DOCSLIB.ORG

The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: in the Beginning There Was Pragmatism

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: in the Beginning There Was Pragmatism THE EARLY ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME: IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS PRAGMATISM SUSAN Low BLOCH* INTRODUCTION The Office of the Attorney General, created by the First Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 occupies a unique position in our tripartite government. Empowered by Congress, appointed by the President, and required to answer to the judiciary, the Attorney General serves "three masters' 2 and often faces a confluence of forces that produces difficult separation of powers issues. Responsible for representing the "interests of the United States,"' 3 the Attorney General may be pulled in conflicting directions if Congress and the President disagree on the nature of those interests. Occasionally, a frustrated or overwhelmed Attorney General has written an anecdotal article about the complexities of the office,4 but few * Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., Ph.D., M.A., University of Michigan; B.A., Smith College. I am very grateful to Professor Maeva Marcus, Director of the Documentary History Project of the Supreme Court, for her informative seminar that both alerted me to the Iredell papers and helped me immerse myself in the history of the 1790s. I am also indebted to Charlene Bickford, Director of the Documentary History of the First Congress, for her guidance and generous access to her valuable collection. Without these two invaluable, exciting documentary his- tories and their able leaders, this article could not have been written. I also want to thank my generous colleagues Richard Bloch, Daniel Ernst, Vicki Jackson, L. Michael Seidman, Girardeau Spann, and Mark Tushnet for their valuable help in reading earlier drafts and my research assistants Katherine Harrison, Samia Rodriguez, Jeffrey Eichen, Michael Heafey, and Keith Donahoe for their helpful research. Finally, I am grateful to the Georgetown University Law Center for its generous research grant. 1. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789) [hereinafter The Judiciary Act of 1789]. 2. Huston, History of the Office of the Attorney General, in L. HUSTON, A. MILLER, S. KRIS- LOV, & R. DIXON, ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1968). 3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 517, 518 (1982). 4. See, eg., F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 174-366 (1962) (memoirs of Francis Biddle, Attorney General from September 1941-June 1945); Bell, Office of Attorney General's Client Rela- tionship, 36 Bus. LAW. 791 (1981) (speech by Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General from January 1977 to December 1979); Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator,or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049 (1978) (Attorney General Bell offering some "tentative views" on the office's proper role in American system); Clark, Reminiscences of an Attorney General Turned Associate Justice, 6 Hous. L. REV. 623 (1969) (reminiscences of Tom C. Clark, Attorney General from 1945 to 1949); Stark, When the Government Goes to Court, Who DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:561 systematic analyses of this position have been attempted.5 On the eve of the two-hundredth birthday of the office, it is time to examine the com- plex separation of powers questions surrounding the office: What is the role of Congress in defining the duties of the Attorney General; to what extent can Congress control the Attorney General's decisions on litiga- tion strategy; to what extent must the President have unfettered control of the Attorney General and law enforcement generally? These issues are not new. Questions concerning authority over the Attorney General and law enforcement arose both in the First Congress's debates and in the Supreme Court's early encounters with the Attorney General. Unfortunately, however, modem efforts to answer these ques- tions make too little use of the history that can inform and guide. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court confronted questions that turned on an interpretation of the role of the Attorney General and, in both cases, the Court could have benefited from a better understanding of the historical background. In United States v. Providence Journal, the Supreme Court had to interpret the modern incarnation of section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.6 The majority approached the statute as if it had been writ- ten yesterday, wholly ignoring its origins and long history.7 Similarly, in Should Speak for Uncle Sam?, 12 NAT'L J. 1098, (1980) (conflict concerning litigation responsibili- ties of Justice Department and agencies not resolved); Tyler, The Attorney General of the United States-Counselto the Presidentor to the Government?, 45 ALB. L. Rav. 1 (1980); cf. Babcock, Role Can Be Ambiguous, Retiring Justice Aide Says, Wash. Star, June 29, 1979, at A3, col. I (Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division). 5. Former Attorney General Homer Cummings and Special Assistant Carl McFarland wrote the classic study of the office of the Attorney General, H. CUMMINGS & C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937). See also J. EASBY-SMITH, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS (19.04); D. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPART- MENT OF JUSTICE 3-18, 26-27, (1980); L. HUSTON, A. MILLER, S. KRISTov, R. DIXON, ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1968); Hightower, From "Attornatus" to the Department of Justice-an HistoricalPerspective of the Nature of the Attorney Generalship of the United States as Embodied in the Department of Justice Act of 1870, reprinted in Removing Politicsfrom the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sss. 405-20 (1974) (chronology of historical roots of Attor- ney Generalship in English precedent, colonial experience, Constitution, Judiciary Act of 1789, and the evolution from office to department 1789-1870); Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Govern- ment, 25 VA. L. REv. 165 (1938) (history of then-current reforms aiming at the most efficient method of handling government litigation-consolidation under Attorney General); Learned, The Attorney General and the Cabinet, 24 POL. SC. Q. 444 (1909) (historical development of Office of Attorney General); Nealon, The Opinion Function of the Federal Attorney General, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 825 (1950) (describing Attorney General's role as advising President and Executive Branch on legality and constitutionality of their actions); Comment, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive Branches: An Examination of the ConstitutionalBalance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney General, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 331 (1984) (legislative reform needed to prevent undue attachments of the Attorney General to the President and the Executive Branch). 6. 485 U.S. 693 (1088). 7. Having previously decided in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), that the judiciary could appoint private attorneys to prosecute criminal contempt of Vol. 1989:5611 HISTORY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 563 Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court faced the question of the constitu- tionality of Congress's creation of special prosecutors and the restrictions imposed thereby on the President's and Attorney General's control over law enforcement. 8 Again, the Court's analysis was too little informed by history.9 It is not that these early experiences would necessarily answer to- day's questions. Indeed, one of the most important contributions that a study of this history offers is precisely the point that, from the start of this Republic, these questions were present and their answers uncertain. Originalists who believe the answers to today's questions are to be found in the framers' intent and the words they chose are mistaken.'0 There are no clear lines now because there were none then. But while history cannot provide definitive answers, it offers an in- structive approach to constitutional interpretation. The framers of the Constitution and the early legislators understood they were creating- "constituting"-a dynamic organism. They created a unitary Presi- dency, but did not mandate complete presidential control over all admin- istrative offices that Congress might establish. Their approach to questions of control was neither rigid nor doctrinaire. On the contrary, it was remarkably subtle and pragmatic. The simplified model of separa- tion of powers assumed by many modern discussants misses the nuances the framers and early legislators appreciated. This Article attempts to accomplish two distinct but related objec- tives. First, it initiates the proposed systematic study of the Office of the Attorney General by examining its early role. Second, it explores how these early experiences help to answer today's questions. To those ends, Part I examines the establishment of the Office of the Attorney General. Studying the genesis of the office and contrasting it to the other signifi- cant offices created by the First Congress, such as the Secretaries of For- eign Affairs, War, and Treasury, reveals the priorities and concerns of court, the Supreme Court in Providence Journal had to explore the extent to which these special prosecutors could operate independently of the Attorney General. See infra notes 202-14 and ac- companying text. 8. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 9. See infra notes 244-75 and accompanying text. 10. While generalizations are inherently suspect, broadly speaking, one can say that the originalist school of constitutional interpretation views constitutional decisionmaking principally as a search for the original historical understanding of a particular constitutional clause. Non-original- ist thinkers tend to look to a much wider range of sources for such decisionmaking. For a small sample of the debate between the groups, compare R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969) and Berger, PaulBrest'sBrieffor an Imperial Judiciary,40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981), with Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court Justice White and the Exercise of Judicial Power
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2003 Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court Justice White and the Exercise of Judicial Power Dennis J. Hutchinson Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Dennis J. Hutchinson, "Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court Justice White and the Exercise of Judicial Power," 74 University of Colorado Law Review 1409 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TWO CHEERS FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINT: JUSTICE WHITE AND THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON* The death of a Supreme Court Justice prompts an account- ing of his legacy. Although Byron R. White was both widely admired and deeply reviled during his thirty-one-year career on the Supreme Court of the United States, his death almost a year ago inspired a remarkable reconciliation among many of his critics, and many sounded an identical theme: Justice White was a model of judicial restraint-the judge who knew his place in the constitutional scheme of things, a jurist who fa- cilitated, and was reluctant to override, the policy judgments made by democratically accountable branches of government. The editorial page of the Washington Post, a frequent critic during his lifetime, made peace post-mortem and celebrated his vision of judicial restraint.' Stuart Taylor, another frequent critic, celebrated White as the "last true believer in judicial re- straint."2 Judge David M.
    [Show full text]
  • Edward Douglas White: Frame for a Portrait Paul R
    Louisiana Law Review Volume 43 | Number 4 Symposium: Maritime Personal Injury March 1983 Edward Douglas White: Frame for a Portrait Paul R. Baier Louisiana State University Law Center Repository Citation Paul R. Baier, Edward Douglas White: Frame for a Portrait, 43 La. L. Rev. (1983) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol43/iss4/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. V ( TI DEDICATION OF PORTRAIT EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE: FRAME FOR A PORTRAIT* Oration at the unveiling of the Rosenthal portrait of E. D. White, before the Louisiana Supreme Court, October 29, 1982. Paul R. Baier** Royal Street fluttered with flags, we are told, when they unveiled the statue of Edward Douglass White, in the heart of old New Orleans, in 1926. Confederate Veterans, still wearing the gray of '61, stood about the scaffolding. Above them rose Mr. Baker's great bronze statue of E. D. White, heroic in size, draped in the national flag. Somewhere in the crowd a band played old Southern airs, soft and sweet in the April sunshine. It was an impressive occasion, reported The Times-Picayune1 notable because so many venerable men and women had gathered to pay tribute to a man whose career brings honor to Louisiana and to the nation. Fifty years separate us from that occasion, sixty from White's death.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Court Database Code Book Brick 2018 02
    The Supreme Court Database Codebook Supreme Court Database Code Book brick_2018_02 CONTRIBUTORS Harold Spaeth Michigan State University College of Law Lee Epstein Washington University in Saint Louis Ted Ruger University of Pennsylvania School of Law Sarah C. Benesh University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee Department of Political Science Jeffrey Segal Stony Brook University Department of Political Science Andrew D. Martin University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts Document Crafted On October 17, 2018 @ 11:53 1 of 128 10/17/18, 11:58 AM The Supreme Court Database Codebook Table of Contents INTRODUCTORY 1 Introduction 2 Citing to the SCDB IDENTIFICATION VARIABLES 3 SCDB Case ID 4 SCDB Docket ID 5 SCDB Issues ID 6 SCDB Vote ID 7 U.S. Reporter Citation 8 Supreme Court Citation 9 Lawyers Edition Citation 10 LEXIS Citation 11 Docket Number BACKGROUND VARIABLES 12 Case Name 13 Petitioner 14 Petitioner State 15 Respondent 16 Respondent State 17 Manner in which the Court takes Jurisdiction 18 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation 19 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation State 20 Three-Judge District Court 21 Origin of Case 22 Origin of Case State 23 Source of Case 24 Source of Case State 2 of 128 10/17/18, 11:58 AM The Supreme Court Database Codebook 25 Lower Court Disagreement 26 Reason for Granting Cert 27 Lower Court Disposition 28 Lower Court Disposition Direction CHRONOLOGICAL VARIABLES 29 Date of Decision 30 Term of Court 31 Natural Court 32 Chief Justice 33 Date of Oral Argument 34 Date of Reargument SUBSTANTIVE
    [Show full text]
  • Fedresourcestutorial.Pdf
    Guide to Federal Research Resources at Westminster Law Library (WLL) Revised 08/31/2011 A. United States Code – Level 3 KF62 2000.A2: The United States Code (USC) is the official compilation of federal statutes published by the Government Printing Office. It is arranged by subject into fifty chapters, or titles. The USC is republished every six years and includes yearly updates (separately bound supplements). It is the preferred resource for citing statutes in court documents and law review articles. Each statute entry is followed by its legislative history, including when it was enacted and amended. In addition to the tables of contents and chapters at the front of each volume, use the General Indexes and the Tables volumes that follow Title 50 to locate statutes on a particular topic. Relevant libguide: Federal Statutes. • Click and review Publication of Federal Statutes, Finding Statutes, and Updating Statutory Research tabs. B. United States Code Annotated - Level 3 KF62.5 .W45: Like the USC, West’s United States Code Annotated (USCA) is a compilation of federal statutes. It also includes indexes and table volumes at the end of the set to assist navigation. The USCA is updated more frequently than the USC, with smaller, integrated supplement volumes and, most importantly, pocket parts at the back of each book. Always check the pocket part for updates. The USCA is useful for research because the annotations include historical notes and cross-references to cases, regulations, law reviews and other secondary sources. LexisNexis has a similar set of annotated statutes titled “United States Code Service” (USCS), which Westminster Law Library does not own in print.
    [Show full text]
  • History of the U.S. Attorneys
    Bicentennial Celebration of the United States Attorneys 1789 - 1989 "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor– indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." QUOTED FROM STATEMENT OF MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, BERGER V. UNITED STATES, 295 U. S. 88 (1935) Note: The information in this document was compiled from historical records maintained by the Offices of the United States Attorneys and by the Department of Justice. Every effort has been made to prepare accurate information. In some instances, this document mentions officials without the “United States Attorney” title, who nevertheless served under federal appointment to enforce the laws of the United States in federal territories prior to statehood and the creation of a federal judicial district. INTRODUCTION In this, the Bicentennial Year of the United States Constitution, the people of America find cause to celebrate the principles formulated at the inception of the nation Alexis de Tocqueville called, “The Great Experiment.” The experiment has worked, and the survival of the Constitution is proof of that.
    [Show full text]
  • 19-783 Van Buren V. United States (06/03/2021)
    (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 19–783. Argued November 30, 2020—Decided June 3, 2021 Former Georgia police sergeant Nathan Van Buren used his patrol-car computer to access a law enforcement database to retrieve information about a particular license plate number in exchange for money. Alt- hough Van Buren used his own, valid credentials to perform the search, his conduct violated a department policy against obtaining da- tabase information for non-law-enforcement purposes. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, his actions were part of a Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion sting operation. Van Buren was charged with a felony violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which subjects to criminal liability anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access.” 18 U. S. C. §1030(a)(2). The term “exceeds authorized access” is defined to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to ob- tain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not enti- tled so to obtain or alter.” §1030(e)(6).
    [Show full text]
  • The Supreme Court Database Codebook
    The Supreme Court Database Codebook Supreme Court Database Code Book brick_2020_01 CONTRIBUTORS Harold Spaeth Michigan State University College of Law Lee Epstein Washington University in Saint Louis Ted Ruger University of Pennsylvania School of Law Sarah C. Benesh University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee Department of Political Science Jeffrey Segal Stony Brook University Department of Political Science Andrew D. Martin University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts Document Crafted On September 21, 2020 @ 01:42 1 of 128 The Supreme Court Database Codebook Table of Contents INTRODUCTORY 1 Introduction 2 Citing to the SCDB IDENTIFICATION VARIABLES 3 SCDB Case ID 4 SCDB Docket ID 5 SCDB Issues ID 6 SCDB Vote ID 7 U.S. Reporter Citation 8 Supreme Court Citation 9 Lawyers Edition Citation 10 LEXIS Citation 11 Docket Number BACKGROUND VARIABLES 12 Case Name 13 Petitioner 14 Petitioner State 15 Respondent 16 Respondent State 17 Manner in which the Court takes Jurisdiction 18 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation 19 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation State 20 Three-Judge District Court 21 Origin of Case 22 Origin of Case State 23 Source of Case 24 Source of Case State 2 of 128 The Supreme Court Database Codebook 25 Lower Court Disagreement 26 Reason for Granting Cert 27 Lower Court Disposition 28 Lower Court Disposition Direction CHRONOLOGICAL VARIABLES 29 Date of Decision 30 Term of Court 31 Natural Court 32 Chief Justice 33 Date of Oral Argument 34 Date of Reargument SUBSTANTIVE VARIABLES 35 Issue 36 Issue Area
    [Show full text]
  • H. Doc. 108-222
    34 Biographical Directory DELEGATES IN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS CONNECTICUT Dates of Attendance Andrew Adams............................ 1778 Benjamin Huntington................ 1780, Joseph Spencer ........................... 1779 Joseph P. Cooke ............... 1784–1785, 1782–1783, 1788 Jonathan Sturges........................ 1786 1787–1788 Samuel Huntington ................... 1776, James Wadsworth....................... 1784 Silas Deane ....................... 1774–1776 1778–1781, 1783 Jeremiah Wadsworth.................. 1788 Eliphalet Dyer.................. 1774–1779, William S. Johnson........... 1785–1787 William Williams .............. 1776–1777 1782–1783 Richard Law............ 1777, 1781–1782 Oliver Wolcott .................. 1776–1778, Pierpont Edwards ....................... 1788 Stephen M. Mitchell ......... 1785–1788 1780–1783 Oliver Ellsworth................ 1778–1783 Jesse Root.......................... 1778–1782 Titus Hosmer .............................. 1778 Roger Sherman ....... 1774–1781, 1784 Delegates Who Did Not Attend and Dates of Election John Canfield .............................. 1786 William Hillhouse............. 1783, 1785 Joseph Trumbull......................... 1774 Charles C. Chandler................... 1784 William Pitkin............................. 1784 Erastus Wolcott ...... 1774, 1787, 1788 John Chester..................... 1787, 1788 Jedediah Strong...... 1782, 1783, 1784 James Hillhouse ............... 1786, 1788 John Treadwell ....... 1784, 1785, 1787 DELAWARE Dates of Attendance Gunning Bedford,
    [Show full text]
  • Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law*
    The Yale Law Journal Volume 88, Number 7, June 1979 Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law* John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.t and Paul B. Stephan IIT TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1325 I. Burden of Proof as an Exclusively Procedural Concern 1328 A. The Constitutionalizationof Burden of Proof and the Inadequacies of Formalism 1328 B. The ProceduralInterpretation of In re Winship 1333 C. The Rise and Fall of Mullaney v. Wilbur 1338 D. Flaws in the ProceduralApproach 1344 1. A Theoretical Critique 1344 2. A PracticalEvaluation 1353 II. Substantive Justice 1356 A. Substantive Justice and the Limits of Procedure 1357 B. Burden of Proof and Substantive Justice 1359 * This article is an elaboration of views first stated in Low & Jeffries, DICTA: Con- stitutionalizing the Criminal Law? Va. L. Weekly, Mar. 25, 1977, at 1. The authors would like to thank Thomas F. Bergin, Richard J. Bonnie, Ronald A. Cass, Thomas H. Jackson, Jerry L. Mashaw, Harvey S. Perlman, Stephen A. Saltzburg, and Peter Westen for their criticisms and comments. Thanks are also due to Jonathan Koch, Barbara Schilberg, and Douglas Sullivan for research assistance and to Andrew Brumby for preparation of the appendix. Most especially, the authors acknowledge their continuing intellectual indebted- ness to Peter W. Low. Without his guidance and encouragement, this piece would not have been done. t Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Virginia. $ J.D. 1977, the University of Virginia School of Law. 1325 The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1325, 1979 III. A Constitutional Basis for the Scope of Winship 1365 A.
    [Show full text]
  • The North Carolina Historical Review
    The North Carolina Historical Review Volume XII July, 1935 Number 3 THE FIRST BOUNDARY SURVEY BETWEEN THE CAROLINAS Marvin Lucian Skaggs Controversies with regard to boundary limits have character- ized the relations of the political units within the territory of the United States from their beginnings. These controversies have not only been the subject of negotiations between the units con- cerned, but have often become so acrimonious as vitally to affect their peaceful relations and even permanently to color their his- tory and shape their destinies. Such issues as security of terri- tory, State's rights, peace and war, economic welfare, right of settlement, national politics, international relations, and even the existence of the Union, have been at stake. Statesmen and schol- ars have not failed to point out their great significance. ^ The dispute between the Carolinas was one of the oldest and the most lengthy of all of these boundary controversies, and in- volved elements unique in their nature and character. The northern section of the original province was settled by an im- migration to a great degree alien in origin and race to that of the southern section, and remained so throughout the period of their boundary bickerings. Physical, economic, and social con- ditions played a great part in maintaining the ever-widening dif- ferences between the two sections, while an ungenerous attitude of superiority on the part of South Carolina tended to alienate the good will of North Carolina. This controversy, therefore, involved more than the mere use of surveyors' instruments and 1 See, for example, Journals of the Continental Congress, April 15, 1776 ; quotations from John Jay and others in Allen Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775-1789 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), pp.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Court of Ohio Writing Manual Is the First Comprehensive Guide to Judicial Opinion Writing Published by the Court for Its Use
    T S C of O WRITING MANUAL A Guide to Citations, Style, and Judicial Opinion Writing effective july 1, 2013 second edition Published for the Supreme Court of Ohio WRITING MANUAL A Guide to Citations, Style, and Judicial Opinion Writing MAUREEN O’CONNOR Chief Justice SHARON L. KENNEDY PATRICK F. FISCHER R. PATRICK DeWINE MICHAEL P. DONNELLY MELODY J. STEWART JENNIFER BRUNNER Justices STEPHANIE E. HESS Interim administrative Director The Supreme Court of Ohio Style Manual Committee HON. JUDITH ANN LANZINGER JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Chair HON. TERRENCE O’DONNELL JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO HON. JUDITH L. FRENCH JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO STEVEN C. HOLLON ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO ARTHUR J. MARZIALE JR., Retired July 31, 2012 DIRECTOR OF LEGAL RESOURCES, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO SANDRA H. GROSKO REPORTER OF DECISIONS, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO RALPH W. PRESTON, Retired July 31, 2011 REPORTER OF DECISIONS, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO MARY BETH BEAZLEY ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW AND DIRECTOR OF LEGAL WRITING, MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY C. MICHAEL WALSH ADMINISTRATOR, NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT The committee wishes to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable contributions of editor Pam Wynsen of the Reporter’s Office, as well as the excellent formatting assistance of John VanNorman, Policy and Research Counsel to the Administrative Director. TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE...........................................................................................................................ix
    [Show full text]
  • THE UNITED STATES COURTS of APPEALS DATA BASE DOCUMENTATION for PHASE 1 a Multi User Data Base Created by a Grant from the Natio
    THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DATA BASE DOCUMENTATION for PHASE 1 A Multi User Data Base Created by a Grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-8912678) Principal Investigator: Donald R. Songer Professor of Political Science University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 29208 email: Dsonger @ sc.edu Table of Contents General Introduction................................... 3 Files Distributed...................................... 7 Sampling & Weighting................................... 8 Reliability Analysis................................... 9 Variable list.......................................... 10 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES Basic Case Characteristics General Description.......................... 17 History & Nature of Case..................... 21 Participants Appellants................................... 32 Respondents.................................. 58 Other Participants........................... 66 Issue Coding Basic Nature of Issues & Decision............ 68 Provisions Cited in Headnotes................ 95 Threshhold Issues............................102 Criminal Issues..............................109 Civil Law Issues.............................118 Civil Government & Administrative Law........127 Diversity Issues.............................134 Judges and Votes..................................135 Appendix 1: Alphabetical List of Variables.............147 Appendix 2: Variable List in Input Order...............152 Appendix 3: List of Appeals Court Judge Codes..........158 Appendix 4: List of District Court Judge Codes.........173
    [Show full text]