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The Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq War(S) CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 Access: Web: CSIS.ORG Contact the Author: [email protected] The Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq War(s) Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies Second Rough Working Draft: August 6, 2004 Cordesman: Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq Wars 8/6/04 Page ii Table of Contents Intelligence and the Strategic Lessons of the Iraq War and the War After the War........... 1 Broader Lessons for Interagency Action Growing Out of the Iraq Conflict(s) .................. 3 THE NEW STRATEGIC CLIMATE IN WHICH INTELLIGENCE MUST FUNCTION.............................................. 3 KEY INTELLIGENCE LESSONS ..................................................................................................................... 6 The Overall Architecture of Intelligence for Warfighting and Stability Operations.......... 9 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (IS&R); AND COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C4I) ................................ 9 THE SCALE OF THE IS&R EFFORT ............................................................................................................ 10 THE LIMITS OF IS&R ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION........................................................................ 10 Key Barriers Inhibiting Progress........................................................................................................ 11 The Limits of IS&R Capability............................................................................................................ 11 Netcentric Warfare, and Near-Real-Time Intelligence..................................................... 13 THE BROADER PICTURE: THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED COMMON OPERATING PICTURE, INTEROPERABILITY, AND THE POSSIBLE NEED TO ELIMINATE SERVICE-ORIENTED SUBORDINATE COMMANDS IN THE THEATER ................................................................................................................... 14 PROBLEMS IN STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY ..................................................................... 15 AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND PROBLEMS AT THE UNIT LEVEL............................................................. 17 Service-Level Problems in IS&R/C4I/BM...........................................................................................18 A British View ..................................................................................................................................... 19 Target Characterization and Battle Damage Assessment ................................................. 23 TARGET CHARACTERIZATION................................................................................................................... 23 BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................... 24 BDA Cannot Match the Pace of Operations ...................................................................................... 25 Attempts to Address the Problem Have Been Limited........................................................................ 26 Officials Call for Different Approaches.............................................................................................. 26 Absence of a Unified Battlefield Information System Confuses Effectiveness Measures.................. 27 Different Approaches Used to Measure the Number of attacks Required .......................................... 27 Differences Can Cause Confusion in Operational Assessments and Financial Decisions ................. 28 BANDWIDTH ............................................................................................................................................. 29 The Need for Better Tactical Intelligence Support........................................................... 31 THE NEED FOR IMPROVISATION AND TAILORING SYSTEMS TO A GIVEN CONFLICT.................................. 34 INTELLIGENCE AND THE FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW (FBCB2) SYSTEM ...... 36 Blue Force Trackers ........................................................................................................................... 37 The Full Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System...................................................... 39 Intelligence and Effects-Based Operations: Fundamentally Changing the Effectiveness While Limiting Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage............................................. 40 Cordesman: Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq Wars 8/6/04 Page iii UNDERSTANDING EFFECTS-BASED BOMBING .......................................................................................... 40 THE PATTERN OF EFFECTS-BASED BOMBING DURING THE WAR ............................................................. 52 EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE .............................. 53 Intelligence and True Precision Air Strike Capability...................................................... 54 UNDERSTANDING THE TRUE MEANING OF PRECISION.............................................................................. 54 THE SCALE AND NATURE OF THE COALITION EFFORT.............................................................................. 56 INTELLIGENCE AND IN-FLIGHT AND RAPID TARGETING AND RETARGETING: TIME-SENSITIVE STRIKES.57 Intelligence and the Impact of Space Warfare................................................................. 60 OVERALL COALITION SUPERIORITY ......................................................................................................... 60 EVOLVING SPACE INTO JOINTNESS ........................................................................................................... 60 SPACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND COMMUNICATIONS ...................................................................................... 62 The Ongoing Evolution of Space ........................................................................................................ 63 The Evolving Capabilities of JSTARS ............................................................................. 64 JSTARS CAPABILITIES ............................................................................................................................ 64 INTEGRATING JSTARS INTO JOINT WARFARE AND INTELLIGENCE.......................................................... 65 Intelligence and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) ...................................................... 67 THE PREDATOR ........................................................................................................................................ 67 THE GLOBAL HAWK................................................................................................................................. 68 THE DRAGON EYE .................................................................................................................................... 68 THE SHADOW AND THE RAVEN ................................................................................................................ 70 THE UAV TACTICAL USER INTERFACE.................................................................................................... 70 UAV PROCUREMENT AND THE UAV ROAD MAP..................................................................................... 72 HUMINT, Training, Staffing, and the Human Dimension............................................... 74 THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING..................................................................................................................... 74 THE PROBLEM OF HUMINT AND ADEQUATE STAFF ............................................................................... 75 THREAT APPROACHES TO NETCENTRIC WARFARE AND INTELLIGENCE ................................................... 75 ADAPTING INTELLIGENCE TO LEARN FROM IRAQ'S INSURGENTS AND TERRORISTS.................................. 76 THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE TO COVER THE DETAILED LESSONS OPPONENTS HAVE LEARNED FROM THE IRAQ WAR AND OTHER CURRENT CONFLICTS.......................................................................................... 77 HOSTILE STATES AND “CONVENTIONAL FORCES”.................................................................................... 78 FACTORS DRIVING THE PACE OF REGIONAL MILITARY MODERNIZATION................................................ 78 The Iranian Case Study....................................................................................................................... 80 The Syrian Case Study ........................................................................................................................ 80 Other Arab “Wild Cards” .................................................................................................................. 81 REINFORCING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST ................................................................................................ 81 The Iraqi Insurgency and US and Western Military Vulnerabilities ................................................. 82 Iraq's Islamist Extremist and Other Hostile Movements..................................................................... 84 Cordesman: Intelligence Lessons of the Iraq Wars 8/6/04 Page iv Winning by Losing .............................................................................................................................
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