UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA Los Angeles “Free DC:” the Struggle For

Home , John Tyler Morgan, Julius Hobson, Marion Barry, Robert Drury (sailor), Sterling Tucker, Walter Fauntroy

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

“Free D.C.:”

The Struggle for Civil, Political, and Human Rights

in Washington, D.C., 1965-1979

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in History

Selah Shalom Johnson

2015

Selah Shalom Johnson

2015

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

“Free D.C.:” The Struggle for Civil, Political, and Human Rights

in Washington, D.C., 1965-1979

Selah Shalom Johnson

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Los Angeles, 2015

Professor Brenda Stevenson, Chair

“Free D.C:” The Struggle for Civil, Political, and Human Rights in Washington, D.C.,

1965-1979, illuminates one of the greatest political shortcomings in 20th century America, which was the failure to provide full political enfranchisement for the citizens of Washington, D.C. – the first major American city with a majority African-American population. This project centers on the Free D.C. Movement, a political crusade to fully enfranchise Washingtonians, through grassroots organizing and by pressuring the Federal government to address the political, social, and economic ills that plagued the nation’s capital for nearly a century. Washingtonians’ struggle for full political enfranchisement was one of the most significant goals and significant shortcomings of the 20th century.

Washington has been an under-researched part of Civil Rights Movement history, even though the city had an instrumental role during this era. My project explores the “Free D.C.”

Movement through the lens of residential segregation, employment, and education. I examine how the desire for institutional changes and improvements in these areas helped shape and direct the local movement, and consequently undermined Washington, D.C. as the beacon of democracy and freedom. The Free D.C. Movement culminated in the late 1960s when many civil rights activists were starting to shift their focus from boycotts and protests, to political power and economic control in the black community. Unlike other civil rights activism, “Free D.C.” activism began with the intention of gaining full political enfranchisement and economic control.

I have concluded that the lack of statehood and the lack of full political enfranchisement, essentially retarded Washingtonians’ social, political and economic progress, in what should have been one of the most transformative eras in their history.

iii

The dissertation of Selah Shalom Johnson is approved.

Robin D.G. Kelley

Lauren Derby

Evelyn Blumenberg

Brenda Stevenson, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2015

I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my grandfather, Samuel J. “Pop-Pop” Nicholson for

loving me, and for building my very first bookcase-by hand. The rest is history.

Table of Contents

Introduction: “The Curious Case of Washington, D.C”………………………………………...p.1

Chapter 1: The Destruction of Washington’s Political Self-Determination & Black Resistance, 1890-1965……………………………………………………………………………………...p.10

Chapter 2: “Free D.C.:” The Dawn of Washington’s Local Liberation Movement, 1965- 1967…………………………………………………………………………………………....p. 39

Chapter 3: “The Day the District Shook:” The Riot and the Aftermath, 1968-1972………….p. 80

Chapter 4: “We Have Home Rule, Now What?: Home Rule and the Meaning of Black Political Power, 1973-1978”………………………………………………………………………..…p. 130

Epilogue……………………………………………………………………………...………p. 192

Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………..p. 202

Endnotes……………………………………………………………………………………....p.213

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………p.238

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ, for helping me maintain my sanity, while surrounded by circumstances in which I should have certainly lost it. I know it was nothing but the power of the Holy Spirit that got me through this process. To God be the glory for all of his blessings!

I would like to thank Brenda Stevenson for serving as my advisor and committee chair. I am appreciative for all of your constructive criticism, professional advice, and the multiple letters of recommendation you submitted on my behalf. Additionally, I would like to thank

Robin Kelley, Robin Derby and Evelyn Blumenberg for serving on my committee, writing several letters of recommendation, offering constructive feedback, and for supporting my project.

Next, I would like to acknowledge my family: My mother, for her unconditional love and support throughout this process, and throughout my life. I would like to thank all of my siblings, who often did not understand what I was going through, but supported me through it, anyway-

Muriel, Nile, Matthew and Danube. And of course, my three beautiful nieces Mariah, Nya, and

Autumn.

I also want to thank Eboni Shaw and Hadley Porter for their support as graduate counselors. Eboni, I am so grateful for your patience and always being a sounding board on the days I needed to vent. You have been a great over the past five years.

I would like to thank my dear friend, old roommate, and Spelman sister, Lauren Stanley, for being one of the best friends I could have ever made in my life. You have been so supportive throughout this process, and I am forever grateful and appreciative of our bond. Additionally, I would like to thank my dear friend, Dr. Christopher Bonner, for being such a good friend, and for being willing to look over my prospectus and cover letters to keep me from embarrassing

vii

myself, before showing anybody else. I am so grateful to you for that. I would like to thank my friend, Brandon Jones for opening up his home to me on multiple research trips, so I could save money and be as close as possible to the archives. I want to thank my Spelman sister, Sequoia

Shields, for giving me a place to stay for the ASALH conference, when I couldn’t afford a hotel-

Thank you! I want to thank all of my friends that have offered me support and encouragement during this chapter of my life: Sabrina Smith, Zaneta Smith, Ebony Smith, Alma Heckman,

Kristen Hilaire Glasgow, Laura Redford, Pablo Sierra, Melanie Arias, Dr. Kelly Gildersleeve,

Amber Withers, Sandra Brasda, & Asya Spears.

Additionally, I am grateful for all of the assistance I received at the archives including

George Washington University’s Special Collections, the Manuscript Division at the Library of

Congress, and the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University. I would like to offer a special thank you to archivist, Mr. William Branch of the D.C. Office of Public Records, for his patience, assistance, and support.

It is with great pleasure that I can acknowledge and thank those at my alma mater,

Spelman College. I thank you all for giving me the tools and the foundation to become a great historian. I also want to thank you for the role you played in developing my personal character and thus, helping to make me the woman I am today.

I love you all.

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Selah Shalom Johnson

EDUCATION Master of Arts, U.S. History, UCLA, June 2012 Bachelor of Arts, History, Spelman College, Magna Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa, May 2010

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

UCLA Instructor, Teaching Fellow for African-American Women & the Fight for Gender Equality in the 20th Century, March 2014-Present  Developed Course Curriculum & Created Course Syllabus  Conducts historical writing seminars  Oversees undergraduate development of historical perspectives  Facilitates seminar discussion  Moderates weekly online discussion forums for students

UCLA Teaching Fellow for Sex: From Biology to Gendered Society September 2014-March 2015  Facilitates discussion sections around the issues of sex/gender and the law & gender identity  Leads undergraduate writing workshops  Assists in course curriculum development

UCLA Teaching Fellow for Online Course for 20th-21st Century U.S. History, August 2014- September 2014 & June 2013- August 2013  Created weekly video blog explaining overall historical concepts for each lesson  Developed and maintained course webpage  Facilitated online course discussion boards  Held weekly office hours via Skype

UCLA Teaching Associate for History 156: “Jazz and the Political Imagination,” September 2012-December 2012  Assisted in course development  Taught approximately 30 students for this upper-level course  Facilitated weekly class discussions on various assigned readings among students  Graded two sets 7-10 page, small research papers

UCLA Teaching Associate for “History 13B: The United States and its Colonial Origins: 19th Century,” January 2013- March 2013 & January 2012-March 2012  Lectured on the Postbellum South, emphasizing the 19th century African-American experience  Developed and delivered lecture on the Reconstruction Era in the 19th century  Assisted in course curriculum development

UCLA Teaching Assistant for “History13C: The United States and its Colonial Origins: 20th and 21st Centuries,” April 2012- June 2012  Responsible for teaching three weekly sections, outside of course lectures to expand on course materials  Assisted in curriculum development  Conducted undergraduate historical writing workshops

UCLA Teaching Assistant for “History 13A: History of the United States and its Colonial Origins: Colonial Origins and First Nation Building Acts,” September 2011- December 2011  Facilitated classroom discussions

 Conducted research and writing workshops  Assisted in curriculum development

ACADEMIC RESEARCH & WORK EXPERIENCE

UCLA Graduate Student Researcher for School of Theater, Film and Television/ Online Editor, March 2013-June 2013  Reviewed accuracy of professor’s video lectures for U.S. History online course  Created an image gallery for each of the 15 lessons

Curatorial/Research Intern for Smithsonian National Museum of African-American History and Culture (NMAAHC), June 2010-August 2010  Developed inaugural research on the former Fort Reno area of Washington, D.C.  Worked to develop collections on “Indivisible” project  Developed research for prospective projects on African-American culture in Los Angeles, California

AWARDS

 UCLA History Pre-Dissertation Year Fellowship, 2013-2014  UCLA Graduate Summer Research Mentorship Award, 2012  Spelman College Outstanding Senior History Major, 2010

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

 September 2014, Association of African American Life and History Conference, Presented paper entitled, “The Day the District Shook:” The April 4, 1968 Riot in Washington and the Aftermath”

 January 2014, American Historical Association (AHA), Poster Presentation entitled, “Free D.C.:” The Struggle for Political and Social Equality in Washington, D.C.,1965-1979 at the American Historical Association

PUBLICATIONS “Liberation on the Brinks: A Comparative Study on the Goals and Achievements of the Cuban Revolution, the Civil Rights, and Black Power Movements in the United States” in Mellon-Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Journal Published by Harvard University, 2008.

 Presented research project: Liberation on the Brinks: A Comparative Study on the Goals and Achievements of the Cuban Revolution to the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements in the United States

 Participated in graduate admissions workshops

Introduction:

“The Curious Case of Washington, D.C”

“O, yes, I say it plain, America never was America to me, And yet I swear this oath— America will be!” ---“Let America Be America Again,” Langston Hughes, 1938

“I feel torment coming on They took my chains Said they set me free Good God, tell me why did they lie to me?” --- “Recognition”, recorded by Harry Belafonte, 1949

The cries for Black freedom have rung for centuries- from the voices of cotton-picking slaves in Georgia, to the yells for mercy by co-conspirators of the 1831 Denmark Vesey Slave

Rebellion, to the demands for freedom and citizenship by 19th century black abolitionists, to the

1960s lunch counter sit-ins, and most recently, the call for federal and state governments to realize that “Black Lives Matter.” The cry for freedom, democracy and citizenship rights has characterized the Black political experience in America. Individual political demands and formal and informal political organizing have been used over the course of four-hundred years in an effort to ultimately gain access to the democracy that should have belonged to African-

Americans, upon the ratification of the 13th and 14th U.S. constitutional amendments in 1865 and

1866, respectively.

“Free D.C.:” The Struggle for Civil, Political, and Human Rights in Washington, D.C.,

1965-1978, is an examination of yet another struggle for full political enfranchisement and rightful access to democratic citizenship. “Free D.C.” focuses on a population that has been under-researched and largely disregarded in studies of the Black Freedom Movement- Black

Washingtonians. Black Washingtonians suffered from institutionalized segregation and political disenfranchisement while being citizens of the nation’s capital. By the mid-1950s, Black

Washingtonians constituted the majority of the capital of the so-called, “free world.” The irony of perpetual, intentional and institutional racial discrimination in the nation’s capital against

African-Americans has been a grave, historical oversight.

This dissertation centers on the Free D.C. Movement (FDCM), a political crusade to fully enfranchise Washingtonians, through grassroots organizing and by pressuring the Federal government to address the political, social, and economic ills that plagued the nation’s capital for nearly a century. Washingtonians’ struggle for full political enfranchisement was one of the most significant goals and significant shortcomings of the 20th century. Washington served as the home of the Federal government, and the place where monumental legislation was passed in the

1960s to improve the lives of oppressed minority groups, especially African-Americans.

Washingtonians lived closest to the representatives and officials making these historical changes, but seemed to benefit the least. While the nation’s capital should have symbolized the American ideals of freedom, democracy and equality, it instead, perpetuated the very opposite with institutionalized segregation and the absence of local voting power.

Washington has been an under-researched part of Civil Rights Movement history, even though the city had an instrumental role during this era. My project explores the “Free D.C.”

Movement through the lens of residential segregation, employment, and education. I examine how the desire for institutional changes and improvements in these areas helped shape and direct the local movement, and consequently undermined Washington, D.C. as the beacon of democracy and freedom. The Free D.C. Movement culminated in the late 1960s when many civil rights activists were starting to shift their focus from boycotts and protests, to political power and economic control, in the black community. Unlike other civil rights activism, “Free D.C.” activism began with the intention of gaining full political enfranchisement and economic control.

Political enfranchisement and economic control were the only ways to ensure Washingtonians housing equity, better public education, and equal employment opportunities. I have concluded that Washington’s lack of statehood and lack of full political enfranchisement, essentially retarded its political, social and economic progress, in what should have been one of the most transformative eras in its history.

“Free D.C.” chronicles the FDCM and the necessity of black activism for political enfranchisement in the nation’s capital. Much of the mainstream press and the few pieces of literature around the push for civil rights and Home Rule in Washington, have credited

Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon with the creation of a local government and the Home Rule Act of 1973, respectively. Black, grassroots political pressure on presidents and congressional representatives to grant democratic citizenship rights to Washingtonians, was absolutely essential for the progress made from 1965-1978. Black political activism was largely responsible for dismantling segregation, the creation of a locally-elected government, and the significant movement for proportional, federal representation. “Free D.C.” seeks to resituate the focus of D.C’s political progress from a few presidents and white, male political power players in the city onto black, Washingtonian activists who led the FDCM, which resulted in significant and substantial changes to the political structure and social circumstances for African-

Americans.

Before “Free D.C.”

Washington, D.C. was and is a complicated place. D.C. is technically part of the southern

United States, falling just below the Mason-Dixon Line. It is also an honorary part of the North, as it served as the capital of the Union during the Civil War.1 D.C. nevertheless resembled

Southern governments more than northern ones from 1890 into the mid-1970s. Like the Southern

states, racial segregation was the law of the land in Washington. Unlike most African-Americans in the South, however, Black Washingtonians were not simply disenfranchised, but had no representation for which to vote. Washington was a federally controlled city. Therefore,

Washingtonians did not even have a local government for which it could protest against. While all Washingtonians lacked democratically-elected political representation, Black Washingtonians suffered from disenfranchisement even more so, because they were restricted not only politically, but socially and economically by racial segregation.2

While “Free D.C.” focuses on the Free D.C. Movement from 1965-1978, it is critical for one to understand the history of Washington, beginning in the 19th century to properly contextualize the mid-20th century movement. “Free D.C.” cannot be understood in a vacuum.

There was a long history of racial prejudice and discrimination, and limited democratic access long before the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) set up a local headquarters and began to investigate the particular situation of Black Washingtonians in 1965, and the “Free D.C. Movement” was officially declared in 1966.

A Brief History of Washington, D.C.’s Development

In 1802, at the inception of Washington, D.C., the U.S. Constitution granted formal authority over the affairs of the District by empowering it “to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever…3” Despite this clause, the city of Washington, initially possessed considerable independent power. Its first government consisted of a Presidentially-appointed mayor and an elected city council. A decade later, in 1812, Congress approved a measure in which Washington would have a mayor appointed by the city council, and by 1820, the position of mayor was popularly elected. The early 19th century provided great hope for the potential of local sovereignty in the District of Columbia.4

However, as later events of the 19th century unfolded, Congress began to work to eliminate the limited, democratic freedoms of Washingtonians. The resistance from Congress was directly related to the growing, free, African-American population in the city. Many slaves who were freed out of states like Virginia and Maryland, in particular, settled in the District during the 19th century. The emancipation of these slaves resulted in a great deal of anxiety by congressional representatives and the local white citizenry. Many were anxious to rid the nation’s capital of the overwhelming black population and their potential political power.

In 1890, Alabama Senator, John Tyler Morgan, claimed,

“[T]hey [the African-American population] came in here and they took possession of a certain part of the political power of this District, they did not take possession of it, for they were incapable of doing that…. Thereupon, in the face of this influx of negro population from the surrounding States, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in order to preserve property rights and the decency of administration in the central government of the United States …found it necessary to disfranchise every man in the District of Columbia…to get rid of this load of negro suffrage that was flooded in upon them.5”

Senator Morgan was referencing the decades-long process, beginning in the Reconstruction Era, to ensure the political powerlessness of black freedmen and women. Morgan’s speech was one example of the many considerable efforts in the post-Civil War period to eliminate democratic freedoms among the African-American population. For instance in 1871, Congress adopted a new form of government for the District. The new government replaced the elected mayor and city-council with a Presidentially-appointed District governor, and 11-member council, and a

Board of Public Works. The Board of Public Works was appointed to produce a speedy overhaul

to the city’s antiquated public resources. The board, however, managed to bankrupt the city in three years. As a consequence, Congress revoked the District’s franchise in 1874, and established a presidentially-appointed three-man Board of Commissioners to govern Washington.6

While the commission was supposedly created as a “stopgap” measure, Congress managed to institutionalize the commission government in 1878, and it lasted until 1967, leaving

Washingtonians voiceless and powerless in local and federal government politics.7 The commission government worked not only to eliminate participatory democracy, but to further oppress the African-American population by legalizing segregation, barring access to employment in the government-even in some of the most menial jobs, restricting their housing opportunities, and reducing their access to public education. The commission government’s purposeful discriminatory policies and racial exclusion finally, came to a head in the 1960s with black political resistance in the form of the “Free D.C.” Movement.8

“Free D.C.” Outline

“Free D.C.:” The Struggle for Civil, Political, and Human Rights in Washington, D.C.,

1965-1978, is divided into four chapters which chronicle the fight for political and social equality of black Washingtonians. The first chapter is entitled, “The Destruction of Washington’s

Political Self-Determination & Black Resistance, 1890-1965.” Chapter One will serve as a historical context chapter that explains how Washington lost the power of a locally elected government, as a consequence of post-Reconstruction backlash. Additionally, this chapter will detail subsequent acts of African-American resistance against legalized segregation and a lack of government control. Chapter Two is called, “Free D.C.: The Dawn of Washington’s Local

Liberation Movement, 1965-1967.” This chapter explores how the Free D.C. Movement developed with the establishment of a permanent Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

(SNCC) chapter. From 1965-1967, SNCC members helped organize the Free D.C. Movement in hopes that Washingtonians would gain democratic control over their city.

Chapter Three is entitled, “The Day the District Shook: The Riot and the Aftermath,

1968-1972.” The third chapter discusses the April 4, 1968 riot, and how it forced “Free D.C.” activists to re-evaluate their approach to the problems facing black Washingtonians, especially the poor and working classes. “The Day the District Shook” explores local community organizing in-depth, with special attention on the Model Inner City Community Organization

(MICCO), Washington’s local chapter of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), and Washington D.C.’s Teacher Union (DCTU). The third chapter’s examination of local organizing works to emphasize the social-historical context of “Free D.C."

The fourth and final chapter, is called, “We Have Home Rule. Now, What?: Home Rule and the Meaning of Black Political Power, 1973-1979.” This chapter charts the struggle and achievement of Home Rule. The Home Rule Act of 1973 allowed Washingtonians to elect their own local government representatives, for the first time, in nearly a century. Chapter four also explores the shortcomings of such an act. Despite the Home Rule Act of 1973, Congress still held ultimate power over the city, as they were legally empowered to veto any of the city council’s democratically- approved measures. This chapter explores what the Home Rule Act meant in terms of democracy, in a nation that was supposed to ensure full political enfranchisement for all of its citizens, but failed to do so.

Free D.C. is not a historical account that ends with resolve nor is it an account that concludes with a settling and satisfying conclusion-at least not for those who are interested in ensuring democratic rights to all American citizens. Instead, this is a historical account designed to educate people on the history of injustice against Black Washingtonians and to help properly

contextualize the current struggles of those living in the nation’s capital. It is my sincere hope to inspire activism among other Americans to advocate for the freedom of the vulnerable and politically oppressed population of D.C. that has existed for over a century.

Chapter 1:

The Destruction of Washington’s

Political Self-Determination

Black Resistance, 1890-1965

In 1890, Alabama Senator, John Tyler Morgan, suggested that it was necessary, “To burn down the barn in order to get rid of the rats…the rats being the [N]egro population and the barn

being the government of the District of Columbia.9” Morgan, like many other politicians and white citizens of the District of Columbia, grew wearied with the overwhelming African-

American population of the city at the end of the 19th century. Many African-Americans moved from states like Virginia and Maryland in search of better opportunities and a better quality of life following emancipation. Several congressmen, particularly from the South, sought to undermine the potential political impact of Washington’s large African-American population, by eliminating the District’s local government. Senator Morgan’s efforts were very much like those of white political officials and white citizens throughout the rest of the South. Post-

Reconstruction backlash included purposeful and often violent intimidating efforts to reduce black political power, and thus, permanently, subjugate black American citizens. Congress’ elimination of the District’s local government fit well into the post-Reconstruction backlash mold.

While this project does not center on post-Reconstruction backlash in Washington, this backlash is critical to understanding the development, accomplishments and shortcomings of the

“Free D.C. Movement,” that would emerge nearly eighty years later. Congressional officials’ racism that ultimately led to the elimination of Washington’s local government effectually retarded black political, social, and economic advancement for the next eight decades- and, many could argue, even longer. Moreover, racist policies and attitudes like those of Senator Morgan were duplicated and perpetuated in Congress for decades to come.

Washington, D.C. was and is a complicated place. While D.C. is technically part of the southern United States, as it falls just below the Mason-Dixon Line; it is also an honorary part of the North, as it served as the capital of the Union during the Civil War.10 D.C. nevertheless resembled Southern governments more than northern ones from 1890 into the mid-1970s. Like

the Southern states, racial segregation was the law of the land in Washington, with the exception of transportation.1 Nevertheless, African-Americans were barred from hotels, restaurants, theaters, and other publicly and privately-owned institutions. There were no exceptions for

African-Americans, despite how rich or poor, famous or ordinary-they all endured racial discrimination. For instance, the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) blocked Marian

Anderson from performing at Constitution Hall in 1939, because she was black.11 Segregation negatively affected local and visiting African-Americans in Washington.

Unlike most African-Americans in the South, however, Black Washingtonians were not simply disenfranchised, but had no representation for which to vote in the first place.

Washington was a federally controlled city. Black Washingtonians struggled for the right to vote in presidential elections and for local government representation itself. As a consequence of the intensification of the Cold War, immense international scrutiny on American democracy spread.

Presidents like Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon were forced to deal with the issue of civil rights, especially as it pertained to the African-American populace in Washington. John F. Kennedy, for instance, began to push for political rights for local residents in the nation’s capital, in the early 1960s. In 1960,

Congress passed the twenty-third amendment, giving Washingtonians the right to vote. By 1967, under the direction of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Washingtonians were given a presidentially- appointed provisional government. Although, the presidentially appointed government did signify a form of progress, Washingtonians still continued to advocate for the opportunity to democratically elect their local government, until the passage of the Home Rule Act of 1973.12

1 Transportation segregation was abolished by the Act of Congress in 1863. The National Committee on Segregation noted, “On a street-car or bus, by law and custom, the Negro is the equal of the white man and his fare will buy him any seat he can find.”(p. 12)

Washingtonians faced a struggle that no other local government had to overcome. While many civil rights activists started to shift their focus to political power and economic control in the black community in an effort to gain full citizenship rights in America around 1965, this was the same time in which mass mobilization for civil and human rights in D.C. actually began, primarily because it had to begin there if Washingtonians wanted the opportunity to move into any neighborhood they desired, better educational opportunities for local African-Americans.

Washingtonians did not have a local government to petition, they had a Congressional

Committee on the District of Columbia (CCDC) controlled by Southern congressmen that did not require their votes to maintain their political position. Moreover, Washingtonians’ dissatisfaction with the committee did not result in congressional representatives’ termination or the CCDC’s dissolution, because they possessed no electoral power. Although mass mobilization for civil, political, and human rights does not begin in Washington until 1965, there were efforts to improve the plight of African-Americans prior to 1965. The early history of Black

Washingtonians’ resistance to political oppression is critical. Without an acknowledgement of previous forms of resistance, there is a historical tendency to assume that the FDCM was the result of an African-American epiphany as opposed to conscious organization and resistance, with roots that extended as far back as the early 20th century. There were early efforts by

African-Americans that challenged segregation and racism in Washington, D.C. during the

1940s, prior to the “Free D.C. Movement,” which will be discussed later in this chapter. 13

The Problem of International Scrutiny

In 1948, President Harry S. Truman’s administration assembled a national committee to write a report on segregation in the nation’s capital. After over a hundred case studies, and sample surveys, the committee drew the conclusion that segregation was destroying the international perception of American democracy. The committee based their conclusion on several instances in which darker-complexioned, foreign visitors suffered the same indignities as

African-Americans. For example, the Bolivian educator and other similar instances were critical to the committee’s decision including “Case 8:”

“A distinguished Bolivian educator was invited to Washington by the State Department on a good will tour. He had the dark Indian complexion typical of his countrymen, and was closely attended by an American official, who made arrangements for his hotel accommodations, meals, shopping etc. One night, however, left to his own devices, he went out for a stroll and decided to stop at a restaurant for something to eat. Refused service, he returned to his hotel in great indignation and protested to the State Department. Apologies were offered.”14

The system of segregation in the U.S. was designed to maintain a permanent racial hierarchy that elevated whites and subjugated blacks. Segregation was the law of the land in

Washington, D.C., just as it was throughout the rest of the South. Unlike countries in South

America and the Caribbean, the United States did not create several different racial or color categories to distinguish groups of people. “White” and “Negro” became the two dominant categories of racial division in practice and law. One was categorized and treated as Negro based on their visible complexion and their lineage that demonstrated remnants of African descent. As a consequence of this particular categorization, those who travelled from places such as Bolivia,

Brazil, or India and possessed a dark complexion were treated as “Negroes.” This narrow categorization, and purposeful racial discrimination, became a source of American embarrassment abroad as foreign leaders began to express their outrage and disgust over the practice of segregation known as Jim Crow.15

Most outside of the United States expected the nation’s capital to represent and embody the nation’s ideals of democracy and freedom. However, with the United States’ troubled history of chattel slavery and racial segregation, especially in the southern United States, the “racial problem” still existed. And, while overt forms of segregation were less-likely in the North, segregation was oftentimes worse than it was in the South. As a consequence of the rise of international media and the rise of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, America’s image as the “leader of the free world” was called into question across the globe especially in the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.).16

Many of America’s critics based their critique on their experiences in the nation’s capital.

Although educators, diplomats, and ambassadors of darker hues expressed outrage over

American racial discrimination based on their own personal experience, other foreign visitors from places in Europe who were categorized as white also took note of the blatant discrimination others endured. For example, a Danish official who spent several months in Washington on a mission for the King of Denmark, wrote a letter explaining his disgust with the practice of

American segregation. He explained that “Some of my European acquaintances even made unfavorable comparisons between Washington and Moscow, simply because your racial practices shocked them so strongly…Washington today, despite its great outward beauty, is not a good “salesman” for your kind of democracy.”17

Churches were also representative of Washington’s discriminatory culture. For example, a Panamanian Catholic visited the nation’s capital, and was disturbed at the exclusion of darker- complexioned people in Washington. The National Committee on Segregation reported, “As he knelt at prayer, a priest approached him and handed him a slip of paper. On the paper was the address of a Negro Catholic church. The priest explained that there were special churches for

Negro Catholics, and that he would be welcome there.18” Latin American visitors found this sort of behavior especially troublesome, as the segregated tradition permeated the Catholic Church, despite leadership from the same pope.19

Moreover, the problem of segregation became burdensome and seemingly, more trouble than it was worth for government employees. The government hired subterfuges to assist foreign visitors “to avoid being identified as an American Negro.” In Case 55, the committee recorded,

“A Spanish lady was asked to entertain the daughter of the Minister of Education of a Central American republic, who was visiting Washington under official auspices. The guest was colored, and when she expressed a desire to see the film “Great Expectations,” a hurried conference ensued. It was decided by her friends not to tell her about the practice of segregation, but to try to maneuver her into the theater. As the party approached the box office, everybody talked loudly in Spanish. The strategy was successful, and she slipped past.”20

Efforts to demonstrate that foreign visitors were not American Negroes became commonplace, but did not eliminate segregated practices. Quite frankly, the U.S. government was ill-prepared to insulate every darker-skinned foreign visitor from the rampant racial discrimination in the nation’s capital, which eventually resulted in international sympathy for African-Americans and scrutiny of the U.S. government.

Foreign visitors’ disappointment with America’s application of democracy led to much international criticism. They often cited race etiquette as an example of the nation’s hypocrisy.

The National Committee on Segregation, for example, noted that Washington was “the only major capital in the world where it was necessary to chaperon foreign guests to protect them from insult on account of color.”21 Despite the international stress placed on the U.S. as a consequence of racial segregation and discrimination, Washingtonians did not receive the right to vote for local representation until 1974, and continued to struggle for basic civil rights well after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Residential Segregation

During the 1940s and 1950s, housing covenants, in which neighborhood residents purposefully and legally restricted African-Americans’ opportunities to live in new and improved community developments, were commonplace in Washington. As historian, Lizbeth

Cohen noted, “Race was intrinsic to the process of postwar suburbanization, as the steady influx of African-Americans to northern and western cities during the war, and the Second Great

Migration out of the South that followed it, helped motivate urban whites to leave to the newly developing suburban areas located outside the city.”22 Furthermore, the National Committee on

Segregation found that “segregation [in real estate] is good business.” According to the national report, “By throwing up racial barriers, a realtor can capitalize on the racial feelings of some of his customers without making the property less valuable to others.”23 As a consequence of the

Washington Real Estate Board’s restrictive measures, black Washingtonians were barred from many new neighborhoods, and forced out of old ones “where they lived undisturbed for generations.”24 The destruction of Civil War fort sites that were described as “hilly regions…too far out of town…” began to displace African-American residents for the benefit of whites who wanted to live in suburban communities.25

The Fort Reno Community & Black Washingtonian Displacement

Fort Reno was one of a few forts established in Washington, D.C. during America’s Civil

War, and one of the forts destroyed by suburbanization. Shortly after the Civil War, this fort was settled into a small community predominantly by newly-freed African-American slaves.

Although short-lived, Reno had an incredibly rich history that revealed a great deal about the

African-American experience with discrimination in Washington, D.C. Fort Reno’s history exemplified the harsh realities and the tragedies African-Americans continued to experience far after slavery moving into the Jim Crow era as it pertained to residential segregation.

Fort Reno became an attractive area to African-Americans after slavery for several reasons which included: (1) an abundance of land (2) a growing community of families and businesses that would employ the new residents, (3) a school (which was rare for African-

American children at that time), and (4) eventually three churches. Many of those who settled at

Fort Reno came from Montgomery County, Maryland, or from Louisa, Madison and Loudoun

Counties in Virginia. Fort Reno became a subdivision of the Tenleytown (formerly known as

Tenallytown) borough in Washington, D.C. Most Tenleytown African-Americans lived in the

Fort Reno area. Shortly after the establishment of Fort Reno as a community, segregation was established. Those in Reno had separate churches, schools, and even grocery stores as some oral histories indicated from the wealthier white community of Tenleytown.26

Fort Reno, like many other African-American communities in the early twentieth-century contained people of different socio-economic statuses, because African-Americans were segregated solely on race. Reno residents’ occupations included laborers, laundresses, cooks, farmers, dairymen, and plumbers as well as some who worked in the U.S. Department of

Treasury. 27 This is important because in many of the newspaper articles that discussed

Tenleytown citizens and Congressmen’s efforts to dismantle the area, they referred to the destruction of Fort Reno as a “condemnation.” The word condemnation indicated the entire Reno community consisted of dilapidated homes, and that it was some sort of shantytown. While there were some dilapidated homes, there were also stably built homes. Many people at the time of the city government’s takeover had recently built new homes in the area and made improvements to the homes that were already there.28

There was a large population within Washington, D.C. that resented the existence of Fort

Reno and sought to eliminate it. The Evening Times and Washington Times newspaper articles

indicated that there had been efforts to dismantle the Fort Reno settlement as early as 1901, nearly forty years before the Washington, D.C. city government and the National Park Service

(NPS) began forcing the residents to leave the area officially. In an Evening Times article written on May 24, 1901, it was stated that,

“The Tenleytown Citizens’ Association will unite with the District Commissioners at the coming session of Congress to secure a necessary appropriation to purchase ten acres of ground surrounding the Fort Reno reservoir…The Purchase of the property will wipe out the colored settlement on Reno, where the houses are small and detrimental to surrounding interests.” 29

Additionally, a Washington Times article on December 5, 1903 headline read, “Ask

Condemnation of Fort Reno Tract-Citizens Declare Place Is Unsanitary.” The article also claimed that the development of Fort Reno Park was “Said to Be an Important Public

Improvement That Should Be Undertaken at Once.”30 Needless to say, the push to remove the

Fort Reno settlement had been in the making for several decades. Tenleytown residents had made plans to eliminate this area long before they were able to secure the necessary support to do so.

During the late 1920s, the federal government had decided to reclaim every Civil War

Fort around Washington, D.C. possible in an attempt to make it a national park or historic landmark. There were many congressmen who participated in the ultimate demise of Fort Reno.

Cuno H. Randolph, president of the Board of D.C. Commissioners, wrote to Congress in 1926 urging the passage of a bill for the purchase or condemnation of Fort Reno property.

Additionally, Senator Roscoe Patterson of Missouri introduced a bill that would make Fort Reno a national military park. Randolph and Senator Patterson’s impact on D.C. politics is indicative of the larger problem of Washington’s local and federal political representation. The decisions

that were being made and considered on behalf of African-Americans were done so without black Washingtonians’ consent. A modified form of his bill was passed in 1930 called the

Crampton Bill. City officials acted quickly once the bill passed into law and moved to establish a new park in Tenleytown. The actions by these congressmen generated a great deal of debate over eminent domain. Many wondered to what extent the U.S. government should be allowed to take over private lands for public use especially when it meant barely compensating residents for their homes, and forcing people out of their homes for the sake of a historical landmark. The residents of Reno fought to have such laws repealed, but to no avail.31

On April 1, 1951, The Washington Post reported that,

“Residents of the 12 homes scheduled to be razed …in the Fort Reno section are having great difficulty in finding housing within their income limits…The National Capital Housing Agency, which usually helps resettle families uprooted by governmental moves in Washington has a waiting list of 7000 at present...So far few families involved in the project have applied for low- cost housing...but chances of placement are small even if they do.”32

It is obvious through reports such as this, that there was very little help given to Fort

Reno residents in their move elsewhere. Many of them were forced into despairing situations. In the same article it was reported that Alexander R. Lewis, Treasury Department worker was forced to leave his house in Fort Reno. According to the report, he was unable to find an affordable home, and would most likely have to settle for renting a furnished room for him and his wife. Nettie Westmoreland, another resident, claimed that she would have “no place to go” after the deadline to move out of her home. 33

Frank Coupe and Pete Toatley, both of whom were National Park Service (NPS) workers, recalled the callousness with which they carried out the dismantlement of Fort Reno. When

asked about people who were still living in the houses, they claimed, “…we had to put one of

‘em out. That was a sorry thing to do but we had to…We had a court order…The husband or something, one of ‘em was in the hospital. They didn’t have the social programs that they have today to take care of such things.”34 Regardless of whether or not Fort Reno residents were able to secure accommodations elsewhere, they were all forced to leave the area in order to create a national park. No one was allowed to stay. Unfortunately, this uprooting of African-Americans out of their communities continued into the 1960s; but, instead of accepting or capitulating to the decisions made for the residents, the 1960s marked a period of community mobilization for black

Washingtonians against urban renewal projects that would displace predominantly poor, African-

American residents. The mass mobilization against urban redevelopment will be addressed in

Chapter Two.

Education

With the increasing development of suburbs, the local white population of Washington,

D.C. significantly declined by the early 1950s. By 1951, African-Americans comprised the majority of students in the Washington, D.C. public school system. Similar to the southern U.S., and other areas, Washington, D.C. had a purposefully segregated school system. Washington’s school system, however, possessed two major exceptions. First, unlike many cities, the D.C. public school system had two separate administrations-one for African-American children and the other for local white children. Additionally, there was a completely separate, African-

American staff (including school principals) responsible for day-to-day tasks. Both the black and white public school systems were “…under the direction of the Superintendent of Schools and of the Board of Education. The Board consisted of nine members appointed by the U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia. Three of the long-standing tradition, were Negro.”35

As a consequence of the changing demographics, it became more difficult for the District

Court to justify and sustain the limited presence of African Americans on the Board of

Education. Many whites began to move into the surrounding suburbs of Virginia and Maryland.

This white exodus also resulted in further reduction of the quality of the public school education.

With the intention of maintaining the long-standing tradition of segregation, the board failed to readjust the school zones for the purpose of re-appropriating the public school population, to ultimately re-appropriate financial resources.

Civil Rights in the Nation’s Capital: A Report on a Decade of Progress documented the

D.C. public school’s systemic efforts to transfer schools from “white to Negro use” during the years, 1951-1954. Many white parents expressed outrage in response to the changing school system, and consistently challenged the Board of Education’s efforts; they were successful, by- enlarge. After the demographic shift, for instance, the school system’s adjustments barely approached some of the most minimal forms of equality. The report suggested, “Negro schools remained over-crowded while in many parts of the city buildings occupied by white pupils were half-empty.”36 Despite the minimal changes, a white Board of Education member publicly declared his dedication to segregation, and retired in 1952. He was quoted in the press saying,

“I’m not wanted anymore; the trend is toward integration.”37

The ground-breaking Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) Supreme Court decision followed approximately two years after the board member’s resignation, which declared public school segregation illegal in the District of Columbia. Despite the decision, the board member’s resentment was remained significant in terms of understanding the backlash of Bolling v. Sharpe.

Shortly after the Supreme Court rendered its decision, white parents began submitting

complaints to D.C.’s school superintendent, Hobart M. Corning. The Board of Education

Minutes recorded that,

“Seventeen parents or guardians…‘Strongly protest the policy of the Board of Education, which results in the assignment of Negro teachers to teach in schools which are predominantly white in enrollments’, because it is their belief that such arbitrary appointments are not in the best interest of the children especially in elementary schools, because of the close relationship between teacher and pupil; that it is contrary to the wishes of the majority of the patrons of such schools and may not inherent in the opinion rendered by the Supreme Court in May; and that this policy will eventually be detrimental to the entire teaching staff of the District and Lower the quality of our schools. They request the Board to reconsider and revise this policy.”38

Additionally, O.L. Bell, the president of D.C. Public Schools Association sent a telegram to the superintendent, which stated, “Happenings in our community today demand that…integration…will not work. Negro boys have insulted our white girls and incidents of violence will certainly follow such conduct. Any serious injury to our children will be your responsibility and we place it where it belongs. We demand a segregated school system for protection of our children.39” The assumption that black males desired white women and possessed an inherent desire to harm them was a centuries-old stereotype, which was used as one of the many reasons to create, maintain, and justify racial segregation in D.C. Furthermore,

Southern congressmen serving on the Committee on D.C. Affairs, who controlled the politics and social order of Washington, willingly perpetuated the attitudes of white, D.C. segregationists through various public policies. These congressmen resented the future of racial integration and sought to limit any progress that would allow the local African-American population to benefit from integration especially as it pertained to housing opportunities, increased rates of employment, and education.40

On the other hand, the report also noted that “A large number of citizens and groups, largely those sympathetic to integration, sent in views, generally along the lines that pupil assignment should be made on geographic basis and that teaching staffs should be integrated

along with the student body…The school officers did begin planning behind closed doors, never making any of their thinking public until after the Supreme Court’s decision.”41 These private organizations who promoted the idea of public integration included: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), The Catholic Interracial Council, The

American Friends Service Committee, and the Washington Interracial Workshop. The fact that these organizations were forced to hide their integration efforts, demonstrated the potency of racial oppression in D.C. and white political supremacy.42 These organizations did not simply want physical integration, but integration that offered equal access to a quality education and opportunities for success among both black and white students. As the black population grew the teacher-student ratio grew inadequate. Citizens of D.C. grew concerned that the lack of teachers for black students would undermine integration, and would reduce black students’ opportunities for success. For example, Charles N. Mason, Jr., a private citizen charged that,

“…the basis for this situation seems to be the policy of the Board which required the assignment of teachers on basis of race rather than assigning solely on the basis of the qualifications and the need for their services”; and further stated that it is probably too late to get additional appropriations from Congress for salaries for the current school year [,] but it would still be entirely possible for the Board to correct the situation to a considerable extent by establishing policy of assigning teachers where their services are most needed regardless of race.43”

Likewise, members of the George Truesdell Elementary School of the Parents-Teachers

Association suggested, “…they feel smaller classes will aid not only the children, but will help the teacher meet individual problems and that money spent more teachers will reduce the cost of juvenile delinquency.”44

Washington Public Schools by 1960

By 1960, Washington, D.C.’s total school enrollment 158, 929. Only 58,005 of those students enrolled were white, and the remainder, which the census referred to as “non-white,” numbered 100, 924. The non-white population was majority African-American, at this time.

While there was a significant African-American majority in D.C. and its school population, this majority did not result in an automatic translation of black political and economic empowerment nor educational improvements. In fact, by 1960, there was a total of 13,365 students enrolled in private elementary schools. Of those enrolled in private elementary schools 9, 642 were white, compared to the 3,723 non-white students. As far as high school students were concerned, 60.5 percent of white students attended public schools, compared to the 93.2 percent of African-

Americans that attended public schools in 1960. The majority of African-Americans were enrolled in public schools, in which they possessed little to no power over the public resources that directly affected the level of accessibility and quality of education they received. Moreover,

Washington’s college enrollment demonstrated further divisions between the black and white communities-of the 23, 553 Washington college-attending residents, 17,019 were white, while only 6,534 were non-white, in a majority black city.45 As automation began to expand in the

U.S., a college-degree increased in value and necessity in a changing job market from predominantly low-skilled to highly-skilled jobs. Therefore, the changing shift proved more problematic for the African-American community, especially in Washington, where the number of college-educated was incredibly limited.

Shortcomings of Education and the Problem of the Automation

In 1962, A. Phillip Randolph, long-time labor organizer and civil rights activist, wrote an article entitled, “Jobs for Negroes-the Unfinished Revolution” in which he warned of the

unfavorable consequences of automation for African-Americans. Randolph acknowledged the long history of racial discrimination in employment and suggested that discrimination along with the shift toward an automated industry would perpetuate the levels of unemployment and underemployment among African-Americans in the coming decades. He claimed,

“The crisis confronting the Negro worker today can be summed up in one word: automation. The displacement of men by machines hits the unskilled and semiskilled workers first and hardest, and these are the jobs to which Negroes traditionally have been relegated… The relative position of the Negro in the economy has remained astonishingly static over the years, and the future threatens worsening of even that woeful position. The Negro is not the only loser. According to the United States Civil Rights Commission, automation is likely, ultimately, to create more skilled jobs than there will be men to fill them…” 46

Randolph recalled the history of racial discrimination in employment. He acknowledged that African-Americans made incredible progress in the previous decades like accumulating many economic and civil rights during World War II, primarily because of the “militance of industrial unionism.”47 The unionism Randolph described was led and organized by African-

Americans themselves during the war, while African-American males received job opportunities as white males volunteered and were drafted in to World War II. As a result, black males’ skill sets improved because war technology’s advancement required higher skill levels. As white soldiers returned from war, and war production was reduced, black men unsurprisingly, lost jobs at higher rates than white men. Around the same time, in 1946, Congress voted to end the

Federal Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). While African-Americans still suffered from racial discrimination that permeated their economic, social, and political circumstances at

the time, a federal commission designed to help prevent or at least acknowledge the illegality of such discrimination was a great improvement.48

Therefore, when Congress voted to discontinue the FEPC, it was a clear signal that: (1)

Congress was not dedicated to long-term equal employment opportunities, and they essentially,

“paved the way for the decline of skilled Negro craftsmen and foremen.”49 (2) Once the war was over, and the U.S. did not feel the same level of pressure to demonstrate an international example opposite Hitler’s racist-prone nation-state, and therefore civil rights legislation was placed on the backburner. (3) African-Americans would have to reorganize militantly in order to get laws passed for their protection and to maintain their civil and economic rights, because Randolph concluded, “Even from his friends he could expect little unless he backed up his demands with large-scale social pressures.”50 The federal government’s willingness to withdraw their support for civil rights was even more consequential for black Washingtonians whose local policies were dictated by them. The “Free D.C. Movement” was organized in response to the failure of

Congress to protect and ensure the opportunities and protection under the law for Black

Washingtonians, especially as it pertained to the issue of unemployment and underemployment among African-Americans.51

While African-American women were employed at higher rates than black men, mostly as domestic workers, black women still faced numerous obstacles in the workplace. Domestic employment was most often available to black women who were uneducated or undereducated to qualify for higher skilled jobs. Moreover, even in the cases where black women received a quality education and possessed skills for a higher-level employment, there was no guarantee that would ever acquire a job befitting their skillset, considering rampant race and sex discrimination in employment. Some of the challenges of domestic workers in Washington were

documented. A domestic by the name of Weida Edward, claimed that despite being hired by a family as their primary worker, she still “…struggled with security in the form of guaranteed wages…and the fear of not finding work.”52 According to the U.S. Census, by 1960, there was approximately 15, 375 non-white female, private household workers (which included domestic workers), compared to the mere 1,508 white ones.53 The Welfare Rights Movement of mid-

1960s through the early 1970s in Washington would eventually address the inequities in black women’s job opportunities and earning potential as a consequence of decades-long job insecurity, and low-wages among black women. This will be discussed further in Chapter Three.

Automation did not only pose a problem in terms of increasing unemployment, but also deepening class divisions in Black America. In September of 1963, a mere month after the

“March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom,” Whitney Young, president of the National Urban

League acknowledged the increasing class divisions within the African-America community. He claimed,

“There is a grave danger of the possible alienation of the middle-class Negro from those of his race, who, due to the automation or other factors, are in an almost dependent category of the lower-class…The educationally privileged Negro middle class will share the horrors and hardships of his more handicapped working-class brother as long as racism exists in our society and color is still the determining factor in the treatment accorded the citizens of an imperfect democracy.”54

While all African-Americans, more specifically black Washingtonians certainly experienced and suffered from racism in some shape, way or form, and racism was the primary obstacle, intra- racial classism also grew more problematic. During the 1960s and 1970s, there were many black that benefited from colleges and universities who began to offer admission on a more equal basis among races, however, there were many more blacks who did not benefit nor receive the same opportunity. Many of those African-Americans who took on leadership positions in the broader

Civil Rights Movement, as well as the “Free D.C. Movement,” were college-educated, and thus a

minority, within a minority. Many of those in leadership positions never knew the life of a welfare-recipient, and in many cases, believed in the inability of poor blacks to speak for themselves and fight for themselves. While many leaders like Stokely Carmichael of Student

Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panther Party, did not intentionally mean to undermine poor Blacks’ ability to articulate their struggle, they often did, by assuming it was necessary to speak and fight for them, without even receiving their consent. This will be discussed further in Chapter Two.

The Fight for Civil Rights before “Free D.C.”

Although mass mobilization for civil and human rights in Washington begins approximately in 1965, there were various forms of protest that took place prior to the “Free

D.C. Movement.” In a 1968 interview in the midst of the “Free D.C. Movement,” Pauli Murray recalled her own activism as well as that of other Howard University students in the 1940s who participated in local sit-ins. Murray and other Howard University students began a campaign under the Civil Rights Committee of Howard University Branch of the NAACP, to desegregate public places in Washington.55

According to Murray, the sit-ins began somewhere in 1942 or 1943 at a restaurant called

“Little Palace Cafeteria.” Little Palace Cafeteria was white-owned. While the restaurant was located in a predominantly African-American neighborhood, African-American patrons could not be served. Upon being refused service, students filled the seats until the owner, fearing a loss in profit, served the students. Importantly, Murray noted that the majority of the students were women because African-American men had been sent to fight in World War II. However, after

World War II, and before the Vietnam War began drafting African-American males heavily, women students at Howard University and African-American women residents of Washington,

D.C. would play a significant role in local, civil rights struggles. Nevertheless, the Howard

University Branch of the NAACP and other organizations such as the New Negro Alliance in

Washington, developed picket lines, strikes and sit-ins to challenge the order of segregation in

Washington over a decade before legal changes began to take place during the so-called Civil

Rights Era. 56

Patricia R. Harris, Howard University graduate, and eventual Howard University professor of law, and mayoral candidate of Washington, D.C. participated in the sit-ins along with Murray. Harris recalled, “…we continued to picket…This must have been a

Saturday…because we didn’t have classes in those days on Saturday. On Monday we were called in to the president’s office and we were told in no uncertain terms that we could not do this.” 57 The president of Howard University at the time was Dr. Mordecai Johnson, the thirteenth president of the university and the first African-American one. President Johnson told the students “…that this was the exact time of the year when the Howard University appropriations were before review by Congress, more particularly the District of Columbia Committee, and on that committee sat Senator [Theodore G.] Bilboe [sic] [of Mississippi]…and Dr. Johnson feared the future of the university.”58 Dr. Johnson’s anxiety was certainly justified considering Bilbo was an admitted and outspoken segregationist. Bilboe wrote in his 1947 book, Take Your Choice,

“It is difficult to overestimate the importance of education; grammar schools, high schools, colleges, and universities are dispensable. But who will claim that training and teaching in the school room can overcome racial characteristics?...The child of Negro parents is born of a race that has never shown constructive power, of ancestors who have never shown constructive power, of ancestors who have never founded a civilization , of forefathers who have imitated but never created.”59

Harris and Murray’s recollection was indicative of several problems facing African-

Americans in the local Washington community. African-Americans had no control over their politics and lacked significant economic agency over their educational institutions. As a consequence, Dr. Johnson and Howard faculty members not only faced the challenges of providing a college education to a majority of students who had been undereducated by an inadequate, public school system, but Howard’s administration and faculty had to project an near-perfect (which often meant subservient) image of Howard University that would be pleasing to a committee of Southern, segregationist congressmen who had the power to appropriate however little, or however much money, they desired for the institution. Howard, along with other historically black institutions across the nation, were dependent on either federal funds or private donations from wealthy, white philanthropists, or both, to maintain their colleges and universities. Centuries of no education among African-Americans, as a consequence of slavery, and continuing racial discrimination in the public education system, limited the opportunity for black Americans to increase earning potential. Consequently, continuing the cycle of financial dependency on white, powerful elites for the education of African-Americans continued.60

Despite the obstacles Howard’s administration and student body faced, student activists continued their efforts to achieve social justice, albeit, their new activities were more subtle than their initial picketing. Murray and other student activists created a questionnaire to survey

Howard University students’ perspectives on the struggle for civil rights. There 292 students who responded to the questionnaire. One of the questions on the survey included,

“There is no written law enforcing segregation in Washington. It exists only as a matter of custom and usage. Would you actively join a campaign to break down segregation in

Washington?” On the overall section [of the survey], “Would you actively join a campaign?” 61

According to the responses, 219 students of 292 or 84 percent, said “yes.” Thirty-eight students said that while they would not actively participate in protests, they would “support others.” And only six students said that they would “disapprove” of the protests activities. 62

Murray interpreted the survey responses as an opportunity to continue the local fight against segregation in Washington. The student activists composed and proposed the Equal

Rights Bill for the District of Columbia (ERBDC) which called for “civil rights in public accommodations in Washington.63” As a result, student activists began letter-writing campaigns to local liberal organizations, various progressive college campus organizations, and to the students’ local congressional representatives from their home districts. The students’ letter- writing targets demonstrated the necessity of local representation in Washington. The students had to write to their various representatives from their home-states, because they did not have any local ones. The ERBDC would not only be challenged, and rejected by the representatives of the Committee of the District of Columbia, but it faced opposition by Southern segregationists throughout Congress, whose racist presumptions about African-Americans guided all of their politics. Additionally, the ERBDC had to convince those representatives who did not support the political empowerment of African-Americans in the North, that this bill would ultimately be beneficial in the District of Columbia.

The student activists’efforts were organized by the NAACP Howard Chapter. The leaders of the chapter created a pledge for all of the students who sought to participate in the struggle for social and political equality in Washington. Part six of the pledge read,

“I further pledge to abide by the rules and the regulations of the Civil Rights Committee as worked out through democratic procedure in carrying out this campaign. I pledge to do nothing to antagonize members of the public or the management of public places; to look my best whenever I act on behalf of the Committee; to employ dignity, courtesty [sic] and restraint at all times; to refrain from any boisterous or offensive language or conduct, no matter what the provocation; to indulge in no retaliatory remarks or actions; to act always in a lawful and proper

manner and to do or say nothing which will reflect upon or embarrass the Committee or the University.”64

The NAACP’s pledge oozed with the politics of respectability. To be sure, however,

Howard’s NAACP set a high standard and strong foundation for future organizing efforts among the student body that would become especially apparent during the 1960s and 1970s. However,

Howard’s NAACP, like many other chapters of the NAACP, the National Urban League (NUL), and other similar organizations operated under the assumption that if they embodied the exact opposite of stereotypes and white presumptions about black people, they had essentially won half the battle. Howard’s struggle for the passage of the ERBDC bill, like other middle-class attempts in various cities across the nation with large black populations like Washington and Atlanta, found that over and over again this did not work. In many ways, they pandered to the problematic assumptions of white racists. However, the pledge was not necessarily an indication of how most Howard students, let alone most black people, sought to deal with the discrimination they faced. For example, Murray recalled, “Now 200 students signed this pledge.

Others would say, I can’t honestly sign it because I’m afraid if these white folks mess with me,

I’ll lose my temper.” 65 Depending on the philosophy in which one subscribed, losing one’s temper could be viewed as a lack of self-restraint or an act of resistance, after all, African-

Americans were supposed to be or at least appear subservient, at all times in front of whites, especially in the South.66

Shortly after the Howard’s students’ protest, the refusal to serve African-Americans was documented by the National Committee on Segregation. For example, “Case 155” read, “A distinguished Negro educator was invited to eat in the House restaurant. One of the southern representatives, seeing him there, approached and asked, “Sir, are you a colored man?” On receiving an affirmative reply, he pressed, “Are you an American colored man?” When the

Negro again said “yes”, the southern Congressman announced, “Then you can’t eat here.”67

Despite the government’s documentation and the Howard University students’ protest, racially discriminatory practices against African-Americans continued, encouraging more direct action for social equality in Washington, which eventually culminated into the “Free D.C. Movement.68

Mary Church Terrell & The Coordinating Committee for the Enforcement of the D.C. Anti-

Discrimination Laws

In addition to Howard University students and members of the New Negro Alliance in

Washington, there were also efforts by veteran activists such as Mary Church Terrell who chaired, “The Coordinating Committee for the Enforcement of the D.C. Anti-Discrimination

Laws.” Terrell fought to have the previous laws passed by D.C.’s Legislative Committee in 1872 and 1873, reinstated. These laws were implemented during the Reconstruction era of the 19th century and required all public places to serve “any respectable, well-behaved person without regard to race or color.”69 After several picket lines, protests, and sit-ins, the committee and other activists who participated in their demonstrations made headway in improving the lives of

African-Americans who were socially and economically subjugated based on Jim Crow. On June

8, 1953, the Supreme Court reversed the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals that declared the laws of 1872 and 1873 were no longer valid, and made segregated restaurants illegal in District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., Inc. (1953). After the decision, Terrell, claimed with great optimism that, “I will be 90 on the 23rd of September and will die happy that children of my group will not grow up thinking they are inferior because they are deprived of rights which children of other racial groups enjoy.”70

While Terrell and the CCEAD’s demonstrations and legal efforts represented great progress in the struggle against segregation and racism, the Supreme Court’s decision to outlaw

segregation in restaurants was merely the tip of the iceberg. The Cold War placed a great deal of international pressure on the federal government to uphold democracy for all of its citizens.

While there were many presidents including Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and

Lyndon B. Johnson, who made efforts to improve the image of American democracy, congressional representatives and the local all-white Board of Trade resisted such changes. Black

Washingtonians would face serious obstacles for several decades after District of Columbia v.

John R. Thompson Co., Inc. decision, especially in areas such as residential segregation, unemployment, and education. The struggle for civil and human rights in Washington would continue decades later.

The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom 1963

For decades, African-Americans made efforts to provide adequate, living wages for

African-Americans, whether it was through the Black Populist Movement, the Brotherhood of

Sleeping Car Porters, the Communist Party and several others in the first half of the twentieth- century. Despite this long history of social justice activism, the “March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom” is still one of the best-known demonstrations advocating for social and economic equality in American history.

In the tradition of organizing among for equal employment opportunities, Bayard Rustin,

Dr. Martin L. King, Jr., A. Phillip Randolph, among many others, organized the 1963 “March on

Washington.” One of the primary objectives of the demonstration was to rally support for

African-American employment opportunities without the imposition of institutional racial discrimination. Despite the location of the March and black unemployment rates in Washington, the program did not include any local residents. While racial discrimination in employment was certainly widespread throughout the nation, one could argue that the case for jobs could have

been made more effectively if activists and program participants emphasized the irony of the nation’s capital, as D.C. both failed and refused to set an example for the rest of the country.

Washington was a segregated city in which unemployment discrimination had been documented. As the nation’s capital, Washington set itself as the beacon of democracy; meanwhile, their segregated practices had drawn international outrage, as far back as the 1940s.

Nevertheless, the March failed to point out the irony and hypocrisy of the nation’s capital despite carefully, purposely, and symbolically choosing Washington as the location of the march. Local leaders like Walter Fauntroy, a member of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference

(SCLC) and Sterling Tucker, labor organizer and director of the Washington, D.C. chapter of the

National Urban League, grassroots work epitomized the struggle for democracy among local black Washingtonians, but neither was invited to speak at the March.

Moreover, in Dr. King’s famous, “I Have A Dream” speech, he proclaimed, “We

[African-Americans] cannot be satisfied as long as the Negro in Mississippi cannot vote and the

Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote.”71 The statement was a critique of the problems of voting rights in the North and the South, but Washington in many ways was a gray area of the United States. Washington did not fit into either category Dr. King mentioned.

In one of the largest mass demonstrations for freedom in the twentieth-century, Washingtonians once again, saw their concerns minimized and ostracized in the national struggle for civil rights, while their leaders were excluded and other leaders failed to address their issues while demonstrating in their hometown.72

Of course there could have been several reasons for not including D.C. activists such as

President Kennedy’s insistence on keeping speeches and the march itself, reserved and calm in nature. One could imagine that there were several reasons for not including most black activists, considering their experience with race and sex discrimination along with institutional violence; it

would most likely be difficult to secure speakers that would “water down” their experiences to be presentable to an audience, that could not readily identify with their struggle. For example,

John Lewis the then-national chairman of SNCC referred to President Kennedy’s civil rights bill proposal as “too little, too late.” According to historian, David J. Garrow, “Under great pressure that continued up until just a few moments before the rally itself got under way, Lewis, a veteran of both the sit-ins and the Freedom Rides, finally was convinced to delete the language that the

Kennedys and some of their civil rights allies found offensive.”73 Local Washington leaders would later discuss their beliefs as to why they were excluded at the March and/or the reasons they chose not to participate; this will be discussed later in the dissertation.

Nevertheless, it became clear to local leaders, and became even more apparent to the black citizens of Washington, that they would have to organize and articulate their issues for themselves, because nobody would do it. SNCC was one of the first organizations to address the issue of unemployment and poverty in D.C. following the March. Prior to 1965 there was a

SNCC Washington office, but there was not a formal chapter designed to deal specifically with the struggles of the local community. Approximately four months after the March on

Washington, Washington’s SNCC office sent out a letter to “ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN

“BREAKING THE POVERTY BARRIER.” In the letter, SNCC workers asserted,

“The Freedom movement must demonstrate for Jobs and Food. The political freedom for which we have long suffered and struggled cannot be separated from our freedom to have a job and to eat. Twelve percent of the Negro work-force is unemployed, as is 6% of the total labor workforce, and 2/5’s of the nation lives in poverty…The hundreds of people who have been evicted into the snow in Washington, D.C…this year to seek employment, must give voice to their frustrations. SNCC calls for demonstrations at local court houses, employment offices,

agriculture offices, and other governments offices, for jobs, food, training and representation all committees and boards that make economic policy.”74

SNCC organized a protest to address the issues that racial discrimination spawned including unemployment and poor housing standards, on January 31, 1964 in front of the District

Building. SNCC’s demands included: (1) Rent control laws- “If the Law protects the landlord, then it must also protect the tenant.” (2) More low cost housing- “We must eliminate the five year waiting list for public housing.” (3) Jobs, created by the government through the construction of needed hospitals, schools, and public housing. (4) The Welfare Department must leave the father in the home.” (5)”…Home Rule [must] be instituted for the District.”75 The

SNCC-arranged 1964 protest was in many ways the precursor to the “Free D.C. Movement.”

Segregation in Washington claimed “…the color bar remains in full force and effect.

Exceptions are sometimes made to Negroes in large groups, to Negroes en masse…But to the

Negro as an individual human being? No. He is rejected by the innkeepers in the capital of a country that prides itself on individual rights.”76 The committee certainly made a profound observation in terms mass participation in the struggle for basic rights of citizenship, albeit unintentional. The committee claimed, “Exceptions are sometimes made to Negroes in large groups, to Negroes en masse…” It was precisely mass participation by African-Americans that forced the federal government to grant the fundamental rights of citizenship to the District’s citizens, which included changes to the public policies that retarded the progress of African-

Americans in the public education system, helped develop perpetual unemployment and underemployment of African-Americans, and restricted opportunities for African-Americans to live beyond the confines of certain areas of Washington despite their economic class. All of which will be discussed further throughout this dissertation.

Chapter 2:

“Free D.C.:”

The Dawn of Washington’s Local Liberation

Movement, 1965-1967

“The fact is that their [the poor’s] problems need the social visibility you can give them. The fact is that the poor need the political leadership you can provide. The fact is that if our nation’s War on Poverty is lost, it will not be due so much to the unenlightened public officials whose crippling prejudices and limited social vision are a millstone about society’s neck; it will be due to the appalling silence of the university trained in every field-who have the enlightened eyes to see, but lack the moral courage to act that creative social solutions might be translated into public policy and practice.”77

These words were spoken on June 4, 1965 by Walter E. Fauntroy, Civil Rights activist and pastor of Washington, D.C.’s New Bethel Baptist Church, as he delivered Howard

University’s Ninety-Seventh Annual Commencement Address. Fauntroy charged these recent,

African-American college graduates with a moral obligation to use their education to fight injustice in America. These new graduates received an educational opportunity that many impoverished African-Americans could not fathom in the year 1965. Fauntroy’s speech was timely; he gave this speech when the Civil Rights Movement was in full effect, and while grassroots organizations began various campaigns for black political, social, and economic empowerment, across the nation. While there were black activists from various economic and educational backgrounds, black college students played an instrumental role during the Black

Freedom Movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Among them, Howard students were often some of the most industrious, creative and impactful activists.78

Chapter two will argue that Fauntroy’s theory for the necessity of African-Americans’ to accurately articulate the social and political conditions of black people, and a clear vision of progress for the black community was critical to Free D.C. Movement building. Throughout the chapter, residential segregation, unemployment, and education, will be explored in depth to demonstrate how activism around these issues impacted movement building for ultimate political control and economic power in the nation’s capital. This particular chapter will focus on these three issues from 1965-1967.

Howard University and Social Justice History

As previously discussed in Chapter One, Howard University was a historically black college and university founded in Washington, D.C., in 1867, by Oliver O. Howard, a Civil War

Union general and the Freedmen’s Bureau Commissioner during the Reconstruction Era.

Segregation and other forms of institutional racism and discrimination restricted black students’ access to opportunities for higher education at public and private, majority-white institutions throughout the nation. Therefore, Howard, in many ways, was the premiere institution for young

African-American students seeking higher education because it provided opportunities that most colleges and universities did not for offer to African-Americans.

Howard University had an extensive history of faculty and students who demanded social justice in America. E. Franklin Frasier, renowned sociologist and Howard University faculty member, authored Black Bourgeoisie, in which he critiqued the African-American middle-class for failing to help the struggling masses of black Americans once establishing themselves socially and economically. Franklin called for them to take a more active role in their own communities.79 Pauli Murray, 1944 Howard School of Law graduate, fought against segregation in the nation’s capital. She advocated for civil rights for African-Americans nearly two decades before a mass, national movement for civil rights began.80 And, Thurgood Marshall, the first

African-American Supreme Court Justice and another alumnus of Howard University’s School of Law, argued and won the landmark Supreme Court case, Brown v. Board of Education in

1954. Fauntroy ultimately called for the 1965 graduating class to continue the tradition of

“freedom fighting.81”

Walter E. Fauntroy’s Demand for Social Consciousness to Howard University Students

In an attempt to further stimulate social consciousness among the new college graduates,

Fauntroy challenged them to publicly articulate the issues facing the African-American

community, especially among those impoverished. Fauntroy proclaimed that many Americans, including politicians, “have been so blinded by the effects of poverty on the behavior of the poor that they cannot see the social causes of those patterns of behavior.”82 He suggested that most, if not all of the new graduates, experienced racial discrimination firsthand, and personally knew impoverished African-Americans. As a consequence, Fauntroy believed that Howardites were responsible for articulating a different vision of poverty to mainstream America. Fauntroy claimed, “You ought to enable a community to see beyond the crime and gambling, and recognize how a loss of hope, beyond even a modest success by hard work and thrift, can lead to an obsession with making the quick dollar, either by gambling or crime. This is not to justify crime among the poor; it is to acknowledge the contributing causes.”83

Fauntroy referenced the scholarship of Michael Harrington’s The Other America: Poverty in the United States and Gunnar Myrdal’s Challenge to Affluence as well. He asserted that both

Harrington and Myrdal realized the problems the poor endured were perpetuated directly and indirectly, by the lack of political leadership for the poor. Fauntroy believed that this observation was not a reference to partisan politics, but instead the scholars meant that “…the poor lack the active participation of the enlightened in the all-important task of translating social solutions into public policy and practice.”84 Finally, he suggested that black college graduates had a moral obligation to find effective solutions to the social and political issues facing the

African-American community, and the nation as a whole.85

As previously discussed in Chapter 1, many Howard alumni over the years actively participated in protests and various forms of grassroots organizing. The 1960s were no different; in fact, one could argue that activism intensified, considering the growing national movements for Civil Rights and Black Power during this same time period. In addition to Howard, there were several other historically-black institutions that served as a hub and a training-ground for

black activists. The development of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) served as evidence of the impact HBCU-educated individuals had on the changing social and political climate of the 1960s and 1970s.

While Fauntroy’s words were not spoken directly to the Student Non-Violent

Coordinating Committee (SNCC)’s first president, Marion Barry, or Black Power advocate, and eventual chairman of SNCC, Stokely Carmichael (later Kwame Ture), the two did embody the political vision that Fauntroy asserted during Howard’s 1965 commencement. Marion Barry acquired his bachelor’s degree from the historically black LeMoyne College (now LeMoyne-

Owen College) in Memphis, Tennessee, and received a Masters of Science in Chemistry from

Fisk University, another historically black university in Nashville, Tennessee. Stokely

Carmichael, likewise, received his Bachelor of Arts Degree in Philosophy from historically black, Howard University in 1964. Within historically black colleges and universities, especially members of Howard University’s student body, students made consistent efforts to use their college training to improve the lives of African-Americans, especially among low-income and poorly educated blacks. These student activists’ efforts were demonstrative through SNCC- sponsored voter registration drives, and the Black United Front’s campaigns for “home rule” in

Washington.

SNCC Established in Washington, D.C.

In the summer of 1965-the same year Fauntroy delivered Howard University’s commencement address- Marion Barry along with other SNCC members, spearheaded the permanent establishment of the local Washington, D.C. chapter.2 Prior to 1965 there was a

SNCC Washington office, but there was not a formal chapter designed to deal specifically with

2 By 1965, SNCC began to unravel as an organization. Clayborne Carson’s In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, he traces SNCC’s development through three stages. His discussion on the third stage of SNCC’s development is of particular importance for this project. The third stage is characterized by members’ call for black controlled institutions, purging of white membership, and a focus on civil rights in urban areas. 43

the struggles of the local community. On July 13, 1965, Marion Barry wrote to the SNCC headquarters in Atlanta that, “Washington is a strange city and it is very political. SNCC here by and large is either unliked or unknown.”86 Under the direction of Stokely Carmichael, SNCC shifted its focus from the Deep South to urban areas like Washington, D.C. Importantly, SNCC’s efforts in Washington led to greater success than most other chapters in the late 1960s. Of particular merit were the efforts of the Free D.C. Movement (FDCM). Marion Barry, who was one of the leaders of FDCM, believed that increased black political and economic power would bring racial equality. Barry suggested that, “…jail-going witness no longer weeded out frivolous politics.” 87 Barry eventually concluded that, “The civil rights direction of protest is dead…we must concentrate on control-economic and political power.” 88 This ideological shift was critical because it inspired activists’ to fight for home rule, and run for various political offices upon the granting of home rule for Washingtonians in 1973. 89

Black political and economic power would be essential to even begin to alleviate the problems that plagued black Washingtonians. As a consequence, it is important to make clear what Barry and other activists defined as black political power. Upon Stokely Carmichael’s election to the SNCC chairmanship in May 1966, he made clear how he and other members defined “black power.” Carmichael asserted,

“Where Negroes lack a majority, black power means proper representation and sharing of control. It means the creation of power bases from which black people can work to change statewide or nationwide patterns of oppression through pressure from strength-instead of weakness. Politically, black power means what it has always meant to SNCC: the coming- together of black people to elect representatives and to force those representatives to speak to their needs. It does not mean merely putting black faces into office. A man or woman who is black and from the slums cannot be automatically expected to speak to the needs of black people. Most of the black politicians we see around the country today are not what SNCC means by black power. The power must be that of a community, and emanate from there.”90

Carmichael’s definition of black power demonstrated the need for educated blacks to articulate the issues of those living in Washington’s slums and ghettoes, much like Fauntroy’s

analysis. Moreover, Carmichael’s emphasis on qualified black politicians was an important goal, particularly in Washington, as citizens fought for home-rule. The ultimate goal was to find and elect these black politicians who understood the social, political and economic problems within the black community in order to create public policy that would eventually help alleviate these problems. Later chapters will examine how successful Washingtonians were in electing representatives who advocated for improved the conditions among black Washingtonians.

Although, Stokely Carmichael had a history of service whether it was through the social programs of the Black Panther Party, leading protests, or fighting for proper financial dispersal for African-Americans from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), his definition and explanation of what Black Power meant had remnants of classism. Whether intentional or not,

Carmichael’s statements assumed that those residents of the ghetto were incapable of articulating their problems to public officials. To be sure, there were many examples from this time period in which college-educated black people were essential to articulating the problems of impoverished blacks including Martin L. King, Jr., John Lewis, Diane Nash, Ella Baker and a slew of others.

The college-educated often understood the problems of the black poor, and were more knowledgeable of how the government operated, and how federal and state policies perpetuated racial discrimination in education, employment and living conditions among African-Americans.

Despite, the college-educated’s ability to articulate or develop ideas for improvements to social policy, it was not as if the black poor and working-classes was incapable of lobbying the government or relaying their concerns to government officials.

The Black Poor’s Activism and their Impact on Civil Rights

The Welfare Rights Movement is evidence that black college-educated individuals were not always necessary for the poor to organize and lobby for their rights. Paula Giddings in When

and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America, recalls the impact of welfare rights women during the 1960s. Giddings claimed,

“The NWRO [the National Welfare Rights Organization] was composed of some very forthright women: Beulah Sanders, Johnnie Tillmon, Etta Horn, and others who had personal experience with welfare and who organized other welfare women. The organization quickly scored a number of impressive victories in gaining better welfare laws and, as importantly, effectively broached the issues of the urban poor and the government’s responsibility to them…The NWRO had actually come up with the idea of a poor people’s campaign before King did. And the women in that organization were peeved when King started to beat that drum without even acknowledging their efforts…”91

The struggles for welfare rights and the role of women will be explored later in this chapter.

Despite Carmichael’s seeming classism, he and other members of the SNCC D.C. chapter, helped establish the formal “Free D.C. Movement.” To be sure, there were several other organizations designed to find solutions to improve the plight of Black Washingtonians during the 1960s. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the

Black United Front, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the D.C. Coalition of Conscience, the Washington Urban League, the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), the

Archbishop’s Committee on Community Relations, and the Student Assembly of Howard

University, were just some of the many organizations working for civil and political rights for

Washingtonians. Of these organizations and even among the spontaneous and informal protests within the nation’s capital, three of the issues that repeatedly appear in the various critiques of the Washington power structure and the demands put forth by civil rights and other progressive organizations, include resolving residential segregation, education, and unemployment.

Residential Segregation in Washington, D.C.

Residential segregation was one of the issues that drew some of the most significant, grassroots support for legal changes. While there was legal segregation throughout the South, residential segregation was often more intense and widespread in northern communities.

Technically speaking, Washington is part of the South, as it falls just below the Mason-Dixon 46

Line. Washington, nevertheless, was an urban city, and displayed many of the problems that existed in places like Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia, with a high population of unemployed and underemployed people, a high number of low-skilled, black workers, and purposeful discrimination in the housing market as it pertained to African-Americans.

Residential segregation was a problem in D.C. because it physically separated African-

Americans from parts of the city that made jobs accessible, especially with the slow development of public transit.92 Additionally, African-Americans were not only confined to racially homogeneous neighborhoods, but the lowest quality of housing, regardless of class. This indicated that despite how hard one worked to acquire an education, especially advanced degrees to increase their economic status, an individual’s race would always determine where they lived, and what they could acquire to improve their quality of life.93

“Free D.C.” Bus Boycott

The problems of public transportation and residential segregation came to a head in

December of 1965. It came to Marion Barry’s attention that D.C. Transit would raise the bus fare from twenty to twenty-five cents. The bus fare increase was an opportunity for SNCC to get involved in grassroots organizing of poor and working-class blacks in D.C. The majority of D.C.

Transit riders were poor and African-American. Considering the bus riders’ economic condition, the proposed fare increase would extract from their already low-incomes, and make it far more difficult to arrive at their place of employment in a timely manner, thus making it even more challenging for blacks to maintain employment. The fare hikes would have ultimately continued the cycle of unemployment and underemployment among black Washingtonians.94

For approximately one month, SNCC worked to develop a plan for a boycott against D.C.

Transit. Focusing on the Benning Road line that ran through the black community in Northeast

Washington, SNCC organized a bus boycott that began on January 24, 1966. SNCC had drivers

for those who were too far or unable to walk to their place of employment, while other bus riders walked, hitchhiked or stayed at home. The boycott was successful. Black Washingtonians managed to empty the buses, which led to a $27,000 loss in profit. Based on the boycott’s success, Barry called a press conference that same afternoon and declared that the boycott could possibly be the beginning of a mass movement.95

Mass mobilization for anti-discriminatory legislation and the enforcement of such legislation would be required to change the exploitive public transit system. Throughout the

1960s and early 1970s, the FDCM focused on mass organization to eliminate institutional discrimination in public transit, and residential segregation, more broadly. Residential segregation made it easy for D.C. Public Transit to target Black Washingtonians and maintain economically exploitive policies. These policies encouraged the development of Walter

Fauntroy’s Model Inner City Community Organization (MICCO), and other similar organizations to fight against residential segregation in the late 1960s.96

Washington Residential Segregation: Urban Renewal vs. Urban Redevelopment

As far back as 1944, the Washington Citizens Committee on Racial Relations, which was biracial in make-up, suggested that housing was “…the city’s most pressing social problem.97”

The committee furthered their claim citing the failure of the city to provide “…adequate replacement housing for those who lost homes to demolition.”98 Despite the traumatic loss for the Black Washingtonian population with the destruction of Fort Reno, and despite publicity that showcased how this dislocation negatively affected the black population, racially motivated displacement of Black Washingtonians continued throughout the 20th century.

“No Slums in Ten Years”

In January 1955, James W. Reuse and Nathaniel S. Keith presented to District of

Columbia commissioners, “No Slums in Ten Years: A Workable Program for Urban Renewal

Report.” This report was obviously designed to offer plausible solutions for the existence of slums in Washington. Reuse and Keith offered urban renewal as the most plausible approach for slum elimination. The concept of “urban renewal” is essential to the discussion on the movement for civil, political and human rights in Washington, D.C. In the late 1960s, Black

Washingtonians, led by Walter E. Fauntroy, countered urban renewal efforts, and advocated for urban redevelopment, instead. Urban redevelopment was an alternative policy created to improve the neighborhood living conditions for African-Americans and low-income residents, as opposed to pricing residents out of the neighborhoods in which they lived, which was often the case with urban renewal.99

Nevertheless, “No Slums in Ten Years” failed to address residential segregation as a political, social and economic ill in the nation’s capital. While the authors recognized the detrimental existence of slums, they failed to address residential segregation as a problem, and thus did not acknowledge governmental neglect of the impoverished population of D.C., which was comprised mostly of African-Americans. Nor did the authors appear to understand the detrimental psychological effects on impoverished, black Washingtonians as a consequence of urban renewal and the destruction of “blighted neighborhoods.” In their “Ten-Year Plan,” Reuse and Keith suggested,

“The family displacement in these areas would be caused by demolition of non-salvable structures, by acquisition of sites for public facilities or for more desirable land uses, by enforcement of occupancy controls, and by substantial rehabilitation necessitating the removal of present occupants or resulting in increased rents above their rent-paying ability. It is reasonable to assume that family displacement from all the above causes would in no event exceed the number of substandard dwellings in these areas.”100

Reuse and Keith failed to assess the inherent problems in their “solution” to the

Washington D.C. slums. Their suggestion that “…that family displacement from all the above causes would in no event exceed the number of substandard dwellings in these areas,101” offered the impression that it was acceptable to displace some residents, in many cases who were poor 49

and African-American, as long as the numbers were minimal. Moreover, there was no plan that offered options for those displaced, thus repeating many of the same injustices and indignities that those in Fort Reno experienced, and making their plan a part of the problem as opposed to the solution.102

Additionally, Reuse and Keith’s statements also suggested that adequate urban renewal would result in higher rent prices for residents, whom they knew would be unable to meet the new financial requirements to remain in their own neighborhoods. Reuse and Keith indirectly illuminated two key issues facing Washingtonians that would later help culminate into the “Free

D.C. Movement.” The first issue was that Reuse and Keith were not familiar with the black

Washingtonian community. The duo failed to understand the economic factors, and social impact of displacement on black Washingtonians. As a result, Reuse and Keith operated on the assumption that the issues that plagued slum areas could be destroyed, simply by replacing buildings. Secondly, the “No Slums in Ten Years” document also indirectly illuminated the problem of Washingtonians’ political powerlessness. There were people speaking on behalf of

Washingtonians without their consent and without formal and democratic election, while simultaneously lacking the cultural understanding of the people for whom they spoke. This is ultimately the sort of political leadership Fauntroy critiqued in his Howard University speech.

Fauntroy called on educated black people to properly articulate the issues plaguing black

Americans, in such a way that they not only described the issues, but their causes.103

Black Washingtonians Respond to Urban Renewal Plans

On April 8, 1966, Fauntroy warned against further urban renewal efforts in Washington,

D.C., as he referenced the tragedy of Southwest D.C. He claimed, “This community’s tragic experience with an urban renewal effort…which did not provide housing for the people displaced on the land renewed, and which did not provide adequate and humane re-location

services, remains painfully etched in the memory of many residents of the area.”104 Fauntroy’s analysis of the impact of the urban renewal on black Washingtonians resulted in what later became known as “Shaw Power.” “Shaw Power” was an effort to implement urban redevelopment3 as opposed to urban renewal in the majority-black, Shaw area. Reginald Griffith,

Shaw’s planner described “Shaw Power” as taking, “…urban renewal, a tool often used to destroy black neighborhoods, and fashioned it into an instrument by which the people can preserve and upgrade their own community.105” “Shaw Power” was a special effort to include the opinions of black citizens who would be most affected by the city’s changes in residential policy.106

Southwest, D.C.’s urban renewal area included most, but not Washington’s entire

Southwest quadrant. The urban renewal area was between Independence Avenue on the north side and Twelfth Street and Washington Avenue (formerly known as Canal Street).107

Southwest, D.C., in addition to Fort Reno, experienced the trauma of demolition prior to the culmination of “Shaw Power” in 1966. Southwest also served as a primary example of what

Fauntroy and other activists did not want to happen to Shaw. Southwest had an overwhelmingly

African-American population during the 1940s through the late 1950s. The debates over the benefits of urban redevelopment of Southwest, D.C. extended back to the 1940s. There were many who struggled to decide whether it would be more beneficial for Washington in the long- term economically and socially, to attract higher-income level residents who could contribute higher taxes to the local economy or to improve the state of housing for low-income residents throughout the city.108

3 Urban redevelopment focused on rebuilding slums and ghettoes into adequate and affordable housing units, as opposed to pricing people out of their own neighborhoods.

Much like Fort Reno4, there were parts of Southwest that were debilitated and could have benefited for urban renewal projects. However, there were several houses that were sturdy and were representative of a middle-class presence in the community. This is of particular importance because oftentimes the propaganda behind the urban renewal projects presented areas like Southwest and Fort Reno as decaying urban areas that would benefit from replacement of their neighborhood’s old buildings with the establishment of higher quality, and higher priced housing. Urban renewal often involved (and, in these two cases did involve) the displacement of residents who had no economic or political power to create, or at least influence, housing policy that would be beneficial for them.

Despite Southwest residents’ lack of political power to create public policy, black residents were still vocal about their fears of urban renewal. Joseph Curtis, Chairman of the

Southwest Civic Association’s Redevelopment Committee, for example, complained that,

“…planners had failed to take into account requests of local residents for more public housing, moderate rents, and assurances that they would have priority in buying and renting new properties.”109 Despite Curtis’ presentation, the Washington Board of Trade, the Committee of

100, and the all-white Southwest Citizens Associations, still endorsed high-priced housing because they insisted on the beneficence of urban renewal.110 Curtis’ fear, as well as many Black

Washingtonians, was certainly justified considering that 99 percent of the buildings in Southwest were torn down. By 1962, 5900 new units were constructed, only 310 however, were accessible to those classified as moderate income in 1962.111 Moreover, in reference to urban renewal efforts, the Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA)’s 1959 annual report read, “Here is an opportunity for persons to live who prefer the amenities of…a highly convenient and attractive location to a long commuter’s journey to a larger suburban lot.112” Considering the nature of the

4 See Chapter One. 52

RLA’s statement, one has to question whose convenience to whose convenience they were referring.113

While Southwest urban renewal made living conditions and jobs in D.C. more accessible to the white middle-class, it resulted in further fragmentation and, demolition of black neighborhoods. It was very difficult for Black Washingtonians to appreciate expensive, high- quality housing, when the likelihood of being able to take advantage of it was miniscule.

Unemployment rates made quality to housing even more inaccessible to Black Washingtonians during the 1960s. The unemployment rates were incredibly high among the African-American population during this time. In 1965, whites constituted 4.1% of the national unemployment population, compared to the 8.1% of those categorized as “Negro and other.114” While the unemployment rate dropped nationally by 1967, racial disparities were still evident. In 1967, the unemployment rate among whites dropped to 3.4 percent compared to the 7.4 percent of those in the “Negro and other” racial category.115 Furthermore, the 1960 census, reported that 5.7 percent of non-whites in Washington were unemployed compared to the 2.5 percent of whites.116 In addition to the high unemployment rates, educational opportunities were extremely limited, and when offered, it was of significantly lower quality than it was for white residents, despite class.

This all worked to perpetuate the cycle of poverty and social and political inequality.117

The Fight for Jobs Justice: President Johnson, Unemployment, Class Divides & Automation

In the 1960s, there were many scholars, especially sociologists and historians that began to investigate the issue of unemployment and underemployment rates among Black

Washingtonians. Many of these sociological studies were designed to provide explanations on delinquency and dependency among lower class, black men. There were many common perceptions that poverty and delinquency were somehow hereditary for poor Blacks. The studies were produced during a critical point in the Civil Rights Era when politicians, and private 53

citizens alike, questioned the necessity of the Johnson Administration’s 1960s War on Poverty, and the extent to which the federal government should be involved in improving the economic situation of its citizens. 118

Employment Exploitation Among Black Male Washingtonians

Sociologist Eliot Liebow’s 1967 study focused on the presumptions of employers, and how those presumptions guided hiring practices toward black, male Washingtonians. The employment practices he discussed were critical to understanding the employment obstacles black, male Washingtonians faced during the FDCM. Liebow’s study revealed the harsh consequences of negative stereotypes by larger white society on black men’s daily lives. Several of his interviews with white employers suggested that they believed black men were prone to the act of stealing. As a consequence of their poor perceptions of black males, black male employees were under constant surveillance. Employers even created the “wage-theft system.” This system reduced black male employees’ earnings automatically, to compensate for merchandise the employer anticipated that black male employees would steal. As a result, black men worked for lower wages than other blue-collar workers. Inadequate wages also led to family instability.

Working-class black men, and impoverished black men, rarely made enough to support a family, thus making it difficult for them to commit to a marriage and/or provide for their children and families.119 Discriminatory policies like the wage-theft system not only demonstrated that there was a need to address institutionalized segregation, but that the movement would also have to find creative ways to undo racist attitudes, that perpetuated racist economic policies.120

Black Women Washingtonians and Job Inequality

Black female Washingtonians also faced great challenges in maintaining adequate employment. According to the 1960 D.C. Census, non-white females, age fourteen and older, had an annual median income of $1,894. White females, age fourteen and older, however, had a

median income of $3,351.121 By 1960, there were approximately 15, 375 non-white female, private household workers (which included domestic workers), compared to the mere 1,508 white ones.122 White women numbered 41,189 of clerical and kindred workers in comparison to the 17,899 non-white ones.123 There was an obvious discrepancy in income and the types of work available to white and non-white women in Washington. Black female Washingtonians’ struggles for more employment opportunities and financial assistance to provide food and shelter for their families culminated into another branch of the FDCM in the late 1960s, which was the

Welfare Rights Movement (WRM).124

The History of the D.C. Welfare Rights Movement

The WRM is of particular importance to the FDCM because it illuminated how the problems of racism, sexism, and classism were all connected, and collectively worked to limit the progress of a black, women Washingtonians. The struggle for welfare rights evidenced that not only did unemployed, underemployed, and working-class black women participate in the

Movement, but they led an important aspect of the movement.125 African-American mothers fought negative stereotypes of black women, especially that of hyper-sexuality, by fighting against stipulations on how many children they could have and restricting adult male presence in the household. In 1966, at the unveiling of the “Free D.C. Movement” press conference, Marion

Barry claimed, “We want to free D.C. from our enemies…welfare investigators who go on midnight raids…”126 While the Welfare Rights Movement was a movement within itself, it was nevertheless part of the broader Free D.C. Movement against the regular indignities one suffered at the hands of racism, sexism and classism in Washington.127

It was not simply that these women were African-American, or poor, that they faced the discriminatory obstacles from the federal government. The resistance toward supplying the demands of black, female, welfare rights activists was rooted in the perception of black women

as hyper-sexualized beings-a stereotype that extended as far back as slavery. White slave masters often justified their sexual assaults against black slave women by claiming black women were inherently immoral and perpetually engaged in promiscuous sex. This hyper-sexualized image of black women was designed to absolve white men of any guilt or responsibility in the sexual exploitation, and rape of black, slave women. The perception of African-American women as hyper-sexualized and immoral haunted D.C. welfare rights activists (and, those in other parts of the U.S) throughout the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

Patricia Hill Collins’ Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the

Politics of Empowerment argued that there are four controlling images of the black woman that perpetuate race, class and gender oppression. Three of these images are of particular importance in relation to Washington’s Welfare Rights Movement, and the experiences of African-American women during the broader Free D.C. Movement- the black matriarch, the welfare mother and the jezebel. Black matriarchy consisted of the idea that “African-American women fail[ed] to fulfill their traditional “womanly” duties. These “womanly duties” included ultimate submission to male authority in the household, while simultaneously allowing men to be the “breadwinners” of the family. Furthermore, women were responsible for childcare and the upkeep of the home.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s infamous 1965 “Moynihan Report5” exemplified the demonization of black women as a consequence of the black matriarch stereotype.128

In the Post-World War II era, many white women entered the labor force for the first time, thus moving away from traditional familial roles, and ultimately challenging white, male, patriarchal norms. 129 Collins argued that during World War II, the “…Black matriarch

5 The “Moynihan Report” sought explanations for why there were so many female-headed households in the African-American community, and why such large numbers of African-American men seemed unable to gain and maintain a position as the head of the household. The Moynihan report was controversial because it blamed black women for emasculating black men without giving proper attention to the history of racial discrimination in American society and the economic exploitation of black men in the workforce. 56

emerged…as a powerful symbol for both Black and white women of what can go wrong if white patriarchal power is challenged. Aggressive, assertive women are penalized-they are abandoned by their men, end up impoverished, and are stigmatized as being unfeminine.”130 Labeling black women as matriarchs ignored the race discrimination that existed in employment opportunities for black men. The institutional discrimination that black men faced, often forced black women to work a substantial number of hours to supplement the lack of income in the household, and consequently, forced them to spend less time caring for their children in a more traditional, socially-acceptable fashion. Moreover, Collins suggested that “…being employed when Black men have difficulty finding steady work exposes African-American women to the charge that

Black women emasculate Black men by failing to be submissive, dependent, “feminine” women.”131

The welfare mother, or the image of the welfare mother, was similar to the black matriarch in that she was branded as a “bad mother.” The welfare mother, however, possessed stark differences in comparison to the “black matriarch.” According to Collins, the welfare mother was not aggressive or domineering like the matriarch, instead she was passive in the sense that she is willing to let the government provide economically for her children. She was lazy, and unwilling to work, and unwed. Supposedly, this poor example of motherhood and adulthood was passed on to her children, and as a consequence, the children repeat the cycle of a

“dependent pathology,” generation after generation.132

Finally, Collins discussed the “Jezebel” image. She argued, “…the Jezebel, whore, or sexually aggressive woman-is central in this nexus of elite, white male images of Black womanhood, because efforts to control Black women’s sexuality lie at the heart of Black women’s oppression.”133 The Post-World War II image of the “welfare mother” and the Jezebel image worked together to undermine Welfare Rights activists’ appeals for aid. These two images

were critical to understanding the perception of Welfare Rights activists by white male politicians on the Committee of District of Columbia Affairs, and the provisional D.C. City

Council during this era. Although these images were falsely created about black women, many

Americans, both black and white believed in these images, thus reducing public support and bolstering negative public opinion that could have resulted in welfare concessions for these poor, struggling women, by politicians. Moreover, the perceptions that many white politicians had of black women, and their economic situation proved further why it was necessary that Washington needed adequate and appropriate political representation.134

The Problem of Non-elected Representation & Welfare Rights

One of the many problems with non-elected representation for Washington was exemplified in 1965. On May 12, 1965, the Charleston Gazette published an article entitled,

“Robert C. Byrd- A Villain to Poor of D.C.” Robert C. Byrd, longtime senator of West Virginia also served as chairman of the Senate District Appropriations Subcommittee in 1965. Byrd managed to block welfare funds for the Aid of Dependent Children of Unemployed Parents

(ADCUP), despite the House’s approval. According to the article, the Senate responded to

Byrd’s decision with a deferment to its committee system. The block was upheld by base votes in the 1963 and 1964.135

The article cited real-life examples of people who suffered from the discriminatory public policies of ADCUP. It was reported that an anonymous, jobless father of seven children was forced into a position where he was unable to provide. The anonymous man was quoted saying,

“Now I just don’t know where to turn…I need food and rent money for my family. I don’t want to leave my family but if I stay at home they may starve.136” The same anonymous father would have qualified for ADCUP, if he was a resident of West Virginia instead of Washington, D.C.

Unlike, welfare recipients in West Virginia, Washingtonians had to adhere to the “man-in-the-

house” rule. The “man-in-the-house” rule stipulated that if there was an able-bodied man in the home, then the family did not qualify for public assistance. The fact that this rule was instituted in Washington, D.C. with an overwhelming African-American population, and it was not instituted in West Virginia where the majority of the population was white, demonstrated the racial discrimination and racial discrepancies when dispersing federal funds from the War on

Poverty program. African-Americans were on the low receiving end of most War on Poverty programs, and the lack of adequate representation for the poor in D.C. intensified the negative effects on black Washingtonians. Moreover, West Virginia ADCUP benefited more “…from the program in relation to its population than any other state.137” Democratic Senator, Abraham

Ribicoff of Connecticut, who fought passionately against the discriminatory policies of ADCUP pointed out that, “…extending aid to Washington’s jobless parents for a year would cost only what West Virginia now receives each month in federal aid for its program.138”

The article also discussed one of the most heart-wrenching, yet galvanizing events of the

Welfare Rights Movement in Washington-the story of Mrs. Mary Etheredge. According to this account and various records of Etheredge’s experience, she “…roamed the streets of the nation’s capital for three days with her five hungry children in a fruitless search for aid. Etheredge was a twenty-seven year-old, mother of five, who was found “wandering the streets” by Roman

Catholic Nun, Sister Mary Leo. The nun came to their aid, but despite her efforts, Mary

Etheredge died in a hospital a week later.139” The D.C. Coalition of Conscience, later remarked in an open letter, “Had we as a community acted to end the shameful policy of forcing unemployed fathers to desert their homes in order that their destitute wives and children might qualify for public assistance…the mother of these five children would be alive today.140”

Senator Byrd’s response to the tragedy included a statement that read, “You’re going to shoulder on my conscience the responsibility of this husband…I have this arrest record-he was in

jail more than once.”141 Byrd’s response was intended to silence any demand and to abort assistance for men who were economically deprived, and appeared as imperfect victims of poverty. The senator believed that the man’s incarceration record was enough to justify the racially discriminatory ADCUP policies. ADCUP was for parents with dependent children. His arrest record was certainly no justification for the hunger and homelessness among his children.

Byrd’s belief in the inherent immorality and criminality of blacks helped encouraged discriminatory policy development. The story of Mother Etheredge, as she was later called, demonstrated the need for congressional representation as well as local representation that would spearhead public policy to eliminate such tragedies. Byrd’s policies also, inadvertently, added

“fuel to the fire” as FDCM activists worked to build community support for civil, political and ultimately, human rights in the nation’s capital.142

Black Washingtonians & The Middle and Working-Class Divide

In order to be successful and beneficial to all local residents, local Washingtonian representation would eventually have to include people who knew the residents of D.C., and understood their plight economically, socially, politically and culturally. Additionally, potential representatives would have to possess the moral courage to advocate for policy that eliminated institutional racism and discrimination. The failure to address the stigma of African-Americans’ needs for public assistance, and other tax-based social programs, was not only perpetuated by white Americans, but also African-Americans, particularly those of the middle-class. While there were many members of organizations like SNCC and the Black United Front who belonged to the black middle-class, there were still many members of the black middle-class who did not belong to radicalized, civil rights organizations, nor did they possess a desire to change the predicament of the black working-class and impoverished communities. To be sure, African-

Americans were certainly not racist, but their misconceptions about working-class and

impoverished blacks deepened divisions within a movement that needed more solidarity, not less.

National Urban League Policies & The Effect on the D.C. Poor

In October 1963, Whitney M. Young, Jr., the Executive Director of the National Urban

League, and Kyle Haselden explained justification for a “Domestic Marshall Plan,” where

African-Americans would be compensated for historical-ills which placed many of them at a distinct disadvantage, which perpetuated the cycle of social, political and economic inequality.143

The “Domestic Marshall Plan” was representative of the black middle-class’ perspective that helped further class divisions during the Movement. On the issue of employment, Young suggested, “A planned effort to place qualified Negroes in all categories of employment, at all levels of responsibility.”144 On the issue of housing, Young claimed that, “Racial ghettos [could be] eliminated by providing genuine housing opportunities on the basis of need and financial ability.”145 Whitney Young was one of the foremost leaders of civil rights during this era, and was committed to the struggle against racial discrimination. However, Young’s language presented a problematic perpetuation of stereotypes and assumptions about African-

Americans.146

Young’s emphasis on offering employment opportunities to “qualified Negroes” suggested that the reason that many black people were unemployed was because they were not qualified for certain jobs. Young made the case for “qualified Negroes” in order to thwart assumptions that civil rights activists’ desire for legal protection of equal opportunities would offer African-Americans an undeserved advantage. One could argue it was necessary for Young to make his case in this way, because the “Domestic Marshall Plan” was published in the New

York Times. He was essentially trying to reach a large white audience -be they conservatives or so-called, Liberals. Young had to word his demands in such a way that would be pleasing to

people with political power, and whose public opinion could impact civil rights legislation.

However, the way in which Young’s demands were articulated indirectly made the case for dismissing the impact of racial discrimination. By suggesting that “qualified Negroes” get employment, Young undermined the impact of employment discrimination. For instance, racial discrimination created limited and often insufficient educational opportunities, for African-

Americans, and helped perpetuate a low-skilled labor force.147

Whitney Young, Jr.’s statements that placed particular emphasis on the “qualified

Negroes” serve particular importance in understanding class divisions in the African-American community that grew increasingly worst after the Civil Rights Movement. As a consequence of critical civil rights legislation, there were many African-Americans who benefited from greater educational opportunities, and eventually greater opportunities for higher-skilled and higher- paying jobs. As a result, middle-class African-Americans were in a better position to take advantage of the resources. The shortcoming, however, was that the black working-class and poor had more to overcome, because of their economic limitations, in order to take advantage of the new legislation. This phenomenon perpetuated improvements for the middle-class and unfortunately did not do provide the same opportunities for the majority of African-Americans.

While there were larger structural issues, particularly the impact of institutional racism and discrimination that helped perpetuate class divisions in the African-American community, working-class African-Americans and middle-class African-Americans, still had their own issues. African-American class conflict included the resentment of the black middle-class for being classified with poorer, “less-refined” blacks. Working-class blacks, however, resented the black middle-class for their dissociation with other blacks, for the sake of integration.148

Young’s statements also demonstrated the difficulty civil rights leaders had in trying to gain civil rights for all African-Americans while trying to appease white politicians, and while

battling stereotypes and tainted perceptions of African-Americans. Just one month before,

Young published the New York Times, “A Debate Over “Compensation” Programs, Young published, “Middle-Class Negroes and the Negro Masses” in the September 1963 issue of Ebony

Magazine, in which he refuted the sort of middle-class ideology, he seemed to endorse in the

New York Times. Young’s shift is possibly an indication of what social reforms he and others were willing to negotiate, for the sake of improving conditions, for at least some African-

Americans.

While Young’s statements may not appear directly connected to the Washington struggle, they ultimately had a great impact. Sterling Tucker, the director of the Washington NUL, during

Young’s tenure, was seemingly influenced by his rhetoric, and approach to solving the black community’s problems. Under Tucker’s leadership, the NUL tried to tackle one of D.C.’s most pressing problems in the black community-education. By the mid-1960s, education, above other issues, demonstrated the worsening class differences among black Washingtonians.149

Education

Legalized segregation in the Washington public school system managed to not only separate African-American students physically from white students, but separate them from valuable educational resources. The Congressional Committee on the District of Columbia

Affairs’ failure to appropriate adequate public school funding resulted in an overall lower quality public education. Inadequate public school funding created generations of undereducated black

Washingtonians, and thus a low-skilled workforce in the African-American community.6

As a consequence of the shortcomings of public education and its negative effects including limited employment opportunities, the Free D.C. Movement made educational improvements a primary goal. SNCC members noted that inadequate schools and the failure of

6 See Appendix. Pgs. 203-207 for employment statistics and characteristics. 63

D.C. public education increased participation and momentum within the FDCM. In 1966, SNCC found evidence that school buildings were so dilapidated that school children had to avoid certain areas of the classrooms to avoid floor collapse. The superintendent of schools admitted freely that “more money is spent per child in schools in white sections than in Negro; this was distressing considering the school population was 90 percent African-American and 10 percent white.150” Half-day school sessions and crowded classrooms were common in D.C.’s Public

School System.151” Additionally, SNCC noted, that welfare benefits were inadequate. Thousands of school-age children were forced to remain home during cold weather, because their parents could not afford to buy winter clothing.152” The problems SNCC documented among black school children demonstrated the impact of unemployment, underemployment, and minimal access to welfare benefits on public school education. The existence of such problems was especially distressing, considering that black families constituted the majority of Washington’s welfare recipients. Moreover, by 1970, the average annual income of welfare families was a mere $1,409- 53.7 percent below the poverty line determined by the federal government. All of these issues would require major changes to eventually revolutionize and free D.C.153

In addition to SNCC, there were many efforts by various civil rights organizations, especially in the 1960s, to encourage education among inner city youth, while simultaneously discouraging their participation in the increasingly violent culture of urban environments. The

NUL was one of those organizations. Sterling Tucker, the Director of the Washington Urban

League, helped develop the “Future for Jimmy Program.” The “Future for Jimmy Program” was an after-school program where NUL workers tutored underperforming junior high school students two nights a week, for one hour. According to Tucker, the program raised the students’

“…reading skills, verbal skills, language skills by two grades…”154

The NUL started the program after the Thanksgiving Day Youth Riot7 in 1963.155 In a

1967 interview, Tucker claimed the “Future for Jimmy Program” began, “….when we found that a lot of kids were being led into trouble by others who were not interested in school. We’re trying to save those who can be saved by developing a real interest in school [,] and they’re willing to participate.156”

Violent behavior in D.C.’s black, low-income neighborhoods was common throughout urban areas across the country. Martin L. King, Jr. moved to the West Side of Chicago in 1966 in an effort to understand the plight of African-Americans living in northern, urban areas. King’s reflections on Chicago’s 1966 summer riot, illustrated the pervasiveness of urban violence far outside of D.C. Dr. King claimed,

“Riots grow out of intolerable conditions. Violent revolts are generated by revolting conditions and there is nothing more dangerous than to build a society with a large segment of people who feel they have nothing to lose. To the young victim of the slums, this society has so limited the alternatives of his life that the expression of his manhood is reduced to the ability to defend himself physically.”157

Riots, and the volatile social and economic conditions that caused them, will be discussed further in Chapter Three. Nevertheless, Dr. King’s observations on Chicago were relevant to

Washington as well. Tucker, despite overseeing a program in which the intention was to improve the quality of education for low-income youth, still failed to fully understand the very people he and others sought to help. Therefore, educational improvements were extremely difficult from1965-1967 because teachers and activists alike had to overcome the lack of cultural

7 The Thanksgiving Day riot was a violent, racial conflict. It took place after a high-school football game on November 22, 1962. The game was held at D.C. Stadium (now R.F.K. Stadium). 50, 033 fans attended the game, which was one of the highest attended games in Washington’s history to date. Eastern High School (a majority African-American school) lost to St. John’s High School (a Catholic, majority-white school). Tensions rose after the loss, and fighting broke out between white and black fans. The fighting spread into the surrounding neighborhood. Several youth gangs participated in the violence. 400 people were reported injured. 65

understanding and limited resources, and the awful social conditions that it produced among low- income blacks. However, it is important to note, that as urban riots grew more common, Tucker changed his perspective on the conditions of low-income blacks, and became more aware of the economic and social obstacles that low-income blacks faced. In 1968, he published Beyond the

Burning: Life and Death of the Ghetto, which represented a radical shift in his thought and approach to the conditions of low-income Black Washingtonians, as he critiqued the shortcomings of various Civil Rights organizations, even that of the National Urban League, in addressing the problems facing the black poor. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.158

Illiteracy in Washington, D.C.

In the same year as the “Future for Jimmy Program” launch, Washington’s appointed

Board of Education (BOE) elected a new president, Rev. Everett A. Hewlett. Rev. Hewlett served as a BOE member for two years prior to his election. Hewlett’s election transpired at a time when there were 35,000 illiterate residents of Washington- 26,000 of whom were non- white. In addition to the high illiteracy rates, there was a reported “…130,000 persons in family units earning less than $3,000 a year.159” The BOE faced the problem of overcoming the inadequacies of the public school system, in addition to the economic inequality among the parents of public school students. Hewlett claimed, "There are parents who feel that their children are being denied a fundamental birthright, a good, sound public education which will prepare students for higher education, careers in a technological society, gainful and satisfying employment.160”

In his presidential acceptance speech, Hewlett asserted,

“I am aware of the fact that anyone who becomes Chairman of this Board of Education in these revolutionary times is living dangerously…Therefore, this Board of Education serves a city in which there is impatience for change, rebelliousness against things as they are, and the

frustration of failure...We sense the frustration, the anxiety of our school administrators who are dissatisfied with a system which does not provide for the full utilization of their professional competence.161”

Hewlett’s remarks were in response to the increasing radicalization of black

Washingtonians. He was also preparing to protect and defend the integrity of the Board of

Education at a time when local Washingtonians were challenging the public education system’s strategies and dedication, to preparing young, black students, in particular, for future success in the U.S. labor force.

Hobson v. Hansen

Julius Hobson, Sr.’s class action lawsuit was representative of Washingtonians’ efforts to demand justice and equity in public education. In 1967, Julius Hobson, Sr., outspoken and long-time advocate of D.C. statehood, who was often quoted saying, “I sleep mad,” filed a class action lawsuit against Washington public schools, in Hobson v. Hansen8.162 Hobson argued,

“more than a decade after desegregation, the school system was discriminating against black students by channeling them into the lower rungs of rigid academic tracks that received inadequate resources and discouraged achievement.163” The court discovered that, “Students in the lowest tracks received a substantially different and lesser education geared toward attaining lower-paying, blue-collar jobs, while honors track students prepared for college. Low-income and Black students were disproportionately represented in the lowest track.164” On June 19,

1967, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Hobson’s favor. Judge James Skelly Wright ordered the elimination of the track system and “substantial integration.165”

Hobson’s victory signified a shift in the politics of D.C. public education. Hobson’s victory suggested that redress through the courts could result in significant policy changes, like

8 Carl F. Hansen was Washington’s School Superintendent, at the time.

the elimination of the controversial track system, despite the ineffectiveness of Bolling v.

Sharpe9. As a result of Judge Wright’s favorable decision, D.C.’s board of education was unable to dismiss or ignore the demands of other organizations like CORE and the Black United Front to protect poor, black children’s right to education. President Hewett even claimed, “We who sense the seriousness of the social revolution and the educational chaos…know that members of this Board of Education will need the wisdom of Solomon, the strength of Atlas, and the patience of Job for the months that lie ahead of us.166”

In Hewlett’s acceptance speech as the president of the Board of Education, he noted that while Washingtonians (70% of whom were African-Americans) paid taxes that helped make

Washington a “financially successful center.” Their public education system, however, failed to reap the benefits. Hewlett asserted, “…officials we do not elect, officials not accountable to us, officials immune to our wrath, appropriate, control and deny the money we need to carry out responsibilities for public education in Washington.167” His remarks were ironic, considering

Hewlett was not democratically elected either. Nevertheless, Hewlett’s statements, once again, demonstrated the dire necessity for political power among Washingtonians.

Hewlett’s observations were also indicative of FDCM activists’ political goals. He suggested, “Every child deserves [,] at public expense [,] an education that will equip him, prepare him, [and] motivate him for a useful, productive and satisfying career.168” It was the hope of Hewlett, and many public school parents, that if resources were appropriated fairly, all

Washingtonian children would receive an adequate education. They hoped this would provide a foundation for poor, black children to receive higher-paying employment opportunities and improve their quality of life. Despite Hewlett, other board members, and parents across the city’s

9 Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) was the Supreme Court decision in which public school segregation was declared illegal.

endorsement of educational improvement, education faced greater obstacles, than acquiring favorable public opinion.

D.C. Public Education and the Corporate Wage State

Hewlett took control of the school board at the time of two critical junctures in

Washington and American history: (1) The well-established and effective Free D.C. Movement, was placing immense pressure on the D.C. school board to make substantial changes to the decades-old system of segregation, and (2) the shifting of the social wage state to the corporate wage state.169 The shifting of the social wage to the corporate wage state represented a critical shift at this time.170

The social wage came about during the 1930s during the New Deal reforms and remained until the 1960s. The social wage was defined as the “…amount of deferred wages that goes toward the creation of various publicly available goods, such as health services, schools, parks, postal delivery, safety...171” The corporate wage state, on the other hand, emphasized “fiscal responsibility172” and purposely reduced federal and state funding to various social programs.

While the social wage state generated more widespread benefits among U.S. citizens than previously offered, the social wage state was still “gendered and racialized.”173 As a consequence of institutionalized segregation, African-Americans were barred from equal health services, public transportation and schools. In the cases where there were black schools, or black hospitals, they were always underfunded and undermanned with subpar facilities.174

African-American women who suffered from racism, sexism and oftentimes classism, found themselves double and triple-marginalized within the social wage state. Women’s work in the cases of child-rearing, cooking, and other forms of domestic work, were not incorporated into the social wage state. However, racial differences were pronounced even within the gendered discrepancies of the state. While women’s organizations and even trade unions demands for

public child-care were dismissed, white women still benefited from public schools and parks that black women were not allowed to access.175

As Vijay Prashad argued, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “…allowed people of color to have access to the social-wage and social-insurance schemes of the New Deal.176” For decades,

African-Americans paid taxes that contributed to public services they could not access. Prashad suggested, “It was in and through this state, supposedly outside the maelstrom of racism, that people of color would claim their deferred or indirect wages. The state stood before them as the bulwark against racism and the bank for their economic dreams. Affirmative-action schemes in the state sector strengthened this impression…177” While the mass mobilization and various social protests by African-American activists led to massive civil rights gains with the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the U.S. government’s shift to a corporate wage state retarded the economic, social and political progress of African-Americans. This was especially true for black Washingtonians who lacked statehood.

While the new school board President, Everett A. Hewlett was working toward “home rule” in an effort for Black Washingtonians to benefit from their “deferred wages” in public education, the federal government’s growing shift toward the corporate wage state was effectively undermining these efforts.178

Harry Passow Study in D.C. Education

Despite the growing impact of the corporate wage state, the D.C. School Board continued with various endeavors to research the most pressing problems in D.C. public education. Dr. A.

Harry Passow of Columbia University’s Teachers College led an extensive study on D.C. public education. The 1967 study exemplified the Board’s intention to pinpoint the major obstacles to improve public education in the nation’s capital. Dr. A. Harry Passow reported the findings from a fifteen-month comprehensive study of D.C. public schools. The purpose and intention of such a

study was to “…assess current programs and practices and to make recommendations which, if implemented would insure(sic) education of good quality for Washington’s population.179”As a consequence of the study’s findings, Dr. Passow suggested, that the Federal Government would have to revamp its approach to the District’s public school system, because of its unique relationship to the city.

Passow’s study highlighted how Washington public education was substantially worse than other urban areas. Researchers reported, “With its poverty, slums and obsolete schools…presently the District is exemplary only of the worst of the urbanized setting.” Dr.

Passow’s recommendations to Congress included, increasing the District’s budget to accommodate the public school system’s dire needs. He also recommended that Congress legislate “special categorical grants” over a five to ten year period to create a “laboratory model.”

This model was supposed to demonstrate to the entire nation that city schools could provide equal opportunities for all citizens.180

Passow noted what many progressive organizations understood before his study, which was that Washington was a super-special case. Unlike other urban areas that typically had a

“core of ‘slum’ schools” encompassed by an affluent ring, D.C. had an overwhelming number of inner-city schools. These inner city schools had a disproportionate number of low-income and disadvantaged children. Additionally, Passow noted that the public school population was largely re-segregated, despite any changes that resulted with Bolling v. Sharpe and Hobson v. Hansen.

The study critiqued D.C.’s multiple “inadequate school buildings and inappropriate materials and programs.181”

The study legitimized previous assumptions by those living inside and outside the

District. According to standardized test scores, there was a low-level of achievement among

students. During the 1965-66 school year the Washington dropout rate10 was approximately 24 percent.182 Passow’s study asserted, “An increasing de facto residential segregation for the

District as a whole, which has resulted in a largely re-segregated school system.183” There were a large number of teachers who were hired temporarily, which “heightened the District’s vulnerability at a time of national teacher shortage.184” All of these problems had to be addressed to realize the goals of the FDCM. Voting rights were only the beginning. D.C. needed an established local government, and Washingtonians would have to elect local officials who understood the conditions of Washingtonians, and would create effective solutions to resolve the failing, public school system.185

Phillip Randolph, Automation & the Impact on D.C. Education

One of the most critical suggestions of the study related directly back to A. Phillip

Randolph’s previous predictions from his 1962 article, “Jobs for Negroes-the Unfinished

Revolution.” He predicted the negative impact automation would have on the African-American unemployment rate.11 The study noted that vocational education would also have to undergo great changes for the purpose of improvement. As a consequence of the shift toward automation throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the study expressed concern for the failure of vocational programs to adequately prepare public school graduates for the changing job market. The Passow study noted that,

“Vocational education for the future has to react positively to swift changes…Preparation must be provided not only in distributive, business and office occupations…but also in the development of technicians in emerging fields such as computers, engineering...By developing stronger general education and vocational programs for all students, the District schools will be tackling the perennial problem of a curriculum for youngsters who are presently neither college- bound nor vocationally-trained but in limbo in a ‘general’ program.186”

10 Defined as those leaving the school system before earning a high school diploma.

11 *See Chapter One. 72

Pilot programs for vocational improvement targeted “… adults and young adults with low levels of literacy competence and low levels of vocational competence…187” The study recommended, “…the adult education program be reconceived on the basis of analyses of clientele, of community needs and of existing programs in related agencies.188”Additionally, these pilot programs were supposed to be removed from public schools, and take place in other neighborhood settings where “the potential clientele exists.189” Passow argued that public education should extend beyond the classroom, and even the public institutions themselves.

Education had to extend from school children parents to street-corner men, and others who had a social impact on D.C. students. This is ultimately why neighborhood vocational programs were essential to improving the overall community. The existence of regularly, unemployed black residents perpetuated the impression to young black students that life did not have much to offer them-education or not.

In addition to the educational problems the study presented, the researchers also suggested that, family life, employment opportunities, and the state of the community all impacted D.C. children’s future, for better or for worse. Their intention in presenting such an observation was not to provide excuses, but instead, to alert D.C.’s Board of Education and its teachers to the problems students face, so they could plan accordingly in their approach to policy and classroom instruction.190” The challenges students faced outside the classroom grew more obvious as welfare rights activists garnered more support and media exposure. The D.C.

Coalition of Conscience, for example, led a Mother’s Day March in 1965, to help garner support for welfare mothers to acquire living wages and quality housing for their children. The Coalition claimed, “Some families have to face this decision because their income like that of an unskilled construction worker will not cover basic family needs during winter layoff.191” Many public school students experienced the trauma of eviction. Consequently, they were forced to move to

multiple schools, which led to inconsistency in their education coupled with their unstable economic condition.192

Furthermore, Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy, at a public meeting in July 1962 claimed,

“We have seen it in the rain drenched furniture and belongings of our people who have been set out in the streets because they could not pay their rent. They could not pay their rent because many of the unskilled jobs that they could fill are held by frustrated Negroes of higher skill, who are forced to work at tasks far below their capabilities [,] because higher job categories are closed to them.193” Teachers in D.C. were working to overcome these incredible social obstacles that extended far beyond the basic education of young children.

Passow suggested that the BOE should create new ideas and a more creative approach to equal opportunity policies. As mentioned earlier, Hobson v. Hansen (1967) highlighted some of the shortcomings of Bolling v. Sharpe (1954). According to the study, racial integration (in the classic sense) was not the most appropriate choice for Washington, D.C., which contained a public school population, which was over 90 percent African-American population.194

Researchers were clear that black students could certainly receive an adequate education at an all-black school, but that could only be achieved if majority-black public schools were given the resources to improve education including larger budgets and permanent, qualified teachers.195 It was not that African-American teachers were somehow inherently incapable or incompetent, but black teachers were more likely to be hired as temporary as opposed to permanent. This hiring pattern perpetuated an unstable educational environment for school children, who were already suffering from multiple forms of inequality. In addition to the inconsistency of various educational environments, many of the students endured unstable familial and living arrangements, as a consequence of their parents’ multiple evictions and lack of money to provide

food and clothing for all of their children. All of these things complicated, and created multiple challenges for civil rights activists.196

Additionally, the study addressed the District’s failure to “exploit fully new communication media, instructional materials and educational technologies.197” According to the report, failing to utilize these new advanced resources was common in most school systems throughout the country. However, considering the incredible shortcomings of D.C. public schools and its students, the failure to utilize such resources had a more detrimental effect.

Passow argued that D.C.’s public school system was vulnerable to charges of inefficient textbooks, mediocre library facilities, and deficiencies in school technology.198 Some of the shortcomings Passow mentioned were a consequence of inadequate educational budgets for the

District. At the time, there were some materials that were just becoming available for in- classroom use such as, self-instructional items and materials designed for urban settings and multi-sensory kits. However, researchers suggested that D.C. schools to maximize the utilization of the resources that were available and accessible. And, in preparation for the future, it was suggested that the schools, “…organize and plan for the production of the ‘software’ (the content and substance) needed for the instructional technology and new media available and still being developed.199” This was a recurring problem with urban schools in particular, as suburbs continued to expand, and public schools were valued based on tax brackets. The schools that were more likely to experience advanced technology and improvement in resources were students from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds, which disproportionately deprived low-income, African-American students educationally, and otherwise. This observation is of particular importance considering the continuing shift from the social wage to the corporate wage state during the late 1960s and early 1970s.200

Passow finally concluded,

“Washington is not just another troubled large city; it is the Nation’s Capital and its international center. The District schools cannot be treated as just another school system, different only in that its patrons are without vote and that it is subjected to greater ‘federal control’…Schools alone cannot resolve the problem of the cities but, without adequate education, there is little hope of alleviating the difficulties metropolitan areas face. What better place is there for the nation to tackle its urban problems than in the city which houses its national and international leadership?201”

Passow’s criticism of Washington as an international center and its failure to provide adequate public education to its majority black, student population was a part of the growing criticism about that nation’s capital. Free D.C activists asserted, “The president of the United States is responsible for the welfare of the entire country. It is not possible for him to do very much about local affairs in the cities throughout the nation…except in this city.”202 Washington lost its right to elect its own city government officials at the end of the nineteenth century. The fact that

Washington was the nation’s capital, and was supposed to represent a sort of beacon of democracy, drew a great deal of international attention and criticism. It was a city in which the local citizens had no say over their local government. The racial make-up of the city and the lack of democracy were obvious to many countries across the world, and placed the U.S. in an even more precarious light internationally.203

D.C. Education as a Human Right

Free D.C. activists not only made an argument for civil rights, but also human rights. The

United Nations General Assembly approved The UN Declaration of Human Rights on December

10, 1948, which proclaimed education as a human right as well. Article 26 of the declaration suggested three concrete ideas when it came to education:

“(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages…(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms… (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.204”

Based on Passow’s study, it was evident that the federal government violated the educational, human rights of black Washingtonians. For the most part, Black parents had no choice in the kind of education their children received, as African-Americans were restricted to majority-black schools, which was often synonymous with under-performing schools. Despite instances where class made a difference in attending a better black school, it was never as proficient as majority- white institutions. The political situation of Washingtonians restricted them from even choosing their local school board representatives. Washingtonians’ disenfranchisement supported the argument that the United States violated human rights. As various countries around the world criticized “American democracy,” America’s capital and its treatment of black citizens offered more evidence of a false democracy.

The Impact of D.C.’s Public School System on International Criticism of the U.S.

Aspects of Passow’s study demonstrated his consciousness of international scrutiny on the race problem in America. The study even went as far as to suggest that D.C. school students serve as hosts and guides to the numerous visitors, annual tourists of Washington. The researchers suggested that D.C. public school pupils be used as hosts for foreign and domestic visitors to the nation’s capital. The study suggested that the opportunity to serve as guides would benefit students by helping them become more acquainted with their own city’s layout and learning the District’s history. Researchers argued that this would eventually be beneficial to

D.C. students because it would ultimately “…improve their communication skills and their self- confidence.205”

While researchers claimed this would ultimately help the students (and, it very well may have), it is difficult to believe, however, that efforts to place D.C. public school students (the majority of whom were African-American) was not an attempt to demonstrate to foreign visitors, that race relations and opportunities for African-Americans were improving, or at least, better

than previously reported. These efforts to incorporate students as city tourists cannot be completely separated from Cold War politics of the era. It was important to portray an image of

African-Americans as equal citizens to nations across the world. The tourist idea can be compared to the efforts of the U.S. State Department’s goodwill tour in which they sent African-

American jazz musicians around the world to offer the assurance that black-white race relations in the U.S. were progressing.206

While Passow’s study addressed many of the issues plaguing D.C.’s public school system, there were some shortcomings of the study including inadequate analysis of the race problem in Washington. Despite evidence that majority African-American schools were often inadequate and failed to prepare black students for a successful future in the job market, the study still failed to properly acknowledge and assess how racism negatively affected the student outcomes in the D.C. public school system. In 1967, an observer of Passow’s presentation asked,

“Did you find any correlation between the aggressiveness of parents in the PTA’s and the quality of the schools? If you did, isn’t it true that Congress is much more available and susceptible to requests of white parents than those of Negro parents?” Passow responded by stating, “I, of course, can’t speak for what Congress is going to be more receptive to as far as white parents and

Negro parents are concerned, I would hope not.” His response, not only failed to address race, but offered an incredibly, unrealistic level of optimism toward race relations in D.C.

Senator Byrd’s actions on the issue of welfare and lack of federal funding to the overwhelmingly, black school population indicated a great deal of racism, sexism and classism that resulted in perpetual social, political and economic inequality for black Washingtonians.

These problems certainly did not exist in a vacuum. Passow’s ignorance and/or unwillingness to deal with the race issue, provided further validation to Fauntroy’s position that African-

Americans must be responsible for articulating their own issues. Passow, as a white, male,

American managed, in many ways, to avoid the negative impact of racial inequality, and could operate under “hope” that Congress would deal fairly with all people. Centuries of evidence clearly made it clear that this was not the case. Understanding the racism that permeated D.C. policy making would be essential to improving the condition of African-Americans in the nation’s capital. In short, while Passow’s findings and suggestions added a great deal to the conversation on how to improve the nation’s capital public schools, it certainly did not address the primary determinant in inequality, which was racial discrimination.

Conclusion

Black Washingtonians’ frustrations via housing segregation, educational inequities, and employment discrimination would all come to a head in 1968. The April 4, 1968 riot exposed the racial tensions that were ignored and hidden by the federal government for decades. The riot would also force FDCM activists to develop new strategies that would address the problems of the black working-class and poor, after they found that the strategies from the early movement were not sufficient to achieve their goals.

Chapter 3:

“The Day the District Shook:” The Riot and the

Aftermath, 1968-1972

On March 31, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. travelled to Washington to help plan the

Poor People’s Campaign for the coming summer. He made it clear that he did not come to D.C. to create histrionics, but he did warn, however, “I don’t like to predict violence, but if nothing is done between now and June to raise ghetto hope, I feel this summer will not only be as bad, but worse than last year.207” A mere four days later, Dr. King’s words proved prophetic, when a gunman took his life in Memphis, sparking urban riots across the country. The riots were not only representative of African-American anger in response to the death of one the most, if not the most, acclaimed leader within their community, but they also represented suppressed and repressed anger and frustration in the black community. Black rioters’ actions demonstrated the failure of various local and federal governments to acknowledge, understand and adequately address the conditions that plagued urban, Black America for decades.208

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders12, chaired by Governor Otto

Kerner, Jr. of Illinois, sought to find explanations for the various outbreaks of urban unrest across the nation. Urban riots such as the ones in Watts (1965), Detroit (1967), and Newark

(1967) were becoming far too common across America. These riots took place in ghettos13 with overwhelmingly black populations, compelling the Commission to examine the intersectionality of poverty and racial inequality. The Commission found that, “…white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.209” Psychologist and author of Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power, Dr.

Kenneth B. Clark asserted, “The dark ghetto’s invisible walls have been erected by the white society, by those who have power, both to confine those who have no power and to perpetuate their powerlessness.210” Clark’s observation on the perpetual powerlessness of those in the ghetto

12 Also known as the Kerner Commission.

13 The “ghetto” is defined in this dissertation using Kenneth B. Clark’s definition, which was an institution that intentionally restricted “…persons to a special area and the limiting of their freedom of choice on the basis of skin color.” (Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power, P.11.) 81

is crucial to understanding multiple riots among blacks in the 1960s, especially the April 4, 1968 riot in Washington D.C.

Chapter Three will focus on the shift in consciousness among Free D.C. Movement activists after the riot in April 1968. The 1968 riot forced movement leaders to discover and implement new approaches to addressing the disparities in Washington’s African-American community. The 1968 riot revealed to many leaders the depth of frustration and resentment among African-Americans, especially those impoverished and living in the ghetto. The response by the Black Washingtonian community resulted in more cohesive and collaborative efforts among grassroots organizations, in the larger fight for equality and justice. These collaborative efforts resulted in major political gains including the right to vote for school board members from each of the eight wards of the city in 1968, and the election of a non-voting, delegate to

Congress in 1971. This chapter will examine the political shift of the Free D.C. Movement through the lens of residential segregation, employment, and education.

The Riot of 1968

At 8:19 p.m., on April 4, 1968, the news bulletin confirming Dr. Martin L. King, Jr.’s death raced across the airwaves of Washington, D.C.211 That same evening, President Lyndon B.

Johnson, in a speech from the White House, mourning King’s death, tried to quell the potential for rioting: “We can achieve nothing by lawlessness and divisiveness among the American people…Only by joining…and…working together can we continue to move toward equality…212” While President Johnson’s anticipation and anxiety about possible riots were certainly justified in light of recent history, Johnson’s response, however, was problematic. King died at the hands of white violence, not black violence. If anything, the message of non-violence toward the black community was misdirected.

White America’s fears of black violence had been prevalent since slavery. The fear of mass, black violence was a result of the perpetual violence imposed upon African-Americans for centuries, whether it was through slavery, lynching, rapes, or police brutality. However, despite

African-Americans’ experiences with racial violence, local and federal governments throughout the north and south were known for suppressing actual or potential black retaliatory efforts, and, therefore Johnson’s reaction was not surprising. Black violence was demonized in a way white violence had never been-the riots of the 1960s, and especially the riots of April 4, 1968, exemplify this historical pattern. The violence among blacks that disrupted during the riots of the

1960s was a response to the violence heaped upon the black community via institutionalized violence, especially police brutality, for decades.

The news of King’s death did not result in immediate violence in Washington, however.

Originally, Stokely Carmichael and many others, in the midst of mourning, disappointment, and frustration, asked storeowners on 14th street to close out of respect for Dr. King’s assassination.

Carmichael argued that if Robert Kennedy was murdered, store owners would not have hesitated to shutdown out of respect. The reason why Carmichael began an impromptu campaign for store shutdown on 14th street was because 14th and U streets were heavily populated, majority African-

American areas. 14th and U streets were the nerve center of black activism. Washington’s

Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) headquarters was located on the northwest corner, and SNCC and the NAACP had offices buildings located in the same area.213

Considering the area, it was befitting that Carmichael began the campaign in this location.214

Most stores were willing to shutdown out of respect for Dr. King’s death. During

Carmichael’s various stops to request store closings, there were spontaneous outbreaks of violence. As the following behind Carmichael’s campaign grew larger, the crowd became more unruly. A fifteen-year-old boy was reported to have begun the violence when he punched his fist

into the glass doors of the Republic Theater on U Street. After damaging the door of the theater, the boy slipped through the hole he made, only to steal a bag of popcorn. However, the crowd praised his behavior. Carmichael however, warned that “This is not the way.”215 Despite his admonishment, the violence increased and became more severe. A member of the crowd reportedly said, “This is it baby…We oughta burn this place down right now…216” Carmichael’s response, “What you got? They’ve got guns…tanks…If you don’t have your gun, go home.

We’re not ready. Let’s wait until tomorrow…go home.217”

Meanwhile, Walter Fauntroy, MICCO president and at the time, vice-chairman of the provisional City Council, rushed to the radio station, WOL, and three additional television stations, to discourage the violence among black Washingtonians. His efforts were to no avail.

Despite pleas from Fauntroy and Carmichael who had great influence in the black Washington community, the violence prevailed. The continued violence did not simply represent the declining influence of a few leaders, but in many ways, it represented the various frustrations of the black community, that leaders like Carmichael and Fauntroy were not prepared to adequately address. After all, Martin L. King, Jr. who preached and insisted on non-violence despite the violence leveled against the African-American community was murdered at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis, Tennessee. The philosophy of non-violence did not result in the preservation of Dr.

King’s life. In fact, he died by the very method he preached against. Moreover, the nation was not concerned with non-violence as they continued the war in Vietnam to perpetuate their world domination. For many, King’s death represented a breaking-point in non-violence; it did not appear to be a successful method for the struggle.218

Looting and physical destruction continued throughout the night on April 4, 1968. As the violence grew, so did the police protection. Police protection had an interesting twist, because of what was originally expected among Washingtonians. The federal government reasoned that

landmark events such as Thurgood Marshall’s Supreme Court appointment and Johnson’s appointment of Walter Washington as mayor/commissioner of D.C.’s provisional local government meant that black Washingtonians were comfortable with the recent progress made in the city. Their biggest mistake however, was assuming that working-class14 and impoverished black Washingtonians identified with the accomplishments of the black middle-class. The government thought that Washington’s black population was “too middle-class” to burn down its own communities in a spontaneous riot. Additionally, the federal government assumed that the military presence in the capital was enough to deter black Washingtonians from rioting. Even

Sterling Tucker, the director of the National Urban League, claimed that although a riot was certainly possible, he argued, “I think that if something did break out it would be quickly brought under control. I don’t think that the government can afford anything major to take place here…219” These were obviously faulty assumptions as the majority of black Washingtonians did not qualify as middle-class and the military muscle, certainly did not discourage rioters. The

1968 Washington riot caught the Washington establishment by surprise.220

In the process of asking local stores to close in observance of Dr. King’s death, outbreaks of violence began among Carmichael’s following. According to the President’s Commission on

Civil Disorders, riots were likely to erupt in places with a “relatively high concentration of pedestrian and automobile traffic.221” The 14th and U streets intersection was on the southern end of a twenty-block shopping strip that bordered over-populated and deteriorating neighborhoods. His following was overwhelmingly filled with teenagers and adults under the age of thirty.222

14 The working-class (for this project) is defined as those as unskilled, low-skilled or semi-skilled workers. This consists of people who work for low wages, but are consistently employed. This includes domestics, day- laborers, custodians, menial jobs in the federal government, etc. 85

If riots were to be eliminated, the president along with other local and federal government officials, would have to address the reasons why African-Americans saw rioting as the necessary and appropriate reaction to relieve them of the social and political burdens they endured daily.

The issues that undergirded riots included residential segregation and housing inequities, lack of employment opportunities, inadequate public educational opportunities, and police violence.

The Washington Post reported the actions of rioters as “hostile” and “anti-white” without any explanation for possible reasons for such a reaction, other than the news of Dr. King’s death. The description of rioters as “anti-white” led to a depiction of white Washingtonians as victims and black Washingtonians as aggressors. Additionally, such language suggested that the rioters were anti-white as opposed to “pro-black.” Many reporters failed to understand that riots were an act of desperation for social and political recognition.223

Many black Washingtonians were not simply trying to get back at “the establishment” or at “the man,” but they wanted to express their outrage and empower themselves. When Dr. King reflected on the experiences he had with the Watts rioters, he recalled a conversation with a young man, who claimed that “We won!,” after the riot. King was baffled by such a statement, and asked the young man, how he could assume a victory when thirty people died, and twenty- eight of them were Negroes. His response was that “We made them pay attention to us.” After the conversation, King drew the conclusion that “When people are voiceless, they will have temper tantrums like a little child who has not been paid attention to. And riots are massive temper tantrums from a neglected and voiceless people.224”

Riots and violence in the ghetto would not end if America continued to dismiss the victimization of the black community that led to such outrage, instead of actively engaging with the members of the community to help solve their problems.225 Although, riots happened all over the U.S. and certain aspects and reasons for such behavior varied on region and conditions,

they each demonstrated black frustration with ostracization in their very own country. In fact, Dr.

King, at a press conference on the Watts Riot in 1967 claimed, “…the fact is that when people don’t get attention through normal social channels, they often go outside of these channels in anti-social behavior to get it and there is a quest for attention in the Watts area and the ghettoes of the North...”226 The Washington Riot was no different than the Watts Riot in this respect.227

Washington’s 1968 riot was the most devastating riot of the 1960s. The looting, vandalism and fires reportedly caused more destruction than either the Watts Riot of 1965 or the

Detroit Riot of 1967. A total of 7,600 arrests were made in connection to the riot. A total of 13,

600 regular Army, Marine and District of Columbia National Guard troops were dispatched throughout the riot, which was more than any needed to quell the other big-city riots of the

1960s. The number of deaths, twelve in all, was relatively small compared to the forty-three who died in Detroit, and the twenty- three in Newark’s 1967 riot (which was smaller in scale than

Washington’s riot).228

The rioters themselves represented various social backgrounds. Of those 775 adults arrested on felony charges for their involvement in the riot, only two-percent were white; whereas ninety-eight percent were African-American. Only eight percent of the African-

American rioters charged with felonies were female, compared to the ninety-two percent of

African-American males. Seventy-five percent of unmarried, black males charged with riotous behavior had attained a high school diploma or better, twenty-five percent had not. A total of sixty-one percent of married, black males charged with felonies in relation to the riot had a high school diploma or better, thirty-nine percent did not. Moreover, seventy-four percent of unmarried, black males- charged with a felony, did not have a record of criminal activity or arrests; while fifty-six percent of those married, black males charged with felonies did not.

These statistics are important because they belie the public’s perception of rioters. Many assumed that riots were the spontaneous reaction of uneducated and criminal-prone individuals, but education was not a significant factor in determining whether or not black male

Washingtonians engaged in riotous behavior, nor was previous criminal history. The federal government’s assumption that D.C. was “too middle-class” to participate in such acts was fallacious. The characteristics and personal history of D.C. rioters demonstrated that the underlying frustrations of the rioters were a common denominator of fury and rage over their political and social conditions, as a consequence of their race. It was the daily human indignities and disrespect under racism that manifested itself into the Washington Riot of 1968.

Residential Segregation and Housing Inequities

A question often asked, was why rioters would destroy so much of their own neighborhoods to retaliate against the injustices they experienced, as opposed to going to another side of town where African-Americans did not live, and other poor blacks would not suffer the consequences of their actions. The problem with such a question is the assumption that black

Washingtonians valued their slums and housing projects enough, to guard them in the midst of a riot. Moreover, such a question failed to consider the multiple motivations behind riots and the spontaneity of such behavior. As Kenneth Clark pointed out in Dark Ghetto, “…his apparent lawlessness was a protest against lawlessness directed against him. His acts were a desperate assertion of his desire to be treated as a man.229”

Moreover, the riots by ghetto residents in the 1960s were not unique to the U.S. The violence that erupted in places like Washington, Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit mirrored the violent reactions of those in colonized nations of Africa. Scholar-activists like Frantz Fanon, found similar conditions among Algerians, which he documented in his classic book, The

Wretched of the Earth. Fanon suggested, “Generally in industrialized countries the peasantry as a

whole are the least aware, the worst organized, and at the same time the most anarchical element.230” Fanon argued that characteristics from the peasantry include, “lack of discipline, liking for money, and propensities toward waves of uncontrollable rage and deep discouragement which define a line of behavior that is objectively reactionary.231” While there was not a peasantry class in the U.S. per se, African-Americans were certainly considered of the lowest rank on the totem pole socially, politically, and economically, which is why Fanon’s findings are still useful in understanding conditions, which helped create riots. Fanon’s research suggested that the behavior of oppressed, African-Americans during riots were directly in-line with the behavior one could expect from those ostracized in their own country. The riot was not simply a spontaneous reaction, by black people who were inherently disorderly and violent, but instead, a consequence of psychological struggles that resulted in anti-social behavior, which was a direct consequence of the oppression African-Americans endured daily.232

Therefore, rioters did not usually consider the state of their low-cost, low-value, and most of all, low-quality housing, before destroying it. In Sterling Tucker’s, Beyond the Burning: Life and Death of the Ghetto published in 1968, he argued that riots were the new tool of the Civil

Rights Movement, not to be confused, however, with the new tool by civil rights organizations.

Tucker argued, like many at the end of the 1960s, that the original goals of the Civil Rights

Movement were not expansive enough to solve the problems African-Americans faced as a whole. Tucker, like other activists, began to realize, in the late 1960s, that African-Americans had to depend on themselves to properly articulate the issues plaguing their community. By

1968, it was evident that white liberals and their organizations did not know how to “react to the new sets of unorthodox signals.233” Tucker argued that it was no longer enough (and was never really enough) for civil rights leaders to go into the ghetto and try to reason with the

discontented, and offer them the false hope that if they would only cooperate with the establishment, their conditions would improve.234

After all, Martin L. King used the same strategy when he went to visit Watts' residents in

1965, and it failed to quell the discontent of Watts' residents. By July 1966, when King went to live on the West Side of Chicago, his perspective on the Civil Rights struggle changed significantly. At a press conference in Chicago, King claimed, “I want to stop riots…but… I am not going to serve in the role of a fire engine… until the conditions are removed which make for the riots…our pleas for non-violence will fall on deaf ears.235” While African-American articulation of the issues facing their community was certainly a necessity, the U.S. government, along with local and state governments, would have to play a major role in removing and improving the conditions of ghetto residents, after all they had created the ghettoes and benefited from them economically and politically for decades. Civil rights organizers demanded that the government take responsibility to implement regulations that would ensure equal economic resources for all American citizens, despite their economic class.236

Along with the demands that the government take an even larger role than passing bills like the Civil Rights Act (1964), Voting Rights Act (1965), and the Fair Housing Act (1968),

Tucker called for the elimination of the ghetto as a whole. Tucker claimed that congressional representatives and state house officials were responsible for the conditions black people faced-

“They are the real absentee landlords who drain the life and the spirit of the ghetto.237” While

Tucker was advocating for replacement of the ghetto with housing conditions fit for human beings, and for the government to play its proper role in the creation of such housing, the government still failed to understand what exactly Tucker and organizations like MICCO were trying to articulate.238

Government authorities argued that urban renewal was essentially the best response to such housing conditions. Throughout the 1960s and eventually the 1970s, civil rights organizers argued that urban renewal was one of the worst responses, because it priced low-income, black residents out of their neighborhoods, and created houses, condos, and apartments that residents would not be able to afford. Advocacy through public demonstrations, books and pamphlets on the need for urban redevelopment and equal citizenship rights were all absolutely necessary to place pressure on the government to improve housing for low-income residents, and to offer a clear alternative to the federal government’s insistence on urban renewal.239

In the early twentieth century, despite the fact that ghetto conditions were deplorable, those who lived in the ghetto were assured they would have a place to live. The ghetto essentially belonged to the people who lived there, despite the fact that residents did not own or control it.

By the 1960s, even the dependability of the ghetto had disappeared, because the ghetto was being divided up by public works programs. The U.S. government allowed for freeways and highways to be built on the backs of ghetto residents, while not offering alternatives to the residents it was displacing. While urban renewal projects took years to complete, the impact of urban renewal began much sooner. Once public works projects were approved in certain neighborhoods, the government lessened services or ended them completely, so that neighborhood deterioration increased. Neighborhood deterioration hurt the residents, and also perpetuated the image in the press that destroying these dilapidating neighborhoods was best, which undermined advocacy to change the direction of urban renewal. 240

The Riot and Re-Evaluation of Housing Activism

On April 4, 1968, the same day of the Washington Riot, MICCO executive director, Roy

Littlejohn, wrote a letter, in which he informed members of the organization that the “Keep-up and Rodent Control Program” for the Shaw area was going into full-effect, now that MICCO had

the provisional government’s cooperation along with Pride, Inc.15 This “Keep-up” program was designed to improve the housing conditions for local, low-income residents, whose complaints about rodent infestations were never resolved by the actual landlords. Littlejohn encouraged all members to attend the kick-off ceremony which was scheduled for Saturday, April 6, 1968.

Littlejohn wrote this letter shortly before the death of Martin L. King, Jr., and before the riot broke out. While FDCM activists planned to move forward on the improvement of housing conditions for local blacks, not only did their schedule and current plans change within hours, they were forced to reevaluate their approach to housing improvement. The riot made it obvious that not only were the federal and local provisional governments failing to address the problems of poor, black Washingtonians, but the FDCM organizers and activists also failed to fully understand the resentment, anger and frustration that permeated black Washington, D.C.241

The riot forced the FDCM to establish new approaches in the quest for equal citizenship rights in Washington, especially as it pertained to housing inequities. From its inception, MICCO made a conscious and persistent effort to redevelop the Shaw area based on the input of its citizens. Originally, MICCO attempted to get input and feedback on its plans by calling neighborhood meetings, where citizens could voice their concerns and suggestions for the future development of Shaw. By 1968, it became apparent to MICCO organizers that local meetings were not reaching the citizenry to the extent they expected. The riot, no doubt, informed MICCO that their approach to improving housing conditions for Black Washingtonians was in need of improvement. MICCO staff members surveyed approximately 13,000 Shaw families on their ideas about schools, jobs, transportation, and housing. MICCO termed their work “advocacy

15 Pride, Inc. was a grassroots organization spear-headed by Marion Barry in 1968. The purpose of the organization was to offer employment opportunities to African-American males who were previously unable to get employment elsewhere. They were employed primarily through neighborhood clean-up campaigns. 92

planning.16” The surveyors noted complaints such as “too much traffic,” as a result of nearly

600,000 cars travelled through the Shaw area every day.

As part of advocacy planning, MICCO hired black architects, specifically. Fauntroy believed that black architects would be more likely to empathize with the black residents of

Shaw, and as a result, black residents would be more likely to open up to the surveyors who needed honest answers to improve housing policy. However, despite MICCO’s good intentions their broader plans were certainly not perfect, and in fact, they were problematic in many ways.

For instance, MICCO planners proposed that high-rise apartments be placed in neighborhoods where there was an overwhelming majority of absentee landlords and neglected residents, and suggested that the building of low-rise units should be restricted to areas where people own their own homes. The intention behind such a proposal was to protect the homeowner’s investments.

MICCO’s proposal revealed their failure to even propose policy that would eliminate the injustices that consistently came along with urban renewal. The proposal capitulated to the resentment of middle-class and upper-middle-class residents, who often fought to keep low- income people (who were overwhelmingly African-American) out of their neighborhoods and school districts in D.C. Fauntroy admitted that their proposal was by no means perfect, but still moved forward with the same policy proposal. This could have very well been a strategic effort on the part of MICCO. MICCO could have hoped by granting certain concessions to urban renewal proponents that the provisional and federal governments would be more open to funding their efforts; the problem with such a strategy, however, is that MICCO would receive funding for the purpose of perpetuating many of the housing issues that the organization originally sought to eradicate.242

16 Advocacy planning’s basic premise was that “people know in general what they like and dislike, but don’t always have the expertise and sophistication to know what solutions are possible. MICCO’s planners, through the surveys and other contacts, absorb as much as they can of neighborhood sentiment and feed that into their planning.” 93

Despite MICCO’s progressive efforts to include the opinions and perspectives of Shaw residents, they still failed to propose the radical changes necessary to create adequate housing in

D.C. Urban renewal efforts in Southwest, D.C. in the early 1960s, exploited the residents and devastated the community. Although there were some protests against Southwest urban renewal, there was no mass effort to stop it, and it was evident that the white business community of D.C. did not care about the displacement of African-American citizens. The problem that reappears throughout the FDCM is the failure by the government and local civil rights organizations to adequately address Washington’s housing issues. White, urban renewal planners never engaged with the Southwest residents about changing their community, and moved forward with pricing residents out of their neighborhoods. After the tragic displacement of Southwest residents,

MICCO planners studied and recorded the problems and complaints of Shaw residents, to find out the best way to redevelop the community for the benefit of the current residents. Yet,

MICCO still failed to propose policies that would eliminate those injustices and inequities.

MICCO’s capitulation demonstrated the necessity for poor and impoverished black

Washingtonians to speak on their own behalf and articulate their own concerns. Poor people began to organize themselves in an attempt to articulate the various issues plaguing the African-

American community that were not being addressed by Congress or other black-led organizations. The National Welfare Rights Organization exemplified this growing aspect of the

FDCM.243

The National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) & the Free D.C. Movement

In 1967, George Wiley, former Syracuse University professor and CORE organizer, founded The National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO). The organization was designed to ensure respect for welfare recipients and advocate for economic justice to improve the recipients’ quality of life. The organization was intended to be interracial; the majority of those in the

NWRO, however, were African-American women, despite the fact that white women were the majority of U.S. welfare recipients. Ironically, the NWRO was founded by a man and led by an overwhelming number of men. Nevertheless, the organization provided an opportunity for impoverished, African-American women to articulate their plight as well as offer a platform to lobby for structural improvements to welfare.244

Etta Horn was one of the most involved and outspoken leaders of the NWRO. Horn served as the first Vice-Chairperson of the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO).

Horn’s service in the NWRO was quite remarkable considering she was a mother of seven children, separated from her husband, and only possessed a mere eighth-grade education. Horn and other welfare rights activists formed the Washington Welfare Alliance (which later became the Citywide Welfare Alliance (CWA) to address the issues of impoverished mothers in

Washington specifically. The welfare recipients demanded “more money, more dignity, and more justice. 245” Horn and other black women’s activism was of particular importance because it highlighted many of the shortcomings of earlier efforts of the Free D.C. Movement. Black women activists challenged the federal government on its failure to provide for its citizens and ensure equal opportunities by ensuring that children who were dependent on welfare did not receive sub-standard resources like education and housing.246

By 1968, welfare and women’s rights activists were sufficiently organized to submit a series of demands to the provisional City Council to advocate for improvement to the welfare system. Ethel James Williams, Executive Director of the Southeast Neighborhood House17 and

Assistant Director of the D.C. Commissioners’ Council on Human Relations, submitted a memorandum to Polly Shakleton, the chairman of the Health & Welfare Committee of the City

17 The Southeast Neighborhood House was a sort of community center in southeast Washington, where Ethel J. Williams presided over cooking classes, basketball games and lectures on health and hygiene to hundreds of children. 95

Council in 1968, which discussed new approaches to the current public assistance program.

Williams suggested to the provisional city council that welfare subsidies be reevaluated on the basis of 1967 standard costs of living as opposed to the 1957 standard in Washington, D.C. The cost of living was significantly higher a decade later, but welfare recipients were still forced to live off inadequate subsidies. 247

Moreover, Williams argued that provisions for basic human needs were reduced as a consequence of high rent payments. Welfare was supposed to supplement the income of those unemployed or underemployed who had children to care for, however, welfare programs such as

ADCUP and Temporary Assistance for Unemployed Parents (TAFUP) failed to do so. Williams suggested that women needed more funds for furniture, housewares, and clothing for children.

Subsidies for women paying high rent payments in slums, housing projects and other forms of low-income housing was only the beginning. 248 Many welfare rights groups reported that thousands of children slept on the floor and “ate from cardboard boxes,” because their mothers were unable to purchase household furnishings such as beds and tables. While MICCO’s efforts were certainly essential in the struggle for housing equity, the Welfare Rights Movement highlighted the complexities of the struggle for housing equality. The concessions that MICCO was considering making on equitable housing demonstrated their failure to understand the dire straits of poor, black Washingtonians, especially, black women.249

Even with the expanding influence of the NWRO within the FDCM, MICCO continued the fight for improved housing standards for all Washingtonians. MICCO advocated for federal funds to rebuild the devastated areas of Washington, especially in the Shaw neighborhood. By

January 1969, the provisional city council approved funds for the renewal of Washington’s entire downtown business area and the Shaw neighborhood. The approval of the funds offered an opportunity to eliminate burned-out stores, rebuild rundown homes, construct moderate-cost

apartments, and to add new and improved recreation areas and schools. While the funds were approved, the failure for full dispersal of funds by Congress perpetuated African-American distrust of the government, and also forced many poor, black Washingtonians to suffer the indignities of slum living.250

In a 1969 memorandum to Daniel P. Moynihan, the assistant to the President of Urban

Affairs, Fauntroy outlined some of the housing issues facing Washingtonians. Fauntroy suggested that some of the despair from the inner-city was rooted in false hopes created by the government’s promotion of programs that were never properly administered to improve their living conditions. Fauntroy cited the Small Business Administration (SBA) as an example. The

SBA offered the impression that African-Americans could benefit from working capital loans and opportunity loans. Although, these loans could have created more black-owned businesses, the lack of government funding provided to the SBA reduced the opportunity for economic advancement. Furthermore, Fauntroy suggested that more promises would not suffice as a replacement for housing units in Washington. Fauntroy suggested that the $525 million of

Section 221 (d)(3)18 funds be released, which were authorized by Congress, but were not released. Additionally, he argued that part of this $525 million should be released specifically for the Shaw, New Lincoln, and Northwest areas of Washington.251

Fauntroy’s suggestions were vindicated by the recently-voiced concerns from small- business owners in the Shaw area. In a February 1969 Washington Post article, Jewell Murrell, the owner of Jewel’s Beauty Salon in the Shaw Neighborhood, was reported as fearful that urban renewal would force her to relocate her business. Murrell, along with other small African-

American business owners, believed that urban renewal could be beneficial if it was used to

18 Section 221 (d) (3) of HUD was designed to insurance mortgage loans that would help facilitate new construction or rehabilitation of multi-family rental housing, cooperative housing or SROs for moderate-income households, the elderly, and disabled individuals.

improve opportunities for black businesses to develop and thrive economically. However,

African-Americans’ previous experience with urban renewal was that it only proved to benefit primarily white, male business owners of Washington. As a consequence, many black business owners in Shaw joined the Uptown Progress (UP) organization.19 UP was a government-funded, citizen-run organization designed to give Shaw businesspeople “a voice in urban renewal.252” UP represented several “mom and pop” businesses. Their intent was to help all businesses in the area. By 1969, UP had an executive committee of twenty-one African-American members and eight white members. However, UP was an under-staffed and under-funded organization, and as a result of concern for the success of black businesses in the Shaw area, MICCO interceded in the late 1960s. MICCO called for black ownership of housing and businesses throughout Shaw in an attempt to combat white economic control. MICCO and UP’s advocacy for black businesses was a result of the demographics of the area-Shaw’s population was eighty-percent

African-American population, and business control did not reflect this statistic.253

MICCO planners carried the primary “plan-drawing” load. However, they were still responsible for incorporating the UP members’ ideas and suggestions into proposed housing policies. UP created plans for a twelve-story office building at 15th and U Streets. The building would cost an estimated $15 million, and UP organizers estimated $2 million annual revenue would result from office and store space rentals. Unfortunately, while the provisional City

Council approved the Shaw Urban Renewal program proposed by MICCO, opposition from citizens and local businesses convinced the council to refer UP’s proposal back to the

Redevelopment Land Agency. This was certainly a hindrance to UP’s progress considering the

19 Uptown Progress (UP) began in March 1965 in an effort for business groups to organize against the wholesale demolition that occurred during Washington, D.C.’s urban renewal of the Southwest area. 98

RLA was previously responsible for several urban renewal projects which displaced black

Washingtonians.254

The Power of Citizen Planning Groups & Post-Riot Reconstruction

Despite the political obstacles presented by the RLA and other government organizations like the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC), the FDCM’s momentum remained strong because of mass citizen participation in the “Urban Redevelopment” struggle. On

September 11, 1969, the Washington Post reported that post-riot renewal in ghetto neighborhoods improved at a higher-than expected rate primarily because of African-American citizens’ construction work. Both the RLA and NCPC claimed that the sophistication of citizen planning groups led to speedy neighborhood improvements. Brent Oldham, the head of the

Reconstruction and Development Corporation (RDC), which funded the citizen groups’ reconstruction efforts, suggested that there were two main factors that contributed to the success of post-riot reconstruction. The first factor was that RDC paid twenty-five dollars per day to

“community fellows.” The community fellows were neighborhood residents who were assigned the tasks of surveying their neighbors about their ideas for the future of their neighborhood, communicating with city officials, and serving as staff members for the citizen groups. The community fellows’ job opportunities offered employment to those who were previously unemployed or underemployed, while also providing citizens with a venue to voice their concerns, and improve their neighborhood’s plight. Secondly, Oldham claimed that the RDC funding provided citizens with technical support and “paid, qualified planners” that neighborhood residents actually picked themselves. This second measure proved that with adequate or semi-adequate financial resources, African-Americans still delivered community improvements. The community fellows debunked myths that black Washingtonians did not want

to work or that they were incapable of community improvements without white micro- management.255

The community fellows’ early successes did not indicate, however, that there was no opposition or lack of obstacles for black Washingtonians to overcome. Community organizers claimed that the RLA often dismissed their suggestions for community reconstruction. Dick

Jones, chairman of the Concerned Citizens of Central Cardozo20, acknowledged that the citizens in Cardozo settled for less than they demanded. Jones claimed that during the first-year of the action program, community organizers were forced to justify each and every parcel of any plan they submitted, but “…on each and every parcel, the community had the level of sophistication to justify why. 256” The community’s involvement proved critical when advocating for low- income housing. RLA planners proposed a housing rehabilitation project based on presumptions that the majority of those in the Cardozo area had annual incomes of $5800 or more. The community fellows’ surveys demonstrated contrary evidence. Most residents only had annual incomes of $3,300. Therefore, community fellows’ efforts worked to reduce the RLA’s decades- old renewal efforts that out-priced black citizens from their own neighborhoods. Black

Washingtonians’ input for community changes proved influential and certainly more progressive than previous decades. Despite the shortcomings, by 1969, it was difficult for anybody to deny the success of the FDCM in regard to Shaw citizen participation.257

The Changing Face of the White House

While MICCO’s efforts continued to be thwarted by Congress, they also faced the challenge of the changing face of the White House, with newly-inaugurated President Richard

Nixon on January 9, 1969. A new president meant new policies and new obstacles toward housing equality, and all other civil rights issues in Washington. President Nixon announced his

20 Cardozo was another riot-torn, majority African-American area in Washington, D.C. 100

own plans for the District in a special message to local residents on January 31, 1969. He announced that $29.7 million of federal grant money would be used begin actual post-riot reconstruction; another $1 million in federal money for limited improvements of the riot areas between 14th Street, Northwest and H Street, Northeast (outside of the Shaw area);and, the proceeds from President Nixon’s Inaugural to purchase playground equipment for “blighted areas” in the city. Nixon’s announcement also included his endorsement for a nonvoting delegate in Congress, and home rule in the District. Despite the outward appearance of progressive politics, however, Nixon made it clear in the same announcement that, “now was not yet the time for action.258” Nixon’s stance on home rule for Washington, D.C. was no different than previous presidents like Lyndon B. Johnson and John F. Kennedy who acknowledged that democracy was limited in the District, but were unwilling to fight head-on for such changes. The international political climate of the Cold War did not allow for Nixon to ignore the lack of participatory democracy in the nation’s capital, but it also did not require Nixon to implement home rule.

Needless to say, the necessity of grassroots activism for home rule remained.259

Richard Nixon, Residential Segregation & Police Brutality

Nixon also revealed his plans to combat crime in the District. The President claimed the issue of crime was a consequence of historical struggles, including failures in education and racial prejudice. Despite the President’s concise observation on the negative effects of racial discrimination, his approach to crime in the city worked to perpetuate more of the same. The

President endorsed the principle of jailing “hard-core recidivists” as they awaited trial, if there was any reason to believe they would commit new crimes, while freed on bail. There were many legal experts who argued that such actions were unconstitutional. Nixon also supported efforts to increase prison terms for defendants who were convicted of crimes committed while free on bail.

The President also supported legislation to add 1,000 more cops to the police force, increasing it

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to 5,100. Nixon certainly did not mention any intentions to diversify the police force racially or to recruit actual residents of the District. This was not perceived as progress for black

Washingtonians, who often viewed the police as another form of opposition, because of the brutality they carried out against the local black community. 260

Along with the issue of housing, was the problem of adequate police protection for all

Washingtonians. Policing in white communities was often associated with protection, while policing in the black community, was often associated with brutality, discrimination, and racism.

Residential segregation made it easy for police to discriminate against African-Americans. To be sure, the problem of police brutality was not a new phenomenon of the late 1960s; abuse by police officers against African-Americans was a decades-old problem. The 1960s marked a new era because unlike previous decades, African-Americans formed cohesive organizations designed specifically to address the concerns of police brutality. The Black United Front (BUF) was the premiere organization used to address the problem of police brutality in the D.C. The

BUF documented an increased number of cases of violence against African-Americans after the riot. 261

Shortly after the April riot, on July 14, 1968, for example, two Washington Metropolitan police officers shot and killed forty-four year-old, Theodore Lawson, on 14th and U streets-in

Northwest, Washington, D.C. This was the same area in which the April riot had taken place.

Lawson was shot by three white policemen-for being suspected of stealing groceries at a local

Safeway store. The police claimed that Lawson tried to flee upon their questioning of the alleged looting. As a consequence, the Black United Front began to spearhead a local campaign against the unchecked brutality of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department. To be sure, unwarranted murders by the police of African-Americans, especially African-American males, were not new, and neither was the African-American outrage over such incidents. After a few

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local pickets in front of the grocery store, the Black United Front held a local meeting to discuss what the community’s approach should be for Lawson’s death. The meeting was held July 17,

1968 at the New Bethel Baptist Church, where Rev. Walter E. Fauntroy was the pastor. This was controversial to say the least considering that Fauntroy was serving as the vice-chairman of the

City Council, and earlier in the same month, the Black United Front which he hosted, called the shooting of a Metropolitan policeman a “justifiable homicide.” Fauntroy and BUF’s collaborative efforts demonstrated how Black Washingtonians reorganized themselves for the purpose of addressing the larger issues of discrimination after the riot.262

The BUF documented African-American complaints about mistreatment by policemen throughout the city. Many African-Americans described white policemen as “discourteous and unfair to Negroes.263” These types of complaints served as further proof that the Washington

Metropolitan Police Department needed better recruitment services, in-service human relations training, and supervision.264 White policemen countered the BUF by suggesting these were propagandist complaints that would offer African-Americans an opportunity to break the law without consequences. Racist presumptions by white police officers on the inherent criminality among African-Americans led the BUF to advocate for all-black police officers in African-

American communities. While many argued that this was an unrealistic expectation, history certainly demonstrated why it was not. There was an all-white police force in this 70% African-

American city even during the 1960s. If that was possible, certainly an all-black police force in black neighborhoods was not unrealistic.265

Charles Cassell, the co-chairman of the Black United Front, also discussed the problems with Metropolitan policemen. Cassell argued that the professional caliber of D.C. policemen was very low. Most policemen were poorly educated and were not from the D.C. area. Based on the

D.C. Metropolitan Police department’s refusal to hire black people (who were the overwhelming

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majority of Washington), they hired white men from outside the area, many of whom were southerners and were used to operating under the system of Jim Crow. Cassel argued that D.C.

Metropolitan policemen never saw themselves as protectors of the black Washingtonians, but instead they saw themselves “…as those who must control a people who are getting out of hand.

By getting out of hand, I think they mean the people simply who don’t submit to arbitrary and harsh controls as we once did.266” The police problem was perpetuated by residential segregation because it made it convenient for the police to target and regulate the behavior of the African-

American community.

Nixon and the Paradox of Legal Representation for Washington

Metropolitan police brutality and the Nixon’s D.C. Crime Bill countered many of the progressive changes that Black Washingtonians had fought for in recent years. Nixon advertised his Crime Control Bill as a prototype for the nation. The law authorized home invasions without any warning, expanded the use of electronic surveillance among citizens, and allowed “pretrial detention of certain categories of criminal offenders.267” The detriment of more discrimination within the legal system, worked to reduce the impact of what should have been groundbreaking and progressive legislation. The District of Columbia Election Act exemplified this paradox.268

In 1970, without a formal public statement or pomp and circumstance, Nixon signed the

District of Columbia Election Act into law. The law created a nonvoting delegate for the District of Columbia. While this bill offered Washingtonians the right to vote for congressional representation, it was clearly deficient and semi-democratic, at best. Through the law,

Washingtonians were granted the right to vote for congressional representation, but their lack of statehood restricted them to one congressional representative, with no consideration for the actual population to determine the proper number of delegates. The most obvious, and probably the most insulting aspect of the bill, was the inability of the delegate to vote on bills. The

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nonvoting delegate, could of course hope to influence those who actually had the power to vote, but still possessed no power to do it her/himself. For decades, reliance on other representatives to make decisions in the best interests of Washingtonians, proved a failure. The Committee of

District of Columbia Affairs did not work on behalf of Washingtonians to bring Home Rule to the city. Instead, the committee worked to destroy any opportunity for Washingtonians to benefit from democracy, by restricting voting rights and preserving segregation, for decades. Therefore, the passage of the act represented minimal progress in the continuing struggle for Home Rule.269

Free D.C. Struggles to Tackle Unemployment

In addition to housing inequities and police brutality, grassroots organizers still faced the troubling problem of unemployment and underemployment among black Washingtonians. In an

October 1967 interview, Marion Barry, who was serving as Assistant Director of PRIDE, Inc. in

Washington, D.C., was asked to give his perspective on poverty in Black America. During the interview, Barry made an interesting observation about the intersection of race and poverty. He claimed,

“Now a white person can come to Washington who’s poor, and he can move into that market and get a job. They cease to be poor anymore. They leave that hole. It’s like Negroes can’t escape out of that hole, and no matter how high you get, how much money you make, you’ve still got that pressure to keep you in a certain place, whereas white people don’t have that problem. You can go as far as you want to go. I don’t think it’s possible to have [a] poor white and black movement of any substantial nature for any long period of time in America. I think racism is too deep.270”

Barry’s statement suggested that landmark civil rights legislation would not make racism disappear. Laws changed legal systems, but not necessarily the attitudes of those in charge of it.

Civil rights legislation helped some of the detrimental political conditions, but it did not destroy the systemic and social problems that African-Americans suffered from for centuries. Black women and their fight for welfare rights was representative of how negative racial perceptions limited access to public resources. As stated before, white women were the largest group of

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welfare recipients, but very few of them were willing to participate in the Welfare Rights

Movement. Nevertheless, the perception of freeloading black women persisted with the idea of federal welfare.271

Loic Wacquant attempted to offer an explanation for such a stigma. Wacquant suggested that, after events like the Watts Riots, and other urban riots, poverty was consistently associated with black people. As the image grew darker, African-Americans were cast in an unsympathetic light, and white hostility toward welfare surged. This, by and large, was a successful media strategy, because many people accepted the “welfare myth” as the truth. Therefore, in an effort to combat welfare myths and gain equal access to public welfare, the NWRO gained momentum and national support in the late 1960s, as they fought to counter opposition from citizens and the federal government.272

In 1968, Wilbur D. Mills-congressional representative from Arkansas and the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, created the Anti-welfare Bill (House Resolution 12080).

According to the NWRO, the law included several discriminatory measures including forcing mothers to work, freezing federal aid for children, and increased instances of family break-up. 273

The NWRO believed that any mother who desired employment should be guaranteed meaningful employment, adequate income, and proper child care available. The Anti-welfare Bill did not guarantee meaningful work or training, but instead forced women off of welfare who chose to be full-time mothers. The NWRO argued that the bill was unjust because it forced women to work without welfare benefits, at a time when up to forty percent of all men living in the ghetto and barrios were unemployed. 274

The NWRO made these demands during the time of the 1968 Poor Peoples Campaign (PPC).

The NWRO aligned its goals with that of the PPC, and called for the repeal of the anti-welfare law, a minimum income of at least $4,400 (based on a family of four), and three-million jobs for

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men.275 The NWRO’s goals for welfare recipients were of particular importance for

Washingtonians. Less than half of the states provided aid to two-parent families, which forced men to desert their families in order to receive aid. The District was one of the areas that did not provide aid to two-parent families.276

The NWRO claimed that Congressman Mills “rammed” the Anti-welfare Bill through the

U.S. House of Representatives “without hearing and prohibiting all amendments.” The NWRO also claimed that Mills “snuck” the welfare bill through the Senate when only four senators were on the floor, including Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia. Byrd was known for his attempts to block funds for Aid of Dependent Children of Unemployed Parents (ADCUP),21 as chairman of the Senate District Appropriations Subcommittee. Despite efforts by Senators Robert F.

Kennedy and Fred Harris to fight against the bill, Mills’ Anti-welfare Bill was still made law.

Mills’ and Byrd’s unchecked power to pull the purse strings for social welfare programs exemplified the uphill battle welfare rights activists faced.277

Despite proposals from the Johnson administration, congressmen who held negative views on social welfare still held a great deal of power to eliminate, or at least, significantly reduce, the funding for programs to improve the plight of the impoverished. In 1968, Washingtonians did not even have a non-voting delegate in Congress (as they would eventually, in 1971) to express their concerns to other voting members. They could not organize their own political party like black activists with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, because the political party could not yet run for a local office-there was no locally, elected government. Therefore, Mills’ and

Byrd’s ability to determine the future of a city with a population suffering from worker exploitation, unfair welfare stipulations and a failing public education system, proved more troubling and problematic than in other areas of the country.278

21 See Chapter 2. 107

The Work Incentive Program (WIN) & the Systemic Failure of Welfare

The Welfare Rights Movement highlighted more complexities in the D.C. struggle for fair employment practices. In a1968 memorandum to the D.C. City Council, Ethel Williams challenged the city’s failure to implement adequate living standards for welfare recipients, citing the Work Incentive Program (WIN) as an example.22 Williams argued that the WIN program did not properly accommodate the welfare recipients, despite the expectations placed on them.

Williams cited the WIN program’s failure to acknowledge the issue of childcare. According to the memorandum, parents who worked or wanted to work needed “effective child care plans.”

Parents who were forced to work long hours were often forced to leave their eldest child or eldest children in charge of caring for their siblings. Many of those children who were left in charge were also young, and forced to take on responsibility well beyond their years, which made children vulnerable to hazards in the home. Williams found that older children were hindered psychologically and educationally when forced to take on the responsibility of caretaking. Moreover, she argued that the WIN requirement of “going to work” should translate into the availability of job opportunities, job training and supportive services for those who search for employment. Therefore, Williams demanded the government to work to make jobs available with adequate pay if they wanted to diminish the number of people on welfare, as opposed to making welfare recipients meet unrealistic expectations without the support they needed and deserved as citizens of the U.S. 279

Citizens for Fair Employment Now (CFEN) & the 1968 Mar Salle Strike

While welfare recipients lobbied for better employment and adequate pay, the struggle for workers’ rights was a not just a “welfare mothers’ issue,” but instead, a broader issue that

22 The Work Incentive Program (WIN) was a federal program created in 1967. The program was intended to provide employment and work training programs for welfare recipients. WIN was composed of several services including job training, educational advancement, and a structured job search, in which recipients had to report back to the welfare agency on their efforts to seek employment. 108

affected black Washingtonians disproportionately. The 1968 Mar Salle Strike illuminated the problems of exploited workers’ in D.C. In early1968, Mar Salle Convalescent Home workers collaborated with Citizens for Fair Employment Now (CFEN)23 to organize exploited D.C. workers, most of whom were African-American, for a strike. Employees of Mar Salle spent seven months trying to convince the ownership to correct the intolerable working conditions at the nursing home. Mar Salle was paying some of their employees a mere $1.30 per hour. The nursing home offered no guaranteed leave benefits, promotions or pay increases. Mar Salle’s hiring-firing practices were completely arbitrary according to CFEN. CFEN reported that workers (many of whom served as the heads of families) brought home less than fifty dollars per week. Additionally, they claimed that these workers found themselves “again, trapped in the city’s poverty cycle,” despite wanting to work and wanting to support their families. CFEN’s

Mar Salle Strike was designed not only to raise wages, but to demonstrate that it was not inherent laziness that kept poor black workers, poor, but the legality of inadequate compensation by employers, which was often the result of racial discrimination.280

The organized struggle against Mar Salle, began February 2, 1968, approximately two months before the riot. By February 1968, the majority of Mar Salle employees joined the AFL-

CIO Local 536 of the Service Employees International Union. The union group stated, “We believe we need union help to improve our low wages, earn guaranteed vacation and sick leave and guaranteed job security.281” At this point in 1968, the average wage of all Mar Salle workers was $1.40 per hour. According to the union, promotions and raises were at the behest of their supervisors; there was no company policy that outlined how an employee could or should attain advancement in the workplace. The union cited the example of the charge nurses at the home.

They claimed that it was not uncommon for charge nurses, with five years of service to Mar

23 CFEN was a grassroots organization that advocated on behalf of low-wage and exploited workers for adequate wages. 109

Salle, to only earn twenty-cents more than their starting pay rate. Despite the organization of the union and the demands presented to Mar Salle, the management refused to recognize the union claiming that the union did not represent the majority of employees.282

In April 1968, the Mar Salle union employees voted 71-39 for the Service Employees

International Union (SEIU). By May of the same year, the National Labor Relations Board formally certified the SEIU as the official bargaining representative for Mar Salle employees.

The union made several requests to meet with management over their basic grievances which included, recognition of the union and a minimum wage of $2.00 per hour for health employees.

Mar Salle employees did not receive a response from their employer until June 13, 1968. Mar

Salle management refused to meet with the employees. The following day SEIU filed a charge against Mar Salle citing “unfair labor practice” because of their refusal to bargain with the union in good faith. Employees decided they did not want to wait two to seven years for the courts to grant them fair wages, and as a result they voted to strike.283

The Mar Salle employees were well-aware that their strike could be detrimental for the patients. Therefore, in July 1968, the union wrote and sent letters to the physicians and families of nursing patients explaining the necessity of the strike, and encouraging them to make alternative arrangements. On the 4th of July, employees began a strike outside of Mar Salle protesting their working conditions. Over the course of several days, members of other unions joined the picket line to show their support for their cause. Outside support also demonstrated the broader struggle for adequate wages and fair employment practices. The Mar Salle strikers garnered a great deal of support. Approximately one month later on August 5th, the Greater

Washington Central Labor Council, which sponsored multiple local trade unions in the city, voted unanimously to give their support to the Mar Salle employees “with all our resources.284”

By August 20th, the National Labor Relations Board found the Mar Salle guilty of violating the

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National Labor Relations Act because they refused to bargain with the union, and because the nursing home interfered with the efforts of the union to negotiate its members’ grievances.285

While the Mar Salle strikers’ union was based on health care employees’ grievances with low pay and discrimination, their victory was still one for the broader Free D.C. Movement. African-

American workers were striking, protesting and suing to partake in the promised progress of the

Civil Rights Movement.286

The Government Printing Office & the Old Trend of Employment Discrimination

In September of 1968, the Washington Urban League announced an organized effort to attack discriminatory employment policies at the Government Printing Office (GPO) in the nation’s capital. The Urban League joined with the Council for Negro Progress in Government

(CNPG) in an effort to create a strong united front for black labor rights in the city. John E.

Jacob, who served as the Acting Executive Director of the Urban League, wrote a letter to the public print company in which he claimed, “that nearly all low grade jobs were assigned to blacks, many having been assigned in these grades for the past 20 or 30 years without opportunities for training or advancement.287” Furthermore, when Jacob was questioned by members of the press on GPO allegations of discrimination, he claimed that the poor and discriminatory conditions at the GPO were only new to the white community. He furthered his claim by stating, “Black Washingtonians have known for years that the last vestiges of slave labor in government exist at this large federal employer.288” The NUL and the CNPG requested corrective action by September 20, 1968. Once the League and the CNPG made their criticism and requests public, more black employees came forward and reported more instances of discrimination. This collective and public action to force employers to implement polices of fairness and equality helped further the local cause for more opportunities to advance in the workplace. Additionally, the publicity of the GPO’s exploitation and perpetuation of unfair

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employment practices drew unwanted criticism from civil rights advocates throughout the country and internationally. Despite the success of the Civil Rights Movement, the nation’s capital consistently failed the African-Americans in Washington, especially in employment. The hypocrisy of such blatant racial discrimination in the nation’s capital furthered the poor image of

American democracy of the late 1960s and 1970s.289

Neoconservatism, Nixon & the NWRO in 1970

Nixon’s 1968 election was in large part, a consequence of white middle-class resentment for more liberal politics such as the War on Poverty. As mentioned earlier, public contempt for black welfare recipients grew during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Public welfare benefits and other Great Society programs were defunded as a consequence of the ongoing and costly,

Vietnam War. (Great Society defunding began with the Johnson administration, not the Nixon administration, however.) While the Great Society certainly reduced poverty, it did not eliminate poverty. The Great Society needed massive governmental funding to achieve its goals, but the prioritization of the Vietnam War made this impossible. The war affected impoverished and working-class Americans more quickly and harshly than any other group in the country. Welfare recipients like other inadequately or unemployed Americans needed the support of public assistance programs to compensate for the failing job market which was moving toward automation and highly-skilled jobs. The lack of concern demonstrated by the federal government, forced welfare recipients to redouble their efforts in holding the government accountable to all of its citizens economically. With Nixon’s policy efforts to destroy welfare benefits, the desperation among low-income mothers grew. 290

On May 13, 1970, twenty-five NWRO members took over the Washington, D.C. office of Robert Finch, the Secretary of the Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Department, to demand more welfare benefits and an end to the Vietnam War.291 According to reports, the

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demonstrators walked into the Secretary Finch’s fifth floor office, and discussed their demands with him for approximately one hour. Finch and the NRWO members failed to reach any agreement. Finch left the office, while demonstrators stayed, refusing to leave until their demands were met. The NWRO members demanded an adequate income of $5,500 [per] year for every family of four.292 Richard Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) passed in 1969, stipulated that a family of four would be assured a minimum income of $1600 per year, and approximately, $800 worth of food stamps. Nixon’s FAP was the beginning of welfare reform that attempted to placate the growing conservative movement which resented welfare rights.

Additionally, Wiley, claimed, “We want Finch to fight for an end of U.S. involvement in

Southeast Asia and to direct that money to the nation’s poor people…This office is not serving poor people and NWRO is here to see that it does.293” Johnnie Tillmon, the NWRO’s national chairman who lived in the Watts Section of Los Angeles but served as one of the organizers of the protest, found it difficult to understand how the president expected a family of four to survive on a mere $1600 per year, when “He [Richard Nixon] spends $2,000 a year just taking care of his three dogs.294”

Finch told reporters after his meeting with demonstrators that, “If they persist, we will have no choice.” Additionally, the undersecretary John G. Veneman told the protestors they would have to leave within thirty minutes or they would be arrested. It was reported, that under the threat of arrest, the demonstrators began to shout epithets at Veneman. A report claimed that one of the women shouted, “Where is Finch? Get him here! Get that little pig in here.295” Finch asserted that the takeover of his office “was totally inappropriate because it’s going to be counter-productive to what they want.296” Robert’s suggestion that protests would hinder the progress for Black activists was nothing new. For over a decade, Southerners had suggested that the people like Medgar Evers, Dr. Martin L. King, Jr., and the young Freedom Riders made the

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social and political conditions of African-Americans worse by drawing attention to racism.

However, the concrete civil rights gains through the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting

Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act, and the fall of Jim Crow, proved that direct action and grassroots organizing improved the political and social circumstances of African-Americans.

Welfare activists were unmoved by Finch’s analysis. Protestors made it very clear that the

HEW building was now under their control, and neither Finch nor Veneman had the power to make them leave.297

During the negotiations, between fifty and one-hundred protestors, gathered outside the

HEW building to conduct a rally in support of NWRO’s demands. The protest lasted approximately eight hours. The majority of the protestors were described as “middle-aged Negro women.298” Twenty-one protestors were arrested, seventeen were female and five were males.

Arrests did not deter the activists. The next day, May 14, 1970, many of the same welfare mothers took over the HEW department for the second consecutive day. The women, along with their children, and a few men entered the HEW auditorium “to hold hearings” on the Vietnam

War and the conditions of welfare recipients. After two hours, however, the police reportedly,

“sent them scurrying out of the building via side doors.299” The same day, HEW restricted entrance into the building to only those who carried a pass.300

D.C. Welfare Protests Continue in June 1970

Despite police retaliation and an insensitive and inactive government, the struggle for welfare rights in D.C. continued. NWRO activists reorganized themselves in the weeks following the sit-in of the HEW building. On June 8, 1970, three-hundred people gathered at a

D.C. welfare office and demanded a minimum standard of furniture and school supplies for welfare recipients living in Washington, D.C. Five designated spokespeople for the NWRO met with local welfare officials to discuss negotiations over welfare benefits. Meanwhile, welfare

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recipients completed their “furniture and household supply needs” forms, and turned them over to Robert S. Palausky, a Family Service Section Chief of the local welfare department. Mrs.

Sarah McPherson, a local welfare recipient, claimed they were requesting, “Everything from a bedsheet to chairs for the children to sit on. Kitchen tables, for families that can’t afford them.301” While many argued that welfare recipients’ demand for furniture was “too much,” their requests exemplified their tenacity in the struggle for equal opportunities as American citizens.

Tables, chairs, and bedroom furniture were not luxuries. Lack of furniture necessities made it very difficult to provide a stable and healthy home environment for children. The irony, however, was that many of the same people who denied such requests or expressed public outrage over such requests, were the same individuals who criticized welfare mothers for their failure to provide healthy environments and basic necessities for their children. Most reasoned that welfare mothers were lazy and failed to work long and hard enough to provide properly for their children, and thus, the government should be absolved of any responsibility to help relieve their plight.302

While congressmen and senators publicly denounced an increase to welfare benefits,

Washington, D.C. city officials did not dispute the activists’ complaints, however. In fact, they reported that public welfare grants provided for food, shelter, clothing and minor household expenses. A mother of four children received an average of $238 per month, and a suggested budget that designated a mere $13.60 for personal and household needs. The Washington, D.C. welfare agency possessed an “emergency assistance” fund that was designed to parcel out extra funds in the cases where people could not survive on public assistance. The contention between welfare agencies and its beneficiaries was the way in which the funds were distributed. In 1970, the Emergency Assistance fund distributed approximately $100,000 per month in crisis relief.

The NWRO suggested all impoverished Washingtonians should benefit from the fund. The city

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government claimed the fund could only be used for families as a “one-time grant” to help a family navigate through a crisis, and avoid going on relief.303

Once again, the provisional government was still dependent on Congressional approval for any funds distributed to D.C. citizens. Despite their firsthand experiences, D.C. welfare officials’ policy suggestions were often negated in public policy making. The Welfare

Department of Washington, D.C. originally proposed $12.8 million to the city’s 1971 fiscal budget, so that every welfare recipient could receive additional money for furniture expenses.

Upon the protest, a family service official reported that the furniture suggestion was left out of the mayor’s final budget.304

The Black Panther Party Collaborates with Welfare Rights Activists

A mere two weeks later, according to reports from the Government of the District of

Columbia Executive Command & Communications Center (GDCEC&CC), local welfare rights activists smashed windows of a local Washington welfare office, fought with police officers, and approximately 1,000 persons marched to the U.S. Capitol building-all in an effort to demand higher welfare benefits. Demonstrators, the majority of whom were African-American women, were reacting against the D.C. Welfare Department for their failure to meet furniture demands.

The protestors marched to the steps of the U.S. Capitol, and briefly demonstrated before the police arrived. Unlike the HEW Department incident, District police did not need a formal complaint to arrest and suppress the local rebellion. Police used “chemical spray” to break-up the protest. Many of the women brought their children to the protest. The NWRO claimed that

“children between the ages of four and ten years old were beaten, maced, and arrested along with the other protestors.305”

The Washington, D.C. Chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) came to the defense of the welfare women. The BPP organized another rally for welfare mothers for July 2, 1970. The

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BPP asserted that the welfare mothers simply organized and protested within their constitutional rights for extra funds that were needed. The BPP’s account differed greatly from that of

GDCEC&CC. The Black Panthers asserted, “they [welfare mothers] were met with ferocious big bellied pigs who answered them with riot-sticks, brutal beatings and mace.306”According to the

BPP, these women waited in the park across the street from the Welfare Department until they were finally allowed to meet with officials and members of the City Council, despite the fact that nothing came of the meeting.307 The BPP viewed the welfare mothers as victims of a capitalist system, as opposed to violent perpetrators against a fair and democratic system. The Black

Panthers claimed, “…the federal government is responsible for seeing that every man, woman, and child gets the necessities of life.308” As the BPP saw it, those in the black community had the responsibility to pressure the government to see to it that the mothers received what was rightfully theirs. The BPP’s support was representative of the post-riot cohesiveness of various grassroots organizations. Shortly after the April 4, 1968 riot, it became clear, that camaraderie among Black organizations was necessary to overcome many of the obstacles in the local

African-American community.309

Richard Nixon’s 1972 Campaign Controversy & the NWRO

Richard Nixon’s campaign advertisements in 1972 were demonstrative of his neoconservative voting base who disproportionately endorsed the reduction of welfare benefits.

The Nixon campaign aired a controversial commercial which offered a negative portrayal of welfare recipients by implying that George McGovern’s Welfare program would provide undeserved benefits to Americans. McGovern ran against Nixon on the 1972 Democratic ticket.

By 1972, the Democratic Party was increasingly associated with the concept of leeching welfare recipients who took advantage of federal taxpayers. George Wiley, the director of NWRO, accused the Republicans of misrepresenting the McGovern Welfare program, while

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simultaneously “inflaming people against welfare recipients.310” Wiley furthered his indictment against Nixon by claiming that his administration’s policies worked to oppress poor people further and perpetuated the myths about welfare.311

Infuriated by the public misrepresentation, welfare recipients took over a local

“Democrats for Nixon” office on 16th Street in Washington, D.C on October 12, 1972. Sixty members of NWRO conducted a sit-in in an effort to protest Nixon and his restrictions on welfare grants and the controversial “workfare” provision. The staff fled the office once the demonstrators refused to leave. The office manager eventually returned, but refused to file an official complaint against the protestors. The police were called, but none of the protestors were arrested. McGovern campaigners saw the demonstration as an indication that there was not only a need for a democratic president, but for them to also advocate for welfare advocates specifically by calling more congressmen to encourage them to work on behalf of welfare recipients. The multiple, local demonstrations led by NWRO activists viewed such a reaction as progress in the continuing struggle for welfare rights.312

Education

While inadequacies and inequalities in Washington, D.C.’s public school system were not unique for urban education, the city still had problems that distinguished it from school systems around the country. As consequence of the job market’s growing demand for highly-skilled workers, FDCM activists worked to increase accessibility of higher education in Washington as well. Accessibility of post-secondary education was complicated. D.C., a federally controlled city, without the input of a locally elected government, and the Washington Board of Trade worked closely with Congress to ensure perpetual privatization (and, thus exploitation) within the District.

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Universities like Georgetown, American, George Washington, and Howard were all private institutions. They were not obligated to offer opportunities to D.C. citizens. Originally,

D.C. only had two Teachers Colleges, Miner Teachers College for African-Americans and

Wilson Teachers College for the whites. These were the only forms of public higher education until 1955. The Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision led to the merging of the two teachers colleges. The consolidated college was named District of Columbia Teachers

College. Nevertheless, if Washingtonians did not desire to be teachers or had low-income, they typically did not have an opportunity for public, higher education.313

In 1963, Kennedy appointed the Chase commission to investigate the problems of higher educational access in Washington. The commission found that there was grave need for reform and the creation of opportunities for all District residents. FDCM activists continued to pressure the federal government throughout the 1960s and 1970s to improve the accessibility of D.C. public, higher education. In 1966, Congress approved the District of Columbia Public Education

Act that established Federal City College (FCC), a liberal arts college and Washington Technical

Institute, a vocational-training school.24 On September 9, 1968, Federal City College officially opened. 314

Prior to the FCC, many of the District’s citizens did not have an opportunity to attain a post-secondary, public education, primarily, because there was no liberal arts or technical institute to provide such an opportunity. However, through grassroots organizing and activism,

Black Washingtonians forced the federal government to provide adequate resources to change the state of public education in the District. The FCC became the sixty-ninth land-grant college

24 By 1975, the newly elected city council passed D.C. Law 1-36, which authorized the consolidation of the Federal City College, Washington Technical Institute, and District of Columbia Teachers College. Opportunities for higher education steadily improved as a consequence of the grassroots organizations political pressure on the federal government; however, the limited “home rule” granted to Washingtonians in 1974, made higher education a continuing struggle for D.C. activists throughout the 1970s; this will be discussed further in Chapter 4.(consider switching the position of this info). 119

in the U.S. joining the ranks with local Howard University and other historically black colleges and universities. Considering the political climate of Washington, and the overwhelming

African-American population, Federal City College not only served as an academic institution but an organization that provided a platform to deal with local social and political issues.315

The college’s opening convocation address was actually given by a student named

Shirley Gray, who worked as a community organizer in Washington, prior to working on her post-secondary education at FCC. In the address, Gray asserted, that students at FCC were well aware of the socio-economic inequities that plagued their communities, because many of them had grown up in similar conditions. Gray added, that many of the students witnessed multiple governmental proposals that were supposedly implemented to improve their communities, but the local black community had yet to experience the benefits. She offered that this was one of the reasons for so much skepticism toward “outside help” in Washington. Fauntroy’s analysis was similar in his 1969 memorandum to Daniel Patrick Moynihan on the federal government’s failure to provide the proper resources for black business development. Nevertheless, Gray argued for FCC students and faculty to use their personal experiences with inequality and injustice to move the community forward. Gray claimed, “…because this is a public institution

…and because of the urban inequities, we maintain that the college’s overall philosophy must be geared toward urban involvement and development. Not tokenism as our urban community is so used to, but sincere and diligent efforts to help raise the urban community out of degradation and poverty.316”

Many African-American students, like Shirley Gray, saw their opportunity for higher education not just as an opportunity for self-advancement, but also an opportunity to develop skills that would eventually benefit the greater good of their community. Robert King, Sociology major at FCC, was representative of this outlook. He ran a community center in the Upper

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Cardozo area of Washington. King, as a native of the area, took it upon himself to help rebuild part of his riot-torn community. The community center was created out of a renovated pawn shop, on 14th Street, N.W., that was burned out during the April riot. The community center provided extracurricular activities to children in the neighborhood. King fought against the return of liquor stores to the neighborhood, to resolve housing complaints among residents, participated in improving police-community relations, and collected clothing to distribute to welfare mothers.

Within a mere five months of the riot, the center’s community work expanded into day-care services to help women in the community. African-American college students, like Robert King were very active in the FDCM. Many of these college students participated in local sit-ins and demonstrations-but, like Robert King, they worked to rebuild the local community which suffered from riot destructions years after Martin L. King, Jr.’s death. 317

Public Schools, the Question of Safety, and “Freedom School” in 1970

While the FDCM activists made great strides in helping establish the first liberal arts college and technical institute, there were still multiple challenges in the public education system, grades Kindergarten through Twelfth. The problems of high drop-out rates, a high number of temporary teachers as opposed to more hired, permanent ones, and low-standards, took a backseat, as the Board of Education decided to turn their major focus on the issue of school safety in 1970. In early 1970, the Board of Education convened to develop new approaches for ensuring safe environment for students in D.C. public schools. The irony with the

Board of Education’s focus on school safety, was that it seemed to be a preoccupation of the

Board, not of teachers, not of students, and not of parents.318

In 1970, teachers vocalized their opposition against the Board that was wielding its power and financial resources to police students, as opposed to creating disciplinary measures that 121

would encourage an environment of compliance. William Simmons, the president of the D.C.

Teachers Union (DCTU) made it clear to the Board, that the DCTU was opposed to stationing policemen in the schools. Many board members thought the presence of police officers would reduce and discourage violent behavior in schools. Oddly enough, the DCTU never once complained that they were fearful of the students they taught, nor did they indicate in-school violence was an immediate issue. The Board of Education, of its own accord, decided to enforce the issue of safety.319

There were Board members, however, who questioned the school board’s methods.

Charles I. Cassell, a member of the school board and of the Black United Front, asked other board members to consider the reasons why the D.C. public schools experienced a higher incidence of violence than the Freedom Schools in the District.25 Charles Robinson, director of

Eastern High School Freedom Annex (EHSFA), testified at a school board meeting on February

4, 1970 of the stark differences between students in freedom schools and regular D.C. public schools. Robinson claimed there were no policemen at the freedom school. He stated that the

EHSFA’s “truancy problem was not high; they do not have broken windows or a violence problem.320”

Robinson suggested, that change must evolve from the schools implementing new curricula to change education and the lifestyle of students. He argued that “Extortion and violence including death in the schools, results from a value system students are confronted with daily…Policemen roaming the building are not going to solve the problem.321” Furthermore,

Heidi Steffens, a D.C. Public School teacher and a member of “Women’s Liberation,” offered her assent to Robinson’s statement. Steffens suggested that the reasons for violence in D.C.

25 Freedom Schools were designed in Mississippi in 1964 for the purpose of offering African-American children and teenagers summer, educational enrichment that they were not receiving in Mississippi Public Schools. This concept was used to promote a better educational experience for African-American children in other parts of the country like Washington, D.C. 122

schools had multiple causes. She argued that many of the causes had nothing to do with public schools themselves, but instead were a reflection of a society that denies people a decent standard of living, clothing, food allowances and adequate housing.322 According to Steffens, society was to blame for violence in the schools just as they were to blame for crime throughout the city. She argued,

“The only way to solve the problems of security and control in the schools is for the students to decide that the schools belong to them and that it is important for them to protect those schools; to protect other students in them; and that they are the ones who create, obey and enforce the rules.323”

She maintained that the presence of the police in the schools would impress upon the students that school belonged to their enemies not to them, and “that anything they can get away with within is all right.324” Consequently, using police in the schools to discourage violence would ultimately be counter-productive, considering the hostile relationship between African-

Americans and the police, anyway.325

Encouraging students to embrace their schools as their own, was a concept that lay at the core of EHSFA. Moreover, Miss P.E. Anderson, a “teacher-student” at EHSFA, referred to herself as such because that was the “kind of relationship they tried to develop with the students—that she was learning while she was teaching.326” P.E. Anderson’s professional description was a part of a larger effort to create a healthy and non-hierarchical, academically successful environment. The Freedom Annex was designed to offer D.C. public school students, especially African-American students (who composed the majority of the school population), an alternative to a public school system that was failing to properly prepare students for the workforce or higher education. Anderson asserted that the issues of high drop-out rates, delinquency, and lack of interest in academic subjects were not a problem at EHSFA. Although an annex of Eastern High School, the school still received “zero assistance” from the Board of

Education. Charles Cassell argued that if the freedom school was capable of accomplishing what 123

D.C. public schools could not, then the board should at least consider funding the Freedom

School.327

D.C. Teacher Strike 1972

On September 19, 1972, the problems with D.C. public education exploded onto the local political scene-none of which included school safety. Low-pay and inadequate teacher benefits led to a strike by the D.C. Teachers’ Union (DCTU). Despite a court order to halt the D.C.

Teachers’ Strike, 4,500 union members began demonstrations and filled picket lines to protest

“personnel cuts and a pay raise bill stalled in Congress.328” As a consequence of the strike, the

Board of Education voted to shut certain schools’ doors until the matter was resolved.329

Nine days after the strike officially started, Superior Court Judge, Robert Campbell, ordered the DCTU president, William Simons, to be jailed at 4pm on September 28, 1972.

Additionally, Judge Campbell ordered the jailing of twenty-two other top union officials, if the strike did not end by Monday, October 2nd. Campbell also imposed a fifty-dollar fine against the union citing contempt, and then proceeded to impose a ten-dollar per day fine, if the strike continued. Individual members of the union were fined three-hundred dollars each, and one- hundred dollars every day thereafter, that the strike continued. Campbell justified his actions by claiming that the teachers were in “open defiance of the law.330” The teachers’ strike affected

144,000 public school students. Only fifty-four percent of the 6,173 teachers returned to school the day after the court order for all teachers to return.331

The same day Judge Campbell issued his ruling, the House District Committee approved a new teacher’s pay package that would offer a twelve percent raise over a two-year period.

While the House District Committee’s decision was an improvement to the current pay rates for teachers, William Simons called the decision “discriminatory.” Simons claimed that the same committee approved a seventeen percent pay raise for Washington’s police and firemen earlier

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the same year; the same amount the teachers’ union originally requested. The teachers’ union faced a major obstacle moving into October 1972, as Congress prepared for its fall recess. Once again, the non-existent Home Rule in D.C. retarded Washingtonians’ progress. D.C. teachers could not petition their state and local governments for better pay, and they were dependent on the federal government and the House District Committee within it, to approve their requests. 332

The local provisional government had no power to give pay raises or disburse funds to public employees. During the strike, provisional mayor/commissioner, Walter E. Washington, claimed that the “…enactment of [a] pay hike legislation has been and remains a high priority matter for the city administration.333” Washington and the local provisional government’s priority however, meant very little in the scheme of things; the government had no power to determine the fate of the striking teachers.334

The D.C. Teachers strike was more complicated than most strikes with citywide impact.

In most collective-bargaining strikes, it was difficult for citizens who were not participating or who did not hold office to understand exactly what the real issues were that motivated such strikes. The structure of the D.C. government made it even more difficult for D.C. citizens to grasp the complexities and challenges of public education. Congress set the pay scales and limits on the city budgets for public employees; the school board decided policy and only certain spending priorities; and, the schools’ administrations were responsible for the day-to-day operations. Unfortunately, there was no stipulation or guarantee that Congress, the school board and school administrations must work collectively as a functional unit. Congress often ignored the pleas, suggestions and demands made by the local Washington D.C. school board. This often led to a great deal of public dysfunction for Washington citizens.335

In 1968, D.C. residents were finally given the right to vote and elect members of their school board. One member was elected from each of the eight wards of the city, and three were

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elected at-large; this resulted in an eleven member board. Prior to 1968, school board members were appointed, not elected. However, the local election of school board members did not mean that those elected possessed the same power that most elected school board members experienced across the nation. The members were still subject to yay or nays by Congress, who was less-than-enthusiastic about the growing possibility of home rule.

By 1972, Marion S. Barry, Jr., former SNCC president, was serving as the President of the Washington, D.C. School Board. Barry publicly vocalized his support of teacher demands for higher salaries, and lobbied for them on Capitol Hill. Barry claimed that the school board put forth their best efforts to “meet the severe budget cuts imposed by Congress,” but budget restrictions forced them to cut the number of public school teachers in Washington. Barry supported the right for public employees to strike, but only as a last resort. However, with tension growing between Congress, the school board and the DCTU, he also asserted in the midst of the strike that, “no one has to beat the board across the head in order for us to do that which we consider educationally sound.”336 Barry’s statement demonstrated the growing strain and frustration newly elected board members experienced as a consequence of their lack of power. Barry and other board members’ lobbying and public statements certainly showed their support for teachers and their rights, but the teachers’ strike also managed to make the school board appear as a public enemy, because they were unable to restrict Congressional budget cuts for the school system or refrain judges from imposing fines and court orders to force teachers back to work.337

As a consequence of mounting court fines and the fear that Congress would recess during the strike, D.C. teachers reached a tentative agreement, with the school system on Sunday, Oct.

2nd, ending the 13-day strike. William Simons and the school district officials met to sign an eleven-point agreement to officially end the strike. The agreement called for the restoration of

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182 teachers’ jobs originally eliminated by a congressional budget cut, larger budgets for school supplies, unionizing opportunities for substitute instructors, and a pledge that the 3,500 strikers would avoid any repercussions.338

While the 1972 D.C. Teachers Strike resulted in many improvements, many of the specific demands were still not met by the end of the strike. As mentioned before, the teachers demanded a seventeen percent raise, but settled on a twelve-percent raise over the following two years. The DCTU originally demanded that the three-hundred teaching jobs eliminated because of budget cuts, be fully restored; they settled on the restoration of 182 of the 300 positions.

Tenure was another source of contention for the teachers. Teachers were originally required to complete additional college courses to retain permanent positions. The DCTU settled on an agreement that stipulated that teachers hired before July 1, 1972 would not have to fulfill such a requirement, but teachers hired after the date would have to complete those requirements. The

DCTU also wanted to eliminate the Master’s Degree requirement for a high school teaching position; the Board refused. Finally, teachers appealed for better supplies and equipment and demanded expedited shipping for the materials to classrooms around the city. The settlement added $350,000 to the systems’ budget to ensure speedy delivery, including an immediate

$50,000, which mayor/commissioner, Walter Washington, pledged for more supplies and equipment.339

Lack of Statehood & the Shortcomings of the D.C. Public School System

Dorothy S. Fauntroy, wife of Walter Fauntroy was quoted in 1971 claiming, “I would love to have him in the public schools, if I could be sure he was getting a decent education…Education is the number one problem…I’ve puzzled over it and I’m just not sure what the solution is to have better public schools.340” One of the foremost leaders of the FDCM,

Walter Fauntroy’s son, attended private school in Washington. Many of the activists involved

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were well aware of the shortcomings of D.C. public education, and fought for improvements, but were unwilling to allow their own children to attend, if they could afford other options. The problem of D.C. public education continued well into the 1970s. Once again, the major shortcomings in urban, public school systems was not unique to those living in Washington, it was however, more complicated and more difficult as a consequence of the lack of statehood and congressional representation. Lack of full and adequate representation limited school board suggestions to merely suggestions as opposed to actual policy. Fauntroy’s position as a non- voting delegate was an improvement, in the sense that Washingtonians at least elected someone to articulate their issues on Capitol Hill. However, Fauntroy’s inability to vote made his election appear as no more than a Civil Rights booby prize. It was another step toward limited home rule, which would be granted two years later in 1973, with the Home Rule Act. Nevertheless, the act itself certainly did not solve the issues plaguing Washington. Achieving home rule was only the tip of the iceberg, which will be explored in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Despite well-intentioned activism, improvements in the D.C. public school system were slow and minimal, primarily because the Neoliberal Era was beginning. Public education was losing funding and federal attention, not only because of the Vietnam War but because the economy was moving toward privatization and automation, which required high-incomes to attain the best education (pre- and post-high school), and the skills necessary to work in technologically-advanced fields. Neoliberalism was designed to only accommodate a small portion of the population which was in direct contrast to the principles and goals of the Civil

Rights Movement, world decolonization movements, and movements for human rights across the world during the 1960s and 1970s. This created a great deal of frustration, as many people in urban areas saw their educational and job opportunities decline, despite the benefits they thought

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the Civil Rights Movement would bring. An increasing number of African-Americans saw their blue-collar job opportunities reduced even further, while a limited number of African-Americans experienced the benefits of the movement in education, housing, and employment. Many of those beneficiaries ran for public office to help solve the problems low-income, poorly educated,

Black Washingtonians experienced. The lack of awareness or concern among black middle-class politicians, during the 1970s, would demonstrate how class-advancement worked to complicate the struggle of civil rights and destroy some of the cohesiveness of the FDCM that existed prior to Home Rule.

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Chapter 4:

“We Have Home Rule, Now What?: Home Rule and

the Meaning of Black Political Power, 1973-1978”

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“I am pleased to sign into law a measure which is of historic significance for the citizens of our Nation's Capital…It will give the people of the District of Columbia the right to elect their own city officials and to govern themselves in local affairs. As the Nation approaches the 200th anniversary of its founding, it is particularly appropriate to assure those persons who live in our Capital City rights and privileges which have long been enjoyed by most of their countrymen…The District of Columbia is a unique combination of Federal and local concerns, each of which must be satisfied. All in all, I believe this legislation skillfully balances the local interest and the national interest in the way the District of Columbia is governed.341”

After making this statement on Christmas Eve 1973, President Richard Milhous Nixon signed the Home Rule Act into law. The struggle for home rule resulted in a new era for

Washingtonians, as many activists moved into political office and sought to change the issues they formerly picketed and lobbied Congress to improve-including residential segregation, public education, and unemployment. However, the restrictions within the Home Rule Act limited their impact and made it difficult to implement many of the policy changes they desired.

Additionally, the motives and the class differences between those in power and those who voted for those in power came to a head during the early years of home rule in Washington. This chapter will chronicle the political activism in the months before the Home Rule Act, and will also examine the law’s impact on residential segregation, education, and unemployment and underemployment from 1973-1978.

The Constitution and the Legality of Home Rule

Throughout the early 1970s, home rule proponents solicited the expertise of several legal scholars, to support their case for the full, political enfranchisement of Washingtonians. Experts were called upon in an attempt to endorse the Home Rule Act of 1973, and validate the constitutionality of potential statehood. While multiple scholars contributed their expertise and advocacy to Washingtonians’ right to self-determination, full home rule and/or statehood were never achieved. The majority of congressional representatives and U.S. senators were never

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persuaded to right a long-time political wrong. Moreover, the issue of Washingtonians’ disenfranchisement failed to garner mass political concern or interest.

However, despite the small interest outside of D.C., to enfranchise Washingtonians, there were still House representatives who worked diligently to help pass the Home Rule Act of 1973.

House Representative, Stewart B. McKinney of Connecticut’s Fourth Congressional District solicited the advice of legal scholars to figure out exactly how much legal authority Congress possessed to create a bill that would grant Washington full and adequate home rule.

Congressional members, particularly those sitting on the House District Committee, were dead- set against full Home Rule, often citing that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to permit it.

In a 1973 memorandum addressed to Representative McKinney, an anonymous,

Georgetown University Law Center professor explained the logistics of Congressional power within and over Washington, D.C. The memorandum stated explicitly that, “…there is no question that the Congress can delegate whatever authority it may wish to a local government.342” The memorandum cited the 1952 Supreme Court decision, District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson which stated, “….there is no constitutional barrier to the delegation by

Congress to the District of Columbia of full legislative power, subject of course to constitutional limitations, to which all lawmaking is subservient and subject also to the power of Congress at any time to revise, alter or revoke the authority granted.343”

In an additional statement he claimed, “Congress has the power at any time to revise, alter or revoke the authority granted and to revise, alter or revoke any legislation enacted by the

District of Columbia.344” There was no question that Congress possessed the power to bestow or obliterate full governmental authority to the city of Washington to determine its own political

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destiny. However, the constitutional stipulations that allowed for Congress to offer semi-home rule, while simultaneously maintaining their power to override any political decisions made by popularly and democratically elected officials of the city, was a power they were unwilling to relinquish. Congressional representatives and the Washington Board of Trade’s big business interests trumped the right to participatory democracy for Washingtonians.345

As previously discussed, Washington is a unique city as a consequence of geography, demographics and lack of statehood. Washington was a segregated city, resembling the thousands of cities across the South. On the other hand, Washington demonstrated many northern, urban qualities as well, including declining public education in the inner-city, and the replacement and displacement of low-skilled workers living in the city by highly-skilled workers. While black Southerners experienced oppression by their state and local governments, and neglect by the federal government, D.C. experienced oppression in a very unique way. There was not any state oppression, because there was no state, instead Washington was forced to endure the restrictive measures created and manipulated by politicians with no connection to the local citizens, or obligation to represent them in the halls of Congress.

The demographics of the city cannot be separated from any attempt to understand the lack of motivation in granting home rule to the nation’s capital. D.C.’s overwhelming African-

American majority had a great deal to do with the hesitancy and failure to provide full democracy to Washingtonians. The Home Rule Act was demonstrative of Washington’s political paradox. The long-time belief and political motivation that black political power should be destroyed and suppressed extended as far back as 1871, when Congress first began to curtail the powers of the local government to minimize the political power of newly-freed black slaves. The

1871 decision, and similar ones thereafter by Congress correlated with late twentieth-century,

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Congressional unwillingness to grant participatory democracy in Washington. The racist attitudes that influenced public policy were exactly what African-American grassroots organizations tried to combat, during the 1970s.

The Case for Home Rule

On June 23, 1972, in a speech before the chairman of the Committee on District of

Columbia Affairs, Walter Fauntroy continued advocating for self-determination in Washington, and began the last leg of the political race toward limited Home Rule. Fauntroy asserted,

“The District of Columbia is indeed the last colony. We are governed by colonial masters in

Congress. You may think that I exaggerate our claim of injustice [but]...Men from Mississippi,

Georgia, and California decide…[the] local tax the people of the city must pay, and a man from

Kentucky decides, on a dollar-by-dollar basis, how we can spend the tax revenues that come from the pockets of D.C. residents…This is what we must endure. 346”

Despite the fact that eighty percent of the revenues used to run Washington came from local taxes, Washingtonians had no power to determine how these revenues were spent in 1972.

One of America’s founding principles was “No taxation without representation.” Despite the famous principle’s obvious contradiction with the Washingtonians’ political rights, it did not automatically result in rectification by the federal government. In fact, home rule was only granted in 1973 under the stipulation that Congress reserved budgetary control and the president reserved the power of the presidential veto over municipal legislation.347

The Question of Statehood

Unregulated and unchecked congressional control over Washington spurred arguments from the beginning of the FDCM, over whether or not activists should push for statehood or a basic, locally-elected government. There were many that saw the struggle to free D.C. as a

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struggle that would be gradual, like most other forms of progress for African-Americans. There was another segment, however, who felt compelled by this particular moment in history to demand immediate enfranchisement and access to democracy via statehood.

The majority of Washingtonians agreed that Home Rule, in the most basic sense was necessary, as it pertained to the right to elect a local government and voting representation in the

House of Representatives. Notwithstanding the agreement on basic tenets of home rule, political and ideological battles over what “authentic home rule” should look like exploded in the

1970s among Free D.C. Movement activists. There were activists who endorsed limited home rule, and others who believed if Washington was not granted statehood, then the city possessed faux self-government, and grassroots struggles were in vain.

Julius Hobson, founder of the D.C. Statehood Party and home rule purist, saw the Home

Rule bill as more offensive than no bill at all. In the face of arguments for gradual progress, he maintained that “…it was foolhardy for those who are fighting for their basic rights to adjust their strategies for the convenience of those responsible for the denial of those rights.348” He wanted Article I, Section VIII of the U.S. Constitution amended, which stated that Congress

“shall exercise exclusive legislation [over Washington, D.C.].349” This stipulation was not eliminated with the passage of the Home Rule Act of 1973. Hobson concluded that with the stipulation still in place, Washingtonians failed to acquire the full citizenship rights they were entitled to as American citizens.350

Considering the preservation of Congress’ control over Washington, with Article I,

Section VIII, it appeared that limited home rule was more of a symbolic act intended to subdue protests and demonstrations in the nation’s capital. The United States’ reputation as “leader of the free world” faced multiple challenges based on their continued involvement in the Vietnam

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War, and other third world countries where their presence was unwelcomed and unsolicited.

Therefore, it was necessary that the U.S. government create policies at home which would at least offer the impression to the rest of the world that the U.S. did care about democracy and equal citizenship rights at home, as much as they claimed to care about it abroad. Washington’s

Home Rule Act of 1973 was an attempt to showcase such an effort. Congress’ failure and unwillingness to grant statehood and proper congressional representation for Washingtonians demonstrated their lack of commitment to full democratic rights. With the state of international affairs, and Congress’ decades-old unwillingness to grant home rule in Washington, Hobson’s reluctance to celebrate the 1973 Act was justified.351

The statehood debate grew more intense among long-time activists. Hobson, along with other advocates for full statehood, accused Walter Fauntroy of betrayal for his role in negotiating away the potential for D.C. Statehood. Sam Smith of the D.C. Gazette, criticized Fauntroy for pushing Democratic presidential candidate, Senator George McGovern, to renege on his promise to include statehood in the Democratic Party platform of 1972. Fauntroy reasoned that statehood would have resulted in a significant loss of federal economic support, and therefore, counterproductive in the struggle for political protections and equal citizenship benefits that the

FDCM activists had worked tirelessly to attain. The question of how much Washingtonians should compromise in the fight for full political equality would not be resolved during the “Free

D.C.” Era, and has yet to be fully resolved, as Washington, D.C. remains stateless with limited local powers.352

Despite the multiple ideological differences on D.C. statehood, it was in fact a reasonable demand, goal, and expectation for Washingtonians. By the late 1970s, D.C. residents were paying over one billion dollars in taxes to the Federal Treasury, annually. Washingtonians

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paid $77.00 above the national average in taxes per capita. There were only seven other states who exceeded this level of taxation. Washington’s population numbered approximately 750,000 people-this was more than ten other states in the union, which all had full representation in

Congress. District residents fought in every single American war beginning with the American

Revolution, and their casualties ranked fourth among the fifty states in the union.353

Among the seventeen Federal Districts across the world, Washington was only one of three that did not have representation in their country’s national legislature. There was no constitutional amendment which prohibited the district from being granted full representation, therefore, Congress held the power to grant full representation to Washington. It was a matter of will to actually legalize full and equal democratic rights for District residents. Congress used its power to eliminate the locally elected government by 1871. As mentioned previously, these congressmen were motivated by the desire to control and suppress what they believed was an overwhelming African-American population, and their potential political power. The racial resentment remained decades later. By 1965, D.C. was over seventy-percent African-American, and the activism around the FDCM reinforced many of the preconceived notions that it was necessary to patrol and maintain full control of the black population. This was an obstacle activists would struggle against throughout the 1970s.354

Citizen Support and Opposition for the Home Rule Act of 1973

D.C. Statehood activists were not the only ones who hesitated to support the Home Rule

Bill in 1973. Other opponents of the bill argued that Congress’ role and the power it would possess under limited home rule was unclear. Congress’ “ultimate legislative authority” remained under the proposed bill, which meant that Congress maintained the power to change and/or repeal laws that the popularly-elected council passed, and consequently, undermined true

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democracy. Moreover, Washington D.C.’s delegate would still remain a non-voting member of

Congress, and as a consequence, Congress still had the power to control the politics and economics of the city, without facing any opposition by D.C. representation in Congress.355

Local Washingtonians’ reasons for opposition and support for the Home Rule Bill varied.

An October 1973, WRC-TV Editorial suggested that while Washingtonians were certainly aware that Congress still had overwhelming control, they still saw the bill as practical. The local station voiced their support for the Home Rule Bill by claiming, “WRC-TV favors the measure, not because we think it is the complete answer to the need for self-determination – it isn’t. But, it is perhaps, the only bill that has a chance of passage.356” The editorial acknowledged local complaints that “Congressional oversight negates home rule,357” but nevertheless insisted that complete home rule required a constitutional amendment or statehood, neither of which WRC-

TV believed was “feasible at the moment.358”

WRC-TV and other endorsers of “D.C. political practicality” believed that this bill would pass in 1973, because the face of the House District Committee had changed. By1973, Charles

Diggs, the first African-American elected to Congress from Michigan, was chairing the House

District Committee. Diggs’ position as chair was a huge change from the previous chairman,

Representative John McMillan of South Carolina. In 1968, McMillan sent a truckload of watermelons to the District Building to demonstrate his disgust with President Lyndon Johnson’s appointment of D.C. mayor/commissioner, Walter Washington. Representative Diggs insisted that 1973 was the time for local Washingtonians to use their political voices to show support for the establishment of a local government. Diggs’ support for local self-government, and respect for black political officials was a revolutionary change for a committee that was previously chaired by segregationists. Therefore, for many Washingtonians like those at WRC-TV, Diggs

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and the Home Rule Bill represented significant progress since the beginning of the Free D.C.

Movement in 1966. 359

Other Home Rule bill supporters argued that it would protect the minority voice in

District affairs. Eight members on the new city council would be popularly elected from wards.

Five of the council members would be elected at-large. No more than three council members were eligible to be nominated by one political party at a time. This stipulation ensured that at least two members on the council would represent a party other than the majority party on the local council. The proponents were excited to not only protect the minority voice, but to have a voice in politics, at all. For many, some political voice was better than no voice in government affairs. The endorsement of political practicality was also motivated by the growing concerns for poor housing conditions and exploitative rents that were disproportionately affecting Black

Washingtonians quality of life.360

Housing Inequality in the District of Columbia, 1973-1974

Despite the historic November 1974 elections, housing conditions remained one of the most pressing issues in D.C. By June 1974, Washington housing conditions forced the appointed

city council to address and to draft policy that would establish rent control in the District.

There was a great shortage in the city of available housing units including, rented rooms, apartments, houses and other dwellings. As a consequence of the housing shortage, rent costs skyrocketed and overcrowding ensued, which led to public health, safety, and welfare concerns for Washingtonians. The council warned that if exorbitant and unfair rent payments were not regulated by law, it would result in “…disruptive and abnormal conditions in the leased or rental dwelling market, which will produce serious threats to the orderly functioning of the housing market and the economy…361” Additionally, the council argued that occupants of rented or

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leased housing were entitled to “reasonable advance notice of the intention of their landlords to convert from a rental basis to condominium or cooperative units…362” The council reasoned that mass evictions of apartment dwellers on short notice, was disruptive to the rental market, and was counterproductive to the progress of the city.363 The District of Columbia Rent Control Act of 1973 authorized the appointed, city council to establish rules and regulations whenever necessary to “regulate and stabilize rents in the District of Columbia.364” This act allowed the council to approve new regulations to combat the housing inequities of Washington in 1974.365

Upon the termination of Federal Rent Controls on January 11, 1973, rent exploitation escalated in the District. The deregulation of the housing market allowed for a great deal of exploitation among citizens with low and moderate incomes. Studies on D.C. rent escalations found that rent increases were far more prevalent on moderate rental units than on high rental units. These findings came as no surprise to those in the African-American community, because many had protested and complained about these discriminatory practices for decades. The council suggested that protection of the health and welfare of Washingtonians required rent controls which protected the rights of the tenants, ensured a fair rate of profit for landowners, and encouraged the increase and maintenance of the housing stock in the District.366 It was the express intent of the Rent Control Act to protect tenants from “excessive rent increases, unjustified reduction of services, harassment and unreasonable eviction…367” Likewise, the act also sought to protect landlords to ensure a “reasonable return on their investments.368” One of the challenges of enforcing such an act was the attempt to please both the exploited renters and the exploiting landlords. The policy’s attempt to please both was bound for failure.369

Many D.C. landlords amassed great capital as a consequence of charging exorbitant rent prices, and were not willing to capitulate to policy that would result in a future loss of significant

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profit. The lack of elected officials indirectly ensured that exploited renters concerns would not be fully addressed through policy. The appointed, city council had a responsibility to create policy for the benefit of Washingtonians in theory, but there were no significant consequences, if they did not comply with the law. Therefore, policy attempts to placate landlords exploitive measures, as opposed to creating policy that would instead, end the exploitation of renters, suggested they were not fully committed to housing protections for the poor and working-class.

Consequently, black Washingtonians, suffered with the continuation of displacement and unaffordable rent prices. The necessity of adequate policy will reemerge in the late 1970s with pressure from Housing and Urban Development (HUD) upon the election of Mayor, Marion

Barry in 1978. The housing crisis served as motivating factor behind mobilizing voters and support for certain politicians in the upcoming1974 elections.370

Education

The debate over Home Rule, and what type of stipulations the Home Rule Bill should entail was present even in the public education system during the 1970s. Charles Cassell, member of the Black United Front, and no stranger to political controversy, brought the Home

Rule issue to this D.C. School Board on October 17, 1973. Cassell objected to the Home Rule

Bill, claiming, “Those officials [City Council members] would have no authority to control the budget nor would they have the final authority on any of the legislation or regulations that they pass.371” Traditionally, School Board members avoided taking any controversial, political stance. In this case, however, Cassell argued that because the School Board was the only elected body in Washington, it was their responsibility to take a stand on the issue of Home Rule. He furthered his remarks by suggesting the D.C. Board of Education strongly oppose the Home Rule

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Bill under consideration by the Senate-House Conference. He asserted that the Board must take an “…unequivocal public stand for self-government...372”

The typical procedure for demands like that of Cassell were usually referred to a committee and voted on, at a later time. The timing, however, was not in Cassell’s favor, and other members who endorsed his political views. The Board would not meet for another month and the bill’s consideration date was nearing. Therefore, it was difficult for the Board to take an immediate, “admittedly political” stand, against the bill.373 Cassell acknowledged that the school board would typically refer his suggestion to a committee. However, considering that the Senate-

House Conference on the Home Rule Bill would take place soon, he advocated for the school board to act quickly in opposition. The board was not scheduled to meet officially for another month, and time was running out to voice their discontent with such a law. Cassell claimed that the general consensus across the city was that the 1973 Home Rule Bill was a “very bad bill.374”

There were other school board members including Rev. James E. Coates, who were not clear as to what exactly would be the point of objecting to a bill without a seemingly, clear alternative. Cassell suggested that the Board follow-up their public opposition to the bill, by vocalizing their demand for full, political equality.375 Cassell, like Julius Hobson, was in favor of full and complete Home Rule, because he believed limited home rule was merely a slap in the face to the FDCM activists’ efforts for over a decade. Cassell was representative of the leadership the FDCM activists’ had advocated for in the past. The purpose of electing officials like Cassell was to ensure that Black Washingtonians were not only elected to local office, but would remain dedicated to the political goals of those activists outside “the system.” Therefore,

Cassell’s activism and his history with the radical organization, Black United Front (BUF) was starting to bring fruition to the early expectations of many FDCM activists.376

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Cassell’s motion was seconded, with an amendment that the Board refer the matter to a committee to develop a definite statement on its behalf that asserted their position formally.

Despite the second, four members of the Board opposed Cassell’s notion as well as his political analysis. Board members including Vice-President Martha S. Swaim, Bardyl R. Tirana, Albert

A. Rosenfield, and Rev. Raymond B. Kemp, opposed the motion. It was feeling of the four board members, that the Board should in fact, accept the bill put forth, and, “…keep working toward achieving control over appropriations the following year possibly and the next year elected representatives to the House of Representatives and the Senate.377”

Board members’ opposition to Cassell’s notion of rejecting the Home Rule Bill, was based on the history between the School Board and Congress. According to Bardyl Tirana, the

School Board never experienced any opposition from Congress in appropriating funds for their educational endeavors. He insisted that during his five-year tenure on the board, Congress never used their line item budget power, to prevent the board from spending “one cent of its regular operating funds the way it wished.378” Therefore, Tirana believed the Home Rule Bill was a progressive step for Washington, because his experience offered the impression that Congress would not abuse its power. He also claimed that Congress did not require formal reporting when the school board’s budget deviated from the original budget, in the case that is was less than

$25,000. Congress only required ten days advanced notice in the event that the School Board requested reprogramming totaling more than $25,000. Finally, Tirana asserted that in the course of a five-year period, there was not a single instance where Congress denied a reprogramming request of regular operating funds.379

Rev. James E. Coates, however, begged to differ with Tirana’s assertions. Coates cited

Congress’ stipulation that the board could not use funds to hire an attorney to represent them in

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court, as proof that Congress wanted control and maintained it over the School Board, like the rest of the city. Coates also disagreed with Tirana that the Senate or the House Committee did not wish to exercise line item control over funds expended by D.C. Public Schools.

Consequently, Rev. Coates introduced a substitute motion to appoint an ad hoc committee on

Home Rule Legislation. The committee included Charles Cassell, Raymond B. Kemp, and James

Coates, himself. The committee was charged with the responsibility of developing a critical analysis of the Home Rule legislation, in a one-week period. The ad hoc committee was also required to develop recommendations for the school board’s consideration in regards to the

Home Rule Bill.380

The School Board, “CREATE,” and the Problem of Educational Equality

In addition to the contested Home Rule Bill, the School Board continued to debate and explore options for educational improvements that would lead to an improvement in the quality of life for all Washingtonians. Students at Federal City College developed a program called

“CREATE” which was designed to help people who were either incarcerated or recently released from prison, pass the General Education Development (GED) Test. The student organization also supported the admission of those who passed the exam to Federal City College. CREATE wanted to educate people whose opportunities were limited based on their prison and jail sentences. “CREATE” notified the D.C. School Board of their efforts to offer educational opportunities to former inmates. CREATE asked the School Board to consider how they could duplicate some of their strategies, and implement them in programs for under-performing, public school students. One of their primary goals was to create a strong option for failing students who often dropped-out, and into a life of crime, as an alternative to school. CREATE believed in

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developing preventative measures to lower the incarceration rates through viable and effective, educational alternatives.381

Board member, Martha S. Swaim, acknowledged that CREATE organizers submitted written requests the previous year to acquire financial support for the program. Although no exact reason was provided, the Board chose not to respond to their request. Swaim suggested that the student organization submit these same requests formally in 1973. Swaim did not anticipate any opposition from the Board, considering there were a number of D.C. School buildings with additional space, especially in the downtown area and Ward VI that were not fully occupied.382

In an effort to improve CREATE and the board’s involvement, Swaim proposed some changes. She noted that the Board administration prohibited students under the age of nineteen from taking the GED test, which presented problems for some of those participating in the

CREATE program. Swaim argued that this was an unnecessary stipulation. The purpose of

CREATE was to ensure educational training up to the high school level. Therefore, Swaim reasoned that making rules that would present obstacles to this objective was counterproductive.

Additionally, she suggested that the Board create a uniform policy for all high schools partnered with the CREATE program. At some D.C. public high schools, students from CREATE were allowed to take a full course load, and also receive full credit for their work, while all high schools did not provide this option. This of course, provided uneven options, and consequently, uneven results among CREATE students, perpetuating the inequality within the D.C. Public

School system.383

Federal City College & the Proposal for Reorganization of the D.C. School Board

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The Board’s partnership with Federal City College was significant, because Federal City

College was part of the District’s public education system. Federal City College was still fighting to be recognized as a university, and as an agency independent of the D.C. government. Federal

City College would eventually merge as part of the University of the District of Columbia, through a land-grant like other Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) via House

Resolution 15643, District of Columbia Public Higher Education Reorganization Act.384 Despite the eventual establishment of a public university in D.C., there was a great deal of struggle and opposition in creating such an institution. The complicated history and lack of organized government within the city presented major challenges.

The D.C. Public Higher Education Reorganization Act originally began as District of

Columbia Public Education Reorganization Act of 1973. The bill was originally designed to restructure the authority of the school board. The bill proposed a Board of Regents in place of the

School Board that would exercise “overall responsibility for the coordination of and program policy planning for…public education.385” The bill would also allow for the mayor to appoint three non-resident members to the board, under the stipulation that they would serve in the best interest of the city and attained national stature with their public education experience. The D.C.

School Board argued that the law ultimately lead to the removal of parental authority over their child’s education. As previously mentioned, school board members were the only democratically elected, local representatives with the power to significantly influence policy that effected

Washingtonians. Moreover, the School Board reported, that the Board of Regents was only filled with positions from non-residents, and they would control the overall goal setting and budget for the Board of Education. Therefore, the proposal for a Board of Regents was representative of political regression, and a direct attack on the democracy Washingtonians had been fiercely

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advocating for since 1965, within the Free D.C. Movement. The mere proposal of the bill represented the lack of seriousness toward self-government, and a desire to continue the anti- democratic tradition of Washington.386

Bills such as the District of Columbia Public Education Reorganization Act of 1973

(PERA), demonstrated the necessity for full home rule and statehood for Washington. While grassroots efforts forced Congress to make some headway on the issue of proper political representation, there was already a counter-effort to any potential, political progress. PERA was a clear indicator that the Home Rule Bill was more of an empty effort to showcase an act of democracy in the nation’s capital, while facing domestic and international criticism for racism and segregation. Efforts to invalidate the power of the one democratically-elected board in the city, was representative of the refusal to acknowledge and respect the minimal lackluster potential on the part of Congress and the appointed city council which was accountable to

Congress. As mentioned previously, the Home Rule Bill was contested by many, because

Congress would retain ultimate power over the city. Furthermore, if Congress intended to push the city in the direction of full home rule, and eventual statehood, the Reorganization Act would not have been suggested nor considered. Grassroots efforts obviously changed the direction of the Public Education Reorganization Act into District of Columbia Public Higher Education

Reorganization Act, which led to the first District of Columbia University, and helped local residents receive subsidized tuition costs, like other public college attendees. Efforts to redirect the educational acts, however, did not result in the redirection of Congressional desire to maintain control over the District.387

Furthermore, the draft bill of the Education Reorganization Act, was only presented to the board after it was submitted to the District Committee of the House of Representatives,

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without any input from the members of the very community it would affect. The school board made an official statement in 1973, making it clear where the board stood on the proposed

“Board of Regents.” Board members asserted, “We lament the clear evidence of a continuing colonial mentality on the part of the persons who developed this proposal and…its sponsors…None of the proponents of this ill-considered proposal…are elected officials, nor have they in any other way been designated by the community to design a third class status for our elected School Board.388” Additionally, the school board warned that they were fully prepared to challenge the act, and mobilize their constituents in a citywide offensive against the “flagrant disrespect for the democratic processes we all insist upon.389”

The Nelsen Commission & Local Citizen Participation & the Board of Education

Tension between the elected school board members and Washington’s appointed city council was anything but new. The problem stemmed from the appointed city-council and

Congress unregulated power to reject the board’s budget proposals for the public school system.

The board was often frustrated with the fact that they were the only elected body of the city, and that non-elected officials had more power than the School Board to determine the political direction of D.C., which was essentially, anti-democratic. The Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia also known as The Nelsen Commission findings further demonstrated the tension between the two groups.390

The Nelsen Commission was established by an Act of Congress to “promote economy, efficiency, and improved services for the District Government.391” The report of the Commission was issued on August 17, 1972. The Commission put forth 451 recommendations for an improved Washington government, which would impact all departments and agencies of the

District Government. One of the missing aspects was citizen input on the recommendations

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presented by the Commission. The absence of citizen input was historically commonplace, but the FDCM drew more attention to the detriment of citizens’ non-participation in the democratic process.392

Starting in January 1973, representatives from the Washington government and other local D.C. organizations developed workshops, to help educate the citizenry on the Nelsen findings that would lead to policy that affected their daily lives. The second workshop was offered on April 28, 1973, where Mayor Walter Washington addressed over 300 citizens about the findings of the report. After his address, the reactions of local citizens to the report were recorded. One of the issues was the public education system. The Commission’s report recommended that the Mayor-Commissioner and the District of Columbia continue to review the

Board of Education’s budget proposals, and “make determinations regarding the aggregate level of funding to be requested for the public schools system of the District of Columbia.393”

The commission suggested that the Mayor-Commissioner (MC) and District Council

(DC) based their budget approvals and disapprovals on a two-point set of criteria. The first point of criteria suggested that the MC and DC had the power to determine the “projected use of available funds as reflected in the program and activity levels proposed by the Board of

Education.394” The second point of criteria was that the Mayor-Commissioner and District

Council have the power to base their budget approvals on the “relative need and importance of all activities and services of the District of Columbia Government…395” The council would have the power to determine whether or not they thought school board proposals were important enough to fund. The problem with such a recommendation was that the council did not have any legal obligation to answer to the citizenry-after all, they were not elected.396

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The school board however, did have a constituency, and were obligated by law to include citizen input in developing their budget proposals. Therefore, the council’s potential power to determine the importance of budget proposals and to deny elected school board members’ funding recommendations would keep Washingtonians in a vulnerable political position. Even with a federally-approved commission, in the midst of the Free D.C. Movement, many officials were still refusing to deal with the perpetual anti-democratic policies that continued to oppress

Washingtonians. This recommendation received approval from the citizens present at the workshop, with the provision that the Commission emphasize the School Board’s determination of spending priorities.397

Additionally, the commission recommended that the Superintendent of Schools, Barbara

A. Sizemore, prepare and submit an annual report, beginning on October 1, 1973, to the Board of

Education. This report was supposed to detail problems, programs, activities, and achievements of the recent school year, and plans for the upcoming academic year. Next, the Board of

Education was supposed to review the report and add any suggestions and commentary they thought might be useful to improve Washington’s public schools. The commission suggested that the Board submit addendums, in addition to the Superintendent’s annual report, that should be made available to the public shortly thereafter. Additionally, the commission suggested that copies of the report should be submitted to the Mayor-Commissioner, the District Council, and the Congressional committees, so they could make appropriate decisions, especially as it pertained to funding disbursements for the public school system. This recommendation was approved by Washingtonians at the workshop, with the amendment that “…the report be issues quarterly and that the board circulation appropriate opportunity for citizen response.398”

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The insistence upon citizen approval on the commission’s recommendations for

Washington, and the insistence on elected school board members’ power to determine spending priorities was representative of how FDCM activists managed to force those in power to include

Washingtonians in the creation and implementation of public policy. The 1968 riots, the Welfare

Rights Activists’ sit-in in the Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Building, and the continued grassroots efforts to ensure full, home rule, made it difficult for Congress to ignore the demands by citizens for equal access to democracy.399

1974 Local Washington Elections

Grassroots demonstrations and local political activism led to one of most incredible moments in Washington, D.C.’s history-the 1974 elections. As a result of the enactment of the

Home Rule Act in 1973, there was an outpouring of political candidates for local offices.

Washingtonians had been fighting collectively and massively since 1965 for the freedom of

D.C., and while “freedom” remained relative, the right to elect a local government, represented an opportunity for many activists to put their ideologies into practice. In May 1974, when

Washingtonians were given the opportunity to petition to participate in the local primaries for city council, ninety-two District residents rushed to be involved.400 Mayor-commissioner, Walter

E. Washington, a long-time activist, and one of the few people allowed to hold political office prior to the Home Rule, was among the many people vying for the office of mayor. In 1974,

Washington admitted that he had grown weary of the limited powers of his position. He was tired of having to “urge, cajole and sort of persuade people” as mayor/commissioner. As mayor, however, he could demand that people simply, “Do it.401” While Washington was correct that he would possess more power as an elected mayor, he overestimated the power he would possess as

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elected mayor of D.C. Washington eventually found that Congress maintained the power to regulate and destroy potential social and economic policy that would benefit Washingtonians.402

Nevertheless, Walter Washington like many Washingtonians, saw the Home Rule Act as a step forward, and viewed some improvement as better than no improvement at all. The difference for Walter Washington in 1974 however, was that he faced competition. Unlike his previous appointment in 1968, Washington actually had to campaign, and compete with other citizens who vied for the mayoral position. His competition included an attorney named Clifford

Alexander, Jr., an African-American, graduate of Harvard University. Prior to his run for mayor,

Alexander worked for the Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon administration as the chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) from 1967 to

1969. As chairman, Alexander directed investigations on job discrimination in labor unions, movies, and textile industries. His work affected approximately 70,000 people, compared to the

5,000 by his predecessor. Alexander’s background of pursuing racial justice made him a viable candidate in a city like Washington, where many needed the implementation of policies to help eliminate racial discrimination.403

There was even more competition among those running for at-large seats on the city- council. Among those campaigning was former, Black United Front (BUF) chairman, Rev.

Douglas E. Moore. Moore resigned from his position as chairman of the BUF, in order to dedicate his time to running for the Democratic nomination for an at-large seat on the city council. Moore was one of the most outspoken and militant voices of the FDCM in the 1960s and early 1970s. Many expected his run for political office, but many did not expect his resignation. While he remained a member of the BUF, his resignation as chairman seemed to signify a momentous shift in the fight to free D.C. Douglas Moore was well-known for his

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wardrobe of colorful dashikis, but in his open-air news conference where he announced his plans to run for councilman at-large, he sported a light blue, summer suit. The political race of 1974 signified a transition for many black radicals from grassroots organizers to elected, political leaders. The public witnessed people like Douglas Moore and Marion Barry altering their public wardrobes of dashikis and large afro-haircuts to more conservative images to attract a wider array of support.404

Despite the majority African-American population, white Washingtonians dominated the economics of the city. Therefore, the political endorsements of the Washington Board of Trade and white-owned papers like the Washington Post, were critical in the outcome of the local election. African-American politicians needed the economic support of businesses to run effective campaigns, and endorsements by large papers like the Washington Post certainly aided in their election. African-American politicians were not simply trying to gain the “white vote,” as some may assume, but they were trying to gain the votes of middle-class, black Washingtonians, who frowned upon the militant behavior of radical civil rights activists and organizations. Black political candidates had to demonstrate that they could be trusted to operate differently than they did in organizations like the Black United Front and PRIDE, Inc.405

1974 Election Results and the Changing Tide of Washington Politics

The November 1974 election presented surprising results to many of the city’s political pundits and experts. Douglas Moore and Marion Barry of the Democratic Party, Jerry Moore of the Republican Party, and Julius Hobson, Sr. of the D.C. Statehood Party, managed to win the most votes out of seventeen candidates, for four at-large seats on the city council. Douglas

Moore received the most votes of all four; he won by a margin of 313 votes. Rev. Moore even won more votes than former SNCC President and PRIDE, Inc. leader, Marion Barry in the city’s

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at-large elections. Political observers suggested that Barry’s second place finish would hinder his opportunity for a preeminent position on the council like vice-chairman. 406

Harvey Kabaker of Star News claimed individual precinct results demonstrated interesting conclusions about the 1974 election. Kabaker argued that Moore’s votes almost exclusively depended on African-Americans and Democrats in Washington. The majority of

Barry’s support was constituted by white citizens and voters in precincts without a majority black population. Barry and Moore had nearly the same success among African-Americans and democrats. Correlation indicated that Barry’s vote totals did not depend on these factors as much as Moore. Barry, however, did not do as well among the more affluent communities, black or white, as he did in low-income precincts. This was largely the result of Barry’s vocal opposition to economic exploitation and employment discrimination, which were not issues of immediacy in more affluent communities. Barry appealed to both young and old voters equally, while Moore benefited from the presence of young voters. While political pundits predicted that Barry’s second-place finish would hinder his opportunities for a more preeminent position, the demographics of his voter support would later work to his advantage in his mayoral victory of

1978.407

Mayor/commissioner, Walter E. Washington, however, won every precinct in the city.

Washington gained approximately eighty percent of the 140,000 valid ballots that were cast.

Council Chairman-elect, Sterling Tucker, who spent years in Washington advocating for workers’ rights in the city, also took the polls by storm. Tucker won every precinct in the city with nearly eighty percent of the vote. Tucker’s election also demonstrated a new era in

Washington politics. Tucker had authored Beyond the Burning: Life and Death in the Ghetto in

1968. In his book, he endorsed Black Power, and called for the destruction of the ghetto in order

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to liberate African-Americans from racial oppression. Tucker’s well-known activism and radical beliefs did not destroy nor deter his bid for office, in fact, he won by a landslide. Tucker’s victory, along with Barry, Moore, and Fauntroy, signified not only that black Washingtonians wanted representation, but black representation that went beyond race, but ensure racial understanding and informed sensitivity to the issues that plagued Black Washingtonians. Black

Washingtonians voted for representation they believed would result in the destruction of old, discriminatory policies that previously perpetuated employment discrimination, inadequacies in the D.C. public school system, and housing inequities-all of which remained unsolved problems, years after the 1974 election.408

Walter E. Fauntroy, the Interfaith Committee of Greater Washington & the Equitable

Housing Movement of 1977

Despite the local elections of African-American politicians in D.C., and the influence of the black perspective on local policy, problems still persisted among black Washingtonians, namely housing. The decades of housing exploitation, and the continuation of congressional power to manipulate local policy, prevented the historic election of local officials from having the impact many hoped for with the passage of the Home Rule Act of 1973. Even into the late

1970s, FDCM activism focused heavily on the desire for housing equity. This is evidenced through the Fauntroy’s 1977 public advocation for D.C. housing equity.

On December 15, 1977, Walter E. Fauntroy spoke to the Interfaith Committee of Greater

Washington, in an attempt to further the cause for equitable housing in Washington, and to outline the ways in which the city could finally achieve the goal. He argued that there were two essential needs for the Equitable Housing Movement. The first of which included the need for a housing development plan and a housing finance plan. Fauntroy advocated for a plan that would

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deliver an appropriate supply of rental and owner-occupied housing for Washingtonians. The intention of the local plan was to create a balanced community that offered adequate housing options for all Washingtonians.409

Fauntroy proclaimed that, “Decent, safe, sanitary, affordable housing is the right of every

American.410” While Fauntroy’s statement was one he and other activists had made throughout the struggle to free D.C. specifically from political oppression, it was also tied to a larger belief in human rights. Decent housing was not a U.S. constitutional right, but it was declared a human right by the United Nations in 1948.26 Many FDCM and Black Freedom Movement activists in general, placed their struggles in a global context. There were several reasons for examining black rights in a global context during the 1970s, but one of the primary reasons was that black activists were well aware that the racial inequities at home, were very similar to the racial inequities people of African descent and other colonized groups experienced all over the world.

Additionally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represented a global document to hold the U.S. accountable, for racial discrimination in housing, employment, education and other important facets of American life. Fauntroy and others situated Washington’s housing crisis in global and local contexts to demonstrate how the U.S. was failing its citizens despite its purporting of democracy and equality as guaranteed rights for all, in its overseas propaganda. 411

One of the issues of grave concern was rising housing costs in Washington. The operating costs for rental units and utility costs within units, were increasing at unprecedented rates. Housing costs increased beyond economic accessibility for an overwhelming number of

26 “Article 25” of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, asserted that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”

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Washingtonians. Fauntroy predicted, “Unless something is done soon, only the rich will be able to afford a home.412”

Seventy-percent of the housing in D.C. was comprised of rental units, which was twenty- percent higher than the number of rental units in other central cities. Over 500,000 people in

Washington lived in rental housing. Between 1970 and 1975, the city lost two-percent of its housing stock. D.C. compared unfavorably to other central cities throughout the country, whose stock on average increased approximately six percent. While Washington experienced positive- growth in owner-occupied housing, the city had a net loss, overall, during the same five-year period. The owner-occupied housing’s “positive growth” meant little for a city, where seventy- percent of the citizens were dependent on rental housing, as opposed to houses.413

The lack of housing options for low- and moderate-income citizens exacerbated the other problems in the failing, housing market. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

(COG), “1974 Annual Housing Survey,” revealed the problem of overcrowding across the city.

Of the 34,000 households surveyed, more than 6,000 were “severely overcrowded,” with 1.51 or more persons per room. Nearly forty-nine percent of the overcrowded dwelling units in the

Metropolitan area were in the District of Columbia. The distribution of severely overcrowded dwellings presented an even more disturbing view of housing with approximately seventy-two- percent of the households with 1.51 or more people were located in the District of Columbia.414

Overall, in the Metropolitan area27, the number of renter-occupied dwellings exceeded the number of owner-occupied dwellings, by a two-to-one margin. However, in the District of

Columbia, renter-occupied units exceeded the number of owner-occupied units, by a margin of five-to-one. Nearly 7.6 percent of all renter-occupied units in Washington were overcrowded,

27 The Washington Metropolitan Area consisted of those living in the District of Columbia, Northern Virginia, and Southern Maryland.

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while 2.2 percent were “severely overcrowded.” The 1974 Annual Housing Survey statistics proved further why Fauntroy’s demand for housing options was so critical. He reasoned that more government funding was the solution to the local housing problem. He demanded, “Money for new construction and money for the rehabilitation available of existing structures—and most importantly, money for home purchase.415”

Fauntroy also argued that the federal government bore responsibility for ensuring adequate and affordable housing options for Washingtonians. As a member of the House

Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, Fauntroy produced legislation that he hoped would make the federal government more responsible to Washington’s citizenry. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 is an example of this attempt. The new law appropriated $13.7 billion for the Community Development Block Grant program, to be distributed over a three-year period, 1978-1980. The law provided $33 million to the District for its grant program in the first year. The intention of the act was to provide special assistance for

“older, declining urban communities.416” Additionally, the law included provisions which provided support for single-family home-ownership, by reducing down-payment requirements and increasing mortgage ceilings.417

Further, the law authorized $1.16 billion in contract authority for public housing and

Section 8 Housing Assistance, for the 1978 fiscal year. Despite the fact that there was no financial dispersal commitment for the District of Columbia, Fauntroy was confident that a

“workable sum” could be expected by the city. The law increased the Federal Housing

Administration (FHA) Mortgage Insurance from $45,000 to $60,000, reduced housing down- payment requirements by more than half, and increased the Savings and Loan limit for single- family conventionally financed homes from $55,000 to $60,000. Finally, the law freed up more

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funding for homes priced higher than $60,000 and multi-family housing. All of these provisions, in theory at least, should have made owning a home or living in a dwelling fit for human life easier, but the problems were larger than securing more municipal funds. Black Washingtonians represented the majority of those living in the city; they also made up the majority of low-skilled and semi-skilled workers. Provisions for owning a home were useful to those who made salaries in which they could afford a home for approximately $60,000, but the financially deprived and poorly administered public education system, was working to make poor Washingtonians a permanent underclass. Public school students were not receiving adequate preparatory training for the changing job systems which was increasingly being dominated by higher-skilled, technologically-advanced jobs, as opposed to a semi-skilled labor force. 418

D.C. Public Education, 1975-1978

The National Urban League & the “Street Academy”

Throughout the 1970s, Washington’s National Urban League (NUL) continued pressing for equal and adequate access to public education. One of the NUL’s most significant efforts, was the construction of the “Street Academy.” Street Academy was one of the only three schools funded by the National Office of Education’s Experimental School funds, during the early 1970s.

In 1973, enrollment totaled 154 students- 89 boys and 65 girls. The Street Academy planned to enroll a total of 300 students, ages sixteen through twenty-two, for a two-year period. The funding for the school would last until 1975.419

The Street Academy was designed to create healthy alternatives for former public school students, the majority of whom were African-American. The academy set out to help underachieving students who left public schools for reasons including, “financial difficulties, disillusionment with classes, and emotional conflicts.420” Educators at the academy argued that

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these students could have easily grown complacent with low achievement or turned to a life of crime, but yet and still, chose to attend the Street Academy, proving their desire to rise above their circumstances.421

Classes were referred to as “rap sessions.” Teachers and students both referred to each other by their first names. There was no school uniform and a very loose dress code which invited clothing from “caftans and beads to turtle necks.” Class sizes were relegated to no more than fifteen students to ensure that each student received proper attention. The school also tried to foster a comfortable environment for a free exchange of ideas that would promote learning and creativity. In fact, one student was quoted saying, “Let’s bury Shakespeare. We want to know the modern writers, the now-people. I think degrees should be given for creation, not imitation. If we need a play, we’ll write one!”422

Further, students were counseled and encouraged to take up programs of study that best suited their gifts and interests. The general curriculum taught and stressed the importance of

Afro-American Studies, languages, social studies, art, math, urban living, and government.

Social studies was a school favorite. Students used what they learned in social studies, and were active in rallies for Washington Home Rule. The students observed Congressional sessions on the days when they debated and discussed urban problems. Additionally, students volunteered at other schools, prisons and nursing homes. The Street Academy was successful in fostering a sense of social responsibility along with education for those who attended.423

Upon their graduation, students were either awarded a high school diploma or its equivalent. The first graduate of the Street Academy was a female (who was nameless in the

Urban League’s publication), and by 1973 held a “good job” in the Women’s Bureau of the

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Navy.424 Many of the students were prepared to enter college, and others were offered on-the-job training to enter the workforce after graduating.425

The NUL’s Street Academy, was much like Federal City College, in that it saw their educational institutions, as an apparatus to reach the entire African-American community. It is important to note the sense of community within these educational institutions. It was clear that the Street Academy and Federal City College saw their mission to educate and advocate for improvements to the Black Washingtonian community. The grassroots activism remained focused on the health of the entire community.426

Walter Fauntroy and the Distorted History of U.S. Public Education

While the National Urban League’s Street Academy was created in the 1970s, they were working to correct historical ills in public education extending back to the early 20th century. In a

1978 address to the District of Columbia Congress of Parents and Teachers, Fauntroy made an unconventional assertion on the state of public education. The congressional delegate argued, that as a society, the U.S. “...never really succeeded, in a systemic way, in structuring an educational process that served the masses of poor people whatever their color, ethnic group or religion.427” He argued that what many thought to be a new crisis in urban schools, was actually more of the same.428

He cited scholar, Colin Greer in his The Great School Legend: A Revisionist

Interpretation of American Public Education, which documented the historical failure of

American public schools. Greer’s study focused on the urban cities of New York, Chicago,

Philadelphia, Detroit, and Boston. His investigation utilized periodic surveys of these systems, in the period after 1900, when European immigrants were enrolling in the American public school system en masse. Greer supplemented his findings with data from smaller American cities

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including Youngstown, Ohio, Lynn, Massachusetts, and Patterson, New Jersey. Greer’s study to a lesser degree, incorporated data from cities like Washington, D.C., Baltimore and Pittsburgh.

Greer’s findings on national school performance ultimately proved that America’s “self- congratulatory success story,” was purported. The government had long-suggested that they took in the poor immigrants who crowded into cities, and educated and Americanized them. As a result, these fortunate immigrants were molded into the “one dimensional productive middle class of America.429”

Greer’s findings suggested otherwise. In fact, in the early 1900s, no more than sixty- percent of Chicago’s public school pupils were recorded as performing at normal age level. None of the school systems in Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Pittsburgh, New York, and

Minneapolis, did any of their public school students performing to standard, exceed sixty- percent. Public school officials and teachers often cited “feeble-mindedness” and overcrowding of school facilities. In Detroit, 13,000 students attended half day sessions, and sixty-percent studied in substandard buildings. In Philadelphia, Cleveland, Boston, and New York, all had records of poor performance, overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and financial problems.

These problems were pertinent in urban schools in the 1920s. Urban riots and assumptions of misguided black radicalism were not the cause of failing urban schools D.C.’s failing public school system was merely an extension of the United States’ failure to invest and provide adequate public resources to help schools flourish. Twentieth century wars like Vietnam, exacerbated this problem. The disproportionate allocation of funds for war over education well into the 1970s proved that the U.S. continued to fail in solving its education problem.430

Overall, private schools represented a better option to educate children adequately.

Unfortunately, yet typically, this was a feasible option primarily for wealthy children. The

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NUL’s Street Academy and Freedom Schools were helpful alternatives to failing public school systems, but they were relatively few in number and could not serve in the necessary capacity to accommodate those receiving a substandard education. The conversation, and more importantly federal policy, needed to be centered on a redistribution of financial resources, and a demand that

America live up to its obligation to provide the option of public education to all of its citizens, regardless of economic status. To be sure, there were many schools and school administrators who adequately educated thousands of American students, but historically speaking, America failed to successfully and adequately educate the overwhelming majority of its citizens. D.C., like other cities and towns across the country suffered from this tradition of education neglect.

The failure of Congress to provide significant financial support for the D.C. Board of Education to reform these ills further perpetuated the legacy of public education shortcomings. 431

Unemployment and Underemployment in the District 1973-1979

A 1979 economic study confirmed previous accusations by congressmen that federal spending priorities were harming the nation’s largest and oldest cities in the country. Marion

Anderson, an economic historian who co-authored the “Pentagon Tax Study” argued, “The

Pentagon is spearheading a massive relocation of wealth, at a time that many cities can least afford it.” Of the forty urban cities, fifteen receive more in military expenditures than they pay out in “military” taxes. About half of those cities who benefitted were Western cities, six of which were in the state of California alone. This meant that large, black urban populations were losing federal economic support, and were negatively affected by the relocation of wealth.432

District of Columbia Legislative Program and the Changing Tide of Employment

In 1974, the District of Columbia Legislative Program was presented to Congress to improve employment conditions throughout the city. The city government’s proposal was

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representative of the direction in which citizens wanted the newly elected government to move.

The 1973 District of Columbia Legislative Program outlined the changes the city desired for employment, for first session of the Ninety-Third Congress. One of the legislative recommendations included an amendment that would eliminate gender discrimination for employment. The legislative program focused not only on employment issues of adults, but for minors as well. They asked to “…eliminate restrictive and obsolete provisions which hinder the employment of minors.433” The proposed law required that girls should be eligible to sell or distribute newspapers and to work as street vendors.434

Additionally, the legislative program recommended that fourteen and fifteen-year-olds be allowed to work until 10 p.m. during the summer. It was recommended that the Board of

Education should no longer be required to hold a hearing to prohibit employment of minors in certain occupations when the Secretary of Labor finds employment hazardous or detrimental.

They wanted the elimination of restrictions that kept minors from operating automatic elevators, working in a quarry, tobacco warehouse or factory. Additionally, the legislative program advocated for a lift of restrictions against girls under eighteen from working in retail tobacco stores, hotels, apartment houses or working as messengers, ushers, attendants, or ticket sellers.435

If anything, this legislative program’s agenda demonstrated the impact of the Black

Freedom Movement, the Women’s Rights Movement, and the Welfare Rights Movement. The emphasis on eliminating restrictions for the black, female, adolescent, and low-income population, combined the goals of those three movements. Laws that had purposely prevented the job opportunities of young, black women were being challenged. Additionally, laws that were previously viewed as normal or acceptable by both black and white, male and female,

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Washingtonians were now properly viewed as discriminatory. The legislative program, alone, represented a changing tide in the fight for equal employment opportunities in Washington.

Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy & Humphrey-Hawkins Bill

In December of 1977, the “News and Views” Newsletter, a local D.C. publication, reported Congressman Fauntroy’s efforts to improve the employment rate. Fauntroy along with other members of Congressional Black Caucus, received support from President James “Jimmy”

Carter in November 1977, for the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill. This bill was designed to create more jobs, reduce unemployment, and increase business incentives. The Humphrey-Hawkins bill received the backing of President Carter after great revisions that some saw as “watered-down” from its original drafting.436

Nevertheless, by December 1977, President Carter demonstrated his vocal support for five significant provisions of the Humphrey-Hawkins bill. The first provision offered an

“unqualified affirmation” to the right for a “useful job” and “fair salary” for each and every

American. Under the first provision, full employment would become national policy. The second significant aspect of the bill included a new process for the development of a comprehensive national economic policy. Thirdly, the bill called for an interim numerical goal of reducing unemployment for citizens over the age of twenty, to no more than three percent. The primary goal of the third provision was to ensure a reduction in the unemployment among citizens age sixteen and over, for no more than four-percent within a five-year period. The fourth provision committed to achieving stable prices in the market “as soon as possible.437” The fifth provision promised that if the President found that there were not an appropriate number of jobs in the public and private sector to accommodate citizens who desired employment, that the government

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would create jobs programs in order to achieve the goal of full employment. The Humphrey –

Hawkins bill also offered incentives to businesses that were willing to locate and offer jobs in areas with high unemployment rates, in hopes to reduce the outsourcing of American jobs.438

In a survey submitted to citizens throughout Washington, from Fauntroy’s office, twenty- three percent of survey recipients cited access to jobs as the most important issue the District faced. The issue of jobs was only surpassed by the twenty-seven percent who viewed “rising prices” as the most pertinent issue for Washingtonians. Additionally, survey recipients were asked who they thought the local jobs program should seek to help first- youth, adults, heads of households, or undecided. Fifty-six percent voted in favor of helping the “heads of household” first.439

1977 D.C. Welfare Controversy

By 1977, the struggle for welfare rights continued. Washington’s Welfare Rights

Movement activists worked tirelessly for years, to demand humanitarian treatment via subsidies that provided food, clothing, shelter, and furniture. Despite the high level of need for many women, activists complained about the lethargy of those who were in charge of processing welfare applications. In April 1977, the D.C. Department of Human Resources (DHR) made a great stride toward justice for welfare applicants. A Federal Contempt of Court Order was placed against five city officials, including Mayor Walter E. Washington, for eliminating a backlog of nearly 900 unprocessed welfare applications. Along with Mayor Washington, those held in contempt included: Albert P. Russo-the D.C. DHR director, Joseph P. Yeldell-former

DHR director, Bertrell Hallum-DHR Administrator of Payments Assistance, and Oliver Downs- manager of DHR’s Congress Heights Services Center. U.S. District Court Judge Aubrey E.

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Robinson, issued the order on February 18, 1977. Under the order, the DHR had to be in compliance by May 2, 1977 or else the five people cited could be jailed or fined.440

Judge Robinson found the five in contempt of court, after finding that the DHR violated a previous order from 1974, which stipulated that all welfare applications be processed with in a forty-five day period. Welfare applicants were unable to receive financial assistance until their applications were processed, and their eligibility for benefits was determined. Albert Russo cited a lack of staff, for the five-year hold-up. He claimed that thirty employees were working full- time since mid-February of 1977, to eliminate the backlog of 889 applications. Russo furthered his explanation, by claiming that over fifty people had been hired to work on the “Application

Processing Staff” since October 1976, including the twenty that were hired in January of 1977, not coincidentally, around the same time Judge Robinson held proceedings that led to the contempt citation.441

Judge Robinson issued several requirements for the DHR. One of the requirements included, ensuring that every potential applicant be allowed to submit an Aid to Families with

Dependent Children (AFDC) application on the same day the applicant came to the local service center, rather than returning a second time to submit an application. Secondly, Robinson required that all applicants be immediately informed orally and in writing that they have the right to a hearing in the case they are not informed of their eligibility within forty-five days of submitting their application. One of the most significant requirements stipulated by Robinson was a comprehensive set of steps for the DHR to avoid another backlog in the future. Russo, however, was unable to provide any information on the progress of such a plan that April.442

While under the pressure of legal contempt and media backlash, Russo also pointed out the accomplishments and shortcomings of Congress that was partially responsible for the DHR

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controversy. Russo claimed that the thirty additional people hired in the “Payments Assistance

Administration” were being paid through financial supplements made available by congress the previous year, specifically for that purpose. Another twenty persons were hired with grant money from the federal Comprehensive Employment Training Act, which provides temporary jobs in areas of high unemployment. Despite limited financial contributions by Congress, Russo was quick to point out that although funds were available to hire another fifty-four people, those jobs could not be filled immediately because of a hiring ceiling imposed by Congress on the D.C. government.

The DHR Controversy was significant for many reasons. While it was clear that officials like Mayor Washington and Albert Russo should have bore some of the responsibility for the overwhelming backlog, it was Congress however, who possessed ultimate power over city affairs, and managed to escape a great deal of responsibility. The DHR controversy illuminated the larger problems of unemployment and inadequate public funding, throughout the city. The necessity of welfare among Washingtonians demonstrated that the level of unemployment and underemployment was too high. Even the hiring of more workers for the DHR, only resulted in the hiring of an additional twenty employees, because of the small funding allotment from

Congress. The employment of twenty people did not account for any significant difference in the unemployment levels of Washington. Congress, once again, failed Washingtonians, by not allotting more funding for that would stimulate the local economy and create jobs for local citizens.443

Reciprocal Income Tax

Despite legal, limited home rule, the federal government still held the purse strings and controlled the politics of the city which indicated that the legacy of colonial rule was still

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present. The Washington economy did not thrive immediately nor would it improve quickly because of the failure to pass bills that would improve the local economy. The issue of the reciprocal income tax exemplified the problems of the D.C. economy. In March 1978,

Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy presented arguments for a reciprocal income tax before the

Subcommittee on Fiscal and Government Affairs of the House District Committee.444

Fauntroy asserted, “The fiscal soundness of the District is in serious jeopardy unless some form of financial relief is immediately forthcoming.445” Research and statistics suggested the newborn, Washington city government was facing a revenue-expenditure gap projected to be

$110 million in the fiscal year of 1979, and was expected to increase to approximately $288 million by fiscal year of 1982. The fiscal challenges were compounded by an unfunded, accrued pension fund liability of $2.4 billion. Although, the House of Representatives passed a bill to provide some assistance in liquidating the debt, the majority of the fund would be shouldered by the local taxpayers. 446

Unlike other metropolitan areas, Washington, D.C.’s citizenry was unable to meet the rising costs in the city. Although, the federal government made annual payments to supposedly compensate for their presence in the city, documents from the District of Columbia Tax

Commission revealed that the congressional payment was at least $120 million short of the negative fiscal impact resulting from its presence. Moreover, D.C. was placed at a distinct disadvantage because it only contained one-level of government, whereas most jurisdictions had at least three or more levels of government.447

Furthermore, D.C.’s condition was exacerbated by the fact that Washington serviced approximately 300,000 commuters. Surrounding jurisdictions, like northern Virginia, and southern Maryland, sent thirty-five to forty percent of their employed residents to work in D.C.

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Consequently, nearly sixty percent of the money earned from jobs in the city was taken out of the city. This meant that approximately sixty percent of D.C.’s tax revenue was taken out of the city and given to fund public resources outside the city. The lack of tax revenue led to further underfunding of D.C. public schools, libraries, police and fire protection, street and bridge maintenance, water purification, park and recreation facilities and other essential facilities needed to create an educated and qualified work force, in a growing technologically-advanced society. Additionally, D.C. absorbed eight times as many commuters, as any of the other jurisdictions in the metropolitan area. Congressman Fauntroy argued that Washington, with government, tourism and printing as their only industries, were essentially subsidizing the people from surrounding jurisdictions.448

Washington, D.C. & The Non-Resident Tax Proposal

Fauntroy presented multiple ideas to promote a growing economy and to create jobs to the Subcommittee on Fiscal and Government Affairs. The congressman sought to construct a civic center in the city. He claimed that the civic center would provide job growth and expand the city’s tax base. The major challenge to the civic center was that the effort was contained in a

House and Senate Conference, which was slowing down progress toward its building. A D.C. lottery was also considered as way to increase revenue for the city. However, Fauntroy was personally against a city lottery, because he saw it as “an added tax on the poor who are more likely to seek something for nothing.449” He also noted, that the lottery was likely to set a poor example for the youth “who may be led to believe that one can achieve without hard work or that success is based upon luck...450” There were several people who probably agreed with Fauntroy’s level of hesitancy toward the lottery. The majority of the poor and impoverished in Washington

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was African-American, and thus was vulnerable to buying cheap lottery tickets in hopes to make it out of a stifling economic condition. 451

After considering several other options, Fauntroy concluded that the most appropriate and viable option was to impose a non-resident income tax. The congressman made clear that a non- resident tax was certainly not a new idea. Every state that had an individual income tax had the authority to tax non-resident income. In 1978, forty-one states and forty-four major cities imposed such a tax, and Fauntroy argued that Washington should follow suit. Moreover, he claimed the tax would be “fair and equitable” since it would be gauged by income rather than charging people a flat-rate, which would have been a major imposition for people with low- incomes. The tax would also eliminate double taxation by providing a credit to the taxpayer.

Additionally, it assured that the costs of essential services would be shouldered by all as opposed to some of the people who utilized those resources. According to Fauntroy, the only other adequate alternative would be a major increase in the federal payment to the city, which he argued was a remote prospect.452

In an attempt to acquire new revenue to cover city expenditures, Mayor Washington designed a new budget for the fiscal year 1977. The budget was structured to compensate the finance expenditures which were rising at a rate of twelve percent annually, while

Washingtonians’ income was only increasing by four percent.453 Some of the most distinct features of the drafted budget included, raising $119 million in new taxes by a business groups receipts tax, an increase in the income and commercial property taxes, and a commuter tax, which was rejected. The problem with Washington was that it did not have the power to tax those individuals who lived in the surrounding suburbs of Maryland and Northern Virginia.

Therefore, thousands of individuals travelled into Washington where they were employed but

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were not forced to pay taxes that would contribute to the city’s infrastructure. Their tax money instead contributed to schools and other public institutions in the suburbs while Washingtonians continued to suffer from an insufficient tax base. The lack of taxes depleted the public resources available to Washingtonians. So although the city achieved limited home rule, “white flight28” worked against the city government’s efforts to redistribute resources for the benefit of Black

Washingtonians, who suffered for decades economically, socially, and politically.454

Fauntroy lent his vocal support for two bills he ultimately thought would result in some economic reprieve for the city. One was House Resolution No. 10116 of the 95th Congress, introduced by Representative Stewart B. McKinney of the 4th Congressional District of

Connecticut. H.R. 10116 was a bill to amend the District of Columbia Income and Franchise

Tax Act of 1947. It was designed to grant legality to an “income tax on income derived from sources within the District of Columbia by individuals who are not residents of the District of

Columbia and to remove the franchise tax on the income of unincorporated businesses.455” The second, H.R. 11303 of the 95th Congress, was sponsored by Ronald Dellums, House

Representative for California’s 8th Congressional District. Dellums’ H.R.11303 was designed to amend the District of Columbia Self-Government and Government Reorganization Act “to repeal the limitation on the Council of the District of Columbia regarding the imposition of any income tax upon individuals who are not residents of the District of Columbia.456” While

Fauntroy supported both bills, and vocalized his appreciation for both representatives who had

“the courage to act in this area which is certain to create controversy and vigorous debate.457”

28 A national phenomenon during the 1970s in which large groups of white citizens left urban areas to move to the suburbs. Urban areas like Washington, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago lost a significant portion of their tax base which resulted in subpar public schools and other public resources. Additionally, higher paying and highly-skilled jobs moved to the suburbs and reduced access and opportunities to jobs for lower income people. This phenomenon disproportionately affected the African-Americans negatively.

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However, Fauntroy made clear, that although he had no objection to either bill, his preferred choice between the two bills was H.R. 11303 presented by Congressman Dellums, because the bill was “more consistent with the spirit of Home Rule.458” Despite the incredible efforts of a small group of committed representatives, both bills died in congress.459

The failure to conjure up any significant support was demonstrative of how small of a priority, and ultimately how unimportant the looming economic crisis was to Congress. In spite of the fact that congressmen spent a significant portion of their time in Washington, congress failed to offer any significant support to ensure a strong economic structure for the city.

Therefore, the problems of D.C.’s new government continued. The presence of statehood would not have necessarily resulted in the immediate elimination of D.C. problems, but it would have led to control and proper federal representation that would have allowed for Washingtonians to democratically influence the political direction of their state. With Congress maintaining their power over the disenfranchised city, D.C.’s limited home rule, proved to be limited progress, and the movement would have to continue its efforts by advocating for change via their locally elected officials, while continuing their grassroots efforts. In short, the struggle was far from over.

The Late Seventies & The Struggle For Home Rule

By 1977, the political war for full Home Rule waged on. Full Home Rule would include two new senate seats for D.C., and two in the house, both of which would have voting representation.

The House of Representatives demonstrated its support for home rule by approving a constitutional amendment 289-to-127 in 1977. The Senate, however, rejected the measure.460

There were other acts of support throughout the country to free D.C. The Baltimore Sun called the lack of home rule a “national oddity.461” They furthered their statement, by claiming, “There

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happens to be an enclave of citizens in our 201-year-old nation that, through no fault of its own, still lacks full representation…It is a geographic unit, by the way, that just happens to have a population greater than 9 of the 50 states, which quite obviously enjoy full congressional status.462” Even the L.A. Times weighed in on the disenfranchisement of Washingtonians in 1977 with claims of a human rights violation- “Their disenfranchisement mocks this country’s claim to universal suffrage, and violates the United Nation’s covenants on human rights, to which the

United States is a signatory: ‘All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and cultural development.463”

House Joint Resolution No. 554for Full Voting Representation, 1978

On March 1, 1978, non-voting, yet popularly-elected representative, Walter E. Fauntroy, made the case, once again, for full voting representation. In a congressional speech advocating for the House Joint Resolution 554, which was a constitutional amendment proposal to provide full voting representation. Fauntroy compared the U.S. to other countries across the world. He argued that the citizens of London are represented in both Houses of the English Parliament. The citizens of Paris were represented in both Houses of the National Assembly. And, the citizens of

Bonn were represented in the House and Senate of West Germany’s Legislative branch of government. He argued that the majority of Federal Districts across the world had full voting rights, with the exception of the federal districts under military dictatorships, and Washington,

D.C. Fauntroy questioned members of Congress, “But are we to say to the world…one vote for

ALL Americans, except the citizens of the capital of the free world?464”

There were multiple advocacy efforts for home rule in D.C. even in state legislatures. In

January 30, 1979, Stephen A. Saltzburg, University of Virginia Law School Professor, made a case for home rule before the Joint Committee of the Maryland State Legislature. He asserted,

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“It must be…embarrassing for United States officials to chastise foreign governments over their treatment of minorities and to complain about the disenfranchisement of entire groups of voters, when, at home, the citizens of the District still must seek the franchise they have…been denied.465” Professor Saltzburg cited the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, as an example that the

U.S. had the power to right its wrongs, and move the country forward. The Panama Canal

Treaty29 was signed by President James Carter on September 7, 1977.466

He argued that if the U.S. Senate could approve such a treaty for those in Panama, then certainly congressmen had to see the irony in their unwillingness to grant Washingtonians full enfranchisement. Washingtonians, paid the same taxes, shared the same democratic values, and were affected by the growth of the federal government like all other Americans, but the federal government exerted a force and control over the district that it did not exert over citizens of the other fifty states. Saltzburg furthered his argument by stating, “…in contrast to the difficulties of working out a treaty with another nation, there are no insurmountable problems in providing voting representation for the District.467” Full voting representation was merely a matter of approval by both houses of Congress. Saltzburg argued that H.J. Res. 554, embraced the principle of one person, one vote, without jeopardizing the legitimate interests of American citizens.468

While there was a great deal of opposition to H.J. Res. 554, Saltzburg claimed there was no legitimacy to those arguments against the resolution. Some politicians noted that the bill could not pass because conservative senators and those senators representing rural areas of the country would be disinclined to “favor a resolution that well may add two urban and liberal votes

29 The treaty promised to give Panamanians control over the Panama Canal by 1977. Proponents of the treaty saw it as a serious attempt by the U.S. to eliminate its ties with colonialism. Opponents of the treaty saw the document as proof that the U.S. was relinquishing part of his foreign dominance.

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to a balance that it is not in their favor at the moment.469” Saltzburg hoped that U.S. Senators would conclude that no valid argument should override the principle of “one person, one vote.”

U.S. senators also voiced concern, that the addition of two more seats, would result in the loss of exclusivity of the Senate “club.” Saltzburg argued that whatever the merits of exclusivity, it could hardly be diminished with the addition of two seats, to the one hundred already established. Afterall, the senate did not experience a decline in prestige with the addition of more members when Alaska and Hawaii were approved as states. Saltzburg, also addressed what many

FDCM activists had claimed for years, and that was the racial demographics of D.C. motivated and perpetuated support for political disenfranchisement. There were many state legislatures, along with their constituencies, that long-feared the political power of a predominantly black,

Washington. Saltzburg concluded that biases against the district’s federal representation were certainly rooted in racial prejudices, “…which have no place in American politics in 1979.470”

House Joint Resolution 554, was passed by two-thirds of each chamber, and the proposed amendment was sent to the states for ratification. The resolution was ratified by sixteen U.S. states, but eventually expired in 1985, without receiving three-fourths of the states’ approval.471

The Mayoral Election of 1978- Old School v. New School

As a consequence of the death of House Joint Resolution 554, activism for full political enfranchisement continued. While the desire for full representation was ever-present, by 1978

Washingtonians’ preference for who should lead such a struggle changed. 1978 was one of the most significant years in Washington’s political history. 1978 marked the year in which former

SNCC president and grassroots organizer, Marion Barry won the second-ever mayoral election in Washington. Marion Barry, would eventually be dubbed, “Mayor for Life.” The 1978 election

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marked a shift in the direction of the city, as Washingtonians elected a relatively young, radical, grassroots organizer in Marion Barry.

Marion Barry’s inaugural ceremony alone represented a change in D.C. and a change for those in Black America. Marion Barry was sworn into office on January 2, 1979, by the first-

African-American Supreme Court Justice, Thurgood Marshall. Barry had known Justice

Marshall from his days with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Reflecting on this moment years later, Barry believed his inauguration made him believe everything had come full circle, “with the NAACP working to get me out of jail during the Civil Rights Movement, and now swearing me in as the second black mayor of Washington.472”

Mayor Barry was elected by many Washingtonians because of his radical politics, outspoken nature, and direct approach to addressing the problems plaguing D.C. His inaugural address embodied all of his personal characteristics that drew Washingtonians’ votes. He asserted that, “In 1976, the early settlers of this country went to war with the British around a simple proposition, “No Taxation Without Representation.” Taxation without representation was wrong then, and it is wrong now. The time has come for us to have full self-determination, and I am confident that we will achieve it.473” Taxation without representation was a mark of political tyranny. The United States boasted of its democracy all around the world, but its capital, served as a constant reminder of the level of anti-democracy that persisted in the country. The absence of full voting representation in a city with a majority African-American population, consistently demonstrated that the U.S. had failed to destroy political disenfranchisement. D.C.’s lack of enfranchisement also demonstrated its failure to fulfill its obligation to ensure democratic rights to the African-American population-the same population whose ancestors had built the very country that continued to deny their rights.474

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Marion Barry’s inaugural address demonstrated why he resonated so well with the people of Washington, D.C. Barry, unlike the other mayoral candidates, was willing to engage and represent all sorts of people. Barry, while well-known in Washington, he was not necessarily well-liked. Barry argued that there was a large segment of black Washingtonians who were professional, educated, and employed, and figured they did not need civil rights reforms, like other African-Americans. Consequently, many of those in the black middle-class rejected Barry and his message of urgency for community activism, deeming it unnecessary. While Barry knew that he could not necessarily expect the support of the black middle-class, he instead focused on the groups he could gain support from, which were those that were outcast and ignored in D.C. politics like women, gays and lesbians, the blue-collar working-class, the poor, and small businesses. His strategy worked.475

At his inauguration, Barry made it clear that he had one immediate objective which was,

“to bring all of the people of this city into a full governing partnership with my administration.476” This was a radical notion considering the distance most Americans felt between elected political officials and themselves. This was an especially ground-breaking statement, considering that most Washingtonians, especially black ones had never felt any type of partnership with the federal government. He furthered his remarks by claiming, “The past was too often defined by others-for us-and without us.477”

Demonstrating his political support for groups like women, gays and lesbians, long before it became popular in mainstream politics, gave many the impression that he was bold, and could offer strong leadership in a city that was so desperate for it. His inaugural address established a progressive plan for the city’s future development. Barry declared in his address that, “we insist that the discrimination of women must end. I will insist that they have equal job

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opportunities, access to credit, access to decent day care and a chance to lead meaningful and productive lives.478” His acknowledgements of the need for “equal job opportunities” and

“decent day care” were influenced by the efforts of Washington welfare rights activists. Day care centers were a necessity for low-income, working mothers to ensure appropriate care for young children, and to eliminate the pressure on older siblings to take care of those children, despite their inability to fully take care of themselves. Marion Barry’s prioritization of policy creation that would directly benefit women was representative of how seriously he took the activism of the ostracized Washingtonians like poor mothers, and also why Washington’s black poor and working-class rallied behind him in the 1978 election.479

A popularly, elected African-American man, who played an influential role in the Civil

Rights Movement, and who embraced various radical ideologies during the Black Power Era, and was jailed several times in the name of freedom, was now the head of the local government of the nation’s capital. Marion Barry, as a member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating

Committee in 1966, had participated in the “Campus Free D.C.” week in May 1966. “Campus

Free D.C.” was a series of demonstrations led by D.C. college students where they demanded that congress pass legislation ensuring Washingtonians, “…the right to vote, the right to elect a mayor and city council as the governing body of the nation’s capitol city.480” Marion Barry managed to be a foot soldier in the fight to free D.C., and now, he was the leader of a position he fought so hard to create during the movement. Although D.C.’s struggle for statehood and self- determination continued, there was no doubt that Marion Barry’s election marked a new era in

Washington D.C.’s history- it seemed as if everything had come full circle.

New Mayor, Old Problems

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The election of Marion Barry in 1978 was representative of another major shift in

Washington politics. Barry campaigned on working-class issues. However, even with the election of Marion Barry, old problems of housing discrimination continued. In fact, the month after Barry’s election, Patricia R. Harris, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban

Development, planned to meet with Barry, and housing was the primary issue of concern. Harris’ memorandum cited “temporary displacees” as the major problem in D.C. Housing. “Temporary displacees” were a part of the relocation workload for years without much resolve.481

By 1978, Washington was a three-time recipient of the Community Development Block

Grant (CDBG). As a condition to receive the CDBG for the fourth year, HUD stipulated that

Barry, as the new mayor, had to use the block grant to remedy the problem of a disproportionate number of temporary displacees, and other pressing issues. HUD claimed that Washington’s local government has spent $400,000 in CDBG fund to pay delinquent electric and gas bills for certain landlords in the city. HUD asserted that utility bills were ineligible expenses under the

CDBG. According to the 1978 HUD memorandum, “The city asserts that they do not have the funds to pay these bills and restore the CDBG funds.482” HUD asserted that if the city was not able to repay the funds that the only available option was to reduce the fifth year of the CDBG grant for the city.

Despite home rule, shortcomings in Washington’s housing system remained. Considering

HUD’s findings, the Rent Control Act of 1973, did not cover the loopholes in the exploitive housing system. The fact that city landlords’ utility bills were covered through the CDBG demonstrated the city-in one form or another- was committed to protecting the profits of landlords who were required by a recent law to set rental prices at an affordable rate. While the law seemed to offer a substantial legal protection for renters, HUD’s findings suggested the law

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was more of a symbolic act. City funds compensated landlords by covering some landlords’ utility bills. Landlords’ compensation for charging fair rents was counter-productive. If landlords were not punished for their exorbitant rent charges, one could not expect that exploitive rent rates would cease permanently.483

Washington’s housing market experienced significant changes that placed it in jeopardy for the future. In 1978, D.C.’s housing market was relatively stable overall, but the outlook of the rental housing market and especially, the housing for those of low- and moderate-income, did not appear promising for the future. Between 1970 and 1978 the Washington Metropolitan area experienced a moderate rate of growth. Over three million people moved to the metro area during the eight year period. While this only represented a six-percent increase in population from 1970, this increase was nevertheless significant, considering that most metropolitan areas across the country experienced a decrease in population during this time, as a consequence of white flight.484

Within eight years, 217,000 new housing units were built in the D.C. Metro. Even though new housing units were being built, construction lagged far behind the demand. The high demand for housing made D.C. the second highest priced housing market in the nation. The average home price in 1977 was $68,000, and fifty-five percent above the national average. In

1978, a four-bedroom house was sold on average for $88, 700, a sixteen-percent increase from the previous year. The rental market likewise experienced an increase. The high rental market demand was especially significant considering the low-skilled and low-income population in

D.C. Rental housing was a perpetual need for citizens who could not afford to own a home. In

April 1977, only 3.4 percent of rental inventory was vacant compared to the 4.4 percent in

1970.485

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While the Washington metropolitan experienced more overall growth than most metropolitan areas across the country, the District’s population by itself, declined steadily after

1970. By 1978, 690,000 people lived in the District which was approximately nine-percent less than it was in 1970. During this time period, the number of people moving out of D.C. surpassed the number of those moving in by 90,000. D.C., like other major American cities, grew more vulnerable economically as a consequence of white flight. This demonstrated the need for

Fauntroy’s reciprocal income tax in 1977. The tax was critical for the stability of D.C.’s local economy.486

By the late 1970s, many of the declining D.C. neighborhoods which were inhabited by

African-Americans were revitalized through renovation of old and dilapidated homes and buildings. Many of these newly renovated homes whether apartments, condominiums, or houses were very expensive, especially for those living in the neighborhood prior to the renovation.

Condominiums were not feasible housing options for low and semi-skilled workers, which made up the majority of the workforce in Washington. The construction of high-cost housing in the city made it evident that city plans were not designed with the best interest of local

Washingtonians in mind.487

Between 1970 and 1978, over 11,000 housing units were built in Washington. The majority of those housing units were rental units, and sixty-percent of those were subsidized.

Despite the construction of thousands of units, the overall number of available rental units decreased throughout this same time period. According to HUD, a five percent rental vacancy existed in 1970, but by 1977, the vacancy number decreased 3.5 percent. This decline was partially due to the conversion of older apartment complexes into condominium units. HUD

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reasoned that the housing market’s trend toward condominiums was a consequence of the 1973

Rent Control Act (RCA).488

Additionally, HUD suggested that the operating costs of older apartment complexes skyrocketed, and under the restrictions of rent controls, landlords found it more profitable to convert their properties into condominium complexes. While HUD’s suggestion about the impact of the RCA was certainly, partly influential, in the transition of apartments to condominiums in

Washington, the reasons are varied and complex. HUD’s findings failed to properly analyze how the transition into condominium complexes was primarily because landlords were provided legal loopholes, despite the RCA. The city did not require that overpriced apartment complexes could not be changed into condominiums that would essentially price out the current tenants, thus allowing them to eventually collect even higher rents from local renters. The landlords’ ability to transition into different forms of housing was also indicative of the lack of political and economic protections of Washingtonians. 489

In 1978, HUD argued Washington’s housing market possessed little promise for those of low- and moderate-income, but nevertheless HUD suggested it was possible to turn it around by addressing its shortcomings. HUD suggested that if the Washington city government addressed issues such as “Dispersal of assisted housing,” “displacement and relocation,” “Management,

Coordination, Accountability, and Control Problems within the Department of Housing and

Community Development,” “Lack of a Housing Finance Mechanism,” and “Rental Increases due to Local Administrative Procedures and Regulations, the housing market would certainly improve, and eventually thrive.490”

Section 8 housing was another concern for the District in the late 1970s. In 1978, Section

8 was the primary program HUD used to offer rental assistance to those of low and moderate

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income. During the 1978 fiscal year, HUD allotted seventeen million dollars in Section 8 and

Public Housing contract authority for the Washington Metropolitan Area. The allotment was distributed for the purpose of improving existing housing units, building new forms of housing, or the rehabilitation of units.491 The Section 8 program granted a twelve-month period to the

Public Housing Agency (PHA) to lease units to those of low- and moderate- income who signed up for access to affordable housing. HUD claimed there were many Public Housing Agencies under their jurisdiction, who failed to house people properly within the twelve-month time frame, but the D.C. city government, however, was “worse than average.492” The third allocation of 200 units was disapproved in the 1977 fiscal year. The Department of Housing and

Community and Development (DHCD), was informed that “no additional units would be approved until substantial progress has been made in the leasing of units already under contract…493” Consequently, Section 8 housing construction stalled in the 1978 fiscal year.

The local D.C. government cited several reasons for the slow rate of leasing in their response to HUD. One of the reasons included landlords’ resistance to participating in the

Section 8 housing program. The District government suggested that there was a very low vacancy rate of standard units, and therefore, the necessity was not as high as HUD suspected.

Additionally, the government cited a lack of large size units to accommodate families properly.

In other words, the construction of various units was not erected with the sizes of families in mind. Applicants’ lack of ability to secure housing units on their own was another shortcoming that the local government cited. HUD increased preliminary cost from $274 to $450 per unit so that DHCD could provide direct staff assistance to applicants. The government predicted that the additional assistance would result in an increased rent for leasing applicants. HUD claimed that some of the reasons for lack of progress by the city government on housing “may be valid,” but

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they insisted that “…the lack of adequate program administration by the District is the primary a factor.494” Additionally, HUD suggested the local government carry out an aggressive marketing campaign to increase landlord participation in the Section 8 housing program.495

HUD’s 1978 report also addressed the controversial rent control laws in Washington. The passing of the 1973 Rent Control Act did not eliminate nor improve the issue of exploitive rents for low- and moderate-income families in the District. HUD’s findings argued that the Rent

Control Act had very little success because of its contradictory goals of trying to provide a balance of results- fair rental costs for the tenants and fair returns to the owners. They found that

“fair rental costs” and “fair returns” was relative. One of HUD’s observations also included the high rate of conversions from rental projects to condominiums in the city, in the first five years following the enactment of the Rent Control Act of 1973. HUD pinpointed inadequate administrative mechanisms for the rent control programs along with difficulty in setting clear guidelines and making timely decisions that would work for the benefit of District renters.

However, HUD also noted that the primary responsibility for ensuring proper rents under the law was property management firms.496

Despite the Home Rule Act and an officially elected local government, problems remained. HUD’s report highlighted the housing issues and the lack of coherence within the city.

Elected city officials like Mayor Washington were partly responsible for the failure of equal and adequate housing protection laws. While Washington initially vetoed the Rent Control Act of

1973 as mayor-commissioner, the law was still enacted under his tenure.497 Moreover, both the local citizens and council members complained about the new city administration. Council

Chairperson, Sterling Tucker, accused the mayor of dilatoriness. Other council members insisted that the mayor viewed the new thirteen-member council as an adversary to his administration.

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Previously, Washington only dealt with two other members on the appointed city-council, so the thirteen member council was certainly an adjustment. His failure to make the adjustment during his tenure, left newly-elected Mayor Barry in a more difficult position to fix the housing crisis in

1978.498

Nevertheless, congressionally-mandated restrictions on the power and authority of the council left the city officials with few options to enforce adequate protections for

Washingtonians, which was the case with housing. Congressmen and businessmen alike still had a vested interest in the city of Washington. Lack of local government power did not allow for efficient, enforceable, and effective regulation of the local housing market. The ineffective Rent

Control Act did not require landlord accountability. Therefore, landlords actually wielded more power than government officials.499

In the years following the enactment of Home Rule, some found that the new political situation of the city resulted unbelievable tax burdens for the citizens. In years prior, D.C. had the lowest individual income taxes within the metropolitan area, but by the mid-1970s,

Washington had the highest in the metro. Moreover, the District taxed families earning between

$15,000 and $40,000 at higher rates than over two-thirds of the largest American cities. But, for those families whose annual income ranged from $5,000 to $10,000, they were taxed about average in comparison to other major American cities. The high tax receipts on the upper middle class of the city, and the federal subsidy of $280 million were not enough to cover the increasing expenditures of the city.500

The Office of Housing and Urban Development & Federal Production Subsidies

During the 1970s, HUD also decided to research exactly how cost-effective Federal production subsidies were in increasing the stock of housing. The Office of Management and

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Budget (OMB) asserted that the decline in occupied, substandard housing provided convincing evidence that housing deprivation is a consequence of inadequate income, as opposed to the housing industry’s inability to produce enough housing units. Moreover, they suggested that the problem of substandard housing could be eliminated by increasing incomes of the poor.501 From

1950-1970, household incomes increased significantly and federally subsidized housing production accounted for only three percent of the increase in housing. During the same time period the number of housing units without adequate plumbing or units in a dilapidated condition decreased by seventy-five percent. These statistics suggested that paying employees a living and adequate wage according to the cost-of-living standards, would offer a vast improvement to the housing accessibility. This observation was already very obvious to the unemployed and underemployed throughout Washington, but HUD’s study offered validity to previous grassroots’ grievances that were ignored by government officials.502

The other side of the issue, however, was that these statistics did not result in automatic policy changes for workers. Moreover, the OMB’s report still failed to deal with the issue of landlord accountability. HUD’s findings demonstrated that there was already not enough housing. Therefore, paying employees more adequately would not destroy the housing issue.

Semi- and low-skilled workers were overwhelmingly represented in the city of Washington.

Unless a complete revolution took place, these workers were never going to be paid enough to afford the condominiums built across Washington, D.C., and the problem of housing would still exist. The problem with the OMB’s report was that it did not take into account that the improvement in housing standards and economic conditions between 1950 and 1970, was a result of New Deal and Great Society policies which facilitated these overall improvements.

However, these policies began to diminish as neoliberalism expanded, and deregulation allowed

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for business owners and corporations to grow while exploiting other people, especially the poor, without legal consequences. The power of landlords and the D.C. government’s failure to adequately challenge and stop exploitation of local citizens is a great example of the changing economic guard. 503

This short-sighted analysis perpetuated the failures of the federal and local government to adequately pinpoint and address the problems that Black Washingtonians’ had struggled against for decades. The OMB failed to address the privatization of the housing industry and how it allowed for the continuity of racial discrimination in housing. Even Patricia R. Harris, U.S.

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development claimed, “…no segment of American life is more completely ruled by prejudice than by housing. An underworld gangster or a white call girl can more easily rent or buy a house in most white neighborhoods than [a] black professional man or woman.504” This is ultimately why black grassroots organizations maintained their relevance, even after limited home rule was established-the fight was far from over. 505

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Epilogue

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The movement to free D.C. continued long after Washington’s Home Rule Act of 1973, and the historic election of freedom-fighter, Marion Barry, Jr. in 1978. In fact, the fight to fully enfranchise Washingtonians has yet to be won. The 1803 proponents of voting rights for the

District of Columbia stated that disenfranchisement was “an experiment in how fare free men can be reconciled to live without rights.506” In October 1986, Congressional Member, Walter E.

Fauntroy, continued advocating for statehood and full enfranchisement by explaining to

Americans that, “It is simply time to end this unfruitful experiment.507”

The early 1980s marked the culmination of the “Free D.C.” era, with a movement for statehood. The D.C. Voting Rights Amendment (D.C.-VRA) was one of the most significant markers of the 1980s movement toward statehood. D.C.-VRA was a proposed amendment to the

U.S. Constitution, in the late 1970s, in an attempt to enfranchise Washingtonians. In 1978, the

D.C.-VRA was passed by two-thirds of the U.S. House of Representatives, with a vote of 289 to

127. The DC-VRA was also passed by the U.S. Senate, 67 to 32. The amendment, however, failed to be ratified, by the states, in the final step toward becoming an official amendment. The

D.C.-VRA expired in September 1985, with only sixteen states ratifying the measure.508

Despite the amendment’s eventual defeat in 1985, the statehood movement had small victories throughout the era. On July 10, 1979, the “Statehood Initiative” was filed in with the

Board of Elections and Ethics of the District of Columbia to qualify for the ballot, under the established initiative, “Referendum and Recall Legislation of the District Charter.509” The statehood initiative stated,

“An initiative to present to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval the proposition of calling a statehood constitutional convention with elected delegates for the purpose of forming a constitution, and otherwise providing a process for that portion of the territory now known as the District of Columbia to be admitted in the union as a state on equal with other states.510”

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On November 4, 1980, the “Statehood Initiative” won the approval of D.C. voters, with sixty- percent voting in its favor. This was the first popular Initiative to win district voter’s approval in

Washington’s 180 year history.511

The District government proposed that D.C. be renamed to “New Columbia” once it became a state. The State of New Columbia constitution was approved on May 29, 1982, by duly elected Washington delegates. It was adopted based on a D.C. popular vote on November 2,

1982. On September 9, 1983, Mayor Barry presented the constitution and petition for statehood to Congress.512

Welfare Issues

While the statehood activists continued to fight for liberation of America’s last colony, and the new local government sought to create new policies to benefit Washingtonians, old problems still plagued the district. On March 7, 1981, approximately 300 people crowded into the Shiloh Baptist Church, located on the corner of 9th and P streets, to protest national budget cuts to food stamps. The rally was sponsored by the D.C. Food Stamp Coalition, in response to

President Ronald Reagan’s administration’s proposal for budget cuts to food stamps, child nutrition and other social programs that many needed just to survive, especially black, female

Washingtonians.513

Several prominent individuals spoke at the gathering, including Bristow Hardin, regional organizer for the National Anti-Hunger Coalition Clearinghouse. He proclaimed that the Reagan administration’s proposal was “Robin Hood in reverse.” Long-time activist and D.C. Delegate,

Walter Fauntroy, also made a speech at the rally. Before he spoke, an anonymous member of the audience asked, “If it would be possible for Congress to take money from the defense budget and put it back into the mouths of the hungry?514” Washington Post Staff writer, Janet Cooke

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claimed, “The answer, which never did touch on the original question, took about an hour and was the main event of the day.515” Fauntroy’s most noted response was, “It is apparent to those of us in the [Congressional] Black Caucus…that the burden of fighting inflation and balancing the budget is to be placed on the shoulder of those who can least afford to bear it. I have come today to tell you today that the Reagan administration is failing the moral test of government.516”

Fauntroy seemed to skip a firm and direct response to the citizen’s poignant question in an attempt to avoid the consequences of critiquing military politics, especially as the Cold War continued. His response was reminiscent of the way he capitulated to urban renewal and the white middle-class perceptions of poor blacks when he agreed to avoid building better housing for low-income Washingtonians in certain D.C. neighborhoods, as MICCO’s president.30 He again, avoided the difficulty of challenging the government and established power forces on a policy that would work to the detriment of the most economically and politically vulnerable.

Like 1968, one could argue that Fauntroy’s behavior was a strategic move in hopes to receive greater political and economic concessions for Washingtonians, however, his strategy fell short in 1968, and again in 1981, Black Washingtonians were still suffering many of the same injustices. In short, the strategy was not working.

“Same Old, Same Old:” Employment in D.C.

Moving into the 1980s, the lack of employment opportunities for Black Washingtonians, especially the poor and working classes, was still a major issue. In May 1982, Walter Fauntroy reported to the press that, “…walking through the District’s major downtown area, one sees a disproportionately small number of blacks in meaningful jobs…You can walk down Connecticut

Avenue at lunch-time and feel like you’re in Minnesota sometimes.517” Fauntroy was referencing

30 See Chapter 3.

195

the contrast between Minnesota with a very small population of Blacks, and D.C. which had a black population of seventy-percent, yet the job market was still bleak for Black

Washingtonians. Even with the progress of the FDCM, the 1980s was filled with the struggle for job equality. Fauntroy furthered his claims of employment discrimination when he claimed that

Washington had “an informal apartheid in the private sector.518”

The Office of Human Rights (OHR) Director, Anita Shelton, responded to charges by the delegate, by agreeing that there were agencies throughout the city who were not complying with policies that outlawed job discrimination. The OHR launched an investigation that never quite seemed to materialize into any actual benefits to those poor, Black Washingtonians, it so negatively affected. Job discrimination was compounded by the ineffectiveness of the underfunded public school system, which failed to prepare Black Washingtonians with the skills to move into higher-skilled jobs, white flight, and Congress’ failure to allocate federal funding to establish public resources, that would benefit all citizens in the city’s future. Washington’s problems could only begin to be eliminated, with the establishment of a state government that could control over their most basic, public resources. The fight for statehood, however, was an uphill battle, and was not gaining the traction among states, as hoped. Therefore, the 1980s left much to be desired.519

“No Taxation Without Representation”

On April 15, 1985, the national tax-filing deadline, Mayor Marion Barry, Jr. led a flag- lowering ceremony proclaiming, that it was “Taxation Without Representation Day.” Barry, along with other supporters of the D.C.-VRA acknowledged at the ceremony that the measure was all, but dead. Nevertheless, supporters pledged to continue the fight for the amendment. The

196

ceremony took place, with only four months left to ratify the amendment.31 Although, the amendment was under consideration by six states in April 1985, supporters of the bill doubted that it would be approved because most state legislatures had either adjourned or would do so in the coming weeks. Considering, the amendment was up for ratification for nearly seven years, the majority of states had not demonstrated enough interest to convince statehood advocates that that the following four months would be any different.520

Mayor Barry vowed that the fight for self-determination would continue, despite the near-fact that the constitutional amendment would not be ratified. The mayor proclaimed, “We’ll continue to the very last moment. Just because you can’t win the race, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t finish the race.521”As advocates and opponents predicted, the statehood amendment was not ratified by the August 22, 1985 deadline.

Statehood Fight Continues

In July of 2012, I arrived in Washington, D.C. for a summer research trip. I travelled to

D.C. to access oral history records of those involved in the Free D.C. Movement. As I searched through the Moorland-Spingarn’s Civil Rights Documentation Project, I found the 1968 oral history record of Marion Barry. Unfortunately, I was unable to access his file without written permission from the then-city councilman, himself. I sent quite a few e-mails and left phone messages to Councilman Barry’s office asking for permission to access his file. Motivated by curiosity and full of courage, I took the metro-train to the Federal Triangle Metro stop to get to the Council of the District of Columbia building, in hopes to get Councilman Barry’s permission to pursue my research. While standing on the sidewalk of Pennsylvania Avenue trying to figure out which building housed D.C.’s city council members, I noticed a red and black scrolling sign

31 There was a seven-year period allotted for three-fourths of states to ratify a constitutional amendment.

197

which read, “No Taxation without representation. Statehood Now!” This sign was directly outside the Council of D.C. building. It was 2012, significant, national media attention dealing with the problem of D.C. statehood had ended over two decades prior, but Washingtonians and their local government had yet to give up on the fight.

When I arrived at the door of his office, I realized I may have been over-stepping my boundaries, and it was possible that entering the office without an invitation might have been a bad idea. However, upon my entrance, the staff could not have been more friendly and helpful.

In fact, they acknowledged receiving my e-mails and admitted being overwhelmed with office work and consequently, they were unable to respond. Although Mr. Barry was not in his office that day, his secretary insisted he would not have been happier to grant permission to me to access his record, and write about his civil rights work. I received written permission, and I returned to the Moorland-Spingarn Center to access one of the most interesting oral histories I have ever come across. I left that office inspired about studying the Free D.C. Movement, and hopeful that on my next research trip I would be able to meet Mr. Barry and conduct a more recent oral history. Despite e-mails and calls to request either a phone or in-person interview, I was never able to conduct an interview with Mr. Barry. Although, with every unanswered e-mail and call, I remained hopeful that I would one day get a chance to speak with the “Mayor for

Life,” -that dream died on November 23, 2014.

“Mayor for Life” Laid to Rest

On Sunday, November 23, 2014 former Washington, D.C. mayor, Marion S. Barry, Jr., affectionately known to Washingtonians as “Mayor for Life,” was pronounced dead at United

Medical Center in Washington. He was seventy-eight years old. The Washington Post reported,

“hypertensive cardiovascular disease, with kidney disease and diabetes contributing” as the cause

198

of death.522 Barry’s death marked the end of an era. He spent the majority of his adult life either creating or advocating for policies that would improve the lives of Black Washingtonians, and

African-Americans as a whole.

Barry, as the first SNCC President, the longest-serving mayor of D.C., and outspoken political advocate for D.C. Statehood, embodied so many of the goals of the Free D.C.

Movement himself. However, after years riddled with political and sexual scandal, Barry’s infamous behavior and overwhelming media attention managed to overshadow national concern for full enfranchisement for D.C. citizens. Marion Barry’s cocaine addiction, and his eventual arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on January 18, 1990 for “willful possession of cocaine” made D.C. a national laughingstock, and international embarrassment for the United

States. For over a decade, many Black Washingtonians looked to Marion Barry, Jr. to relay their concerns to Congress, and to fight for policies that would eventually bring forth racial and economic equality, but his personal decline, led to the disempowerment of his political office.

After the FBI released the tape of Barry snorting cocaine, and flirting with one of his many mistresses, it was difficult for Mayor Barry to move the public focus back to D.C. political enfranchisement-even twenty years after the event.523

Barry was sentenced to a six-month federal prison sentence. After serving his sentence,

Barry returned to Washington, making a public apology for his actions, and sought forgiveness from the city, especially his constituents whom he disappointed. In 1994, despite all the controversy and scandal, Barry was elected to his fourth mayoral term. Marion Barry’s comeback is arguably one of the most amazing in American history-so much so, that it appeared almost as something out of a movie. Black Washingtonians stood by Barry despite his drug addiction because many of them thought it pertinent to stand by another African-American

199

leader, that they believed the federal government set up, in order to gain complete control over the city, once again. As Elona Evans-McNeil, one of Barry’s campaign staffers so eloquently summarized, “We understand that you’re attacking him, because you’re attacking us.524” Black

Washingtonians’ determination to protect the image and integrity of their local, black leadership led to federal backlash, and congressional commitment to reclaim control of the city- recreating another era of District disenfranchisement.525

Despite the mayor’s democratic election by Washingtonians, Congress managed to destroy the electoral decision of Washingtonians’ with the establishment of a Financial Control

Board for Washington, D.C. in April 1995. The board was established only months after his

January 1995 mayoral inauguration. Democratic president, William J. Clinton signed the bill into law. The financial control board was granted the authority to overrule political decisions by elected Mayor Barry and the city council. While Barry held the title of mayor, Congress managed to not only eliminate, what was already limited mayoral power, but to effectively undermine and eradicate the power of Washingtonians’ local voting power. The New York Times noted that the board’s power to overrule mayoral decisions gave Congress “a power that would give unelected officials the largest influence over the District since limited home rule was granted by Congress more than 20 years ago.526” While the New York Times was certainly correct that there was a change in the distribution of power, Washington was never actually out of congress’ control, which was evidenced by its ability to create and pass the control board legislation so quickly. The establishment of the Financial Control Board also forced the

Statehood Movement into complete regression, and retarded much of the political progress made during the “Free D.C.” Era.527

D.C. Today

200

On January 21, 2013, President Barack Obama made a subtle, yet significant political statement, by stipulating that his personal limousine and all other presidential limousines have D.C. plates that read, “No Taxation Without Representation,” like other registered vehicles in the District of Columbia. President Obama claimed he was motivated to make such a political statement, because of his experience living in Washington during his first presidential term. He proclaimed that he knew “first-hand how patently unfair it is for working families in D.C. to work hard, raise children and pay taxes, without having a vote in

Congress.528” Like other provocative and inspiring political statements by President Obama, it has failed to materialize into public policy that would benefit Americans citizens-in this case

Washingtonians. While President Obama is certainly not to blame for over a century of political disenfranchisement, the subtle political statement is yet another example of how critical public demand, staunch activism, and protest demonstrations were to forcing Congress to grant limited home rule, approximately forty years prior, and public, assertive, and outspoken forms of activism will be the only way that we can Free D.C.

The struggle continues.

201

Appendix

202

Definitions for District of Columbia Census Racial Categories:

1.) Negro- “In addition to persons of Negro and of mixed Negro and white descent, this classification includes persons of mixed Indian and Negro descent, unless the Indian ancestry very definitely predominates or unless the individual is regarded as an Indian in the community.”

2.) American Indian- “In addition to fullblooded Indians, persons of mixed white and Indian blood are included in this category if they are enrolled on an Indian tribal or agency roll.”

3.) Other Races- “The category “other races” is used variously in different tables of this report [1960 Census] to include all racial stocks not show separately.”

4.) Mixed Parentage- “Persons of mixed racial parentage are classified according to the races are classified according to the race of the father, with the special exceptions.”

(Source: 1960 U.S. Census, “Characteristics of the Population” p. XX. http://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html. Accessed on April 3, 2015.)

203

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. “Table 58-Occupation Group of Employed Persons, By Color and Sex, For the District of Columbia: 1960.” http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

204

205

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. “Table 60-Major Occupation Group of the Experienced Unemployed, By Color and Sex For the District of Columbia: 1960.” http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

206

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. “Table 62-Industry Group of Employed Persons, For the District of Columbia: 1940 to 1960.” http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

207

208

New York Times, January 3, 1979 (Courtesy of the James Forman Collection at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.)

209

The Washington Post, January 3, 1979 (Courtesy of the James Forman Collection at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.)

210

From the Washington Post. (Courtesy of the James Forman Collection at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.)

211

The Washington Post, January 4, 1979 Courtesy of the James Forman Collection at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.)

212

Endnotes

1 Isabel Wilkerson. The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration, (New York: Random House, Inc., 2010), p. 200.

2 Ibid.

3 “H.R. 9682 D.C. Home Rule,” in House Republican Conference Legislative Digest, Vol. II, #29, Part II, October 8, 1973, pg. 2, in the Stewart B. McKinney Papers, Box 1, Folder: Home Rule House Republican Conference Legislative Digest at George Washington University Special Collections Division. (Hereafter cited as House Republican Conference Legislative Digest…).

4 Ibid.

5 Ingle, Edward. The Negro in the District of Columbia. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971, pg. 86.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., pgs. 2-3.

8 Ibid.

9 Edward Ingle, The Negro in the District of Columbia, (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), p. 84-85.

10 Isabel Wilkerson. The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration, (New York: Random House, Inc., 2010), p. 200.

11 Kennesaw M. Landis, Ed. Segregation in Washington: National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital, (Chicago, Illinois, 1948), 16.

12 Harry S. Jaffe and Tom Sherwood, Dream City: Race, Power and The Decline of Washington, D.C., (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 60-63.

13 Taylor Branch, At Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years 1965-68, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 211.

14 Kennesaw M. Landis, Ed. Segregation in Washington: National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital, (Chicago, Illinois, 1948), 5. ) (Hereafter cited as Segregation in Washington…)

15 Ibid., 4-6.

16 Ibid., 4-10.

17 Ibid., 9-10.

18 Ibid., 7.

19 Ibid., 7.

20 Ibid., 6.

21 Ibid., 5.

213

22 Lizbeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America, (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc.), p.212.

23 Ibid., 32.

24 Ibid., 32.

25 Ibid., 32.

26 Judith Beck Helm, Tenleytown, D.C.: Country Village into City Neighborhood. (Washington, D.C.: Tenally Press, 1981), 170-74. (Hereafter cited as Helm, Tenleytown, D.C.: Country Village into City Neighborhood).

27 Samuel Gorman, “Interview with Samuel Gorman, July 18, 1977” Interview by Timothy Ahmann and Bissy Kuttner, Reno Neighborhood History Project records, 1977, The Historical Society of Washington, D.C. Archives and Manuscripts Collections, MS 0483. (Hereafter cited as “Interview with Samuel Gorman, July 18, 1977”).

28 Helm, Tenleytown, D.C.: Country Village into City Neighborhood, 480.

29 “News from Georgetown: A Proposition to Purchase Land Near Fort Reno Reservoir.” The Evening Times, 24 May 1901, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84024441/1901-05-24/ed-1/seq-2/ (accessed on June 15, 2010).

30 “Ask Condemnation of Fort Reno Tract: Citizens Declare Place is Unsanitary.” The Washington Times, 5 December 1903, http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84026749/1903-12-05/ed-1/seq-3/ (accessed June 17, 2010).

31 Helm, Tenleytown, D.C.: Country Village into City Neighborhood, 474-76.

32 “Fort Reno Raze Victims Homes.” The Washington Post, 1 April 1951, p. M16.

33 “Fort Reno Raze Victims Homes.” The Washington Post, 1 April 1951, P. M16.

34 Frank Coupe and Pete Toatley, “Interview with Frank Coupe and Pete Toatley, July 28, 1977…”

35 Irene Osborne, “The Public School System” in Civil Rights in the Nation’s Capital: A Report on a Decade of Progress, Journal of Intergroup Relations, Volume 1, No. 5 (November 1959): 65.

36 Osborne, “The Public School System,” 66.

37 Osborne, “The Public School System,” 68.

38 Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, from Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Oct. 20, 1954 to March 16, 1955, Vol. 92., P.14.

39 “D.C. Public Schools Association, in a telegram dated October 5, 1954, through O.L. Bell, President” in Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Oct. 20, 1954 to March 16, 1955, Vol. 92., P. 15.

40 Osborne, “The Public School System,” 68.

41 Osborne, “The Public School System,” 69.

42 Osborne, “The Public School System,” 69.

214

43 “Mr. Charles N. Mason, Jr., under the date of December 2, 1951,”Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Dec. 5, 1951 to Jan. 16, 1952, Vol. 78, P. A44.

44 “George Truesdell Parent-Teachers Association, under date of September 28, 1954, through Mrs. Gladys B. Darby, Corresponding Secretary,” in Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Oct. 20, 1954 to March 16, 1955, Vol. 92, p.14.

45 U.S. Bureau of the Census. Characteristics of the Population-District of Columbia, 1960. “Table 46- School Enrollment, By Level, and Type of School, By Color, For the District of Columbia, 1960.” http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

46 Randolph, “Job for Negroes-the Unfinished Revolution,” p. 108-109.

47 Randolph, “Job for Negroes-the Unfinished Revolution,” p. 106.

48 Ibid.

49 Randolph, “Job for Negroes-the Unfinished Revolution,” p. 107.

50 Randolph, “Job for Negroes-the Unfinished Revolution,” p. 106.

51 Ibid.

52 Elizabeth Clark-Lewis, Living In, Living Out: African-American Domestics in Washington, D.C., 1910- 1940, (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2010), p.133.

53 U.S. Bureau of the Census. “Table 58-Occupation Group of Employed Persons, By Color and Sex, For the District of Columbia: 1960.” http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

54 Whitney M. Young, Jr., “Middle-Class Negroes and the Negro Masses,” in Freedom Now!: The Civil Rights Struggle in America, edited by, Alan F. Westin, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1964), 315,319.

55 Murray, Pauli. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project. August 15 and 17, 1968. Ralph J. Bunche Collection, #290 at Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center. (Hereafter cited as, “Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project.”)

56 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., 47-54.

57 Patricia R. Harris. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project. June 28, 1968. Ralph J. Bunche Collection, #235 at Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, P. 22-23.

58 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., Pg. 64.

59 Theodore G. Bilbo, Take Your Choice: Separation or Mongrelization, (Poplarville, Mississippi: Dream House Publishing Company, 1947), p. 91.

60 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., Pg. 64.

61 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., Pg. 56-57.

62 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., Pg. 56-57.

63 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., Pg. 56-58.

215

64 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., Pg. 61.

65 Pauli Murray. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project., Pg. 62.

66 Ibid.

67 Segregation in Washington: National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital, 13.

68 Ibid.

69 Mary Church Terrell. A Colored Woman in a White World, (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Colored Women’s Clubs, Inc., 1968), 434-435.

70 Ibid., 444-445.

71 Martin L. King, Jr., “I Have A Dream Speech.” August 28, 1963. http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf.

72 Ibid.

73 David Garrow,“No Easy Walk (1961-1963)” in The Eyes on the Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle 1954-1990, eds. Clayborne Carson, Garow, David, J. Garrow, Vincent Gill, Vincent Harding, and Darlene Clark Hine, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 137- 138; March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom Original Program, “What We Demand,” from August 28, 1963, http://www.crmvet.org. Accessed on April 12, 2013.

74 Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee, “Demonstration, January 31, 1964” written on 11 January 1964, Box:56, Folder 1 in “James Forman Papers, 1848-2005 at Library of Congress (LOC), Subject File: SNCC- Unemployment Demonstration, Proposed, 1964-1965.

75 “Unemployed Demonstrate in Capital,” Box:56, Folder 1 in “James Forman Papers, 1848-2005 at Library of Congress (LOC), Subject File: SNCC-Unemployment Demonstration, Proposed, 1964-1965.

76 Segregation in Washington, 14.

77 “Address by The Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy delivered at the Ninety-Seventh Annual Commencement Howard University – Washington, D.C., Friday, June 4, 1965.” Box 1, Folder 6 at George Washington University Special Collections in Washington, D.C. P.7. (Hereafter cited as, “Fauntroy, Ninety-Seventh Annual Commencement HU…”).

78 Ibid.

79 E. Franklin Frazier. Black Bourgeoisie, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990).

80 Murray, Pauli. Interview recorded by Robert Martin in the Civil Rights Documentation Project. August 15 and 17, 1968. Ralph J. Bunche Collection, #290 at Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., 3.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., 5.

216

85 Ibid., 5.

86 Harry S. Jaffe and Tom Sherwood. Dream City: Race, Power and the Decline of Washington, D.C. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 42.

87 Taylor Branch, At Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years 1965-68, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 211.

88 Harry S. Jaffe and Tom Sherwood, Dream City: Race, Power and The Decline of Washington, D.C., (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 55.

89 Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), 229-231, 233.

90 Clayborne Carson, David, J. Garrow, Vincent Gill, Vincent Harding, and Darlene Clark Hine, Eds. The Eyes on the Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle 1954-1990, (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 283-84.

91 Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001), 312.

92 James Borchert, Alley Life in Washington: Family, Community, Religion, and Folklife in the City, 1850- 1970, (Urbana and Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1982, P. 15.

93 Ibid.

94 Harry S. Jaffe and Tom Sherwood. Dream City: Race, Power and the Decline of Washington, D.C.(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 43-44.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Howard Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning and the Failure of Urban Policy in Washington, D.C. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 147. (Hereafter cited as Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty…).

98 Ibid., 147.

99 Howard Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning and the Failure of Urban Policy in Washington, D.C. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 174. (Hereafter cited as Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty…).

100 James W. Reuse and Nathaniel S. Keith. “No Slums in Ten Years: A Workable Program for Urban Renewal Report to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, P.6.” Box 19, Folder 1 in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at George Washington University.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 James W. Reuse and Nathaniel S. Keith. “No Slums in Ten Years: A Workable Program for Urban Renewal Report to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.” Box 19, Folder 1 in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at George Washington University.

217

104 Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty…174.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Historic American Buildings Survey of the National Park Service, “Historic American Building Survey Southwest Washington, D.C., Urban Renewal Area,” in HABS No. DC-856. Accessed on November 9, 2013 http://lcweb2.loc.gov/pnp/habshaer/dc/dc1000/dc1017/data/dc1017data.pdf.

108 Gillette, Between Justice and Beauty…161.

109 Gillette, Between Justice and Beauty…163.

110 Gillette, Between Justice and Beauty…162-163.

111 Gillette, Between Justice and Beauty …163.

112 Gillette, Between Justice and Beauty…163.

113 Ibid.

114 William Lerner, Chief of General Reports Division, “Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970, 91st Annual Edition,” of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Accessed on November 9, 2013, http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1970-01.pdf. P.16. (Hereafter cited as Lerner, “Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970, 91st Annual Edition”).

115 Ibid.

116 U.S. Bureau of the Census. “Table 53-Employment Status, By Color and Sex, For the District of Columbia: 1940 to 1960.” Accessed on October 13, 2012. http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

117 Lerner, “Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970, 91st Annual Edition,” P. 16.

118 Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

119 Ibid., P.24-25

120 Ibid.

121 U.S. Bureau of the Census. General Social and Economic Characteristics. Table 67-Income in 1959 and 1949 of Persons, By Color and Sex, for the State, for The District of Columbia: 1960 and 1950. http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

122 U.S. Bureau of the Census. “Table 58-Occupation Group of Employed Persons, By Color and Sex, For the District of Columbia: 1960.” http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

218

125 Anne M. Valk, "Mother Power": The Movement for Welfare Rights in Washington, D.C., 1966-1972, Journal of Women's History 11.4 (2000) 34-35. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_womens_history/v011/11.4valk.html.

126 Jaffe and Sherwood, Dream City, 45.

127 Anne Valk, Radical Sisters: Second-Wave Feminism and Black Liberation in Washington, D.C. (Urbana and Chicago: The University Illinois Press, 2008). (Hereafter cited as Valk, Radical Sisters…).

128 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, (New York: Routledge, 1991).

129 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 67.

130 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 75.

131 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 75.

132 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 77.

133 Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 77.

134 Ibid.

135 Robert C. Byrd- A Villain’ to Poor of D.C., Charleston Gazette, May 12, 1965, Charleston, West Virginia. Walter Fauntroy Collection, Box 21, Folder 4.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 “Robert C. Byrd- A ‘Villain to Poor of D.C.?,” The Charleston Gazette, 12 of May 1965, Charleston, West Virginia. Box 21, Folder 4 in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at George Washington University.

143 Whitney M. Young, Jr., “A Debate Over “Compensation” Programs in Freedom Now! The Civil-Rights Struggle in America, ed. By Alan F. Westin, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1964), 279-281.

144 Whitney M. Young, Jr., “A Debate Over “Compensation” Programs in Freedom Now! The Civil-Rights Struggle in America Ibid., 282.

145 Whitney M. Young, Jr., “A Debate Over “Compensation” Programs in Freedom Now! The Civil-Rights Struggle in America, 282.

146 Ibid.

219

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 Whitney M. Young, Jr., “Middle-Class Negroes and the Negro Masses” in Freedom Now! The Civil-Rights Struggle in America, ed. By Alan F. Westin, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1964), 316-17.

150 “Free D.C. Movement, Background,” James Forman Papers, Box: 31 Folder: 16, Subject File: Free D.C. Movement, 1966 at The Library of Congress.

151 Ibid.

152 “Free D.C. Movement, Background,” James Forman Papers, Box: 31 Folder: 16, Subject File: Free D.C. Movement, 1966 at The Library of Congress.

153 Valk, Radical Sisters…, 40.

154 Sterling Tucker. Interview recorded by Vincent J. Browne in the Civil Rights Documentation Project. July 17, 1967. Ralph J. Bunche Collection, #5 at Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center. P.12-13.

155 Dave McKenna, “There’s a Riot Going On,” WashingtonCityPaper.com. December 12, 2008. http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/36582/theres-a-riot-going-on/. Accessed on November 12, 2013.

156 Sterling Tucker, 1967 Interview, P. 12

157 Clayborne Carson, Ed., The Autobiography of Martin L. King, Jr. (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1998), 303-304.

158 Ibid.; Sterling Tucker, 1967 Interview, P. 12-13.

159 “Rev. Hewlett Makes Acceptance Statement,” Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, July 1, 1967 to Oct. 18, 1967, Vol. 119, p. 5.

160 “Rev. Hewlett Makes Acceptance Statement,”…p. 5.

161 “Rev. Hewlett Makes Acceptance Statement,”…p. 5.

162 Cynthia Gorney, “Julius Hobson Sr., Activist, Dies at Age 54,” in the Washington Post, March 24, 1977, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061000956_5.html. Accessed September 30, 2013. (Hereafter cited as Gorney, “Julius Hobson Sr., Activist, Dies at Age 54”).

163 Hereafter cited as Gorney, “Julius Hobson Sr., Activist, Dies at Age 54.”

164 “Hobson v. Hansen,” on Education Law, http://educational-law.org/333-hobson-v-hansen.html. Accessed September 30, 2013.

165 Gorney, “Julius Hobson Sr., Activist, Dies at Age 54.”

166 “Rev. Hewlett Makes Acceptance Statement,” …p. 6.

167 “Rev. Hewlett Makes Acceptance Statement,” …p. 6.

168 “Rev. Hewlett Makes Acceptance Statement,” …p. 7.

169 Vijay Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” Social Analysis, vol. 49, no. 2, (Summer 2005), 192-193.

220

The Journal of American History Vol. 91 No. 4 (2005):1234. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3660172.

170 Ibid.

171 Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” 191-192.

172 Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” 193.

173 Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” 191-192.

174 Ibid.

175 Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” 192.

176 Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” 192.

177 Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” 192.

178 Prashad, “Second-Hand Dreams,” 192.

179 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools by Teachers College, Columbia University” in Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, July 1, 1967 to Oct. 18, 1967, Vol. 119, P.2.

180 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools by Teachers College, Columbia University,” P.3.

181 Ibid., 4.

182 Washington State Institute for Public Policy, “High School Graduation Rates in Washington and the United States: A Long-Run View,” March 2005. Accessed on November 12, 2013, http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/05- 03-2201.pdf.

183 Ibid., 5.

184 Ibid., 5.

185 Ibid.

186 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…,” p. 21.

187 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…,” P. 22.

188 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…,” P. 21.

189 Ibid.

190 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…” P.7.

191 “For Broadcast” by the D.C. Coalition of Conscience on May 6, 1965, P.2, Box 21, Fld. 11, News Release, Welfare April-May 1965, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers in George Washington University Special Collections.

192 Ibid.

221

193 “Addressed delivered by the Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy at a public meeting, honoring Commissioner John B. Duncan sponsored by the Baptist Ministers’ Conference of Washington, D.C. and Vicinity on Monday, July 9, 1962, p. 3.

194 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…” p. 13.

195 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…” p. 14.

196 Ibid.

197 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…” P.23.

198 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…” P.23.

199 Ibid.

200 Ibid.

201 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools…,” P. 4.

202 “The Fight to Vote in the Nation’s Capital” flyer, James Forman Papers, Box: 31 Folder: 16, Subject File: Free D.C. Movement, 1966 in the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress.

203 Ibid.

204 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” by the United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 10, 1948. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. Accessed on September 13, 2013.

205 “Report of Fifteen-Month Comprehensive Study of D.C. Public Schools by Teachers College, Columbia University,” P. 16.

206 Penny M. Von Eschen, “The Real Ambassadors” in Uptown Conversation: The New Jazz Studies, Editors: Robert O'Meally, Brent Hayes Edwards, and Farah Jasmine Griffin, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

207 Jaffe and Sherwood, Dream City…P. 67.

208 Ibid.

209 Sterling Tucker, Beyond the Burning: Life and Death of the Ghetto, (New York: Association Press, 1968). (Hereafter cited as Tucker, Beyond the Burning…).

210 Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power, (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1965), 11.

211 Ben W. Gilbert and the staff of the Washington Post, Ten Blocks from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), P. 14. (Hereafter cited as Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…).

212 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…), P. 15.

213 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…, P.13.

214 Ibid.

215 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…, P.20.

222

216 Ibid., P. 21.

217 Ibid., P. 21.

218 Ibid.

219 Sterling Tucker, Interview recorded by Vincent J. Browne in the Civil Rights Documentation Project, July 17, 1967, Ralph J. Bunche Collection, #5 at Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, P. 21.

220 Jaffe and Sherwood, Dream City…P. 69.

221 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…, P.19.

222 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…, P.18-19.

223 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…, P.24.

224 Clayborne Carson, ed., The Autobiography of Martin L. King, Jr., (New York: Warner Books, Inc.), p. 293.

225 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…, P.24.

226 Citizen King. Produced by Orlando Bagwell and W. Noland Walker. 115 minutes. PBS Home Video, 2004. DVD.

227 Ibid.

228 Gilbert, et.al., Ten Blocks from the White House…, P. 32.

229 Clark, Dark Ghetto…, P. 16.

230 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (New York: Grove Press, 1963), P. 111. (Hereafter cited as Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth).

231 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, P. 111.

232 Ibid.

233 Tucker, Beyond the Burning…, P. 8-9.

234 Ibid.

235 “Citizen King,” produced by Orlando Bagwell and W. Noland Walker, 115 minutes, PBS Home Video, 2004, DVD.

236 Ibid.

237 Tucker, Beyond the Burning…, P. 10.

238 Ibid.

239 Ibid.

240 Tucker, Beyond the Burning…, P.14-16.

223

241 Model Inner City Community Organization, Inc., “Letter to MICCO member from Roy Littlejohn, Executive Director,” April 4, 1968in the George Washington University Library Special Collections Division.

242 William Raspberry, “Planners Try Shaw Survey,” from the Potomac Watch, November 24, 1968, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers MS2070, Box 26, Folder 23: Clippings, Shaw Urban Renewal Area, 1960, 1966-1972, n.d., at the George Washington University Library Special Collections Division.

243 Ibid.

244 Valk, Radical Sisters…, 41.

245 Valk, Radical Sisters…, 38-39.

246 Valk, Radical Sisters…, 38-39.

247 “Memorandum from Ethel James Williams to Polly Shackleton- Issues on Public Welfare for 1970” October 3, 1968, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington Special Collections Divisions. (Hereafter cited as “Memorandum from Ethel James Williams to Polly Shackleton- Issues on Public Welfare for 1970”).

248 Ibid.

249 Anne M. Valk, "Mother Power": The Movement for Welfare Rights in Washington, D.C., 1966-1972, Journal of Women's History 11.4 (2000), p. 46. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_womens_history/v011/11.4valk.html. (Hereafter cited as Valk, "Mother Power…").

250 Phineas R. Fiske, “Council Votes Renewal of Central City,” MS2070, Box 26,Folder 23: Clippings, Shaw Urban Renewal Area, 1960, 1966-1972, n.d., of Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington Special Collections Divisions.

251 “Memorandum from Walter E. Fauntroy to Daniel P. Moynihan on Rebuilding Programs for Washington, D.C.,” February 13, 1969 in Box 27, Folder 4 of Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington Special Collections Divisions, P. 3.

252 Vincent Cohen, “Urban Renewal Raises Questions: Shaw Area Ponders Its Future, D1,” Washington Post, February 10, 1969, Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, MS2070, Box 27, Folder 4: Plan, The Shaw Urban Renewal Area, c. 1969 at George Washington University Special Collections Division.

253 Ibid., D1-D2.

254 Ibid., D2.

255 Martin Weil, “Citizens’ Role Speeds Renewal for Ghetto,” September 11, 1969, Pgs. 1-2, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers in the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

256 Ibid., p. 3.

257 Ibid., p. 3.

258 Robert L. Asher and Leonard Downie, Jr., “Nixon Details Plan to Make District Safe,” February 1, 1969, The Washington Post, P. 1 in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington Special Collections Division.

259 Ibid.

224

260 Ibid., P. 2.

261 Black United Front, “Draft Proposal for Neighborhood Control of the Police in the Black Community,” September 25, 1968, P.2, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers in the George Washington University Special Collections.

262 “Proposal on Police Control Is Planned by the Black Front,” July 17, 1968, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers MS2070, Box 26, Folder 23: Clippings, Shaw Urban Renewal Area, 1960, 1966-1972, n.d., at the George Washington University Library Special Collections Division.

263 National Capital Area’s National Conference of Christians and Jews, Inc., “Police-Community Relations in the District of Columbia: A Proposal for Breaking the Deadlock, p. 2-3,” July 26, 1968, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers in the Special Collections Division.

264 Ibid., p. 3.

265 Ibid., P. 3-4.

266 Charles Cassell. Interview recorded by Robert Wright in the Civil Rights Documentation Project. December 31, 1968. Ralph J. Bunche Collection, #357 at Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, P. 8-9.

267 David L. Lewis, District of Columbia: A Bicentennial History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976), p. 184. (Hereafter cited as Lewis, District of Columbia…). Lewis, District of Columbia…, p. 184-85.

268 Ibid.

269 Lewis, District of Columbia…, p. 184-185.

270 Barry, Marion. Interview recorded by Katherine M. Shannon in the Civil Rights Documentation Project. October 3, 1967. Ralph J. Bunche Collection, #64 at Howard University Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, P. 57- 58.

271 Ibid.

272 Loic Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2009), p. 83.

273 National Welfare Rights Organization, “Facts About Welfare and Welfare Rights” Pamphlet, from Folder: 200- Poor Peoples Campaign (PPC), Solidarity March (June 19), Volume 7, Box 4, in RG 23, Office of Emergency Preparedness Records RE. To Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events, 1965, 1968-1978.

274 Ibid.

275 Ibid.

276 Ibid.

277 Ibid.

278 Ibid.

279 “Memorandum from Ethel James Williams to Polly Shackleton- Issues on Public Welfare for 1970,” p.4.

225

280 Mel Stack, “Citizens for Fair Employment Now Letter to “Friends,” August 25, 1968, in Box: 42, Folder: Current Letters and Memorandum date 1968, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Library Special Collections Division.

281 Citizens for Fair Employment Now, “Chronological History of the Mar Salle Strike” in in Box: 42, Folder: Current Letters and Memorandum date 1968, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Library Special Collections Division.

282 Ibid.

283 Ibid.

284 Ibid.

285 Ibid.

286 Ibid.

287 “GPO Target of New Thrust” Equality-Washington Urban League Newsletter, Vol. VII, No. 5, (September 1968): 2.

288 Ibid.

289 Ibid. . 290 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 215-217.

291 “Government of the District of Columbia Executive Command & Communications Center, Case File Number(s) 204-209, May 13, 1970, UPI-110) Office of Civil Defense Executive Command Center,”RG23, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Records RE to Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events, 1965, 1968-78, Folder: National Welfare Rights Organization, 13 May – Sept. 1970, Box 23 at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

292 Ibid.

293 Ibid.

294 Ibid.

295 Ibid.

296 Ibid.

297 Ibid.

298 Ibid.

299 “Government of the District of Columbia Executive Command & Communications Center (GDCEC&CC), Case File Number(s) 204-209, May 14, 1970, UPI-110) Office of Civil Defense Executive Command Center,”RG23, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Records RE to Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events, 1965, 1968-78, Folder: National Welfare Rights Organization, 13 May – Sept. 1970, Box 23 at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

300 Ibid.

226

301 “300 Welfare Recipients Demand Furniture Aid,” June 9, 1970 in The Evening Star, from the GDC, Case File Number(s): 204-722, Folder: National Welfare Rights Organization, 13 May-Sept 1970, Box 23, at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

302 Ibid.

303 Ibid.

304 Ibid.

305 GDCEC&CC, June 23, 1970, Folder: National Welfare Rights Organization, 13 May-Sept 1970, Box 23, at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

306 Ibid.

307 Ibid.

308 Ibid.

309 Ibid.

310 “Government of the D.C. Executive Command and Communications Center, Oct. 12, 1972, Office of Civil Defense Exec. Comd. Ctr.,” Folder: National Welfare Rights Organization, Oct./72-Dec 31/72, Box 44, RG 23, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Records RE to Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events, 1965, 1968-1978 at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

311 Ibid.

312 Ibid.; “Democrats for Nixon,” The Dispatch, October 13, 1972, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1734&dat=19721013&id=c3kcAAAAIBAJ&sjid=AVIEAAAAIBAJ&pg= 3018,4119340, P.14. Accessed on February 10, 2014.

313 University of the District of Columbia, “UDC’s History,” http://www.udc.edu/about_udc/history_university_district_columbia, Accessed on October 11, 2013.

314 Ibid.

315 “Convocation Address by Shirley Marie Gray,” FOCUS on The Federal City College, Vol. 2, No.1 (September 1968), Pgs. 1-2.

316 Ibid.

317 Ibid., P.4.

318 “Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Board of Education: Bell Vocational High School,” P.9-10, February 4, 1970, in Minutes from the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, January 26, 1970 to September 28, 1970, Vol. 124.

319 Ibid.

320 “Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Board of Education: Bell Vocational High School,” P.9-10, February 4, 1970, in Minutes from the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, January 26, 1970 to September 28, 1970, Vol. 124.

227

321 Ibid., p. 9.

322 Ibid., p. 11.

323 Ibid., p. 11.

324 Ibid., p. 11-12.

325 Ibid.

326 Ibid., p. 10.

327 Ibid., p. 10.

328 “Report from the Government of the District of Columbia Executive Command and Communications Center, attached, United Press International article,” Folder: Washington Teachers Union, September 1972 (Strike), Box 41, of RG 23, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Records RE to Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events, 1965, 1968-1978-Washington Teachers Union Strike at the Washington, D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

329 Ibid.

330 “Report from the Government of the District of Columbia Executive Command and Communications Center, September 28, 1972,” Folder: Washington Teachers Union, September 1972 (Strike), Box 41, of RG 23, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Records RE to Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events, 1965, 1968-1978-Washington Teachers Union Strike at the Washington, at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

331 Ibid.

332 Ibid.

333 Ibid.

334 Ibid.

335 “The Teachers’ Strike,” from The Washington Post, Pg. A22, September 21, 1972, Folder: D.C. Teachers Strike, 9-27/10-2-72), Box 43 in in RG 23, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Records RE to Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events 1965, 1968-78-Washington Teachers Union Strike, Sept.-Oct. 1972 at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives. (Hereafter cited as “The Teachers’ Strike,” from The Washington Post, Pg. A22, September 21, 1972…).

336 Ibid.

337 Ibid.

338 Ibid.

339 “Teacher Demands and Settlement,” The Evening Star & Daily News,” October 2, 1972, in RG 23, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Records RE to Demonstrations, Civil Disturbances and Special Events 1965, 1968-78- Washington Teachers Union Strike, Sept.-Oct. 1972, Folder: D.C. Teachers Strike, 9-27/10-2-72, Box: 43 at the D.C. Office of Public Records and Archives.

228

340 Lucia Johnson Leith, “Fauntroy’s Enjoy a First,” from The Christian Science Monitor, May 28, 1971, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, Box 1, Folder 3: Clippings, “Fauntroy’s Enjoy a First” at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

341 Richard Nixon, “Statement on Signing the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act” on December 24, 1973, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4086.

342 “Memorandum from Brock Adams, M.C. to Honorable Stewart McKinney,” June 6, 1973, in Box 1, Folder: Home Rule – H.R. 9056 Bills of the Stewart B. McKinney Papers at George Washington University, Special Collections Division.

343 Ibid.

344 Ibid., pgs. 9-10.

345 Ibid.

346 “Walter E. Fauntroy, Member of Congress The District of Columbia, News Release,” June 23, 1972, P.1- 2, Box 15, Folder 1: News Releases, Democratic National Committee, June 28, 1972, RG1 in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at George Washington University Library: Special Collections Division.

347 Ibid; David L. Lewis, District of Columbia: A History, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1976), p. 186. (Hereafter cited as Lewis, District of Columbia: A History…).

348 “District of Columbia Statehood Celebration-Julius W. Hobson, Sr.,” May 21, 1983, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, RG4, Box 35, Folder 15- Clippings, Hobson, Julius W., Sr., 1977, 1983 at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

349 Lewis, District of Columbia: A History, P. 186.

350 Ibid.

351 Ibid.

352 Ibid., P. 187.

353 Remarks of the Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy (D., D.C.) Opening Debate on House Joint Res. 554, A Constitutional Amendment Providing Full Voting Representation in the Congress for the District of Columbia, March 1, 1978, pg.8, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections. (Hereafter cited as “Remarks of the Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy (D., D.C.) Opening Debate on House Joint Res. 554…”)

354 “Fact Sheet on D.C. Full Voting Representation” in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at George Washington University Library: Special Collections Division.

355 “H.R. 9682 D.C. Home Rule” in the House Republican Conference Legislative Digest, Vol. II, #29, Part II, October 8, 1973, P.11, in the Stewart B. McKinney, District of Columbia Papers, 1966-1974, Box 1, Folder: Home Rule House Republican Conference Legislative Digest at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

356 “WRC-TV Editorial: Home Rule Campaign #27 – Congressional Oversight,” Volume: Eight, Number: Fifty, Broadcast: October 1 &2, 1973, Box: 1, Folder: Home Rule WRC-TV Editorial, 1973 in the Stewart B. McKinney Papers at George Washington University Special Collections.

229

357 Ibid.

358 Ibid.

359 Dream City…,p. 61-62. 360 “WRC-TV Editorial: Home Rule Campaign #28 – Elected Mayor & City Council,” Volume: Eight, Number: Fifty One, Broadcast: October 2 &3, 1973, Box: 1, Folder: Home Rule WRC-TV Editorial, 1973 in the Stewart B. McKinney Papers at George Washington University Special Collections.

361 “Proposed Rent Control Regulation for the District of Columbia,” from the District of Columbia Council: District of Columbia Register” June 17, 1974, Supplement No.6, Volume: 2, Number: 25, p. 1264.

362 Ibid.

363 Ibid.

364 Ibid., P. 1265.

365 Ibid.

366 Ibid.

367 Ibid., p. 1266.

368 Ibid.

369 Ibid.

370 Ibid.

371 “Minutes of the Twenty-Sixth (Stated) Meeting of the Board of Education,” Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, October 3, 1973 to April 3, 1974, Vol. 130, pg. 17.

372 Ibid.

373 Ibid., pgs. 17-18.

374 Ibid., p. 17.

375 Ibid., pgs. 17-18.

376 Ibid.

377 Ibid.

378 Ibid., p. 18.

379 Ibid.

380 Ibid., p. 19.

381 “Report for Information on Project CREATE; Formal Request for Assistance to be Forwarded to Administration; Administration also to Consider Problem Areas Cited by Board Member Swaim” in Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, October 3, 1973 to April 3, 1974, Vol. 130, pg. 20.

230

382 Ibid., p. 21.

383 Ibid., p. 21.

384 “H.R. 15643 (93rd): District of Columbia Public Higher Education Reorganization Act,” Text as of October 26, 1974, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/93/hr15643/text, Accessed on June 3, 2014.

385 “A Bill- District of Columbia Public Education Reorganization Act of 1973,” in Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, October 3, 1973 to April 3, 1974, Vol. 130.

386 Ibid.

387 Ibid.

388 “Statement,” Minutes of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia, October 3, 1973 to April 3, 1974, Vol. 130.

389 Ibid.

390 “Steering Committee for the Workshop on the Nelsen Commission Report, Final Report, 1973,” Folder: 1973, Box: 28, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections Division. (Hereafter cited as “Steering Committee for the Workshop on the Nelsen Commission Report…”).

391 Ibid.

392 Ibid.

393 “Steering Committee for the Workshop on the Nelsen Commission Report, p. 10.

394 Ibid.

395 Ibid., p. 10.

396 Ibid.

397 Ibid.

398 Ibid., p. 11.

399 Ibid.

400 “92 District Residents Vying for City Offices,” Sunday, May 26, 1974, (unknown newspaper), Box: 1, Folder: 1974 Misc. of the Washington, D.C. Election Data Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

401 “A Celebration and a Rash of Candidates,” Wednesday, May 8, 1974, (unknown newspaper), Box: 1, Folder: 1974 Miscellaneous in Washington, D.C. Election Data at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

402 Ibid.

403 Ibid.; “Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.-Third Chairman of the EEOC, August 4, 1967-May 1, 1969,” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission History, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/bios/cliffordalexander.html. Accessed on December 30, 2014.; “Clifford Alexander, Jr.-National Visionary,” National Visionary Leadership Project Oral History Archive, http://www.visionaryproject.org/alexanderclifford/. Accessed on December 30, 2014.

231

404 Corrie M. Anders, “Rev. Moore Quits As BUF Chief to Run for Council,” June 2, 1974, in Star-News Newspaper, in Washington, D.C. Election Data Papers, Box 1, Folder: 1974 Miscellaneous at George Washington University Special Collections Division.

405 Ibid.

406 Harvey Kabaker, “D.C. Democracy: Factors in the Voting,” Sunday, December 1, 1974, in Star-News Newspaper, Box:1, Folder: 1974 Miscellaneous in Washington, D.C. Election Data at George Washington University Special Collections Division.

407 Ibid.

408 Sterling Tucker, Beyond the Burning: Life and Death of the Ghetto, (New York: Association Press, 1968). 409 Walter E. Fauntroy, “Remarks of the Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy at the General Meeting of the Interfaith Committee of Greater Washington,” December 15, 1977, Pg. 1, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections.

410 Ibid., p.2

411 U.N. General Assembly, United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 1948, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml. Accessed on May 16, 2014.

412 “Remarks of the Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy (D., D.C.) Opening Debate on House Joint Res. 554…,” pgs. 2-3.

413 Ibid. p. 3.

414 Ibid., pgs. 3-4.

415 Ibid., p. 4-5.

416 Ibid., p.5.

417 Ibid.

418 Ibid., p. 6.

419 Olga Moore Arnold, “Street Academy,” in Urban Action-bi-monthly publication of the Washington Urban League, October-November 1973, Vol. 3, No. 4, Box: 28, Folder: 1973, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

420 Ibid.

421 Ibid, p.2.

422 Ibid., p.3.

423 Ibid.

424 Ibid., p.2.

425 Ibid., p.3.

426 Ibid.

232

427 Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy, Address Before the District of Columbia Congress of Parents and Teachers, “The Historical Crisis in Education and the Need for a Plan,” May 25, 1978, pgs.1-2, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, RG1, Box 1, Folder: 36, at the George Washington University Special Collections Division. (Hereafter cited as Walter E. Fauntroy, “The Historical Crisis in Education…”).

428 Ibid.

429 Ibid., pgs. 2-3.

430 Ibid., p. 3-4.

431 Ibid., p. 3-4.

432 “Study: Older Cities Hurt By Military Spending Policies,” Washington Associated Press via the Virgin Islands Daily News, March 13, 1979, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=757&dat=19790313&id=JO1LAAAAIBAJ&sjid=4q0DAAAAIBAJ&pg= 3942,1485963. Accessed on June 10, 2014.

433 “District of Columbia Legislative Program- 93rd Congress First Session,” by Judith Rogers Legislative Program Coordinator, p.16, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, MS2080, Box: 28, Folder: 1973 at the George Washington University Special Collections Division. (Hereafter cited as “District of Columbia Legislative Program- 93rd Congress First Session”).

434 Ibid.

435 Ibid.

436 Eldridge Spearman and Maureen Mussenden, Editors. “News and Views from D.C. Congressman, Walter E. Fauntroy” Newsletter, December 1977 in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections Division. (Hereafter cited as “News and Views from D.C. Congressman…”).

437 Ibid., p. 2.

438 Ibid.

439 Ibid.

440 Milton Coleman, “DHR Trims Welfare Backlog by 900,” April 8, 1977, Washington Post, pg. A1 in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, Box: 4, Folder: 19, at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

441 Ibid., A6.

442 Ibid.

443 Ibid.

444 Walter E. Fauntroy, “Statement of Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy Before the Subcommittee on Fiscal and Government Affairs of The House District Committee,” March 14, 1978, in the Walter E. Fauntory Papers, RG1, Box: 2, Folder: 15, at the George Washington University Special Collections Division. (Hereafter cited as “Statement of Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, March 14, 1978…”).

445 Ibid., p.1.

446 Ibid.

233

447 Ibid. pgs. 1-2.

448 Ibid., p.2.

449 Ibid., p. 3.

450 Ibid., p.3.

451 Ibid.

452 Ibid.

453 Ibid., p. 188-189.

454 Ibid., P. 189.

455 “Statement of Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, March 14, 1978…p.4”; Stewart B. McKinney, “Bill Summary and Status 95th Congress (1977-1978) H.R. 10116,” http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d095:H.R.10116 accessed on July 10, 2014.

456 Robert Dellums, “H.R. 11303 (95th): A bill to amend the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act ...,” https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/95/hr11303#summary accessed on July 10, 2014.

457 “Statement of Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, March 14, 1978…p.4.”

458 Ibid., p.4.

459 Ibid.

460 “Untitled,” p. 4., Friday, March 3, 1978, in The Wall Street Journal, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

461 J.F. terHorst, “Enclave Of Citizens Is Still Being Denied Full Representation, pg. A 13, September 30, 1977, The Evening Sun, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections.

462 Ibid.

463 “Freedom for a Company Town,” May 10, 1977, The Los Angeles Times, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

464 “Remarks of the Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy (D., D.C.) Opening Debate on House Joint Res. 554…” pgs. 2-3.

465 Stephen A. Saltzburg, “Testimony of Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg, University of Virginia Law School Before the Joint Committee of the Maryland Legislature-Representation in Congress for the District of Columbia; H.J. Res. 554,” January 30, 1979, p.4, in Walter E. Fauntroy Papers at the George Washington University Special Collections Division. (Hereafter cited as Saltzburg, “Testimony of Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg…January 30, 1979.)

466 Ibid.

467 Ibid.

234

468 Ibid.

469 Ibid., p.3.

470 Ibid., p.4.

471 “Bill Summary & Status 95th Congress (1977-1978) H.J. Res. 554,” Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d095:H.J.Res554. Accessed on July 30, 2014.

472 Marion Barry, Jr. and Omar Tyree, Mayor for Life: The Incredible Story of Marion Barry, Jr., (Largo, MD: Strebor Books, 2014), p. 1866.

473 Marion Barry, “The Inaugural Address of The Honorable Marion Barry Mayor of the District of Columbia,” January 2, 1979, pg. 3, in the James Forman Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. (Hereafter cited as Barry, “Inaugural Address…”).

474 Ibid.

475 Ibid., p. 1789.

476 Barry, “Inaugural Address…,”pg. 3.

477 Ibid., pg. 3.

478 Barry, “Inaugural Address…,” pgs. 4-5.

479 Ibid.

480 “Petition for a Free D.C.” from May 5, 1966, in the James Forman Papers, Box: 31 Folder: 16-SNCC, Subject File: Free D.C. Movement, 1966 at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

481 “Memorandum for Secretary Harris, Subject: Agenda Items for Meeting with Mayor-Elect Marion Barry, December 4, 1978, pgs. 1-3,”The Papers of Patricia Roberts Harris, Box: 14, Folder: Barry, Marion 1978, Subject File: Department of Housing and Urban Development at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division. (Hereafter cited as “Memorandum for Secretary Harris, Subject: Agenda Items for Meeting with Mayor-Elect Marion Barry, December 4, 1978”).

482 Ibid., p.2

483 Ibid.

484 Ibid., “General Introduction,” p.4.

485 Ibid.

486 Ibid.

487 Ibid., p. 5.

488 Ibid.

489 Ibid.

490 Ibid.

235

491 Ibid., p.6.

492 Ibid., p.10.

493 Ibid.

494 Ibid., p. 10-11.

495 Ibid.

496 “Memorandum for Secretary Harris, Subject: Agenda Items for Meeting with Mayor-Elect Marion Barry, December 4, 1978”), p. 17.

497 Lewis, District of Columbia: A History, P. 192.

498 Ibid., p. 191-192.

499 Ibid.

500 Ibid.

501 “Memorandum for Secretary Harris, Subject: Agenda Items for Meeting with Mayor-Elect Marion Barry, December 4, 1978,” p. 20.

502 Ibid.

503 Ibid.

504 “Remarks Prepared for Delivery by: Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development at the 1978 Dinner of the Washington Committee of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, D.C., May 24, 1978” in The Papers of Patricia R. Harris, Box: 357, Folder: Speeches, Statements, and Writings File, May 19-25, 1978 at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division.

505 “Memorandum for Secretary Harris, Subject: Agenda Items for Meeting with Mayor-Elect Marion Barry, December 4, 1978,” p. 20.

506 “If You Favor Freedom: A Briefing Booklet on the Issues Surrounding Statehood for the People of the District of Columbia,” October, 1986, p. 3, in the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, RG4, Box: 38, Folder: 3, at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

507 Ibid.

508 Ibid., p. 13.

509 Ibid., p. 18.

510 Ibid.

511 Ibid., pgs. 18-19.

512 Ibid., p. 19.

513 Janet Cooke, “Emotions High, Politics Polished During Rally to Save Food Stamps,” The Washington Post- Metro, p. 81, March 8, 1981 from the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, RG1, Box 4, Folder 10-Clippings, Activism, 1966- 1988 at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

236

514 Ibid., p. B1

515 Ibid.

516 Ibid.

517 Vincent Taylor, “Fauntroy Says ‘Rights’ Laws Not Sufficiently Enforced,” p.1, Afro, May 22, 1982, from the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, RG1, Box 4, Folder 10-Clippings, Activism, 1966-1988, at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

518 Ibid.

519 Ibid.

520 Bill Allegar, “Fight vowed to get D.C. vote in Congress,” Washington Times, April 16, 1985, from the Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, RG1, Box 4, Folder 10-Clippings, Activism, 1966-1988, at the George Washington University Special Collections Division.

521 Ibid.

522 Bart Barnes, “Marion Barry Dies at 78; 4-term D.C. Mayor was the Most Powerful Local Political of his Generation” from WashingtonPost.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/marion-barry-dies-4-term- dc-mayor-the-most-powerful-local-politician-of-his-generation/2014/11/23/331ad222-c5da-11df-94e1- c5afa35a9e59_story.html. Accessed on February 16, 2015.

523 The Nine Lives of Marion Barry, directed by Dana Flor & Toby Oppenheimer, (2009; Washington, D.C.: IndiePix Films, 2010), DVD.

524 Ibid.

525 Ibid.

526 Michael Janofsky, “Congress Creates Board to Oversee Washington, D.C.,” April 8, 1995 in the New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/us/congress-creates-board-to-oversee-washington-dc.html. Accessed on March 29, 2015.

527 Ibid.

528 Tim Craig, “Obama to use D.C. ‘Taxation Without Representation’ License Plates,” January 15, 2013 in The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/obama-to-use-dc-taxation-without- representation-license-plates/2013/01/15/f91b09ac-5f5b-11e2-9940-6fc488f3fecd_story.html. Accessed on March 30, 2015.

237

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Cohen, Lizbeth. A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America. New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 2004.

Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963.

Frazier, E. Franklin. Black Bourgeoisie. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

Giddings, Paula. When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2001.

Gilbert, Ben W. and the staff of the Washington Post. Ten Blocks from the White House: Anatomy of the Washington Riots of 1968. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968.

Gillette, Jr., Howard. Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning and the Failure of Urban Policy in Washington, D.C. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995.

Helm, Judith Beck. Tenleytown, D.C.: Country Village into City Neighborhood. Washington, D.C.: Tenally Press, 1981.

Ingle, Edward. The Negro in the District of Columbia. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971.

McGirr, Lisa. Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Jaffe, Harry S. and Tom Sherwood, Dream City: Race, Power and The Decline of Washington, D.C. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

Landis, Kennesaw M., ed. Segregation in Washington: National Committee on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital. Chicago, Illinois, 1948.

Lewis, David L. District of Columbia: A Bicentennial History. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976.

Liebow, Elliot. Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003.

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O’Meally, Robert, ed., et.al. Uptown Conversation: The New Jazz Studies. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Terrell, Mary Church. A Colored Woman in a White World. Washington, D.C.: National Association of Colored Women’s Clubs, Inc., 1968.

Tucker, Sterling. Beyond the Burning: Life and Death of the Ghetto. New York: Association Press, 1968.

Westin, Alan F., ed. Freedom Now!: The Civil Rights Struggle in America. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1964.

Wacquant, Loic. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2009.

Wilkerson, Isabel. The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America’s Great Migration. New York: Random House, Inc., 2010.

Journal Articles

Osborne, Irene. “The Public School System” in Civil Rights in the Nation’s Capital: A Report on a Decade of Progress, Journal of Intergroup Relations, Volume 1, No. 5 (November 1959): 65.

Prashad, Vijay. “Second-Hand Dreams,” Social Analysis, vol. 49, no. 2, (Summer 2005), 192- 193. The Journal of American History Vol. 91 No. 4 (2005). JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3660172. Accessed on May 10, 2012.

Valk, Anne M. "Mother Power": The Movement for Welfare Rights in Washington, D.C., 1966- 1972, Journal of Women's History 11.4 (2000) 34-35. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_womens_history/v011/11.4valk.html. Accessed on November 28, 2012.

Documentaries

Citizen King. Produced by Orlando Bagwell and W. Noland Walker. 115 minutes. PBS Home Video, 2004. DVD.

Nine Lives of Marion Barry. Directed by Dana Flor and Toby Oppenheimer. 87 minutes. IndiePix Films, 2010. DVD.

Websites – for Secondary Sources

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“Clifford Alexander, Jr.-National Visionary,” National Visionary Leadership Project Oral History Archive, http://www.visionaryproject.org/alexanderclifford/. Accessed on December 30, 2014.

“Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.-Third Chairman of the EEOC, August 4, 1967-May 1, 1969,” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission History, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/bios/cliffordalexander.html. Accessed on December 30, 2014.

“Study: Older Cities Hurt By Military Spending Policies,” Washington Associated Press via the Virgin Islands Daily News, March 13, 1979. http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=757&dat=19790313&id=JO1LAAAAIBAJ&sjid=4q0 DAAAAIBAJ&pg=3942,1485963. Accessed on June 10, 2014.

Historic American Buildings Survey of the National Park Service, “Historic American Building Survey Southwest Washington, D.C., Urban Renewal Area,” in HABS No. DC-856. http://lcweb2.loc.gov/pnp/habshaer/dc/dc1000/dc1017/data/dc1017data.pdf. Accessed on November 9, 2013.

University of the District of Columbia, “UDC’s History,” http://www.udc.edu/about_udc/history_university_district_columbia, Accessed on October 11, 2013.

Washington State Institute for Public Policy, “High School Graduation Rates in Washington and the United States: A Long-Run View,” March 2005. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/05-03- 2201.pdf. Accessed on November 12, 2013.

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