DOCSLIB.ORG

Poland Political Briefing: Presidential Elections - Results and Consequences Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Poland Political Briefing: Presidential Elections - Results and Consequences Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 31, No. 1 (PL) July 2020 Poland political briefing: Presidential elections - results and consequences Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Presidential elections - results and consequences On July 12, 2020, the second round of presidential elections ended in Poland. After months of unusually difficult campaign, the winner was the incumbent President Andrzej Duda from the ruling party Law and Justice. However, his victory over the opposition candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski from Civic Platform is small. What was the campaign like and what consequences would Duda's second term of office bring for Poland? Preparations for elections The presidential election in Poland was set for June 28, 2020. This final date was ordered however very late - as a result of the situation related to the COVID-19 epidemic, there was no voting in the elections planned for May 10, 2020 (the date of which was set by the Marshal of SeJm in February). Two days before the voting scheduled for that date the National Electoral Commission issued a resolution in which it argued that: “the inability to vote for candidates due to the pandemic is tantamount to a situation of no candidates”. This questionable interpretation of the situation made it possible to re-announce the election date by the SeJm Marshal. And at the same time, gave the right to take part in these new elections by the candidates who were registered in the elections ordered on May 10, but without a second duty of collecting the 100,000 signatures of support required by the Electoral Code. According to art. 296 of the Act of 2011 of the Electoral Code, a candidate for President of the Republic of Poland may be a person proposed by at least 100,000 citizens who have the right to vote in the parliamentary elections. Such notification is made by the electoral committee formally supporting him/her, which is established after the written consent of the person concerned. The election committee may be created by a minimum of 15 people. After collecting at least 1,000 signatures of supporting citizens, the election committee may be notified to the National Electoral Commission, and start collecting the signatures of support for the presidential candidate. Finally, by June 10, 2020, eleven presidential candidates were registered. Nine of them have already submitted their candidates in the spring (in the elections planned for May 10), one turned out to be a completely new candidate, while one was replaced by the Civic Platform party by another candidate from this camp. 1 Voting In fact, the most interesting battle took place between the incumbent President AndrzeJ Duda from the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), and this completely new candidate – Rafał Trzaskowski, the vice-president of the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and the current mayor of the capital city of Warsaw, who replaced the earlier candidate from the PO, Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska. It was these two candidates who received the greatest support in the first voting round, which took place on June 28. Duda then obtained 43.5% of votes, and Trzaskowski 30.5% of votes. Szymon Hołownia, a non-party candidate, came third, with the support of 13.9%. Already during the first round of elections, the turnout was, considering Polish conditions, high - it amounted to 64.5%. This indicated that the stakes of these elections were huge, and the public was aware of importance of the decisions. It was possible to choose to maintain the current political course, which took place over the last 5 years, when President Duda has been ruling in a team with a government from the same right-wing political environment. Or to choose to change and gain some control over the legislative process by electing a head of state coming from the opposite political option - the centre-liberal Civic Platform. After the first round of elections, there was a two-week, very intense campaign of two candidates before the second round. Both political parties were mobilized - especially Law and Justice and their coalition partners from the government of the United Right (Jarosław Gowin's Agreement and Zbigniew Ziobro's United Poland); and the Civic Platform. But citizens themselves mobilized as well, encouraging other citizens to actively participate in the elections (and to vote for any candidate) and to show that the fate of the motherland was not indifferent for them. This resulted in an increase in voter turnout - on July 12, 68.2% of those eligible to vote (in total 20,640.000 citizens out of 30,260.000) went to polling stations. The voting ended with the victory of incumbent President Duda, who was elected for the second term, receiving 51.03% of the vote in the second round in which he defeated Trzaskowski (48,97%). The slight difference between the candidates (approx. 420,000 votes) indicates that the fight was both fierce as well as very even. However, the current ruling camp achieved the final victory. It is interesting to take a closer look at the election results, considering several important factors that define voters: 2 • Trzaskowski won in most age groups, with the greatest advantage over his competitor among the youngest voters (18-29 years of age), but he also kept the advantage among people of 30-49 years old. The elderly, over 50, were much more inclined towards Duda; • taking into account the voters' place of residence, Duda won in the countryside with a clear advantage. However, in cities up to 50,000 inhabitants his competitor has taken the lead. Although in cities with a size from 50,000 up to 200,000 of residents, support for both candidates was almost the same, yet the larger the city, the greater the advantage of Trzaskowski - the advantage in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants was even greater than the advantage of Duda in the countryside; • in terms of division into voivodships (regions), Poland has been divided almost in half along the Vistula River. Rafał Trzaskowski was supported by the following voivodeships: Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Kujawsko- Pomorskie, Mazowieckie, Wielkopolskie, Lubuskie, Dolnośląskie, Opolskie and Śląskie. AndrzeJ Duda had the greatest support in the provinces: Podlaskie, Łódzkie, Lubelskie, Świętokrzyskie, Małopolskie and Podkarpackie; • in terms of the level of education, the division of support looks even more interesting. AndrzeJ Duda definitely gained the support of people with primary and basic vocational education (mainly pensioners, factory workers, farmers and the unemployed). Poles with secondary education slightly more supported the incumbent President. On the other hand, university graduates strongly supported Trzaskowski. 3 These results caused a huge wave of discussion. It turned out that AndrzeJ Duda was elected President by - generalizing the outcomes - older people, with lower education, living in agricultural areas of central and eastern Poland. Many years ago this part of Poland was called in a critical way by political scientists the so-called “Poland B”, in opposition to the better educated, richer and younger “Poland A” living in the western part of the country. Consequences of the elections The result of these elections is extremely important for the future of Poland and will bring a number of consequences, but it also leads to a few conclusions. Firstly, the results of the elections show that Poland remains somewhat cracked. To put it simply, the trench between “two Poles” is Just as wide as in previous years (although due to the increase in turnout, the difference between AndrzeJ Duda and the Civic Platform candidate is smaller, numerically similar to the voting from 2015), but it seems to be getting deeper. Secondly, the level of bilateral aggression, negative campaigns, radicalisms of both sides, open agitation for AndrzeJ Duda by the main state-owned media (which at the same time discredited Trzaskowski) - seem to be increasingly accepted by the maJority of voters in each camp. This may bring devastating consequences for Poles as a national community in the years to come. Thirdly, the slight advantage of AndrzeJ Duda with the increase in turnout shows that in the event of a match with another candidate in the second round, he would have huge problems with victory. Perhaps he would have lost if the non-party candidate Hołownia, who had practically no negative electorate, and united voters from the right, left and the centre, got to the second round. At the same time, however, Trzaskowski's candidacy allowed the President's staff to mobilize voters from outside the United Right's electorate, who would stay at home in a less confrontational clash or even (in a minority) would vote for his competitor. Fourthly, the biggest failure of the ruling camp seems to be allowing the “pendulum mechanism” to be activated among the youngest voters. It was they who, having experienced their “conservative rebellion” in 2015, significantly contributed to the success of the United Right at that time. Today, both at the level of political choices and sympathies, as well as more and more expressive cultural and civilization trends, one can notice a progressive drift of the young generation to the left. 4 So the two most important challenges facing AndrzeJ Duda's second term today will be: i) to attempt to rebuild the minimum standards of political culture, which would at least enable communication between polarized camps on strategic matters, and ii) to win in the United Right camp a centre capable of stopping the liberalization of the young generation. However, it will be difficult to do this, because young people are rediscovering the charms of liberal Europe again and want to feel part of it.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Assumptions of Law and Justice Party Foreign Policy
    Warsaw, May 2016 Change in Poland, but what change? Assumptions of Law and Justice party foreign policy Adam Balcer – WiseEuropa Institute Piotr Buras – European Council on Foreign Relations Grzegorz Gromadzki – Stefan Batory Foundation Eugeniusz Smolar – Centre for International Relations The deep reform of the state announced by Law and Justice party (PiS) and its unquestioned leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, and presented as the “Good Change”, to a great extent also influences foreign, especially European, policy. Though PiS’s political project has been usually analysed in terms of its relation to the post 1989, so called 3rd Republic institutional-political model and the results of the socio-economic transformation of the last 25 years, there is no doubt that in its alternative concept for Poland, the perception of the world, Europe and Poland’s place in it, plays a vital role. The “Good Change” concept implies the most far-reaching reorientation in foreign policy in the last quarter of a century, which, at the level of policy declarations made by representatives of the government circles and their intellectual supporters implies the abandonment of a number of key assumptions that shaped not only policy but also the imagination of the Polish political elite and broad society as a whole after 1989. The generally accepted strategic aim after 1989 was to avoid the “twilight zone” of uncertainty and to anchor Poland permanently in the western security system – i.e. NATO, and European political, legal and economic structures, in other words the European Union. “Europeanisation” was the doctrine of Stefan Batory Foundation Polish transformation after 1989.
    [Show full text]
  • POLAND: Duda's Victory Paves the Way for Pis Rule Until 2023
    Europe | July 13, 2020 POLAND: Duda’s victory paves the way for PiS rule until 2023 According to preliminary data from the National Electoral Commission (PKW), incumbent President Andrzej Duda – supported by the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party – narrowly won the second round of the presidential election held on 12 July. With nearly all ballots counted, Duda secured 51.2% of votes, leaving his opponent Rafal Trzaskowski (Civic Platform, PO) behind with 48.8%. The fiercely contested presidential race attracted a nearly record turnout of 68.1%. The PKW is expected to announce the official results within few days. Trzaskowski has not accepted defeat yet and could still challenge the result in courts, although this appears unlikely. An extremely divisive electoral campaign and a tight result reveal the deep polarization of Poland’s society. Exit polls show that Duda was predominantly supported by farmers, senior citizens, blue-collar workers, and the unemployed based in smaller towns and villages in the eastern parts of the country. Meanwhile, Trzaskowski performed well among students and entrepreneurs, as well as highly-qualified professionals. He is also much more popular in large cities and the western parts of the country. Duda’s re-election is a major win for the ruling PiS, which is now relatively well-positioned to continue carrying out its policy agenda until the parliamentary election in the autumn of 2023. In terms of the government’s policy priorities going forward, justice minister Zbigniew Ziobro (United Poland) has highlighted that it would further reform state institutions – including the judiciary – and continue implementing its generous social policies.
    [Show full text]
  • Poland's 2019 Parliamentary Election
    — SPECIAL REPORT — 11/05/2019 POLAND’S 2019 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse Warsaw Institute POLAND’S 2019 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION Held on October 13, 2019, Poland’s general election is first and foremost a success of democracy, as exemplified by crowds rushing to polling stations and a massive rise in voter turnout. Those that claimed victory were the govern- ment groups that attracted a considerable electorate, winning in more constitu- encies across the country they ruled for the past four years. Opposition parties have earned a majority in the Senate, the upper house of the Polish parliament. A fierce political clash turned into deep chasms throughout the country, and Poland’s political stage reveals polarization between voters that lend support to the incumbent government and those that question the authorities by manifest- ing either left-liberal or far-right sentiments. Election results Poland’s parliamentary election in 2019 attrac- try’s 100-seat Senate, the upper house of the ted the attention of Polish voters both at home parliament, it is the Sejm where the incum- and abroad while drawing media interest all bents have earned a majority of five that has over the world. At stake were the next four a pivotal role in enacting legislation and years in power for Poland’s ruling coalition forming the country’s government2. United Right, led by the Law and Justice party (PiS)1. The ruling coalition won the election, The electoral success of the United Right taking 235 seats in Poland’s 460-seat Sejm, the consisted in mobilizing its supporters to a lower house of the parliament.
    [Show full text]
  • Codebook Indiveu – Party Preferences
    Codebook InDivEU – party preferences European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies December 2020 Introduction The “InDivEU – party preferences” dataset provides data on the positions of more than 400 parties from 28 countries1 on questions of (differentiated) European integration. The dataset comprises a selection of party positions taken from two existing datasets: (1) The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File contains party positions for three rounds of European Parliament elections (2009, 2014, and 2019). Party positions were determined in an iterative process of party self-placement and expert judgement. For more information: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/65944 (2) The Chapel Hill Expert Survey The Chapel Hill Expert Survey contains party positions for the national elections most closely corresponding the European Parliament elections of 2009, 2014, 2019. Party positions were determined by expert judgement. For more information: https://www.chesdata.eu/ Three additional party positions, related to DI-specific questions, are included in the dataset. These positions were determined by experts involved in the 2019 edition of euandi after the elections took place. The inclusion of party positions in the “InDivEU – party preferences” is limited to the following issues: - General questions about the EU - Questions about EU policy - Questions about differentiated integration - Questions about party ideology 1 This includes all 27 member states of the European Union in 2020, plus the United Kingdom. How to Cite When using the ‘InDivEU – Party Preferences’ dataset, please cite all of the following three articles: 1. Reiljan, Andres, Frederico Ferreira da Silva, Lorenzo Cicchi, Diego Garzia, Alexander H.
    [Show full text]
  • PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS in POLAND 25Th October 2015
    PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN POLAND 25th October 2015 European Elections monitor The conservative opposition running favourite in the upcoming parliamentary elections in Poland Corinne Deloy Abstract: Just a few months after the unexpected victory of Andrzej Duda in the presidential election on 10th and 24th May last the Poles are returning to ballot on 25th October next to renew the two chambers of their parliament. All of the polls forecast victory by the main opposition party Law Analysis and Justice (PiS) in a country that is still divided between the industrial west which leans rather more to the Civic Platform (PO), a liberal party in office for the last eight years, and the east, which is more rural and closer to the conservative forces embodied by PiS Justice. The most recent poll by CBOS and published on 2014 of former Prime Minister Donald Tusk (PO) as 25th September and published by CBOS credits the the President of the European Council. However the PiS with 34% of the vote and Civic Platform with country is at a crossroads and in a month’s time will 30%. The Kukiz’15 group created by the candidate make a vital choice between two opposite paths, in the last presidential election, Pawel Kukiz, is due personified for the first time in the country’s history to come third with 9%; of the vote. The United by two women. Left (ZL) is due to win 5% of the vote – i.e. below the 8% voting threshold vital for a coalition to be THE OUTGOING GOVERNMENT IN DIFFI- represented in parliament – likewise the People’s CULTY Party (PSL).
    [Show full text]
  • CEE Covid-19 & Political Overview 30 June 2021
    Regional Update CEE Covid-19 & Political Overview 31 MAY – 30 JUNE 2021 Table of Contents CROATIA ................................................................................................................................ 3 CZECHIA ................................................................................................................................ 5 HUNGARY .............................................................................................................................. 8 POLAND ............................................................................................................................... 10 ROMANIA ............................................................................................................................. 12 SLOVAKIA ............................................................................................................................. 15 2 CROATIA (prepared by CEC's Croatian partner - Vlahovic Group) COVID-19: • The number of active COVID cases dropped by 85% within the past 30 days (from 2,726 to 418), while dozens of delta variant cases have been recorded. Since the last week, entire Croatia is marked in green on the European Center for Disease Control (ECDC) map. Ahead of the European Council, the PM stated that Croatia advocates freedom of movement as a fundamental value of the EU to be re-established because it allows a normal life, normal circulation of both people and capital and trade and, ultimately, tourism. The health minister sent an open letter inviting all
    [Show full text]
  • Poland at a Crossroads? Analysing the 2019 Parliamentary Election
    UCL SSEES Press Briefing Poland at a crossroads? Analysing the 2019 parliamentary election Press briefing 15 October 2019 BACKGROUND TRIUMPH OF THE RULING PARTY On 13 October 2019, Polish voters went to Professor Aleks Szczerbiak (University of the polls to re-elect the 460-member Sejm Sussex) (the lower house of pArliAment) And the 100- member SenAte (the upper house). KEY POINT PiS Achieved this remarkable electoral success As they were the sole pArty The ruling nAtionAlist-conservative LAw And not only campAigning about, but Also with a Justice (PiS)-led coAlition retAined its majority record of delivering on, the sociAl needs thAt in the lower house, winning 235 seAts, but, many Poles care most About. with 48 seAts, lost its majority in the SenAte. It wAs the PiS-led coAlition’s second electoral 1. PiS wAs Able to score A victory despite victory After gAining An Absolute majority in Accusations About undermining Polish both houses in 2015. democracy put forwArd by both domestic And externAl Actors. The main opposition bloc, the Civic CoAlition, came second with 134 And 43 seAts in the 2. PiS populArity wAs predicated on its lower And upper houses, respectively. The success in fulfilling its generous Left coAlition Also gAve A strong enough welfAre pledges while in office. Also, performance to enter pArliAment. the pArty “redistributed prestige” by providing A sense of importAnce to the Voter turnout wAs A record 61.7% – the sociAl groups previously highest of the post-1989 pArliAmentAry condescended to by the governments elections in PolAnd. led by liberal urbAn elites.
    [Show full text]
  • Poland by Mikołaj Czes´Nik
    Poland by Mikołaj Czes´nik Capital: Warsaw Population: 38.5 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$21,760 Source: The data above are drawn from the World Bank’sWorld Development Indicators 2014. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Electoral Process 1.75 1.75 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.25 1.25 Civil Society 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 Independent Media 1.50 1.75 2.25 2.25 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 National Democratic Governance 2.50 2.75 3.25 3.50 3.25 3.25 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 Local Democratic Governance 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.50 Judicial Framework and Independence 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 Corruption 3.00 3.25 3.00 3.00 2.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.50 Democracy Score 2.00 2.14 2.36 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 2.14 2.18 2.18 NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Independence Regained
    1 INDEPENDENCE REGAINED The history of Poland in the modern era has been characterised by salient vicissitudes: outstanding victories and tragic defeats, soaring optimism and the deepest despair, heroic sacrifice and craven subser- vience. Underpinning all of these experiences and emotions, however, are the interrelated themes of national freedom, independence and sovereignty, which were sometimes lost, then regained, but never forgotten or abandoned. They, more than anything else, shaped Poland’s destiny in the modern era. And if there is one single, fundamental point of reference, then it is unquestionably the Partitions of the eighteenth century which resulted in Poland’s disappearance from the map of Europe for well over a century. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as the Polish State was consti- tuted since the mid-sixteenth century, was for the next two hundred years one of the largest and most powerful in Europe, occupying a huge swathe of territory stretching from the area around Poznań in the west to far-off Muscovy in the east, and from Livonia in the north to the edge of the Ottoman Empire in the south. Famous kings, such as Stefan Batory (1575–86) and Jan Sobieski III (1674–96), and great landowning families, the Lubomirskis, Radziwiłłs, Zamoyskis, Czartoryskis and the like, played a leading role in moulding the economic, political and social life of the country and bringing it unprecedented international prestige. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the first unmistakable signs of decline appeared, and were accentuated by the emergence of ambitious and expansionist neighbours in Russia, Prussia and Austria.
    [Show full text]
  • Society Register
    ISSN 2544-5502 SOCIETY REGISTER 4 (4) 2020 Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan ISSN 2544-5502 SOCIETY REGISTER 4 (4) 2020 Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan SOCIETY REGISTER 2020 / Vol. 4, No. 4 ISSN: 2544-5502 | DOI: 10.14746/sr EDITORIAL TEAM: Mariusz Baranowski (Editor-in-Chief), Marcos A. Bote (Social Policy Editor), Piotr Cichocki (Quantitative Research Editor), Sławomir Czapnik (Political Science Editor), Piotr Jabkowski (Statistics Editor), Mark D. Juszczak (International Relations), Agnieszka Kanas (Stratification and Inequality Editor), Magdalena Lemańczyk (Anthropology Editor), Urszula Markowska-Manista (Educational Sciences Editor), Bartosz Mika (Sociology of Work Editor), Kamalini Mukherjee (English language Editor), Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy (Philoso- phy Editor), Anna Odrowąż-Coates (Deputy Editor-in-Chief), Aneta Piektut (Migration Editor). POLISH EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS: Agnieszka Gromkowska-Melosik, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (Poland); Kazimierz Krzysztofek, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities (Poland); Roman Leppert, Kazimierz Wielki University (Poland); Renata Nowakowska-Siuta, ChAT (Poland); Inetta Nowosad, University of Zielona Góra (Poland); Ewa Przybylska, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń (Poland); Piotr Sałustowicz, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities (Poland); Bogusław Śliwerski, University of Lodz (Poland); Aldona Żurek, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (Poland). INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS: Tony Blackshaw, Sheffield Hallam University (United King- dom); Theodore Chadjipadelis, Aristotle University Thessaloniki (Greece); Kathleen J. Farkas, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio (US); Sribas Goswami, Serampore College, University of Calcutta (India); Bozena Hautaniemi, Stockholm University (Sweden); Kamel Lahmar, University of Sétif 2 (Algeria); Georg Kam- phausen, University of Bayreuth (Germany); Nina Michalikova, University of Central Oklahoma (US); Jaroslaw Richard Romaniuk, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio (US); E.
    [Show full text]
  • The Polish Army in France: Immigrants in America, World War I Volunteers in France, Defenders of the Recreated State in Poland
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University History Dissertations Department of History 7-28-2006 The Polish Army in France: Immigrants in America, World War I Volunteers in France, Defenders of the Recreated State in Poland David Thomas Ruskoski Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_diss Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Ruskoski, David Thomas, "The Polish Army in France: Immigrants in America, World War I Volunteers in France, Defenders of the Recreated State in Poland." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2006. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_diss/1 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE POLISH ARMY IN FRANCE: IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICA, WORLD WAR I VOLUNTEERS IN FRANCE, DEFENDERS OF THE RECREATED STATE IN POLAND by DAVID T. RUSKOSKI Under the Direction of Gerald H. Davis and Christine M. Skwiot ABSTRACT Independent Poland ceased to exist in 1795 and the various insurrections to restore the Polish state were thwarted by the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and Russians. During the First World War, Polish statesmen called upon the thousands of Polish immigrants in the United States to join the Polish Army in France, a military force funded by the French government and organized by the Polish Falcons of America and Ignacy Paderewski, the world-famous Polish pianist. Over 20,000 men trained in Canada and fought in the final months of the war on the Western front.
    [Show full text]
  • The 2015 Elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland
    Polish Political Science Yearbook vol. 45 (2016), pp. 205–218 DOI: 10.15804/ppsy2016016 PL ISSN 0208-7375 Krystyna Leszczyńska Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin (Poland) The 2015 Elections to the Senate of the Republic of Poland Abstract: The discussion about justification for the very existence of Senate, as it was the case in previous years, also took place prior to the 2015 parliamentary elections. Postulates for the second chamber of parliament to be abolished are the inseparable element of election campaigns in Poland. Announcements of total abolishment or change of: form, competencies or number and the election prin- ciples for members of Senate, although they found their expression in the 2015 election programs of some of the political parties, but they were never applied after elections. The single member Senate constituencies secured seats almost ex- clusively for candidates supported by one of the two strongest political parties, that is the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO). Even if in the result of 25 October 2015 elections four independent candidates were elected for senators, three of them used support of political parties, using a rule well proven four years earlier: there is not senator without a political party protector. The 40% support for PiS which turned into 61% of seats indicates that the election system for Senate leads to overrepresentation of election winners. Keywords: Senate; election campaign; single member constituencies; deformation of election result; overrepresentation of the winning party Introduction The analysis of the 2015 Senate election campaign aims at verification of two hy- potheses. First of the assumes that the announcements of abolishment or change of Senate’s character are solely an element of pre-election strategy and in those catego- ries we may perceive the votes that negate the justification for its very existence.
    [Show full text]