Mexico and the New Challenges of Hemispheric Security
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W oodr ow W ilson Center Repor MEXICO AND THE NEW CHALLENGES OF ts on the Americas • 11 HEMISPHERIC SECURITY Raúl Benítez-Manaut Latin American Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, DC 20004 Tel. (202) 691-4030 Fax (202) 691-4076 Latin American Program MEXICO AND THE NEW CHALLENGES OF HEMISPHERIC SECURITY Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Latin American Program Creating Community in the Americas Raúl Benítez-Manaut ©2004 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC www.wilsoncenter.org ©William F. Campbell/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images ©William Whitehurst/CORBIS Latin American Program MEXICO AND THE NEW CHALLENGES OF HEMISPHERIC SECURITY Raúl Benítez-Manaut WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS LEE H. HAMILTON, PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR BOARD OF TRUSTEES Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair; David A. Metzner, Vice Chair. Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United States; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for the Humanities; Roderick R. Paige, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; Colin L. Powell, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Lawrence M. Small, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Private Citizen Members: Joseph A. Cari, Jr., Carol Cartwright, Donald E. Garcia, Bruce S. Gelb, Daniel L. Lamaute, Tamala L. Longaberger, Thomas R. Reedy WILSON COUNCIL Bruce S. Gelb, President. Elias F. Aburdene, Charles S. Ackerman, B.B. Andersen, Russell Anmuth, Cyrus A. Ansary, Lawrence E. Bathgate II, Theresa Behrendt, John Beinecke, Joseph C. Bell, Steven Alan Bennett, Rudy Boschwitz, A. Oakley Brooks, Donald A. Brown, Melva Bucksbaum, Richard I. Burnham, Nicola L. Caiola, Mark Chandler, Peter B. Clark, Melvin Cohen, William T. Coleman, Jr., David M. Crawford, Jr., Michael D. DiGiacomo, Beth Dozoretz, Elizabeth Dubin, F. Samuel Eberts III, I. Steven Edelson, Mark Epstein, Melvyn J. Estrin, Sim Farar, Susan R. Farber, Roger Felberbaum, Julie Finley, Joseph H. Flom, John H. Foster, Charles Fox, Barbara Hackman Franklin, Norman Freidkin, John H. French, II, Morton Funger, Gregory M. Gallo, Chris G. Gardiner, Gordon D. Giffin, Steven J. Gilbert, Alma Gildenhorn, David F. Girard-diCarlo, Michael B. Goldberg, Roy M. Goodman, Gretchen Meister Gorog, William E. Grayson, Ronald Greenberg, Raymond A. Guenter, Cheryl F. Halpern, Edward L. Hardin, Jr., John L. Howard, Darrell E. Issa, Jerry Jasinowski, Brenda LaGrange Johnson, Shelly Kamins, James M. Kaufman, Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Anastasia D. Kelly, Christopher J. Kennan, Willem Kooyker, Steven Kotler, William H. Kremer, Raymond Learsy, Dennis A. LeVett, Francine Gordon Levinson, Harold O. Levy, Frederic V. Malek, David S. Mandel, John P. Manning, Jeffrey A. Marcus, John Mason, Jay Mazur, Robert McCarthy, Linda McCausland, Stephen G. McConahey, Donald F. McLellan, Charles McVean, J. Kenneth Menges, Jr., Kathryn Mosbacher, Jeremiah L. Murphy, Martha T. Muse, John E. Osborn, Paul Hae Park, Gerald L. Parsky, Jeanne L. Phillips, Michael J. Polenske, Donald Robert Quartel, Jr., J. John L. Richardson, Margaret Milner Richardson, Larry D. Richman, Carlyn Ring, Edwin Robbins, Robert G. Rogers, Otto Ruesch, Juan A. Sabater, Alan M. Schwartz, Timothy R. Scully, J. Michael Shepherd, George P. Shultz, Raja W. Sidawi, Kenneth Siegel, Ron Silver, William A. Slaughter, James H. Small, Shawn Smeallie, Gordon V. Smith, Thomas F. Stephenson, Norman Kline Tiefel, Mark C. Treanor, Anthony G. Viscogliosi, Christine M. Warnke, Ruth Westheimer, Pete Wilson, Deborah Wince-Smith, Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Paul Martin Wolff, Joseph Zappala, Richard S. Ziman, Nancy M. Zirkin ABOUT THE CENTER The Center is the living memorial of the United States of America to the nation’s twenty-eighth president, Woodrow Wilson. Congress established the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1968 as an international institute for advanced study, “symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation- ship between the world of learning and the world of public affairs.” The Center opened in 1970 under its own board of trustees. In all its activities the Woodrow Wilson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, sup- ported financially by annual appropriations from Congress, and by the contributions of founda- tions, corporations, and individuals. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that pro- vide financial support to the Center. | iv | TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface 1 Joseph S.Tulchin Chapter 1 9 Defense and Hemispheric Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Multinational Cooperation Chapter 2 35 North America: Regional Security under Construction? Chapter 3 49 Mexico’s Security Dilemma: Between Nation, North America, and Latin America About the Author 65 | v | | vi | PREFACE JOSEPH S. TULCHIN Joseph S.Tulchin is director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson Internation Center for Scholars. ne of the most disquieting features of the post-cold war global community has been the confusion surrounding discussions of O security—national security and international security—so that the very definition of the term is unclear. There is confusion on some of the most basic issues, such as: what constitutes an external threat; what is the role of the armed forces; under what circumstances should security be a question for multilateral agencies or responses; and, what is the appropriate response to threats from non-state actors. Perhaps most con- fusing of all is the increasing tendency to blur or erase the traditional line between domestic and international security, between citizen or person- al security and national security. While traditional security threats—armed conflicts between symmetri- cal state actors—may be fewer or much reduced from what they were perceived to be in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the missions of the armed forces in the Latin American region still reflect those threats. And, over the past decade, there has been considerable debate over the capacity of civilian authorities to manage the armed forces, the budgets allocated to them, and the uses to which they are put within the nation’s frontiers or overseas as part of multilateral peacekeeping. In October of 2003 in Mexico City, the Organization of American States held a “Special Conference on Security” with the objective of defining the important concepts, priorities, and instruments of security for entire hemisphere. Never before had a security debate generated so much attention in the Americas, nor had it promoted so much cooper- ation between the countries of Latin America as well as among the countries of North America and the Caribbean. This is a signal that the nations of the region have matured and are attempting to position | 1 | Joseph S. Tulchin themselves as interlocutors with the superpower, not only as rule-takers but also as rule makers.1 We take this to be the beginning of a process, not the end. Nevertheless, not a single country managed to form a secu- rity community that answers its society’s demands for the civil and dem- ocratic control of the armed forces, and develops clear mechanisms of cooperation in defense. While there have been advances in the democ- ratization of defense and security structures in some countries of South America and severe conflicts were overcome through negotiated means in Central America, many elements of state reform, the defense of human rights, and decision-making in matters of defense and security remain to be solved. These elements are fundamental to the institution- alization of cooperation in matters of security—the creation of a secu- rity community. And, since September 11, 2001, the U.S., which had been playing a vital role in forging a useful security community, retreat- ed to a unilateral definition of security and the security agenda that made creating community more difficult. So long as the U.S. insists on imposing its own security agenda on the hemisphere, there will be cri- sis points defined by the U.S. that undermine the concept of communi- ty. Furthermore, looking to the future, because U.S. unilateralism weak- ens the hemispheric potential of the OAS, it is by no means clear that the OAS, and not some other regional institution, will be the key ele- ment in the architecture of hemispheric security. The multidimensional concept of security emerging from the com- mitments of Bridgetown and Mexico, 2002–2003, can be understood as the agreement that each State in the hemisphere faces different risks to its security and that what is perceived as a risk by one country is not necessarily perceived as such by another. There are inherent benefits to this approach. First, it allows for the give and take necessary in the accommodation of differing interests within a community. Second, it is methodologically more sophisticated and inclusive in the sense that it allows for consideration of a wider range of perceived threats and refers to a wider range of institutions available to democratic governments. This sophistication also brings complexity with it. The multidimension- al concept incorporates both social and political variables and, as a con- sequence, takes on ambiguity and a multiplicity of attributes that makes it difficult to achieve cooperation among governments