Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939 Author(S): BOHDAN BUDUROWYCZ Source: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes, Vol

Canadian Slavonic Papers

Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939 Author(s): BOHDAN BUDUROWYCZ Source: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 1983), pp. 473-500 Published by: Canadian Association of Slavists Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40868197 . Accessed: 15/06/2014 19:35

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This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ARTICLES

BOHDAN BUDUROWYCZ

Poland and the UkrainianProblem, 1921-1939

"The Polish people have to realizethat their attitude towards the minorities will determineto a largeextent the fateof Poland. . . . ThereforeI regardall manifestationsof hatredand impatiencedirected against the minoritiesas blundersfor which Poland, sooner or later,will have to pay."1 These memorablewords were uttered in thePolish Sejm on 24 Janu- ary 1938,not by a minoritydeputy or bya representativeof the opposition, but by General Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski,the PrimeMinister of Po- land and Ministerof the Interior. Indeed, the minority problem was one of themost urgent and perplexingissues facing the Polish Republic during the interwarperiod. Basically,there were two approachesto theproblem of nationalmi- noritiesin Poland,both of them developed before the end ofWorld War I.2 The firstof them,elaborated chiefly by National Democratic theoreticians and knownas theprogramme of incorporation,was based on the slogan "Poland for the Poles." It denied the politicaland culturalrights of the non-Polishminorities, regarding them as second-classcitizens, who were eitherto be Polonized (in thecase of theUkrainians and Belorussians)or (as in the case of the Jews)completely isolated from Polish society.The second conception,known as the federalistprogramme, later associated largelywith Józef Püsudski, favoured resolving the problem by a spiritof

1. Skladkowski'sspeech to the Committeeof Ways and Means (Komisja Budzetowa)of the Sejm, SprawyNarodowosciowe, XII, no. 1-2 (1938), 97. 2. For a detailed discussion of these conceptionssee Roman Wapinski, "Z dziejów tendencjinacjonalistycznych: Ο stanowiskuNarodowej Demokracji wobec kwestiinarodowej w latach 1893-1939,"Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXXX, no. 4(1973), 817-44,and his "Endecja wobec kwestiiukrainskiej ibialoruskiej,"in Slowianiew dziejachEuropy (Poznan, 1974),pp. 301-8,and NarodowaDemokracja 1893-1939(Wroclaw, 1980); J. Lewandowski,Federalizm, Litwa i Biatorusw poli- tyceobozu belwederskiego(Warsaw, 1962); and M. K. Dziewanowski,Joseph Pü- sudski:A EuropeanFederalist, 1918-1922 (Stanford, Calif., 1969). A concisesum- maryof these two approaches is given by Andrzej Chojnowskiin his excellent study,Koncepcje polity ki narodowosciowejrzqdow polskich w latach 1921-1939 (Wroclaw, 1979),pp. 18-26.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 474 I Canadian Slavonic Papers December1983 toleranceand coexistence.Assuming an identityof interestsamong all the nationalitiesof pre-partitionPoland, the supporters of this idea advocated the resurrectionof the old Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth in its his- toricborders of 1772,but in a modernized,federalist form. The various nationalitieswere expected to join thisfederation voluntarily on theun- derstandingthat, given a democraticsystem, such a structurewould auto- maticallyguarantee the rightsof all the non-Polishnationalities. Whenthe Polish-Sovietconflict of 1919-20ended in a stalemate,the hopes of thefederalists had to giveplace to a morerealistic but, in many ways,less satisfactorysolution. As the resultsof the 1921and 1931cen- suses show,over 30% of thepopulation of thereconstructed Polish State consistedof non-Poles.3However, since the two largestterritorial minorities- the Ukrainianand the Belorussian- wereconcentrated in the area east of the riversBug and San, the term"national minority"could, as AndrzejChojnowski points out, have been moreappropriately applied to the Polishpopulation in thatarea, whichamounted to only37.8% of the total.4This linguisticand ethnicdiversity was, in thewords of Hans Roos, "theresult of a compromisebetween the concept of a nationalunitary state and a supranationalfederal state."5 The frontierestablished by theTreaty of Riga in March 1921failed to leaveenough Ukrainians and Belorussians on the Polish side to warrantthe creationof a federalstate, but the numbersof those two ethnicgroups were obviously large enough to de- privePoland of thecharacter of a trulynational state. Of course,this situation was not unique in East CentralEurope, wherepractically all coun- triescontained substantial national minorities; nevertheless, it was one of themain causes of theinternal and externalweakness of interwarPoland, since thepolitical, cultural, social, and economicdifferences between the nationalgroups impeded the process of integration and stabilization,while

3. A convenientsummary of the returns of the 1921and 1931censuses with regard to nationality,mother tongue, and religiouspersuasion is givenin Werner Markert(Ed.), Polen(Cologne, 1959),p. 37. It has beenclaimed that Polish official statisticsof nationalorigin are unreliable;it is equally true,however, that the fig- uresgiven by some non-Polishsources (e.g., Stephen Horak in hisbook Polandand Her NationalMinorities, 1919-1939 [New York, 1961]) tendto overstatethe per- centageof non-Polishnationalities, putting it as highas 39% in 1931.Most Polish scholarsagree thatthe correctfigure would be somewherebetween 32 and 35%, withthe Ukrainians accounting for 15-16% and theBelorussians for 4-6%(see Choj- nowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 6). 4. Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 6. 5. Hans Roos, A Historyof ModernPoland (New York, 1966),p. 96.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.xxv, No.4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 475 thedissatisfaction of theminorities - mostnotably the Ukrainians - after thefailure of theiraspirations to independencetended to keepsome parts of thecountry in a stateof continuousunrest and agitation.It is not surprising,therefore, that some Polish politicians,supported by a considerable part of public opinion,began to demand thatthe Slavic minorities westof theRiga frontierbe assimilatednot only politically but also cultur- ally and linguistically.Thus, the resurrectedPoland was on itsway to becoming,to use Roos's phrase,"a multi-nationalstate with a uni-nationalist ideology."6 The legal statusof nationalminorities in Poland was definedand re- gulatedby provisionsof thePolish constitutions of 17 March 1921and 23 April 1935and by severalinternational agreements. The firstof thesewas theMinorities Treaty of 28 June1919, according to whichPoland assumed the unilateralobligation to assure thatPolish nationalswho belongedto racial,religious, or linguisticminorities should enjoy full civil and political rightsand receivethe same treatment, in law and infact, as theother Polish nationals.7Poland agreedfurther that any memberof the Council of the League of Nations would have the rightto bringto the attentionof the Council any infractionof these obligations.8The second international agreementwas the Treatyof Riga, whose ArticleVII stipulatedthat all personsof Russian,Ukrainian, and Belorussianorigin living on theterri- toryof the PolishState were entitled to cultivatetheir national languages, organizeand supportnational schools, practise their forms of religion, develop theirnational cultures,and establishfor that purpose special as- sociationsand organizations.9 Amongthe national minorities of Poland, theUkrainians were by far the most numerous.According to officialstatistics, they comprised an absolute majorityin the provincesof Stanislawów(69.8% in 1928) and Volhynia(68.4%), a pluralityin theprovince of Tarnopol(close to 50%), and a substantialproportion of thepopulation in theprovinces of Lwów (35.8%) and Polesie (17.7%). In addition,they formed a narrowwedge in thesouthern part of theprovince of Cracow and werealso concentratedin

6. Ibid. 7. "Treatyof Peace betweenthe United States of America, the British Empire, France,Italy, and Japan,and Poland," in H. W. V. Temperley(Ed.), A Historyof thePeace Conferenceof Paris, V (London, 1921), Art. 2, pp. 439-40. 8. Ibid., Art. 12, p. 442. 9. Dokumentyi materialy do historiistosunków polsko-radzieckich, III (War- saw, 1964), No. 275, p. 581.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 476 I Revue Canadiennedes Slavistes Décembre1983 some easterndistricts of the provinceof Lublin, forming,respectively, 2.4% and 3% of the populationof thoseprovinces. They were moreover onlya partof a largerethnic entity of morethan 30 million,spreading far into Sovietterritory and overflowinginto Rumaniaand Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Ukrainianissue was not only a Polish problem,but also had significantgeopolitical and internationalramifications. The Ukrainianpopulation of Poland was not homogeneous.The Ukrainiansof Galicia, who formedclose to 60% of the total,led by a numericallysmall but politically active intelligentsia, had, underthe com- parativelybenevolent rule of the Habsburgs, developed considerable nationalconsciousness, which had maturedduring the FirstWorld War and thebrief period of independence in 1918-19.The Ukrainiansof Volhy- nia and Polesie,on theother hand, separated from their Galician kinsmen fora centuryand a half,remained to a greatextent politically dormant; practicallyall of thembelonged to theOrthodox Church, which was under strictgovernmental control, particularly with regard to itsinternal organization.10The GreekCatholic or Uniate Churchof Galicia was in a much strongerposition, since its rightsand privilegeswere guaranteed by the concordat concluded by the Holy See and the Polish Republic on 10 February1925, and itsclergy began to identifyitself increasingly with the Ukrainian national movement.11Most Ukrainians,however, whatever

10. Originallythe Polish governmentfavoured a de-Russificationof the Church's hierarchy,but later began to use the pro-Russianelements within the Churchto neutralizethe Ukrainianmovement, which began to gain in forceespe- ciallyafter the UkrainianOrthodox Church Council in Luck in 1927.The charter of theAutocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland,proclaimed in 1938,made that bodyfully dependent on thegovernment and intensifiedthe efforts to introducethe Polish language into its administration.For details see J. Wolinski,Polska a KosciótPrawosfawny (Lwów, 1936); Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, pp. 50-54, 147-55,208-10; and MiroslawaPapierzynska-Turek, Sprawa ukrainskaw Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej1922-1926 (Cracow, 1979),pp. 100-13,245-47, 274-75. 11 . Details in WieslawMystek, Kosciot Katolicki w Polsce w latach1918-1939 (Warsaw, 1966),passim; Papierzynska-Turek, Sprawa ukrainska, pp. 94-99;Choj- nowski,Koncepcje polityki, pp. 55, 188-89.It shouldbe notedthat the hierarchy of theGreek Catholic Church in Poland was split,with the Metropolitan of Galicia and Archbishopof Lwów,Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, regarding it as a nationalUkrain- ian Church,and the bishop of Stanisíawów,Hryhorii Khomyshyn, maintaining thatthe UniateChurch represented only one of therites of the UniversalChurch and should not,therefore, be used as a tool forgaining purely temporal objectives (see Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, pp. 188-89).

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.xxv, No.4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 477 theirbackground, viewed their Polish rulerswith suspicion and indiffer- ence,if not outrighthostility; thus, what was neededwas an imaginative, farsightedpolicy that would bringthem closer to thePolish State bydem- onstratingto themthe advantagesthey could derivefrom their associa- tionwith it and encouragingthem to assumean activeand creativerole in it. Of all theissues dividing the Poles and theUkrainians, the most com- plexand intractablewas thatof Eastern Galicia - theterritory of the short- lived WesternUkrainian People's Republic,proclaimed on 1 November 1918,and eventuallytaken over by Poland aftera bitterstruggle in July 1919.This conflict,deeply rooted in centuries of political, religious, cultural, and economicstrife, had leftmany painful memories and deep wounds, but had at thesame timereawakened in theUkrainian people of Galicia a feelingof nationalpride and a convictionthat they could, after centuries of foreignrule, become mastersin theirown house. The Poles, on theother hand,regarded Galicia as a partof their inalienable historical heritage and the recaptureof its capital, Lwów, inspiredthe whole country.Thus, in EasternGalicia therewas littleroom leftfor any compromisesolution. In spiteof the factthat, by the Treatyof Riga, the RSFSR and the UkrainianSSR abandonedall rightsand claimsto theterritories ceded to Poland,12the Great Powerswere still reluctant to givethe Poles sovereigntyover EasternGalicia. Nevertheless,having finally established their rule in thatarea, thePolish authorities proceeded to dismantlemost of the self- governingbodies and institutionsof theformer Austrian crown land, in- cludingthe provincial diet. In March 1920the name of Eastern Galicia was officiallyreplaced by thatof EasternLittle Poland (Matopolska Wschod- nia) and most tracesof Polish-Ukrainianbilingualism in provincialad- ministrationwere eradicated; many Ukrainians were dismissed from the provincialcivil service and all Ukrainianchairs at theUniversity of Lwów wereformally abolished. The Ukrainians,for their part, tried to sabotage the Polishadministration by boycottingthe censusof 30 September1921 and theparliamentary elections of November 1922, which they regarded as violationsof thespecial statusof the territory.They also organizedwide- spreadterrorist activities, mostly conducted under the auspices of the new- ly createdUkrainian Military Organization (UVO), led byformer officers of theUkrainian armies, which culminated in an attemptto assassinatethe head of the Polish State,Józef Püsudski, during his firstofficial visit to Lwów on 25 September1921. These activitieshad seriousinternational

12. Dokumentyi materialy do historiistosunków polsko-radzieckich, III, p. 577.

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implications,since some foreigncountries - notably Czechoslovakia, Lithuania,and laterthe Free Cityof Danzig - wereused as bases fortrain- ing UVO cadres; moreover,at the end of 1922 the UVO leadershipes- tablishedcontact with the German General Staffand receivedmaterial help fromthe Reichswehrin exchangefor intelligence information.13 In order to win the approval of the Great Powersfor the incorpo- rationof EasternGalicia, the PolishSejm on 26 September1922 passed a statuteof self-governmentfor the provinces of Lwów,Tarnopol, and Sta- nislawów,which approved the creationof local assemblies{sejmiki) in each province,consisting of two chambers,one Polish and the other Ukrainian,invested with the power to discussand decideupon "mattersof commonconcern" in suchfields as publiceducation, welfare, health, road construction,agriculture, and assistanceto industryand commerce.14In addition,provision was made forthe establishment of a "Ruthenianuni- versity,"which was to be subjectonly to controlby theMinistry of Edu- cation.15The statuteof self-governmentwas to becomeeffective "not later thanin two years,"but the special order which was to announcethat date was neverissued and, consequently,the statutenever became effective. Despite all this,when on 15 March 1923the Conference of Ambassadors,

13. See AntoniB. Szczesniakand WiesJawZ. Szota, Droga do nikqd (War- saw, 1973),p. 33. 14. DziennikUstaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1922, No. 90, item829; English translationin Horak, Poland and Her NationalMinorities, dd. 197-200. 15. DziennikUstaw, 1922, No. 90, item829, Art.24; Horak, Polandand Her National Minorities,p. 199. Actually,a so-called UkrainianSecret University opened in Lwów in thefall of 1920.The existenceof thisinstitution, which at one timehad 3 facultieswith over 50 chairsand some 1,200 students, was wellknown to the Polish Police, who sometimesconnived at its illegalactivities and sometimes tookaction against its students and professors,before finally suppressing it in 1925. The Ukrainiansfelt that the legalization of this university would have been an ideal solutionof the whole controversialissue; this,however, was unacceptableto the Polishauthorities because oflocal hostilityto theidea ofharbouring an institution thatwas almostbound to becomea hotbedof militant Ukrainian nationalism. The governmentplayed for a timewith the idea of transferringthe so-called Ukrainian Free Universityfrom Prague to Warsawor of creatinga nucleusfor a futureuni- versityunder the temporary patronage of theJagiellonian University in Cracow. Negotiationswith a group of Ukrainianscholars seemed to develop ratheraus- piciously;Ukrainian politicans, however, proved to be adamantlyopposed, claim- ingthat the establishment of theuniversity was a politicalissue and insistingthat thenew institution be locatedon Ukrainianethnic territory. After Pilsudski's coup, thepossibilities of openinga Ukrainianuniversity in Galicia outsideLwów and of

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.xxv, No.4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 479 representingFrance, Italy,Japan, and the United Kingdom,decided to vestin Poland "all administrativepowers" with regard to EasternGalicia, itdid so on theunderstanding that "insofar as theeastern part of Galicia is concerned,the ethnographicalconditions necessitated an autonomous regime"and thatPoland, by signingthe Minorities Treaty of 28 June1919, had "providedfor special guaranteesin favorof racial,language and re- ligiousminorities in all theterritories placed underPolish sovereignly."16 The decisionof theConference of Ambassadorsthus conferred the official blessingof theGreat Powers on a stateof affairsthat had existedsince the signingof the Treatyof Riga. During the periodof parliamentarygovernment, which lasted until Piïsudski'scoup d'étatin May 1926,the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia had no representativesin thePolish Sejm or Senate,as a resultof theirboycott of the 1922 elections,except for five deputies elected by the so-called UkrainianAgricultural Party, which collaborated with the Polish government and whose leader, Sydir Tverdokhlib,was assassinated by the Ukrainian undergroundin October 1922; however,twenty Ukrainian deputiesand six senatorswere elected from Volhynia, Polesie, and thepro- vinceof Lublin.17As a resultof negotiationsconducted by AntinVasyF- chuk, the head of the Ukrainianparliamentary representation, with the PrimeMinister, General Wtadysiaw Sikorski, the Ukrainians voted for the budgetand supportedthe governmentin a vote of confidencein March 1923.At thesame time,however, they called forspecial statuswithin the State. As thehead ofthe Ukrainian Club in theSejm, Samiilo Pidhirs'kyi, said on 2 June 1923:

transferringthe Ukrainian Technical and AgriculturalInstitute from Podébrady in Czechoslovakiato Volhyniawere discussed by Polishofficial circles, but no posi- tiveaction was takenin eithermatter, although the question of the university regu- larlyre-emerged in countlessmemoranda submitted by the Ukrainian parliamen- tariansto the government,which were routinely ignored. In 1930,however, the governmentdid establishand providefinancial support for the UkrainianScien- tificInstitute in Warsaw,a primarilyresearch institution staffed with Ukrainian scholars,most of thememigres from the Soviet Ukraine.For details see VasyP Mudryi,Ukrains'kyi Universytet u L'vovi u rr. 1921-1925(Nuremberg, 1948); M. Iwanicki,Oswiata i szkolnictwoukrainskie w Polsce w latach 1918-1939(Siedlce, 1975); Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, pp. 57-67;and Papierzynska-Turek,Spra- wa ukrains ka, pp. 261-69. 16. League of Nations, TreatySeries, XV (1923), No. 398, pp. 260-65. 17. Papierzynska-Turek,Sprawa ukrainska,pp. 147-50.

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The presentsituation on WesternUkrainian territories came intoexist- ence againstour willand againstour desires.The easternfrontiers of the Polish Republic have been determinedwithout the consentof the in- terestedparties. [This situation]will be rectifiedonly if Volhynia, Polesie, Podlasie,the Chelmcountry, and EasternGalicia withthe Lemko coun- trywill be setapart as a legallyrecognized entity and grantednational territorialautonomy.18 If theUkrainian deputies had everexpected that these demands would be met,they were bitterly disappointed by theirexperience with the coa- litiongovernments ruling Poland duringthis period.19 Perhaps their great- est singlereverse was thepassing of theschool law of 31 July1924, which appearedoriginally to be fairto the nationalminorities, but whichin the long rundealt a devastatingblow to theUkrainian public schools of East- ernGalicia and Volhynia,transforming most of theminto either bilingual or outrightPolish institutions.20These developmentswere accompanied by an almost completePolonization of local governmentand the state apparatusin all ethnicallymixed territories as wellas by specialincentives givento militarycolonists in theeastern borderlands by the Land Reform Act of 1925,which resulted in theredistribution of some 800,000hectares to newsettlers (many of themex-servicemen of the Polish Army), approxi- mately200,000 of whommoved into Eastern Galician and Volhynianvil- lages.21 The comingto powerof Marshal Pilsudskidid not changethe situation perceptiblyin spiteof highhopes thathis approach would be more enlightenedand innovative.But it wouldseem that, after the failure of his grandiosefederalist programme, Püsudski retained only a marginalin- terestin thequestion of minoritiesand regardedit solelyfrom the point of viewof statesecurity.22 It is noteworthy,however, that less than two weeks afterPUsudski's coup hisold comrade-in-arms,Symon Petliura, was assas- sinatedin Paris. Afterhis death the Polish governmenttook over thefi- nancial supportof the so-called government-in-exileof the Ukrainian

18. Poland,Sejm, Sprawozdanie Stenograf iczne, Okres I, Posiedzenie92, p. 72. 19. For a detailedaccount see Papierzynska-Turek,Sprawa ukrainska. 20. Ibid., pp. 224-33;and S. Mauersberg,Szkolnictwo powszechne dla mniej- szosci narodowychw Polsce w latach 1918-1939(Wroclaw, 1968),passim. 21. Details in Papierzynska-Turek,Sprawa ukrainska, pp. 271-74;Chojnow- ski,Koncepcje polityki, pp. 45-48;and C. Madajczyk,Burzuazyjno-obszarnicza re- formarolna w Polsce 1918-1939(Warsaw, 1956),passim. 22. See Chojnowski,Koncepcje polity ki, pp. 71-73.

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People's Republic.23But this was not so much a gestureaimed at the Ukrainianminority in Poland as an indicationof Warsaw'spreparedness to play the Ukrainiancard in any futureconflict with Moscow. One interestingexperiment that took place underPilsudski's auspices, however,was the appointmentof HenrykJózewski, a formerDeputy Ministerof theInterior in Petliura'sgovernment, as governorof Volhynia in 1928, wherehe remained,except for one briefinterval, until 1938.24 Underhis rule,Volhynia became, as AndrzejChojnowski puts it, "an en- clave of the ideologyof 1920."25Józewski saw no contradictionbetween the conceptof an independentUkraine and Polish rulein Volhynia.Ac- cordingly,he surroundedhimself with Ukrainian emigres and Poles from the Dnieper Ukraine,who advocated a relentlessstruggle against Com- munismand an aggressivepolicy towards the Soviet Union, while the local Ukrainianshad to recognizethat only unswervingsupport of Warsaw's sovereigntyover Volhyniacould win any concessionsfrom the Polish authorities,notably in the fieldsof cultureand religion;thus, what was sometimesreferred to as the "politicalassimilation" of the Ukrainian po- pulationin Volhyniawas to be accompaniedand made morepalatable by a limitedcultural autonomy.26 Simultaneously, Józewski tried to seal the frontierbetween Galicia and Volhyniain orderto preventany undesirable politicaland culturalinfluences penetrating his fief.In time,however, his repeatedreferences to the "programmeof 1920" becameembarrassing to thePolish government and he was transferredto theless sensitive position of the governorof the Lodz province.After his departure,most of his achievementswere quietlydismantled and the aggressivelyanti-Ukrain- ian attitudeof thenewcomers from Western Poland, whom he had triedto neutralize,received official blessing. In March 1928, Ukrainiandeputies and senatorsfrom Galicia, re- presentingtwo major politicalparties- the UkrainianNational Demo-

23. On theactivities of this"government" which was headed byAndrii Livyt- s'kyi,one of thesignatories of the Treatyof Warsaw,see Ivan Kedryn,Zhyttia - podii- liudy(New York, 1976), pp. 206-17; see also Mariia Livyts'ka,Na hrani dvokhepokh (New York, 1974). 24. A concise account of Jozewski'sactivities in Volhyniais givenby Choj- nowski,Koncepcje polityki, pp. 97-102. Many interestingdetails are providedby Józewskihimself in his memoirs,"Zamiast pamiçtnika," Zeszyty History czne, No. 59 (1982), pp. 3-163; No. 60 (1982), pp. 65-157. 25. Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 99. 26. Ibid.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 482 I Canadian Slavonic Papers December1983 craticUnion (UNDO) and theUkrainian Socialist Radical Party- as well as some splintergroups, entered the Polish parliament for the first time.27 The strongestof these parties, the UNDO, with25 seatsin the Sejm and 9 in the Senate,represented an attemptto perpetuatethe old UkrainianGali- cian establishmentthat controlled most Ukrainian economic institutions and mouldedpublic opinion throughthe Ukrainianpress, especially the influentialdaily Dilo.2%The legal Ukrainianparties, while pledging their supportfor the idea of Ukrainianstatehood, were at thesame timepre- pared to negotiatewith the Polish government on thebasis of existingpo- liticalrealities. Their influence was beingconstantly eroded, however, by the nationalistunderground, which rejectedany accommodationwith Warsaw and vowed to continuean all-outrevolutionary struggle against what it consideredto be an illegal Polish occupation of the Western Ukraine. The man who exertedthe most profoundinfluence on thedevelop- mentof the nationalistmovement was undoubtedlyDmytro Dontsov.29 An EasternUkrainian by birth,a brilliantwriter and journalist,Dontsov

27. These groupsincluded the pro-Soviet Ukrainian Peasants' and Workers' SocialistOrganization and theUkrainian Peasants' and Workers'Socialist Union, popularlyknown as Sel-Roband Sel-Rob Union.Counting the deputies from Vol- hyniaelected on thelist of thegovernment bloc (BBWR), the Ukrainianshad 46 seatsin the Sejm (out of444) and 11 inthe Senate (out of 11 1 ). For a detaileddiscus- sion of Ukrainianpolitical parties in Poland see JerzyHölzer, Mozaika polityczna DrugiejRzeczypospolitej (Warsaw, 1974),pp. 241-53and 531-51,and M. Felinski, The Ukrainiansin Poland (London, 1931),pp. 76-105. 28. Actually,the UNDO was the continuation,under a slightlychanged name, of the prewarNational DemocraticParty, later known as the Ukrainian People's Labour Party.Since its formationin July 1925, it had splitinto three groups,one of themfavouring some formof autonomyfor Ukrainian ethnic ter- ritorieswithin the Polish State, another opposed to anyattempts at Polish-Ukrain- ian cooperationbut advocatingcloser relationswith the Soviet Ukraine,and a thirdrejecting any compromisewith either Poland or the Soviet Union and pro- claimingits allegianceto the idea of an independentUkrainian State. The pro- Sovietgroup was, in fact,in ascendanceand maintainedrather intimate ties with theSoviet consulate in Lwów untilapproximately 1929, when the experiment of the "Ukrainization"in the USSR came to an abruptend; later,its popularity declined sharplyas the autonomistfaction gained the controllinginfluence in the party. 29. The mostthorough discussion of Dontsovand hisideology is providedby MykhailoSosnovs'kyi in DmytroDontsov: polity chnyi por tret (New York, 1974); see also AlexanderMotyl, The Turnto theRight: The Ideological Origins and De- velopmentof UkrainianNationalism 1919-1929 (Boulder, Col., 1980).

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.XXV, No. 4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 483 settledafter World War I in Lwów, where,with the financial help of the UVO, he succeededin obtainingthe control of one of themost respected Ukrainian journals- Literaturno-naukovyivistnyk - and proceeded to make it theplatform for an extremeand intolerantbrand of nationalism, which,as JohnA. Armstrongputs it, "was largelyexpressed in advocacy of terrorism,led to extremeglorification of illegality"as such and "enhanced thenatural tendency of integralnationalism to relyon youthand rejectthe moderationof itselders."30 It was Dontsov ratherthan any political or re- ligiousleader who transformedUkrainian nationalism into a cultand pro- foundlyinfluenced the Western Ukrainian youth of the late 1920sand '30s, and indeedeven later. While Dontsov himselfregarded Russia as thechief enemyof the Ukraineand nevermade any explicitlyanti-Polish state- ments,his writingsprovided a justificationfor activities that were directed primarily,if not exclusively,against Poland. It was in 1929 thatthe fatefuldecision was takento transformthe paramilitaryUVO into a mass movement,consisting to a largeextent of secondary-schooland universitystudents, with a liberal sprinklingof peasant and working-classyouth.31 The new illegalparty, known as the Organizationof UkrainianNationalists (OUN), was led by the former commanderof the UVO, Colonel IevhenKonovalets', regarded by some as a nationalhero and by othersas a sinisterindividual in thepay of foreign intelligenceservices,32 who untilhis death in 1938exercised supreme au- thorityover the Ukrainian underground in Poland and thusperhaps more than anyone else on the Ukrainianside affectedthe course of Polish- Ukrainianrelations in thoseyears. Like anyterrorist underground, itwas a largelynegative force, which began eventuallyto use strong-armtactics withinthe Ukrainiancommunity itself to coerceits leaders into abandon-

30. JohnA. Armstrong,Ukrainian Nationalism, 2d ed. (New York, 1963),p. 22. One of themost astute and level-headedUkrainian journalists, Osyp Nazaruk, predictedas earlyas 1927that Dontsov's nationalism,once it gained acceptance amongthe Ukrainians, would "transformmen into beasts," bringing "internal dis- cord,ruin and death"- see hisNatsionalizm Dontsova i inshimyshugizmy (original- ly publishedin 1927,reprinted in Lwów in 1934),p. 7, as quoted by Ivan Lysiak- Rudnyts'kyi[Ivan L. Rudnytsky]in "Nazaruk i Lypyns'kyi:istoriia ikhn'oi druzhbyta konfliktu,"in Lysty Osypa Nazaruka do ViacheslavaLypyns'koho (Philadelphia,1976), p. Hi. 31. For details see Motyl, The Turnto the Right;Volodymyr Martynets', Ukrains'kepidpillia vid UVO do OUN (n.p., 1949);and PetroMirchuk, Narysistorii OrhanizatsiiUkrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, vol. I, 1920-1939(Munich, 1968). 32. See LystyOsypa Nazaruka, No. 138 (28 January1928), p. 447.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 484 I Revue Canadiennedes Slavistes Décembre1983 ing theirsearch for a settlementwith the Polish government.33 Obviously, such a largebody could not be alwayseffectively restrained by itsleader- ship,but it could be easily infiltratedby the agentsand informersof the Polish police. At thesame time,the leaders of thelegal Ukrainianparties could not ignorethe fact that the policy of seekingconfrontation with the Polish re- gimewas rapidlyattracting the younger generation while their own plat- formswere becoming largely irrelevant. It is perhapsnot surprising, then, thatthey maintained regular contacts and in some instanceseven tried to coordinatetheir activities with the nationalist underground. As Ivan Ked- rynput it, the Ukrainian leaders "realized that it was necessaryto conduct towardsPoland a policyon twoparallel tracks: the legal and theillegal."34 Both groupswere merely waiting for an internationalconfiguration that would permitthem to realizetheir aspirations to nationhood;the Poles were,of course,aware of thisand so tendedto regardthe irredentist move- mentas thetrue expression of Ukrainianfeelings and all attemptsto reach an accommodationas insincereand opportunistic.35 The viewsof the various Polish parties on theUkrainian problem were subject to some variationsbut their basic attitudesremained largely unchanged.36The partiesof the Right,notably the National Democrats, reorganizedsince 1928into the National Party (SN), favouredlegal differ- entiationbetween the Polish and non-Polishpopulations, with certain rightsbeing reserved exclusively for the Poles, and advocatedthe radical curtailmentof minorityrights as well as thegradual Polonizationof the easternprovinces. The attitudeof thepeasant parties was somewhatam- bivalent:the PSL "Piast," while paying lip-serviceto the rightsof all nationalitieswithin the Polish State to fullcultural and economicdevelop- ment,was infavour of restricting some of their electoral privileges and supportedthe idea of Polish colonizationof the easternborderlands; at the same time, such groups as PSL "Wyzwolenie"and the Peasant Party (StronnictwoChlopskie) and, aftertheir amalgamation in 1931, Stron- nictwoLudowe, supported at leastin theory the national aspirations of the

33. See Kedryn,Zhyttia-podii-liudy, pp. 144-45and 288-90. 34. "Zhadaimovelykykh Dmytriv," Svoboda (Jersey City), 13 November 1982,p. 2. 35. WiekNowy (Lwów), 30 December1938, as quotedmDilo, 31 December 1938,p. 8. 36. A conciseaccount is providedby Chojnowski in Koncepcje polityki, pp. 125-28;see also Holzer, Mozaika polityczna,passim.

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Ukrainiansand Belorussians,including their demand forterritorial autonomy.The Polish Socialist Party(PPS) wenteven further:in October 1931 it formallysubmitted in the Sejm a bill proposingterritorial autonomyfor the threesoutheastern provinces of Lwów, Stanislawów,and Tarnopol,as wellas forVolhynia and a partof Polesie.37As forthe illegal CommunistParty, it stressed the right of both the Ukrainians and theBelo- russiansto self-determination,including separation from Poland. In addition, therewere various groups, not necessarilyconnected withany political party, that took a keeninterest in the Ukrainian problem and evenadvocated the establishmentof an independentUkrainian state east of the Riga frontier.While theirinfluence in Polish society was marginal they performedan importantfunction by popularizingthe Ukrainianissue and discussingit at a higherlevel of sophistication than the daily press.These circlesestablished close tieswith the so-called Prome- theanmovement, an emigreorganization that purported to representthe "oppressedpeoples of the USSR" and includedamong itsmembers some formerRussian citizens, mostly of Ukrainianand Georgianorigin, serving as officersin the Polish Army.Of special significancefor the Ukrainian problemwere the periodicalsBunt Mlodych and Poliîyka,published and editedby Jerzy Giedroyc, and theweekly Biuletyn Polsko-Ukrainski, which appeared underthe editorship of WlodzimierzB^czkowski from Septem- ber 1932until December 1938.Although the initiativefor the latter came fromthe Second Divisionof the General Staff of thePolish Army, in close cooperationwith the NationalitiesBranch of the Ministryof the Interior and theEastern Department of theMinistry of ForeignAffairs,38 itcannot be regardedas an officialor semi-officialpublication: rather, it represented thosegroups in the rulingcamp thatsubscribed to the Prometheancon- ception.Even so, thePolish "Prometheans" were criticized by the National Democrats,who maintainedthat Poland, threatenedby an implacable enemyin theWest, could notafford the luxury of provoking Russia. As the Lwów daily StowoNarodowe observed, "whoever is breedingUkrainian bacteriato harm Russia should rememberthat he is also breedingthem against Poland."39 One of thefew fresh and constructiveprogrammes for the solution of the Ukrainianproblem in theseyears was developedby PiotrDunin-Bor-

37. Poland, Sejm, Kadencja III, Druki sejmowe,No. 365. 38. Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 193. 39. Slowo Narodowe,19 February1939, as quoted in Dilo, 22 February1939, p. 3.

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40 kowski, governor of Lwów province in 1927-28. He regarded the Ukrainianquestion as an issueobscured by emotionalism and nationalistic propaganda on both sides, but also as a serious threatto the futureof Poland. In his opinionit was unrealisticto expectthe Galician Ukrainians to redirecttheir national aspirations towards the Soviet Ukraine,since theirnationalism was basicallyoriented towards their own nativeprov- ince. He was, however,opposed to concludinga formalagreement betweenthe Polish State and the Ukrainians,which would onlyencourage thelatter to makenew political demands. What was needed,in his opinion, was the removal of some economic grievancesand the establishingof personalcontacts that would help, in due course,to putan endto isolation- istattitudes and enableboth sides to agreeon commonmeasures. Accord- ingto Borkowski,Warsaw's final objective with regard to theUkrainians was to be theirpolitical or stateassimilation, but thiscould be achieved only if the authoritiessucceeded in satisfyingtheir legitimate aspirations and demandswithin the boundariesof the Polish State. As a step in this direction,Borkowski proposed the creationof a separateterritorial unit out of the provincesof Lwów, Stanislawów,Tarnopol, and Lublin, in which both nationalitieswould be approximatelyequal in numbers- a solutionthat would presumably ease theapprehensions of thePoles about thenumerical superiority of the Ukrainiansin EasternGalicia. Publicof- ficesand institutionsin all areas wherethe Ukrainian population amounted to at least 20% would be bilingual,and Ukrainiancould be used as the sole languageof administration in all localitiesand districtswith a Ukrain- ian majority.Similar privileges were to be extendedto theUkrainian mi- norityin thefield of elementary and secondaryeducation. In Borkowski's opinion,the granting of cultural autonomy to theUkrainians would speed up the process of theirpolitical assimilation,and he appealed to the governmentto initiatethe necessarymeasures during what he called "the calm beforethe storm." The tempestof whichhe was afraidwas, however, to descendon EasternGalicia thevery next year in the form of the so-called "pacification." In orderto appreciatethe significanceof the "pacification"of 1930 and itsimpact on Polish-Ukrainianrelations, it is necessaryto realizethat it followeda widespreadterrorist campaign launchedby the OUN, di- rectedprimarily against Polish private and publicproperty in EasternGa- licia: accordingto officialdata, 191acts of terrorism (chiefly arson anddis-

40. The subsequentaccount is based on Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, pp. 102-6.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.XXV, No. 4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 487 ruptionof telephone,telegraph, and railwaycommunications) took place duringthe second halfof 1930.41With Polish vigilantes threatening to re- taliate,the situation was gettingout of hand, and thedanger of an insur- rectionseemed to be quitereal. Underthese circumstances, Prime Minister Marshal Pitsudskipersonally decided that "acts of arson, sabotage, and terrorismshould not be treatedas an uprisingbut ratheras violationsof law and orderand, as such, should be dealt withby means of repressive police measures."42Between 16 Septemberand 30 Novemberpunitive ex- peditions,consisting of militaryand police detachments,were sent into some 450 villagesin 16 districts;43Ukrainian sources claim, however, that over 700 villageswere affected, 250 of themseriously.44 Corporal punish- ment was frequentlyapplied and buildings,especially those housing Ukrainiancultural institutions and communitystores, were damaged or destroyed.45 General Slawoj-Skladkowski,the Ministerof the Interiorentrusted withcarrying out Piïsudski'sorders, claims in his memoirsthat the "pacification" was a bloodless operation,46but Ukrainian writersput the numberof deathsat between7 and 35.47In any case, the "pacification" provedto be costlyto the OUN, forits commanderin Galicia, Captain IuliianHolovins'kyi, was arrestedand killedby thepolice "whiletrying to escape."48In relateddevelopments, 30 formerUkrainian deputies of the Sejm were arrestedand fiveof themwere sent to the militaryprison in Brest-Litovsk,where they joined some Polish oppositionleaders;49 in addition, the Ukrainian scouting movement"Plast" was disbanded and severalsecondary schools wereclosed because of theinvolvement of some of theirstudents in undergroundactivities. 4 1. For detailssee PolskiInstytut Wspóípracy ζ Zagranica^Sabotai ukrainski i akcja paeyfikacyjna(Warsaw, 1931); Felinski,The Ukrainians,pp. 158-73;and Mirchuk,Narys istorii, pp. 232-44. 42. Felicjan Slawoj-Skfadowski,Strzepy meldunków (Warsaw, 1936),p. 233. 43. Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 158. 44. See Michael Yaremko, Galicia-Halychyna:From Separation to Unity (Toronto, 1967),p. 241. 45. Ibid. 46. Nie ostatnieslowo oskarzonego(London, 1964),p. 198. 47. The formerfigure is givenby Mirchukin Narysistorii, p. 253,the latter by Horak inPoland and Her NationalMinorities, p. 162,and Yaremkoin Galicia-Haly- chyna,p. 241. 48. For detailssee Mirchuk,Narys istorii, pp. 247-50. 49. Ukraine:A ConciseEncyclopaedia, I (Toronto, 1963),p. 843.

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The "pacification"received wide coveragein the Westernpress and thus,in a way,internationalized the Ukrainian issue, for, as an application of thedoctrine of collectiveresponsibility, it seemedto runcounter to the principlesof internationallaw. As TheManchester Guardian wrote on 14 October1930, "The 'pacification'of theUkraine by meansof these 'puni- tiveexpeditions' is probablythe most destructive onslaught yet made on any of the national minoritiesand the worst violation of a minority treaty."50Numerous petitions from Ukrainian representatives and prom- inent individualsof other nationalities,including 62 membersof the BritishParliament, reached the League of Nations,and werestudied there bythe Committee of Three,consisting of representatives of Italy, Norway, and the UnitedKingdom.51 The Polishgovernment, for its part, declared its willingnessto reachan internalsettlement of theissue, including com- pensationfor damages suffered by the Ukrainians; this had to be preceded, however,by a withdrawalof Ukrainianpetitions and a declarationof loyaltyto Poland by Ukrainian parliamentaryrepresentatives - some- thingthat the Ukrainiansrefused to consider.52Eventually, after long de- liberationsand attemptsat conciliation,on 30 January1932 the Council of theLeague of Nationscame to theconclusion that "Poland does notcarry on anypolicy of persecution against the Ukrainians,"53 thus effectively dis- posingof the Ukrainiancomplaint. The finalact in thisdrama occurredsome two and a halfyears later. Withthe SovietUnion about to enterthe League of Nationsand receivea permanentseat on itsCouncil, Warsaw decided to depriveMoscow of the opportunityof using it as a platformfor attacking the treatmentof the Ukrainiansand Belorussiansin Poland. On 13 September1934 the Polish Foreign Minister,Józef Beck, informedthe General Assemblyof the League thatin futurehis government would decline to cooperatewith any internationalbodies "in thematter of thesupervision of the application by Poland of the systemof minorityprotection" until a uniformscheme for dealingwith that question was adoptedby all countries.54While Beck's de- clarationwas criticizedby someforeign diplomats and a partof the Polish oppositionpress, it was generallywelcomed by Polish public opinion.

50. Quoted in Horak, Poland and Her NationalMinorities, p. 164. 51. Ibid, p. 165. 52. Ibid, p. 166. 53. League of Nations,Official Journal, XIII (Geneva, 1932),p. 513. 54. League ofNations, Official Journal, Special SupplementNo. 125 (Geneva, 1934),p. 43.

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On thewhole, the "pacification"proved to be counter-productive:it alienatedeven furtherthe Ukrainianpopulation and tarnishedPoland's internationalreputation without bringing any perceptiblebenefits in return.At thesame time, the nationalist underground expanded its activities, increasedits membership,and launcheda seriesof retaliatoryacts of ter- ror,expropriatory actions against post offices,mail coaches, and banksas wellas personalattacks against individuals who were deemed to havebeen responsiblein some way for the "pacification."A particularlysenseless crime was the assassinationin August 1931 of Tadeusz Hotówko, the formerchief of the EasternDivision of the Ministryof ForeignAffairs, whose attitudetowards the Ukrainianproblem had been comparatively enlightened.55However, the most spectaculardeed of the OUN was the assassinationin June 1934 of BronistawPieracki, the Ministerof the In- terior.56The immediateconsequence of thiswas the openingof the only concentrationcamp in Poland in BerezaKartuska, which had a majorityof Ukrainianinmates from the verystart.57 Pieracki's murder was followed only a fewweeks laterby thatof Ivan Babii, theprincipal of a respected Ukrainiangymnasium in Lwów, for his alleged collaborationwith the Polishpolice.58 This actionprovoked a scathingdenunciation of the activi-

55. The forthcomingpublication of a monographon Holówko by Iwo Werschler(Zdziejów obozubelwederskiego: Tadeusz Hofówko - zyciei dzialalnosc) was announcedin ZapowiedziWydawnicze, No. 27/28for 1982, item 7. Some ofthe circumstancesof Hotowko's murderremain obscure even today:Kedryn is of the opinionthat "it was plannedby some Polishchauvinist clique and stagedwith the helpof thePolish police, who availed themselvesof agents inside the Organization of UkrainianNationalists;" he also claimsthat the commander of theOUN, Colo- nel Konovalets',was "shaken"by the newsof theassassination (Zhyttia - podii- liudy,pp. 220-30;see also ZynoviiKnysh, V sutinkakhzrady: ubyvstvo Tadeusha Holufkana tlizrady Romana Baranovs' koho [Toronto, 191 5], passim). However, accordingto Mirchuk,Konovalets' expressed his post-factum approval of Hoîowko's killing(Narys istorii, p. 285). 56. A comprehensiveaccount of thisassassination and itsaftermath is given in WíadyslawZelenski, Zabójstwo ministra Pierackiego (Paris, 1973);see also Mir- chuk,Narys istorii, pp. 373-86;Ryszard Torzecki, Kwestia ukrainska w polityce HI Rzeszy(Warsaw, 1972),pp. 138-40;and Marian Wojciechowski,Stosunki polsko- niemieckie1933-1938, 2d ed., rev. (Poznan, 1980), pp. 228-33. 57. See VolodymyrMakar, Bereza Kartuz'ka:spomyny ζ 1934-35rr. (Toron- to, 1956),passim. 58. For detailssee Mirchuk,Narys istorii, pp. 368-71.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 490 I Canadian Slavonic Papers December1983 ties of the Ukrainianunderground from the Metropolitanof Galicia, AndreiSheptyts'kyi, who condemnedthe terrorists as "madmen,""crimi- nals," and "enemiesof the people."59 The naturalconsequence of such activities was a continuousseries of politicaltrials throughout the two decades of Polish rule in EasternGalicia and Volhynia,which, in the words of Ivan Kedryn,must be regardedas "the most strikingevents or ratherphenomena of the '20s or '30s in the WesternUkraine."60 Reports from these trials, often revealing the use ofil- legal methodsof interrogationby the Polishpolice, filled the pages of the Ukrainianpress and helped to fan and intensifyanti-Polish feelings. In- deed, some of thesetrials - notablyone in Lwów in December 1932,at whichan emergencytribunal handed out threedeath sentences,two of whichwere immediately carried out - weretraumatic experiences for the whole Ukrainiancommunity in EasternGalicia. In spite of this bitterness,however, the possibilityof an eventual Polish-Ukrainianagreement could not be completelyruled out, at a time when the centralizingtendencies in the USSR, the end of the policyof "Ukrainization"in the Soviet Ukraine,the collectivization drive of 1932- 33, and finallythe famine of 1933seemed to threatenthe very existence of the Ukrainianpeople. Under these circumstances,a policy of accommodationwith Poland appearedmore attractive and promising.61At first, the Polish governmentseemed reluctantto engage in any negotiations. Marian Zyndram-Koscialkowskistated on 14 February 1935 to the

59. Dilo, 5 August 1934,p. 3. The Metropolitanalso bitterlycondemned the leadersof theOUN, who,acting from their foreign hideouts, "are usingour chil- " drento killtheir parents. Interestingly,Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter is not men- tionedin Mirchuk'sdetailed account of Babii's assassination. 60. Kedryn,Zhyttia - podii- liudy,p. 218. 61. In this connectionsee a ratherrevealing statement made by the Greek Catholic bishop of Stanislawów,Hryhorii Khomyshyn: "What are we to do? Should we remainpassive and waitfor our own demise?Or shouldwe adoptan attitudeof negationand provocation?Should we continueto conducta terroristac- tionuntil our heads are bashed in and we fallinto an abyss?No! The firststep on our part should be a loyal attitudetowards the state in whichwe live. This is a matterof commonsense. Even ifwe gain no positiveresults and advantages,we shalltie the Poles' handsin sucha waythat they will have no reasonto oppressand persecuteus. This,in turn,will give us a chanceto recoverand revive"(Grezegorz Chomyszyn,Problem ukrainski [Warsaw, 1933], pp. 101-2,as quotedby Papierzyn- ska-Turek,Sprawa ukrainska,p. 96).

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Ukrainiandeputies in theSejm, "You, gentlemen,are demandingfrom us, therepresentatives of the Polish State, declarations and promises,but you yourselveshave so farnever declared that you wereloyal and faithfulciti- zens of the State."62Unofficial discussions, however, started in thespring of 1935and an attemptwas made to reconcilePoland's securityconcerns withthe legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainianminority. The Ukrainian negotiatorspresented a series of memorandalisting their most urgent grievancesand demands,including an immediatefreeze on Polish settle- mentsin EasternGalicia and Volhynia,some concessionsin thefield of elementary,secondary, and highereducation, increased opportunities for employmentof Ukrainiansin local and centraladministration, and an amnestyfor political prisoners. Koscialkowski promised to take all these demandsinto considerationand at the same timesuggested an electoral compromiseby whichthe Poles and theUkrainians would elect their own deputiesin each of the 15 electoraldistricts of EasternGalicia. Although the UkrainianRadical and Social Democraticparties rejected this offer, the CentralCommittee of the UNDO decided to accept it, in spiteof the factthat it was limitedto EasternGalicia and thatthe government reserved foritself the rightto disqualifyindividual Ukrainian candidates.63 As a resultof this agreement,generally known as the "normalization," 14 Ukrainiandeputies and fivesenators were elected to the polish parliament,as wellas fivedeputies and one senatorfrom Volhynia elected on thegovernment list. The new leaderof theUNDO, Vasyl' Mudryi,became Deputy Speakerof theSejm, an amnestyfor political prisoners was approved,and certaincredits were extended to Ukrainianeconomic institutions.In return,the Ukrainiandeputies voted for the budgetand eitherceased or moderatedtheir criticism of thegovernment's policies. At thesame time,however, their hopes for bilingualism, greater participation in local administration,and concessionsin thefield of education remained unfulfilled.As timewent on, thechances for regularizing Polish-Ukrainian relationsbegan to decrease,for the Polish government never regarded the agreementof 1935 as more than a purelytactical move.64 In addition, forcesopposed to any concessionsto the nationalminorities were begin-

62. Sprawy Narodowosciowe,IX, no. 1-2 (1935), p. 57. Having served as Ministerof theInterior in thegovernments headed by Leon Kozlowskiand Walery Sfawek(June 1934-October1935), Kosciatkowski himself became PrimeMinister of Poland on 13 October 1935. 63. Kedryn,Zhyttia - podii- liudy,pp. 253-54. 64. Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 205.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 492 I Revue Canadiennedes Slavistes Décembre1983 ningto gain ascendancyafter the death of Marshal Pilsudski,especially whenthe coolly pragmatic "dove," Zyndram-Koscialkowski, was replaced as PrimeMinister in May 1936 by a well-intentionedbut unimaginative and heavy-handedmartinet, General Slawoj-Skiadkowski, whose government was dominatedby General (and afterNovember 1936 Marshal) EdwardSmigty-Rydz. Moreover, the attempt to transformthe nation into a fullyauthoritarian, unitary state on thebasis of theconstitution of April 1935 and the emergenceof a new pro-governmentalbloc, the Camp of National Unity(OZN), whoseplatform seemed to reduceeven further the role of thenational minorities, did notaugur well for the future of Polish- Ukrainianrelations.65 Particularlyominous was the establishmentin December 1935 of a special Committeeon NationalityAffairs, consisting, in additionto the PrimeMinister, of theministers of the Interior,Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs,Religious Denominations and Education,and Agriculture.66The Committeewas reluctantto make any but minor concessions to the Ukrainians,and showed much more energyand initiativein supporting projects and schemes that were clearly underminingthe principleof "normalization."Some of theseprojects were aimed at weakeningUkrain- ian unityby encouragingthe regionalismof such tribesas the Lemkians and the Hutsuls,by preventingcontacts between the Galician and Volhy- nian Ukrainians,and by lendingofficial support to the Old Ruthenian movementin Galicia as a potentialcounterpoise to Ukrainiannational- ism.67The Committeealso endorsedthe project of colonizing the sparsely

65. See Tadeusz Jçdruszczak,Pilsudczycy bez Pitsudskiego:Powstanie Obozu ZjednoczeniaNarodowego w 1937 roku(Warsaw, 1963),passim. 66. Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 207. 67. The Old Ruthenianswere a once influentialgroup, whose effectiveness afterWorld War I was practicallynegligible. Based on theirtwo main strong- holds- the National Home and the StauropegianInstitute in Lwów- and main- tainingsome strengthin a fewrural areas (notablythe Lemko country),they engaged in acrimoniousdebates with the Ukrainianpress through their newspaper, RusskiiGolos, while at thesame timeclosely cooperating with the Russian ethnic groupand Russianemigres in Poland.Their loyalty to thePolish State was generally beyondreproach, though their left wing became associated in themid-'twenties with the so-called Sel-Rob, or the UkrainianPeasants' and Workers'Socialist Union, which,because of its pro-Communistsympathies, was eventuallybanned by the Polish government.In 1930,two of therepresentatives of theirright wing wereelected to thePolish Sejm fromthe list of thegovernmental bloc BBWR. It is

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.XXV, No. 4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 493 populatedeastern regions, such as Polesie,and ofstrengthening the Polish elementin such stronglyUkrainian areas as EasternGalicia.68 These developmentswere influenced to a greatextent by theattitude of the Polish populationof the easternborderlands, who regardedthe "normalization"as harmfulto Poland in generaland themselvesin par- ticular.Rejecting any accommodationwith the Ukrainians imposed from above, in November1935 the Poles of EasternGalicia receivedofficial en- couragementto set up the so-called CoordinatingSecretariat of Polish Social Organizationsin Eastern Little Poland (SekretariatPorozumie- wawczyPolskich Organizacji Spotecznych w Malopolsce Wschodniej),an umbrellagroup of Poles of differentpolitical persuasions, but unitedby theirmilitant anti-Ukrainianism. Its initiatorsclaimed that the Poles were theautochthonous population of EasternGalicia and thatpractically the whole civilizationof that area was the productof Polish thoughtand Polish toil.69The activitiesof the Secretariatwere strongly supported- indeed,often initiated - by the army,which fully endorsed the so-called "programmeof revindication,"aimed at reclaimingindividuals and groupsof Polishorigin.70 In addition,of course, there were Polish authorities at all levels,generally not concernedwith any ideologies and not followingany political theoriesin theirday-to-day contacts with the Ukrainians,but simplytrying to fit them into the Procrusteanbed of officialdecrees and regulations.71 difficultto estimatetheir numerical strength, but in 1939the so-called Ruthenian AuditUnion included about 250 cooperatives,while their cultural association, the KachkovskiiSociety, had in 1936close to 6,000members (Entsyklopediia Ukraino- znavstva,II /5, p. 1654,s.v. "MoskvofiTstvo,"by S. Ripets'kyi). 68. See P. Stawecki,Nastepcy Komendanta: Wojsko a politykawewnçírzna II Rzeczypospolitejw latach 1935-1939(Warsaw, 1969),pp. 138-40. 69. Quoted by Chojnowski,Koncepcje polityki, p. 214. 70. For detailson thisprogramme see ibid.,pp. 226-32,and Stawecki,Nastep- cy Komendanta,passim. As partof thisprogramme many allegedly unused Ortho- dox churchesand chapels in the Chekn regionwere destroyedor transferredto the Roman Catholic Church,while in some districtsof Volhyniaconversion from Orthodoxyto Catholicismwas openlyencouraged and sometimesforcibly carried out under the auspices of such militaryunits as the Corps of FrontierGuards (KOP). 71. E.g., under the law of 7 July1936 it was expresslyforbidden to sell or transferwithout special permission any land withinthe so-called border belt, which was 30 kmwide and coveredsome 28% of theterritory of thePolish State. This af-

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The Ukrainianside viewedall thesedevelopments with considerable apprehension.A growingnumber of UNDO membersbegan to question thepolicy of theirleadership, claiming that "normalization," far from im- provingPolish-Ukrainian relations, had achievedthe opposite, since the Polish governmenthad interpretedUkrainian cooperation as a sign of weakness.72 The failure of "normalization"was a disappointmentfor those Ukrainianswho had hoped that Poland, possiblyin alliance withGer- many,would revivePitsudski's and Petliura'sold dreamof an anti-Soviet crusade.On February1935, only a fewdays afterone of Goring's famous "huntingtrips" to Poland duringwhich he had offeredUkraine to the Poles,73Dmytro Levyts'kyi, the leader of the UNDO groupin the Sejm, urgedthe Polish governmentto take an activepart in the "politicalre- organization"of EasternEurope and help the Ukrainiansachieve inde- pendencefrom Soviet rule;74 not surprisingly, both the government and the opposition parties denounced the proposal.75This synchronizationof Germanand Ukrainianefforts was probablypurely coincidental, though it fectedUkrainian peasants especially and theywere often denied the right to buy land in theirown area. At thesame time,individuals who wereconsidered trouble- someor suspectedof anti-state activities could be expelledfrom the border region. Even thename of Poland's largestnational minority remained a matterof contro- versy,while Ukrainian newspapers were sometimes censored for employing the his- toricalname "Galicia" insteadof the official term "Little Poland," or evenfor using the word "autonomy." 72. Especiallyrevealing in thisrespect was theseries of articles in responseto a questionnairewhich appeared in Dilo: e.g.,the contributions by Dmytro Levyts'kyi (Dilo, 11 July1937, pp. 3-4), Hryn'Tershakovets' (ibid, 15 July,p. 3), Kost' Le- vyts'kyi(ibid., 18 July,pp. 3-4), VolodymyrStarosol's'kyi (ibid., 29 Julypp. 3-4), Oleksa Iavors'kyi(/6/i/.,12August, pp. 3-4),and VolodymyrKuz'movych(/6/V/., 12 September,pp. 3-4; 15 September,pp. 3-4; 18 September,pp. 4-5; and 23 Sep- tember,pp. 3-4). 73. Poland,Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Official Documents Concern- ingPolish-German and Polish-SovietRelations, 1933-1939 (London, 1940),p. 26; S. Strzetelski,Where the Storm Broke: Poland from Yesterday to Tomorrow(New York, 1942); S. Mackiewicz,Colonel Beck and His Policy(London, 1944),pp. 25- 26. 74. Poland, Sejm, Sprawozdaniestenograflczne, Okres III, Posiedzenie 128, p. 31. 75. See, e.g., thespeech by KazimierzCzapinski, ibid, Posiedzenie133, p. 32.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.xxv, No.4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 495 is possiblethat Levyts'kyi, through his contacts with the Ukrainian underground,was aware of Berlin'shopes of persuadingPoland tojoin theanti- Sovietexpedition, while the Ukrainian press in Poland,with only a fewex- ceptions,was declaringthat therewere no territorialor otherdisputes separatingthe Germans from the Ukrainians, and applaudingHitler's dis- mantlingof the systemof Versailles. As Dilo, the mouthpieceof the UNDO, commented:"obviously, we are notdelighted with everything that is takingplace withinthe Third Reich. . . . However,like all nationsof the world,we are watchingwith admiration that gigantic work of revivalthat is being conductedfor the German nation by the presentleader of the Germanpeople and of the Third Reich."76 The Ukrainianproblem was revivedbriefly in October 1938when the creationby Prague of an autonomousSubcarpathian Rus' was regardedby manyobservers as a steptowards establishing an independentUkrainian State. Czechoslovakia,and especiallyher easternmost province, provided a convenientjumping-off point for any campaign against the Soviet Union or Poland. Thus, the threatof Germanaggression from the south and the spectreof an independentUkraine could be used againstPoland as an ef- fectivebargaining-counter for Danzig and the "Corridor." It is not surprising,therefore, that the annexationof Subcarpathian Rus' by Hungaryseemed to be an ideal solutionfrom both Budapest's and Warsaw'spoint of view.While the Hungarians were interested in reclaim- ing theirancient province, the Poles feltthat a Germanbase in thesouth could have becomea permanentmenace to theirsecurity. They were even

76. "Za samostiinyiukrains'kyi pidkhid do inshykhnarodiv," Dilo, 14August 1938,p. 2. It shouldbe notedthat Ukrainian nationalists looked upon Germanyas theirnatural ally, whose objectivesin Eastern Europe- the destructionof the Soviet regimeand the dismembermentof the USSR - basicallycoincided with theirown. Theyforesaw economic domination of Ukraineby Germany,but were readyto pay thatprice for the sake ofpolitical independence. The Germans,on the otherhand, neverseriously entertained the idea of a partnership,and whilethey wereready to use theUkrainian nationalists as a tool to underminePoland and the Soviet Union,they were always prepared to exchangeor sacrificethem in orderto gain moreimmediate political advantages. This led to manydisappointments for the Ukrainiannationalists, since almost any improvementin relationsbetween Germanyon theone hand and Poland or the.USSR on the other,no matterhow short-lived,took place at theirexpense. For detailssee Torzecki,Kwestia ukrainska, passim,and Roman Ilnytzkyj,Deutschland und die Ukraine,1934-1945, vol. I, 2d ed. (Munich, 1958).

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 496 I Revue Canadienne des Slavistes Décembre1983 less inclinedto tolerateits becominga centrefor a Ukrainianirredentist movement,and eventsin EasternGalicia seemedto demonstratethat their apprehensionswere well-founded.In October and November 1938, Ukrainiancrowds in Lwów and severalother places stagedanti-Hungar- ian and anti-Polishmarches and demonstrations,which in turnled to counter-demonstrationsand pogroms of Ukrainian institutionsand commercialenterprises. This exacerbationof Polish-Ukrainianrelations enabledthe OUN to rebuildits tarnished reputation and to regainthe supportof the Ukrainianpopulation in EasternGalicia forits policy of con- frontation.77The Polish governmentreacted to these developmentsby takinga seriesof repressivemeasures, which recalled the "pacification" of 1930. It was at this inauspiciousmoment that, on 9 December 1938,the Ukrainiandeputies in theSejm presenteda billproviding for the establishmentof an autonomous"Galician-Volhynian Land," enjoyingfull rights of self-governmentexcept in foreignpolicy and militaryand financialmat- ters.It was to have itsown legislatureand a government,whose premier and leading ministerswere to be membersof the Polish Cabinet. Both Polishand Ukrainianwere to be recognizedas officiallanguages of this territory,which, with some 40,000 square miles and a populationof 9 million, would have comprisedapproximately one-fourth of thewhole area of the Polish Republic.78The billwas modelledon thehome-rule law grantedby the Pragueparliament to Slovakia and SubcarpathianRus', butit also re-

77. During the periodbetween 5 September1938 and 15 March 1939,when the tensionover Czechoslovakia and theCarpatho-Ukrainian problem was at its peak, the Ukrainianunderground engaged, according to officialstatistics, in 397 illegaldemonstrations, 47 acts of sabotage,and 34 terroristattacks (Chojnowski, Koncepcjepolityki, p. 235). At the same time,on the Polish side,an increasingly aggressiverole was playedby theparamilitary organization "Strzelec" and above all by the universitystudents of Lwów, largelyunder the influenceof National Democraticideology, whose anti-Ukrainian and anti-Semiticexcesses made them notoriousthroughout Poland. The tenseatmosphere which gripped the southeast- ern provincesof Poland impelled Msgr. Felipe Cortesi, the papal nuncio in Warsaw,to visitthe Roman and GreekCatholic bishops of EasternGalicia and to issue an appeal for reconciliation,which was duly publishedin the Polish and Ukrainiandailv Dress(see Dilo. 16 December 1938,p. 4). 78. See "PolishUkrainian Demands: AutonomyBill Introduced,"The Times (London), 10 December 1938,p. 11. The demand fora territorialautonomy of Ukrainianethnic regions in Poland was includedin theresolutions adopted by the GeneralCommittee of theUNDO on 7 May 1938:"Whereas all theareas inhabited bythe Ukrainian people in Poland formone geopoliticaland economicwhole, and

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.XXV, No. 4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 497 called the demands put forwardby Konrad Henlein and his Sudeten German Partythat had led to the dismembermentof Czechoslovakia. Whilesuch proposalshad been voiced in thePolish Sejm as earlyas 1922, theattempt to revivethe issue at a timewhen Poland's internationalsitua- tion was becomingincreasingly insecure was bound to produce deep- seatedresentments and indignationeven among those groups that usually showed some sympathyfor the Ukrainian minority.79As the popular Lwów daily, WiekNowy, put it, We have now obtainedthe certainty that the thread which binds the Ukrainiansto ourstate is verythin indeed. . . . Weare not sure what advantagesthey are going to getfrom a TranscarpathianRus' underGer- manprotectorate, but it is possibleeven today to calculate the losses. The factthat our ways are partingand thatthe slogans of cooperation are beingreplaced by those of conflict represents a definite loss for Poland; [theUkrainians], however, are also goingto be losers- and theyhave chosentheir path quite consciously, recklessly, and witha completedis- regardof the lessons of history.80

In fact,many Ukrainians in Poland wereconvinced that the Czecho- slovakdebacle was notthe end but ratherthe beginning of a newhistorical upheaval thatwould realize,in one formor another,their aspirations to statehoodand independence:thus it is unlikelythat they would have been readyto revisetheir attitude towards Warsaw even ifthe Polishgovern- menthad acceptedtheir demands for territorial autonomy. To acceptany benefitsof Polish ruleimplied the acceptance of Polishrule itself and this was disagreeableto manyUkrainians.81 In the meantime,international events had begun to move inex- orablytowards war, for Poland's refusalto allyherself with Germany was whereasthe national conditions there require a specialarrangement, the Central Committeeof the UNDO demandsthe introduction ofa territorialautonomy for all theseregions" (quoted from Dilo, 10 May 1938, p. 7).The formal presentation of theautonomy bill in theSejm was precededby an attackon thepolicies of the governmenttowards the Ukrainian minority (Poland, Sejm, Sprawozdanie steno- graficzne,Kadencja V, Posiedzenie3, pp. 48-51). 79. See,e.g., the editorial "Shum dovkola vymohy avtonomii" in Dilo, 9 De- cember1938, pp. 1-2. 80. WiekNowy, 9 December1938, as quotedin Dilo, 10 December 1938, p. 2. 81. As theGerman consul in Lwów stated in one of his reports, "the Ukrain- ianswould regard an autonomystatute only as a tacticalgain, and notas a final solution"- seeGermany, Auswärtiges Amt, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,Series D, VI (Washington,1956), No. 763,p. 1054.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 498 I Canadian Slavonic Papers December1983 to unleash Hitler'svengeance upon her. The Ukrainianissue became ir- relevantto himas he had decidedto collude withthe Soviet Union in the destructionof Poland. Thus,having enjoyed brief prominence as an inter- nationalissue, the Ukrainianproblem was temporarilyshelved in March 1939, when the Polish-Hungarianfrontier was re-establishedfor what turnedout to be a periodof onlysix months.Rejoicing in Budapestwas sincere,but celebrationsin Warsawwere tinged with bitterness and frus- tration,and Beck's triumphwas markedby a forebodingof comingdis- aster. His apprehensionswere well-founded,for the disappearanceof Czechoslovakiafrom the map of Europe provedto be merelya firststep towardsthe fourthpartition of Poland.82 These dramaticevents shocked the Ukrainiansin Poland, and their high hopes thathad been fannedrather irresponsibly by sectionsof the local Ukrainianpress collapsed. This traumaticexperience led to a tempo- rarydisenchantment with Germany and an attemptto renewthe dialogue withWarsaw.83 On 25 March 1939,Dr. IosyfSlipyi, the rector of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lwów, paid a courtesycall on Jan Szembek,Under-Secretary of State in the Polish Ministryof ForeignAf- fairs,to soundout theviews of thePolish government on whetherit would be possible to start Polish-Ukrainianconversations "on an internal platform;"however, nothing seems to have come out of this initiative, whichwas duly reportedto Beck and apparentlyaroused his interest.84 In themeantime, Warsaw proceeded to takemeasures to enhancethe defencecapabilities of the state in the face of imminentwar. A decree draftedearly in 1939 proposed to strengtheneven furtherthe Polish elementin theeastern provinces, particularly Eastern Galicia, and to en- couragethe internal migration and emigrationof local Ukrainians.85The aim was to Polonize the stateadministration completely, to increasethe 82. As the Warsaw correspondentof Dilo reportedfrom the Polish capital, "the enthusiastsof the common frontierwith Hungary are today less than de- lighted.Their joy overthe common frontier is marredby their awareness that the [Polish] frontierwith Germany has been extended far beyond the Tatra Mountains"("Bez entuziiazmu,"Dilo, 19 March 1939, p. 4). For a selectionof editorialopinion in thePolish press see ibid.,19 March,p. 5; 20 March,pp. 4-5; 21 March,p. 2. 83. It is noteworthythat for a momentthe pro-Sovietorientation, once re- presentedby a factionwithin the UNDO, seemedto regainsome of its popularity- see "Nebezpeka novykhmirazhiv," ibid., 24 March 1939,p. 2. 84. Diariuszi tekiJanaSzembeka (1935-1945), IV (London, 1972),pp. 530-31 (Rozmowa ζ ks. Slipyjem)and 536 (Rozmowa ζ min. Beckiem). 85. Chojnowski,Koncepcje polity ki, pp. 237-38.

This content downloaded from 62.122.73.250 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 19:35:37 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Vol.XXV, No. 4 Poland and the UkrainianProblem | 499 cadres of Polish technicians,teachers, and other professionalsin the nationallymixed areas, and to expandthe network of Polishschools and of social and paramilitaryorganizations.86 Needless to say, thisambitious, long-rangeproject represented an admissionof the failure of official policy towardsthe minorities in generaland theUkrainian population in particu- lar. It is significantthat one of thelast acts of Püsudski'ssuccessors was to adopt unreservedlythe so-called incorporation programme of the Nation- al Democrats,and abandon the last vestigesof thefederalist scheme.87 In June1938 Governor Józewski was recalledfrom Volhynia and laterin the yearthe weeklyBiuletyn Polsko-Ukrainski was closed™ Hitler'sterritorial demands and the threatof war finallypersuaded theUkrainian politicians to keepa generallylow profilein ordernot to an- tagonizethe Poles duringtheir hour of trial.89The Nazis were,of course, quite anxious to use the Ukrainianunderground in Poland as a fifth columnand theGerman consul in Lwówassured his superiors on 2 August 1939 that the Ukrainianshad "regainedtheir faith in Germanyand her Führer"and would, in the eventof an armedconflict between the Third Reichand Poland, "riseas one man."90These hopescame to naught,however,since, with the exception of a fewisolated incidents, theOUN leader- shiprefused to initiateany large-scale anti-Polish action, which, in thelong run,would have provedfutile and evensuicidal.91 In fact,the fears that Po- lishdoubts over Ukrainian loyalties might provoke a massanti-Ukrainian actioneither officially or unofficiallyled thehead of theUkrainian parlia- mentaryrepresentation and DeputySpeaker of the Sejm, VasyP Mudryi, to make a declarationof loyaltyto the Polish Republicduring the extra- ordinarysession of 2 September1939; a similarstatement was made bya Ukrainianrepresentative in theSenate.92 By then,however, it was too late; boththe Poles and the Ukrainianswere rapidly descending into the abyss of the Second World War.

86. Ibid., p. 238. 87. Ibid., p. 239. 88. Actually,Biuletyn Polsko-Ukrainski was supersededby a monthly,Prob- lemyEuropy Wschodniej, which continued to uphold the "Promethean"conception,but approachedit froma broaderviewpoint - see Torzecki,Kwestia ukrainska, p. 176. 89. Kedryn,Zhyitia - podii- liudy,p. 318. 90. Documentson GermanForeign Policy, Series D, VI, dd. 1053-54. 91. Mirchuk,Nary s istorii,pp. 584-86. 92. Slawoj-Skladowski,Nie ostatnieslowo, pp. 257-58; Kedryn,Zhyttia- podii- liudy,p. 318.

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As JózefLobodowski has observedin his reviewof thisperiod: "the seeds of the futuremassacres were sown duringthose twentyyears"93 -years, one mightadd, in whichboth the Polish and theUkrainian sides werefound wanting in prudenceand foresight,in politicalrealism and in commonsense. If thePolish authorities frequently showed a lack ofstates- manshipand imagination,and the Polish communityin the easternbor- derlandswas adamantlyopposed to grantingthe slightest concessions, the Ukrainianleadership oscillated between timidity and intransigence,in- decisivenessand opportunism,and at criticalmoments displayed a lackof practicaljudgement. At thesame time,the terrorist underground did more harmto the Ukrainiancommunity than to the Polish Stateby provoking mass reprisalsand seriouslyimpeding the legal activitiesof Ukrainian social, cultural,and economicinstitutions.94 The Poles and theUkrainians should not be judged too harshly,however,for a settlementof the problemhad defeatedmany generations of theirancestors. With nationalism in its mostvirulent form in ascendancy and totalitarianideologies officially enshrined by Poland's neighboursto theeast and west,it is perhapsnot surprising that the two societies proved unable to withstandthe pressuresof thosefateful years. In such circumstances,even the drastic solution by territorial adjustment and population exchangethat followed the end of WorldWar II seemsjustified.95 Will this solution prove to be beneficialand permanent,or will the Poles and Ukrainians,according to the tritephrase, be condemnedto repeattheir history?Only timewill tell- and a discreethistorian should knowbetter than to engage in futilespeculations.

93. JózefLobodowski, "Przeciw upiorom przesztosci," Kultura (Paris), No. 2/52 - 3/53 (February-March1952), p. 57. 94. See Kedrvn.Zhvttia - vodii- liudv.dd. 144-47. 95. Accordingto officialdata, theexchange of populationaffected 1,530,000 Poles as well as some 520,000 Ukrainians,Belorussians, and Lithuanians.Roos claimsthat "those who had fledin 1939-40and 1944-5swelled the number of Poles fromthe east to be foundon Polishsoil in 1950to about 2,180,000" (A Historyof ModernPoland, p. 212). The returnsof the Soviet census of 1979 indicatethat 1,151,000Poles wereleft on the Sovietside of thefrontier, while Polish statistics show that in 1970 therewere 180,000Ukrainians and 165,000Belorussians still livingin Poland.

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