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ALLEN, Thomas Harrell, 1942- AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE*S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM JANUARY 1969 TO FEBRUARY 1972.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1973 Speech

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM JANUARY 1969 TO FEBRUARY 1972

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By Thomas Harrell Allen, B.A., M.S

*****

The Ohio State University 1973

Reading Committee: Approved By

Keith Brooks L . C . Hawes J • L> Golden Adviser ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes; to publicly express his appreciation | to the many people who contributed to the development and completion of this dissertation.

To his major adviser, Professor Keith Brooks, for his support and able counseling.

To his reading committee, Professor James Golden and Professor Leonard Hawes, for their constructive criticism |i * and encouragement. To John Murdock and Fred Goodman of Battelle Memorial Institute for their assistance in processing the data. And finally to Her who endured the most.

i VITA

October 17, 1942 Born - Palestine, Texas 1965 ...... B.A., The University of Texas 1967 ...... M.S., West Virginia University 1968-1970 ...... Instructor, The University of Florida 1973 ...... Researcher, Battelle Memorial Institute

PUBLICATIONS "Mass Media Use Patterns in a Negro Ghetto," Journalism Quarterly, Volume LL, 1968, pp. 109-111.

FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field Speech Communication B.A. Journalism and Economics

M.S. Journalism Ph.D. Research Methodology Communication Theory

Mass Communications CONTENTS

Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . i VITA ...... ii TABLES ...... iv CHAPTER

I BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM ...... 1 II REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ...... 17 III RESEARCH DESIGN OF THE S T U D Y ...... 48 IV PRESENTATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF D A T A ...... 71

V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 100 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 112 LIST OP TABLES

Table Page 1 Frequencies by Initiating Country in Terms of Year of M e s s a g e ...... 72 2 Frequency by Type of Message in Terms of Year of Message ...... 73 3 Frequency by Nominal Categories in Terms of Year of M e s s a g e ...... 73 4 Frequency by Tone of Message in Terms of Year of Message ...... 74 5 Frequency by Type of Message in Terms of Year of Message for U.S. Initiated M e s s a g e ...... 74 6 Frequency by Nominal Categories in Terms of Year of Message for U.S. Initiated M e s s a g e s ...... 75 7 Frequency by Tone of Message in Terms of Year of Message for U.S. Initiated M e s s a g e s ...... 76 8 Frequency by Type of Message in Terms of Year of Message for China Initiated M e s s a g e s ...... 76 9 Frequency by Nominal Categories in Terms of Year of Message for China Initiated M e s s a g e s ...... 77 10 Frequency by Tone of Message in Terms of Year of Message for China Initiated M e s s a g e s ...... 78 11 Percentages for each Year for Tone M e s s a g e s ...... 78 12 Chi Square Analysis by Initiating Country in Terms of Period of M e s s a g e ...... 80

iv Table Page 13 Chi Square Analysis by Type of Message in Terms of Period of Message for both Countries...... 80 14 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Period of Message for both Countries...... 81 15 Chi Square Analysis by Tone of Messages in Terms of Period of Message for both Countries...... 82 16 Chi Square Analysis by Tone of Message in Terms of Message Type for both Countries...... 82 17 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Message Tone for both Countries...... 83 18 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Type of Message for both Countries...... 84 19 Chi Square Analysis by Type of Message in Terms of Period of Message for both Countries...... 85

20 Chi Square Analysis by Type of Message in Terms of Period of Message for U.S. M e s s a g e s ...... 85

21 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Period of Message for U.S. M e s s a g e s ...... 86 22 Chi Square Analysis by Tone of Message in Terms of Period of Message for U.S. M e s s a g e s ...... 87 23 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Types of Message for U.S. M e s s a g e s ...... 88

v Table Page 24 Chi Square Analysis by Type of Message in Terms of Tone of Message for U.S. M e s s a g e s ...... 88 25 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Tone of Message for U.S. M e s s a g e s ...... 89 26 Chi Square Analysis by Type of Message in Terms of Period of Message for China Messages ...... 89 27 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Period of Message for China Messages ...... 90

28 Chi Square Analysis by Tone of Message in Terms of Period of Message for China Messages . 91

29 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Type of Message for China Messages ...... 92 30 Chi Square Analysis by Tone of Message in Terms of Type of Message for China Messages ...... 92 31 Chi Square Analysis by Nominal Categories in Terms of Tone of Message for China Messages ...... 93 32 Chi Square Analysis by Selected Nominal Categories in Terms of Type of Messages for both Countries ...... 94 33 Chi Square Analysis by Selected Nominal Categories in Terms of Tone of Message for both Countries...... 94 34 Chi Square Analysis of Selected Nominal Categories in Terms of Period of Message for U.S. M e s s a g e s ...... 95

vi Table Page 35 Chi Square Analysis by Selected Nominal Categories in Terms of Message Type for U.S. Messages ...... 95 36 Chi Square Analysis by Selected Nominal Categories in Terms of Period of Message for China Messages ...... 96 37 Chi Square Analysis by Selected Nominal Categories in Terms of Type of Message for China M e s s a g e s ...... 97 38 Chi Square Analysis by Selected Nominal Categories in Terms of Message Tone for China M e s s a g e s ...... 97

vii CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

During the last three or four years the international relations between the United States and the People's Repub­ lic of China apparently have entered a period of transition from two previous decades of hostility. The new relation­ ship was dramatically underscored by President Nixon's visit to Peking in February, 1973, thus ending the climate of nonrecognition inherited from the 1950's and suggesting a revised modus operandi for diplomatic communication.

When the People's Republic of China was established in Peking on October 1, 1949, it was unlikely that the United States would recognize the new government. One year later Chinese "volunteers" marched into Korea and fought American troops for the first time in history. The outbreak of the

Korean War in June, 1950 marked the beginning of a new period of hostile Sino-American relations. The Korean events changed the perception of the United States toward

China from that of the heroic underdog to a dangerous menacing giant, and also confirmed the views of the Chinese

Communist that the United States was the archenemy of

China. These mutual perceptions of the United States and China led to decisions by both governments that had sub­ stantial effects on their relations with one another for decades to come.-1- j In subsequent years additional sources of tension i developed between Communist China and the U.S.: Chinese involvement in "wars of Liberation" in Indochina; a U.S. embargo on trade and cultural relations with China; con­

tinuing American opposition to Communist Chinese repre­ sentation in the United Nations; and Sino-American compe­ tition in the "Third World" nations. Finally after massive involvement of U.S. troops in Vietnam (1965-1968), hopes for better China-U.S. relations were apparently shattered. With U.S. bombs falling within miles of its border and increased involvement in Vietnam with American troops, Communist China took an even more wary view toward the U.S. perceiving the actions in Vietnam as part of a U.S. aim to encircle China. The Chinese press carried the warning "American interventionists (will not) abandon their scheme to conquer Vietnam in preparation for aggression against

China."2

^Harold Isaacs, Images of Asia (Ne w York: Capricorn Books, 1962), chap. 10, pp.

2Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 236 (December 14-15, 1951), p. 10. 3

The Chinese reacted to American attacks on North Vietnamese PT boat bases in 1964 with a military act {"signal”). They sent several units of MIG jet fighters and 50,000 railroad construction troops to North Vietnam, and furthermore began constructing air bases in southern

China. Dr. Allen Whiting, former Director of Intelligence and Research for East Asia, U.S. Department of State, argues that this was a "signal" from China to the U.S. that it would not remain neutral if North Vietnam were destroyed.4 The devil mirror-images of each nation toward the other that had begun in 1950 with Korea became even stronger in Vietnam. Each country compared the other to

Nazi Germany and Hitler. Such a comparison by China appeared in the Peking Review on April 30, 1965 in the form of an editorial entitled, "Escalation Means Getting Closer and Closer to the Grave:" The tactics used by the Johnson Administration are very similar to Hitler's gradual expansion of aggression before World War II. 5

■^Dr. Allen Whiting, "How We Almost Went to War with China," Look (April 29, 1969), pp. 13-17.

4Ibid. ^Marvin Gettleman (ed.), Vietnam (New York: Fawcett, 1965), p. 428. 4

Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated many times that the hostility in Vietnam was supported and encouraged by China, and it was like Hitler's aggression in Europe, and that appeasement in Vietnam would have the same effects as g appeasement in Munich. Such devil images featured aggressor roles in each country's perceptions of the other. A vicious cycle on international relations developed. Each assumed the other was hostile and aggressive, and each act was perceived to confirm the views held by the other side; here was "proof" of previous convictions. Thus the Chinese responded angrily toward Vietnam as a scheme of American foreign policy to encircle them. The U.S. then perceived this Chinese reaction as proof of China’s hostility. In view of international communication what seemed to be an ag­ gressive behavior to one appeared obviously defensive to the other. What developed from this interaction was a spiralling positive feedback loop. The self-image of the U.S. as "world policemen" served to justify its role in Vietnam as had been the case in Korea. President Johnson vindicated U.S. in­ volvement in Vietnam in this way:

6 John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness {New York: Random House, 1971), p. 87. 5

To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of American commitment, the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.7 China, like the U.S., transferred many of its per­ ceptions from the Korean War to the Vietnamese conflict. Once again, China noted its revolutionary mission and the

Q need to make China a "secure base for world revolution." Marshall Lin Piao wrote in 1965 that China was the revolu­ tionary base of the "world countryside" of Asia, Africa and Latin American, as it prepared to surround and ulti­ mately defeat the "world cities" of Europe and North

America.® Thus the view seemingly prevailing during the Vietnam conflict was that each nation was hostile and militant and must be stopped before aggression got out of hand. Despite these extreme "devil" images of one another, both nations remembered Korea and wanted to avoid war. President Johnson said, "We know there are about 200 million in the Chinese ArmyThink about 200 million Chinese coming down those trails...No sir, I don't want to fight them."^®

7 Lyndon B. Johnson, quoted in The New York Times, February 13, 1965. ®Lin Piao, "The International Significance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Theory of People1s War," Foreign Language Press (September, 1965), pp. 42-59. ^Ibid. ■^Lyndon B. Johnson, quoted in Philip Geyelin, Johnson and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 197. 6

Even though China often called the U.S. a "paper tiger," a sensible respect for U.S. military capability often showed through the propaganda. The People's Daily warned in 1967 that, "the U.S. is very powerful; it is

11 the strongest country in the world." A comparison of images between China and the U.S. as particularly noted in the Korean and Vietnamese armed con­ flicts does offer proof of the hostility beginning in 1950 between the world's most powerful nation and the world's most populous nation. Both nations tended to view them­ selves as reacting only to the hostility of their adver­ sary. The Korean War became the great watershed in Sino- American relations with the U.S starting to view China as a menacing power to be encircled and the Chinese viewing the United States as a threatening power bent toward op­ pression. Although Vietnam added to these hostile images, both nations fortunately had learned to respect each other's military power so that armed conflict was avoided. However, relations between the two great countries prac­ tically ceased to exist for two decades after Korea. Little, if any, communication passed between the two countries.

•^People's Daily (Peking), April 5, 1967. 7

As noted earlier, the election of Richard M. Nixon as President seems to have marked the beginning of a new era of Sino-American relations. On November 26, 1968, China proposed to meet with the United States at Warsaw

February 20, 1969. 12 Such talks had been suspended since January, 1968. Peking called on the United States to join "an agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence."^2 Then, November 29, 1968, the Johnson Ad­ ministration, in a move endorsed by President-elect Nixon, accepted China's proposal to resume the Warsaw talks. 14 As President-elect, Nixon ordered a secret study by Harvard University scholars to answer these questions: How should the U.S. approach China to see if more relaxed relations might not exist between the two nations and, if the U.S. and China do undertake policy discussions, what should they talk about?-*-2 Shortly before Nixon took the oath of office, the document dealing with these questions was sent to Dr. Henry Kissinger. In addition to this Harvard study

•*~2United States-China Relations; A Strategy for the Future (Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 1970), p. 346. 13 Peking Radio, November 26, 1968. 14 United States-China Relations, op. cit., p. 346. 15 David Kraslow, The New York Times, December 15, 1971. 8 another important, and still secret, study was made by the National Security Council at the request of Nixon just a few days before he took office. ^ In January, 1969 under the Nixon administration, the most significant changes in Sino-American relations commenced. The U.S. began with a series of small uni- laterial steps on trade and travel. In July, 1969, tourists travelling abroad were allowed to purchase up to $100 worth of Chinese goods. At the same time restrictions relating to travel were relaxed to permit almost anyone with a legitimate purpose to journey to mainland China on an

American passport. In December, 1969, permission was granted to U.S. tourists to make unlimited purchases of Chinese goods and to enable collectors, museums, and uni­ versities to import Chinese products. Also in December, the U.S. government allowed American-controlled subsidi­ aries abroad to conduct trade in nonstrategic goods with mainland China. Finally, and perhaps more significantly, in that same month Nixon ordered the Seventh Fleet to ter­ minate its regular patrolling of the Taiwan Straits— an act long termed "hostile" by China.

16David Kraslow, The New York Times, December 15, 1971. 9

In April, 1970, the U.S. announced selective licensing of American-made components and related spare parts for

nonstrategic foreign goods exported to China. In August, 1970, restrictions were lifted on American oil companies abroad to permit fueling free world ships bearing non­

strategic cargoes to Chinese ports. Furthermore, the Nixon administration indicated that it believed the Peking

government, not Taipei, was the effective, long-term ruler of the China mainland. Other U.S. steps were taken during this period, all of them in the general area of contacts

and trade. Peking did not respond immediately to these U.S.

gestures with reciprocal moves, but it did purchase machinery with American-made parts and tone down the shrillness of its anti-American propaganda. But then came the dramatic events of March and April,

1971. The U.S. removed all travel restrictions to the People's Republic of China, and soon (April 7) China in­ vited the U.S. table tennis team to tour the mainland. In addition, three U.S. newsmen, specialists in Far Eastern affairs, were allowed to enter China to cover the ping pong matches. This was a marked departure from China's basic and long-standing policy of excluding American journalists. 10

Ten years earlier negotiations between Peking and Washington

for the exchange of correspondents had ended without success amid charges and countercharges by the two nations. 1 7

During this time period China sent other "signals" to the U.S., often in the form of cultural exchanges, to indicate its interest in improved relations. Also at the same time, procedures were worked out for Dr. Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Peking, resulting in the official invitation for

President Nixon to visit Peking. Finally came the Presi­ dent's journey to China in February, 1972 (the first by an American President), signifying as Chou En-lai stated, a

TO new page in Sino-American relations. After 22 years of hostility and lack of communication between the U.S. and Communist China, the improved relations produced a sense of guarded optimism about the future. Cer­ tainly before the ping pong visit and Nixon's televised trip to Peking, more Americans had seen Armstrong's historic first step on the moon than the Great Wall of China via TV. The contemporary history of Sino-American affairs has been one of hostility, misunderstanding, and a lack of diplomatic communication. But the recent events suggest that a historic change, beginning in 1969, is under way.

■^Ian Stewart, The New York Times, April 11, 1971, p. 3. 18 John Roderick, The New York Times, April 15, 1971, p. 5. 11

This change in the U.S.-China relations is noted in the rhetoric of their two heads of government, President

Nixon and Chairman Mao. Referring to the need for social and political interactive changes, Mao has stated, The next 50 to 100 years, beginning from now, will be a great era of radical change in the social system throughout the world, an earth- shaking era without equal in any previous historical period. Living in such an era, we must be prepared to engage in great struggles which will have many features different in form from those of the past. 2-9 Speaking on U.S. foreign policy in February, 1971, President Nixon said,

The twenty-two-year-old hostility between our­ selves and the People's Republic of China is another unresolved problem...It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely out­ side it and hostile toward it.20 However, abolishing deep-rooted hostility and im­ proving international relations between two large nations is not an easy accomplishment. A minimum requirement is the establishment of improved communication between the two nations. Both must learn to be more sensitive to the other's messages; words are extremely important. From events cited earlier, apparently since 1969 both China and

19Lin Piao, Peking Review (April 28, 1969), p. 30.

2^U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's (Washington, D.C. U.S. Printing House, February 25, 1971), p. 105. 12 the U.S. desired to improve relations. The question for both nations' leaders was not only whether to establish diplomatic communication, but also simply how to do it. The issue is not the climate of Heaven; but how to get there. The interesting problem, then, is to explain this outcome of improved relations. How may nations hostile to one another for over twenty years communicate their intentions of friendliness? One approach to answering this relies on historical explanations of the nations' motives. However, at this time this method must be rejected because the documents, records, and persons directly involved are not available and probably will not be for an indefinite time. The question, however, is important enough to merit a search for an answer based on available materials and from a communication perspective. Communication scholars are prone to ask such questions as the following: What message code or system does a nation use to indicate its intent if normal diplomatic channels, such as exchange of diplomats, are closed? How does one nation know that its message has been correctly received by the target nation? What means of authenticating the messages communicated are available? In short, how does one nation, through com­ munication, make another nation believe something? These 13 questions have certain characteristics in common; all of them clearly depend not only on stating an intent but also on communicating it persuasively to the other nation. In an attempt to answer these questions a sample of specific international events (messages) occurring in U.S.- China relations during the Nixon administration will be analyzed. The selected time period extends from January 20, 1969 (date of inauguration) through February 20, 1972 (date of Nixon's China visit). The events under analysis suggest several additional questions: What channels of communication did the two nations use to conduct relations? Were there particular modes of messages that relate to credibility and accuracy? Are particular types of messages sent by each nation? If so, do they produce an observable pattern? And if patterns are found, do they change over time? Finally, does a particular mode of message (pattern) indicate the probability of the occurrence of the next type pattern) of message? Are some communication channels unique to each country? Once again, is there a strategy for communicating a message to China or the U.S.? As stated earlier, the outcome is known. After two decades of withdrawal and hostility, the U.S. and China improved their relations, but the problem remains how to explain this change in international climate. The exchange 14

of communication between the two seems to offer a paradigm for developing an explanation: The gradations in inter­ national relations— from friendly gestures through the

signing of treaties, the exchange of diplomats, and war declarations— show some dependence on the need to communi­ cate. In the modern world nations certainly rely on secret channels for conducting intercourse with other nations, but the public channel is also extremely important. The tech­ nological advances in the media of communication, from telegraph and telephone to television and Telstar, increase utility in the production and distribution of messages— symbolic commodities. The distribution of messages and also the lack of messages may lead to another product, conflict. Much of the literature on international relations has concerned itself with this subject. As T. C. Schelling has written, The possibility that, in a crisis, reciprocal suspicions might be amplified by a feedback process, each side's preparation against sur­ prise looking like preparations for attack...21 However, this study seeks to examine a "crisis" of friend­ liness. Do the variables in a conflict spiral of recipro­ city operate in a similar fashion during a spiral of

21T. C. Schelling, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January, 1965) p. 5. 15 reciprocal friendly exchange? The sample of events under examination provides data to analyze the question with "real" facts. The study also offers some unique circum­ stances for examining the variables under consideration. For many years China has isolated itself from the mainstream of world interaction via diplomatic communication. As Coral Bell has written: This unique history of exclusion (and earlier self-exclusion) from the society of states means that Chinese historical experience and familiarity with modes of diplomatic behaviour is very restricted, compared with that of the other dominant powers, and still more as com­ pared to other crisis managers in earlier Western systems.22 Bell goes on to state: The point is that though the Chinese have this (diplomatic communication) system of their own they are not familiar participants in the West­ ern tradition (which has become universalized), and that this impedes our interpretation of their crisis signals, as well as their receipt of o u r s . 23 This point of isolation from the mainstream of diplo­ matic activity is significant. This author argues that communication is the main instrument of international re­ lations, and the ability both to send and receive discrete diplomatic messages is a necessary condition for successful international communication.

22Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 37. 23Ibid. p. 38. 16

The relaxation of attitudes between Communist China and the U.S. certainly suggests that some type of communi­ cative exchange between the two was successful. This chapter has attempted to sketch how this shift from hos­ tility to friendliness has evolved. Chapter II contains a review of the literature pertinent to the topic under consideration. The chapter concludes with a justification of the study. Chapter III describes the design and pro­ cedures of the study. Chapter IV presents the data and statistical analysis derived from the research. Chapter V includes conclusions drawn from the data and recommenda­ tions for additional areas of research. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This review surveys alternative approaches to the study of international relations and then shows why a communication paradigm best answers the questions posed in this study. Finally, it offers a justification of the study from a communication perspective. Social scientists offer many explanations for human behavior. Anthropologists offer the explanation: man's

•i behavior is completely explained by culture. However, the anthropological proposition, culture explains human be­ havior, is much more complex than it first appears. The key word, culture, must be defined before theoretical state­ ments can be made. A typical and beginning definition is offered by E. B. Taylor in which he defines culture as, "Including everything that humans learn as members of a society. Culture or civilization, taken in its wide eth­ nographic sense, is that complex whole which in­ cludes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.3

1 Morris Freilich, The Meaning of Culture (Lexington, Mass. Xerox Corp., 1972), p. 1. ^Edward B. Taylor, Primitive Culture (London: John Murray, 1871), pp. 32-33. 3Ibid. 17 18

Taylor's definition is considered the "classic," but as Morris Freilich notes, "when six (or sixty) anthro­ pologists use the word culture, they probably have six

(or sixty) slightly different ideas in mind. ...Most anthropologists no longer accept this (Taylor) definition as the best."^

Despite the different definitions by scholars working in the discipline, cultural anthropology has studied the culture of man in different parts of the world. Because of this geographic difference such research studies have centered on different nations. With the crossing of nation-state boundaries and the study of the effects of one culture on another cultural anthropology may be an avenue for studying international relations. The anthropological approach to explaining human be­ havior has been particularly helpful in explicating the notion of man as a symbol using animal. As an important distinction is offered in the act of "symboling" by Leslie A. White. When things and events dependent upon symboling are considered and interpreted in terms of their re­ lationship to human organisms, i.e. in a somatic context, they may properly be called human behavior. When things and events dependent upon symboling are considered and interpreted in an extrasomatic context

4 Freilich, op. cit. p. 3. 19

i.e. in terms of their relationships to one another rather than to human organisms, we may call them culture.5 Since culture is not innate, but is acquired by each individual and passed on from generation to generation, culture requires some means of transmission. Such a con­ veyer may be communication. Language then is a necessity for human culture otherwise the individual would have to begin exactly where his parents began— culture could not be passed on. Some anthropologists, such as, Alfred G. Smith argues that communication and culture are inseparable. Our perception is behavior that is learned and shared, and it is mediated by symbols. Culture is a code we learn and share, and learning and sharing require communication. And communication requires coding and symbols, which must be learned and shared. Thus one may conclude that communication is a universal reaching across both time and culture. However, to define the concepts of communication and culture as inseparable, as Smith seems to do on the one hand, and then to define communication as the whole of culture on the other is to make the definitions so broad as to lessen their meaning and utility as theoretical constructs. Whether communica­ tion involves a socially shared pattern (cultural) and some

5Leslie A. White, "The Concept of Culture," American Anthropologist, Vol. 61, No. 1, 1959, pp. 227-251.

^Alfred G. Smith, ed., Communication and Culture; Readings (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 7. 20

process of symbolic interpretation, distinctions must be made between the two concepts for any meaningful theory construction. Such overlapping could lead to much dis­ tortion in the research related to message exchange between people of different nations.

The term, "intercommunication" often appears in the cultural anthropological literature suggesting communication 7 between nations or cultures. Recently, the term has been used to differentiate between communication that crosses national (countries) or cultural boundaries. Perhaps this distinction is made clearest by Gerhard Maletzke: Whereas intercultural communication is an exchange of meaning between cultures, international communi­ cation takes place on the level of countries or nations, which is to say across frontiers. This means: Intercultural and international communica­ tion can, on occasion, be identical; but this is not always so. Very often people who belong to a common culture are separated by a state frontier, with the effect that international communication is taking place within a single culture. And, the contrary case, humans of quite different cultures can be united in the same state, so that within this single state intercultural communication can take place. It is thus that one tends to use the word international when speaking of communication on the purely political level, whereas the concept of intercultural communication corresponds more to sociological and anthropological realities.8

7 Carl Hovland, "Social Communication," in B. Berelson Reader in Public Opinion and Communication (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 181. p Gerhard Maletzke, International Communication (New York: Wiley, 1970), p. 478. 21

Thus cultural anthropology does have a contribution to make to the study of international relations, however, the research has followed a common paradigm, culture. There­ fore, the anthropological approach does not seem appropriate for this particular study with its emphasis on communication.

Another approach to international studies may be found in the journalism field. Many of the journalism studies have attempted to determine the role of communication in. de­ veloping countries. More precisely, such works have been interested in answering the question of what the mass media can do to assist economic and social development in develop- q ing nations. Other scholars, such as Daniel Lerner, have been concerned with studying the communication channel be­ tween the developing country and the country that would assist it.-*-® In short, some type of communication model

(mass media) is presented to the developing country to follow. Some research in the relations between journalism and nations has been to compile a list of the various media available in nations throughout the world. One study has

9 Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, Communication and Change in the Developing Countries (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967) . 22 compiled a listing of the print media in the various nations11 while another examined the broadcasting media.12 Recently, other research has been concerned with the effects of one nation's communication media on the citizens of another nation. For example, the effects of American television on Canadians living near the U.S. border. Herbert I. Schiller has expanded such concerns into a book in which he contends that electronic communications provide an in­ dispensable element in America's expanding influence in global affairs.12 The character of the United States communications complex is significant then, not only for its tre­ mendous importance domestically. Less apparent at home but increasingly felt abroad is its contact with the international community. This powerful mechanism now directly impinges on peoples1 lives everywhere.^ Thus, such {mass media) studies have made contributions to the understanding of international relations. The common focus of these seems to be on the mass media. Particular

11John Merrill, A Handbook of the Foreign Press (Baton Rouge, La. Louisiana University Press, 1971). 12Walter B. Emery, National and International Systems of Broadcasting (East Lansing, Mich. Michigan State University Press, 1969). 13Herbert I. Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), p. 3. ^ibid. p. 17. 23 emphasis has been on the mass media institutions per se with some attention given to content and the audiences and many

studies conclude that communication (mass media) is one of the primary factors in the process of modernization. There­ fore, journalism as an alternative way of studying inter­ national communications must be rejected for this particular study. The study has reled on the historical method for data generation and analysis. Specifically a sample of U.S.- China relations from January, 1969 to February, 1972, was

examined to generate a statement of facts. In using the historical method the author has attempted to distinguish between factual statements and statements of value and ethics, as Ernest G. Bormann suggests, "Historical proof is 15 but a special case of empirical proof." In addition to the sample data other historical works were examined for additional understanding of the subject under investigation. Modern history reveals many examples of nations engaging in war or armed conflict even though this was not the goal or desire of the conflicting nations. North and Holsti in their Studies in International Conflict and Integration point out

15Ernest G. Bormann, Theory and Research in the Communi- cative Arts (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 169. 24 how World War 1 resulted from inaccurate perception, mis- i I *1 C understanding of messages, and miscalculations.

Background information on modern China was gained from Winberg Chai's I The New Politics of Communist China 1 7 and The

Foreign Relations of The People's Republic of China. The reliance on the historical method is also apparent

! from the study's use of newspapers as a source of historical information. The bulk of the exchanged messages between the U.S. and China were reported in The New York Times and thus a historical record of the events was established. The Times also carried commentary on these events which was helpful background information as well as providing some ideas of the 'climate' in the international setting during the case study. Some of the questions that the study raised were not entirely answered by a historical methodology. The limita­ tions of a pure historical design require that the study also incorporate empirical techniques, such as, statistical analysis for the final research strategy. Because the study was concerned with establishing the different types of

1601e Hols ti, Studies in International Conflict and In- tegration (Stcnford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 2,

"^Winberg Chai, The New Politics of Communist China Pacific Palisc des, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Co. 1972). •^Winberg Chai, The Foreign Relations of The People * s Republic of CHin a (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1972). 25 messages that were being exchanged, it was necessary to explicate message categories. J. David Singer notes that he considers the primary weakness of the historical method. The key weakness is the lack of what social scien­ tists call operation description, by which we mean that the criteria by which one observes, measures, and describes must be made visible and explicit. Another reason why the historical method is not used exclusively is that statistical correlations are needed to answer the study's questions. While it is true that his­ torical examination may suggest that certain variables do correlate, this insight says nothing about the degree (quantification) to which the variables correlate. Thus history must remain a major technique for the study in question and the historical method does play an important explanatory role along with the other research design variables.

A related discipline, political science, has had many scholars study international relations. The contribution of political scientists to the understanding of international relations has been rich and varied. Political science has contributed understanding, data, and theoretical constructs in its analysis of the subject. In writing about the con­ tribution of political science Knorr and Rosenau observe,

19J. David Singer, "Comment 1," in Public Opinion and Historians, ed. by Melvin Small (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1970), p. 35. 26 There is little disagreement over how to identify international phenomena, and yet there is ardent disagreement over how such phenomena should be studied.20 From the political science field there have been, gen­ erally speaking, two fundamental approaches to the study of international politics. One major approach has been that of "general explanatory concepts": its thrust has been to focus on a single explanatory concept to pull together the field of international relations. One may view these concepts as in­ dependent variables. At least since World War II "military force," 21 and "power" have often been identified as keys to an understanding of international relations. 22 Thomas C. Schelling notes in his Arms and Influence that military force can be used to achieve an objective, but it can also be used as bargaining power and thus it becomes part of diplomacy. 23 Other scholars have studied the relation of technology to military strategy and foreign policy. *

2 0Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 4. 21 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press’^ 1971) . 22 John R. Champlin, Power (New York: Atherton Press Inc., 1971). 23 Schelling, op. cit. p. 6. 2^Robert J. Art, The Use of Force (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971). 27 "Power" has also been used by political scientists as the crucial concept needed to unify the study of inter- p C national politics.^ John R. Champlin argues that power is capable of generating a paradigm for political science, and that power can be used to explain all of the political arrangements of a society. 2 fi °

The other approach of the political science discipline has been to focus on a particular country or a geographic area such as the "Middle East." Often it explains in con­ siderable detail a particular event or the processes in­ volved in the evolution of a particular nation's foreign policy.27 The foreign policy of a nation may also be sub­ divided to analyze a particular aspect as Wilfrid L. Kohl does in his French Nuclear Diplomacy. 2 8 Other scholars have studied the various decision makers' perceptions and how this affects foreign policy choices.2^

2^Champlain, op. cit. p. 2. 26 27Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York: The Viking Press, 1970). 2®Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972). 29 Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972). 28

Thus the strengths of the two approaches are some­ what at odds. One explains the common features in all international events; the other explains the unique be­ havior of a given country. The strengths of these two approaches also suggests their weaknesses, for in reach­ ing their particular insights each must throw away some important information. General explanatory concepts ab­ stract on a high enough level to cover an entire field, but have to omit some details in the explanation. On the other hand, detailed analysis of a single country or region covers the subject matter, but must offer less for high levels of abstract analysis. In the years since World War II, and especially since the mid-1950's, the study of political science in the in­ ternational sector has moved toward the behavioral ap- ■a ft proach. The rhetoric of its major writers has reflected the principles of scientific inquiry and the use of quanti­ tative analysis.31 Finally the study of politics in a cross-cultural setting has become known as "comparative politics." 32 Comparative in the sense that the major theories are applied to more than one political system.

3 fl Richard L. Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Com­ parative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1970), p. 5. 31 Ibid. pp. 10-11. 32 Robert T. Holt, The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 5. 29

A common paradigm for comparative research has been

systems analysis. In this review three major writers have been studied in detail for their "systemic" approach to

comparative politics. The works of David Easton are more frequently asso- ciated with systems analysis m political science,

Morton A. Kaplan, who uses systems analysis to develop O A models of international systems, and Karl Deutsch who is interested in applying the concepts of cybernetics to

political phenomena. 3 5 No "systemic" approach to political science could be considered without reference to David Easton because his

works and systems analysis are almost inextricably tied together. In his writings Easton does argue for the sys­

temic approach to comparative politics. The fruitfulness of the approach is suggested by its implications for the comparative study of polit­ ical institutions. Given the discovery of similar or identical tasks in every political system,... political science would then be in position to draw generalizations that pass beyond the experience of any one political system or of the systems in any one culture or civilization.36

David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965). 34Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967). 35Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Communication and Control (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963). O g David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1953), p. 319. 30

In his analysis Easton asserts, "we may define a sys­ tem as any set of variables, regardless of the degree of o 7 interrelationship between them." Easton goes on to state, "The political system can be designated as those inter­ actions through which values are authoritatively allocated o g for a society." The contribution of Easton's preliminary definitions to the field are valuable. However, the neces­ sary broadness of his definitions raises important questions for further analysis. In particular, for this study, the use of "interactions" in Easton's definition must be ex­ plicated for additional theory construction. This study is basically concerned with the nature of the relationship be­ tween the U.S. and China via their communicative inter­ actions, and thus must attempt to further define "inter­ actions" as used in Easton's definition of a political sys­ tem. The theme that underlies Kaplan's System and Process is that if the number, type and behavior of nations vary over time, and if the nations' economic strengths, military capabilities and information also change over time, then there is some likely interconnection between these variables such that different (structural) systems can be discovered

3^David Easton, Varieties of Political Theory (Engle­ wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 147. 38Ibid. 31 to operate in various historical periods. For example, in the "modern European" period a "balance of Power" type of system would be expected to operate according to Kaplan's criteria.^ The theory offered by Kaplan is a strong research tool, but it is an analytic theory and not a descriptive theory. Since his theory contains a set of "if-then" propositions the predictions are only true if the stated parameters are held constant. However, parameters may change as one moves from conceptual systems to more particular conditions as in this study. Although it goes beyond the scope of this study, Kaplan's theory could be useful if his stated para­ meter conditions hold for the U.S.-China case study. Karl Deutsch in The Nerves of Government argues, "that the viewpoint of cybernetics suggests that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics and that every organization is held together by communication, and that these same concepts apply to governments."40 Deutsch views such organizations as information-processing systems with information defined as a patterned relationship between events and communication as the transfer of such patterned relationships.4^ Channels become the paths through which

■^Kaplan, op. cit. pp. 21-53. 40Deutsch, op. cit. p. 77. 41 Ibid. p. 146. information is transferred. 42 For Deutsch then, these three concepts— information, communication and channel— become theoretical constructs in his general model of an information processing system. Deutsch has offered val­ uable insights and new research routes for comparative politics. However, to state that communication may be used as a theoretical construct for studying the govern­ mental organization is of crucial importance, but for the scholar attempting to put this valuable insight into op­ eration he is faced with a problem so complex as to be almost overwhelming. To use communication in theory con­ struction, the serious scholar must develop his own method­ ology for his particular study. The author wishes to note in fairness to Deutsch that it was not his (Deutsch) goal to explicate the term communication, but merely to suggest it as a theoretical construct for his model. Deutsch argues in his preface to The Nerves of Government, "all that is offered here, in addition to a body of ideas or sugges­ tions, is a point of view."^ A review of political science literature suggests that in their treatment of international relations much of the focus has been on the behavior of particular units— called

^2Deutsch

43Deutsch, op. cit. p. xxvii. 33 states (nations). Among the influences acting on a nation were the relationships or interactions between the nation under examination and other nations of the world. However, the literature of earlier studies suggests that these inter­ actions were not seen as the primary variable to examine but were viewed as of secondary interest to the nation under study. In short, the analysis would identify par­ ticular nations and examine all the international inter­ actions of these nations. A different way of analyzing international inter­ actions is to shift the primary focus to the interactions per se. That is, a particular type of interaction may be identified and described regardless of whatever nation is under investigation. These differences in conceptualization suggests to the researcher different questions and different beginning points to answer his questions. If he assumes that the nation is the primary focus of interest, then he will be more concerned with identifying the relations between the nation under study and others; the internal influences on a nation's foreign policy; the process of the nation's de­ cision-makers on foreign policy; the identification of nation-systems, and so forth. Conceptualization of inter­ actional systems as the primary interest should concern 34

the researcher with questions about the process of inter­ national interaction; identification of different types of interactions regardless of nation; message flows be­

tween nations; in short, the whole communicative inter­ change between nations. The researcher with this focus

would be concerned with discovering the boundaries of in­ teraction between nations in the world system as well as the forms of such interaction. For example, is the inter­ action in the present study limited to the United States and China or should Russia and Japan be considered? Is the interaction limited to economics? Or, are there other kinds of interaction such as cultural movement (exchange of art, scholars and tourists), an exchange of communica­ tion media (TV, newspapers, etc.), or political inter­ action (treaties, negotiations, threats, etc.)? Also he would be concerned with the change of the interactions over time. For example, how does a stable system change to one of instability through the interactional process?

Thus an alternative way of studying international re­ lations is to look not on the nations, but on their inter­ actions. This conceptualization is difficult, as Kaplan

notes. The mere statement of the alternative models necessitates the collection of information relevant to... patterns of national interactions. 35

It is significant that the simple task of counting various kindsof interactions has never seriously been attempted in the literature and that this information is essential to the description of the states (nations) of the international system.44

The concentration on interaction seems necessary for the questions raised in this study.

To the author a review of political science literature suggests that the discipline has not produced an adequate classification system for describing, explaining and pre­ dicting interactional behaviors from a communication para­ digm. Still lacking from its body of knowledge are commu-? nication concepts which conceive international relations as sets of interactions of many different types and which concern themselves primarily with the nature of the inter­ actions and their interrelationships, including how and why and in what sense they change or remain stable over time. Related to this is Paul Watzlawick's idea that in the presence of another all behavior is communicative, and thus this notion could be applied to nations and their interactions. Watzlawick states: ...behavior has no opposite. There is no such thing as nonbehavior, or to put it even more simply: one cannot not behave. Now, if it is accepted that all behavior is an interactional

44 Kaplan, op. cit. p. 4. 36

situation has message value, i.e., is communi­ cation, it follows that no matter how one may try, one cannot not communicate.45

The area of interactional analysis is new and complex enough to justify a cross-discipline attack on the phenomena. As Anatol Rapoport has written: The 'laws of interaction1 involving the newly singled-out variables cannot be deduced from known (physical or chemical) laws. We there­ fore face the necessity of discovering 'from scratch' laws of interactions of states de­ scribed by pattern of behavior (if such laws exist), that is, by observing regularities in the changes of the s y s t e m .

Rapoport's suggestion for discovering such 'laws of interaction1 is to concentrate on what he terms, "large corpuses of verbal output.He argues that in a dia­ logue, for example, the behavior becomes manifest in the interaction between two or more corpuses. Thus a corpus could be described in a systematic fashion, in terms of frequency or temporal distributions of its semantic units. Rapoport concludes, Thus it is not too far fetched to say that verbal corpuses behave and evolve and have their own in- variancy, which makes them susceptible for a systems theory approach.48

45Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin and Don Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication (New York: Norton & Company, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 4 8 . 4 6 Anatol Rapoport,"A System-Theoretic View of Content Analysis," in G. Gerbner, ed., The Analysis of Cummunication Content (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 1 S T .

4^Ibid. p . 3 0 . 48Ibid. p. 31. 37

Leonard Hawes also argues that a research model is needed that treats units of communication, rather than

human beings {in this case nations) as components of a system. In such a model the various patterns of communi­

cation units would be considered as the systemic relation­ ships that give meaning to the structure, function, and a a behavior of the system. ?

In relation to this study, one of the difficulties in analyzing international communication has been the lack of a methodological paradigm powerful enough to account for abstract threads common to all international communi­ cative behaviors. General Systems Theory appears suffi­ cient to do this according to Rapoport. As noted earlier in this chapter the central concern is with the inter­ action between the U.S. and China; it would seem that this interactional focus would suggest a systemic approach. A basic view of a system is that it is a set of interacting parts, in this case types or sub-systems of messages. The systems approach is a special way of looking at the phenomena understudy and visualizing the relationships be­ tween the various parts of the units. It offers the re­ searcher a broad, general framework for the study of inter­ national communication at various levels of inquiry; a

49 B. Aubrey Fisher and Leonard C. Hawes, "An Interact System Model: Generating a Grounded Theory of Small Groups," Quarterly Journal of Speech, pp. 444-453. 38 message may be viewed, for instance, as a system or a sub­ system of the entire message exchange, just as our solar system is a part of a larger system called a galaxy.

A variety of ways are available to approach a subject from the systems viewpoint. One of the main contributions of the systems procedure is that it allows for an orderly shift in perspective from level to level with appropriate redefinitions of the key variables. Systems analysis does not require the use of either behavioral or traditional modes of research; historical, experimental or statistical - techniques may be used in systemic analysis, as Charles

A. McClelland has written in his Theory and the Inter­ national System; It is a mistaken notion that system analyses must involve the quantification of data, although it is true that these operations are compatible. Histor­ ical narratives that depend greatly on artistic re­ constructions of the relationships in past events could be cast in the mold of systems analysis and could be organized according to the shift of level technique. ® A systems theory approach does offer several advantages for this study. First, a systems approach underscores the fact that every variable or component of the system is affected by every other component. A change in one of the components will likely produce changes in the others. This

50Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 92. 39 at first appears to produce a view of hopeless confusion, but it avoids a too-narrow analysis and helps to snare im­ portant variables that at first glance might appear irrele­ vant. After the connections between the systems are broken down, the research may lead to important variables more quickly. Secondly, the systems approach also underscores and calls attention to the points of interaction between systems as being particularly important. This also calls atten­ tion to the fact that systems are flexible and do change over time. Interaction analysis focuses on the outputs of nations. Little attention is given to the reasons for the national outputs, but much energy is devoted to tracing resulting patterns and combinations of interactional be­ havior. Eventually interaction analysis attempts, through the accumulation of data and sound design to answer this type of question: If nation A communicates x in situation y, what is the probability that nation B will respond by communicating z based on past performance? Thirdly, a systems approach calls attention to the different 'states' a system may occupy. The "state of a system" is a description of the variables of a system at a given point in time. A nation may be at war or peace, each of these at some point in time could be described as 40 the 'state1 of the system (nation). Since a system will evolve over time, it is necessary to describe it at different times, that is,to identify its successive states.

This would help the researcher answer the question, how does a system change so that it has become a different system? As McClelland argues,

Over a period of time, the international system is conceived to move from one state to another state. Its motions, however complex they are found to b e , are the phenomena that become the objects of in­ vestigation. 1 " , Thus it is the contention of the author that General

Systems Theory, as reviewed in the literature, offers a promising approach to a study giving special attention to interactions and relationships occurring in the behavioral exchanges of messages. Such an approach gives attention to developing conceptual categories for the analysis of such interactions and to offer a method for identifying states of the system over time. The interaction between nations is the object of the study. If a nation exhibiting a particular behavior is studied in isolation, then the analysis must be concerned with the nature of the nation and, in a broader sinse, the 'state' of the nation at a particular time. However, if

51 McClelland, op. cit. p. 90. 41 the parameters of the analysis are extended to include the effects of the nation's behavior on other nations, their reactions to it, and the particular context of these be­ haviors, then the analysis shifts from the nation in iso­ lation to the relationship between nations in a much larger system. The research analysis is thus shifted from mere observation of one nation to the study of the observable behaviors of the interaction/relationship. These observ­ able behaviors are viewed as communicative. With the nations' particular 'states' (or behaviors) being only variables with an incalculable range of possible moves whose meaning is not static nor absolute, the nations' 'states' only emerge in relation to each other.

This chapter has surveyed traditional ways of viewing international relations and also shown the potential value of a communication paradigm for increasing the understanding of international relations. The essential quest for such research is whether patterns (regularities) can be un­ covered which would allow the organization of the inter­ national data within a theoretical structure of realistic explanatory and/or predictive power. The final section of this chapter is concerned with the justification of the study. Justification is sought 42 from the viewpoint of the betterment of mankind and finally to the relevance of a communication perspective for international relations analysis. Charles A. McClelland, a political scientist, has written after surveying the field: Despite a large amount of writing on propaganda, public opinion, espionage, national views, national character, brainwashing, persuasion, international education, and similar topics, not enough systematic research has been undertaken, and no adequate theory of international communication has, as yet, been s t a t e d .

Although only marginal attention has been given to the subject, the applicability of a communication perspective to the study of international relations by various polit­ ical scientists, such as Karl Deutsch, demonstrates think- ing in this rt.ode. 53 The survey of the literature suggests that the application of a communication paradigm to inter­ national relations is "natural." After all, diplomacy, commerce, the fcold war,' are all sub-systems to the sending and receiving of information in an international system. As McClelland notes, "If we were tempted to accept a single factor explanation of international relations in war and peace, the communication concept might be a good choice."54

^McClelland, op. cit. p. 114. CO Deutsch, op. cit. 54 McClelland, op. cit. p. 119. 43

McClelland raises this point but does not elaborate in his writings. A focus on communication presents no insur­ mountable transition in viewing international activity as a large and complicated communication network. The nations' behaviors, interacting in an international system, converts these to a form of message exchange. A nation's suggestion, exchange of ambassadors, treaty agreement, threat, protest or an act of war, may all be viewed as a message that will evoke a reply from another nation. As in an open system, each time a government so acts, it contributes to the po­ tential for change in the system. Thus, through the pro­ duction of information and uncertainty, the realization emerges that the interaction between nations produces the establishment of relations. These relations are established, maintained, or broken through the exchange of messages be­ tween nations. Contemporary history reveals the importance of communi­ cation for establishing the nature of the relationship be­ tween nations. Allan Whiting in China Crosses the Yalu argues that China made several attempts to communicate her conviction to fight in Korea if U.S. troops invaded North Korea, while the U.S. failed to understand these war

'signals.'^

55Allan Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Harper & Row, I960). 44

This failure to communicate resulted in armed conflict. Was as an institution flourishes as robustly as ever: There have been about eighty sets of armed encounters in what is usually called the postwar period according to Konrad Lorenz, (On Aggression.). In Vietnam, on the other hand, the Chinese initiated specific military moves in order to signal Washington of their intentions, rather than relying entirely on verbal warnings and diplomatic 57 channels. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 became largely a strategy of communication between the U.S. and Russia. Mr. McNamara, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis said, "There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only 5 8 crisis management." The author argues that communication is the main instrument of crisis management and that the ability both to use and to read the meanings of diplomatic communication is a vital element in successful management. Schelling argues in his A Strategy of Conflict that deterrence or a threat depends to a great extent on a nation's ability to communicate it in a manner that is be­ lieved by the other side: in short, it must be communicated

5®Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York: Oxford, 1960). 57Stoessinger, op. cit. p. 77. 5 8 Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) , p. T~. 45

C Q persuasively to the other side. The earlier examples from North and Whiting suggest what happens when this ability fails. As Schelling points out, one may say and say and say that the gun is not loaded without being able to prove it until one actually shoots it. The above ex­ amples reflect the tragic consequences with a common thread— communication failure or breakdown. The author contends that deterrence and threats are essentially communication concepts. But there is an interesting and even less-explored side to the international coin. There may be circumstances in which a nation is desperate for another nation to know the truth. But how can nation A make nation B know it? In short, how can one nation make another nation believe it when it is actually telling the truth? How could the Chinese, if they were determined not to be interested in their own offensive nuclear capability, convince the U.S. of their intentions? How could the U.S. convince the Chinese that its war effort in Vietnam was not aimed at the Chinese? How could either nation after twenty years of hostility convince the other side that it wanted to im­ prove relations and that verbal statements to that effect

^Thomas C. Schelling, A Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 46 were not designed to lull the other side into a false sense of security?

As Bell argues, the unique history of exclusion from the society of nations means that Chinese historical ex­ perience and familiarity with modes of diplomatic be­ havior is restriced (as compared with that of other domi­ nant powers), and still more restricted as compared to other crisis managers such as the Western style of the

U.S. diplomats. 60 Thus how should the U.S. 'signal' China that it wanted to move to more friendly terms? This ques­ tion may form the thesis topic for the secret Harvard study mentioned earlierin the supranuclear age answers to these questions are necessary. Thus this investigation, while a historical case study, will be grounded in empirical methods. If this is success­ ful, then this would provide a way of ordering and measuring multivariant complex international communications related to actual events. In addition, if its coding system proves satisfactory, then the empirical data yields itself to com­ puter analysis. This bit of technology could be useful to the student attempting to recognize patterns in large amounts of data.

**°Bell, op. cit. p. 47. 61 David Kraslow, The New York Times, December 15, 1971. 47

It appears likely that the next major change in the systemic study of international relations will be marked by a vast increase in the ability to handle large quantities of data and by a growing interest in arranging and manipulating these data in various combinations.

The readership for this study should reach beyond academia. Ultimately it might offer suggestions to future decision-makers as to how one should attempt to communicate to another nation. That is, State Department officials should be interested in such questions as what channels prove most effective, given a certain type of situation, what particular messages are usually responded to in a certain manner, how does one communicate the truth— so that the other side will realize one is telling the truth, arid finally, how does one analyze another nation's message for revealing patterns. In the field of international communication, prac­ titioners must soon realize (if they haven't already done so) that the difficult problems they grapple with are also problems of theory and research in the communication dis­ cipline and that these problems must be attacked by both groups.

^McClelland, op. cit. p. 99. CHAPTER III RESEARCH DESIGN OF THE STUDY

This chapter discusses the purpose of theory, data selected for the study, operational definitions of terms, procedures employed and statistical procedures used in this research. One of the basic functions of theory is to provide coherence to observations. In addition, as Abraham Kaplan, a philosopher of science, notes

Theory, therefore, functions throughout inquiry, and does not come into its own only when inquiry is successfully concluded. It has a greater re­ sponsibility ... it guides the search for data, and for laws encompasing them.l The most effective theory is one that is able to de­ scribe or state precise relationships between clearly de­ fined, quantified variables and which allows the researcher to make predictions with a high degree of probability.

Most of the theories in the natural sciences meet this rigid definition of effectiveness. However, the social sciences in general, and communi­ cation in particular, are not yet in this position. As the study of communication has grown, so has the number of

^Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., lWffrp. 302.

48 49

definitions, related concepts, theories, models and methodological approaches. The goal of communication science is how to identify key variables in various communicative situations, de­ scribe them with accurate precision, and finally how to

test hypothesized relationships between them, in order to be able to predict with reasonable probability that these events will in fact occur. Prediction is often cited as

the goal of science, but even thorough understanding of a phenomenon may not be significant basis for predicting

accurately. Man has long been able to predict the weather— much longer than his knowledge as to why his predictions did or did not develop. But the important point here is that one should not confuse the scientific approach with the problem of accurate prediction. Science is but a method for studying phenomena. Thus the researcher's objective of understanding should not be confused with the methods of science. As Kaplan points out, one may have explanation without prediction and prediction without explanation.2

As noted earlier, the social science theories do not have the precision of the natural sciences, yet this may be due not to a faulty research design, but to the com­ plexity of the data under analysis. It is possible that

o Kaplan, op. cit. p. 346. 50 communication studies can never be as precise as the hard sciences. The theoretical aims of communication at this time may have to be more modest— simply, the acquisition and codification of knowledge. Communication scholars debate how scientific the discipline can be, given the randomness of the phenomena. At the present, all of the questions raised by scholars in the communication field cannot be answered because of methodological restrictions or because the data has simply not been collected. However, this does not mean that theory construction in communication has to lag. As noted earlier, theory is not so concerned with providing answers as it is with generating questions to guide the research activity. It orients knowledge by enabling the researcher "to fit the pieces of the puzzle together." As Kenneth W. Thompson has suggested Theory gives order and meaning to a mass of phenomena without which it would remain dis­ connected and unintelligible.3

Communication scholars have responded to the method­ ological problems in the discipline in two ways in par­ ticular. The first is to go back and try to describe with more precisely defined categories lumps of data as found

^Kenneth W. Thompson, "Toward a Theory of Inter­ national Politics," American Political Science Review, 49 (September 1955), p . ?35. _ 51 in the real world rather than generating it under labora­ tory conditions. Parallel to this effort has been a re­ orientation toward history with the use of case studies to generate data.

The second is to assign probabilities to expected re­ lationships between variables. In short, most theories only predict with some degree of probability— not in terms of absolutes. This enables the communication scientist to argue that his theories are not absolute laws but do pro­ vide descriptions of probable behavior. Fifteen years ago Harold Guetzkow stated a research design for international relations that may prove helpful to communication scholars. Guetzkow argued that the field of international relations is so extensive and comples that the best research design is to build some clusters of islands of partial theory and research and then attempt to connect these clusters gradually over time as the re­ lationships among the parts become clearer.^ It may be that scholars working in the field will have to begin with a simple purpose. Taxonomic in nature it will simply be to develop categories of data in such a way that other lumps of data may be similarly arranged, and thus the beginnings of comparison are laid.

^Harold Guetzkow, Simulation in International Re­ lations (Englewood Cliffs^ Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 5. 52

The study of international communication must grapple with two difficult and yet somewhat related problems. One

is a problem of how to conceive or categorize the data, and the other is how to manage it so that it can be

analyzed. A solution to the first difficulty is to de­ velop a category system for handling the data. In short, one must have a way of conceiving the events. The traditional scientific method hypothesizes a re­ lationship between some variables and then attempts to create an experimental environment in which other inter­ vening variables are held constant so as to determine whether the hypothesized relationship holds between the independent and dependent variables. This method of analysis has produced some worthy scientific advances in

the natural sciences. However, for the problem at hand this approach is not realistic. It becomes increasingly more difficult to "do science" as the level of inter­

actional complexity increases, and also behavioral vari­ ables are much more difficult to define than physical variables. Finally, from a practical viewpoint, one cannot re­ create the events of say, 1969, nor manipulate them. In addition leaders of nations do not submit to questionnaires or interviews about their past or intended behaviors. 53

In sum, what is suggested here is that international communication analysis produces an almost infinite number of variables to examine and it is impossible, given the

structure of the data, to manipulate it in the traditional "scientific" manner. What is needed, then, is a category

system for ordering the data, for without accurate de­ scription science cannot exist. The systems approach by definition would ideally re-

'quire that all of the components (variables) of the system along with their interactions be viewed at once. In short, everything is relative to everything forming a whole greater than the sum of its parts. From this ideal view­ point, the second problem of analytical manageability,

develops. The communicative exchanges between the U.S. and China produce in their entirety a system of wholly un­ imaginable complexity. The human mind simply cannot process

that much information (i.e. a system). Man is obsolete as a memory device. Therefore, such a system must be broken

down into more manageable units, yet such a simplification may distort the reality. What is involved then is a trade­ off between what is ideal and what is possible. The re­ searcher is on defensible grounds if he realizes that the system under analysis (if it is less than totality) is

then a 'manmade1 construct, the boundaries of the system 54 are created by him, and some of the variables are ignored. Given this understanding, the researcher can define every­ thing under analysis as a system and can proceed with his investigation. As argued in chapters I and II there is warrant for another approach to the study of international relations. A common paradigm is needed. The author argues that it is useful to view international relations as communicative be­ haviors; if one nation is going to interact with another, communication is required. Messages must be sent and re­ ceived between nations. Moreover, in view of the lack of previous analyses of large amounts of international communication among nations' decision-makers, the choice of a method drawn from a field that has concentrated more on communication is probably wise. It is the author's contention that such a method is content analysis. Content analysis is a systematic technique for observ­ ing and analyzing the overt communication behavior of cer­ tain communicators as defined by Budd.^ Generally it's the study of messages, how they were produced, sent, under what conditions and with what effects on the receivers.

^Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp and Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communications (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pT 2~! 55

It is also an "unobtrusive measure" in that the source of the communication content is not aware at the time that his message is being observed by the analyst, as Kerlinger ob­ serves . Content analysis, while certainly a method of analysis, is more than that. It is...a method of observation. Instead of observing people's behavior directly, or asking them to respond to scales, or interviewing them, the investigator takes the communications that people have pro- , duced and asks questions of the communications. The content analyst may investigate the large process under investigation by studying the messages of the larger system and hence, gain some of his primary information, as Krippendorff has suggested. The study of how such symbols are exchanged in complex webs of social interactions and of how messages are transmitted in self-modifying net­ works of communication is expected to yield significant insights into human social behavior on all levels of inquiry. Content analysis is involved in inquiries of this kind.7 Anatol Rapoport has addressed himself to this point and extended the method to a larger area I look upon content analysis as a sort of diag­ nostic technique. Just as medical diagnosis is partly an art and partly a science and is most effective when the art and the science are com­ bined, so I look upon content analysis as a com­ bination of an art and a science. What to pay attention to, what to conjecture about and how to process the data is a matter of art. But

^Pred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 544. ^Klaus Krippendorff, The Analysis of Communication Content (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1969), p. 3^ 56

there is also a science of content analysis. This science is practiced, for example, by programming a computer for analytical purposes.8 As a method, content analysis has grown from a mere counting exercise to one of drawing inferences. As

Krippendorff argues The analytical problem is to inferentially link available observations, the raw data, or in short, text, to specific events, behavior, or phenomena associated with the source. Just as the reader of a letter may wish to understand what it is about, so does the analyst attempt to regard text as messages about specific states or properties of its source.9 Krippendorff and others apparently see a difference in the traditional aims of content analysis, "the processes of interpreting text...by human judges who intuit the content of messages." Krippendorff concludes In scientific approaches to content analysis, em­ phasis is placed on explicit techniques for re­ garding a text as being informative about some specific aspects of its source. Content analysis may therefore be redefined as the use of replicable and valid methods for making specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its ' source.I® Much of the literature on content analysis (Berelson and Lazarsfeld, 1948) does not seem to grasp Krippendorff's critical distinction between treating data as mere observa­ tions, and using data as messages to make inferences about

8Krippendorff, op. cit. p. 7. 8 Ibid. p . 8 . 10Ibid. p. 11. 57 particular unobserved sources. The utility and signifi­ cance of content inferences about sources has been demon­ strated in the work by North and Holsti in which the author's make use of the content analytic technique to make inferences about the origins of World War I. 11 A quick glance at any newspaper suggests that a nation's reaction to another's actions is dependent in large part upon its inferences about the other nation's purpose or intentions behind those actions. Thus the author has attempted to show in this chapter why content analysis would be a suitable research approach to the study.

Students of international relations, whether they apply content-analytic techniques or the more traditional his­ torical ones to the situations, must deal almost exclusively with available communications in written form. In this study the chief participants were not available for inter­ viewing.

For this study the author had access only to public messages between the U.S. and China. One of the strengths of such data as noted earlier in this chapter is that it is generated under natural as opposed to laboratory con­ ditions among the participants. Thus those messages ap­ pearing in The New York Times, the magazines reviewed in

^Robert C. North, Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University, 1963). 58

The Reader1s Guide, U.S. State Department documents con­ cerning the topic of U.S.-China relations, selected (by random number) issues of the Peking Review and Hsinhua, A Survey of the Mainland China News were reviewed and made up the public channel. Public channels of comiiiunication were seen as being particularly relevant to this study because diplomatic re­ lations did not exist between the two nations. Hence, diplomatic messages could not be exchanged between ambass­ adors. Also the public channels were necessary to the governments because each of the peoples had to be "ed­ ucated" to the acceptance of their government's behavior toward the "enemy" country. In short, a government's message had more than one audience. In addition, North, Brody and Holsti write: A feasible approach to the 'behavior' of nation­ states, therefore, is to concentrate on attri­ butes of those relatively few individuals in any given government who make foreign policy deter­ minations and commit their nations to a course in international activity.^2 Thus, the author contends that the messages of key govern­ ment leaders— in this study those of the U.S. Executive branch and the Chinese equivalent, the State Council of the Party Central Committee headed by Chou En-lai, form the basis for the case study under investigation.

12North, op. cit. p. 37. 59

The New York Times is a journal of record which has

proven its reliability over the years and serves as the basic source of messages. The reliability of this source was enhanced by the author's efforts to review other sources in the public sector and to add them to the messages not published in The New York Times. The Reader's Guide

for the time period under study was examined thoroughly for additional events (messages exchanged between the U.S.

and China) to be added to the Times1 listing. Two scholarly journals, Foreign Affairs and The China Quarterly, were also examined for additional events. Finally, a review of

The State Department Bulletin provided additional events. On the Chinese side, in addition to the above mentioned sources, two chief China-based publications were examined, the Peking Review and Hsinhua, A Survey of the Mainland China News. Both of these publications are official govern­ ment publications and are published in English. The author examined all of the publications by Hsinhua for additional events to be added to the case study. The Peking Review is

a weekly and hence, too large to examine entirely. Conse­ quently, the author examined a sample of the Reviews, using a table of random numbers to select the editions for analysis. In all thirty eight issues were examined— or a stratified sample was drawn to ensure at least one Review was examined for each of the months (38) under study. 60

External validity was added to the study design by

interviewing several authorities on Sino-American affairs

at the Institute for Strategic Studies in England April and May, 1972. 13 The study design was presented to these experts to get their reactions, criticisms and suggestions. The author in developing his research design also ex­ plored the field of "semiotic" or the philosophy of language as described by Charles Peirce. This important area was surveyed because many of the scholars in the field have dealt with the distinction between signs, signals and

symbols. The author believes this to be an important area for the study since the basic mental ability that separates man from other animals is his use of symbols to convey meaning. Susanne Langer in her major work, Philosophy in a New Key, has argued that language is made of signs.These signs are composed of what Langer terms "signals and symbols." She states: ...A signal indicates the existence— past, present or future— of a thing, event or condition. Symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are vehicles for the conception of objects. Signals announce their objects while symbols lead their interpreters to conceive their objects.

l-^Major John Elliot, interviews held at the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England, April and May, 1972. !^Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 57-60. 1 5 Ibid. p. 61. 61

Such a distinction is relevant to the data classifi­

cation scheme contained in this chapter on research design. Another important work was by Charles Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior. In his book Morris argues that

semiotic is composed of three areas, semantics, syntactics and pragmatics. He defined semantics as having to do

with the meaning of signs, syntactics as dealing with the relationships between signs and finally pragmatics as having to do with the effects of signs on the users. This is a relevant work to the study because the three distinc­ tions as outlined by Morris form major considerations for

the study design. It is the author's contention that the examination of international interactions may be subdivided into these

same three areas. Applied to the study's framework, then, the first of these may be said to cover the meaning of the messages exchanged between nations. This is important as it is easily possible for nations to transmit messages with syntactical accuracy, but this would be meaningless 'noise'

unless the nations {sender and receiver) agree beforehand what the various symbols "mean.1' Of course, before this level of communication is reached there must be syntactical

^Charles Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1946). 62

agreement. Applied to the study's framework this has to do with information theory and is concerned with the problems of channel, noise, capacity, redundancy and coding. It is not concerned with the meaning of symbols on the semantical level, but is a necessary condition for it to occur. Fin­ ally the third area, pragmatics, must be applied to the study. Since communication affects the behavior of a nation and its resulting interactions with other nations this re­ veals its pragmatic dimension. A communication approach should attempt to combine in an analytical technique the systematic features of general explanatory concepts with the empirical content of more de­ tailed quantitative analysis. In terms of a rough metaphor such an approach in this study would pay attention to the largest trees, but not all of the trees; it would look at the forest, but probably wouldn't see all of it. Such a communication approach would also be concerned with categories of messages in order to identify aspects of the process by which a policy is sent from the initiat­ ing nation to the receiving nation. The methods employed to convey a message offer another basis for grouping for­ eign policies according to their communication festures. A way of understanding the complex data is to develop a category system at a high enough level of abstraction to 63 be applicable to other systems of international communica­ tion. Such a design would need a methodological strategy for coping with large amounts of complex data. The author does offer in this chapter a category-coding system for analyzing the data of this study. If successful, it is a simple but necessary step to translate the communicative events into numbers for quantitative analysis. The fol­ lowing categories for the nations' messages are an attempt to achieve this goal. It may be helpful to think of them as four major dimensions— I. nation, II. signal or symbol, III. nominal distinction, IV. tone (positive or negative). These categories are operationally defined. I. Nation — United States or China (People's Republic) in terms of which country initiates the message. II. Signal — A signal is an action or an announcement of an action that has occurred, is occurring, or will take place. Symbol — A symbol is a written or oral expression of an attitude about the perceived or desired state of another nation. III. Cultural Messages — An exchange of all of those messages by the U.S. and China that reflect a traditional way of life of the nation's people, as reflected in such interchanges as art acquisitions, athletic participation, educational methods, scientific achievements, journalistic accounts, scholarly studies, and visits by tourists. 64

Commercial Messages— The exchange of those messages by the U.S. and China related to the ex­ change of materials, products, trade agree­ ments , currency evaluations and business transactions.

Military Messages— The exchange of messages by the U.S. and China pertaining to the armed forces, their activities, personnel, troop movements, equipment, patrols, reconnaissance missions and defense policies.

Governmental Messages— The exchange of messages by official government decision-makers through direct negotiations, interviews, news con­ ferences, speeches, policy studies and official government publications. This would include only those government (U.S.) officials in the Executive branch of the federal government, and only those Chinese officials in the State Council of the Cen­ tral Party Committee (China).

IV. Tone Positive Messages— The overall tone of the message by the U.S. or China is to promote a change toward friendly or less hostile relations with the other nation.

Negative Messages— The overall tone of the message by the U.S. or China is to maintain or worsen the current state of hostility in the relations with that nation. It is important to note that some of the categories, in particular the nominal, were developed from the data. Others, such as the signal/symbol distinction, came from a priori assumptions based on the author's reading. Although noted earlier it is worth recalling that the signal/symbol operational definitions are in the spirit of the works 65

(previously mentioned) by Morris, Langer and Fotheringham. All of these authors generally state that signals indicate or announce an object (past, present or future) while a symbol refers to the conception of an object. It may add clarity to the definitions to link the idea of "referent" to signal, and that of "reference" to symbol. While both terms may be viewed as "signs," the referential distinction is very useful for the operational definition in this study.

The signal/symbol category seems a useful one as dip­ lomatic communication uses messages to announce or explain actions on the one hand and on the other, to convey sym­ bolic intentions. As Richard Rovere notes, If it were always possible to distinguish between words and deeds, this would be splendid and time- saving rule...However, words often do have con­ sequences (Bombs Awayl), and though there is frequently a disparity between what governments say and what they do, what they say is generally to be regarded as part of what they do— and, at times, the more important part.1 ' Several specific examples are offered for clarity. In April, 1971, China invited the U.S. Ping Pong team to Peking. 18 This would be coded as a signal as it is an action. In 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers suggested the Nixon administration's outlook toward com­ munication with China in a statement delivered to the

17 Richard Rovere, "Letter from Washington," The New Yorker, July 12, 1969, p. 69. 18 The New York Times, April 7, 1971, p. 5. Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he said, "We have attempted to maintain and develop a dialogue with the 19 Chinese." This would be coded as a symbol since it is an oral expression about the desired state the U.S. wishes to have with China. The reader may notice that both ex­ amples contain signal or symbol attributes. However, if the operational definitions are reread, and if the reader will note that just because a government official makes a statement, he will understand that the message is not viewed as "action" in the spirit of the signal operational defi­ nition. An action is defined here as denoting a specific event that has taken or will take place. This distinction is necessary to the study otherwise, every government official's statement could be viewed as an action and, hence, the category would lose its meaning. Another example may help. In July, 1969, the U.S. relaxed its curbs on travel and trade with China.2 0 Since this is a specific action, the message announcement of it would be coded as a signal. Concerning the reliability of the category system, a preliminary sample of items (all items in 1969 or 39 which was 24% of the total) was tested for unitizing and cate­ gorizing reliability. Unitizing reliability, a test de­ signed to insure that coders select the same amount of data

^ The New York Times, April 2, 1969, p. 16. 20The New York Times, July 22, 1969, p. 1. 67 for each category of classification, was accounted for by the fact that the same number of messages based on publi­ cation dates were measured for each month. That is, each of the coders did consider the same amount of material as they were instructed by the author to consider all of the items in the sample for classification. Since each item had a date and was part of the sample, and the coders did assign only one four-digit code per item from the 1969 messages, each coder did in fact examine the same amount of material. Coding procedure thus accounted for unitizing reliability. Categorizing reliability, indicating the proportion of items which the coders classified similarly, was computed by a formula developed by Leonard Hawes. 21 The estimates of the categorizing reliability for the coders were derived by summing the items which they classified correctly and those items classified incorrectly and then dividing by the total number of items coded. Levels of significance at the .05 level were computed with an estimated coding reliability of .83 for the category system, signal/symbol; 100 for nations; .87 for the nominal categories, and .92 for tone

(positive or negative).

O 1 Leonard C. Hawes, "Development and Application of an Interview Coding System" Central States Speech Journal, XXIII, No. 2 (1972), pp. 95-96. 68

Following this the author began coding the data based

on the categories that had been developed. The operational definitions cited earlier were used to place the messages in the categories. Each of the items received only one four­

digit coding classification (discussed later in this chapter) so that, each message was only coded once by the author. In all, 158 messages were coded by the author, and recorded on a Batelle standard coding form (fortran statement) for com­

puter analysis. As a procedural operation for analyzing the data, the author imposed a time frame of one month. That is a total of thirty-eight monthly categories was defined (from January, 1969, to February, 1972). All of the messages by the U.S.

and China were thus divided by mutually exclusive categories— the particular month as to when the messages were initiated. For example, all of the messages by the U.S. and China for January, 1969 would be coded and placed within that time

frame. A method of coding the interactions between the U.S. and China is offered. A digital code necessary for computer calculations offers a suitable scheme based on a design by

Mark for coding the speech behavior in a dyad.22 The coding

scheme:

9 9 Robert A. Mark, "Coding Communication at the Relation­ ship Level," The Journal of Communication, Vol. 21:3 (1971), pp. 221-232. 69

First Digit Code— U.S.— 1 China— 2 Second Digit Code— Signal— 1 Symbol— 2 Third Digit Code (nominal categories)— Cultural— 1 ,

Commercial— 2, Military— 3, and Governmental— 4. Fourth Digit Code— Positive— 1 Negative— 2 All silence is coded as 0000. Given these four digits it becomes possible to code the nation, the signal or symbol distinction, one of the four nominal categories, and the tone (positive or negative) of a nation's message. For example, suppose the U.S. announces that it is dropping travel restrictions to China as of the date of the announcement: based on the above coding scheme the message would be coded this way for analysis— nation or U.S. (1); signal (1 ) since it announces an action; the nominal category of cultural (1 ) since it has to do with travel and tourists; and, finally, it would be coded as a positive (1 ) tone since it promotes a change toward friendly relations. On the coding sheet it would-be marked as 1111. All of the months of the study (38) for 1969, 1970, 1971, and January and February of 1972 were examined and the messages falling in those time frames were coded according to the four-digit scheme. Given this numerical data, it was necessary and possible to analyze it for meaningful patterns by computer techniques, 70 so personnel experienced with computer computation were consulted.33 As a result of these conferences the coded messages were numbered for keypunch processing. A Chi Square test for correlations was used along with the con­ struction of a 32 x 32 matrix for analysis. The Chi Square statistic was used since a nonparametric test was needed as one is dealing with nominal data in mutually exclusive categories. Since the study dealt with the entire popula­ tion (and not a scientific sample) with observed frequencies of data in categories, a Chi Square statistic is an appro­ priate test for the null hypothesis. Completed code sheets were checked and coded for proper form for data processing, and were taken to the Batelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio. There, the coded data was transferred through the keypunch process to IBM cards for coding, ease of analysis, cross sorting and final tabulation. The statistical analysis of sums, means, percentages, horizontal and vertical dis­ tributions, standard deviations, frequencies, correlations and tests of significance was accomplished by the use of computer at Battelle. The data are presented in Chapter IV and are inter­ preted in Chapter V.

2 ^Fred Goodman, interviews held at Battelle Memorial Institute, March and April, 1973. CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA

This chapter presents the data derived from the pro­ cedures described in Chapter III. The data will be pre­ sented as total frequencies for both nations totaled to­ gether. Total frequencies for each individual nation will also be presented. In addition the Chi Square test statis­ tic will be used on the data for both nations. Because the data is presented in true matrix form each of the message variables will be compared to every other message variable for analysis. This procedure has the advantage of com­ paring any message variable with any other message variable, and thus the relationship can be revealed. In short, the matrix format allows every variable to be compared. The Chi Square test statistic was selected as an ap­ propriate test for the null hypothesis since the study dealt with the entire population (and not a scientific sample), and a nonparametric test is useful since the data is in nominal form. Percentages for the data are presented in parenthesis in the tables. Message Frequencies There were a total of 158 messages examined in this study in terms of messages exchanged between the U.S. and China. Both nations initiated about the same number of messages with the U.S. sending a total of eighty-two while China sent seventy-six. The year, 1971, was the peak period for both countries mainly due to the Chinese invitation to the U.S. ping pong team followed by many exchanged messages.

Table 1 depicts the total message distribution according to year for each country, the percentages are shown in paren­ thesis .

Table 1 FREQUENCIES BY INITIATING COUNTRY IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972* Total 158 39 (24.7) 32 (20.3) 79 (50.0) 8 (5.1) U.S. 82 18 (2 2 .0 ) 14 (17.1) 44 (53.7) 6 (7.3) China 76 21 (27.6) 18 (23.7) 35 (46.1) 2 (2 .6 ) *The date 1972 represents from January 1, 1972 to February 20, 1972, {President Nixon landed in Peking February 21, 1972) . The type (signal or symbol) of message for each year is shown in Table 2. The signal/symbol category was used about equally when both nation's messages were considered in the final tally. 73

TABLE 2

FREQUENCY BY TYRE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE

Total " 1969 1'9T(T" 1971 1972 Total 158 39 32 79 8 Signal 76 16 (21.1) 17 (22.4) 41 (53.9) 2 (2.6) Symbol 82 23 (28.0) 15 (18.3) 38 (46.3) 6 (7.3) The nominal categories (cultural, commercial, military and governmental) are totaled for both nations according to year in Table 3. Cultural with thirty-five messages (22 percent) and governmental with ninety-seven messages (61 per cent) account for most of the nominal categories while military and commercial were not used as often by the U.S. and China as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

FREQUENCY BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE

Total "1969 ... 1970 1971 X 97 2 Cultural 35 7 (20.0) 3 (8 .6 ) 25 (71.4) 0 (0 .0 ) Commercial 15 4 (26.7) 2 (13.3) 8 (53.3) 1 (6.7) Military 11 3 (27.3) 1 O.l) 7 (63.6) 0 (0 .0 ) Governmental 97 25 (25.8) 26 (26.8) 39 (40.2) 7 (7.2) The tone of the messages (positive or negative) are totaled in Table 4. Of the total messages the majority of them are positive 115 (72.8 per cent) while forty-three are negative (27.2 per cent). The positive messages number about the same for 1969 and 1970, 22 and 23 respectively, but there 74

was a large increase in 1971 with sixty-four positive mes­ sages. There were seventeen negative messages in 1969 and fifteen in 1971.

TABLE 4

FREQUENCY BY TONE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972 Positive 115 22 (19.1) 23 (20.0) 64 (55.7) 6 (5.2) Negative 43 17 (39.5) 9 (20.9) 15 (34.9) 2 (4.7)

Frequencies for U.S. Initiated Messages In the messages initiated by the U.S. according to type (signal or symbol) there is almost an even split with forty- two signals (51.2 per cent) and forty symbols (48.8 per

cent). That is, in the time period under study the U.S. did not seem to prefer one type of message over another using signal and symbol evenly. Table 5 shows this distribution for the U.S.

TABLE 5 FREQUENCY BY TYPE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. INITIATED MESSAGES

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 82 18 (2 2 .0 ) 14 (17.1) 44 (53.7) 6 (7.3) Signal 42 8 (19.0) 7 (16.7) 25 (59.5) 2 (4.8) Symbol 40 10 (25.0) 7 (17.5) 19 (47.5) 4 (10) As Table 5 reveals the U.S. increases the use of signal messages at a higher rate than its symbol type of messages going from 19.0 per cent in 1969 to 59.5 per cent in 1971. Symbol messages are also increased over the same time period but not at the same rate of increase.

The nominal categories for those U.S. initiated mes­ sages reveals that the governmental channel was the most frequently used (61.0 per cent) followed by the cultural (18.3 per cent), commercial (14.6 per cent), and military

(6.1 per cent). The data is presented in Table 6 .

TABLE 6 FREQUENCY BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. INITIATED MESSAGES

Total 1969 19 TO T 9 T T " _ Total 82 18 14 44 6 Cultural 15 3 (2 0 .0 ) 1 (6.7) 11 (73.3) 0 (0 .0 ) Commercial 12 12 (25.0) 3 (8.3) 1 (58.3) 7 (8.3) Military 5 1 (2 0 .0 ) 1 (2 0 .0 ) 3 (60.0) 0 (0 .0 ) Governmental 150 1 1 (2 2 .0 ) 1 1 (2 2 .0 ) 23 (46.0) 5 (10.0) In the U.S. initiated messages the tone is positive rather than negative for the time period under study. In total seventy-six (92.7 per cent) of the U.S. messages were positive as opposed to six (7.3 per cent) negative. Thus over time the U.S. sent an overwhelming number of positive messages. Table 7 illustrates the tone data for the U.S. by frequency and by percentage. Insights may be revealed .76 by looking at the messages for each year and then deter­ mining the percentage of positive and negative for that period. Table 7 presents this data.

TABLE 7

FREQUENCY BY TONE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. INITIATED MESSAGES

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 82 (100) (1 0 0 ) (1 0 0 ) (1 0 0 ) (1 0 0 ) Positive 76 (92.7) 17 (94.4) 13 (92.9 41 (93.2) 5 (83.3) Negative 6 (7.3) 1 (5.6) 1 (7.1) 3 (6 .8 ) 1 (16.7)

Frequencies for China Initiated Messages

In the messages initiated by China according to type (signal or symbol) there is a slight predominance of symbol messages, forty-two (55.3 per cent), to signal messages, thirty-four (44.7 per cent). In contrast to the equal usage by the U.S., China used the symbolic message about ten per cent more often than signals. Table 8 illustrates the dis­ tribution for China.

TABLE 8 FREQUENCY BY TYPE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA INITIATED MESSAGES

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 76(100) 21(27.6) 18 (23.7) 35 (46.1) 2 (2 .6 ) Signal 34 8 (23.5) 10 (29.4) 16 (47.1) 0 (0 .0 ) Symbol 42 13 (31.0) 8 (19.0) 19 (45.2) 2 (4.8) It?

As Table 8 reveals China increased its use of symbolic messages from 1970 to 1971 more than its signal type of messages. The nominal categories for the China initiated mes­ sages reveals that, like the U.S., the cultural and govern­ mental channels were more frequently used. The governmental channel was used forty-seven (61.8 per cent) times, cul­ tural twenty (26.3 per cent), military six (7.9 per cent) and commercial three (3.9 per cent). The data is presented in Table 9.

TABLE 9

FREQUENCY BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA INITIATED MESSAGES

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 76 21 (27.6) 18 (23.7) 35 (46.1) 2 (2 .6 ) Cultural 20 4 (20.0) 2 (1 0 .0 ) 14 (70.0) 0 (0 .0 ) Commercial 3 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 0 (0 .0 ) Military 6 2 (33.3) 0 (0 .0 ) 4 (66.7) 0 (0 .0 ) Government 47 14 (29.8) 15 (31.9) 16 (34.0) 2 (4.3) In the China initiated messages the tone is split al­ most evenly between positive and negative if only totals are considered. However, across the years under study it should be pointed out that the tone of China's messages does become more positive. The positive category does increase across the years under study while the negative drops in 1970, but shows a slight increase in 1971. The tone date is shown in Table 10. 78

TABLE 10

FREQUENCY BY TONE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF YEAR OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA INITIATED MESSAGES

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 76 21 (27.6) 18 (23.7) 35 (46.1) 2 (2 .6 ) Positive 39 5 (12.8) 10 (25.6) 23 (59.0) 1 (2 .6 ) Negative 37 16 (43.2) 8 (2 1 .6 ) 12 (32.4) 1 (2.7) It is also helpful to view the percentage of positive or negative messages as a percentage of a given year. This distribution is shown in Table 11.

TABLE 11 PERCENTAGES FOR EACH YEAR FOR TONE MESSAGES

Total 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 100 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 Positive 51.3 23.8 55.6 65.7 50.0 Negative 48.7 76.2 44.4 34.3 50.0 As noted in Chapter III a Chi-Square test for correla­ tions was used since a nonparametric test is appropriate for analyzing nominal data in mutually exclusive categories. Further, since the study dealt with the entire population (observed frequencies of data in categories) and not with a sample of such items, a Chi-Square statistic is an appro­ priate test for the null hypothesis. The level of confidence was set at the .05 level. A number of the following tables are not significant at the confidence level .05, however, since the thrust of 79 this study is descriptive and general trends are noted in the final chapter the author has included the results of all the Chi-Square tests. Another reason for including all the tests is that the author sought to compare every major variable with every other major variable {a true matrix), and thus the reader should have the opportunity to examine this in operation as an interesting computer technique.

In following this technique the tables that are significant at the .05 level will be marked with an asterisk.

Chi-Square Analysis The first set of Chi-Square tables represents the mes­ sages of both the U.S. and China totaled together and com­ pared to the major message categories. The time periods before 1970 and after 1970 were developed as categories so as to get some measure of what was happening over time. This is an important distinction as the Chinese invitation to the U.S. ping pong team occurred in 1971 and thereby, produced a large number of messages in that year. Table 12 illustrates the data for both countries in relation to time periods. 80

TABLE 12 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY INITIATING COUNTRY IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 158 (100) 71 (44.9) 87 (55.1) U.S. 82 32 (39.0) 50 (61.0) China 76 39 (51.3) 37 (48.7) The data does reveal that the U.S. sent more messages after 1970 (61.0 per cent), but China's declined (48.7 per cent).

The data reveals that the U.S. did increase its messages after 1970, but statistical significance is not achieved when both countries are considered together because of China's decline in messages after 1970. Type of message (signal or symbol) reveals no signifi­ cant pattern when both countries are considered together in terms of time periods. Table 13 presents this data.

TABLE 13 ' CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TYPE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 158 (100) 71 (44.9) 87 (55.1) Signal 76 33 (43.4) 43 (56.6) Symbol 82 38 (46.3) 44 (53.7) Table 13 shows no significant difference based to time periods for signal or symbol usage. That is, both time periods reflect about the same amount of type of message usage. Nominal categories for both countries in terms of time periods reveals no significant differences. Two categories,

cultural and governmental were used by both countries most frequently. Commercial and military were used less by the

U.S. and China; in fact these channels were used so seldom (9.5 and 7.0 per cent respectively) that statistical sig­ nificance was not possible (the percentage of cells with

expected value greater than five was 87.5). Table 14 shows the nominal category date. The percentages are included for further analysis since the low number of commercial and military messages eliminates the possibility of statistical significance at the .05 level. If the nominal categories are examined as percentages of the total number of messages appearing in a given time period, before or after 1970, trends do appear. Table 14 presents this date.

TABLE 14

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Betore ' After Total 1970 1970 Total 158 (100) 71 87 Cultural 35 (22.2) 10 (14.1) 25 (28.7) Commercial 15 (9.5) 6 (8.5) 9 (10.3) Military 1 1 (7 .0 ) 4 (5.6) . 7 (8.0) Government 97 (61.4) 51 (71.8) 46 (52.9) The analysis of tone data (positive or negative) for both countries over periods of time does reveal that the messages became more positive (friendly). The tone data is presented in Table 15 and is statistically significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 15

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TONE OF MESSAGES IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

— Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 158 (100) 71 (44.9) 87* (55.1) Positive 115 45 39.1) 70* (60.9) Negative 43 26 (60.5) 17* (39.5) P < .05 Table 15 shows that seventy {80.5 per cent) of the eighty- seven messages sent after 1970 were positive. Thus the total messages sent became more friendly over time.

A Chi Square analysis was also used to test for sig­ nificance when comparing message variables. That is, the tone category was compared to the type category for sig­ nificance. Table 16 illustrates the results of this com­ parison.

TABLE 16

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TONE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF MESSAGE TYPE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Total Signal Symbol Total 158 (100) 76 (48.1) 82 (51.9) Positive 115 67* (58.3) 48 (41.7) Negative 43 9 (20.9) 34 (79.1) P < .05 - Table 16 shows that positive messages are generally corre­ lated with signal categories while negative messages are correlated with the symbol distinction. The data is in­

teresting because it reveals that both nations1 messages when totaled together link positive tone and signal type of message together at the .05 level. Accordingly both nations also link negative tone with symbol type message as shown in the data. This last is also statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence.

The test statistic, Chi Square, was also used to compare the nominal categories with message tone. Table 17 pre­ sents this comparison.

TABLE 17

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF MESSAGE TONE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Total Positive Negative Total 158 (100) 115 (72.8) 43 (27.2) Cultural 35 32* (91.4) 3 (*.6 ) Commercial 15 13 (86.7) 2 (13.3) Military 1 1 5 (45.5) 6 (54.5) Government 97 65* (67.0) 32 (33.0) *P < .05

Both countries apparently linked the cultural message cate­ gory with a positive toned message while also associating the governmental category with the positive tone. The same association exists for the commercial category, but the 84>. ,

small number of coded messages is not strong enough to sus­ tain a correlation. (The percentage of cells with expected

value greater than five equaled 75.0).

Nominal categories for both countries in terms of types of messages reveals some statistical significance at the

.05 level. The comparison of these variables suggests that cultural messages are associated with signal type. The

commercial category suggests the same association. However, the governmental category is usually linked to the symbolic message. The data is presented in Table 18.

TABLE 18

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF TYPE OF MESSAGE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Total Signal Symbol TOTAL 158 (100) 76 (48.1) 82 (51.9) Cultural 35 26* (74.3) 9 (25.7) Commercial 15 13* (86.7) 2 (13.3) Military 11 6 (54.5) 5 (45.5) Governmental 97 31 (32.0) 6 6 * (6 8 .0 ) * P < .05

A Chi Square analysis of message types (signal and symbol) compared to time periods reveals no statistical difference at the .05 level. That is, there is no signifi­ cant difference in signal of symbol usage when compared to the time periods before and after 1970. The data is pre­ sented in Table 19. 85

TABLE 19

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TYPE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Total Before After 158 (100) 1970 1970 Total 71 (100) 87 (100) Signal 76 (48.1) 33 (46.5) 43 (49.4) Symbol 82 (51.9) 38 (53.5) 44 (50.6) Over the time periods, before and after 1970, as Table 19 illustrates there was no statistical difference in message type (signal or symbol) usage.

Chi Square Analysis of U.S. Messages

After conducting Chi Square analysis of both nations1 messages totaled together it is useful to seperate the mes­ sages of the U.S. and China for further analysis. A Chi Square analysis of message types (signal or symbol) com­ pared to time periods (before and after 1970) for the U.S. reveals no statistical significance. However, the data is reported in Table 20.

TABLE 20

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TYPE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 82 (1 0 0 ) 32 (100) 50 (100) Signal 42 (51.2) 15 (46.9) 27 (54.0) Symbol 40 (48.8) 17 (53.1) 23 (46.0) 86

Table 20 does reflect what appears to be a trend toward

signal usage by the U.S. after 1970 even though it is not statistically significant at .05.

Nominal categories were also examined by Chi Square analysis to see if there was any significant change in their usage before and after 1970 by the U.S. The Chi Square

analysis did not reveal any statistical difference (.05 level) in nominal category usage. However, this is predictable be­ cause of the low number of commercial and military message (percentage of cells with expected value greater than five was 62.5). The data is presented in Table 21.

TABLE 21

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OP PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 82 (1 0 0 ) 32 (100) 50 (100) Cultural 15 (18.3) 4 (12.5) 1 1 (2 2 .0 ) Commercial 12 (14.6) 4 (12.5) 8 (16.0) Military 5 (6.1) 2 (6 .2 ) 3 (6.0) Governmental 50 (61.0) 22 (68.7) 28 (56.0) Despite the lack of significance (due to low cells) a pos­ sible trend is suggested in the cultural category. There is an increase in cultural messages after 1970 from thirty- two before 1970 to fifty after 1970. Also there seems to be a declining trend in the use of governmental messages after 1970. An examination of the tone (positive or negative) of U.S. messages across time underscores a large number of positive messages but very few negative messages. An analy­ sis of the data shows that the U.S. was significantly posi­ tive over time, but the low number of negative messages (percentage of cells with expected value greater than five was 50.0) eliminated any chance of statistical significance.

The tone data is illustrated in Table 22.

TABLE 22

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TONE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 82 (1 0 0 ) 32 (100) 50 (100) Positive 76 (92.7) 30 (93.7) 46 (92.0) Negative 6 (7.3) 2 (6 .2 ) 4 (8.0) When nominal categories of U.S. messages are compared with types of messages (signal or symbol) a significant statistical difference is produced. Despite the low number of commercial and military messages significance at the .05 level is achieved. The nominal data compared to types of messages is presented in Table 23. 88

TABLE 23

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF TYPES OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Total Signal Symbol Total 82 (1 0 0 ) 42 (51.2) 40 (48.8) Cultural 15 10* (66.7) 5 (33.3) Commercial 12 1 2 * (1 0 0 ) 0 (0 .0 ) Military 5 4 (80.0) 1 (2 0 .0 ) Governmental 50 16 (32.0) 34* (68.0) *P < .05 A comparison of type of message (signal or symbol) with tone of message for the U.S. produces no statistical signifi­ cance due mainly to the few number of negative messages (percentage of cells with expected value greater than five equals 50.0). An examination of message type to positive tone shows an almost equal use of signal and symbol. Table

24 presents the data.

TABLE 24 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TYPE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF TONE OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Total Positive Negative Total 82 (1 0 0 ) 76 (92.7) 6 (7.3) Signal 42 40 (95.2) 2 (4.8) Symbol 40 36 (90.0) 4 (10.0) If nominal categories are compared to tone of message for U.S. messages, no statistical significance results. Once again the few number of negative messages produces 89

little chance of significance, (percentage of cells with

expected value greater than five equaled 37.5). The data is presented in Table 25.

TABLE 25

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF TONE OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Total Positive Negative Total 82 (1 0 0 ) 76 (92.7) 6 (7.3) Cultural 15 15 (100) 0 (0 .0 ) Commercial 12 1 2 (1 0 0 ) 0 (0 .0 ) Military 5 4 (80.0) 1 (2 0 .0 ) Governmental 50 45 (90.0) 5 (10.0)

Chi Square Analysis of China Messages A Chi Square analysis of message types (signal or symbol) compared to time periods (before and after 1970) for China reveals no statistical significance. However, the descrip­ tive data is presented in Table 26.

TABLE 26 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TYPE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 76 (100) 39 (100) 37 (100) Signal 34 (44.7) 18 (46.2) 16 (43.2) Symbol 42 (55.3) 21 (53.8) 21 (56.8) The data in Table 26 suggests that China made no significant change in her usage of signals and symbols over time. For 90

example, China used the same number of symbols, twenty-one, for both before and after 1970. The same distribution for the signal category except for a slight decline after 1970 is evident in the table.

Nominal categories were also examined by Chi Square analysis to see if there was any significant change in their

usage before and after 1970 by China. The Chi Square analy­ sis did not reveal any statistical difference {.05 level) in nominal category usage over time. However, this is pre­

dictable because of the few number of commercial and military messages (percentage of cells with expected value greater

than five equaled 50.0). The data is presented in Table 27.

v TABLE 27 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 76 (100) 39 (100) 37 (100) Cultural 20 (26.3) 6 (15.4) 14 (37.8) Commercial 3 (3.9) 2 (5.1) 1 (2.7) Military 6 (7.9) 2 (5.1) 4 (10.8) Governmental 47 (61.8) 29 (74.4) 18 (48.6) Despite the lack of significance (due to low cells) a pos­ sible trend is suggested in the cultural and governmental categories. There is an increase in cultural messages after

1970 and a decrease in the governmental. 91

An examination of the tone (positive or negative) of China messages across time suggests an increase in positive messages after 1970 corresponding with a decrease in nega­ tive messages after 1970. An analysis of the data shows that the Chinese message trends toward the positive were statistically significant. The tone data is shown in Table 28. TABLE 28 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TONE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 76 (100) 39 (51.3) 37 (48.7) Positive 39 15 (38.5) 24* (61.5) Negative 37 24 (64.9) 13* (35.1) * P < .05

With significance at the .05 level of confidence the data suggests that China's messages did get more positive or friendlier over time toward the U.S. When nominal categories of China messages are compared with types of messages (signal or symbol) a significant statistical difference is produced. Despite the low number of commercial and military messages significance at the .05 level is achieved. The nominal data compared to types of messages is presented in Table 29. 92

TABLE 29

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF TYPE OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Total Signal Symbol Total 76 (100) 34 (100) 42 (100) Cultural 20 (26.3) 16* (47.1) 4 (9.5) Commercial 3 (3.9) 1 (2.9) 2 (4.8) Military 6 (7.9) 2 (5.9) 4 (9.5) Governmental 47 (61.8) 15 (44.1) 32* (76.2) *P < .05

The data suggests that China often sends her cultural messages via signal type while transmitting governmental mes sages through the symbolic form. The few number of commer­ cial and military messages eliminates any test on them of statistical significance. A comparison of tone of message (positive or negative) with type of message (signal or symbol) for China produces statistical significance at .05. China usually sent a positive message via signal while negative toned messages were sent through the symbolic form. The tone type data is illustrated in Table 30.

TABLE 30 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY TONE OF MESSAGE IN TERMS OF TYPE OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Total Signal Symbol Total 76 (100) 34 (44.7) 42 (55.3) Positive 39 27* (69.2) 12 (30.8) Negative 37 7 (18.9) 30* (81.1) *P < .05 93

If nominal categories are compared to tone of message

for China messages statistical differences at the .05 level are found. The data is shown in Table 31.

TABLE 31

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OP TONE OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Total Positive Negative Total 76 (100) 39 (100) 37 (100) Cultural 20 (26.3) 17* (43.6) 3 (8.1) Commercial 3 (3.9) 1 (2 .6 ) 2 (5.4) Military 6 (7.9) 1 (2 .6 ) 5 (13.5) Governmental 47 (61.8) 20 (51.3) 27* (73.0) *P < .05 The data in Table 31 suggests that cultural messages were

usually positive for China while governmental messages were negative. The few number of commercial and military messages makes it impossible to achieve statistical significance

(percentage of cells with expected value greater than five equaled 50.0). There is a hint of the military message

associated with the negative tone, but with so few coded messages it is impossible to say with any statistical con­

fidence.

Chi Square Analysis of Selected Nominal Categories

Because of the relatively few number of^commercial and military coded messages, these were dropped and only

cultural and governmental categories were used for 94 statistical analysis. When cultural and governmental nomi­ nal categories are considered for both countries totaled to­ gether statistical significance at .05 level is achieved suggesting an association between cultural and signal and between governmental and symbol. This is reflected in Table 32.

TABLE 32 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY SELECTED NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OP TYPE OF MESSAGES FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Total Signal Symbol Total 132 (100) 57 (43.2) 75 (56.8) Cultural 35 26* (74.3) 9 (25.7) Governmental 97 31 (32.0) 6 6 * (6 8 .0 ) *P < .05 A Chi Square analysis of selected nominal categories with tone of message does reveal statistical significance at .05. For both countries cultural was associated with the positive tone while governmental was linked with the nega­ tive. The data is illustrated in Table 33.

TABLE 33 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY SELECTED NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF TONE OF MESSAGE FOR BOTH COUNTRIES

Total Positive Negative Total 132 (100) 97 (73.5) 35 (26.5) Cultural 35 32* (91.4) 3 (8 .6 ) Governmental 97 65* (67.0) 32 (33.0) *P < .05 95

Chi Square Analysis of Selected U.S. Nominal Categories A comparison of selected U.S. nominal message categories in terms of time period before and after 1970 does not reveal

statistical significance at .05. However, a trend toward fewer governmental messages and more cultural after 1970 is

suggested. The data is presented in Table 34.

TABLE 34 CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 65 (100) 26 (100) 39 (100) Cultural 15 (23.1) 4 (15.4) 11 (38.2) Governmental 50 (76.9) 22 (84.6) 28 (71.8) If selected nominal categories are compared to type of

message (signal or symbol) for U.S. initiated messages statistical significance at .05 is found. For the U.S. cul­ tural messages are associated with signal type while the

governmental message are associated with the symbol type. The data is shown in Table 35.

TABLE 35

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY SELECTED NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF MESSAGE TYPE FOR U.S. MESSAGES

Total Signal Symbol Total 65 (100) 26 (40.0) 39 (60.0) Cultural 15 10* (66.7) 5 (33.3) Governmental 50 16 (32.0) 34* (68.0) *P < .05 96

Chi Square Analysis of Selected China Nominal Categories A Chi Square analysis of selected nominal categories

(cultural and governmental) in terms of time period before and after 1970 for China message produces statistical sig­ nificance at .05. For China there was an increase in cul­ tural messages after 1970 and a corresponding decline in governmental messages after 197 0 as shown in Table 36.

TABLE 36

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY SELECTED NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF PERIOD OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Before After Total 1970 1970 Total 67 (100) 35 (52.2) 32 (47.8) Cultural 20 6 (30.0) 14* (70.0) Governmental 47 29* (61.7) 18 (38.3) < ,0b

If selected nominal categories are compared to type of message (signal and symbol) for messages initiated by China statistical significance is achieved at .05. As the data suggests China apparently sent cultural messages via signal while governmental messages were sent by symbol most of the time. Table 37 illustrates this finding. TABLE 37

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY SELECTED NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF TYPE OF MESSAGE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Total Signal Symbol Total 67 (100) 31 (45.3) 36 (53.7) Cultural 20 16* (80.0) 4 (20.0) Governmental 47 15 (31.9) 32* (68.1) *P < .05 A Chi Square analysis of selected nominal categories in terms of message tone (positive or negative) for China mes­ sages revealed statistical significance at .05. Table 38

shows the data.

TABLE 3 8

CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS BY SELECTED NOMINAL CATEGORIES IN TERMS OF MESSAGE TONE FOR CHINA MESSAGES

Total Positive Negative Total 67 (100) 37 (100) 30 (100) Cultural 20 17* (85.0) 3 (15.0) Governmental 47 20 (42.6) 27* (57.4) *P < .05 As shown in Table 38 China apparently tended to send cultural messages through a positive tone while sending governmental via negative tone.

Summary of Statistically Significant Findings (.05) 1. The tone (positive or negative) of messages for both countries for the time period after 1970 is positive. Thus 98 over time one can say that the message exchange between the U.S. and China became more friendly. 2. For both countries, positive messages were associated with signal message types while negative messages were asso­ ciated with the symbolic type of message. 3. Both countries linked cultural messages with positively toned messages while governmental messages were often sent through negatively toned messages. 4. Nominal categories, cultural and governmental, for both countries suggested that cultural messages were associated with signal and governmental messages were associated with the symbol type of message. 5. An analysis of U.S. messages alone reveals that cultural messages were usually sent through a signal type of message while governmental messages were sent by a symbolic type of message. 6. The tone of China's messages changed after 1970 from negative to positive. 7. In terms of nominal categories, China usually sent cul­ tural messages via signal type, but sent her governmental messages through symbol. 8 . For China, positive messages were most likely to be transmitted by signal while negative messages usually ap­ peared via symbol. 99

9. China most often would send her positive messages by cultural route while negative messages usually were sent by the governmental form.

10. With the messages of both countries considered together, cultural messages increased after 1970, but governmental mes­ sages declined. CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to examine the communica­ tive exchange between the United States and the People's Republic of China from January, 1969 to February 20, 1972. The outcome of this exchange is known, improved relations between the two nations, but the question of how such an outcome evolved after two previous decades of hostility pointed to the need for such a study. An appraisal of the messages of both nations was necessary before one could be­ gin an explanation of how the outcome evolved.

A message category system was developed by the investi­ gator, a coding scheme applicable to computer techniques, and data were collected from public documents were completed in order to accomplish this task.

Summary of Procedure The research procedures involved (1) a survey of the literature to gain background and direction, (2) collecting the messages of both nations concerning their international relations with each other as reported in public documents, (3) developing a category system for the messages, (4) im­ plementing a coding scheme for the messages suitable to

1D0 101

computer application, (5) coding the messages and trans­ ferring the numerical codes through keypunch processing to IBM cards, (6) statistical treatment and analysis of data by computer, and (7) presenting the data in tabular form.

The hypotheses investigated were: 1. The communicative exchanges of the U.S and China will reflect patterns (defined as a recurring sequence of behaviors) in the time period under study? 2. Over time the relations between the U.S. and China became more friendly as reflected in their messages to one another; and 3. There will be statistically significant associa­ tions between the message categories for each country.

The Statistical Treatment In order to test the hypotheses of this study the fol­ lowing statistical procedure was used. A nonparametric test statistic, Chi Square, was used since the data was in nominal form in muturally exclusive categories. Frequencies, hori­ zontal and vertical distributions, associations and expected distributions were determined by computer at Batelle Memorial Institute. The Chi Square test was used to identify statis­ tical difference at the .05 percent level of confidence. 102

Findings A summary of the investigator's major findings is as follows: 1. There were a total of 158 messages examined with both nations initiating about the same number of messages (the U.S. sent eighty-two while China sent seventy-six). The year (1971) was the peak period for both countries mainly due to the Chinese invitation to the U.S. ping pong team followed by many exchanged messages. 2. The type of message category (signal or symbol) was used about equally by both nations. 3. Of the nominal categories (cultural, commercial military and governmental) both nations relied on the cul­ tural and governmental channels more than the others. 4. Over time, the messages of both nations became significantly more positive in tone. 5. During the period under study the U.S. incrased its rate of use of signals and decreased its use of symbols whereas China increased its rate of symbol usage more than signal. 6 . The U.S. apparently sent cultural messages via the signal mode while sending governmental messages via symbol. 103

7. Despite the lack of statistical significance there does seem to be a trend for both nations to increase their

cultural messages and to decrease their governmental messages after 1970. 8 . China often sends her cultural messages via signal

while transmitting governmental messages through the sym­ bolic form. 9. China usually sent a positive message by signal while sending negative toned messages via symbol. 10. For China cultural messages were usually positive while governmental messages were negative. 11. If only selected nominal categories (cultural and governmental) are examined in terms of time periods before and after 1970, China increased its cultural messages after 1970 while decreasing its governmental. 12. For both countries, positive messages were asso­ ciated with signal message types while negative messages were associated with the symbolic type of message. 13. The tone of China's messages changed after 1970 from negative to positive. 14. Both countries linked cultural messages with posi­ tive toned messages while governmental messages were often sent through negative toned messages.

In summary, the findings support all three of the

original hypotheses. 104

Conclusions 1. An examination of the exchanged messages during the time period under study shows that the nations did become more positive (friendly) toward one another. Over time most of the U.S. messages were friendly while China shifted from a negative stance in 1969 to a positive or friendly position in 1970 and 1971. 2. In the messages initiated by the U.S. according to type (signal or symbol) there was almost an even split with forty-two signals and forty symbols. The U.S. did not seem to prefer one type of message over another. Viewed another way, the U.S. used action-oriented messages about as often as attitudinal-oriented messages. 3. In the messages initiated by China according to type there was a slight predominance of symbol messages, forty-two (55.3 per cent) to signal messages, thirty-four (44.7 per cent). This difference is in contrast with the equal usage of the U.S. 4. Of the nominal categories both nations used the governmental channel the most (about 61 per cent of the total) followed by the cultural. The commercial and mili­ tary channels were used very little by either nation. 5. Both nations when sending negative or unfriendly messages to one another encoded it in the symbolic form 105 while positive or friendly messages were associated with the signal messages. In reality many of the negative sym­ bolic messages took the form of government propaganda, editorial attacks in the Peking Review and rather general statements by government officials. In contrast, the positive signal messages wejre usually in the form of spe­ cific actions or announcements such as the dropping of travel restrictions or the release of prisoners. 6. Both nations linked cultural messages with signals and governmental messages with symbols. That is, cultural messages usually involved specific actions while govern­ mental usually took the form of symbolic gestures, such as an announcement of a desire to improve communications with­ out naming any specifics of how this would be accomplished. 7. The frequency data does reflect what appears to be a trend toward signal usage by the U.S. after 1970 rather than symbols even though statistical significance was not achieved. Viewed another way, this trend (if true) would suggest that the U.S. was moving toward more specific actions as opposed to symbolic messages. 8. The nominal categories for the U.S. also suggest a trend toward more use of the cultural channel and less of the governmental after 1970. Statistical significance was not achieved due to the number of empty cells, but the data 106 does suggest a trend of more cultural exchanges over time as the nations became more friendly. 9. During the time period under study it was the ap­ parent strategy of the U.S. to send a large number of posi­ tive (friendly) messages toward China with the hopes of stimulating a similar response. This is reflected in the large number (76) of positive messages as opposed to nega­ tive (6) ones. 10. Although the U.S. data reflected a trend toward more signal usage over symbols after 1970, China showed no similar trend. In fact, for the time period after 1970 China used about the same number of signals and symbols. This suggests that the U.S. may have begun to use more specific actions (signals) after 1970 in her international communication, but China continued to use a twin approach of action and attitudinal messages. 11. Like the U.S. China began to send more cultural messages after 1970 and fewer governmental. Thus as re­ lations improved between the nations both of them began to use cultural exchanges rather than the more formal and official government channels for diplomatic communications. 12. For China cultural messages were positive. In reality this usually meant that China might attack the U.S. 107 through government propaganda, but if she wanted to send a positive message she encoded through the cultural channel.

Recommendations for Further Study 1. Aspects of this study, such as the message cate­ gories should be replicated by other researchers to establish its reliability. 2. The study design should be applied to the inter­ national communication between the U.S. and China for several more years so as to generate more data for analysis. This extended time period should produce more commercial and military messages. With this additional data more could be said about the association of signal/symbol with commercial or military messages. 3. The validity of the research design should be ex­ amined by studying the international communication between the U.S. and another country and the results compared to this study. For example, the recent difficulties between the U.S. and Sweden would provide an interesting example for analysis. Also the communicative exchanges between the U.S. and one of the developing nations of Africa in which there has been little communicative interchange would pro­ vide an additional test for the research design. 4. More research is needed to determine how the U.S. encodes its negative messages. This particular study found 108 the U.S. posture so positive as to generate few negative messages. If there are patterns to the negative messages they need to be described. A possible study design would be to examine a month of low general tension messages and then compare this to a month of high tension messages. 5. Additional research is needed for the message cate­ gories in order to make the data applicable to a Markov analysis. In particular, transitional probabilities of the nation's behaviors from one state to the next need to be determined. Also the construction of a two dimensional transition probability matrix would be required. More re­ search is needed to attack the problem of determining when a communication system passes from one phase to the next. 6. Efforts should be made towards ways to disseminate the information gained in this study and further research efforts to government decision-makers. In particular, what is needed are more elaborate communication models of in­ ternational behavior. If these were developed, they could be published in a book, or developmental research contracts could be requested from the appropriate agencies.

Extended Implications

Additional implications of this study are offered in the hopes of furthering understanding even though such 109 suggestions cannot be proven on the basis of the research data. 1. If there are "styles" to the way nations encode their diplomatic messages then these need to be discovered and explained to facilitate better international communi­ cations. That is, nations may have particular modes for transmitting threats, warnings and friendly gestures and unless the receiving nation places the messages in this context distortion may occur. 2. To gain the complete meaning of a diplomatic mes­ sage it may be necessary to divide it into two parts, the content (report) and the relationship (command). The con­ tent conveys the information or data part of the message while the relationship tells how the communication is to be taken. 3. As relations between nations become more strained the diplomatic messages will contain more relationship data than content material. Hostile relationships are charac­ terized by an extended debate over the nature of the re­ lationship while the content (informational) part of the communication fades into the background and becomes less important. 4. All diplomatic messages are either symmetrical or complementary, reflecting either equality or difference. 110

Thus a close examination will reveal the nature of the re- i i lationship as it changes over time.

5. As the international communications between nations becomes more hostile (or if friendly the converse) the nations will increase their usage of nonverbal (analogic) communication (troop movements, etc.) while decreasing their formal (diplomatic) verbal procedures. Hence, an early ex­ amination of the international exchanges may provide an in­ dication of the nature of the relationship, and in what direction it may change. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Books

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