DOCSLIB.ORG

Strategic Panorama 2018

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Strategic Panorama 2018 Strategic Panorama Spanish Institute for 2018 Strategic Studies MINISTRY OF DEFENSE Strategic Panorama Spanish Institute for 2018 Strategic Studies March 2018 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SPANISH OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS CATALOGUE http://publicacionesoficiales.boe.es/ Publishes: SECRETARÍA GENERAL TÉCNICA https://publicaciones.defensa.gob.es/ © Authors and Publisher, 2018 NIPO: 083-17-128-X (print on demand) NIPO: 083-17-127-4 (e-book edition) Publication date: october 2018 The ideas expressed in this book are the resonsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the IEEE, which sponsors its publication. The exploitation righits of this work are protected by the Spanish Intellectual Property Act. No parts of this publication may be produced, stored or transmitted in any way nor by any means, electronic, mechanical or print, including photocopies or any other means without prior, express, written consent of the © copyright holders. INDEX Page Foreword ................................................................................................................................. 9 The international Strategic Panorama 2018 ........................................................................ 9 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 13 Trump’s first year .................................................................................................................... 13 More questions than answers ............................................................................................... 17 Security, democracy and human rights ............................................................................... 19 Europe’s optimism ................................................................................................................... 24 The November verdict ............................................................................................................. 27 Promises and realities ............................................................................................................ 28 What historians think .............................................................................................................. 31 The best and the worst .......................................................................................................... 33 2017 ............................................................................................................................................ 35 Challenges in 2018 .................................................................................................................. 37 Risks and threats ..................................................................................................................... 40 Strategic Panorama 2018 ....................................................................................................... 45 The EU after the Global Strategy and the future of the CSDP......................................... 46 The Middle East after the caliphate .................................................................................... 48 The Maghreb: challenges for a region with low integration ........................................... 49 Asia-Pacific: significant elections and perpetual conflicts ............................................. 51 América Latina, at a critical juncture ................................................................................... 52 Chapter one The EU after the Global Strategy. The future of the CSDP .................................. 55 Introduction: towards a stronger and safer European Union ........................................ 57 Evolution of strategic thinking in the Union. From the Solana strategy to the Global Strategy ............................................................................................................................. 60 Catalysts of the evolution of the CSDP ................................................................................ 62 5 Page The Union’s response ............................................................................................................. 66 CSDP operations and missions ........................................................................................ 66 The Lisbon Treaty and the Global Strategy Implementation Plan ...................................... 69 Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) ...................................................................... 73 The Commission’s Action Plan .............................................................................................. 76 Command and control capability .......................................................................................... 78 Funding of CSDP military operations and missions ........................................................ 81 The EU’s intelligence structures ........................................................................................... 83 The Union’s Rapid Response ................................................................................................. 84 NATO-EU relations ............................................................................................................. 86 The future, by way of conclusion ......................................................................................... 87 The near future (until the consolidation of Brexit) ............................................................ 89 The more distant future .......................................................................................................... 91 Chapter two The Middle East after the caliphate ............................................................................. 93 From Mediterranean to MENA ............................................................................................... 95 The Arab Springs and their derivatives .............................................................................. 97 Syria, a regional disaster ...................................................................................................... 101 The ultimate root of the problem: Jerusalem .................................................................... 104 Regional escalation, global risk ............................................................................................ 109 European derivatives 1: the issue of refugees, European governments and the Eu- ropean Union .................................................................................................................... 114 European derivatives 2: the question of jihadi terrorism ............................................... 115 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 120 Chapter three Latin America at a critical juncture .............................................................................. 123 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 125 Politics and elections ................................................................................................................... 126 The electoral cycle 2017/2019 .............................................................................................. 126 A few notable precedents. The elections in Argentina, Peru and Ecuador ................. 131 The late 2017 elections ..................................................................................................... 134 Elections in 2018 and 2019 .............................................................................................. 135 Could the potential political changes mean the end of populism? ........................ 137 Different manifestations of violence .................................................................................... 138 The end of the Colombian conflict .................................................................................. 140 Economic trends and governance ....................................................................................... 141 The presence of Latin America in the world .................................................................. 143 Latin America on the international stage ........................................................................... 145 Current state of the hegemonic projects and regional leaderships .......................... 146 Regional integration. Sub-regional alliances and blocs ............................................... 147 The presence of significant extra-regional actors: the US, China and Russia ............ 150 Latin America and the EU. Spain’s role ........................................................................... 153 By way of conclusion: future prospects .............................................................................. 155 6 Page Chapter four Asia-Pacific: a year of significant elections and perpetual conflicts ............ 157 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 159 A year of significant elections .............................................................................................. 163 Hong Kong: between continuity and democracy ............................................................ 164 South Korea buries its recent past .................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ortega for President: the Religious Rebirth of Sandinismo in Nicaragua
    European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 89, October 2010 | 47-63 Ortega for President: The Religious Rebirth of Sandinismo in Nicaragua Henri Gooren Abstract: This article analyses various connections between Daniel Ortega’s surprising victory in the presidential elections of 5 November 2006, his control of the Frente Sandinista de la Liberación Nacio- nal (FSLN) party, and the changing religious context in Nicaragua, where Pentecostal churches now claim almost one quarter of the population. To achieve this, I draw from my fieldwork in Nicaragua in 2005 and 2006, which analysed competition for members between various religious groups in Managua: charismatic Catholics, the Assemblies of God, the neo-Pentecostal mega-church Hosanna, and the Mormon Church. How did Ortega manage to win the votes from so many religious people (evangelical Protestants and Roman Catholics alike)? And how does this case compare to similar cases of populist leaders in Latin America courting evangelicals, like Chávez in Venezuela and earlier Fujimori in Peru? Keywords: Nicaragua, religion, elections, FSLN, Daniel Ortega. Populist leadership and evangelical support in Latin America At first look, the case of Ortega’s surprise election victory seems to fit an estab- lished pattern in Latin America: the populist leader who comes to power in part by courting – and winning – the evangelical vote. Alberto Fujimori in Peru was the first to achieve this in the early 1990s, followed by Venezuelan lieutenant-colonel Hugo Chávez in the late 1990s and more recently Rafael Correa in Ecuador (Op- penheimer 2006). These three populist leaders came to power thanks to the break- down of an old party system, which gradually became stagnant and corrupted.
    [Show full text]
  • The Carter Center News Spring 1990
    THE CARTER CENTER NEWS SPRING 1990 Carter, Council Monitor Nicaraguan Elections Peaceful Transition of Power First in Country's History On April 25, the Nicaraguan people inaugurated a new president in the first peaceful transfer of power to an elected opposition in the country's history. of Nicaragua chose their new president in a free and fair election," said President Carter, who led an international delegation to monitor the February 25 elections. The delegation was formed under the auspices of the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government, chaired by President Carter and based at The Carter Center of Emory University (CCEU). The Council joined delegations from the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) in monitoring the elections. Following the transfer of power from the Sandinista (FSLN) government of Daniel Ortega to the coalition government (UNO) of Violeta Chamorro, President Carter said, "Both Daniel Ortega and Violeta Chamorro deserve the world's respect and admiration for the way they handled the transition. Former President Ortega has set his country on the road to democracy. President Chamorro has been entrusted by the people of Nicaragua with the difficult task of healing the division in that nation and nurturing the newly-born democratic spirit. It is my sincerest hope that peace and democracy will flourish in Nicaragua." The Invitation In the summer of 1989, President Carter and the Council were invited to observe the elections by thenPresident Daniel Ortega, the Union of National Opposition (UNO), and the Supreme Electoral Council. The Nicaraguan election project was directed by Robert Pastor and Jennie Lincoln, director and associate director respectively of CCEU's Latin American and Caribbean Studies program.
    [Show full text]
  • Rapport De Synthèse Sur Le Pluralisme
    Royaume du Maroc Rapport Semestriel sur le Pluralisme dans les Médias Audiovisuels (Magazines d’information) Du 1er Janvier au 30 Juin 2010 Sommaire Préface 004 I – Règles de référence 006 1- Médias audiovisuels objet du contrôle 007 2- Modalités de relevé dans les médias audiovisuels à programmation nationale 007 3- Modalités de relevé dans les médias audiovisuels à programmation régionale et locale 008 II – Présentation des résultats globaux 010 Graphes globaux des Quatre Parts sur les médias audiovisuels suivis 011 III – Observations générales 015 IV – Résultats par catégorie de médias 020 1 - Médias audiovisuels publics 021 . TV Al Oula 021 . TV 2M 033 . TV Tamazight 029 . TV Laâyoune 039 . Radio Nationale 044 . Radio Amazighe 050 . Radio Chaîne Inter 056 Observations relatives aux médias audiovisuels publics 066 2 - Médias audiovisuels privés à programmation nationale 068 . Radio Aswat 069 . Radio Med 075 . Radio Chada FM 081 . Radio Atlantic 087 . Radio Luxe 093 Observations relatives aux médias audiovisuels privés à programmation 103 nationale 3 - Médias audiovisuels privés à programmation régionale 105 . Radio Casa FM (programmes nationaux) 106 . Radio Casa FM (programmes régionaux) 112 . Radio MFM Atlas (programmes régionaux) 119 2 . Radio MFM Saïss (programmes régionaux) 121 . Radio MFM Souss (programmes régionaux) 126 . Cap Radio 131 Observations sur les médias audiovisuels privés régionaux 137 4 - Médias audiovisuels privés à programmation locale 139 . Radio Plus Agadir 140 . Radio Plus Marrakech 146 Observations sur les médias audiovisuels privés locaux 151 V – Annexes, Sommaire & Tableaux 153 3 Préface En vertu du Dahir l’ayant instituée, et du fait de l’évolution accélérée du secteur audiovisuel, la Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HACA) a été appelée à mettre en place un cadre normatif précis pour la gestion du pluralisme politique dans les médias audiovisuels afin de mieux garantir la liberté d’expression des organisations politiques, syndicales, professionnelles et associatives.
    [Show full text]
  • The November 2011 Elections in Nicaragua: a Study Mission Report of the Carter Center
    The November 2011 Elections in Nicaragua Study Mission Report Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope. The November 2011 Elections in Nicaragua: A Study Mission Report of the Carter Center THE NOVEMBER 2011 ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA: A STUDY MISSION REPORT OF THE CARTER CENTER OVERVIEW On November 6, 2011 Nicaragua held general elections for president and vice president, national and departmental deputies to the National Assembly, and members of the Central American Parliament. Fraudulent local elections in 2008, a questionable Supreme Court decision in October 2009 to permit the candidacy of incumbent President Daniel Ortega, and a presidential decree in January 2010 extending the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) magistrates in office after their terms expired provided the context for a deeply flawed election process. Partisan election preparations were followed by a non-transparent election day and count. The conditions for international and domestic election observation, and for party oversight, were insufficient to permit verification of compliance with election procedures and Nicaraguan electoral law, and numerous anomalies cast doubt on the quality of the process and honesty of the vote count. The most important opposition party rejected the election as fraudulent but took its seats in the legislature. Nicaragua’s Supreme Electoral Council dismissed opposition complaints and announced that President Daniel Ortega had been re-elected to a third term. In addition, the official results showed that Ortega’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) party had won enough legislative seats both to reform articles of the constitution (requires a 60% majority) and to call a constituent assembly to write a new constitution (requires 66%).
    [Show full text]
  • Spotlight on Nicaragua
    February 16, 2021 CLOSING OF POLITICAL AND CIVIC SPACES: SPOTLIGHT ON NICARAGUA TABLE OF CONTENTS February 16 Agenda ................................................................................................................ 2 Part I: Nicaraguan Spring: The Rise & Repression of a Protest Movement ............. 5 State-Sponsored Violence & the Closing of Political Space Part II: How Did We Get Here? Background on the Current Political Landscape ... 7 State-Sponsored Violence & the Closing of Political Space El Pacto: Leftist on Paper but Not in Practice Questionable Reelections Reforms Favor Authoritarianism An Economy in Ruins Impacts of COVID-19 and Hurricanes Eta & Iota The 2021 Election Part III: Recent Laws Limiting Civic Space .......................................................................... 15 Law of Regulation of Foreign Agents Special Law of Cybercrimes Law of Life Sentence Law of Defense of the Rights of the People to Independence, Sovereignty, Self-determination for the Peace Penal Code Reform A Diverse and Divided Opposition Civic Alliance for Justice & Democracy White & Blue Unity Great National Coalition Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights U.S. Policy and the Biden Administration’s Challenges Speaker Biographies ................................................................................................................ 24 1 February 16, 2021 AGENDA AGENDA Welcome & Introduction Introduction to Topics for Meeting Understanding the Current Context of Nicaragua • Current Political
    [Show full text]
  • Reputación Y Resultados
    CHALLENGE: CITIZENSHIP Non venal edition Creative Commons License (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) Developing Ideas from LLORENTE & CUENCA, January, 2018 Lagasca, 88 - 3rd floor 28001 Madrid (Spain) Edition: Anatomía de Red Design: Joaquín Gallego Content INTRODUCTION A challenged and anxious society José Antonio Zarzalejos 13 CHALLENGE: CITIZENSHIP The Ethical Challenge of the New Citizenship José Antonio Llorente 19 GLOBAL CITIES Latin America challenged by smart cities Javier Rosado & Raimundo Diaz 25 Citizen Engagement versus Tourism-phobia: The Role of Citizens in a Country’s Brand Juan Arteaga & Anel Hernandez, 31 Mexico City: Keys and Challenges to Building a Smart City for Citizens Alejandro Romero & Arie Ellstein 45 Improving ourselves as citizens Daniel Silberfaden 53 The Major Challenges Facing Cities Jordi Serra del Pino 57 TERRITORIES AND COMMUNITIES The dawn of the phygital consumer David G. Natal & Julio Alonso 63 Inbound Marketing: User-based Communications Iván Pino & Diego Romero 71 Grassroots: The Power of Organized Communities Joan Navarro & Laura Martínez 77 Liquid Democracy and Exponential Technology for Transforming the World Ana Lorenzo 83 PUBLIC AFFAIRS The Doria Effect: The Impact of Communication on the Management of a City Juan Carlos Gozzer & Thyago Mathias 91 Latin America’s New Wave of Populism—a Movement More Alive Than Ever Before Luisa García & Claudio Vallejo 101 The Impossible Politics of Walls José Antonio Zarzalejos 127 Does Every Trump Have a Silver Lining? Cecilia Soto 133 REPUTATION & SUSTAINABILITY The case of
    [Show full text]
  • Chávez, Daniel. Nicaragua and the Politics of Utopia. Development and Culture in the Modern State. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2015
    Chávez, Daniel. Nicaragua and the Politics of Utopia. Development and Culture in the Modern State. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2015. Print. 363 pp. ________________________________________________ JOSÉ MARÍA MANTERO XAVIER UNIVERSITY The recent work Nicaragua and the Politics of Utopia. Development and Culture in the Modern State by Daniel Chávez offers a timely study of recent Nicaraguan history and the distinct cultural and political manifestations of national utopian projects. As ambitious, grounded, and well-documented as the study is, the work would have benefited from a more Central and Latin American contextualization of utopia, the central theme and theory of the analysis. Essays and poems by Simón Bolívar, José Martí, Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Enrique Rodó, José Carlos Mariátegui, and works such as La raza cósmica (1925) by José Vasconcelos and the poem “Salutación del optimista” from Cantos de vida y esperanza (1905) by Rubén Darío, for example, call for a defense of Latin American identity and for the construction of an America where no one nation was subjugated by another and the influence of the United States in national and international affairs was offset by the strength of a continental consciousness. In all, Nicaragua and the Politics of Utopia. Development and Culture in the Modern State is a valuable contribution to the field of Nicaraguan and Latin American studies that combines the study of lesser-known documents (the inauguration speeches of the Anastasio Somoza García and Violeta Chamorro, for example)
    [Show full text]
  • Nicaragua: Revolution and Restoration
    THE NEW GEOPOLITICS NOVEMBER 2018 LATIN AMERICA NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION RICHARD E. FEINBERG NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION AND RESTORATION RICHARD E. FEINBERG EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since independence, Nicaragua has suffered periodic internecine warfare, deep distrust between contending factions dominated by powerful caudillos (strongmen), and interventions by foreign powers. While the United States was frequently a party to these conflicts, local Nicaraguan actors often outmaneuvered U.S. diplomats. At the end of the Cold War, internationally supervised elections yielded an interlude of relatively liberal democracy and alternation of power (1990-2006). To the consternation of the United States, Sandinista Party leader Daniel Ortega regained the presidency in 2007, and orchestrated a successful strategy of coalition-building with the organized private sector and the Catholic Church. Supported by the international financial institutions and the Venezuelan Chavista government, Nicaragua achieved strong economic performance with moderately inclusive growth. President Ortega used those economic resources to gradually capture or suppress—one by one—many of the nation’s political institutions, eroding institutional checks and balances. Ortega’s strategy of co-opting all centers of power extended to the military and national police. The restoration of traditional caudillo politics and the fusion of family-state-party-security forces were all too reminiscent of the Somoza family dynasty (1934-1979). Frustrated by Ortega’s narrowing of democratic
    [Show full text]
  • Nicaragua's President Ortega
    No. 2097 January 11, 2008 Nicaragua’s President Ortega: The Balancing Act After One Year James M. Roberts Marketing himself as a completely redesigned the vegetarian and carnivorous socialist camps. The 2007 model, with sleek new lines and reassuring former Comandante is walking a tightrope, appear- sound bites, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega per- ing to support capitalism and the U.S.–Central suaded 38 percent of Nicaraguan voters to elect him America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agree- president in November 2006 on his third try since ment (CAFTA–DR) and maintaining relations with leaving office in 1990. Ortega, now 62, assumed the the U.S. while seeking close relations with and cash presidency for the second time in January 2007. As from world troublemakers such as Iranian Presi- he approaches the first anniversary of his inaugura- dent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Chávez, and Colo- tion, however, many design flaws in the clunky nel Muammar Qadhafi of Libya. 1979 model Ortega are beginning to manifest them- What the U.S. Should Do. The U.S. should selves again. carefully monitor the situation in Nicaragua and Across South America, a number of countries are give Ortega every encouragement to continue down backsliding into a variety of long-discredited social- the path of democratic governance and neoliberal ist models. In some cases, countries are being ruled market reform. If he chooses to follow the Chavista by despotic hard-leftist and populist caudillos path instead, the U.S. should take every opportu- (strongmen). The leaders of this resurgent Latin left- nity to counter Ortega’s influence and steer Nicara- ist wave generally fall into two camps: “vegetarian” gua back onto the right track.
    [Show full text]
  • Nicaragua Building Ties with Iran
    Nicaragua Building Ties With Iran http://www.newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?page=http://www.... Reprinted from NewsMax.com Nicaragua Building Ties With Iran By Joachim Bamrud Wednesday, Aug. 15, 2007 Nicaragua's new left-wing president has begun building a strategic alliance with Iran, calling America a "terrorist nation." The president, Daniel Ortega, is no stranger to Americans. Back in the 1970s and 1980s he headed the Sandinista junta that ruled Nicaragua with the support of Castro's Cuba and the Soviet Union. Ortega and the Sandinistas were ousted from power — though they kept control of the state police — after a plebiscite in 1990 gave pro-democracy forces control of the nation's parliament. But the Sandinistas have re-emerged with the election of Ortega last November, giving him control of the strategically located Nicaragua, the poorest country in Central America and the second poorest in the Western Hemisphere. Dangerous Alliance Though Ortega had campaigned to keep Nicaragua democratic and open to free enterprise, there are worrisome signs he is increasingly joining ranks with Hugo Chavez's neighboring Venezuela to oppose U.S. interests in the region. And now he is seeking to establish ties with Iran. Iran is set to pump nearly $500 million into Nicaragua to build a new hydroelectric project, invest in a new port and build 10,000 new houses, Ortega announced in early August after hosting an Iranian government delegation that included Iran's deputy energy minister, Hamid Chitchian. That visit came after Ortega flew to Tehran in June and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Nicaragua in January, shortly after Ortega assumed office.
    [Show full text]
  • UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara Rosas Sin Pan: The
    UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara Rosas Sin Pan: The Cultural Strategies of the Sandinista Devolution A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in Sociology by Cristina Awadalla Committee in charge: Professor Denise Segura Chair Professor Jon Cruz Professor Kum-Kum Bhavnani June 2019 The thesis of Cristina Awadalla is approved. ___________________________________________________________ Kum-Kum Bhavnani ___________________________________________________________ Jon Cruz ___________________________________________________________ Denise Segura, Committee Chair April 2019 Acknowledgements Para mi mama, que me enseñó desde que era pequeña a amar, luchar, y alzar mi voz. A mi hermano mayor que ha estado a mi lado a lo largo de este viaje, alentándome incondicionalmente a confiar en mi trabajo. Para todas las valientes feministas Nicaragüenses, las que me brindaron su tiempo, historias y análisis profundos, las que siguen luchando y que siguen imaginando y creando nuevos mundos a pesar de toda la repression física y idiologica. Sin ellas, este proyecto no se podriá realizar. To my parents who came from different lands, whose endless hours at work have allowed me to dream and go places none of us could have imagined. To all my friends and family who support, motivate, and inspire me—thank you for letting me talk your ears off, engaging me and showing interest in my work. I would also like to thank the department of Sociology at UC, Santa Barbara, for the training and support provided to me that has helped me realize this work. Thank you to Denise Segura who has shown me what it is to be a bold woman of color in academia, who was the first here to show me my potential, giving me the support to cultivate it, and has provided endless feedback on an ever-evolving project.
    [Show full text]
  • Enquête L'economiste-Sunergia La Moitié Du Gouvernement Peut S'en
    2 EvènEmEnt Enquête L’Economiste-Sunergia La moitié du gouvernement peut s’en aller! • Pas une seule voix pour tout le équipe ne pèsent rien au regard du travail Les ministres qui réussissent secteur industriel et commercial que les citoyens attendent d’eux. Et pour faire bonne mesure, ne voilà-t-il El Houssaine Louardi 18% pas qu’un ministre politiquement impor- Aziz Rebbah 13% • Etrange phénomène avec tant, Mohand Laenser, se retrouve cité… Mustapha Ramid 11% avec l’opposition. Le gouvernement paye Aziz Akhannouch 9% Laenser! sans doute les rivalités puissantes qui op- Salaheddine Mezouar 6% posent le chef du Mouvement Populaire Mohamed Ouzzine 6% 5% avec le chef du PPS: pas un seul thème, Lahcen Daoudi • Le ministre de la Santé, El Mohamed Hassad 5% Cette année, nous n’avons pas mis pas un seul projet, sans qu’ils montrent Mohamed Boussaid 4% Benkirane dans la course avec ses Houssaine Louardi, reste le pré- publiquement leur désaccord, et sans que Mohamed Nabil Benabdellah 3% ministres, car les sondages précédents féré des Marocains le chef d’équipe n’entreprenne d’y mettre Mohamed El Ouafa 3% nous ont montré qu’il les écrase tant Mustapha El Khalfi 3% que leurs chiffres deviennent insigni- bon ordre. fiants. Apparemment, cela n’a pas Rachid Belmokhtar 2% Avec un étonnement navré, on notera suffi à les réhabiliter… C’EST clair, Benkirane peut virer Bassima Hakkaoui 2% la moitié de son gouvernement, personne que personne parmi les ministres et mi- Lahcen Haddad 1% ne s’en apercevra. Et parmi ceux qui res- nistres délégués chargés de la marche des Abdelkader Amara 1% tent, il n’y en a que quatre qui trouvent affaires et des entreprises n’est cité comme Mbarka Bouaïda 1% grâce, bien modestement.
    [Show full text]