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The Radical Right in the European Parliament Impact on Development Policy Raphaëlle Faure

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The Radical Right in the European Parliament Impact on Development Policy Raphaëlle Faure 4 April 2014 Working paper The radical right in the European Parliament Impact on development policy Raphaëlle Faure In May 2014, European Parliament elections will be held across Europe. There is a growing awareness that the next European Parliament may contain a large contingent of anti-Europe radical right parties. At the domestic level, the reality is that 21 out of the 28 EU member states have a radical right party in their political system but only in nine countries have those parties gained in popularity since 2005. Nevertheless, at the European level, radical right parties could see an almost 50% increase in their number of seats. This increase could result in a stronger influence over European decision-making, with implications for reduced aid budgets, aid tied to national interests and potentially a threat to the EU aid programme. Shaping policy for development odi.org Acknowledgements I am grateful for helpful comments provided by Simon Maxwell and Mikaela Gavas. I would also like to thank Elize Hefer for copy-editing this paper. The views presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI. Table of contents Acknowledgements ii Abbreviations 2 Introduction 3 1 How do radical right parties fare in national elections? 4 2 Who represents the radical right in the European Parliament? 8 3 What influence do radical right parties have in the European Parliament? 12 4 What influence do radical right parties have on EU development policy? 14 5 Conclusion 16 References 17 Figures Figure 1: Share of radical right votes in the last two legislative elections and differences in percentage points (2005-2013) 5 Figure 2: Distribution of radical right MEPs per member state 9 Figure 3: Cohesion rate across political groups (14 July 2009 to 27 February 2014) 12 Figure 4: Average participation in (roll-call) votes per European Party Group (%) 13 Tables Table 1: Electoral results of radical right parties in domestic legislative elections (2005-2013) 6 Table 2: Size of political groups in the EP 8 Table 3: Comparison of electoral results in national and European legislative elections 10 Table 4: Balance of power 14 The radical right in the European Parliament 1 Abbreviations ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe ECR European Conservatives and Reformists EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy EP European Parliament EPP European People's Party EU European Union FN Front National FPÖ Freedom Party of Austria Greens/EFA Greens/ European Free Alliance GUE-NGL European United Left - Nordic Green Left MEP Member of European Parliament NA Non-Associated PVV Party for Freedom S&D Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats UK United Kingdom UKIP UK Independence Party The radical right in the European Parliament 2 Introduction European parliamentary elections will take place from 22 to 25 May 2014. There is a growing awareness that the next European Parliament (EP) may contain a large contingent of anti-Europe radical right parties, which could have significant consequences for future European Union (EU) legislation. In an interview published by The Guardian in October 2013, the former Prime Minister of Italy, Enrico Letta, warned that if radical right parties win more than 25% of the seats, we run ‘the risk of having the most anti-European European Parliament in history’ (The Guardian, 2013). In the United Kingdom (UK), the UK Independence Party (UKIP) achieved unprecedented results in the latest council elections across England, with an average of 25% of votes in the wards it was represented. In France, poll ratings published by Le Nouvel Economiste in March 2014 placed the Front National (FN) in second place in the run up to the European Parliament elections, with 21% of the votes -- just behind the centre-right party. This paper analyses the extent to which there has been a rise in radical right parties at a European level, as well as the role and influence of those parties in the European Parliament, in order to determine their impact on EU development policy-making. It concludes with a set of risks to EU development cooperation should a stronger wave of radical right parliamentarians enter the EP after the elections next spring. Although radical right parties are not a homogeneous group across the EU, they portray a series of common characteristics: they are (i) populist because of their condemnation of a ‘corrupt elite’, (ii) radical for the ‘outsider’ challenge they pose to the political mainstream parties, and (iii) of the right due to their social conservatism and anti-immigration stance (Morris, 2013; Mudde, 2013). They are also characterised by their Euroscepticism. The radical right in the European Parliament 3 1 How do radical right parties fare in national elections? The results presented in Table 1 and Figure 11 show that 21 of the 28 EU member states have radical right parties present in their political systems. Although the seven without represent a quarter of the EU member states, their combined population amounts to only 17% of the EU population. They include Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Spain -- four of the five countries bailed-out during the economic crisis. Electoral results in the 21 countries with radical right parties have been uneven over the past decade. Between 2005 and 2013, radical right parties have seen an increase in their electoral results in nine countries, while their popularity declined in the other 12 (see Figure 1). In the former group, five countries experienced an increase of more than 5%: Finland (+14.9%), France (+9.3%), Greece (+6.9%), Hungary (+14.5%) and Latvia (+6.2%). Conversely, radical right parties’ support decreased by around 5% in four countries: Belgium (-4.2%), Italy (-4.2%), Lithuania (-5.4%) and the Netherlands (-5.4%). 1 The figures mentioned in this section are extracted from Table 1 and Figure 1; the relevant references can be found under the table and figure. The radical right in the European Parliament 4 Figure 1: Share of radical right votes in the last two legislative elections and differences in percentage points (2005-2013) Source: Author’s compilation based on national parliamentary election results. Only the votes with direct universal suffrages were taken into account (so usually lower chambers in countries that have a bicameral system). Available at: http://electionresources.org/, http://www.parties-and- elections.eu/countries.html and http://www.volby.cz/. * Results from the first round of votes for the National Assembly. ** These results are for the June 2012 and October 2009 elections. *** United Poland was born in 2011 when 17 MPs broke away from the second main political party (PiS) after the elections. They have not yet run for elections under the colours of this new party. Note: The radical right parties considered in this figure are the following: Austria: FPÖ; Belgium: Vlaams Belang; Bulgaria: Attack party; Croatia: Croatian Party of Rights (HSP); Czech Republic: Workers’ Party of Social Justice (DSSS); Denmark: Danish People’s Party (DPP); Finland: Finns party (formerly known as True Finns); France: Front National (FN); Germany: NPD; Greece: Golden Dawn; Hungary: Jobbik; Italy: Lega Nord; Latvia: National Alliance; Lithuania: Order and Justice; Netherlands: PVV; Poland: United Poland; Romania: Partidul România Mare (PRM); Slovakia: Slovak National Party; Slovenia: Slovenian National Party; Sweden: Sweden Democrats; United Kingdom: UKIP and BNP. Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Spain are not represented in this figure as they either have no radical right or they are very marginal. Radical right parties have only managed to obtain directly elected parliamentary seats in 14 member states in the latest domestic legislative elections. Figure 1 and Table 1 show that radical right parties in Austria, Finland and Hungary received The radical right in the European Parliament 5 between 15 and 20% of the votes in recent national legislative elections. In Denmark, France, Latvia and the Netherlands, they received over 10% of the votes. The parties doing well in those countries are also among the radical right parties expected to see an increase in their number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the next EP elections. Table 1: Electoral results of radical right parties in domestic legislative elections (2005-2013) EU Member Number of Difference in Share of Share of Difference Evolution in Share of EU States seats won number of votes in votes in representation population5 in seats won in latest prior in national Parliament Parliament national national Parliament in last since prior elections3 elections 4 elections1 election2 EU 28 100% Austria 40 +6 20.5% 17.5% 3.0% ↗ 1.65% Belgium 12 -5 7.8% 12.0% -4.2% ↘ 2.12% Bulgaria 23 +2 7.3% 9.4% -2.1% ↘ 1.51% Croatia 0 -1 2.8% 3.4% -0.6% ↘ 0.87% Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.16% Czech Republic 0 0 0.9% 1.1% -0.3% ↘ 2.08% Denmark 22 -3 12.3% 13.9% -1.6% ↘ 1.09% Estonia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.26% Finland 39 +34 19.0% 4.1% 14.9% ↗ 1.05% France 2 +2 13.6%* 4.3%* 9.3% ↗ 12.77% Germany n/a n/a 1.3% 1.5% -0.2% ↘ 16.28% Greece 18 +18 6.9%** 0.0%** 6.9% ↗ 2.22% Hungary 47 +47 16.7% 2.2% 14.5% ↗ 1.99% Ireland n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.89% Italy 17 / 18*** -8 / -42*** 4.1% 8.3% -4.2% ↘ 11.91% Latvia 14 6 13.9% 7.7% 6.2% ↗ 0.46% The radical right in the European Parliament 6 Lithuania 11 -4 7.3% 12.7% -5.4% ↘ 0.66% Luxembourg n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.10% Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 0.08% Netherlands 15 -9 10.1% 15.5% -5.4% ↘ 3.26% Poland 17**** +17**** n/a n/a n/a ↗ 7.57% Portugal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 2.10% Romania 0 0 1.24% 3.2% -1.96% ↘ 4.27% Slovakia 0 -9 4.6% 5.1% -0.5% ↘ 1.07% Slovenia 0 -5 1.8% 5.4% -3.6% ↘ 0.40% Spain n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0 9.09% Sweden 20 +20 5.7% 2.9% 2.8% ↗ 1.83% United Kingdom 0 0 5.0% 2.9% 2.1% ↗ 12.25% Source: Author’s compilation based on European data and national election results.
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