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Poland Political Briefing: Poland 2021 Outlook on Polish Domestic Policy Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska

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Poland Political Briefing: Poland 2021 Outlook on Polish Domestic Policy Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 36, No. 1 (PL) January 2021 Poland political briefing: Poland 2021 Outlook on Polish domestic policy Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Poland 2021 Outlook on Polish domestic policy The continuing fight against the pandemic, the implementation of national vaccination plan and economic recovery are crucial challenges facing Poland in the coming year. But politically, it can also be very hot twelve months. Although this year’s calendar is the first since a long time where no elections are scheduled, the political situation is developing so dynamically that there may also be some surprises in this regard. The growing political and social conflict, as well as changes taking place in the opposition, will be the leading themes of the new political season in 2021. The pandemic and the long presidential campaign 2020 have strained all political forces to make maximum effort. The beginning of 2021 is still dominated by the fight against the epidemic, including the political discussion around the vaccination program, which for Group Zero (medics) began on December 27, 2020, and for Group One (seniors over 60 years of age and direct contact professions) is to start at the end of January 2021. Along with increasing vaccination exposure covering majority of generations and professions, it can be assumed that the country will return to normality, at least partially. This “new normal” will also be related to the defrosting of the economy, which theoretically did not suffer much because of Covid-19 (according to the latest estimates, Poland’s GDP fell only by 3.5% in 2020 compared to 2019; inflation was 3.4%, and unemployment remained at 6.1%), but in practice it hit hard in the pockets of both employers and employees. Along with thawing of the economy, the country will start to return to political normality as well - and it can be assumed that the “classic” party politics will start all over again. This applies to both the ruling, and opposition parties. Here are some important events that may influence Polish domestic policy in 2021. Changes in the ruling camp After recent declines in polls of the ruling coalition United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica), which consists of three parties: Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, PiS), United Poland (Solidarna Polska, SP) and Agreement (Porozumienie), the opposition, broadly understood as 1 anti-PiS, has raised the wish that maybe since 2015 the breakthrough moment has come, after which the power camp will finally start to lose its political position. It was long hoped that one of the scandals would eventually plunge the ruling formation, that it would wear out naturally, or that it would be permanently burst by internal conflicts. However, the United Right turned out to be a “Teflon coalition”, with no scandal harming its governing. It happened already that it was losing 10% in polls, it was caught up by the largest opposition party, the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), when both groupings had the support of 25% of voters, but these were only incidents. There was a quick rebound and another top political support. The events that should have knocked this political elephant down did not make a big impression. This year it may be similar, although there is undoubtedly a belief that another scandal involving the authorities may overflow the cup of bitterness. If this actually happens, it is probable that Poland will face one of two scenarios: 1. Collapse of the United Right camp and the formation of a minority government – it is likely that PiS and Agreement will split up with United Poland. Its leader, Zbigniew Ziobro, has been conducting quite confrontational rhetoric in recent months. Ziobro is not only the Minister of Justice, but also the Prosecutor General, which means that he has enormous political power in terms of jurisdiction. Ziobro is also the biggest political competitor in the fight for the seizure of power on the right, after the expected departure of PiS chairman, Jarosław Kaczyński - currently the undisputed leader of the conservative camp. For many months, there has been a growing tension between Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, Kaczyński’s favourite nowadays, and Ziobro. As Ziobro’s party has recently been gaining in polls (in the latest polls it reaches the ceiling of 5.4% of votes, i.e. it may assume that in the event of an election it could enter parliament on its own), the appetite for leaving the uncomfortable coalition and building a stronger conservative base, even more to the right from PiS, is growing. Members of the Confederation party may be Ziobro’s allies - together, both parties may constitute an important political camp that will counteract the political steps of PiS and the Agreement. The stakes are high, but the risk of failure is also great. So the political calculation of profit and loss will be very important here. 2. early elections - if social tensions increase and the rift between the government parties grows, early parliamentary elections cannot be ruled out. All the more so as it is increasingly heard that the United Right may lose a slight advantage in Sejm (lower house), due to the planned transfer of several politicians to other parliamentary clubs. Moreover, months of social protests, triggered by the judgment of 2 the Constitutional Tribunal on the prohibition of abortion despite incurable defects of the fetus, symbolize a generational change - it is not the generation of 40- or 50-year- olds who took to the streets, but young people who are fed up with the current political system and shaping it by the same people for last 20 years. If, however, PiS feels relatively confident in its permanent electorate (around 30% support), it may decide to hold an early election. Change in the opposition camp On January 24, 2001, the founding meeting of the Civic Platform took place. For the largest opposition party, the first event in the 2021 calendar is therefore its 20th anniversary. But there is no indication that it will be particularly boisterous. On the occasion of the anniversary, this party, founded among others by Donald Tusk, announced a new ideological declaration - it is to be presented in spring 2021. So far, PO politicians have held 7 out of 16 regional meetings concerning the declaration. The important question is whether Civic Platform will in coming months absorb the Modern party (Nowoczesna), with which it forms the Civic Coalition parliamentary club, or will the two parties part ways? The declaration may provide an answer here. The situation in the agricultural party, the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), which is facing internal elections, is also interesting. For years this party sat as a minor coalition partner in successive governments, assuming the role of a “revolving party” in Polish domestic politics. For several years now, however, it has not been able to get out of the hole of social confidence - the question whether the new leadership will give it a new impetus is open. Other opposition forces are also preparing their plans. In the next few weeks, a new party, Poland 2050 (Polska 2050), whose leader is the charismatic journalist Szymon Hołownia, may be registered. The registration of the party will be an important event for the entire project, which lasts since spring 2020, when Hołownia decided to run as a non-party candidate in the presidential election and gained almost 14% of the votes. In the next few months, the long- announced parliamentary circle Polska 2050 may be created in Sejm (at least 3 members). Currently, Hołownia’s movement is represented only by Hanna Gill-Piątek, who got to Sejm from the political lists of the Left (Lewica). Yet, in fact Hołownia is counting on early elections, which give his movement a great chance for a high result (app. 15%). From the point of view of a moderate voter, discouraged 3 from mainstream parties, Hołownia may be a safe haven. especially for those who now believe that PiS deserves a defeat, but that the opposition does not deserve a victory either. The Left party remains the big unknown. It gained 12.5% of votes in parliamentary elections 2019, but its position is weakening (currently around 7%). Perhaps 2021 will bring a revival - especially if there are actually early elections, and the level of social anxiety increases. Internal policy around EU recovery program Finally, the european context. Over the next few months, Polish parliament will vote on the ratification of the “Generation Next eU” plan. This event has a chance to become a real test of unity of views of individual parties. Discussions around the vetoing of the eU budget for 2021-27, where this recovery program is written, inflamed Polish political scene in November and December 2020. It is already known, that Ziobro’s party is to be against the project, the right-wing Confederation, and perhaps some eurosceptic PiS politicians will probably join them. Yet, PiS and Agreement are to vote for. Thus the question of the plan’s approval divides the United Right. The leaders of the parliamentary opposition have previously announced that they will support the ratification. The question of what to spend the money on from the eU program will become the most important topic for the entire political class and beyond. The eU only sets the priorities in general, but it is the governments that decide the details, adapting the plan to local needs. The Chancellery of the Prime Minister and the PiS leader, Jarosław Kaczyński realize the importance of this project.
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