John W. Dower. Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999. 676 pp. $29.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-393-04686-1. Reviewed by Mark Selden Published on H-Asia (October, 1999) Embracing Defeat, John Dower's magisterial refashion another society as a democratic nation. chronicle of Japan under U.S. occupation, is the "Initially," Dower tells us with characteristic inci‐ summa of his four important studies of twentieth- siveness and irony, "the Americans imposed a century Japan and the U.S.-Japan relationship.[1] root-and-branch agenda of 'demilitarization and Its sweep is ambitious, ranging from political and democratization' that was in every sense a re‐ diplomatic history to innovative attempts to lo‐ markable display of arrogant idealism-both self- cate the Japanese people in the fow of change, in‐ righteous and genuinely visionary." (p. 23) Draw‐ cluding the frst efforts to chart cultural and social ing on a wealth of archival, documentary and dimensions of the era. Central to the work, and to published sources to illuminate kaleidoscopic Ja‐ the continuing debate about the occupation, are panese and American perspectives, he highlights three intertwined political issues whose resolu‐ MacArthur's arrogance and peccadilloes while tion would profoundly affect Japan's postwar positively assessing American contributions to an course: the emperor, the constitution and democ‐ enduring democratic political transformation. ratization, and the war crimes tribunals. In taking "Never," he concludes, "had a genuinely demo‐ discussion of these and other issues far beyond cratic revolution been associated with military the official record, Dower offers fresh social and dictatorship, to say nothing of a neocolonial mili‐ cultural perspectives on Japan and the U.S.-Japan tary dictatorship . ." (pp. 80-81). relationship, perspectives that cut through domi‐ The work is at its very best, however, in nant images and stereotypes on both sides of the showing the hybrid and contested character of the Pacific, and from Washington and Tokyo to broad occupation. For if MacArthur ruled with the abso‐ strata of each society. lute authority of a military dictator who brooked The early occupation emerges in these pages no criticism, it is Dower's achievement to reveal as the boldest, yet in many ways the most Quixot‐ how the Japanese people, from the highest levels ic, attempt at social engineering ever attempted to of imperial and state power to the grassroots, H-Net Reviews speaking not in a single voice but expressing great MacArthur was critical not only to the sur‐ diversity, shaped many of the outcomes. They did vival of the imperial institution and the Showa so at times by reinforcing, at others by subtly sub‐ emperor's continued reign until his death in 1989, verting, the vision and plans of their American but to the creation of a contradictory imperial military rulers through the skilled, even brilliant, democracy-one of many intriguing oxymorons use of gaiatsu tactics that were facilitated by the that run through this study. "[T]he occupation au‐ American decision to rule indirectly through the thorities," Dower astutely observes, "chose not Japanese government.[2] merely to detach the emperor from his holy war, "Much that lies at the heart of contemporary but to resituate him as the center of their new Japanese society-the nature of its democracy, the democracy." (p. 278) intensity of popular feelings about pacifism and MacArthur emerges from these pages alter‐ remilitarization, the manner in which the war is nately bigger than life, as in the iconic photograph remembered (and forgotten) derives," he ob‐ of the proconsul towering over a subservient Hi‐ serves, "from the complexity of the interplay be‐ rohito, and ludicrously nave and out of touch with tween the victors and the vanquished." (p. 28) Japanese thought and society. In the end, howev‐ Half a century later, both achievements and a er, it is the elusive fgure of the emperor that at‐ host of unresolved problems of the occupation tracts the author's interest. Together with Herbert continue to shape Japan, the U.S.-Japan relation‐ Bix's innovative research on the wartime role of ship, and the political economy and strategic con‐ the emperor, and his forthcoming biography of figurations of the Pacific. Hirohito, Embracing Defeat brings the emperor Why did MacArthur, that democratic Caesar, out of the shadows and into the spotlight as a personally assure not only the preservation of the supremely shrewd and powerful actor.[3] "The monarchy, but also the continued reign of Hirohi‐ more one studies twentieth century Japan," Dow‐ to, who bore ultimate responsibility for Japan's er observes in a recent article in the journal Sekai, brutal war with Asia, and subsequently with the "the more the Showa emperor emerges as the na‐ United States and its allies? Dower shows that "re‐ tion's most interesting and influential political ac‐ spectful appraisal of the emperor's benign poten‐ tor. He was, without question, a cautious and con‐ tial and virtually totalitarian 'spiritual' control servative man. He was also intelligent, well edu‐ over the Japanese psyche would become the cated in military as well as civilian matters, opin‐ bedrock of postwar [American] policy" (p. 283). ionated, and obsessed with detail. He used people While U.S. policymakers believed that Hirohito and knowingly allowed himself to be used by was indispensable to preserving stability and eas‐ them. He was extremely well informed about ing the task of the occupying forces, Embracing what was going on at the top levels of policy mak‐ Defeat reveals the existence of broad Japanese ing."[4] Among those he used so effectively were popular, and even substantial official, sentiment MacArthur and the occupation leadership. In par‐ in favor of deposing Hirohito, and in some cases, ticular, the Americans were quick to accept the of abolishing the monarchy. Indeed, at three criti‐ contrived and self-serving image of the emperor cal points SCAP stepped in to suppress mounting presented to them by Japanese officials, and by pressures for the emperor to accept responsibility the emperor himself, as both peacemaker and for the war and retire: at the start of the occupa‐ democrat. tion in 1945, at the close of the war crimes tri‐ Dower's most trenchant political criticism of bunals in 1948, and at the end of the occupation the emperor and the Japanese political system is in 1951-52. highlighted in his Sekai article. There he under‐ 2 H-Net Reviews lines the lasting significance of the emperor's fail‐ Breaking sharply with the image long culti‐ ure, whether by apology or by stepping down vated both by Japanese and American officials of from the throne, "to take even moral responsibili‐ Hirohito as a passive fgure (the sole exception be‐ ty for the 'Great East Asia War' that devastated ing self-serving claims of his dramatic initiative to Asia and his own subjects . ." The result was si‐ end the war), Dower offers one particularly telling multaneously to preserve the imperial mystique example of imperial activism in the early occupa‐ and to prevent apology, still less responsible criti‐ tion. This was Hirohito's intervention to recast the cism, of Japanese colonialism or the death of imperial rescript of New Year's Day 1946. While twenty million Asians and three million Japanese many have taken the document as a "sweeping as a result of Japan's ffteen year war. To do so 'renunciation of divinity,'" Embracing Defeat would imply the unthinkable: criticism of Hirohi‐ shows that "Through the use of esoteric language, to, who bore ultimate authority for these acts. The Emperor Hirohito adroitly managed to descend issues continue to haunt Japan more than half a only partway from heaven. [T]he rescript seized century after the end of the Pacific War. The is‐ the initiative for the throne by identifying it with sues are best approached comparatively. Whereas a 'democracy' rooted neither in the reformist poli‐ German apologies and reparations have enabled cies of the actors nor in popular initiatives from that nation to overcome historical hostilities and below, but in governmental pronouncements dat‐ to provide leadership in the European Union, ing back to the beginning of the reign of Hirohi‐ Japan's inability to lay to rest wartime issues con‐ to's grandfather, the Meiji emperor." (p. 308) tinues as a source of tension in contemporary Again, in 1951, in affirming his intention to re‐ Asian politics.[5] main on the throne at the conclusion of the occu‐ In an interview with the reviewer, Dower pation, Hirohito scotched the language of an earli‐ points to Hirohito's pivotal initiative in sacrificing er draft stating "I deeply apologize to the nation Okinawa and the Okinawan people to American for my responsibility for the defeat." (p. 330) "For strategic designs by offering the U.S. virtually un‐ the defeat," but not, of course, for the lives lost, restricted military use of the island and continu‐ whether Japanese, Asians, or others, and certainly ing U.S. colonial rule long after the main islands not for the atrocities committed in the name of were returned to Japan. It was a shrewd ploy for the emperor. But even that phrase was too much. reducing U.S. demands for bases in the home is‐ There would be no imperial apology. lands and encouraging the U.S. to expedite the Among the most significant contributions of end of the occupation. It was also thoroughly con‐ Embracing Defeat is the attempt to overcome ob‐ sistent with the Japanese military's sacrifice of the stacles to the writing of a social history of the oc‐ Okinawan people, one-fourth of whom perished cupation era, that is, one attentive to the experi‐ in the final great battle of the war.