The 1996 Nicaraguan Elections: How Arnoldo Alemdn "Won" by Dianne Feeley Nicaraguans elected to the Parliament, 9 SYMPATHIZERS OF THE were are from the Liberal Alliance,8 divided in their opinions about the politics of the 1996 from the FSLN, and one each election campaign. Did 's campaign for from the \icaraguan Chris- presidency represent a creative response to the extremely tian Way Party and Conserva- difficult situation the Nicaraguan people face after six tive Party. years of neoliberalism or did the Sandinista Front (FSLN) abandon the revolutionary project in favor of a glitzy, Organizing the Election personalistic and pro- one? Outside the con- As defined by the 1987 text of a real discussion of what actually happened dur- Constitution, the CSE is ac- ing the campaign and on the day of the October 2()th tually a fourth branch of election—all of which has been grossly underreported— government, sharing an inde- this is a sterile debate. pendent and equal status with On November 22nd, more than a month after the the judicial, legislative and ex- Nicaraguan elections, Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) ecutive branches. Until now President Rosa Marina Zelaya announced after "exten- the CSE has enjoyed a reputa- sive review and investigation" of charges of fraud that tion as the one branch most the October 20 elections were "perfectly valid, clean and free of partisan politics and legitimate." She acknowledged minor fraud but said it unblemished by scandals. In February 1996 Mariano was confined to a few precincts and a few individuals. Cardinal Obando y Bravo (right) supporter The CSE thus rejected- the demand of the FSLN that Fiallos resigned as president the election be annulled in as well as a second of the CSE, stating that he could not guarantee clean challenge by ten parties (including the FSLN) that the elections. He felt that the new election law opened the election in Matagalpa be invalidated. Zelaya stated that door to partisan influence (with political parties nomi- the major problem was not fraud but differing interpreta- nating officials for the various Departmental Electoral tions of the electoral law. The CSE then proclaimed Ar- Councils). He was also concerned about the inadequate noldo Aleman, the candidate of the right-wing Liberal funding and governmental attention given the difficult Alliance (AL), president elect (with 51% of the vote to process of voter registration. Daniel Ortega's 38%). He will take office on . In addition to the lack of funding, there was actually Of the 93 members elected to the National Assembly, very little time to organize the election process (registra- 42 were elected on the Liberal Alliance ticket and 36 are tion of voters, issuing new voter identification cards, Sandinista Front candidates. Nine other parties/coali- registration of candidates and electoral coalitions, or- tions have the other 15 seats, including 4 for the Nica- ganizing and staffing polling stations). For example, the raguan Christian Way Party, 3 for the Conservative Party, CSE based its estimates for ID cards and polling stations 2 for the , and one each for the Liberal on the most recent census—which, as it turns out, vastly Independent Party, National Conservative Alliance, undercounted the population. At every stage in the elec- Nicaraguan Resistance Party, Sandinista Renovation tion process the CSE was faced with obstacles. Movement, and UNO '96 Alliance. Since But since Fiallos' replacement by Zelaya, the CSE the election, however, two National Assembly members has come under suspicion: elected on the AL ticket (an alliance of three right-wing • Presidencies of the departmental regions seemed parties) have resigned from the AL. Members of the to be unjustly awarded. Last August the FSLN protested National Liberal Party, they accuse Aleman of unilateral that the Liberal Alliance ended up with being awarded decision-making. the lion's share. The AL was appointed Departmental Additionally, 91 of the municipalities elected AL Electoral Council presidencies in Managua, Jinotega and governments while 52 elected the FSLN. The AL heads Matagalpa—where 42% of the population lives—while the government in ten departmental capitals, including the FSLN was awarded presidencies in regions repre- Managua and Matagalpa, while the FSLN won in six: senting only 14% of the population. Carazo (Jinotepe), Esteli, Leon, Madirz (Somoto), Nueva • The company that submitted the highest bid re- Segovia (Ocotal) and RAAN (Puerto Cabezas). Of the 19 ceived by the CSE to print the ballots was given the job. (The rumor is that Zelaya's husband owned stock in that Dianne Feeley if a member of the ATC editorial board. She company.) spent a month in on a tree-planting brigade just • In the October 20 election the Sandinista Renova- before the 1984 elections. She would like to acknowledge the tion Movement (MRS) won one seat in the National fo'llmving sources: Barricada Internacional, envio, Green Assembly from Carazo. However, in its November 22nd Left Weekly and the Nicaragua Monitor, published by the statement on the elections, the CSE claimed an irregular- Nicaragua Network Education Fund. ity in that race—without providing any evidence—and

26 • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1997 took the seat from the winner, Adolfo Arguello, and reported that the results from over 200 electoral booths, without explaining why, assigned it to Jorge Samper, representing more than 50,(XK) votes, disappeared, MRS member and Zelaya's husband. Arguello charged pointed out that thousands of tally sheets were lost or that Zelaya worked out a deal with Aleman. calculated incorrectly, and documented that the security • Most importantly, the system that the CSE set up codes and verification signatures on ballot papers were in order to be free of any fraud not identical to those on the tally sheets for the same was contaminated. polling booth. The FSLN calculated that 84% of the After the polls were Managua polling stations had "grave irregularities." closed and before proceeding The Sandinista Assembly pointed out that the great- to the count, officials in each est number of irregularies occurred in those departments polling station were to recon- where the Liberal Alliance was in charge: Managua, cile the unused and used bal- Matagalpa and Jinotega. In both Matagalpa and Jinotega lot papers. Each step was to be armed bands had campaigned in favor of the Liberal documented. When the final Alliance while preventing other parties from campaign- figures were ready, the figures ing. At least seven members of the FSLN were brutally were to be sent to the local killed in these regions during the fall election period. CSE by telegram, phone or fax Responding to the Sandinista Front's call, 30,000 pro- so that the overall results tested the electoral fraud at the tomb of Carlos Fonseca, could be compiled. The orig- founder of the FSLN, on November 8, the 20th anniver- inal documents were then to sary of Fonseca's murder. be taken to the local CSE for While on October 20 many polling stations did not verification. (The CSE had open on time—either because the election materials had instructed international ob- not been delivered or because CSE officials had not servers not to remain at the arrived—people patiently waited for hours. So despite polling stations for the count- problems, the voting process proceeded smoothly (80% Amoldo Alemdn (left). ing of the votes or the delivery voted). The main problem was that Liberal Alliance mem- of the tallies to the departmental CSE offices.) bers were in charge of the most populated polling places, When the FSLN began to detect discrepancies be- and used their position to deliberately alter the results. tween the provisional figures and what their poll Was the fraud significant enough to alter the results? watches reported, Ortega urged the CSE to use the offi- Clearly it was enough to hand victories to the Liberal cial tally sheets rather than the provisional figures. But Alliance in races for mayor of Managua and Matagalpa the CSE continued to release provisional figures and the as well as some National Assembly seats. It also may have right wing proclaimed quick victory. been enough to give Aleman a victory on the first round Yet the provisional figures were obviously wrong. (a candidate had to win more than 45% of the vote on the For example, one polling place in Jinotega reported that first round to avoid a runoff). the Liberal Alliance received 1,085 votes. The electoral The FSLN newspaper, Barricada, has accused the law states that no more than 400 can vote at any polling Costa Rican-based Centre of Advice and Electoral Pro- place. When the provisional figure was compared with motion, funded by the United States International the vote tally, there were 233 valid votes cast! According Development Agency of having played a key role in to a November 4 FSLN statement, 853 provisional "tele- advising certain officials of the CSE and the Liberal grams" were altered in this way. Alliance on ways to obtain desired election results. Once a number of political parties documented the fraud, other cases were discovered. The most outrageous Why Did Aleman Steal the Elections? violations include: At the beginning of the 1996 electoral campaign 32 • 28,300 ballots were found in a warehouse owned political parties, some grouped into coalitions, registered by the children of the president of the Matagalpa Elec- presidential candidates. By August nine had withdrawn toral Council and a Liberal Alliance activist. or been declared ineligible. (The CSE ruled Antonio • Six boxes filled with ballots were discovered in the Lacayo off the ballot on the basis of a constitutional Managua home of a member of the Liberal Alliance. article barring relatives of the incumbent president from Poll watchers for eight parties, including the FSLN, running, while Eden Pastora and Alvaro Robelo were submitted a request to annul the elections in Matagalpa, barred because both had given up their Nicaraguan reporting that there were no final tallies for 132 polling citizenship at one time.) No "center" force coagulated to places, 314 tallies were written in pencil and showed compete with Aleman and Ortega. signs of erasure, 137 tallies showed a larger number of More importantly, by August opinion polls revealed votes than registered voters, 593 tallies had altered data, that Ortega's FSLN ticket was gaining while Aleman's 88 polling places were not in authorized locations and support was stagnating. CID-Gallup poll's June survey 280 polling places were not legally constituted. Seventy- pinpointed Ortega's support at 26%, but by early August two percent of the departmental polling places registered it had risen to 30%. By the end of August Aleman and some irregularity. Ortega were running neck-and-neck. in Managua, tor A report submitted by the majority of the Managua example, the difference between Ortega (33.8%) and Departmental Electoral Council described the election as Aleman (34.4%) was 0.6%. Carlos Denton, a director of "chaotic," and outlined a wide variety of irregularities. It CID-Gallup, commented that "the pro-FSLN vote is

AGAINST THE CURRENT • 27 highest among people who feel that they are in a worse • The visceral anti-Sandinista forces who want to economic situation now than in the past." wipe out all vestiges of the revolution—from its land Surveys carried out by the Institute for Nicaraguan reform, organizations, institutions and laws to names, Studies and Borge and Associates—the latter commis- people, dates, murals. sioned by Aleman—revealed the same dynamic. Political • Thesmall and medium rural and urban producers, analysts attributed the change to Arnoldo Aleman's "bel- middle-class merchants, technicians and professionals ligerent, violent campaign speeches, which contrast with who have become poorer over the last six years. They the positive image Daniel Ortega has projected." have been sidelined by the Chamorro-Lacayo economic After predicting for months that he would "sweep" policies and their cronyism and corruption. the elections in the first round, winning the majority of • The marginalized urban and rural poor who see the National Assembly seats as well as those of the mu- Aleman as someone who gets things done, who guaran- nicipal governments, Aleman, on September 25, spoke for tees heavy-handed law and order, who is hard-working the first time of having to compete in a second round. He and always out there hustling. His crudeness works in threatened the CSE with massive demonstrations if de- his favor: he seems to represent the polar extreme from lays in issuing voter cards continued and demanded that the neoliberal technocrats. all "democratic" parties withdraw their candidates and Ot these three elements, the anti-Sandinista com- give him their votes. ponent is the strongest, and therefore can work to un- I would suggest that as the polls revealed Aleman's dermine his appeal to the others. The big capital that majority beginning to fall, he felt it was necessary to win bankrolled the Liberal Alliance campaign reinforces this in the first round by whatever means. If Aleman had not element: the Somocista and Cuban exiles living in Miami scored a first-round victory, he might have won on the along with some non-Somocista capitalists whose prop- second round—but given the dynamic FSLN campaign, erty was confiscated during the revolution. The best it would have been unpredictable. In addition, Aleman known and most representative figure of the latter is would have had to reopen negotiations within his al- Aleman's vice presidential mate, Enrique "Churruco" liance over how to divide ministerial appointments. Bolanos. While all of these elements are heavily anti-San- The extent to which the.U.S. government and mem- dinista, those who stayed in Nicaragua during the '80s bers of the CSE were involved in the fraud is not clear, have investments in the agricultural sector. The other, but it will be impossible to sweep the evidence under the larger force is speculative capital. Obviously in all this rug no matter what the CSE has declared. small producers are left out in the cold. In fact, although On August 13 several political analysts declared that Aleman has portrayed himself as an opponent of Cha- "Aleman lost the elections yesterday." Why did they come morro's economic policies, an Aleman government will to such a conclusion? On the afternoon of August 12 represent a continuity of neoliberal policies. every presidential candidate except Aleman signed a document entitled the "Commitment of Nicaragua to a The Problems the FSLN Faced Minimum National Agenda" in the presence of repre- The FSLN waged its election campaign as the under- sentatives from all four branches of state, including Vice dog of the two central presidential contenders. The key President Julia Mena. The document is an assessment of question they had to answer was: What will Washington the country's situation and sets general priorities and do if you win? No one wanted the resumption of a war, solutions for stimulating production, rebuilding the nor the tremendous inflation of a U.S. destabilization (in economy, expanding democracy and combatting corrup- the worst year, 30,000%). The FSLN attempted to neutral- tion. It represents a month's long discussion by over 150 ize Washington. This was not an easy task, particularly organizations (unions, producers' associations, religious with U.S. Senator Jesse Helms' demand that reversing and women's organizations, etc.) and attempts to press confiscations of any U.S. citizen's property remains top political leaders into drawing up their governmental priority. (These U.S. citizens are overwhelmingly plans within the context of this assessment. Nicaraguans who left the country after 1979. Aleman justified his conspicuous absence by saying A second question for the FSLN was: After six years "I already have my own agenda. I'm not a lamb that of ruthless neoliberalism and a government which pri- travels in a flock." "That's a Sandinista document since vatized much of the state property so that its small circle its creator is [former economic minister Alejandro] of relatives and friends could increase their wealth, what Martinez Cuenca, who destroyed this country's econ- is the FSLN proposal for restarting the economy? omy and should be brought to justice for it." And, lastly, Thirdly, the FSLN also had to incorporate its evalua- "no one should come dictating to any serious party what tion of its past errors into its 1996 election campaign, procedure it should follow in its government plan." projecting an attitude toward the ex-, the other Deprecating the minimum agenda, Aleman changed the political parties and the electorate. Central to their self- tone of his campaign, becoming, in the words of envio, evaluation had been acknowledging their "political in- "both more aggressive and more defensive. Aleman's tolerance" when they were the party in government. speeches have become a mix of challenging triumphalism That arrogance of power led them into a whole series of and desperate warnings not to trust Sandinismo." errors, most of which the FSLN has discussed since their electoral defeat in 1990. These include: The Liberal Alliance's Constituency • the forced relocations of those living in the areas Aleman's electoral base was composed of three of the war (the indigenous and the peasantry); separate, even contradictory, elements: • the ignoring of familial and religious ties—and

28 • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1997 corresponding loyalties—which in turn drove many in the FSLN candidates in the election were women. How- the areas of conflict into the contra camp; ever the percentage elected is lower, but higher than for • the failure to legalize the , thus en- any other political party.) dangering this significant reform; The Sandinista Assembly had stipulated that the • the tendency to favor cooperatives over other vice-presidential slot was to be reserved for an alliance forms of land tenure, without taking into account the with a political sector outside the party. (One of the genuine desires of the peasantry; obvious candidates for an alliance was the MRS, which • the cavalier and inconsistent attitude taken split from the FSLN two years ago. Yet the MRS remained toward the democratic rights of one's opponents; uninterested in the FSLN overtures.) When Juan Manuel • the chauvinism of party members, who—for the Caldera accepted the slot, it was quite a surprise. Caldera most part—did not understand the experiences of the is a large-scale cattle rancher whose land was confiscated Atlantic Coast; in the '80s. Caldera has long been a member of the High • the continuation of the military draft; Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP), a group of big • the continual sacrifices demanded of the poor by businessmen who opposed the Sandinista government. the FSLN government, while granting significant con- Caldera explained to reporters that he accepted the cessions to the wealthy; FSLN vice-presidential slot because "we believe that if • the failure of the FSLN to investigate and take we can get this country to start producing again, we can action against those FSLN officials who appropriated save it," and stated that the Aleman forces "don't believe state property before leaving office in 1990, thus staining in production." In an agreement signed before register- the moral integrity of the party; ing their candidacies, Ortega and Caldera outlined their • the party's structural lack of internal democracy, plan to reactivate production, provide more jobs and which facilitated its inability to evaluate its problems and improve living standards for all. overcome them. The FSLN's fifteen-point program outlined how to This list is a harsh critique, but all these points have rebuild the economy "with ." It also empha- been raised and debated within the Sandinista Front, sized prioritizing health, education, housing and elec- though not necessarily resolved. While the FSLN gov- trification to rural communities and urban squatter ernment did—by the mid-1980s—help the Atlantic Coast neighborhoods. The platform represents a radical, pro- people develop their autonomy, nonetheless the FSLN ducer-centered alternative to the neoliberal agenda that had to dig itself out from its initial mistakes. has been implemented under Chamorro. Of course as U.S. solidarity activists, we understand The platform recognizes the particular need for the central role Washington played in funding the contra women's rights, labor rights and the continued develop- war and destabilizing the Sandinista government. We ment of autonomy for the Caribbean coast communities. can also sympathize with a party of 600 suddenly faced The FSLN promised to legalize all urban and rural prop- with leading a country. The FSLN carried out an impres- erties legitimately redistributed during the '80s with sive literacy campaign, organized the country's health compensation and no further confiscations. The plat- care, begun an extensive land reform and attempted to form advocates pan-Americanism and demands that build a just and equitable society. be included in continental affairs. (The full pro- Given Washington's determnation to eliminate the gram, in English and Spanish, is available at the FSLN's Sandinistas, any error by the FSLN was magnified. Yet Internet site:http://spin.com.mx./[tilde mark]hvelarde/ under the circumstance, there was no room for error. nicaraua/fsln/) During the course of the '96 campaign Daniel Or- Throughout the campaign the FSLN candidates saw tega, as the FSLN's presidential candidate, admitted the the need to reach out beyond its activist base. It sought party's past arrogance and asked for people's forgive- to do that by actively seeking unity with other political ness. The Sandinista Front built a platform that at- forces, particularly in posing an economic model focused tempted to answer today's problems, where social fund- on production. That was the basis of the FSLN signing ing has been cut to the bone, 60% of the population is onto the minimum agenda August 12. On August 28 the unemployed and a significant section of agricultural pro- FSLN signed an agreement with representatives of ducers cannot obtain credit. youth organizations (to create 50,000 productive jobs for youth, to establish a 25% quota for hiring young people The FSLN Builds Alliances in municipal and national government structures, to Over the summer sixty women formed the National have young people head vice ministries of education, Women's Coalition, an organization comprising women social action, environment and the Institute of Culture candidates from various parties and members of and Women, no reinstitution of a draft). women's groups. They put together The Women's Mini- Perhaps most importantly of all, on September 18 the mum Agenda, a document listing their common goals FSLN signed an agreement with former contra leaders and demands. Their objective was to discuss the agenda "El Indio" and "Mack," in front of almost 5,000 former with the leaders of all the political parties and have it contras, who then added their individual signatures. incorporated into governmental programs. In addition, While Arnoldo Aleman's forces attempted to play down the initiative became a reference point for other women's this alliance, MRS's Sergio Ramirez denounced the FSLN groups, as they drew up similar agendas for their own tor including "Mack," who was noted for his particularly municipality. This pattern of building alliances was to brutal killing of FSLN soldiers and supporters. But the become a hallmark ot the FSLN strategy. (About 30% of point is that you don't need to make pacts with your

AGAINST THE CURRENT • 29 friends, only former enemies. tionary practice. For this reason I am hopeful that the Ever since 1990 the National Union of Farmers and organizing currently taking place inside the FSLN will be Ranchers (URNG) has been working for reconciliation able to investigate and resolve "the pinata." Of course with former contras on the basis that both contras and the right wing paints with a broad brush all property small and medium-sized farmers who supported the San- issues handled after the 1990 election whereas solidarity dinistas share the same basic problems, and have a basis activists defend them, isolating out only the appropria- for unity. The September 18th pact, therefore, lays the tion of property by government officials for their per- basis for overcoming the legacy of the contra war. sonal use. While this represents a handful of cases, they The September 18th agreement formulates a plan to are important to investigate. The tact that it happened at disband existing armed groups, pledges to honor the all enabled the right to charge the Sandinistas with the 1990 agreements that the Chamorro government never corruption and paved the way for the Chamorro regime carried out and projects stable property ownership by to do the same on a grand scale. The FSLN's moral issuing land titles and "access to credit under conditions authority is at stake—will it be swept under the rug or that permit the recipients' active incorporation into can the Sandinistas discipline their own? production. Landowners whose properties were unjust- 4. The fight to defend the gains of the Sandinista revolu- ly confiscated will be appropriately compensated." Had tion—particularly legalizing the land reform—will continue, the FSLN won, this section of the Nicaraguan Resistance, even with the election of Aleman. The Sandinista land re- in supporting the FSLN slate, would have received three form is still in place, although the neoliberal economic ministries (Ministries of Government, of Agrarian Re- model does not allow the small- and medium-sized form, of Natural Resources and the Environment) and producers access to credit. That was a major problem "ample participation in all governmental institutions under the Chamorro government and will not be ade- and autonomous organizations at all levels (national, quately addressed by Aleman. regional and departmental), as guarantors and propon- Insofar as the poor voted for Aleman, he represented ents of the country's economic development." for them the possibility of returning to a time "when It was the building of this triple alliance—the FSLN, there was plenty of work and even if you only had four the agricultural producers and the former contras—that cordobas, it was still worth the same when you woke up established the FSLN as a dynamic political force in the the next morning . . . ." But Aleman's financial backers 1996 elections. Their closing electoral rally brought out have a very different agenda. Aleman's first ministerial 300,000 people—far more than anticipated. appointments and his quick trip to Miami following the October 20th election confirm the suspicion that the AL Conclusion is dominated by the far right and its speculative capital. I draw five conclusions from the election period: However, Aleman is a successful politician because 7. The widespread accusations of fraud, documented by he projected a populist image. He will attempt to reduce official reports and a number of the country's political parties, unemployment and legalize the land reform—the latter were not seriously reviewed and resolved by the CSE. This if only in order to clear the title so that the peasants will damages the reputation of the CSE, which, until recently, sell, since they will not have access to credit. At the same was unblemished. It is thus a big blow to representative time, Aleman will attempt to further weaken the institu- democracy in Nicaragua. tions that still remain in place from the revolutionary 2. The FSLN's role in challenging the elections reinforces period. The two that the Chamorro regime have success- their image as a party that is for democratic rights. The 1996 fully attacked and altered—the education ministry and elections contrast unfavorably with the fully transparent the police—will be reinforced with Aleman's people. one they held in 1990. 5.Ttie Clinton administration carries out interventionist Today the FSLN is the main opposition political policies in Nicaragua. These strengthen the right-wing force in the country. In contrast to 1990, when the FSLN forces and attempt to block the FSLN and the popular was totally unprepared to lose, the Sandinistas have movement. As the opinion polls charted the FSLN's gone through a split and a process of political re-evalua- growing strength, Washington revealed its opposition to tion and reorientation. They are prepared to be an op- a FSLN victory. Nicholas Burns, spokesperson for the position party that defends the interests of the vast ma- U.S. State Department, stated at a press briefing October jority and have developed an economic program to coun- 4 that Daniel Ortega was not a democrat and "consider- ter the neoliberal model Aleman will support. ing his actions against the United States in the past, I Following the CSE proclamation of Aleman as presi- think we need to remember that." The remarks were well dent elect, Daniel Ortega explained in a TV interview publicized by the conservative Managua daily, . that the FSLN recognizes the "legality" of the elections Ultimately it may be that the explicit remarks Burns but not their "legitimacy." made played a greater role in stopping the FSLN band- Ortega has outlined a series of fourteen points that wagon than the actual fraud. These remarks—along with could provide the basis for the country's genuine recon- the endorsement Cardinal Obrando y Bravo handed ciliation. These are based on the minimum agenda. In Aleman on October 17, after the campaign period had addition, Ortega called tor the CSE magistrates to resign been officially closed—undoubtedly provided Aleman in the face of incompetence and fraud. with more votes. What is essential for the U.S. solidarity 3. What is impressive to me as a sympathetic observer of movement to understand is that Washington remains the the Nicaraguan revolution is that the FSLN learned from their implacable enemy of all who attempt to throw off the errors and then reinvigorated their understanding of revolu- yoke of the neoliberal order.

30 • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1997