Defence Annual Report 2002-03 Analysis
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Review of Defence Annual Report 2002-03: Analysis of Department of Defence Responses Dr Carlo Kopp, MIEEE, MAIAA, PEng, Defence Analyst and Consulting Engineer Peter A Goon, BEng, FTE (USNTPS) Managing Director, Australian Flight Test Services Pty Ltd January 26, 2004 Submission to the JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE DEFENCE SUBCOMMITTEE Defence Annual Report 2002-03 Analysis 2 Analysis Findings The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- Finding 1: stand the magnitude or the impact of the risk factors arising in the Joint Strike Fighter program. The Defence Senior Leadership Group appears to be confusing the characteristics and design aims of the smaller Joint Strike Fighter Finding 2: with the characteristics and design aims of the larger and more capable F/A-22A fighter. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- stand the respective cost structures of the Joint Strike Fighter and Finding 3: F/A-22A fighter programs, and the export pricing models which apply. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- stand the capabilities in the F-111, especially in terms of the air- Finding 4: craft’s capacity for the carriage and delivery of precision guided munitions which the F-111 has been doing since the early 1980’s. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- stand modern strategic and battlefield strike techniques, especially Finding 5: persistent strike techniques required for the engagement of mobile ground targets. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- Finding 6: stand the operational economics of the existing RAAF force struc- ture, and their proposed RAAF force structures. The Defence Senior Leadership Group excluded the F/A-22A fighter Finding 7: from evaluation against the Joint Strike Fighter before detailed brief- ing materials on F/A-22A capability and cost were available. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- Finding 8: stand conventional Measures of Effectiveness used to compare the relative capabilities of air power force structures. Defence Annual Report 2002-03 Analysis 3 The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- stand the characteristics of modern precision guided munitions, es- Finding 9: pecially the relationships between weapon explosive payload size, weapon guidance accuracy, Designated Mean Point of Impact ac- curacy and target type. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- Finding 10: stand the relationship between aircraft payload range characteristics and the resulting combat effect. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- stand the relationship between combat aircraft thrust to weight ra- Finding 11: tio and the suitability of an aircraft for air combat engagements against agile fighter aircraft. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- Finding 12: stand the differences between intended United States Air Force roles for the Joint Strike Fighter and intended RAAF roles for same. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- Finding 13: stand the operational limitations arising from an AEW&C fleet size of only four aircraft. The Defence Senior Leadership Group failed to articulate the scope and importance of the respective tasks in the AGM-142 program, Finding 14: and their implications for the carriage of other new generation weapons. Injudicious early choices by DMO in the Stand Off Weapon (now AGM-142) program and the F-111 Interim EW program led to sig- Finding 15: nificant delays and higher costs in these projects, for little gain in planned capability. The Defence Senior Leadership Group does not appear to under- stand the strategic impact of developing regional capabilities, espe- Finding 16: cially the Sukhoi Su-30 fighter, the Il-78MK aerial tanker, the Beriev A-50 AWACS and Russian precision guided munitions. Defence Annual Report 2002-03 Analysis 4 The reported 6% cost increase in operating the F-111 over recent years is less than one third the rate of increase in Total Costs over the period for the whole of the RAAF. Were this much lower rate of cost Finding 17: increase sustained, the F-111 would consume a progressively smaller fraction of RAAF Operating Costs over coming years, relative to the F/A-18A and other force elements. 1. The Defence Senior Leadership Group accepted an inappropri- ate cost prediction model for the F-111, one which inherently inflates long term costs. 2. This cost prediction model was used inappropriately, further contributing to an inflated long term cost estimate. Finding 18: 3. Then available data from the F-111 engineering community was not exploited to build an accurate long term cost prediction model, one which fits with engineering data indicating longer term cost reductions. Establishing the competencies and skill sets of the personnel who developed this model will show why the appropriate engineering data was not used. 1. The Defence Senior Leadership Group made public statements and provided advice to Cabinet based on a defective and in- flated estimate of long term F-111 operating costs. 2. Any decisions about F-111 (Life of Type) withdrawal dates Finding 19: based on the inflated estimate of long term operating costs are defective and should be reversed. 3. The Planned Withdrawal Date of 2020 for the F-111 could be exceeded without prohibitive costs being incurred. The Defence Senior Leadership Group failed to follow the Defence Industry Policy in not considering the effect on Industry, in particu- lar, the strategic importance of the extensive aircraft maintenance, Finding 20: engineering and systems integration capability at RAAF Base Am- berley, of their recommendation to Cabinet to retire the F-111 fleet early. Defence Annual Report 2002-03 Analysis 5 Key Items Omitted by Defence in Evidence An explanation of why no risk mitigation strategy, such as the eval- Evidence Item 1: uation of alternative solutions, exists to protect the Commonwealth against risk factors inherent in the Joint Strike Fighter program. An explanation of why the superior F/A-22A was not evaluated in Evidence Item 2: detail to establish the cost/benefit ratio and unit production costs relative to the Joint Strike Fighter, prior to the decision to exclude it from further evaluation. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) pricing schedules for an export model of the F/A-22A, detailing the unit flyaway costs to Australia of this aircraft (not the total unit program cost to US taxpayers which is Evidence Item 3: higher). The specific advice on unit flyaway costs provided by De- fence to Cabinet at the time of the Joint Strike Fighter decision. If Defence was advised by Cabinet that the F/A-22A was unaffordable, any then dated documents detailing this advice to Defence. An explanation of why Defence intends to use the strike optimised Joint Strike Fighter aircraft for air combat roles in which the US Evidence Item 4: Air Force intends to use the high performance multirole F/A-22A fighter. An explanation of what Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) Defence employed to conclude that no strike capability gap would arise as a Evidence Item 5: result of arbitrary early retirement of the F-111 fleet; and whatever dated analysis reports might exist to support this conclusion. An explanation of what Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) Defence Evidence Item 6: employed to conclude that the AP-3C Orion was a viable strike asset in a regional environment equipped with long range Su-30 fighters. An explanation of why Defence did not perform a comprehensive Evidence Item 7: reliability and wearout analysis of the F-111 airframe and systems prior to recommending to Cabinet early retirement of the fleet. Defence Annual Report 2002-03 Analysis 6 All Defence internal studies and analyses employed to support the recommendation to Cabinet for early retirement of the F-111; These Evidence Item 8: analyses including the risk analysis which claims a high risk of ‘loss of capability’ post 2010. All studies and analyses which support the claim by Defence that an increase in empty weight in the Joint Strike Fighter would not de- Evidence Item 9: grade the aircraft’s capability in air combat roles, especially against the Sukhoi Su-30 fighter. A detailed accounting of costs incurred in the AGM-142 upgrade Evidence Item 10: project, year by year, and specifically where these costs were incurred (contractors, DMO, consultants, munition warstocks etc). An explanation of why the Office of the Chief of Air Force has, through internal defence and public pronouncements, in effect ac- Evidence Item 11: cepted responsibility for the developmental risks inherent in the Joint Strike Fighter program. Notes1 Defence Annual Report 2002-03 Analysis 1 Analysis in Detail 7 1 Analysis in Detail Mr BEVIS On the final matter, you have addressed an aspect of this in response to Mr Byrne’s question about tanks, when you mentioned that there are three particular tanks that we are looking at. Why aren’t we doing the same thing for what is going to be the most significant acquisition we make in the next decade, which is our F111 and F18 replacements? There was a program to review a number of alternative options. As I understand it, it does not exist any more at least, it is not an ongoing activity. Companies are not in town doing their bidding. It is the most important acquisition we will make and the most expensive acquisition we will make in defence procurement in the next 10 years, yet we do not have the same review mechanism and same evaluation mechanism in place that you just outlined for our tank replacement. Gen. Cosgrove The tank technology is extant. The tanks that are being considered are either operationally proved or their technology is so contemporary that you can compare them: you are comparing apples with apples.