitive interpretation of the occupation. Yet this was primarily reifcation of the orthodoxy of much of the freshest and most innovative materi‐ the Harvard-trained historian who privileges doc‐ al is in the cultural and social realm. For example, uments, especially ofcial documents, over "chat‐ we learn that in the brief period between Japan's ter", confdent that this explanation would not surrender and the landing of U.S. forces, the Japa‐ sufce given his pioneering work in the creative nese authorities created an indigenous "comfort use of such unconventional sources as comics, woman" system to service the G.I.s Where the Ja‐ flm, and popular novels to gain insight into popu‐ panese military had turned to Koreans, Filipinas, lar culture. I had noted, moreover, his use of in‐ Taiwanese, Chinese and other colonized peoples terview protocols, written reminiscences, and to serve as comfort women for troops throughout even interviews conducted by others. In respond‐ the empire, the Home Ministry as early as August ing, he made two important points: frst, he want‐ 18, 1945 began recruiting young Japanese women ed to listen to and convey the multiplicity of con‐ as prostitutes, praising them for "the great spirit temporary voices of the occupation, not sift mem‐ of maintaining the national polity by protecting ories and visions fltered through subsequent ex‐ the pure blood of the hundred million," that is, periences and infuenced by dominant ideologies; serving the country as a "dike of chastity." Against second, having mined valuable interviews and this background the occupation's guarantees of testimony prepared by other researchers and par‐ women's electoral, labor and social rights, begin‐ ticipants, both American and Japanese, he would ning with constitutional provisions that remain turn his own energies to other types of sources. I the envy of American women half a century later, suggest that this limiting decision leaves impor‐ would meet a positive reception among Japanese tant ground for future historians to conduct inter‐ women. It is in the discussion of social and cultur‐ views with those who lived through and shaped the occupation at all levels of society and with multiple perspectives. They will, however, have to

6 H-Net Reviews work quickly while those with memories of the proaches should not be conceded to the anthro‐ occupation remain alive. pologist and sociologist but claimed as an integral Embracing Defeat draws not only on pub‐ part of the historians' repertory. Esman recalls an lished sources but also interviews conducted by incident in which Richard Poole, disturbed by the others including the historian Takemae Eiji, for provisions of Article 9, discussed the matter with many purposes. It records, for example, the fact Colonel Charles Kades, who headed the twenty- that the 22-year old Beata Sirota, who played a four member drafting team. "Isn't it," Poole asked, critical role in inscribing women's rights into the "a bit impractical to send Japan out into the world Constitution, had requisitioned a jeep and made with a constitution that does not even allow it the the rounds of Tokyo libraries to collect the consti‐ right to maintain a military to defend itself from tutions of other nations to provide the American aggression?" Kades' response was simple and di‐ drafters with reference works. Milton Esman, an‐ rect: "Do you know where the idea came from?" other member of the drafting committee who ar‐ Poole: "MacArthur." Kades: "That's right." End of rived in Japan fresh from completing a Princeton conversation. Ph.D., is able to add his personal experience. He Many important questions pertaining to such told me of visiting the home of his friend, the issues as the drafting of the constitution by Ameri‐ scholar Royama Masamichi, who ofered addition‐ cans and the subsequent negotiations with the Ja‐ al constitutions and constitutional studies from panese government, I suggest, can further be his superb personal library. Esman adds, howev‐ probed through interviews. What, for example, er, that these books sat on a table and were never was the nature of MacArthur's personal involve‐ consulted by the drafters of the constitution who ment in the drafting process beyond his three were hard pressed to complete their task within a point memorandum? Were not the drafters in week. (At least never during his days as a partici‐ Government Section in continuous contact with pant as he was "furloughed" to Nikko for several the general and his chief aides to resolve con‐ days after raising uncomfortable questions about tentious issues throughout the week of drafting? the drafting process.) Interviews at multiple social If so, with what consequences? and political levels, with both Japanese and Amer‐ Of course, not all of the possibilities for inter‐ icans, would have made it possible to open up fur‐ views center on the "great events" of the era. The ther fascinating questions concerning the interac‐ anthropologist Robert Smith provided this vi‐ tion of Americans with English speaking intellec‐ gnette of the early occupation years. He and an‐ tuals and others in educating them about Japan other American GI decided to take in a musical in and informing them of Japanese perspectives on Osaka (such entertainment spots were of-limits critical questions, not to mention the broad range to G.I.s). Entering the hall after the show had be‐ of social contacts. These issues take on particular gun, to Smith's embarrassment, the manager salience given the isolation from the Japanese made two Japanese surrender their seats. But his people of MacArthur and many of his top aides. embarrassment was far greater when the per‐ And what of the dynamics within the ranks of formers belted out a number whose refrain went: Government Section charged with drafting the Pikadon, pikadon, pikadon . . . don . . . don. Those constitution? Again, there are voluminous docu‐ memorable words, the fash-bang used to describe ments and memoirs, yet oral history can surely go the impact of the atomic bomb, and the audience's further in capturing important sociopolitical and raucous laughter, remained inscribed in the cultural dynamics, not as a substitute for, but as a young language ofcer's memory more than ffty supplement to, the documentary record. Such ap‐ years later.

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Harlan Koch, who commanded a naval com‐ and documentary sources, to write about revolu‐ pany in Southwestern Honshu and Kyushu, ofers tionary transformations in village .<8> Dow‐ another perspective, rightly noting that Embrac‐ er's suspicions concerning the uses of oral testi‐ ing Defeat is essentially the view of the occupa‐ mony are certainly apt. Yet all sources have their tion from Tokyo, or from the large cities. To be limitations, not least the ofcial record. Checked sure, such a view is critical in understanding key against the range of ofcial and unofcial, docu‐ dimensions of the big picture. Koch, however, un‐ mentary, fction, graphic, and other records that derlines the fact that occupation forces in the pe‐ have been consulted for the present study, the riphery lacked the cushy perks of their American oral record surely ofers future historians unique counterparts in Tokyo. . . alluding specifcally to perspectives on many critical issues. the photograph of a Chief Petty Ofcer in Tokyo If this study's most important contributions served by kimono-clad maids at home with his lie in engaging the politics and culture of the era, wife and children. Koch's comments focus primar‐ the realms of economic and institutional change ily on the diversity of experiences of occupation are barely scratched. Land reform, for example, is forces, perhaps exaggerating the claim.<7> He is scarcely mentioned, and economics and economic nevertheless correct in pointing to diferential policy is essentially relegated to the fnal chapter privileges of occupying forces in the periphery, where Dower shows, importantly, the ways in even if his assessment doubtless understates the which Japanese planners early on anticipated privileges enjoyed by his own unit. But the impor‐ much of Japan's subsequent high-tech surge while tance of the photo lies above all in the fact that it Americans continued to envisage an economy was U.S. navy propaganda displaying the good life that would continue its prewar focus on textile of navy personnel and the appropriate position of production. Future studies of the occupation will Japanese servants to their American masters. perforce go further in exploring the foundations Moreover, if Dower focuses on U.S. occupying of Japan's subsequent economic surge or perhaps, forces in the capital, his portrait of Japanese soci‐ for that matter, anticipating the economic and so‐ ety draws on letters, diaries, stories, photographs cial doldrums that Japan has encountered in the and much more to convey dimensions of broad 1990s. If economics has come to symbolize Japan strata and diverse regions of the occupied nation. and the "Japanese challenge" for many Ameri‐ There nevertheless remain numerous important cans, Europeans, and Asians, the economic and perspectives to be researched on the outcomes of institutional history of the occupation await full- the occupation in peripheral, including rural, ar‐ dress treatment. eas of Japan and on broad classes of Japanese peo‐ The preceding queries and criticisms place ple. heavy demands on an author who has produced a These random examples draw on conversa‐ seven hundred page opus that sets the standard tions with, or e-records from, participants in the for postwar studies of Japanese politics and U.S.- occupation. The point is simply to suggest that the Japan relations. With this work, Dower consoli‐ treasure house of oral history, above all for a dates his position as the leading Western historian work that makes so important a beginning toward of modern Japan. Embracing Defeat is one of a social and cultural history, has only begun to be those rare books that deserve to be read and de‐ tapped. This is particularly true on the Japanese bated on both sides of the Pacifc. side. Given the magnitude and subtlety of Dower's [1]. The earlier works are Origins of the Mod‐ research, the point is perhaps gratuitous, even ern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Nor‐ self-serving, on the part of a reviewer who has re‐ man, edited with an introduction by John Dower lied heavily on oral history, together with ofcial

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(New York: Pantheon, 1975); Empire and After‐ of the Wannsee Conference, Permanent Exhibit: math: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experi‐ Guide and Reader (Berlin: Haus der Wannsee- ence (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Konferenz Memorial, n.d.). By contrast, Japanese Studies, Harvard University, 1979); War Without historical memory, when turned to the war, has Mercy: race and Power in the Pacifc War (New long focused on the great symbol of Japanese vic‐ York: Pantheon, 1986)l and Japan and War and timization in the memorial to the hibakusha at Hi‐ Peace: Selected Essays (New York: Pantheon, roshima (only in the 1990s expanded to address 1993). the wider context of the war), or in the Yasukuni [2]. Gaiatsu: outside pressure (editor's note). Shrine that honors the Japanese war dead. The great eforts by Japanese scholars and citizens to [3]. Herbert Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: unearth and publicize Japanese crimes of colo‐ A Reinterpretation," in Michael Hogan, ed., Hi‐ nialism and war must continue to face ofcial ef‐ roshima in History and Memory (Cambridge: forts at denial and refusal to accept responsibility Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 80-115; for everything from the comfort women to the "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Prob‐ . Cf. Associated Press report on lem of War Responsibility," Journal of Japanese October 2, 1999, announcing the Tokyo court re‐ Studies 18 (Summer 1992), pp. 295-363; Herbert jection of a Korean woman's demand for $1.1 mil‐ Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan lion compensation and ofcial government apolo‐ (New York: Harper & Row, forthcoming). gy for being forced into sexual slavery by the Ja‐ [4]. "Tennosei minshushugi no tanjo: 'Showa panese military in the years 1938-1945; Laura tenno no message' o yomitoku" (The birth of im‐ Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Living With the perial democracy: Constuing the Showa Emper‐ Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conficts or's Message), Sekai (September 1999), pp. in the Nuclear Age (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 221-232. 1997). [5]. Cf. Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., His‐ [7]. See Koch's comments in the form of a per‐ tory Censored: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, sonal review of Embracing Defeat at Germany, and the United States (Armonl, New www.amazon.com. York: M. E. Sharpe, forthcoming). [8]. Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz, and [6]. Frank Gibney, ed., Senso: The Japanese Re‐ Mark Selden, Chinese Village, Socialist State (New member the Pacifc War (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Haven, Conn.: Press, 1991); "Revo‐ Sharpe, 1998). A September 1999 visit to Weimar, lution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China," and particularly Berlin, makes clear the myriad (forthcoming). ways in which Naziism and the Holocaust remain Copyright (c) 1999 by H-Net, all rights re‐ imbricated both in the architecture and intellectu‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft al and cultural life of contemporary Germany. educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ From numerous monuments to Holocaust victims thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ to reminders of Auschwitz and Buchenwald to the tact [email protected]. Holocaust Museum under construction, to the Wannsee Conference exhibit preserving records of the decision to move forward in January 1942 to the Final Solution, to the outdoor exhibition at S.S. headquarters in downtown Berlin, Germans "daily, hourly" confront the Nazi past and issues of German responsibility. See particularly House

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Citation: Mark Selden. Review of Dower, John W. Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II. H-Asia, H-Net Reviews. October, 1999.

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