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The 1996 Nicaraguan Elections

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The 1996 Nicaraguan Elections The 1996 Nicaraguan Elections: How Arnoldo Alemdn "Won" by Dianne Feeley Nicaraguans elected to the Central America Parliament, 9 SYMPATHIZERS OF THE Nicaraguan revolution were are from the Liberal Alliance,8 divided in their opinions about the politics of the 1996 from the FSLN, and one each election campaign. Did Daniel Ortega's campaign for from the \icaraguan Chris- presidency represent a creative response to the extremely tian Way Party and Conserva- difficult situation the Nicaraguan people face after six tive Party. years of neoliberalism or did the Sandinista Front (FSLN) abandon the revolutionary project in favor of a glitzy, Organizing the Election personalistic and pro-capitalism one? Outside the con- As defined by the 1987 text of a real discussion of what actually happened dur- Constitution, the CSE is ac- ing the campaign and on the day of the October 2()th tually a fourth branch of election—all of which has been grossly underreported— government, sharing an inde- this is a sterile debate. pendent and equal status with On November 22nd, more than a month after the the judicial, legislative and ex- Nicaraguan elections, Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) ecutive branches. Until now President Rosa Marina Zelaya announced after "exten- the CSE has enjoyed a reputa- sive review and investigation" of charges of fraud that tion as the one branch most the October 20 elections were "perfectly valid, clean and free of partisan politics and legitimate." She acknowledged minor fraud but said it unblemished by scandals. In February 1996 Mariano was confined to a few precincts and a few individuals. Cardinal Obando y Bravo (right) supporter The CSE thus rejected- the demand of the FSLN that Fiallos resigned as president the election be annulled in Managua as well as a second of the CSE, stating that he could not guarantee clean challenge by ten parties (including the FSLN) that the elections. He felt that the new election law opened the election in Matagalpa be invalidated. Zelaya stated that door to partisan influence (with political parties nomi- the major problem was not fraud but differing interpreta- nating officials for the various Departmental Electoral tions of the electoral law. The CSE then proclaimed Ar- Councils). He was also concerned about the inadequate noldo Aleman, the candidate of the right-wing Liberal funding and governmental attention given the difficult Alliance (AL), president elect (with 51% of the vote to process of voter registration. Daniel Ortega's 38%). He will take office on January 10. In addition to the lack of funding, there was actually Of the 93 members elected to the National Assembly, very little time to organize the election process (registra- 42 were elected on the Liberal Alliance ticket and 36 are tion of voters, issuing new voter identification cards, Sandinista Front candidates. Nine other parties/coali- registration of candidates and electoral coalitions, or- tions have the other 15 seats, including 4 for the Nica- ganizing and staffing polling stations). For example, the raguan Christian Way Party, 3 for the Conservative Party, CSE based its estimates for ID cards and polling stations 2 for the National Project, and one each for the Liberal on the most recent census—which, as it turns out, vastly Independent Party, National Conservative Alliance, undercounted the population. At every stage in the elec- Nicaraguan Resistance Party, Sandinista Renovation tion process the CSE was faced with obstacles. Movement, Unity Alliance and UNO '96 Alliance. Since But since Fiallos' replacement by Zelaya, the CSE the election, however, two National Assembly members has come under suspicion: elected on the AL ticket (an alliance of three right-wing • Presidencies of the departmental regions seemed parties) have resigned from the AL. Members of the to be unjustly awarded. Last August the FSLN protested National Liberal Party, they accuse Aleman of unilateral that the Liberal Alliance ended up with being awarded decision-making. the lion's share. The AL was appointed Departmental Additionally, 91 of the municipalities elected AL Electoral Council presidencies in Managua, Jinotega and governments while 52 elected the FSLN. The AL heads Matagalpa—where 42% of the population lives—while the government in ten departmental capitals, including the FSLN was awarded presidencies in regions repre- Managua and Matagalpa, while the FSLN won in six: senting only 14% of the population. Carazo (Jinotepe), Esteli, Leon, Madirz (Somoto), Nueva • The company that submitted the highest bid re- Segovia (Ocotal) and RAAN (Puerto Cabezas). Of the 19 ceived by the CSE to print the ballots was given the job. (The rumor is that Zelaya's husband owned stock in that Dianne Feeley if a member of the ATC editorial board. She company.) spent a month in Nicaragua on a tree-planting brigade just • In the October 20 election the Sandinista Renova- before the 1984 elections. She would like to acknowledge the tion Movement (MRS) won one seat in the National fo'llmving sources: Barricada Internacional, envio, Green Assembly from Carazo. However, in its November 22nd Left Weekly and the Nicaragua Monitor, published by the statement on the elections, the CSE claimed an irregular- Nicaragua Network Education Fund. ity in that race—without providing any evidence—and 26 • JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1997 took the seat from the winner, Adolfo Arguello, and reported that the results from over 200 electoral booths, without explaining why, assigned it to Jorge Samper, representing more than 50,(XK) votes, disappeared, MRS member and Zelaya's husband. Arguello charged pointed out that thousands of tally sheets were lost or that Zelaya worked out a deal with Aleman. calculated incorrectly, and documented that the security • Most importantly, the system that the CSE set up codes and verification signatures on ballot papers were in order to be free of any fraud not identical to those on the tally sheets for the same was contaminated. polling booth. The FSLN calculated that 84% of the After the polls were Managua polling stations had "grave irregularities." closed and before proceeding The Sandinista Assembly pointed out that the great- to the count, officials in each est number of irregularies occurred in those departments polling station were to recon- where the Liberal Alliance was in charge: Managua, cile the unused and used bal- Matagalpa and Jinotega. In both Matagalpa and Jinotega lot papers. Each step was to be armed bands had campaigned in favor of the Liberal documented. When the final Alliance while preventing other parties from campaign- figures were ready, the figures ing. At least seven members of the FSLN were brutally were to be sent to the local killed in these regions during the fall election period. CSE by telegram, phone or fax Responding to the Sandinista Front's call, 30,000 pro- so that the overall results tested the electoral fraud at the tomb of Carlos Fonseca, could be compiled. The orig- founder of the FSLN, on November 8, the 20th anniver- inal documents were then to sary of Fonseca's murder. be taken to the local CSE for While on October 20 many polling stations did not verification. (The CSE had open on time—either because the election materials had instructed international ob- not been delivered or because CSE officials had not servers not to remain at the arrived—people patiently waited for hours. So despite polling stations for the count- problems, the voting process proceeded smoothly (80% Amoldo Alemdn (left). ing of the votes or the delivery voted). The main problem was that Liberal Alliance mem- of the tallies to the departmental CSE offices.) bers were in charge of the most populated polling places, When the FSLN began to detect discrepancies be- and used their position to deliberately alter the results. tween the provisional figures and what their poll Was the fraud significant enough to alter the results? watches reported, Ortega urged the CSE to use the offi- Clearly it was enough to hand victories to the Liberal cial tally sheets rather than the provisional figures. But Alliance in races for mayor of Managua and Matagalpa the CSE continued to release provisional figures and the as well as some National Assembly seats. It also may have right wing proclaimed quick victory. been enough to give Aleman a victory on the first round Yet the provisional figures were obviously wrong. (a candidate had to win more than 45% of the vote on the For example, one polling place in Jinotega reported that first round to avoid a runoff). the Liberal Alliance received 1,085 votes. The electoral The FSLN newspaper, Barricada, has accused the law states that no more than 400 can vote at any polling Costa Rican-based Centre of Advice and Electoral Pro- place. When the provisional figure was compared with motion, funded by the United States International the vote tally, there were 233 valid votes cast! According Development Agency of having played a key role in to a November 4 FSLN statement, 853 provisional "tele- advising certain officials of the CSE and the Liberal grams" were altered in this way. Alliance on ways to obtain desired election results. Once a number of political parties documented the fraud, other cases were discovered. The most outrageous Why Did Aleman Steal the Elections? violations include: At the beginning of the 1996 electoral campaign 32 • 28,300 ballots were found in a warehouse owned political parties, some grouped into coalitions, registered by the children of the president of the Matagalpa Elec- presidential candidates. By August nine had withdrawn toral Council and a Liberal Alliance activist. or been declared ineligible. (The CSE ruled Antonio • Six boxes filled with ballots were discovered in the Lacayo off the ballot on the basis of a constitutional Managua home of a member of the Liberal Alliance.
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