Understanding Populism and Political Participation: the Case of Nicaragua
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WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS No. 4 JUNE 2009 Understanding Populism and ew Left’ Political Participation: N The Case of Nicaragua By Carlos F. Chamorro, Edmundo Jarquín and Alejandro Bendaña Edited by Cynthia J. Arnson and Adam T. Stubits INTRODUCT I ON Adam T. Stubits Last year, the Latin American Program’s proj- in Ecuador. As a result, Ortega is forced into tak- ect on “Democratic Governance and the ‘New ing a pragmatic stance when it comes to relations Left’ in Latin America” convened the semi- with the United States or other international nar “Understanding Populism and Political financial institutions. Moreover, Chamorro ques- Participation.” The purpose was to examine new tions that the system of direct democracy estab- forms of political participation and state-civil lished by Ortega—the Citizen Power Committees society interaction in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, (CPCs), established by Presidential decree and led and Venezuela. In recent years, public opinion by regional Sandinista party officials distribute polls throughout Latin America have identified a the benefits of the government’s social policies as great deal of popular dissatisfaction with the insti- well transmit the president’s policies directly to tutions of democratic governance and with exist- the people. Because they are fundamentally secre- ing channels of political representation. This con- tive and non-transparent they run contradictory ference sought to understand the extent to which to the basic tenants of democracy. the governments in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Edmundo Jarquín examines the similarities and Venezuela had responded to these ‘deficits’ and differences that exist between Nicaragua and with new or innovative programs and what the its neighbors, Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador, resulting consequence for liberal democracy has emphasizing the great contradiction of a political been. This bulletin contains the observations of minority, albeit a significant minority, promot- three distinguished analysts of Nicaraguan poli- ing a “refoundational” and “rupturist” agenda. tics: Carlos F. Chamorro is the editor of the weekly Ortega’s objective, Jarquín argues, has been to paper Confidencial; economist Edmundo Jarquín, consolidate his political hegemony through a dual Democratic Governance and the ‘ who was the Sandinista Renovation Movement system of authoritarian populism and authori- (MRS) candidate in the 2006 presidential elec- tarian corporatism, although he questions the tions; and Alejandro Bendaña is president of the viability of Ortega’s authoritarianism in light of Center for International Studies. Nicaragua’s worsening socioeconomic situation. Carlos Chamorro argues that the difference Alejandro Bendaña addresses the importance between Nicaragua and the other “new left” coun- of distinguishing between political content and tries in Latin America is that Daniel Ortega did personality when it comes to analyzing the “new not win the presidential elections of 2006 with a left” governments of Latin America, arguing that LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM majority, and thus did not have the same over- instead, we must focus on the real ideological whelming mandate for change as did President content promulgated by these new governments, Evo Morales in Bolivia or President Rafael Correa and whether it reflects the mounting demand for WOODROW WILSON CENTER UPDATE ON THE AMERICAS the deepening of democracy and social and economic the Americas (ALBA). Unlike Hugo Chávez, Evo justice. According to Bendaña, the current govern- Morales, and Rafael Correa, each of whom won their ment led by Ortega has not attempted to revamp elections with over 50 percent of the popular vote and social and educational priorities and it differs from promises of profound changes in the existing politi- other “new left” governments in that there has been cal system, Ortega was elected with only 38 percent no questioning of free trade with the United States, of the vote, an important minority for sure, but a economic programs with the IMF, collaboration with minority nonetheless and one that correlates closely the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, the Millennium with the paramilitary forces. Indeed, the Sandinista Challenge Cooperation and with the Pentagon in the National Liberation Front (FSLN) won 38 of the 92 form of Nicaraguan army training in the old School delegates in the National Assembly, or 41 percent. of the Americas. Ortega’s victory was made possible by a 2000 consti- tutional reform agreed to by former president Arnoldo Ortega’s “Citizens’ Power” in Alemán and his Constitutionalist Liberal Party that Nicaragua: Democratic Participation lowered the threshold necessary to win a presidential 2 or Authoritarian Populism? election in the first round from 45 percent to 35 per- Carlos F. Chamorro cent when the candidate in first place had at least a 5 Confidencial percent lead over the second-place candidate. As such, Ortega’s victory is not evidence of a general leftist turn Before analyzing the types of changes President Daniel among Nicaragua’s electorate; rather, a new electoral Ortega’s so-called “Democratic Directive” has intro- rule combined with the schism of the right-wing anti- duced in Nicaragua, it is first necessary to understand Sandinista bloc—the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance the nature of the Sandinista government that returned (ALN), which won 28.3 percent of the vote, and the to power in January 2007 after sixteen years as the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC), which won 27.1 opposition. percent of the vote. In fact, the FSLN won the presi- Although Ortega has defined his government as dency with a lower percentage of the electorate than “a continuation” of the 1979 Sandinista People’s it garnered in its last three electoral defeats: 1990 (41 Revolution, there are substantial differences between percent), 1996 (38 percent), and 2001 (42 percent). this process and those of other governments that con- Unlike Evo Morales’ party, Movement Towards form to the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Socialism (MAS, which in Spanish means “more”), THE LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM and its institutes on Mexico and Brazil serve as a bridge between the United States and Latin America, providing a nonpartisan forum for experts from throughout the region and the world to discuss the most critical issues facing the Hemisphere. The Program sponsors research, conferences, and publications aimed at deepening the understanding of Latin American and Caribbean politics, history, economics, culture, and U.S.-Latin American relations. By bringing pressing regional concerns to the attention of opinion leaders and policymakers, the Program contributes to more informed policy choices in Washington, D.C., and throughout the Hemisphere. The Latin American Program’s work on democratic governance focuses on questions of democratic quality. Current research seeks to explain the rise of leftist and populist governments in Latin America and to explore the impact of specific public policies to reduce poverty and inequality and enhance citizen participation and human rights. The pro- ject builds on three decades of prior work on democratic governance at the Wilson Center, including path-breaking studies of the breakdown of democratic regimes, transitions from authoritarianism, challenges to the consolidation of democratic rule, decentralization, citizenship, and the relationship between democratization and internal armed conflict. We are grateful to The Ford Foundation and the Open Society Institute for its generous support of this initiative. WOODROW WIlsON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20004-3027 tel. (202) 691-4000, fax (202) 691-4001 www.wilsoncenter.org/lap UnderstandinG POPULISM AND POLITICAL Participation Nicaragua’s resurgent FSLN did not come from a egy of national development? The answer is largely coalition of growing social movements, but rather unknown—or, at the very least, difficult to identi- from an electoral machine that maintains a privileged fy—given Ortega’s tendency to jump between prag- relationship with its constituent social groups and, matism and revolutionary rhetoric, his increasingly thanks to the beneficial pact made with the PLC, has traditional leadership style and lack of a long-term significant influence on state powers including the development strategy. Supreme Electoral Council, Supreme Court of Justice, Ortega’s plan is unique, however, in that it includes and Inspector General. Ultimately, Ortega’s victory a short term strategy for accumulating personal power cannot be attributed to a mass endorsement of his based on three principles: 1) the growing, iron-clad stance against the neoliberal policies of his predeces- control the executive holds over the powers of the sors, as the majority of poor voters in Nicaragua—six state; 2) a social assistance policy supported by the dis- out of every ten—voted against Ortega.1 cretionary use of economic resources stemming from Venezuelan cooperation; and 3) an advantageous, What is the electoral mandate given to Ortega? blackmail-based relationship with Arnoldo Alemán’s 3 Ortega’s electoral mandate reflects the Nicaraguan PLC–which allows him to manipulate, divide, and co- population’s dual desires: on the one hand, a desire opt the opposition, effectively permitting the FSLN to to fight poverty and fortify social policies, and on the function as a majority party, even though it is techni- other, demands for institutional