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Storm Water Management Program Regulated MS4
Storm Water Management Program Regulated MS4 1.0 Introduction The Storm Water Phase II regulations became effective on December 1999 under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They required operators of Small Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4) to secure a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit to regulate the discharge of storm water runoff from their systems into surface bodies of waters of the United States. Although the Department of Transportation and Public Works (DTPW) and the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (HTA) are not municipal entities, the definition of regulated systems, also incorporated the discharges of storm sewer systems operated by public entities like the mentioned agencies as part of the regulated community. The regulations also required the development of a Storm Water Management Program (SWMP) as a tool to satisfy some water quality requirements and minimum technology standards detailed in Clean Water Act (CWA) amendments. 1.1 Regulatory Background The CWA establishes the basic structure for regulating discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States and quality standards for surface waters. The origins of may be traced back to 1948, where the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted. This Act was significantly reorganized and expanded in 1972. When it was amended in 1977, it became commonly referred to as the CWA. It was under this new name that EPA began the implementation of pollution control programs that start setting wastewater standards for the industry. It also established water quality standards for a wide range of contaminants in surface waters. The act made unlawful the discharge of pollutant from defined (or point sources) into navigable waters, unless a permit was obtained. -
Analysis of Puerto Rico's Current Economic and Fiscal Situation
Final Version ANALYSIS OF PUERTO RICO’S CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FISCAL SITUATION Sergio M. Marxuach Policy Director Center for a New Economy October 2015 We live forward; but we can only think backward. —Soren Kierkegaard Puerto Rico currently faces two distinct, yet related, crises. The first, and most urgent, arises out of the government’s weak financial situation. The second is the product of the chronic stagnation of its economy over the last ten years. Decades of fiscal and economic mismanagement have engendered an economy characterized by: (1) chronic primary deficits; (2) high debt-to-GNP ratios; (3) low employment levels in the formal economy; (4) a large informal economy, encompassing both legal and illegal activities; (5) significant government corruption and predatory rent- seeking behavior in both the public and private sectors 1; (6) substantial tax evasion; (7) a hollow productive base; and (8) high levels of private consumption and indebtedness enabled by having access to a stronger currency than its economic fundamentals would warrant. In our opinion, the parallels with Greece are quite evident for all to see and none to misunderstand. In this paper we delve deeper into the some of the historical factors that played a role in creating this dysfunctional economy, analyze some aspects of the current economic and fiscal crises and provide both short and medium-term policy recommendations. Puerto Rico: A Child of the Postwar World It is perhaps quite difficult for people living in 2015 to imagine the state of the world at the end of Second World War. Europe was shattered, full of ruins from the coast of Normandy all the way to the outskirts of Moscow; Britain was exhausted after six years of war; Germany was literally split in four parts; France was still traumatized by the shame of Nazi occupation and the guilt of those who collaborated with it; Japan had just witnessed the nuclear obliteration of two of its most important commercial and industrial cities; China was in the midst of a civil war; and India was still part of the British Empire. -
Teodoro Moscoso Bridge)
New Issue - Book Entry Only Ratings Standard & Poor’s: BBB+ Moody’s: Baa2 $153,222,270.45 Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority Special Facility Revenue Refunding Bonds, 2003 Series A (Teodoro Moscoso Bridge) The Authority will issue the Bonds and lend the proceeds to Autopistas de Puerto Rico y Compañía, S.E. Autopistas de Puerto Rico operates the Teodoro Moscoso toll bridge pursuant to a concession agreement with Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority. The bridge is owned by the Authority. The Bonds are payable primarily from net toll revenues from the bridge collected by Autopistas de Puerto Rico (after payment of bridge operating and maintenance expenses). In the event that such net toll revenues, together with available reserves, are insufficient to pay the Bonds, or that the concession agreement is otherwise terminated, the Authority will assume Autopistas de Puerto Rico’s obligation to pay the Bonds, the concession will be acquired by the Authority, and the Authority will be required to exchange the Bonds for new senior or subordinated bonds (at the option of the Authority) having the same terms as the Bonds but issued under its 1998 bond resolution, provided the Authority meets the requirements for the issuance of such new bonds. If the Authority cannot issue such new bonds in exchange for the Bonds, the Bonds would continue to be payable from available net toll revenues from the bridge and from any other revenues available to the Authority, after payment of debt service on the bonds issued under the 1998 bond resolution. • The Bonds will be issued as Serial Bonds, Term Bonds, and Capital Appreciation Bonds, in denominations of $1,000 principal amount and multiples thereof in the case of the Serial Bonds, $5,000 principal amount and multiples thereof in the case of the Term Bonds, and $5,000 maturity amounts and multiples thereof in the case of the Capital Appreciation Bonds. -
Transportation Revenue Refunding Bonds Series N
NEW ISSUE - BOOK-ENTRY ONLY $2,184,860,553 Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority $250,000,000 Transportation Revenue Bonds (Series M) $1,502,904,943.95 Transportation Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series N) $431,955,609.05 Highway Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series CC) The Transportation Revenue Bonds (Series M) (the “Series M Bonds”) and the Transportation Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series N) (the “Series N Bonds”) are being issued by the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (the “Authority”) pursuant to Resolution No. 98-06 adopted by the Authority on February 26, 1998, as amended (the “1998 Resolution”), for the purpose of financing various highway projects and refunding certain of the Authority’s Transportation Revenue Bonds, respectively. The Highway Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series CC) (the “Series CC Bonds”) are being issued by the Authority pursuant to Resolution No. 68-18 adopted by the Authority on June 13, 1968, as amended (the “1968 Resolution”) for the purpose of refunding certain of the Authority’s Highway Revenue Bonds. The Series M Bonds, the Series N Bonds, the outstanding bonds of the Authority previously issued under the 1998 Resolution, and any additional bonds that the Authority may from time to time issue under the 1998 Resolution (collectively, the “Transportation Revenue Bonds”) are payable from, and are secured by a pledge of, certain revenues of the Authority, which include: (i) the total amount of excise taxes, up to $120 million per fiscal year, imposed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”) on certain petroleum products; (ii) toll revenues of the Authority’s traffic facilities that were not financed with Highway Revenue Bonds; (iii) certain investment earnings; and (iv) the 1968 Resolution Revenues (as described below) available after payment of debt service on the Authority’s outstanding Highway Revenue Bonds (collectively, the “1998 Resolution Revenues”). -
Financial Oversight Management Board for Puerto Rico PRHTA Reporting - July 2020
Financial Oversight Management Board for Puerto Rico PRHTA Reporting - July 2020 Overview Tab 1.0 Executive Summary Tab 1.1 B2A: YTD June Tab 1.3 B2A: Traffic Volume Tab 2.0 Fiscal Measures Tab 3.1 CIP: Pre-Construction Tab 3.2 CIP: Construction Tab 3.3 CIP: EFL ER Program Tab 4.1 Liquidity: Weekly Cash Flow Tab 4.2 Liquidity: Bank Balances (restricted and unrestricted) Tab 4.3 1 (C) Report Tab 5.0 Balance Sheet 1 1.1 B2A: YTD June In $ Thousands FY20 Budget Reapportion Adjusted YTD Budget YTD Actuals Variance ($M) Variance Variance Explanation Budget (%) Variance is due to: 1) Toll fares increase not implemented 2) Humacao toll stations will resume operations on 8/16 instead 7/1 3) Increase on unpaid tolls and decrease in violations collected within the month they were incurred. 4) Reduction in the traffic 1 145,762 145,762 145,762 121,470 (24,292) -16.67% Toll Revenue of the PR 52 in the month of January due to the emergency of the earthquake. 5) Reduction in the traffic and toll collections in all the system due to emergency COVID-19 Transit Revenue 2 6,761 6,761 6,761 5,397 (1,364) -20.17% Collective transportation services are not being offered due to COVID-19 Toll Fines 13,067 13,067 13,067 - (13,067) -100.00% The PRHTA position for FY2020 is not to collect toll fines. Other Income 11,612 11,612 11,612 10,617 (995) -8.57% Total Own Revenues 177,202 - 177,202 177,202 137,484 (39,718) -22.41% Commonwealth Funds Earmarked for Operational 600 600 600 600 - 0.00% Expenditure Commonwealth Funds Earmarked for Capital 74,334 74,334 74,334 74,334 - 0.00% Expenditures Current year Total Funding from Commonwealth 3 74,934 - 74,934 74,934 74,934 - 0.00% Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") Funds 251,480 251,480 251,480 138,864 (112,616) -44.78% Construction Project was delayed due to emergency COVID-19 Federal Emergency Revenues 80,594 80,594 80,594 42,114 (38,480) -47.75% The execution of construction projects related to hurricanes Irma and Maria has been different from planned. -
Cano Martin Pena Ecosystem Restoration Project
FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT DELIVERY PACKAGE Caño Martín Peña Ecosystem Restoration Project )(%5UARY 2016 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS CORPORACIÓN DEL PROYECTO JACKSONVILLE DISTRICT ENLACE DEL CAÑO MARTÍN PEÑA Table of Contents Page ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS TAB 1: FINAL FEASIBILITY REPORT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOLUME I: FINAL FEASIBILITY MAIN REPORT .................................................................... Vol I Appendix A: National Ecosystem Restoration Benefits Evaluation Appendix B: Real Estate Plan Appendix C: Recreation Resources Assessment and Recreation Plan Appendix D: Cost Engineering D1: Planning Level Cost Estimate D2: Project Cost Summary Estimate D3: Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis Appendix E: Adaptive Management Plan Appendix F: Monitoring Plan VOLUME II: APPENDIX G: ENGINEERING ........................................................................... Vol II VOLUME III: APPENDIX H: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT .................... Vol III H1: Essential Fish Habitat Assessment H2: Biological Assessment under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act H3: Section 404(b)(1) Evaluation H4: Wetland Delineation and Determination H5: Coastal Zone Management Certification Package H6: Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste Assessment H7: Pertinent Correspondence and Public Involvement H8: Public Comment Report iii This page intentionally left blank. Acronyms and Abbreviations ac acres AAHU Average Annual Habitat Unit ACGIH American Conference on Governmental Industrial Hygienists ACI American Concrete -
Conference Full Paper Template
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships Austin, Texas, U.S.A., 26-29 May 2015 Dynamic Toll Lane: A Success Story as Part of the of Public Private Partnerships in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Benjamín Colucci Ríos, PhD, PE, PTOE, FITE, API, JD abertis Chair, University of Puerto Rico Mayagüez Campus PO Box 9000 Mayagüez, PR 00681 [email protected] ABSTRACT The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory not incorporated of the United States, through the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) and Autopistas Metropolitanas of Puerto Rico, LLC established the first highway public-private partnership (PPP) in the island under Act No. 29 of June 8, 2009, known as the Puerto Rico Public-Private Alliance Law. Under this consortium, Metropistas will be responsible to rehabilitate, conserve and improve the built freeway infrastructure and enhance safety to all road users of PR-22 and PR-5 to provide world class services, under a 40 years Grant Agreement. As part of this consortium, the design, construction, operation and management of a Dynamic Toll Lane (DTL) was included to reduce traffic congestion and expedite traffic flow, while using the Metro Urbano lane, a Bus Rapid Transit System (BRT). The DTL has an exclusive right of way operated at 40-45 mph that was constructed in the median of the PR-22, has a length of 10.4 kms (6.4 miles) which connects the Western Region of Toa Baja with Metropolitan Area of San Juan. The DTL ensures traffic flow using a dynamic toll adjusting rates according to traffic conditions in real time, using video technology to identify crashes and communicates with drivers through electronic signs. -
Analysis of Puerto Rico's Current Economic And
Final Version ANALYSIS OF PUERTO RICO’S CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FISCAL SITUATION Sergio M. Marxuach Policy Director Center for a New Economy October 2015 We live forward; but we can only think backward. —Soren Kierkegaard Puerto Rico currently faces two distinct, yet related, crises. The first, and most urgent, arises out of the government’s weak financial situation. The second is the product of the chronic stagnation of its economy over the last ten years. Decades of fiscal and economic mismanagement have engendered an economy characterized by: (1) chronic primary deficits; (2) high debt-to-GNP ratios; (3) low employment levels in the formal economy; (4) a large informal economy, encompassing both legal and illegal activities; (5) significant government corruption and predatory rent- seeking behavior in both the public and private sectors 1; (6) substantial tax evasion; (7) a hollow productive base; and (8) high levels of private consumption and indebtedness enabled by having access to a stronger currency than its economic fundamentals would warrant. In our opinion, the parallels with Greece are quite evident for all to see and none to misunderstand. In this paper we delve deeper into the some of the historical factors that played a role in creating this dysfunctional economy, analyze some aspects of the current economic and fiscal crises and provide both short and medium-term policy recommendations. Puerto Rico: A Child of the Postwar World It is perhaps quite difficult for people living in 2015 to imagine the state of the world at the end of Second World War. Europe was shattered, full of ruins from the coast of Normandy all the way to the outskirts of Moscow; Britain was exhausted after six years of war; Germany was literally split in four parts; France was still traumatized by the shame of Nazi occupation and the guilt of those who collaborated with it; Japan had just witnessed the nuclear obliteration of two of its most important commercial and industrial cities; China was in the midst of a civil war; and India was still part of the British Empire. -
EXHIBIT 9 Case 3:16-Cv-01893-JAG Document 2-10 Filed 05/10/16 Page 2 of 104
Case 3:16-cv-01893-JAG Document 2-10 Filed 05/10/16 Page 1 of 104 EXHIBIT 9 Case 3:16-cv-01893-JAG Document 2-10 Filed 05/10/16 Page 2 of 104 A UDITED F INANCIAL S TATEMENTS, R EQUIRED S UPPLEMENTARY I NFORMATION AND SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULES Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (A Component Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) Years Ended June 30, 2014 and 2013 With Report of Independent Auditors 1507-1576959 Case 3:16-cv-01893-JAG Document 2-10 Filed 05/10/16 Page 3 of 104 Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (A Component Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) Audited Financial Statements, Required Supplementary Information and Supplemental Schedules Years Ended June 30, 2014 and 2013 Contents Financial Statements: Report of Independent Auditors................................................................................................ 1 Management’s Discussion and Analysis .................................................................................. 4 Audited Financial Statements: Statements of Net Position ..................................................................................................... 24 Statements of Revenues, Expenses and Changes in Net Position ......................................... 26 Statements of Cash Flows ...................................................................................................... 27 Notes to Financial Statements ................................................................................................ 29 Required Supplementary Information: -
The Endgame: an Analysis of Puerto Rico's
The Endgame: An Analysis of Puerto Rico’s Debt Structure and Arguments in Favor of Enacting a Comprehensive Debt Restructuring Mechanism for Puerto Rico Sergio M. Marxuach Policy Director Center for a New Economy San Juan, PR Revised and Updated on April 2016 Introduction Puerto Rico currently faces two distinct, yet related, crises. The first, and most urgent, is the government’s fragile financial situation. The second is the chronic stagnation of the Puerto Rican economy over the last ten years. In this document we analyze Puerto Rico’s debt structure, which has been described by some analysts as “insanely convoluted” and is one of the principal causes of the island’s financial woes.1 In other words, this paper is an attempt to explain this complicated structure in a relatively simple manner. In addition, we analyze some of the consequences of a default on Puerto Rico’s debt and consider some of the principal arguments in favor of allowing Puerto Rico to avail itself of a comprehensive debt restructuring mechanism. Before we continue, however, it is important to note that many of the Constitutional and statutory provisions that govern Puerto Rico debt have not been tested in Puerto Rico Courts so we are, to a large extent, trying to map uncharted territory. Therefore, this paper is not intended, and should not be construed or interpreted, to provide a formal legal analysis of the issues set forth herein. It should be used only as an informal and unfortunately incomplete guide for the perplexed trying to understand Puerto Rico’s complicated financial structure. -
Rebuilding Surface, Maritime, and Air Transportation in Puerto Rico After Hurricanes Irma and Maria Supporting Documentation for the Puerto Rico Recovery Plan
Rebuilding Surface, Maritime, and Air Transportation in Puerto Rico After Hurricanes Irma and Maria Supporting Documentation for the Puerto Rico Recovery Plan LIISA ECOLA, AARON C. DAVENPORT, KENNETH KUHN, ALEXANDER D. ROTHENBERG, ERIC COOPER, MARK BARRETT, THOMAS F. ATKIN, JEFFREY KENDALL HS AC HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS CENTER An FFRDC operated by the RAND Corporation under contract with DHS RR2607_cover_v9.indd 1,3 9/8/20 2:30 PM Published in 2020 Preface On August 8, 2018, the government of Puerto Rico submitted to the U.S. Congress its economic and disaster recovery plan, as required by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. Under contract with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) provided substantial support in developing the plan by soliciting and integrating inputs from a wide variety of stakeholders, contributing analysis where needed, and supported drafting the plan. The plan included an overview of damage and needs, courses of action to meet those needs, estimated costs of the courses of action, and potential funding mechanisms for those costs. To support federal agencies evaluating and funding recovery actions, HSOAC is releasing this detailed volume for the transportation sector. The purpose of this document is to provide decisionmakers greater detail on the conditions in Puerto Rico prior to the 2017 hurricane season, damage from Hurricanes Irma and Maria, courses of action that were identified to help the sector (and, more broadly, Puerto Rico) recover in a resilient manner, potential funding mechanisms, and considerations for implementers as they move forward. This document will likely also be of interest to other stakeholders funding or implementing recovery activities, including government of Puerto Rico and local agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. -
Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority
NEW ISSUE - BOOK-ENTRY ONLY $1,499,910,000 Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority $800,000,000 Transportation Revenue Bonds (Series K) $598,285,000 Transportation Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series L) $101,625,000 Highway Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series BB) The Transportation Revenue Bonds (Series K) (the “Series K Bonds”) and the Transportation Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series L) (the “Series L Bonds”) are being issued by the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (the “Authority”) pursuant to Resolution No. 98-06 adopted by the Authority on February 26, 1998, as amended (the “1998 Resolution”), for the purpose of financing various highway projects and refunding certain of the Authority’s Transportation Revenue Bonds. The Highway Revenue Refunding Bonds (Series BB) (the “Series BB Bonds”) are being issued by the Authority pursuant to Resolution No. 68-18 adopted by the Authority on June 13, 1968, as amended (the “1968 Resolution”), for the purpose of refunding certain of the Authority’s Highway Revenue Bonds. The Series K Bonds, the Series L Bonds, the outstanding bonds of the Authority previously issued under the 1998 Resolution, and any additional bonds that the Authority may from time to time issue under the 1998 Resolution (collectively, the “Transportation Revenue Bonds”) are payable from, and are secured by, a pledge of certain revenues of the Authority, which include: (i) the total amount of excise taxes, up to $120 million per fiscal year, imposed by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”) on certain petroleum products; (ii) toll revenues of the Authority’s traffic facilities that were not financed with Highway Revenue Bonds; (iii) certain investment earnings; and (iv) the 1968 Resolution Revenues (as described below) available after payment of debt service on the Authority’s outstanding Highway Revenue Bonds (collectively, the “1998 Resolution Revenues”).