Edward Douglas White: Frame for a Portrait Paul R
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court Justice White and the Exercise of Judicial Power
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2003 Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court Justice White and the Exercise of Judicial Power Dennis J. Hutchinson Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Dennis J. Hutchinson, "Two Cheers for Judicial Restraint: Justice White and the Role of the Supreme Court Justice White and the Exercise of Judicial Power," 74 University of Colorado Law Review 1409 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TWO CHEERS FOR JUDICIAL RESTRAINT: JUSTICE WHITE AND THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON* The death of a Supreme Court Justice prompts an account- ing of his legacy. Although Byron R. White was both widely admired and deeply reviled during his thirty-one-year career on the Supreme Court of the United States, his death almost a year ago inspired a remarkable reconciliation among many of his critics, and many sounded an identical theme: Justice White was a model of judicial restraint-the judge who knew his place in the constitutional scheme of things, a jurist who fa- cilitated, and was reluctant to override, the policy judgments made by democratically accountable branches of government. The editorial page of the Washington Post, a frequent critic during his lifetime, made peace post-mortem and celebrated his vision of judicial restraint.' Stuart Taylor, another frequent critic, celebrated White as the "last true believer in judicial re- straint."2 Judge David M. -
President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court Bill of 1937
President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court bill of 1937 Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Hoffman, Ralph Nicholas, 1930- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 26/09/2021 09:02:55 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/319079 PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE SUPREME COURT BILL OF 1937 by Ralph Nicholas Hoffman, Jr. A Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Department of History and Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Graduate College, University of Arizona 1954 This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the Library to be made avail able to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without spec ial permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the dean of the Graduate College when in their judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other in stances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED: TABLE.' OF.GOWTENTS Chapter / . Page Ic PHEYIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE JODlClMXo , V . -
The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility
Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 28 Number 2 Symposium on Civility and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: Professionalism in the pp.583-646 Practice of Law Symposium on Civility and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s: Professionalism in the Practice of Law The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Edward McGlynn Gaffney Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 583 (1994). Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss2/5 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at [email protected]. Gaffney: The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility THE IMPORTANCE OF DISSENT AND THE IMPERATIVE OF JUDICIAL CIVILITY EDWARD McGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR.* A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the errorinto which the dissentingjudge believes the court to have been betrayed... Independence does not mean cantankerousness and ajudge may be a strongjudge without being an impossibleperson. Nothing is more distressing on any bench than the exhibition of a captious, impatient, querulous spirit.' Charles Evans Hughes I. INTRODUCTION Charles Evans Hughes served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1910 to 1916 and as Chief Justice of the United States from 1930 to 1941. -
Supreme Court Database Code Book Brick 2018 02
The Supreme Court Database Codebook Supreme Court Database Code Book brick_2018_02 CONTRIBUTORS Harold Spaeth Michigan State University College of Law Lee Epstein Washington University in Saint Louis Ted Ruger University of Pennsylvania School of Law Sarah C. Benesh University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee Department of Political Science Jeffrey Segal Stony Brook University Department of Political Science Andrew D. Martin University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts Document Crafted On October 17, 2018 @ 11:53 1 of 128 10/17/18, 11:58 AM The Supreme Court Database Codebook Table of Contents INTRODUCTORY 1 Introduction 2 Citing to the SCDB IDENTIFICATION VARIABLES 3 SCDB Case ID 4 SCDB Docket ID 5 SCDB Issues ID 6 SCDB Vote ID 7 U.S. Reporter Citation 8 Supreme Court Citation 9 Lawyers Edition Citation 10 LEXIS Citation 11 Docket Number BACKGROUND VARIABLES 12 Case Name 13 Petitioner 14 Petitioner State 15 Respondent 16 Respondent State 17 Manner in which the Court takes Jurisdiction 18 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation 19 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation State 20 Three-Judge District Court 21 Origin of Case 22 Origin of Case State 23 Source of Case 24 Source of Case State 2 of 128 10/17/18, 11:58 AM The Supreme Court Database Codebook 25 Lower Court Disagreement 26 Reason for Granting Cert 27 Lower Court Disposition 28 Lower Court Disposition Direction CHRONOLOGICAL VARIABLES 29 Date of Decision 30 Term of Court 31 Natural Court 32 Chief Justice 33 Date of Oral Argument 34 Date of Reargument SUBSTANTIVE -
Fedresourcestutorial.Pdf
Guide to Federal Research Resources at Westminster Law Library (WLL) Revised 08/31/2011 A. United States Code – Level 3 KF62 2000.A2: The United States Code (USC) is the official compilation of federal statutes published by the Government Printing Office. It is arranged by subject into fifty chapters, or titles. The USC is republished every six years and includes yearly updates (separately bound supplements). It is the preferred resource for citing statutes in court documents and law review articles. Each statute entry is followed by its legislative history, including when it was enacted and amended. In addition to the tables of contents and chapters at the front of each volume, use the General Indexes and the Tables volumes that follow Title 50 to locate statutes on a particular topic. Relevant libguide: Federal Statutes. • Click and review Publication of Federal Statutes, Finding Statutes, and Updating Statutory Research tabs. B. United States Code Annotated - Level 3 KF62.5 .W45: Like the USC, West’s United States Code Annotated (USCA) is a compilation of federal statutes. It also includes indexes and table volumes at the end of the set to assist navigation. The USCA is updated more frequently than the USC, with smaller, integrated supplement volumes and, most importantly, pocket parts at the back of each book. Always check the pocket part for updates. The USCA is useful for research because the annotations include historical notes and cross-references to cases, regulations, law reviews and other secondary sources. LexisNexis has a similar set of annotated statutes titled “United States Code Service” (USCS), which Westminster Law Library does not own in print. -
Journal of Supreme Court History
Journal of Supreme Court History THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY THURGOOD MARSHALL Associate Justice (1967-1991) Journal of Supreme Court History PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. Chairman Donald B. Ayer Louis R. Cohen Charles Cooper Kenneth S. Geller James J. Kilpatrick Melvin I. Urofsky BOARD OF EDITORS Melvin I. Urofsky, Chairman Herman Belz Craig Joyce David O'Brien David J. Bodenhamer Laura Kalman Michael Parrish Kermit Hall Maeva Marcus Philippa Strum MANAGING EDITOR Clare Cushman CONSULTING EDITORS Kathleen Shurtleff Patricia R. Evans James J. Kilpatrick Jennifer M. Lowe David T. Pride Supreme Court Historical Society Board of Trustees Honorary Chairman William H. Rehnquist Honorary Trustees Harry A. Blackmun Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Byron R. White Chairman President DwightD.Opperman Leon Silverman Vice Presidents VincentC. Burke,Jr. Frank C. Jones E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. Secretary Treasurer Virginia Warren Daly Sheldon S. Cohen Trustees George Adams Frank B. Gilbert Stephen W. Nealon HennanBelz Dorothy Tapper Goldman Gordon O. Pehrson Barbara A. Black John D. Gordan III Leon Polsky Hugo L. Black, J r. William T. Gossett Charles B. Renfrew Vera Brown Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. William Bradford Reynolds Wade Burger Judith Richards Hope John R. Risher, Jr. Patricia Dwinnell Butler William E. Jackson Harvey Rishikof Andrew M. Coats Rob M. Jones William P. Rogers William T. Coleman,1r. James 1. Kilpatrick Jonathan C. Rose F. Elwood Davis Peter A. Knowles Jerold S. Solovy George Didden IIJ Harvey C. Koch Kenneth Starr Charlton Dietz Jerome B. Libin Cathleen Douglas Stone John T. Dolan Maureen F. Mahoney Agnes N. Williams James Duff Howard T. -
Master Pages
Master Pages 15 • Be Careful With My Court Legitimacy, Public Opinion, and the Chief Justices SHAWN C. FETTIG AND SARA C. BENESH On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in National Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services et al., upholding the Affordable Care Act by a vote of 5-4. Chief Justice John Roberts read his majority opinion. Almost immediately, political scientists and pundits alike began dissecting the opinion and the reason for Chief Justice Roberts’s vote. Public approval of the Court, as noted by the media, was at its lowest levels ever as the Court prepared to hear the case.1 Many argued that the Court’s legitimacy weighed heavily on Roberts as he considered the case, with CBS News reporting that Roberts, as chief justice, “is keenly aware of his leadership role on the court, and he also is sensitive to how the court is perceived by the public.”2 “To be sure,” wrote New York Times reporter Adam Liptak, “the chief justice considers himself the custodian of the Supreme Court’s prestige, authority, and le- gitimacy, and he is often its voice in major cases.”3 He reprised the role in King v. Burwell, the 6- 3 decision announced almost exactly one year later upholding the subsidies associated with the health care exchanges.4 There, Rosen argued, the chief used the case’s reason to confer legitimacy. Judicial restraint, Rosen suggests, drove the chief’s decision, for “In a polarized age, it is important for the Supreme Court to maintain its institutional legiti- macy by deferring to the political branches.”5 We know that the Court is influenced by public opinion and the Court’s decisions are often in line with it.6 We also know that judicial legitimacy is fairly widespread and relatively stable,7 and that it is drawn from diffuse 374 Ward.indd 374 2/12/2016 2:30:33 PM Master Pages Be Careful With My Court • 375 support, a “reservoir of good will,”8 that is resilient and resistant to signifi- cant fluctuation. -
The Hughes Court Docket Books: the Late Terms, 1937–1940, 55 Am
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Journal Articles Publications 2015 The uH ghes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937–1940 Barry Cushman Notre Dame Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937–1940, 55 Am. J. Legal Hist. 361 (2015). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1300 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 1937-1940 by BARRY CUSHMAN* ABSTRACT For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the justices of the Hughes Court have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. Recently, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers the first-ever examination of the available docket book entries relevant to what scholars commonly regard as the major decisions of rendered during the late years of the Hughes Court, from the 1937 through the 1940 Terms. The decisions examined concern the Commerce Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause, substantive due process, equal protection, the general law, anti- trust, labor relations, intergovernmental tax immunities, criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil liberties. -
19-783 Van Buren V. United States (06/03/2021)
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2020 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 19–783. Argued November 30, 2020—Decided June 3, 2021 Former Georgia police sergeant Nathan Van Buren used his patrol-car computer to access a law enforcement database to retrieve information about a particular license plate number in exchange for money. Alt- hough Van Buren used his own, valid credentials to perform the search, his conduct violated a department policy against obtaining da- tabase information for non-law-enforcement purposes. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, his actions were part of a Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion sting operation. Van Buren was charged with a felony violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which subjects to criminal liability anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access.” 18 U. S. C. §1030(a)(2). The term “exceeds authorized access” is defined to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to ob- tain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not enti- tled so to obtain or alter.” §1030(e)(6). -
The Supreme Court Database Codebook
The Supreme Court Database Codebook Supreme Court Database Code Book brick_2020_01 CONTRIBUTORS Harold Spaeth Michigan State University College of Law Lee Epstein Washington University in Saint Louis Ted Ruger University of Pennsylvania School of Law Sarah C. Benesh University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee Department of Political Science Jeffrey Segal Stony Brook University Department of Political Science Andrew D. Martin University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts Document Crafted On September 21, 2020 @ 01:42 1 of 128 The Supreme Court Database Codebook Table of Contents INTRODUCTORY 1 Introduction 2 Citing to the SCDB IDENTIFICATION VARIABLES 3 SCDB Case ID 4 SCDB Docket ID 5 SCDB Issues ID 6 SCDB Vote ID 7 U.S. Reporter Citation 8 Supreme Court Citation 9 Lawyers Edition Citation 10 LEXIS Citation 11 Docket Number BACKGROUND VARIABLES 12 Case Name 13 Petitioner 14 Petitioner State 15 Respondent 16 Respondent State 17 Manner in which the Court takes Jurisdiction 18 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation 19 Administrative Action Preceeding Litigation State 20 Three-Judge District Court 21 Origin of Case 22 Origin of Case State 23 Source of Case 24 Source of Case State 2 of 128 The Supreme Court Database Codebook 25 Lower Court Disagreement 26 Reason for Granting Cert 27 Lower Court Disposition 28 Lower Court Disposition Direction CHRONOLOGICAL VARIABLES 29 Date of Decision 30 Term of Court 31 Natural Court 32 Chief Justice 33 Date of Oral Argument 34 Date of Reargument SUBSTANTIVE VARIABLES 35 Issue 36 Issue Area -
The Supreme Court Opinion As Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court
The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court Robert Postt In 1921, when William Howard Taft became Chief Justice, the Supreme Court did not occupy the serene and imposing marble building that has since become its contemporary icon.1 Its courtroom was instead located in the old Senate Chamber, whose intimate, elegant surroundings echoed with the debates of Webster, Clay, and Calhoun.2 Its administrative staff and offices were scattered haphazardly and inefficiently throughout the Capitol.3 It was Taft who, with great skill and patience, t I am very grateful for the advice and insight of friends and colleagues. I would particularly like to thank Paul Carrington, Jesse Choper, Meir Dan- Cohen, Mel Eisenberg, Dan Farber, Phil Frickey, Barry Friedman, Howard Gillman, Jim Gordley, Morton Horowitz, Laura Kalman, Robert Kagan, Larry Kramer, David Lieberman, Sandy Levinson, David and Miranda McGowan, Paul Mishkin, William Nelson, Judith Resnik, Dan Rubinfeld, Reva Siegel, and Mark Tushnet. I am especially grateful for the stalwart and heroic efforts of Linda Lye, Cathy Shuck, and Sambhav Nott Sankar. Copyright 2001 by Robert Post. Many of the materials cited and quoted herein are archival and on file with the author. The Minnesota Law Review was thus unable to independ- ently verify this authority. Unless otherwise noted, figures are based on the independent research of the author or annual reports of the Attorney General of the United States. 1. Writing in 1984, Margaret P. Lord noted that to the Justices who first moved into the contemporary Supreme Court building in 1935, "the spaces were too huge, the corridors were too long and cold, the rooms too formal." Margaret P. -
Remarks of the Chief Justice: My Life in the Law Series
REHNQUIST IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/31/03 2:14 PM Lecture REMARKS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE: MY LIFE IN THE LAW SERIES WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST† INTRODUCTION This afternoon I shall speak about my predecessors as Chief Jus- tice, except for Chief Justice Warren Burger, with whom I served. I am the sixteenth Chief Justice, and certainly one noteworthy fact is that in the 213 years of our country’s existence, while there have been forty-three Presidents, there have been only sixteen Chief Justices. I am going to go in chronological order, starting with John Jay, who was the first Chief Justice, and ending with the fourteenth Chief Jus- tice, Earl Warren. But I shall pass quickly over the first three who held this office, because they really had little or no influence on the institution, and they sat at a time when the Supreme Court was far different from what it is today. During the first ten years of its exis- tence, the Court decided only a total of sixty cases—that is not sixty cases per year, but six cases per year. There was so little business that the Justices sat in Washington for only a few weeks during February and early March, spending the rest of their time riding circuit as trial judges. It was only with the arrival of John Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice, that the Court acquired its co-equal status—along with Con- gress and the President—in our tripartite system of federal govern- ment. Copyright © 2003 by William H. Rehnquist. † Chief Justice of the United States.