Norwegian Defence 2006 Contents

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Norwegian Defence 2006 Contents Norwegian Defence 2006 Contents Norwegian security and defence policy 3 NATO 5 Division of responsibility for defence in Norway 7 The Ministry of Defence 8 Personnel and education 9 The Armed Forces’ military organisation 10 National Service 11 The concept of total defence 12 Civil protection 13 Operations abroad 14 The Armed Forces in Norway 15 The Royal Norwegian Army 16 The Royal Norwegian Navy 17 The Royal Norwegian Airforce 18 The Home Guard 19 Non-governmental organisations 20 Addresses 22 Ranks and insignia 23 Norwegian security and defence policy The framework parameters against which Norway’s security • to uphold Norwegian sovereignty, policy is formulated are changing. The decade that has Norwegian rights and interests, and elapsed since the end of the Cold War can be regarded as a protect Norwegian freedom of action in the face of political, military and other transitional phase, which has now passed. kinds of pressure; • to defend together with our Allies Norway and NATO against assault and attack; Security Policy Objectives • to protect society against assault and A comprehensive and quantifiably attack, by state and non-state actors. real threat has been replaced by uncertainty and unpredictability. The same Defence policy objectives applies to Norway’s neighbouring areas The contribution made by Norway’s defence where the inherent strategic importance of organisation to the achievement of the national the northern region, and the need to security policy objectives set out above, will administer and safeguard natural resources depend on its ability to meet its more specific extending over vast sea areas, are key factors defence policy objectives. The Armed Forces, as in our security and defence policy. an instrument of policy, must be able to: Norway has now, as have many other • alone and together with Allies secure Norwegian nations worldwide, entered an epoch which sovereignty, safeguard Norwegian rights and could be termed the global age. interests as well as ensuring Norwegian freedom of Geographical borders no longer afford the action in the face of military or other pressure; same degree of protection against a broad spectrum of security threats and challenges. • together with Allies, through participation in We must therefore take steps to ensure our multinational peace operations and international security in this new instable and defence cooperation, contribute to peace, stability, unpredictable environment. Faced with the enforcement of international law and respect these challenges, it is important that Norway, • to prevent war and the emergence of for human rights, and to prevent the use of force by together with its allies and partners, various kinds of threats to Norwegian and state and non-state actors against Norway and contributes to the prevention and limitation collective security; NATO. of crises, armed conflicts and war. The • to contribute to peace, stability and the fundamental objectives of Norwegian further development of the international security policy for the period 2005-2008 are: rule of law; 3 • together with Allies, contribute to the collective defence of Norway and other Allies in accordance with our Alliance commitments and to meet different kinds of assaults or attacks with force in order to safeguard Nowegian and collective security; • contribute to safeguarding the security of Norwegian society, save lives, and limit the consequences of accidents, disasters, assaults and attacks by state and non- state actors. National tasks The Defence Concept • to ensure a national basis for decision- The Defence Concept provides a concise but making through timely surveillance comprehensive description of the most and intelligence gathering; central principles that form the basis for the • to exercise Norwegian sovereignty; future development and activities of the NAF. • to exercise Norwegian authority in defined areas; • to prevent and manage security-related incidents and crises in Norway and in The Norwegian Armed Forces are to areas under Norwegian jurisdiction. be developed as a modern, flexible and Alliance-adapted instrument of Tasks to be carried out in cooperation with Allies, and possibly others security policy, with a balance being • to contribute to the collective defence of sought between the NAF´s tasks, Norway and other parts of NATO against organisational structure and funding. threats, assault and attacks, including the use of weapons of mass destruction; The NAF´s activities are to be based • to contribute to multinational crisis on close cooperation with relevant management, including multilateral civil authorities and on military Defence tasks peace operations. By successfully handling their tasks the conscription adapted to the needs of Norwegian Armed Forces will fulfil the Other tasks the NAF. Focus will be on securing and defence policy objectives. The NAF´s tasks are • to provide military support to diplomacy promoting Norwegian interests divided into a) national tasks, b) tasks that are and to prevent the proliferation of through the ability to handle a broad carried out in cooperation with Allies and weapons of mass destruction; possibly others and c) other tasks. • to contribute towards safeguarding the range of challenges, both nationally security of society and other vital tasks. and internationally. 4 The UN NATO The United Nations plays a key The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance role in Norwegian security between 26 North American and European countries dedicated to policy. fulfil the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949. Our security is closely linked to the The following countries are now existence of well-functioning arrangements members of NATO: Belgium, for security cooperation on a global level. Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech The altered picture of risks and threats, in Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Ger- which geography plays a reduced role and many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, threats are global, reinforces this point. It is Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, in Norway´s interest that international Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, security challenges are resolved through Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom broad consensus, based on the principles of and the United States of America. the UN Charter and in line with internatio- nal law. Within the overall framework of the UN, NATO remains the cornerstone of Norwe- The UN itself does not have the sufficient gian security and defence policy. resources to conduct all the peace support NATO´s geographical focus is the Euro- operations required to safeguard interna- Atlantic area and the Alliance actively works tional peace and security, and therefore to promote security and stability prefers that regional organisations assume throughout this entire area. The main focus an active responsibility on its behalf. is prevention, containment and resolution of Through such a division of labour, regional regional crises and conflicts that may organisations like NATO, the EU and the AU escalate and threaten the security of may help the UN and thereby strengthen member countries. However, the fact that the UN´s role and capacity. Operations led the new security challenges have a global by the UN and operations carried out with a reach also affects NATO cooperation. NATO´s UN mandate, both support the UN´s work collective security guarantee where an for international peace and security. attack against one is considered as an attack against all is based on the ability to counter threats and security challenges where they arise. An overall Norwegian goal is to 5 and to strengthen the operational has registered both military and civilian capability of the Alliance. personnel in the EU catalogue of capabilities. Norway also participates While acting primarily as a planning actively in military as well as civilian organisation during the Cold War when the operations in the western Balkans. Based primary function was military deterrence, on broad parliamentary support, the NATO has now also become an Government has decided that Norway will organisation that manages and participate in the Nordic Battle Group implements various types of military together with Sweden, Finland and operations. Estonia. In 2005, NATO conducted operations in On 1 January 2005, the EU established the Afghanistan (ISAF – International Security European Defence Agency (EDA) in order Assistance Force), Kosovo (KFOR – Kosovo to support the development of both Force), Iraq (NTM-I – NATO Training Mission military and civilian crisis management - Iraq) and Bosnia. All these operations are capabilities. The agency will be responsible based on either UN Security Council for EU efforts related to developing mandates or invitations from the military capabilities, defence R&D, materiel authorities of the countries concerned. In cooperation and procurement. addition, NATO is running a surveillance operation in the Mediterranean (OAE – In order to enable the EU to conduct Operation Active Endeavour) based on complex military operations, arrangements Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The have been established between the EU Alliance has also supported the African and NATO for ready access by the EU to the Union in its operation in Darfur in Sudan. collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance. EU In recent years, the EU common security and defence policy has undergone significant developments. A key element of contribute actively to ensuring that NATO the security
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