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Speaking Biology. From Kant to Parsons…. And beyond?

Script for Lecture May 19th 2008

FAU Erlangen Sociology Colloquium

The audience of this event was comprised of MA and PhD graduate students and members of the faculty on the occasion of a summary lecture of the results of my work as a PhD candidate of the department, a relation to my current projects and their relation to my conception of the future of social science in general.

Alexander Stingl Galvanistrasse 17 90459 Nuremburg Gemany +491607863333 [email protected] 2

1.Introduction to Speech First of all thank you for having me today, and thank you very much for agreeing to let me speak in English. I am obliged by protocol to mention the DAAD, because they made possible a trip to the Parsons archives at Harvard in Summer 2007. I most certainly would have to mention a great many names of people who have aided my research, but we probably would be running out of time. So I refer to the publication of the thesis, which will occur within a year’s time, with Edward Mellen Press it seems.

The title of this presentation is “Speaking biology. From Kant to Parsons”. Since the general assumption is that I have, been doing my PhD work on Talcott Parsons, I must first make a very important confession: I have not. My interest was in the sources and the genealogy of his theoretical language in the history of science. I have found that the language that Parsons applied was the language of biology. Aside from that, allow me a provocation: I have also found out that Parsons seems inevitably quite and utterly boring.

Now, before I elaborate – on both, the biology and the boredom – let me please explain in short why and how I became interested in Talcott Parsons and why and how he became actually the least of my worries.

2. Communication as Problem

The problem I was thus toying with some five years ago when I was still pondering what I wanted to do not for my PhD, but my MA thesis – which took a very different turn in topic, but delivered the first inkling of my methodological approach; now this problem was the question or questions: 3

How, when and why did we begin to address the problem or the question of Communication and Mediality or Communicabilty in science and philosophy? While it certainly is always a nice sentiment to say with Alfred North Whitehead that all our pondering is but a footnote to Plato, I think it is equally clear that the way in which we today in the social sciences, in humanities and in the natural sciences and even in popular and public discourse speak about communication, information and media has a distinct “quality” to it. A quality not found in Plato, or Aquinas or Descartes. This “quality” has emerged at a certain place in time, under certain circumstances and with certain consequences. My research was and will continue to be guided by this question, because I remain convinced that this “quality” is the guiding thread, the thin red line that connects all of modern science. In the end, all those “turns” we have witnessed – the linguistic turn, the cultural turn, the iconic turn – they can all be reduced to the problem of communication, communicability and media. Naturally, I sought to begin my research, or let us say my adventure of communication with an archeology. And coming from the background of sociology I started at the uppermost layer of social theories. 4

3. Parsons/Habermas/Luhmann It is certainly no surprise then that I began with Niklas Luhmann’s media theory on the one hand and was looking at the aspect of the differences that his theory has with his opponent Jürgen Habermas in regard to communication and media. We can look at both men in a way that suggests that they are both different sides of the very same coin. But like two sides of a coin, they will forever face in exactly opposite directions and never one another. And they both share a blind spot, namely the body of the coin itself. In other words, from a less dogmatic point of view that allows for some contextualism Luhmann and Habermas offer two complementary accounts of social reality with the exception of their analogous blind spot. That blind spot is filled by a theory that accounts for a bridge between individual actors and collectivities as systems. A theory that accounts for the intermediary. That theory is the theory of Talcott Parsons, whose scholarship served both Luhmann and Habermas as an intellectual basis. At the same time, Parsons had enunciated the very first explicit sociological media and communication theory. In my archeology, Parsons became the natural next step downwards to finding a source of the problem of communication in science.

A brief word on Habermas’ sources, which will receive a specific twist further down. There are many works and theories that Habermas draws from. But aside from Parsons, there is certainly one other that has received comparatively little attention by his interpreters. That is Hannah Arendt. I must thank Mark Gould for pointing this out to me and thereby confirming my suspicion on that. And please forgive me for leaving you in the dark for but a moment, why Hannah Arendt has a role to play in my reconstruction of Parsons’ language.

4. Archeology of Parsons: Back to Kant via Jaspers/Weber and Meiklejohn/Early Pragmatism (Emerson/James/Cooley)

My archeology leads me through Parsons down a very interesting road. Parsons combines in a sense the best of both worlds: the Anglo-American and the Continental-European context. Very specifically, these worlds circumscribe the 5 interdisciplinary and international discourse of philosophy and physiology in the dialogue between Northeast Coast American and German scholarship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the United States, Parsons was immersed in a tradition that ran from Alexander Meiklejohn’s Kantianism back to the first generation of Pragmatism with Ralph Waldo Emerson and William James. In Germany, Parsons found a similar intellectual climate in Karl Jaspers’ class-room in Heidelberg, where he encountered the spirit of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim.

There were a number of candidates, for who was the common source for these different strands of the intellectual discourse. Upon careful reconstruction this source was revealed to be Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817 – 1881). Lotze was both a philosopher and a physiologist. My task was therefore set: If I wanted to find out, how the theoretical language of Talcott Parsons was made possible, then I had to investigate the discourse of philosophy and physiology. Going further back from Lotze it became clear to me that indeed the source for the conceptual frame of reference for this dialogue was Kantian philosophy. Turning from archeology to genealogical reconstruction, I would have to begin with Kant and Kantianism and via Lotze investigate the German and American branches of the discourse that became re-united in Parsons’ theoretical language.

5. Biology versus Logic My idea is thus the following: Talcott Parsons spoke a theoretical language that has become rare in the social sciences. He was one of the last scholars to be socialized, educated and immersed in an intellectual climate permeated by Kantianism and Lotzeanism “in spirit”, if you like. This way of talking, thinking and theorizing, this mode of thought, or as we can call it dialect of science, this epistemological vernacular of biology has been replaced by another language. A dialect of science, a vernacular that owes its conceptions to physicalist reductionism, naturalism, mathematics, logics and the idea of quantification. 6

The emergence of this dialect occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century with John Dewey, Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. It gained strength and with Quine and others became the dominant tongue of science, including social science.

6. Genius Accounts versus discursive accounts I am speaking of languages more than of people. And in this regard, let me briefly say something about previous interpretations of the work and biography of Talcott Parsons. Whenever I mention that I am generally interested in the work of Parsons the reaction is two-fold. One half of people simply roll their eyes thinking I am seeking to “re-introduce grand theory”, a type of theory that seeks to have an “abstract explanation for everything”. Well, I do not, nor does that interpretation do justice to what Parsons did. Plus, I am not interested in Parsons’ work and biography for the sake of Parsons but because he is an excellent example for a development in the history of science – the genealogy of the biological vernacular. The other half of the people, making usually the same mistake, give me the advise that Harald Wenzel has written the final word on Parsons, or that I can at best offer a footnote correction and that any attempt to link Parsons to Neo-Kantianism or whatever else must fail, because Harald Wenzel has shown that the sole interpretation left is to link Parsons to Alfred North Whitehead. Or so I been told by Wolfgang Schluchter and Hans Joas. Well, since I did not want to write a biography of Parsons or simply offer another reconstruction of his theoretical development, I do not feel obliged to accept that. But most interestingly, my work reveals that there would be another account of Parsons possible. The problem is the following: Nearly all previous attempts follow what we can call a “genius-account”. Parsons life and work is reconstructed in the course of the life of Talcott Parsons the genius, the man, the individual. Nowhere are the productive conditions of historic aprioris considered. The discursive prerequisites are largely ignored. What is the difference in my approach? I am not interested in Talcott Parsons, the man. That does not mean that I do not assume that episodes in his life are without relevance, but they have to be seen in 7 the larger context. In other words, I see Talcott Parsons’ entire work as an enunciation system. An enunciation system that developed along the lines of the distinction of Constitutive and Regulative, which was crucial for the work of Kant and which, I think, became the guiding dualism of the philosophical-physiological discourse of the nineteenth century. Its reverberations, its waves are still felt today. Even if the pendulum of scientific discourse has almost completely swung away from the Regulative and towards the Constitutive, the dualism itself has not waned in influence and is felt in the semantics throughout contemporary debates.

Before I go on with the actual account, let me briefly explain my methodological approach.

7. Method a. Genealogy (interpretative Analytics)

I was combing backwards thru the development of theory and history of science in an archeology, towards a certain point of origin, a rupture an incision. This is very exact and concrete procedure. Once that point is reached, one must turn around and reconstruct not the actual discourse but the opportunities that had presented themselves in the productive progression of theory. The roads that could have been taken but weren’t. This is interpretative analytics, as I understand what Michel Foucault has tried to do according to Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus. The theoretical language is the productive element in my account which ‘I seek to uncover, as an epistemological vernacular it enables enunciations, thoughts concepts ideas.

b. Constellation Research From Dieter Henrich, we can learn that the act of original enablement through a scholar, like Kant, means that a thought-scape is opened up, a Denkraum. 8

For Foucault, Kant was an author, a discursivity founder. That is largely translatable to Henrich’s concept. The actual context and prerequisites of this act of foundation of a discourse, as Foucault says, are forgotten. To be able to get beyond them means to reconstruct them. At the end of this speech, if I have some time left, I shall try to say something about the reasons why we need to reconstruct them, why we need history of science. But for now let us look at the opening up of a thought-scape. We must not confuse this with a genius-account. Even Kant is only an address. His name stands for a nexus. His is but the voice that emerged most prominently in making selections from prior discourse. The ideas that Kant enunciated most were already floating “in the air”. And Kant was not alone. He was part of an institution, a university, a constituency. He was part of a network of friends and colleagues, he met and corresponded with. These networks, roles, connections , institutional obligations I understand with Dieter Henrich to be Constellations. In my account, constellations are the counterpart to the productive prerequisites of the vernacular. They form constraints, negative selection mechanism of exclusion. They make it necessary for a scholar who is speaking in those constellations, to work theory very much like politics. Not every theoretical idea can be uttered in a given context. It might be unfashionable to speak in biology, where the language of reductionism is spoken.

c. Latent Meaning Structures in Texts

We now have two elements, a productive and a constraining element. Reconstructing those is what I sought to do for the development from Kant to Parsons. I seem to analyze macro-structures, semantics, conceptual frameworks. But these we often find represented in the micro-structures themselves. Particularly in the instances, where the structures of meaning can be revealed at their most latent stage. In correspondence, in speeches, lecture notes, manuscript drafts etc. This requires sometimes a very close and detailed reading to make explicit to ones audience what is going on. Sometimes, I had to gloss over decades of development 9 in the history of ideas, while at the same time spending the work of a whole chapter on brief outline Parsons drafted. And as paradoxical as it may seem this approach was extremely fertile, for in the end, I could show that it was not Talcott Parsons the genius who had come up with a “grand theory”, which he continually developed in one stroke of a genius after the other in synthesizing the newest developments in science like cybernetics or Ernst Mayr’s evolutionary biology. Instead it was the theoretical language, the epistemological vernacular that had formed the intellectual climate he was educated in, it was the enunciation system that enabled the theory. It was similarities in language that led him to conceptual systems he could translate into his theory, because these systems, like cybernetics, had the very same roots in nineteenth century discourse. And now we should take a good look at this discourse.

8. Summary of the account

In the late 18th century the biological sciences in the era after Albrecht von Haller (1708 – 1777) entered a time of crisis. New developments and discoveries had rendered the existing theoretical language problematic. Von Haller had played an instrumental part in the foundation of the new university of Göttingen in 1737. The prime institutional innovation was the combination of teacher and researcher in one person. We nowadays take this for granted and claim that this was the success- model of the German university system that has been considered a mile-stone of progress for the education of future researchers and professionals. (I may note with sad irony, that today, Germany is busy with the effort of abolishing this system). With new experimental methods, the early Göttingen school yielded physiological results that were radically different and paradoxical in light of what has been previously known in anatomy and physiology. However, scholars of the era were puzzled and unable to fit the theoretical language unto the experimental data that the new possibilities of undertaking comparative physiology and comparative anatomy yielded. Von Haller and his contemporaries were still “traditionalist” in that they kept trying to express their findings in relation to Galen, Aquinas and other predecessors 10 of historic esteem. In the midst of the chaos no unified common language seemed available to resolve the chasm between data and conceptual frames of reference. In this situation, physiologists like Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752 – 1840) or the early Johan Christian Reil (1759 – 1813) had turned to philosophy and learned to enunciate their conceptual system in the epistemological vernacular that we today associate with the name Immanuel Kant and Kantianism. This new theoretical language could help them overcome the ruptures produced by the previous scientific progress. Building upon Newton they introduced the aspect of force as in formative force or life force ( Bildungstrieb and Lebenskraft). But adhering to Kantian epistemology as outlined in the Critique of Judgement they did use these concepts not as constitutive categories but as regulative principles, which was exactly what Kant had demanded of the science of life that would soon be named biology, a science in contrast to physics. Between mechanic determination and teleological purpose there was a gap that need not be viewed as an either/or situation. Blumenbach and his followers managed to form a teleomechanic approach that saw the organism build from functions that could have purpose, while being built in mechanism to fulfil these. The whole and the part were interrelated (in Wechselwirkung). Also, along these lines Kant managed to come up with a philosophy that was inherently political and communication oriented. According to this interpretation, the discursivity of concepts, which is nothing else but contingency, necessitates a touchstone that could offer some security for judgements made. This touchstone could be found – according to the first Critique – in others, in the community of people. Thus what was necessitated was communicability (Vermitteltheit) and the orientation towards others in judgement crystallized in the concept of the sensus communis. Kant was not the first, whose reflection implicitly hinted at the problem of Coordination with others and the problem of communication. Descartes, Hutchinson or the Earl of Shaftesbury had done so previously. More importantly Philip Petit in his new book has shown that Hobbes should be viewed as a theoretician who emphasized the importance of language for conflict resolution. Kant of course criticized the scope of Hobbes’ reflections but in effect he was largely familiar with the concepts at play. However, the impact of Kantian type philosophy was immense on both biology and political science, both were at Kant’s time yet to be created as independent disciplines And since neither discipline was yet created, 11 the Kantian philosophy cannot separate these aspects. We should never forget that the Kantian theoretical language is supposed to handle both fields entirely. The creation of biology as an independent problem followed thru students of Blumenbach. Most importantly Gottfreid Reinhold Treviranus (1776 – 1837) who coined the term biology. In the wake of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Johann Chrisitan, Reil Christian Gottlob Heyne or Treviranus, concepts were applied that upon inspection should raise our eyebrows. For example: Wechselwirkung (Interaction), Ideal-type, Equilibrium, habitus. We know these from Weber and Parsons to be classic concepts in sociology. Although these were only prominent men of the social sciences applying them. But some of these concepts and ideas were household concepts of nineteenth century biology and psychology.

Nowadays we gloss over these matters in fields like sociology and others, because we have accepted the judgments of the disciples of the physics and mathematics approach to all things “science”. We are used to ascribe to early nineteenth century biology the term Naturphilosophen or Vitalismus, reduced to the name of Schelling. However, the Naturphilosophen made the mistake to try and render regulative principles such as Lifeforce into constitutive categories themselves. The following materialist traditions, by the way, merely “turned Schelling on his head”, as Stanford’s Timothy Lenoir once eloquently put it. This said, let us move on in history. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, philosophy, psychology and physiology began to drift apart. Neurology, pedagogical theories and the new mathematical logic were among the products of this process of intra-disciplinary differentiation. It was in this critical phase that the “language of the sciences of all things social” was born by William James, James Baldwin and Charles Horton Cooley in American Pragmatism, while in Europe the same problem emerged in the works of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel and others. They have one thing common. They were products of the discourse of physiology and philosophy that had preceded them from Kantianism forward. A common ancestor can be found in the works of Rudolf Hermann Lotze. 12

Lotze who tried to solve the chasm between Somatist and Psychists, which was the hottest dispute of his time, was both a philosopher and physiologist in his training, his teaching and his writings He managed to bridge the gaps by returning terms like Lifeforce to their regulative meaning. He introduced the common notion of Geltung or validity. He introduced the distinction of value and value-judgement that would become important for Weber. And he managed to find a mediating concept of communicability between man and his actual environment in the concept of personality. It is almost forgotten today, but Otto Kraushaar as but one example wrote a series of essays in the 1930s on what was common knowledge at the time, he gave those the title of “The debt William James owed to Lotze”. And indeed Early Pragmatism from Emerson to James and Cooley is unthinkable without the theoretical language of teleomechanism that crystallized in the works of Lotze or Karl Ernst von Baer (1792 – 1876). Lotze began working at a time when once again physiology, the fledgling study of the human brain and related fields were deep in a crisis of theoretical language. They were stuck between associationism, clinical versus experimental tradition, and so forth. Lotze managed to bridge the gaps as well as he could.

One central question of Lotze touched the fact that hidden in that Kantian line of discourse is the question of the existence of the soul. From the side of materialistic psychology Lotze was often scorned and ridiculed. The “soul” was perceived by many materialists as a concept that led to nothing: the tendency went towards the “Materialisation of the ‘I’ ” (Breidbach 1997). However, Lotze does not make a point of naturalising the soul, instead he claims that it is a scientific postulate.. Thus the soul is how consciousness is being produced. One cannot materialistically reduce this to an explanation of the why (as e.g. theology would suggest). Like Kant, Lotze avoids the traditional “double bookkeeping” of the body-soul dualism therefore by saying nothing about the substantial existence of the soul, but applying it as a postulate instead. Whether or not, critics like physicist Karl Snell properly understood that this is at dispute; from the point of physics and the energy-conservation doctrine, physical reductionists were refusing the dualism also. This represents also the dawn of fatigue research, that Moleschott’s student Angelo Mosso (1846 – 1910) and in his wake Emil Kraepelin and Hugo Münsterberg (and of course in the US the school of 13

Taylorism, see: Sarasin 1995) would be turning into fertile and influential scientific ground. By applying the language of Energie, Kraft, Arbeit (“energy, force/power and labour), Snell had in his influential and widely distributed essay on the Materialismustreit (1858) used the terminology of physics and physiology in a new way by transcending boundaries of these disciplines and the boundaries of the public, in interpenetration. In his review of Snell’s contribution, Lotze (1859)1 fully conflated the term labour (Arbeit) as it was used in physics and physiology with economic terminology equating it with “capital”, however pointing out, that this was a mere analogy of different matters, yet it was an analogy that could be quantified (see summarized in Pester 1997). He eventually showed that these highly effective analogies at the same time may in no way be naturalized; The immediate translation of movements2, in the sense of mechanical physics into movements of psychological processes, is not possible. They can illustrate the transformation, make it understandable, but not explain it. Thus, the translation cannot explain away the need for a concept like soul, for it is the postulate of the soul which serves as the medium of said transformation. The need of purpose in mechanical explanation illustrates the application of the teleomechanist program.

Lotze taught many students with an international background. William James send his students to study in Germany to become acquainted with the work of Lotze (and of course Wilhelm Wundt), men like Edmund Burke Delabarre or George Santayana or G. Stanley Hall. James led Hugo Münsterberg to Harvard and with him came the theoretical language of Experimental Psychology and Fatigue Research. The talk about energy, fatigue, values, validity, interaction and so on became the new vernacular of fashion in the sciences of life, psyche and the social. In Germany, Emil Kraepelin and others were busy categorizing constitutively in the clinical tradition, while experimenters like Wundt or in France Pierre Janet came up with results that infected the world of science. Following Janet and James, John Boodin and others in early American sociology began at the turn of the century to speak about concepts like “social systems”, social equilibria and interaction.

1 Lotze in general was very active as a reviewer. 2 Movement being the unifying term in these discussions, representative of the whole discourse, while it is really only another residual category 14

But the development brings us to a familiar point, when in the 1930s the social sciences entered into a similar crisis of theoretical language, with quote/unquote “as many sociologies and as many theoretical languages as there were individual sociologist”. Talcott Parsons was the most prominent of a group of scholars who made the effort of working on a common language for the social sciences. They turned to the language of the physiological and philosophical discourse of the nineteenth century. A language informed by the very form of Kantianism that had already born the idea of the “social” and was about to give birth to the new and improved life sciences (Genetics, Cybernetics) and the scientific study of communication from the technical side of information (Shannon/Weaver). unto its political dimension of propaganda and governance(e.g. David Riesman, Carl Friedrich, A.D. Lindsay). It has recently become an inescapable conclusion that the discourse between philosophy, physics, social science and biology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century must be understood in the light of the Neo-Kantian schools and their debates (Michael Friedman, Peter Gordon, Timothy Lenoir). From Lotze’s famous work on Lebenskraft (‘life-force’), to Toennies Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, and to Carnap’s early exploration of Der Raum. The debates in methodology and on the concept of science itself depend on a thorough reconstruction of the Neo-Kantian discourse. (Presently the social and the life sciences find themselves once more at the climax of a process of hyper-specialization and fragmentation, where even within these disciplines the ability to translate one’s ideas and results for the dialogue with others is becoming a major problem. Sociologists in particular often seem to have no common vocabulary anymore. While at the same time the inter-disciplinary fledgling field of Neuro-Ethics is trying to negotiate its “grammatical conventions” and “semantical implications” for it future discourse. So the situation we are in today is fairly.)

Talcott Pasons was educated at Amherst College under the reform program of Alexander Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn was a student and later colleague of Edmund Burke Delabarre and James Seth at Brown University, where he encountered the language of Neo-Kantianism, Early Pragmatism and biology. He introduced a program at Amherst that enabled Parsons to study biology and chemistry and social sciences and Kantian philosophy. 15

There are significant connections between the work of Meikeljohn and Ralph Waldo Emerson on the one hand and Parsons and Emerson on the other. The fluidity of power as a medium is a concept we find in Emerson. We find in William James the Lotzean concept of personality, which we also find in the work of Cooley who was in many ways a disciple of Albert Schaeffle. And so was Emile Durkheim. Schaeffle himself was a student of Lotze’s work. Cooley and Durkheim were a subject matter that Parsons encountered in the philosophy courses at Amherst. Moving on to London to study at LSE, with Hobhouse and others, Parsons encountered a climate that was saturated with the same semantics, the same language. In Heidelberg, he is naturally attracted to the philosophy courses of Jaspers, who held a medical degree, who spoke therefore in the biological vernacular and whose teachings on Kant centre on the aspect of communication, which his student Hannah Arendt has accredited with most prominently and which she features in her own work. Today Onora O’Neill and Susan Neiman promote this philosophy in Arendt’s wake.

Working on his dissertation in Heidelberg, Parsons’ uses Lujo Brentano’s work, which is closely related to Fatigue Research, he discusses the “Neo-Kantian” alternative to the problems of capitalism in Troeltsch, Sombart and Max Weber. The other alternative is a Marxism that is transformed by catholic social ethics of Scheler. Back in the US, he begins teaching Scheler among other things. But he has to drop that the constellation does not allow for a “catholic Marxism”. While writing a book on Pareto, which is yet unpublished, Parsons was approached by Ralph Barton Perry to help establish a sociology course at Harvard in 1929. The Outlines and lecture materials from the archives show that Parsons was at the vey least aware of the political ideas of followers of Lotze like Bosanquet. He himself used concepts of energy in relation to social actors in his earliest lectures.. The point being: the language he applied in those lectures is very close tot the language of cybernetics he used in the 1960s. As Georges Canguilhem has pointed out, the history of cybernetics and its basic concepts is deeply tied to the history of physiology including Lotze. Parsons, in other words, already spoke the same language in the 1930s as he did in the 1960s. 16

His essays on the history of science and the sociology of knowledge repeat all over his life the same ideas and questions in the very same fashion. And it can be shown that the “evolution” of his theory is enunciated in this fashion, this vernacular and therefore it is never really changing, but instead it is only feeling out for similar ideas and tries to translate the concepts accordingly. I try to show, therefore that Parsons is the product – as a critic once said to me – of “communicative incest”. Plus, he therefore appears to be boring, for he never really says anything new. This was my provocation earlier. But what then is the importance of Parsons? Of course, certain of his concepts – in particular his distinction of power, money, influence – are a very good and precise analytical tool. But more importantly we should learn from his effort that in the social sciences we do require a common language. And also that this language can be found through a clear understanding of where we come from in the history of our discipline, which is the discourse of physiology and philosophy since Kant.

9. Conclusion

Now you may certainly ask the question, what is the utility of all this historic reconstruction? Does that have any bearing on sociology? Does it have practical value? Can we learn something from it? Of course, I could answer that if we do not learn from history in all its virtues and vices, we will be doomed to repeat it, particularly the errors. But there is certainly more to it. And of course, Bruno Latour’s Sociology for Earthlings should finally play some part.

Not only should we know that certain roads that the modern and emergent dominant paradigm of neuro-science travels down, are not new. Even Weber in his Wissenschaftslehre predicted and warned of the development of a brain-science that would reduce social action to neural activity. The conceptual roots of contemporary debates lie deep and so does the criticism we apply. Onora O’Neill in her recent Gifford and Reith Lectures has shown that 17 bioethical debates will profit from clear-cut Kantian ethics, which can be practically applied. Richard Ashcroft has shown that her arguments are similar to Durkheim’s. We are thrown back onto old debates, we are repeating old stories. In sociology, these developments affect us very gravely in a fashion that is similar to psychology in the early 20th century. Sociology is at a cross-roads. And it will be split in two. A sociology of demographics, labour market research etc. on the one hand. And on the other hand some abstract and reflective theorizing. This split will occur institutionally at some point. Both branches will be given their own names and budgets. The latter will be for Earthlings. The first task of the latter will be to make explicit the excess baggage we carry with us, the conceptual debts we pay to the discourse that precedes us, that shaped our modes of thought both as laymen and members of the public as well as specialists. That biology is returning to be of central importance is one thing, that the physical and quantitative reductionism is on the decline is another and less certain for even neuro-scientists dream of reductionist explanations and have been for a long time: Warren McCollough and Walter Pitts described this in 1943 as the “all-or-none law of nervous activity”. As Carl Craver has recently shown, reductionist accounts are still the prevalent accounts within and about neuro-science, in other words: neuro- scientists try to explain the phenomena they study in a reductionist fashion, as well as they explain the historic progress of neuro-science itself according to reductionist accounts. But Craver could show on the example of actual experimental studies that these narratives are inherently inconsistent on both counts. Instead he suggested accounts that are mechanical insofar as they involve the following traits: a. They must be intratheoretically integrative b. Feature interfield relations that oscillate in upwards and downwards hierarchy. c. The relations are boundary relations d. The causal mechanism must be linked to the phenomenon it explains, that implies purpose and reiterates the teleomechanist program of the biological vernacular ion the Kantian tradition.

As a consequence Craver uses a model that sounds inherently like Parsons. 18

Again, this no accident. It is simply the fact that Craver has discovered that the reductionist vernacular is insufficient to describe empirical reality in a satisfying account. He turns to another language of description, which is closer to the biological vernacular and therefore seems miraculously similar to Parsons’ language. However, narratives of all scientific progress and phenomena studied outside of physics itself are best understood in accordance within frames of reference that take into account the mechanics and the purpose. Only physical phenomena can be explained, otherwise we have to rely on sciences that are Verstehende Wissenschaften, while adhereing to Weber in making explicit the value-judgments we may harbour as far as is possible. But this remains an ideal, a regulative principle. The empirical situation, particularly in sociology, proves to be more difficult and complex than reductionist models suggest. Today, howeve, we have reached a state where hyperspecialization has created circumstances where it is increasingly impossible for sociologists that are experts on Ethnicity and Childhood to confer with experts on Ethnicity and Family who in turn cannot really translate their ideas to experts on Family and Childhood. And I wish this was a mere joke, but I think most of us here in the room have attended sessions at conferences where they could actually witness this. The idea of Talcott Parsons was not to provide an explanation for everything. He saw the same situation we have today in a more infant state. He suggested a Common Language for the social sciences. In his world, this language was rooted in biology and in Kantianism. It was a return to sources that had proven effective. Biology is again on the agenda of sociology today. German sociology has once again not yet caught up with this development in full. The leaders are the British, for reasons that are in themselves historic and were not my topic today – pace Spencer. But we need a common language, a sociology for Earthlings. Bruno Latour’s reference to William James is no accident either. First Generation Pragmatism with its keen understanding of the connection of philosophy and physiology with its debt to Lotze and the teleomechanist program was more attuned to the demands of applying science in a changing, fragile and threatened world than our current state of hyperspecialization is. Not because differentiation is the problem but because we have created us a Babel in sociology. Onora O’Neill, Bruno Latour and others have pointed backwards to go forward. 19

The vernacular of physical reductionism has reached its end because it cannot translate the empirical situation of the world. When it tries to do so, it comes up with answers that Latour quite correctly ridicules on the example of Lovelock. The lesson I seek to draw from reconstructing the genealogy of Parsons’ theoretical language is not to re-establish grand theory. But to re-enable the potential of the idea of a common language and to understand the differences that the rise of the logical vernacular has created within our sciences. I hope to elucidate the obstacles that the constellations we live in as active sciences create. My next project along this very same line is centred on the idea of the human condition that industrial psychology and fatigue research in the late nineteenth century created. In the first half of the twentieth century, this idea disseminated and sedimented into a “collective representation” to use a phrase of Durkheim. As a semantic it still guides the discourses between the public and scientists/specialists even if the discourse among scientists may have changed completely. We find this exemplified in everyday medical practice, when patients and doctors negotiate a diagnosis, when they discursively struggle over the power of definition. The politics at play in these situations within the public, between public and biomedical specialists and among biomedical specialists have been characterized by Nikolas Rose in the difference between molar versus molecular politics. The body is viewed by most people on the molar level. Acted upon by diet, hygiene, excercies surgery. This, Nikolas Rose has claimed, is the body as it was constructed in clinical medicine over the 19th century. The molecular gaze of style of thought deals with other aspects, semantics and practices that are yet today less part of public social life and collective representations. Creating an awareness within the public for these differences requires time-frames that as sociologists we seem to have abandoned. While modern technology allows information to flow ever faster, that does not mean that understanding is created with equal speed. The mutual interactions take their time to create collective effects. The development of a public traffic system in a city, its speed and passenger capacity and so forth develops over decades. But it sets the mood, the attitude, the general speed of a city. Comparing Cologne, Frankfurt and Nuremberg, we have cities of roughly equal size. And yet the “feeling” of them is incredibly different. And this “feeling” has effects on people living in it. 20

Reading the work of Georg Simmel, we find a scholar who understood this. These aspects can only be described and understood, not quantified. These developments cover time-frames that exceed the short-term criteria we have come to take for granted when writing research proposals for the DFG or other organisations. However, understanding how the history and discourse of science works is imperative, if we want to understand the changes that will affect our future most profoundly that will transform not just Western society, but us, as Earthlings. To have Earthly Science, we need an Earthly language, a common language for these sciences. Earth is a biological, not a just physical phenomenon. The common language should thus be biological also. That this insight is neither new nor without potential for further progress is the continued lesson of current history of science. And against all pessimism, Talcott Parsons in 1973 finished pretty much with saying that he was optimistic about the human prospect in the long run: So on Rose, O’Neill and Latour, let me quote Parsons on the future of Sociology: “most of sociology, when it gets to be more theoretically systematized and formalized, will look much more like genetics than like classical mechanics. I think that’s going to happen, although the timing is questionable. And there may be parallels to the loss of Mendel’s work for a generation or two, and then suddenly it will begin to revive again.”

I thank you for your attention. 21

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Parsons, Talcott (1934b) “Society” in: Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (E.A. Seligman, ed.) Vol. 14: 225 – 231 Parsons, Talcott (1934c) “Thrift” in: Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (E.A. Seligman, ed.) Vol. 14: 623- 626 Parsons, Talcott (1934d) “Some Reflections on ‘the Nature and Significance of Economics” in: Quaterly Journal of Economics 48: 511 – 545 30

Parsons, Talcott (1935) “H.M. Robertson on Max Weber and his school” in: Journal of Political Economy 43 : 688 – 96 Parsons, Talcott (1935a) “Sociological Elements in Economic Thought” in: Quaterly Journal in Economics 49: 414 – 453 Parsons, Talcott (1935b) “The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory” in: International Journal of Ethics 45: 282 - 316 Parsons, Talcott (1936) “Review of Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre, by Alexander von Schelting” in: American Sociological Review 1: 675 – 681 Parsons, Talcott (1936a) “Pareto’s Central Analytical scheme” in: Journal of Social Philosophy 1: 244 – 262 Parsons, Talcott (1936) “On certain Sociologcal Elements in Professor Taussig’s Thought” in: Explorations in Economics: Notes and Essays Contributed in Honor of F.W. Taussig McGraw-Hill Book Company: 359 – 379 Parsons, Talcott (1937a) “Review of Economics and Sociology, by Adolf Löwe” in: American Journal of Sociology 42: 477 - 481 Parsons, Talcott (1949 (1937)) The Structure of Social Action • A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. Parsons, Talcott (1951) The Social System Free Press, New York Parsons, Talcott (1958a) “Social Structure and the development of Personality: Freud’s contribution to the integration of Psychology and Sociology” in: Psychiatry 21/4 : 321 – 340 also in Parsons (1964): 78 – 111 Parsons, Talcott (1960) “Durkheim’s Contribution to the Theory of Integration of Social Systems” in: Parsons (1967) : 3 – 34 Parsons, Talcott (1961) “The Point of View from the Author” in: Black, (ed.) (1961) : 311 – 363 Parsons, Talcott (1962) “Introduction to Max Weber’s Sociology of Religion” in: Parsons (1967): 35 – 78 Parsons, Talcott (1964) Social Structure and Personality The Free Press, Glencoe Ill. Parsons, Talcott (1964a) „Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science: An Interpretation of Max Weber’s contributions” in: Parsons (1967) : 79 – 101 Parsons, Talcott (1965) “Unity and Diversity in the Modern Intellectual Sciences: The Role of the Social Sciences” In Holton (ed.) (1965) :39 – 69 Parsons, Talcott (1967) Sociological Theory and Modern Society The Free Press, New York Parsons (1969) “Sociology of Knowledge and the History of Ideas” in: Staubmann (ed.) (2004): 31 – 81 Parsons, Talcott (1969a) Politics and Social Structure Free Press, New York Parsons, Talcott (1975 (1970)) „Die Entstehung der Theorie des sozialen Systems: Bericht zur Person“ in: Parsons, Shils, Laszarsfeld : 1 - 68 („On Building Social System Theory: A Personal History“ in: Daedalus 99/4: 826 –881) Parsons, Talcott (1975) “On ‘De-Parsonizing Weber’: Comment on Cohen et al” in: American Sociological Review Vol. 40 : 666 – 674 Parsons, Talcott (1994) Aktor, Situation, und normative Muster Ein Essay zur Theorie sozialen Handelns 31

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