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Chinese Naval Power and East Asian Security

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Chinese Naval Power and East Asian Security Chinese Naval Power and East Asian Security Elizabeth Speed Institute of International Relations The University of British Columbia Working Paper No. 11 August 1995 About the Author Elizabeth Speed obtained a B.A. at the University of British Columbia (1983) and an M.Phil from the University of Manchester, United Kingdom (1984). Since 1987, she has been a strategic analyst at the Department of National Defence where she is responsible for research and reporting on security developments in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently on leave of absence from the Department, she is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, the University of British Columbia. Her dissertation research focuses on the evolution of Chinese maritime interests and naval power. Contents I. Introduction......................................................................... 1 II. The Evolution of Chinese Maritime Interests and Naval Power................................................................. 2 III. National Military Doctrine and the Offshore Defence Strategy........................................... 5 IV. Current and Projected PLAN Capabilities......................... 8 V. The PLAN and East Asian Security................................... 14 VI. Conclusions........................................................................ 19 Abstract This paper examines the evolution of Chinese naval power and its consequent impact on East Asian security. Viewed historically, the 1970s marked a key turning point in the national recognition of Chinese maritime interests and the need to secure and promote them. The Chinese navy now has an offshore forward defence strategy and is in the midst of an extensive and ambitious naval modernization program. The reconfiguration of Chinese naval power poses a potential threat to East Asian stability and security. China increasingly has the capacity to challenge the territorial status quo in Asia and to alter significantly the regional balance of power. It is imperative that the emerging regional security framework encourage Chinese participation. Likewise, China must increase its level of military transparency in order to ease regional apprehensions. Titles in the Working Paper Series No. 1 The Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe: A New Research Agenda, by Allen Sens, January 1994 No. 2 Perspectives on US-Japanese Political Economy: Making Sense of the Nichibei Economy, by Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, April 1994 No. 3 The Geostrategic Foundations of Peace and Prosperity in the Western Pacific Region, by Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, July 1994 No. 4 Hanging Out in Europe: Necessary or Discretionary? by Allen Sens, August 1994 No. 5 Multilateralism: The Relevance of the Concept to Regional Conflict Management, by Brian Job, October 1994 No. 6 Asia Pacific Arms Buildups Part One: Scope, Causes and Problems, by Shannon Selin, November 1994 No. 7 Asia Pacific Arms Buildups Part Two: Prospects for Control, by Shannon Selin, November 1994 No. 8 The Logic of Japanese Multilateralism for Asia Pacific Security, by Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, December 1994 No. 9 New Powers, Old Patterns: Dangers of the Naval Buildup in the Asia Pacific Region, by Michael Wallace and Charles Meconis, March 1995 No.10 The Evolution of Cooperative Security: Canada and the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1973- 1994, by Cathal J. Nolan, April 1995 No.11 Chinese Naval Power and East Asian Security, by Elizabeth Speed, August 1995 I. Introduction1 With the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, East Asia has entered a transitional phase in which the security relations among major and minor powers alike are fraught with uncertainty. Bipolarity has disappeared to be replaced by an as yet undefined form of multipolarity. The rapid decline of Russian power and influence in the region has occurred simultaneously with a perceptual diminution of the US commitment to remain fully engaged, absent a clear, unambiguous threat to US national interests. Regional states are left with a new configuration of power which has at its core, the looming presence of China. While China is not necessarily viewed as an imminent threat to regional security and stability, the Chinese economic and military potential, coupled with clear aspirations to join the first rank of nations, makes China a source of much regional concern. This is only exacerbated by China’s ambitious military modernization program. To many countries in Asia, the most worrying aspect of China’s military modernization has been the gradual enhancement of its ability to project naval power away from its home waters. If this naval modernization program is completed, it will significantly enhance the reach and power of Chinese naval forces in the coming years. It is expected that within twenty years, China will be a major sea power able to exert more influence in the regional military balance. China has disavowed hegemonic aspirations, yet its leadership has shown little reluctance in using coercive pressure to enhance its maritime sovereignty claims and to secure the offshore approaches to the Chinese mainland. This paper examines the evolution of Chinese naval power and its consequent impact on East Asian security. The concentration on naval issues stems from the fact that the security environment in East Asia is essentially maritime. Many of the states of the region are island groups or have long coastlines. The sea lanes of the region are strategically important both to merchant and to naval traffic. Offshore resources--especially fisheries and oil--are increasingly important sources of revenue and livelihood. Many of the more important and intractable territorial sovereignty disputes concern maritime boundaries and offshore island groups. As a consequence, and without exception, the countries of East Asia are modernizing and expanding their naval capabilities so as to provide the means to secure and protect their multifaceted maritime interests. China is of particular concern in this regard because its declared interests involve changes to the region’s territorial status quo. A modernized People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is thus likely to be a prime instrument wielded by the Chinese state to affect any changes its leadership views as important to Chinese sovereignty and security.2 Does the type of navy China is building indicate its international goals and objectives? Does this signal a Chinese threat to regional security? How should regional players respond to these developments? The paper is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the evolution of Chinese maritime interests and naval power. In particular, it highlights the growing Chinese awareness of the economic and security interests it has at stake in its offshore areas. The second section discusses the military doctrinal review underway since the early 1980s and the new offshore defence naval strategy. The articulation of a forward defence strategy for the Chinese navy has meant a substantial revision to naval force structure, fleet training and weapons and acquisition programs. The third section outlines the current and projected capabilities of the PLAN. The changes now underway will lead to the development of an ocean-going fleet with expanded capabilities configured to secure China’s maritime interests. However, significant fleet weaknesses continue to exist which the current modernization program has yet to redress. The final section assesses the threat to East Asian security posed by China’s evolving naval 1 The author would like to thank Brian Job and Paul Godwin for the many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Canadian Department of National Defence. 2 Naval power is perhaps the most flexible of military instruments available to a state. Navies are unencumbered by national frontiers and, with appropriate logistical support, can be deployed anywhere in the world to meet a host of contingencies. Naval power is both a military and a political instrument: it can signal commitments, display presence, intimidate opponents, interdict or protect merchant shipping, secure national maritime resources and bring force to bear on coastal states. 1 force posture. This will include a discussion of the possible contingencies where Chinese naval power may be employed to further Chinese state interests. The principal finding of this paper is that the growth of Chinese naval power does pose a potential threat to East Asian stability and security, and especially to the security of Southeast Asia. Given China’s economic and military power trajectory, the scope of its maritime interests and the reconfiguration of its naval forces, China increasingly has the capacity to challenge the territorial status quo in Asia and to alter significantly the regional balance of power. Whether or not China intends to become more assertive in Asian waters, its growing capabilities pose a challenge that necessitates some response by regional states and those external states with important interests in the region. II. The Evolution of Chinese Maritime Interests and Naval Power China has one of the oldest naval traditions in the world, dating from at least the end of the Warring States period in 221 BC. Nonetheless, China has long been viewed primarily as a continental state.3 China has always had some interests at stake in its maritime environment, given its long coastline and large coastal population, but most Chinese governments have chosen
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