BRENDAN NYHAN ­BRENDAN Department Government of Dartmouth College [email protected] REIFLER JASON Politics of Department Exeter of University [email protected]

University of Exeter of University [email protected] BENJAMIN LYONS BENJAMIN Politics of Department ANDREW GUESS ANDREW Politics of Department Princeton University [email protected] ­— Why selective exposure to like-minded like-minded to exposure selective Why think you than prevalent less is news political AVOIDING THEAVOIDING ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS:

knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 2 THE ECHO CHAMBERS CRITIQUE CHAMBERS ECHO THE STORY COMPLEX A MORE EXPOSURE: SELECTIVE CONTEXT SOCIAL OF IMPORTANCE THE CONCLUSION REFERENCES CONTENTS 6 4 13 15 17

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Contents knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 3 Is the expansion of media choice good for democracy? Not according criticsto who decry “echo chambers,” “filter bubbles,” and “information news of forms homogeneous ideologically polarized, highly the — cocoons” and media consumption are these that facilitated technology. by However, claims overstate the prevalence and severity of these patterns, whichat most capture the experience of a minority of the public. thisIn review summarize we essay, the most important findings of the and news get Americans how where and about literature academic information. focus We particular attention on how much consumers engage in selective exposure media to content is that consistent with their political beliefs and the extent which to this patternexacerbated is technology.by As the show, we data frequently contradict least or at complicate the “echo chambers” narrative, which has ironically been amplified and distorteda in kind of echo chamber effect. instead emphasizeWe three fundamental features of preferences fornews about politics. First, there is diversity in the sources and media outlets to which people attention. pay In particular, only a subset of Americans are devoted a particular to outlet or set of outlets; others more have diverse motivation of levels high have people some Second, diets. though information followto the latest political news, only many attention pay to politics at critical moments, or hardly all. the at Finally, context in which encounter we and media social on fromEndorsements friends matters. information but consume, people information the influence can rankings algorithmic assume. Strikingly, many than contingent and are effects more modest these our vulnerability echo to chambers instead be may greatest in offline social networks, where exposure diverse to views is often more rare.

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Introduction knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 4 News consumers innumerable now have options across media formats. To deal with this glut of information, consumers choices make to have about what they consume. Worries this that process will lead increasingly to one- echo exposure, selective concepts: related three on center diets media sided chambers, and filter bubbles. Selective exposure refers “systematic to bias in audience composition” (Sears and Freedman 1967) stemming from tendency a for individuals to select information is that congruent with prior attitudes(Klapper or 1960) comesthat from like-minded sources (Iyengar and Academic Hahn 2009). attitude-confirming preferences, such for research whether to refers information or for friendly sources, as “congeniality bias” (Hart et al., 2009). Selective exposure congenial to political information is sometimes analyzed environment, current the In 2008). (Stroud exposure selective partisan as the stereotypical news consumers engaging in selective exposure would be Democrats liberal or News Fox watch only who Republicans conservative who are dedicated MSNBC. to (The tendency toward selective exposure is real but also more complex than this caricature suggests, as discuss we below.) Critiques of “echo chambers” or “information cocoons” go however, further, in suggesting not only people that overwhelmingly select media into and these that but pre-existing their biases confirm that flows information habits can reinforce people’s views, exacerbating extremism. Sunstein, for “Daily the — online personalization opportunity the for that argues instance, (NegroponteMe” — has 1995) reduced exposure competing to views and (2001; attitudes political consumers’ news of polarization the accelerated 2009; 2017). This pessimistic view has grown only more prevalent as media have self-segregation ideological about Concerns proliferated. have options and Jamieson 2007; (Prior television cable of expansion the accompanied 2009a; widespread (Garrett broadband internet of adoption Cappella 2008), Hindman and most 2008), recently the rise of social Messing, media (Bakshy, and Adamic 2015; Flaxman, Goel, Research 2016). and Rao on echo chambers to tendency the enhance advances these technological whether examines selectively expose oneself voices to please that and comfort and whether electorate. the further fragmented have they A variant of this argument focuses on online intermediaries such as Google and Facebook seek that tailor to individual users’ experiences or histories, browsing location, characteristics, personal their on based generate features personalization These 2013). (Bozdag networks social search results and news feeds differ that are that ways in invisibleto the user (Zuiderveen Borgesius Although et al. 2016). these features be may THE ECHO CHAMBERS CRITIQUE

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | The echo chambers critique knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 5 aimed increasing at the relevance of information which to individuals are exposed, they also may create “filter bubbles” that reduce encounters with algorithmic critics argue, time, Over 2011). (Pariser information challenging perceptions increasingly result idiosyncratic in of may personalization our undermining and bias us, amplifying around confirmation world the aspirations consume to a broad range of information. exposure, echo selective how identified research has academic While democracy, to a problem pose could bubbles filter chambers, and commentators and otherpublic figures gone oftenhave further, are effects that sweeping describing and phenomena oversimplifying these not supported the by data. For instance, an editorial The at Independent declared after the 2016 election “Social that media echo chambers gifted the presidency,”Donald while Trump a Wired article claimed Filter “Your Bubble is Destroying Democracy” (Hooton 2016; El-Bermawy Similarly, 2016). Scientific American reflectedNation “A Divided on by Social following Media” inauguration (D’Costa 2017).Trump’s President Even Obama repeatedly realities alternative the media, chambers, echo and “balkanized” bemoaned 2010; Johnson (e.g., inhabit supposedly now conservatives and liberals Nakamura 2017). 2016; Hatmaker the evidenceAs will we however, for show, “echo chambers” is more equivocal than the alarmist tone of popular discussion suggests. is true It peoplethat tend prefer to congenial political content in studies when given the choice, but these findings are more limited and contingent than people realize. For instance, these tendencies are asymmetric; people tend preferto pro-attitudinal informationto a greaterextent avoid than they overridden be also exposure can Selective information. counter-attitudinal otherby factors such as social cues. addition, In behavioral data shows tendenciesthat toward selective exposure do not translate real-world into often suggest. Commentators would discussion public often as as outcomes neglect how little political news most people consume — much of the public is not attentiveto politics and thus unlikelyto be in an echo chamber of any sort. among thoseMoreover, who do consume more than a negligible amount of political news, most do not get all or even most of it from congenial media outlets.

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | The echo chambers critique knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 6

In theIn lab, people do consistently exhibit a preference for congenial information over uncongenial information — a tendency is that especially prevalent in the domain of politics Hart (see et al. 2009 for a recent meta- analysis). For instance, individuals can select like-minded news based on source cues, as when conservatives display preference for information from News regardless Fox of its content (Iyengar and Some Hahn 2009). instead relymay on cues about the slant of the contentitself or its relevance theirto interests, using those select to media in line with their attitudes (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng or 2009) pertaining their to preferred party or candidate (Iyengar et al. 2008; Iversen and Knudsen N.d.). Studies exploiting longitudinal survey designs — repeatedly interviewing the same media congenial of patterns further — that suggest time over subjects exposure least can at potentially result in increased polarization (Stroud Researchers2010). working within the reinforcing spirals framework (Slater 2007) addressed have this causal ordering in greater detail. Over time, surveys focused on beliefs about global warming find an ongoing cycle in influence beliefs, beliefs strengthens these exposure media partisan which subsequent media use, and this use again reinforces selection (Feldman et al. 2014). in the which ways theseHowever, tendencies operate are more subtle than does exposure selective toward tendency First, assume. people the many not appear be to the result of people seeking minimize to the cognitive dissonance results that from encounters with unwelcome information little received theory has popular this surprisingly, Perhaps 1957). (Festinger direct support in the academic literature (Freedman and Sears 1965; Sears Hartsell,and Metzger, Freedman 1967; and Flanagin One 2015). compelling balanced or attitude-consistent view people that is explanation alternative information as more credible than counter-attitudinal information and make and Greitemeyer, (Fischer, credibility judgments those on choices based Frey 2008; Kahan et al. 2010; Lord, Ross, and Studies Lepper 1979). show, for instance, expected that informational and quality Greitemeyer, (Fischer, credibility and Hartsell, 2015) 2008) Flanagin perceptions and Frey (Metzger, betteraccount for selectiveexposure than the dissonance peopleexperience also(see Hart et al. 2009). Another complicating factor is selective that exposure tends be to asymmetric — studies find more evidence of a preference for pro-attitudinal information than avoidance of counter-attitudinal information(Garrett 2009b; Garrett and Stroud 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009; prefer to tendencies Although the 2016). Flanagin and Metzger, Winter, congenial information uncongenial and avoid to information are often treated avoidance why reasons several are there inseparable, theoretically as SELECTIVE EXPOSURE: A MORE COMPLEXSTORY

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Selective exposure: A more complex story knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 7 tendencies might be (Garrettweaker and Stroud While2014). consonant information almost offers always psychological rewards, dissonant information is notundesirable; always some people find engaging with it beto gratifying or enjoy seeking out counter-attitudinal information when preparing defend to their views others to (Valentino some et al. In 2009). cases, successful a defenseviews of one’s can even elicit pleasure (Westen et al. 2006). pro-attitudinal to exposure report people then, considerable Accordingly, mediain their day-to-day lives (e.g., Johnson, Bichard, and Zhang 2009; Mitchell et al. 2014; Stroud but2008), not the to exclusion of opposing sources. a representative In sample of U.S. news consumers, for example, 64 percent of conservative Republicans, but also percent 26 of liberal conservative one least at on rely consistently they reported that Democrats, and Democrats liberal of percent 76 Conversely, 2008). source (Stroud 43 percent of conservative Republicans said they rely least on at one liberal news source. The preference for attitude-consistent sources often strong among even side, other the hearing avoid to tendency any outweighs partisans; in surveys, for instance, exposure pro-attitudinal to news is associated withactually increased exposure counter-attitudinal to news (Garrett,Lynch Carnahan, 2011). and with competes information source ideological or partisan explicitly Finally, other cues as news consumers choose among a broad range of options (Knudsen, Johannesson, and Arnesen N.d.; Mummolo Givena realistic 2016). set of options, individuals select may out of politics choosing altogether, to Other cues, such 2007). (Prior instead soft or news entertainment consume as an article’s social mediaendorsements (Messing and Westwood 2014; cause and may people Flanagin Metzger, 2016), select to Winter, information even if its source or content are potentially disagreeable. For example, outweigh sometimes will news relevant personally preference for individuals’ 2016). like-minded sources (Mummolo preference for their

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Selective exposure: A more complex story knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 8 If the echoIf chambers critique were true, would we expect observe to disproportionately is that news political consuming frequently Americans congenial their the to data do point not As of view. will we however, show, support this it conjecture. is explain helpful why, consider to To both how often people consume pro-attitudinal news wellas as how much information they consume about politics in total. Both of these aspects of selective exposure — and the contribution technology that them makes to — are often misunderstood. or exaggerated theAt aggregate level, data suggest the that extent of politically congenial news consumption is smaller than people many believe. Media outlets with a significant partisan or ideological slant simply do not reach most of U.S.the population. More than million 325 people currently live in the United States. Audiences News for and Fox MSNBC 1 million average 2 million to viewers and peak 2 million at 3 million to for well-known shows hosts by Rachel like Maddow and Sean Hannity in prime time (Otterson 2017). By comparison, about million 24 Americans tune nightly into network news broadcasts on NBC, ABC, and CBS and million over 10 viewersthese watch networks’ Sunday morning political talk shows (Smith 2017). These audiences are in turn dwarfed those by for entertainment, where programs The like Big Bang Theory, The Walking Dead and Sunday Night Football attract as many as 20 million viewers (Petski 2016; Mitovich 2017). The number of Americans who follow partisan outlets closely, in other words, is quite limited. Online news audience data tells a similar story. For instance, about million 10 people visited the far-right Breitbart website makingin April it only 2017, the 281st most trafficked site in the United (Nguyen States 2017). By comparison, The Washington Times Post and The ranked New York in the top 40 sites by traffic 70 millionand draw to 100 million unique visitors per (Nguyenmonth 2017), though these mainstream news sites are again outranked sites by 2017). (Gray shopping and entertainment to dedicated Others point may social to media as facilitating echo chambers, but the frequently also is platforms these on news gets that public proportion the of overstated. total, In 67 percent of all U.S. adults report getting news from social media, but only about 20 percent they say do so regularly (Shearer and Gottfried 2017). As a portionU.S. of all adults, just under half of Americans say they get news on Facebook, which is far by the leading platform. By contrast, only percent 15 of adults and useonly Twitter 11 percent they say get news MYTHS ABOUT POLITICAL INFORMATION CONSUMPTION

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Myths about political information consumption knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 9 there (Shearer and Gottfried and 2017). there (Shearer individual-level online by confirmed are observations These aggregate-level behavioral data allows that us directly to observe webconsumption and segregation ideological observe limited we example, For behavior. browsing in online news visits in the United States (Gentzkow and Shapiro Nielsen 2011). data combines that television and online trackingdata similarly reveal a in overlap significant — “duplication” audience of degree high surprisingly mediause across groups of users — rather than fragmentation(Fletcher and Nielsen Webster and Ksiazek 2017; Audience 2012). data suggests most that news is consumed from largemainstream sites and even that the audiences for niche partisan media are ideologically mixed (Nelson and Webster 2017). news reflect divergent patterns these that indicate data Individual-level consumption habits Most (Guess people 2016). largely have centrist information diets or simplydo not care about politics or follow it closely. consumers, users, heavy particularly news tend more active Moreover, visitto multiple sites. These omnivorous habits result in exposure to using when even information discrepant ideologically and outlets centrist example, For exposure. selective worsen to thought platforms technological an examination of frequent news consumers’ browsing histories finds that while news discovered through social networks and search engines is sources these of use the segregation, ideological greater with associated also increases exposure counter-attitudinal to information(Flaxman, Goel, only We observe 2016). and Rao heavily patterns skewed of information consumption based on political affiliation among a minority of Americans attitude-consistent of consumption frequent their However, 2016). (Guess news drives much of the traffic to ideological and partisan websites, producing a stark partisan divide in website visits is that not otherwise public. the among observed The differences between these real-world behavioral findings and the lab studies of selective exposure describe we that above reflect an important substantial find to tend surveys Experiments issue. and methodological evidence of partisan selectivity, while behavioral data reveals significant centrism and omnivorousness. There are a few potential reasons for this choice media of investigations respondents,disconnect. experimental For are one-time exercises conducted in highly artificial environments may that affect theirResearchers motives and behavior. especially struggleto capture the sheer number of available sources and the rich variety of contextual cues encountered in day-to-day life. As a result, participants different make may choices about which news consume to in a controlled experiment than they would in everyday life. problematic also are from exposure self-reported derived media Findings (Prior 2013a). A number of studies documented have systematic error in television self-reported to exposure type including measurement, this of news (Prior 2009b, 2009a, online 2013b), news (Guess and 2015), even presidential debates One (Prior 2012). reason for inaccuracy is expressive responding: Republicans falsely may report News watching as Fox a signal of

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Myths about political information consumption knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 10 partisanship, while Democrats admitting avoid may who Fox watch forit the are use media monitor passively that reason, studies this For reason. same likely be to more accurate (Prior 2013a).

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Myths about political information consumption knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 11 Technology canTechnology in some cases facilitate or worsen echo chambers, but the findings are more subtle than many popularaccounts imply. One frequently whichcited is often culprit used is Twitter, as a proxy for social media due theto ease of studying it compared Facebook to (where posts are largely For instance,private). an analysis ofconversation the Twitter about the 2010 U.S. congressional midterm elections found retweet that networks were Americans general, In 2011). et al. (Conover ideology by segregated highly Twitter homogeneous in embedded be to more likely are extreme views with networks (Boutyline and Willer 2017) tend and dominate to may online conversations only (Barberá a small fraction and Rivero However, 2014). of Twitter as noted above,the users and population are exposed is on Twitter, cross-cuttingto content theythat are unlikelyto re-broadcast, butto which they respond may (Conover et al. 2011; see also Karlsen et al. 2017). This exposure cross-cutting to content often occurs via “weak ties” revealed by Twitter and othersocial social mediaIn this way, media (Granovetter1973). could which networks diverse ideologically in users most embed platforms even reduce mass polarization over time (Barberá addition, N.d.). In other such events, political about Twitter on conversations public that shows work as elections, are likely resemble to echo chambers among ideologically similar users, but those concerning other current events are more inclusive (Barberá et al. 2015). Similar apply caveats algorithmic to personalization and the extent which to it creates filter bubbles(a difficult topic to study because data from search largely are themselves algorithms the and platforms media social and proprietary). The most notable study comes from researchers Facebook at who estimated the effects of the NewsFeed platform’s algorithm on exposure “ideologically to diverse” news articles among the subset of users who self-identify as liberal or conservative Messing, (Bakshy, and Adamic Within2015). this sample, the News Feed algorithm reduced exposure to 5 percent and liberals self-identified for 8 percent cross-cuttingby material content reduced diverse individuals these However, conservatives. for exposure in their own choices of which articles click to on 6 percent by of generalizability The conservatives. among percent 17 and liberals among these small effects Only aboutis limited, 4 percent however. of users include their political preferences in their profile and log in regularly, and they may ways different fundamentally in information challenging ideologically to react people. other than LIMITS ON THE OBSERVED EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Limits on the observed effects of technology knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 12 Some initial attemptsto quantify filter bubblesstemming from web search for results, particularly search of personalization substantial observed have political topics. These effects seemto be driven primarilyby location(Hannak butet al. other 2013), studies suggest minor effects on content diversity et al.(Hoang 2015; Haim, Graefe, and Brosius Puschmann 2017; 2017). More work is needed inthis area (Lazer 2015; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. proprietary and are question in algorithms the that given especially 2016), time. over change frequently short,In while digital media offer greater opportunityto construct echo chambers for the a motivated majority few, appears continue to to those Even environment. media centrist and mixed largely a experience sources extreme information more ideologically consume and out seek who seem encounter to cross-cutting content we Similarly, lack along theway. politics.in bubbles filter algorithmic of evidence convincing

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Limits on the observed effects of technology knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 13 The final potential mechanism for echo chamberswe considerthat is social context. Importantly, the evidence be strongest may for the echo chambers hypothesis in offline socialinteractions. One of the classic models of political communication is the “two-step flow” in which information travels from opinion leaders, who attention pay to mass media,to their less-attentive peers (Lazarsfeld, Berelson,and Gaudet Information 1948). directly consumed a small by number of people can reach a much wider audience A recentin this experiment way. shows those that who do not consume partisan media themselves, but instead discuss it with those who do, form opinions comparable direct to consumers (Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain 2017). This indirect effect can even be larger than the direct effectof groups, discussion homogeneous which in situated those for exposure media combine information reinforcement and social pressure. As the prior study illustrates, the larger information environment individuals find themselves in must be considered. Doing so can helpexplain pervasive habits. media partisan strictly widespread, of absence the in polarization large a serve networks media, interpersonal social and media mass Beyond role in exposing individuals political to information and augmenting what fromthey Jr 2001; away take it (Eveland Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004). As with media exposure, the amount of “cross-cutting” talk is a central 2004; Sprague Huckfeldt, and Johnson, 2009; Hively and concern (Eveland Mutz 2006; Nir 2011; Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013; et al. Wells 2017). discussion of selection drives attitudes of similarity that suggests Research partners as individuals construct their networks from a larger set of potential contacts (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Like-minded discussion networks are therefore common (Mutz However, 2006). political discussion often takes place among people in close daily proximity individuals that likely is regardless It their political of 2013). similarity (Small discussprefer to politics with like-minded but will individuals available, if discuss it with others in their absence (Song and Boomgaarden 2017). How does the relative like-mindedness of discussion networks compare with individuals Previous research finds that selection media habits? individuals’ encounter greater diversity of views in their media consumption than in their interpersonal discussion (Mutz and Martin 2001), but this finding comes from an era of lower media choice and polarization. More recent research, using internet trafficdata, finds thatinstead the online news audience is less friends, co- family, with in-person than ideologically interactions segregated workers, and political discussants (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011). Beyond their direct effects, media content and discussion can also interact. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL CONTEXT

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | The importance of social context knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 14 This concept, which has been referred as to the “filterhypothesis,” suggests media consonant of effects the strengthen networks homogeneous that messages (Southwell 2007) and Yzer and diminish the effects of dissonant may networks mixed Politically 2017). Boomgaarden and (Song messages also cause individualsbe to less resistant dissonant to messages (Neiheisel and Niebler2015). about conversation the that suggests research this together, Taken information polarization places far too much emphasis on social media and other technological changes. the In process, lost have sight we of the fact ourthat offline social networks are often more politically homogeneous than online. with interact we those

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | The importance of social context knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 15 CONCLUSION Concerns continue grow to citizens that are trapped in media echo chambers shieldthat them from counter-attitudinal information, further polarizing an already divided America. According critics, to the prevalence of selective exposure, echo chambers, and filter bubbles are fueling growing polarization between the parties and divergent views about basic facts, further weakening the state of our democracy. thisIn review, show we of these many that concerns are overstated. While they that evidence the content, congenial ideologically prefer do people some though Similarly, weaker. much is content uncongenial avoid actively partisan and ideological media outlets audiences have of millions of people, fraction small a only represents sources from these news of consumption of the total amount of news encountered, which is in turn vastly smaller than surveys, from findings to Contrary consume. people non-news content the behavioral data indicates only that a subset of Americans news diets have arethat highly concentrated ideologically. reality, In most news diets are could platforms technology though Similarly, centrist. and more diverse help balkanize to news consumption competing into ideological camps, the Evidence reality. outpace currently fears that indicates evidence empirical for echo chambers is actually strongest in offline social networks, which can increase exposure like-minded to views and information and amplify partisan messages. then,Why, does the narrative of technology-fueled echo chambers continue holdto among sway journalists, commentators, and the public? We would propose three possible explanations. First, while polarized media consumption not be may the norm for most people, it is much more common among an important segment of the public — the most politically active, These disproportionately are individuals engaged. visible and knowledgeable, both the to public and observers to of political trends. They also may come mindto easily when people imagine others engaged in political debate or consuming political news, creating a feedback loop in which the narrative and anecdotes and examples seem that confirm to it repeat endlessly. As a result, public debate about news consumption has become trapped in an echo chamber about echo chambers resists that corrections from more rigorous evidence. people that persists is narrative chambers echo the reason second A default the to prevailing consensus in the face of apparent disagreements evidencediffers depending above, discuss we As literature. scientific the in on the approach is that used; lab and survey-based studies tend find to behavioral using those than exposure selective for evidence stronger data from the field.Even more confusingly, some of the earliest and best- known studies cited in support of echo chambers focus retweet on Twitter networks (Conover et al. 2011) and blog links (Adamic and Glance 2005).

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Conclusion knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 16 But it is important remember to the that motivations behind public acts like retweeting and linking differ may from those drivethat news consumption. return we Finally, the to fact several that studies found evidence have for offline echo chambers that are as strong or stronger than those documented online. While this conclusion strike may as many surprising, it merely restates a commonly understood fact — people associate and spend time with those similar them. to realms In where this is not possible always like the workplace, social norms typically have politics kept andreligion out of the conversation minimize to conflict — a social practice is that not all that different from filtering and curating online (orone’s feeds havingfrom it done automatically). But because norms against discussing politics work are at go usually they developments, technological emerging with associated not unnoticed. Of course, would we not claim all that is well with American media. Though the phenomena of selective exposure and echo chambers are less widespread than feared, the potential for a balkanized future remains. the content ofMoreover, the media people that consume still matters. if echoEven chambers are not widespread, partisan media can still spread misinformation and increase animosity toward the other party among a highly visible and influential subset of the population. In this sense, the danger is not all that of us are living in echo chambers but a subset that of the are. us among vocal and engaged politically most

AVOIDING THE ECHO CHAMBER ABOUT ECHO CHAMBERS | Conclusion knightfoundation.org | @knightfdn 25 / 17

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