19791No. 47 by Howard Handelman : A New Political South America [HH-5-'791 Direction?'

On March 31,1979 thousands of traditionally been among the elections preceding the one recently bereaved filed through region's least developed nations. completed), a mere 30-55 percent of the streets of 's old city to pay Through the early 1970s, the the country's adult population even final homage to Jose Maria Velasco country experienced little managed to register and only 60-80 Ibarra, the man who had dominated industrialization and retained a percent of those registered actually their country's politics for some 40 substantial, impoverished rural voted.5 In the countryside, years. Elected to the presidency on population. participation has been particularly five occasions (1933, 1944, 1952, restricted since cultural and 1960, 19681, Velasco was repeatedly As Table 1 reveals, in 1970, among linguistic considerations have ousted from office by the military or the ten Spanish-speaking nations of isolated much of the Andean Indian forced to resign, completing only South America Ecuador ranked peasantry from the political arena. one full term (1952-1956).A ninth in life expectancy, eighth in Those villagers who have voted powerful orator- he once boasted, literacy, and eighth in urbanization. often have been pressured to follow "give me a balcony and the people Indeed, the Ecuadorian economy the dictates of local political bosses are mine1'- he followed demagogic was so undeveloped prior to the allied with the landed elite and, not campaign promises of fundamental nation's post-1973 petroleum boom infrequently, with the Catholic reform with mediocre performance that, at the close of the past decade, Church. in office and maintenance of the the country had nearly twice as status quo. Eschewing a political many government bureaucrats as An UnrepresentativePolitical party base or an ideologically industrial workers3 System coherent program, Velasco Ibarra Ecuador's low level of political Not surprisingly, the comparatively mobilization has undoubtedly ran purely on the basis of his low level of socioeconomic personality. As a result, Ecuadorian helped spare the country the development was accompanied by politics from 1952-1978 was largely pronounced class conflict that has limited political participation. The marked by the alternation of torn apart nations such as Chile, small size of the nation's middle Argentina, and Uruguay in recent Velasquista populism (nine years), class, the absence of a strong trade military rule (ten years) and years. It has, however, also union movement, the small number contributed to a weak transitional civilian presidents of skilled blue- and white-collar lacking a popular mandate (four system and rule by unresponsive workers, and a low literacy rate all elite cliques. Until the current years), hardly a strong record of contributed to a nonparticipatory institutional development2 Though election, the country had failed to political culture. When national few suggested it at the time, establish mass-based, national elections were held, suffrage was parties. Velasco's death - merely weeks restricted to literates-less than half before the final round of Ecuador's the adult population through the Historically, Ecuadorian political recent presidential election- may mid-1950s. Ecuadorian political parties distinguished themselves have symbolized the end of an era in scientist Rafael Quinteros notes that ideologically on the basis of their that nation's politics-an era in the early 1950s, only 28.4 percent stance on church-state relations. dominated by caudillo (strong man) of the nation's adult population "Left" parties- Liberals, rule, weak political parties, voted, a lower proportion than in Socialists-were anticlerical and outdated ideological debates, and Argentina (61.8%), Bolivia (51.4% ), secularist. Parties of the "Rightu- low levels of political legitimacy. Colombia (40.2% 1, (39.2% 1, or Conservatives, Social Christians- The Legacy of Underdevelopment even Paraguay (29.1% 1.4 Indeed, in were generally confessional One of South America's smallest Ecuador's presidential elections held Catholic. By the rnidtwentieth republics, Ecuador has also between 1948-1968 (that is, the five century, however, the church-state Table 1

Socioeconomic Characteristics of Selected South American Nations (circa 1970)

Nation Population (000) Annual Popula- Percent Percent Life Expectancy (Rank)* tion Growth Urban Literate --Years (Rank) (Rank) (Rank) (Rank)

Uruguay 2,886 (9) 1.3% (10) 79.9% (1 90.5% (2) 68.4 (1) Argentina 24,352 (2) 1.6% (9) 78.9% (2) 91.5% (1) 66.3 (2) Colombia 21 ,I16 (3) 3.2% (3) 57.5% (5) 72.9% (6) 60.6 (6) ECUADOR 6,093 (7) 3.4% (2) 45.7% (8) 69.7% (8) 55.0 (9) Bolivia 4,931 (8) 2.6% (7) 29.3% (10) 39.8% (10) 53.0 (10) 'rankings in all the columns indicate their position within the 10 Spanish-speaking nations of South America.

Source: Inter-American Development Bank data and The Statesman's Yearbook: 1970-71. Reprinted in R. Scott (ed.) Latin American Modernization Problems (Urbana, University of Illinois, 1973), p. 15. issue had lost any real significance political parties have been alliances regional loyalties, and political styles in the nation's political life. Thus, of convenience between powerful have had overriding importance. Dr. the old left-right labels now explain factions, in which ideology, Trujillo vividly illustrated this point little about the individual party's programs, or policies have had little to me when he noted that during the orientation toward fundamental importance. 1960s, while still a Conservative socioeconomic issues nor do they Party leader, he served as legal have much relevance to Ecuador's More often than not, aspiring young council to a bank workers union. contemporary political problems. politicians selected their party Once, while representing several affiliation on the basis of their own clerks who had been fired by their While political lore still places the regional origins and family bank during a bitter strike, his court Liberals "to the left" of the background rather than on room adversary, representing the Conservatives and Social Christians. programmatic or ideological criteria. bank, was the leader of the Socialist the laissez-faire financial Prominent contemporary leaders Party. oligarchs who dominate the Liberal such as Deputies Julio C6sar Trujillo Party are actually more (leader of the small but influential Because of the nonprogrammatic, economically conservative than Popular DemocracyIChristian ideologically confusing nature of the much of the Conservative Party's Democratic Union (DPIUDC) and Ecuadorian party system, leading Andean elite. When asked to Rodrigo Borja (leader of the growing political figures change party differentiate themselves from the Democratic Left) originally joined affiliations and interparty alliances opposition, spokesmen for all of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, like discarded sports coats. The Ecuador's major parties- respectively, simply because those current mayor of Quito withdrew Concentration of Popular Forces groups dominated the regions from the progressive, Democratic (CFP), Democratic Left, (highlands and coast, respectively) Left when he failed to secure its Conservatives, Liberals and Social in which the two men lived. Dr. mavoral nomination. and then ran Christians-insist that they are "left Trujillo rose to the secretary successfully as the candidate of the of center" on socioeconomic generalship of the Conservatives right-of-center Liberals. During the issues6 Even the party secretary of (before leaving the party to form a recently concluded presidential the Conservatives (a very new, more progressive alliance) in campaign, the traditionalist group currently led by spite of his deep political differences originally announced its support for a retired right-wing Colonel from with other party leaders. Even while the rightist Social Christian one of the highlands' most feudal serving as the party's national candidate, then withdrew its states) and the secretary of the CID leader, he was barred from speaking backing when he selected a populist (a party closely tied to coastal, big at party meetings in certain Andean running mate. business interests) characterized provinces where local Conservative their orientations in those terms? officials considered him to be "far The failure of Ecuadorian parties to The fact that such ideological self- too radical."* define their position on issues has definitions bear no resemblance to been accompanied by their inability actual party behavior does not mean Attempts to place Ecuadorian to develop a broad organizational that these leaders are consciously parties along an ideological base or to build a mass following deceptive or cynical. Rather, it spectrum have thus been doomed among the peasants and urban poor reflects the fact that, until recently, to failure, since personalities, who have been gradually incorporated into the political The Populist Response leading populist movement. Since system in recent decades. Through much of Latin America the early 1960s, the party has been Consequently, from 1944 until this during the postwar decades, as dominated by Assad Bucaram, the year's election, none of the voting and other forms of mass former mayor of Guayaquil. Born of country's elected presidents were political participation expanded, Lebanese immigrant parents, closely linked to the major political existing political parties generally Bucaram's humble origins are highly parties. Velasco Ibarra was proved incapable of integrating atypical of the Ecuadorian political essentially an independent; Galo lower income groups into the elite. A former merchant with little Plaza (1948-1952)came out of the political system. A frequent formal education, he has combined ranks of the Liberals (indeed his response to that institutional void inflammatory oratory with father, also a president, had been a was the growth of populism. These administrative competence (as major party figure) but was elected movements often were based mayor) to amass a great personal as an independent Liberal against heavily on the oratorical and political following among the impoverished the candidate of the party's skills of a single charismatic leader, dwellers of Guayaquil's dominant faction; Camilo Ponce offered vague promises of reform to shantytowns (suburbios)? Though (1956-1960)left the Conservatives to the newly enfranchised masses, and staunchly anti-Marxist, he espoused form his small, personalistic, Social frequently adopted an a progressive, if vague, political Christian Party from which he was antioligarchical tone which program. elected to the presidency. frightened vested economic Until the current election campaign, interests and the armed forces. In short, events leading up to this however, the CFP failed to serve as Once in power, however, the year's election support political an effective agent of political populists usually avoided structural scientist John Martz's contention development and economic change. changes, relied more heavily on that Ecuadorian parties have been Like most populist movements, it rhetoric than on coherent programs, elitist in leadership, highly was longer on rhetoric than on and did little to alter the political or opportunistic, weak in organization, constructive policy alternatives. economic status quo. Brazil's ineffective in articulating positions, More a personal vehicle for its Getulio Vargas, Argentina's Juan and lacking in fixed ideological strongman leader than a coherent Perfin, and Panama's Omar Torijos orientations. "Short term gains," political party, it was unable to are all outstanding examples of such said Martz, have been "prized over develop a national constituency leadership. long-term ideological outside its power base in the state of consistency.. .. Efforts to create In Ecuador, the populist response to Guayas (Ecuador's most populous mass parties [have been] the political party vacuum was and economically critical province). unusual.. . . Between elections the initially represented by Velasco Bucaram himself has allegedly not organizations [have] concentrated Ibarra and his Frente Nacional been adverse to engaging in the on relations with their counterparts ~elas~uista?~More recently, the at senior levels and internal elitism Concentration of Popular Forces At left: mourners at funeral of [has] negated effective participation (CFP), a left-center party founded in Velasco Ibarra; at right, Assad of the rank and file."9 1947, emerged as the nation's Bucaram, CFPl&der. Table 2 political alternatives. The decision of Ecuador's armed forces to introduce Indicators of Socioeconomic and Political Change: 1950-1978 a new constitution (in 1978) and to hand over the reigns of power to a Year Percent Urban Percentage Registered civilian government (in 1979) after Adult Literacy Voters seven and a half years of military rule, reflected the growing illegitimacy and inadequacy of the old of caudillos and coups.

The Search for a New Legitimacy While the nation's officers were not united in their political goals, many Sources: Rafael Quinteros, "Los Partidos Politicos en el Ecuador.. . ," military leaders wished to create a pp. 281 and 293; Ecuador: Tecnologfa Agropecuaria y constitutional order that would economies campesinas (Quite: CEPALES, 19781, p. 24; John provide the new civilian government Martz, Ecuador: Conflicting Political Culture and the Quest for with greater legitimacy and stability Progress (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972). than had been enjoyed by past regimes. Consequently, the new unsavory tactics common to exploitation. That process constitution, selected by popular Guayaquil politics (including the use converted many peasants from referendum in January 1978, gave of goon squads to intimidate peons to hired agricultural laborers, the vote to illiterates (though not in opponents). His personal changed others to small the 1978-79 election). It thereby domination of the CFP, his rough landowners, and drove still others promised to increase the size of the (often vulgar) oratorical style, and off the land.14 All three results electorate in future elections by his no-holds-barredattacks on his tended to weaken traditional some 25 percent?7 Ecuador's opponents not only antagonized the landlord controls over the eighteenth Constitution, which took nation's economic elite and military, peasantry. While Ecuador's level of effect in August 1979, also provided but also alienated many lower-class political mobilization for a second round run-off should middle-class voters and drove a remains somewhat limited even no presidential candidate achieve an number of capable politicians out of today (far lower, for example, than absolute majority on the initial vote his party?2 in neighboring Peru), by the early (a procedure following in the 1970s the needs and demands of the 1950-1978: Changes in the Social recently concluded election). The peasantry and urban poor could no and Economic Order intention of that provision was to longer be ignored. As in most of Latin America, during prevent the election of a "minority the past few decades Ecuador has president" such as the 1956 winner witnessed important modifications The post-1973 Ecuadorian petroleum boom accelerated these who took office with only 29% of in the pattern of underdevelopment the vote) and to guarantee the processes of change.15 Oil revenues described above. The spread of ultimate victor the legitimacy of flowing into the public treasury and public education, the expansion of having obtained an absolute the private sector contributed to the radio and other mass media into the majority. The creation of a expansion (and personal urban slums and countryside, the unicameral national congress was enrichment) of the urban middle breakdown of rural feudalism, and designed to streamline legislative class. The rapid growth of university the movement of peasants into the activity. Finally, election laws education, the creation of new jobs cities were all under way by the late promulgated by the military in the government bureaucracy and 1950s. government subsequent to the the development of the commercial approval of the Constitution sought Extensive rural-to-urban migration and industrial sectors all were to eliminate very small parties.This, (principally into Guayaquil and critical elements in this process. Oil it was reasoned, would "rationalize" Quito) and the expansion of money has also drawn back to the political system by presenting literacy -two interrelated Ecuador professionals who had the electorate with a more restricted phenomenon - increased the been working abroad.16 number of voters as well as the but more clearly defined set of general level of lower-class Many younger members of the alternatives. politicization.13 In the countryside, growing middle class-lawyers, the 1964 Agrarian Reform law and academics, progressive Unfortunately, as we shall see, subsequent agrarian legislation capitalists-found the existent military behavior during the course accelerated an already ongoing political order inadequate to the of the 1978-79 presidential transition in several regions of the needs of an expanding, gradually campaign served all too often to countryside from semifeudal to modernizing economy. undermine these efforts at more modern, capitalist agricultural Consequently, they looked for new legitimizing a new political order. The Original Alternatives: had served as Minister of Public mate. More confident than his uncle Populism Versus the Old Cliques Works (1956-1960), as a technocrat had been of his own popularity, Once the new Constitution was in the Inter-American Development Pancho led his party out of the Front selected by the voters and the first Bank (1960-1968)and as Mayor of so that he could secure the Liberal round of presidential elections Quito (1970-1978); and 62-year-old nomination. Thus, as the Liberals (along with municipal elections) had Raul Clemente Huerta Rend6n, a concluded their convention, the been scheduled for July 1978, the former Finance Minister, former nation looked forward to a military junta faced their next national director of the Liberal Party presidential campaign dominated by dilemma. Assad Bucaram, the front- and twice an unsuccessful three candidates, Assad Bucaram, running candidate, was generally candidate for the Sixto Durgn, and Francisco Huerta. expected to win any freely presidency!8 Duran, an amiable contested election. Yet, the nation's father of 13 with a reputation for That picture, however, was to economic oligarchy, most of the being a good administrator and change extremely rapidly. Dismayed military high command, and a large public works advocate, was a by the inability of the Liberals and portion of the middle class were leading figure in the Social Christian Conservatives to name a single unalterably opposed to him. Indeed, Party and the favorite of the candidate and by the more the armed forces' 1972 coup was traditional right-of-center. Huerta, generalized splintering of the partially motivated by the fear that widely associated with political Constitutional Front, Assad Bucaram would win the following intrigue, was supported by the Bucaram's military and civilian year's presidential election. This coastal, Guayaquil financial opponents searched for a more author's recent interviews with a oligarchy. dependable means of eliminating diverse sample of Ecuadorian him. Initial efforts to dump Bucaram political leaders revealed a widely Despite their apparently potent had centered on allegations that, held, intense hostility toward the array of political support, both men contrary to his own assertions and CFP strongman. Bucaram was were initially hesitant to run, a birth certificate, the CFP leader had alternately depicted as a dangerous hesitancy based on the fragility of actually been born outside Ecuador leftist (though he is staunchly anti- the Constitutional Front and on their during his parents' migration from Marxist), a neofascist demagogue, apprehension that Assad Bucaram the Middle East, making him and a would-be dictator. Not might be impossible to beat. When ineligible for the presidency. When surprisingly, then, the nation's Huerta withdrew from the race these allegations could not be military, political, and economic (citing his wife's alleged ill health), substantiated, a new approach was establishment looked for a way to the Front turned, in February 1978, tried. On February 20, 1978 the block his election. to Sixto Duran. Soon thereafter, government announced that however, the 11-party coalition presidential nominees must be born Early in 1977, when the military showed itself to be as unstable as of parents who were citizens of signaled the start of the "return the candidates had feared. The Ecuador at the time of the process" (retorno), Liberal and Socialist Party withdrew its support candidate's birth. As he was born Conservative Party leaders began to for Dur6n in a dispute over his shortly after his Lebanese immigrant plan an alliance aimed at stopping selection of a running mate. Several parents arrived in Ecuador, Bucaram the CFP. In August of that year they small rightist parties (particularly the was clearly ine1i~ible.1~Commenting opened formal negotiations which CID) offered Sixto (as he was widely on the transparency of the junta's culminated 4 months later with the known) only lukewarm support. maneuvers, Guayaquil's El Universe formation of an 11-party coalition Finally, and most important, the stated, "The dictatorial government called the "National Constitutional Liberal Party withdrew from the has insistently denied that its laws Front." While its spokesmen Front in order to run its own are earmarked for some people. insisted that the purpose of the candidate. Nevertheless, they ke., the laws1 coalition was to insure a broad have meant the destruction of the political base for the restoration of On February 12, 1978 the Liberals' political aspirations of certain people civilian government, they privately national convention nominated whom the government dislikes."20 admitted their anti-Bucaram Francisco Huerta Montalvo, the intentions. Front members spanned highly ambitious nephew of party With Assad Bucaram's abrupt the , including chieftain Raul Clemente Huerta. elimination, conventional political Liberals, Conservatives, Social Starting his political career as a wisdom held that the CFP was no Christians, Socialists and the national student leader, "Pancho" longer a viable political threat since neofascist Democratic Nationalist Huerta had moved rapidly through its popularity allegedly rested Revolutionary Action (ARNE). the Liberal ranks up to the party's heavily on its strongman's secretary generalship. During the shoulders. The two dominant Two figures emerged as potential negotiation of the National traditional parties, Conservative and coalition candidates: Sixto Dur5n Constitutional Front, the young Liberal, could now, so it seemed, vie Ballen, a 57-year-old, U.S.-trained (37-year-old)physician had declined for power. The Liberal nomination, architect and urban planner who an offer to be Sixto DurSn's running so recently spurned by Raul Clemente Huerta, suddenly national legislature (1968-19701, debater. His air of competence and appeared extremely tantalizing to however, he was a relatively professionalism set him apart from the aging party boss (whose wife's unknown figure in national politics. the haranguing style of his mentor, health improved remarkably after Indeed, his designation as CFP Bucaram, and his Liberal opponent, Bucaram's legal removal). Paul nominee appeared to have rested on Raul Clemente Huerta. As a member Clemente's renewed interest in the two factors: his role as a close aide of a distinguished coastal family and presidency coincided with growing to Bucaram within the party, and his an attorney for the Bank of doubts within the Guayaquil marriage to the party boss's niece Guayaquil, Rold6s could appeal to oligarchy and the military regarding (herself a politically involved the members of Ecuador's the "overly outspoken" young lawyer). Not surprisingly, political expanding middle class who had Liberal nominee, Francisco Huerta. pundits tended to regard Rold6s as been offended by ~ucaram.?~ an understudy who would surely Thus, in March 1978, the Guayaquil In selecting his running mate, take his marching orders from his newspaper El TelSgrafo charged wife's powerful uncle. Initial CFP Rold6s reached beyond the ranks of that a research institute headed by campaign literature and posters the CFP to the small but intellectually powerful and well Pancho Huerta had signed an reinforced this impression declaring 1 1-million sucre ($450,000) organized Popular Democratic "Bucaram is with Rold6s." Here, as agreement for a Party (officially called Popular in the party's impressive coastal Democracy/Christian Democratic government-commissionedstudy of rallies during the early months of the Union or DPIUDC). Further unemployment. Technically, then, campaign, the presidential nominee emphasizing his ticket's strengths- the Liberal nominee had violated an seemed to be getting second youth, professionalism, and electoral law barring candidates billing22 from being party to a government intelligence- Rold6s selected contract?' When Huerta denied Yet, as the campaign progressed, , a prominent any wrongdoing, the case was RoldOs began to establish an image 38-year-old political sociologist at brought before the Supreme of his own. Though neither highly Quito's Catholic University. Hurtado Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the photogenic nor charismatic, the had also begun his political career in government body charged with CFP candidate was clearly the 1960s as a university student administering the elections and intelligent and highly articulate. In leader (concurrently with Rold6s interpreting electoral law. Given the mass media and at public rallies and with Francisco Huerta) and the close ties linking the TSE's he emerged as an extremely soon thereafter led an exodus of leadership to the military and to the polished (if low-key) speaker and progressive, young Catholic Liberals' Guayaquil oligarchy, few were surprised when the Tribunal ruled on April 27 that Francisco Huerta (like Bucaram) was ineligible to run. Shortly thereafter, less than three months before the scheduled July elections, Raul Clemente Huerta succeeded his nephew as Liberal Party candidate. The CFP: Two New Faces With their original standard-bearer and party titan removed from the race, the CFP was forced to seek a new nominee. Losing little time, the party turned to a 37-year-old Guayaquil attorney and law professor, Jaime Rold6s Aguilera. A man of obvious intellectual ability, Rold6s had graduated first in his class from a prestigious preparatory school and first at the University of Guayaquil Law School while at the same time serving as president of the university's student body. Despite his impressive scholastic credentials, his work as a CFP functionary, and a brief stint in the A CFP campaign advertisement. professionals from the conservative liability. He was viewed by much of personalities. Dur5n Bal16n1s only Social Christian Party (currently led the nation's economic and political significant previous entry into by Sixto DurSn). The dissidents elite (and by some military officers) electoral politics was his successful formed the Ecuadorian Christian as a "closet Marxist" with 1970 campaign for mayor of Quito. Democratic movement, endorsing dangerously progressive ideas. Once in office, he pursued his the most "radical" ideology and instincts as an architect, former The First Electoral Round: program of any non-Marxist Minister of Public Works, and Frontrunners and Alleged Also Pans Ecuadorian party. Heavily development bank planner by By May 1978, with the Liberals' influenced by the writings of the stressing the construction of water nomination of Raul Clemente Christian communitarian movement works, power stations, and paved Huerta, a field of six presidential and by the left-wings of the Chilean nominees was completed. Political streets. Sixto's technocratic and Venezuelan Christian pundits, labeled Sixto Dur5n Ballen orientation appealed to the military Democratic parties, Hurtado as the leading "right-of-center" government that seized power in became the group's leading candidate and Raul Clemente 1972 and he was the only mayor of a spokesman, as well as one of the Huerta as the front-running large Ecuadorian city to be asked to nation's most widely read political "left-of-center" nominee. Actually, serve beyond his elected term of scientist^.^^ while Dur5nfs backing came from office. The close relationship which In early 1978, as the electoral Catholic parties traditionally he enjoyed with the governing junta campaign approached, the Christian associated with the precapitalistic, earned him the label (to his dismay) Democrats merged with the highland landlords, he tended to of "the military's candidate." Progressive Conservatives (a group speak more for the interests of the that had previously bolted from the new QuiteRo entrepreneurial class While Dur6n felt that his Conservative Party under the produced by the post-1973 oil association, in the public mind, with leadership of Julio CEsar Trujillo) to boom. Based in the nation's capital, an unpopular military regime cost form the DPIUDC. When the Sixto and his supporters favored an him votes, he didn't mind being Popular Democrats failed to meet active state role in the economy labeled a technocrat. Running on a technical requirements for a place (though their primary interest clearly record as "a builder," his campaign on the ballot, Jaime Rold6s lay in subsidies for business) and propaganda called him "the man approached Hurtado and Trujillo were, in many ways, less who works." Indeed, he told this regarding an electoral alliance. Once conservative than the laissez-faire author that he saw himself more as on the CFP ticket, Hurtado not only coastal, commercial groups an urban planner than as a far outshone his vice-presidential associated with the Liberals' Raul politician. His weak campaign opponents, but added a forceful Clemente Huerta. performance bore this out. Despite oratorical style and photogenic his pleasant and likable personality Though they both represented the quality lacking in Rold6s.25 (a quality that emerged more clearly traditional era of Ecuadorian politics, in small groups), Sixto performed Despite his obvious talents, Dr. Duriin and Huerta offered differing poorly in several television debates Hurtado had one clear political campaign styles and distinct among the six candidates and in other media appearances. In his walking tours he did little better, seeming uncomfortable as he asked bystanders for their votes or tried to deal with the occasional heckler.

Dur5n1smajor asset in the first electoral round was his extensive financial support. Because of the chaotic condition of the Liberal Party-changing candidates in mid campaign from one Huerta to another- DurSn received considerable aid from both the Quito and Guayaquil oligarchies. Indeed, the streets of the nation's major cities were dominated by pro-Sixto wall signs and posters. At left, Sixto DurSn, Social Christian candidate; at right, Liberal candidate Raul Clemente Huerta. his opponents, Rold6s ran (both as a generation of reformist, conscious strategy and in the minds professionally trained, of his critics) as part of a team. He programmatically oriented political allotted a critical campaign role to leaders. Loosely linked to the Osvaldo Hurtado, his articulate international social democratic running mate, and accepted-for movement, ID is characterized by its better and for worse- Bucaram's leaders as "left of the CFP" (a populist appeal among Guayaquil's proposition which the CFP's impoverished slum dwellers. Said spokesmen and many independent one political analyst, "Hurtado analysts reject) and right of the diagnosed reality in scientific terms; Christian Democrats. Rold6s translated those explanations into political reality; Borja - handsome, articulate, and Bucaram expressed them in ambitious, and skillful (characterized irrational terms." by some as "too skillful") -was a Raul Clernente Huerta, Liberal candidate formidable candidate offering many Raul Clemente Huerta, commonly Gradually, however, the CFP's of the same qualities as Rold6s (and considered to be the principal presidential candidate emerged Hurtado). Lacking the money and opponent of the allegedly "front- from under the shadow of his national organization of Dur5n and running" Dursn, was a coastal mentor and established himself, not Huerta, or the CFP's voting base in lawyer whose firm represented only as the leading member of the the slums of Guayaquil, the many multinational and Guayaquil party's team, but also as the most Democratic Left assessed its corporations. Though he failed to effective campaigner of all the major present position realistically and saw enunciate any clear position candidates. Still, as election day itself rather as the party of the (depending instead on vague approached, political analysts and future. In an attempt to establish a slogans such as "Raul Clemente is opinion polls indicated that Rold6s clear national identity, ID was the the "fatherland"), he represented was still in a battle for third place only major party to have rejected economic interests to the right of (highest among the first round's from the start of the "return Dur5n BalEn. A proponent of the "also rans") with another young process" any electoral coalition. Dr. old, fire-breathing school of oratory, and articulate candidate, Dr.Rodrigo Borja indicated to this author that he Huerta did very poorly on the first Borja Cevallos. Borja, a 42-year-old never entertained expectations of televised candidate debate and attorney and university law making the two-man presidential failed to participate in follow-ups. If professor, had left the Liberal Party run-off, but rather was aiming at a Sixto Dursn was an insufficiently in 1969 to help found a new, left-of- strong third place finish as the base aggressive campaigner, Huerto was center party, the Democratic Left for future growth. excessively so. His pugnacious (Izquierda Democratica, ID). style, his late entry into the race, and Drawing its greatest support in Ecuadorian opinion polls (Table 3) in his reputation as a back-room dealer Quito, the party has sought to the closing weeks of the first round who had sabotaged his own establish itself as the voice of a new seemed to confirm general "political nephew, all hurt Raul Clemente's campaign. He seemed unable to build on the Liberal Party's coastal base and develop a national constituency.26 Indeed, one Ecuadorianjournalist, arguing that most of Huerta's support was rooted in his long record as a Liberal standard bearer and his wire-thin (3,000 vote) loss of the presidency 23 years ago, caustically commented, "the high point of Raul Clemente's 1978 campaign came in 1956." While the two early front-runners were performing disappointingly as campaigners, the CFP's Jaime Rold6s developed momentum as the electoral race progressed. Unlike Rodrigo Borja ( Izquierda Dernocratica). Table 3

Final Pre-Election Opinion Polls: The First Electoral Round

------Dur5n Huerta Rold6s Borja IECOP Poll 25.5% 29.3% 21 .O% 18.9% CEDATOS Poll 20.9% 19.0% 10.4% 11.6% wisdom." They indicated that no author) who had recently witnessed candidate would come close to national elections in Venezuela and securing the 50 percent vote needed Colombia, the Ecuadorian for a first round victory, that the presidential campaign seemed Social Christians' Sixto Dur5n rather modest and low key. Ballen and the Liberals' Raul Long-term students of Ecuadorian FRA candidate, Abd6n Calder6n Mufloz. Clemente Huerta were engaged in a politics, however, insisted that the On July 16, 1978, 1.6 million close battle for first place (with both first presidential round elicited more Ecuadorians went to the polls to making it to the run-off) and that than usual voter interest. Because vote for the presidency and elect Jaime Rold6s and Rodrigo Borja national elections had not been held municipal governments. As most were closely matched for third for a decade, this was the first political analysts had predicted, opportunity for many young Sixto Dur5n finished slightly ahead Ecuadorians to choose their chief of Raul Clemente Huerta, though his Two other candidates, neither of executive. Whereas only 852,000 razor-thin margin awaited whom were considered serious voters had participated in the 1968 confirmation in a recount. But, contenders, rounded out the list of election, some 1.8 million were contrary to the predictions, Sixto's nominees. Abd6n Calder6n Mufioz, expected to go to the polls this time. apparent lead was for second place, a Guayaquil economist, was the not first. The CFP's Jaime Rold6s, leader of the Frente Radical Traveling to towns and villages initially viewed as an unknown fill-in Alfarista, a coastal-based party that throughout the nation, the leading for Assad Bucaram, had had left the Liberal Party years candidates drew crowds confounded the experts by before, as the parent organization everywhere. With the exception of outdistancing all his rivals by a had moved increasingly to the right. CFP demonstrations in Guayaquil wide margin. Besting his nearest Calder6n had made many political and some Liberal rallies, spectator opponent by over 100,000 votes, enemies through his exposes of emotions were generally rather Rold6s unofficially amassed 31 corruption in Guayaquil and national restrained. A European rural percent of the ballots cast politics, but had also picked up development expert working in an compared to 23 percent and 22 some national following as a impoverished province of the percent for the candidates of the muckraker. highlands suggested to this author major traditional parties. The ID'S Finally, Ren6 Maug6 Mosquera, a that the same villagers came out to Rodrigo Borja finished a distant and young communist lawyer, led a cheer with equal enthusiasm any of disappointing fourth with 11 percent coalition of Marxist parties joined the candidates who passed through of the vote. Abd6n CalderOn together in the "Leftist Broad their town. If the candidate did not (Alfarista) with 9 percept and RenG Front" (FADI). Along with Rold6s, define their programs in much detail Maug6 (FADI)with 5 percent (both Hurtado, Borja, and Francisco (indeed they didn't), if all of them higher totals than expected) Huerta, he represented a new depicted themselves as progressives rounded out the count. generation of national political seeking badly needed change (as What accounted for Jaime Rold6s1 leadership. An articulate and they did), if party identifications unexpectedly strong showing? intelligent speaker, Maug6 brought were generally weak and voter Stunned spokesmen for the respectability to the FAD1 ticket. decisions based largely on Liberals, Conservatives, and Social Because the Ecuadorian Marxist left personality, the race was still good Christians whom I interviewed exercises little influence outside entertainment after years of political insisted that massive fraud had certain labor unions and in the inactivity. In short, the first round taken place in the city of Guayaquil nation's universities, however, lacked strong passion, great where the Rold6s-Hurtado ticket Mauge and FAD1 lacked the intensity, or well-defined issues. It had outdistanced its nearest rival by organizational base or funds to was, however, a campaign and 143,000 votes (indeed that city mount a serious challenge. Ecuador had not experienced one of those for ten years. contributed the CFP's entire margin The First Round of Campaigning: of national victory). Yet, even Sixto Interest and Entertainment The Voters Speak- Durhconceded that ballot stuffing For an observer (such as this And Confound the Experts could merely have widened the CFP margin but did not account for its As for the Constitutional Front's If the CFP's first round showing first place finish. Independent Dur5n Ballen, he had started the surprised most Ecuadorians and analysts noted that any fraud in race with a large lead and financial pleased many, it greatly upset Guayaquil was largely offset by advantage, but had been stymied by critical elements of the military and similar Liberal and Conservative his weak campaign style and poor of the nation's political and activity in their coastal and highland use of media. Wrote one Ecuadorian economic elite. Election-night strong holds. journalist, "it's not certain that he statements by Vice-presidential had the most money [Huerta may candidate Osvaldo Hurtado on the More serious analysis suggested have had morel but he certainly need for "popular organizations that Rold6s1slogan, "the Force of made the worst use of it." More such as labor unions, cooperatives Change," had struck a responsive important, Dur5n was popularly [andl neighborhood committees" as chord among the electorate. identified with the old order. eventual channels for "gaining the Peasants and urban workers Speaking of his first round means of production" fueled the throughout the country, feeling they performance, Sixto admitted to me fears of the right. So too did an had not shared equally in the "he [Rold6sl was able to project an article published shortly before the benefits of Ecuador's oil boom image of freshness and youth, and I July election in which Jaime Rold6s (indeed, a common subjective couldn't." One more cynical stated, "I believe.. .that a assessment of the "man on the observer wrote, "The high point of revolutionary process would be an street" was that inflation had made DurGn's campaign was the day he ideal one given the present life more difficult for the poor), announced: . . . From then on he lost condition of so many people laid rejected the old order and hoped for votes continuously." aside from the economic order."29 a new one. Equally important, Raul Clemente Huerta, a more Statements such as these, said Rold6s1restrained call for reform dynamic campaigner than Dur5n Guayaquil's daily El Telegrafo, convinced many middle class voters Ballen, had also been hurt by his "have brought about worry-worse, that the CFP standard bearer was identification with the status quo yet, panic-in Guayaquil's not a rabble-rousingpopulist or and the interests of the oligarchy. entrepreneurial circles." At the radical, but rather an intelligent Divisions within the Liberal Party same time, the rightist party CID voice for political and economic and Huerta's reputation as a (closely tied to Guayaquil financial modernization. Significant numbers back-room dealer who had interests) warned that "the of voters who had been undecided sabotaged his own nephew's communist-like infiltration of the until the final weeks of the candidacy added to his difficulties. Rold6s ticket, be it named Popular campaign apparently moved to Indeed, Raul Clemente's record Democracy [i.e., Osvaldo Hurtado's RoldOs-Hurtado (and, possibly, denied him the one strength that party1 or what have you, represents away from the Democratic Left) on Sixto Dur5n enjoyed, a reputation the greatest danger ever to election day. for integrity.28 Ecuadorian democracy." Not surprisingly, then, the electoral Rold6s' victory was particularly Borja and the Democratic Left had results of July 16 quickly produced impressive given that the run a respectable campaign, but had rumors of an impending coup which percentage of adults registered to failed to extend their strength would preclude a second-round vote in the highlands (the outside their power base in the run-off and the promised return to stronghold of the Conservatives and nation's capital. Even there, ID lost civilian government. Indeed, on Social Christians) was far higher the mayoral election in Quito and election night Hurtado warned a than on the coast (where the CFP is carried the province of Pichincha by national television audience of a more organized). That percentage a mere 1,300 votes. Rodrigo Borja possible golpe (coup). ranged from 69-93 percent in had campaigned for essentially the Andean provinces and only 55-78 same constituency as had Rold6s- Fears of military intervention were percent on the coast. Thus, while Hurtado-the urban lower and soon exacerbated by the shadowy the Ecuadorian coast has a slightly middle class voters seeking nature of the electoral recount. higher population than the sierra change-andhadbeenbestedby Earlier in the year the government (highlands), the Andean region had the CFP candidates. Borja insisted had announced that, should a to this author that the military's 300,000 more voters. The CFP second-round presidential run-off transparent victimization of Assad bastion of Guayas (Guayaquil),with be necessary, it would be held 847,500 adults, cast 44,000 fewer Bucaram had earned the DFP an within one month of the first antigovernment sympathy vote. But votes than Pichincha (Quito), with election. Indeed, informed the underlying fact remained that 564,000 adults. Rold6s and Hurtado observers, noting that the the CFP had run a more effective overcame this disadvantage not Ecuadorian run-off system had campaign and Rold6s had proven only by sweeping Guayas, but also essentially been borrowed from the himself the strongest candidate. by running ahead of Sixto DurSn in French Fifth Republic, expected that the sierra provinces of Pichincha, Trying to Stop Roldk-Hurtado: the second round would be Cotopaxi, and Caiiar. The Oligarchy Panics completed (as it is in France) the following week. Yet, shortly after relation to the presidential Ecuadorian armed forces to Roldfis' triumph, the Supreme candidate), commander of the continue the return to civilian rule. Electoral Tribunal (TSE-the Ecuadorian , and General Further indication of the Carter government body responsible for Bolivar Jarrfn Cahuefios, Minister of administration's strong commitment administering the electoral process) Government (i.e., internal security) to retorno came in the form of a visit announced that a recount would and a close associate of General to Ecuador by the commander of take at least 46 days. In early August Dur6n1s, were known to favor the Canal Zone's Southern Military the TSE declared that the recount termination of the electoral process. Command. The visiting general would require four months. In Indeed, a former director of the conveyed to the Ecuadorianjunta addition, they stated, a second- Liberal Party (Dr. Pedro Jose Arteta) the ' firm support for round election could not be held for claimed that in November the electoral process. Within five months after completion of the 1977- before the constitutional Ecuador itself, the mass media recount. referendum had even taken place (particularly leading television (with Assad Bucaram still a potential stations and newspapers in Quito Since the majority of the Electoral candidate)-General Jarrfn had and Guayaquil) had helped mobilize Tribunal's members had been approached Liberal and public opposition to a coup. The named either by the Supreme Conservative leaders with a plan to military was itself divided. While Court's rightist chief justice (a man cancel the referendum and the army commander DurZin was linked to the Liberal Party's elections. moving toward a takeover, the chief Guayaquil oligarchs) or by the of the ruling junta, Admiral Alfredo military government, few regarded it On September 12, another golpista, Poveda, firmly committed himself to as a neutral body. Shortly after the Dr. Rafael Arizaga Vega, succeeded continuing the return process. election, several TSE from the vice chairmanship to the Within the army (clearly the critical officials-particularly the Tribunal's chairmanship of the Supreme branch), most junior officers vice chairman-spoke darkly to the Electoral Tribunal. Arizaga had seemed to feel the time had come press of major irregularities and called his own neutrality into for a military withdrawal. Indeed, a fraud in the vote. In the succeeding question by revealing after the significant number enthusiastically weeks, as the TSE proceeded to election that he had voted for Raul endorsed Rold6sf reformist throw out thousands of votes, it Clemente Huerta. In early program. In the final analysis, then, appeared increasingly evident that September, he had anticipated the Generals Durfin and Jarrh could not the Tribunal was trying to alter the Electoral Tribunal's findings, stating be at all sure that their troops would results. While it would be impossible "the TSE is absolutely and totally follow orders for a coup. to disallow enough votes to oust aware that an election fraud was Rold6s from first place (his margin committed on July 16. The electoral was too large), there seemed to be process may be declared void." On September 23-less than 24 hours after Dr. Arizaga Vega's an effort to narrow his victory so Events quickly moved toward a that voters would not view him as inflamatory television speech- confrontation. Two days after Admiral Poveda and the ruling the inevitable second-round victor Arizaga Vega assumed leadership of (the TSE was anxious to avoid a Military Council reconfirmed their the TSE, Jaime Rold6s warned "we commitment to stepping down. The band wagon effect). In addition, are on the verge of a coup." On suspicion abounded that the presidential run-off, they September 22 Arizaga went on announced, would be held in April Electoral Tribunal was trying to national television to "prove" that move Huerta into second place on 1979, some four to five months after massive fraud had taken place and the completion of a new first-round the assumption that he would be a to suggest that the elections be stronger candidate than Dur5n in recount. In addition, the junta cancelled. He also announced that decreed that congressional the second round. At the same time the members of the Tribunal, having elections-for a 69-member single the Conservative and CID Parties established electoral fraud to their chamber -would be held (which had backed Sixto in the first own satisfaction, were resigning simultaneously with the second round through the National from off ice. Arizaga Vega's presidential round. Two days later, Constitutional Front) pressured statement was clearly designed to the Supreme Military Council DurSn to step down in favor of precipitate an internal coup by anti- appointed a new-presumably more Huerta in the run-off. retorno forces. Indeed, highly objective- Electoral Tribunal which placed sources informed me that As the recount dragged on, would start a fresh recount. On golpista elements within the armed expectations heightened that the October 5, the Council further forces were on the verge of seizing return to civilian government would announced that the elected civilian power that day. be interrupted. Speculation focused government (both President and on the statements and activities of Military intervention did not take Congress) would take office on three men widely considered to be place for a variety of reasons. To August 10, 1979. This was the first golpistas (advocates of a coup). begin with, the United States time that a precise date had been set General Guillermo DurSn (no embassy had strongly pressured the for that critical event. day before Abd6n Calderfin's death that the shooting was related to a hit-and-run accident involving the economist's family. Rejecting that interpretation completely, the Guayaquil daily Expreso (directed by Calder6nfsbrother-in-law) warned of a government cover-up. Jaime Rold6s called for a full investigation and demanded the dismissal of General Jarrfn, known to be a leading golpista. The General responded with a December 11 radio and television address featuring thinly veiled threats Abd6n CalderQn,assassinated General Bolivar Jarrih, Minister of against the mass media. "Abuse of Alfarista candidate. Government. freedom of speech," he warned, All these developments heartened plot had originated and no arrests might prevent the return of civilian retorno supporters, although their were made. On November 11,1978 government. pleasure was tempered by the the new Electoral Tribunal junta's new, delayed timetable. The announced that its recount had During the weeks that followed, the nine month lapse between been completed. Yet, even then, "Calder6n Affair" unfolded in the presidential rounds not only prospects for the future remained nation's press, implicating contradicted the spirit of the cloudy as weeks passed without an government officials in an upwardly "French run-off system," but gave official announcement of the spiraling fashion reminiscent of the hard-line opponents of Rold6s and recount results. United States' Watergate Hurtado time to mobilize their scandal. Stymied by the Guayaquil forces. "Thus," wrote one leading The Calder6n Affair police's refusal to follow up leads, political journalist, "the On November 29,1978-as the the Calder6n family and supporters congressional election, originally nation anxiously awaited the TSE's pursued their own investigation. seen as a legitimization of the return recount-Abd6n Calder6n MuFioz, Shortly after the shooting, three process, now appears to be a the unsuccessful July 16 witnesses told police (and the method of stalling so as to presidential candidate of the Calder6ns) that they recognized one strengthen military control of the Alfarista Party (FRA), was shot of the assailants as Guillermo transition." At the same time down on the streets of Guayaquil by MEndez, a well-known member of a spokesmen for the Guayaquil elite- two men on a motorcycle. Ten days right-wing terrorist group? such as Leon Febres Cordero, a later the muckraking economist When police failed to pursue major anti-Rold6s activist-called died. Some analysts suspected that MEndez, the Calder6n family (with for an alternative to either continued the assassination was a reprisal by the help of friendly witnesses and military rule (clearly unacceptable to local political or business interests several Guayaquil policemen who most Ecuadorians) or a which had been subjected to resisted a cover-up) traced him to a second-round election Calder6n1sexposes of small highland city. On December 8, (unacceptable to the oligarchy). corruption-a shooting in the M6ndez was apprehended by the Febres Cordero and Francisco violent tradition of Guayaquil authorities as he carried forged Huerta (the former Liberal politics. Others noted that Calder6n identification and over 100,000 presidential candidate) called for and the FRA had announced their sucres ($4,000) in cash. The accused cancellation of presidential elections second-round support for Jaime assassin quickly implicated Abel and the establishment, instead, of a Roldos, while still others felt the Salazar, a Guayaquil attorney who constituent assembly which would murder was part of a more he said had hired him to attack (but select an interim president generalized attempt by rightist not kill) Abdon Calder6n. When (undoubtedly other than Jaime forces to intimidate progressive Salazar was arrested later, he told ~old6sI.3~ political movements and to create police that Major Jaime Hermosa- an atmosphere of chaos that would a top-ranking aide to Minister of In short, despite the apparent serve as a pretext for termination of Government Jarrin- had given him September setback for golpista the electoral process. 50,000 sucres after Calder6n1sdeath forces, the real danger of a coup and advised him and Guillermo persisted well into 1979. At one For its part, the government quickly M6ndez to flee the country. point, in fact, the military insisted that the attack was a private government officially announced affair unrelated to national politics. For a brief period the military that a coup plot had failed, but it Indeed, Minister of Government government continued to reject revealed nothing about where the General Bolivar Jarrh stated on the these allegations, with Minister of Table 4 political parties more time for preparing their congressional The First Electoral Round: Provisional and Recount Results slates). - - - The recount had narrowed Rold6sf Candidates Provisional Results Official Recount July margin sufficiently (from (PresidentlVice Pres.) (%I (%I 112,000 to 52,700 votes) to make Sixto's candidacy in the second round appear more viable. Thus, Dur5n Ballen and leaders of the Dur5nlYcaza Conservative and Social Christian (Social Christ1 Parties told me that they could win Conservative) 340,447 (23%) 328,452 (23.8% ) in April "simply by picking up most Huertalvivanco of Raul Clemente Huerta's votes." From the perspective of the (Liberal) 321,327 (22%) 31 1,986 (22.7% ) candidates' ideologies such BorjalBanca optimism seemed reasonable, since (Democ. Left) 162,342(11%) 165,284 (12.0%) Huerta stood to Duran's right, but it discounted the historical animosity between Liberals and Conservatives. As in the United States' old "solid south" (which remained in the Democratic camp Blank or Void 130,177 144,988 long after that leaning conformed with any ideologically based 1,612,994 1,521,449 rationale), many voters in Liberal Source: ElComercio (Quito):July 18, 1978; Neuva (December 1978), p. 41. bastions such as Esmeraldas would never consider voting for a Defense General Andres Arrata become abundantly clear: that the Conservative-backed candidate asking newsmen why anyone assassination was indeed an regardless of left-right should accept the word of "a attempt to create a climate of chaos configurations. Hence, it was hard proven delinquent" (Mended. On which would permit termination of to believe that the conservative December 20, however, the the electoral process. Whether the coalition could pick up more than Supreme Military Council plot really originated with General half of Huerta's votes, especially announced that General Jarrih and Jarrfn or with higher-ranking after Liberal leaders declared their his aide, Colonel Alberto Villamarh officials remained unreso~ved.~~ neutrality in the run-off. Ortiz, chief of the national police, Rold6s1position was further had been removed from their The Recount Results strengthened by endorsements from positions. Three weeks later, Major Amid the unfolding drama of the the parties that had placed fourth Hermosa (of the national police) Calder6n case-which complicated and fifth in the July election-the admitted giving some 600,000 an already unstable political atmosphere-on December 8 (six Democratic Left (whose defeated sucres ($23,000) to Abdel Salazar, months after the July election) the presidential candidate, Rodrigo instructing him to organize a "hit government finally announced the Borja, headed a strong squad" against Abd6n Calder6n. official results of the new Electoral congressional slate) and the FRA Those orders, said Major Hermosa, Tribunal's recount. The revised tally originated with his own superior, (now led by Cecilia Calderfin, the showed Jaime Rold6s still in first General Jarrin. In February 1979 the charismatic daughter of the slain place and Sixto Durah Ballon still in party leader).The sixth place FAD1 government announced it would second with a reduced margin over remained neutral, but one could bring charges against the General. Raul Clemente Huerta. expect voters for the Marxist front Legal maneuvers and further details either to vote for Rold6s-Hurtado or regarding the case dominated the As Table 4 reveals, of 95,000 votes news during the following months, annulled by the TSE, 71,500 were to abstain. often overshadowing the ongoing for the CFP slate of Rold6s and The Problem of Political Legitimacy electoral contest. As of the writing Hurtado (62,000 of them in the party Earlier in this Report, I maintained of this article, General Jarrh's trial stronghold of Guayas). But after that a critical goal of the new had not yet begun and no official months of recounting, charges of Ecuadorian Constitution and of the explanation has been offered for the fraud, calls for termination of the return to civilian rule was to Calder6n murder. However, Jarrb's electoral process, and several near enhance the legitimacy of a political successor as Minister of coups, the second presidential system which had heretofore Government, Admiral Victor Hugo round was set for April 8 (later enjoyed only limited popular Graces, soon admitted what had changed to April 29 in order to allow participation and support. Yet, the sequence of events from the start of minimal sentence and that higher Hurtado and the Christian the electoral process in early 1978 government officials had probably Democrats, "quasi-Marxists.'' through the first months of 1979, been involved in the Calder6n affair. When asked how Roldos and served only to increase popular I was also repeatedly told that Hurtado could be both "bourgeois cynicism and to call into question politics was a crooked game and communist," Ponce replied that the integrity of the political system. manipulated by a power elite. Thus, "electoral alliances bring together The elimination of Assad Bucaram's as the country prepared to face the antagonistic forces." 34 candidacy for the presidency (and, next stage in the electoral process, When pressed, most of the CFP's then, for mayor of Guayaquil), the many voters believed that Jaime harshest critics admitted to me that removal of Liberal nominee Rold6s would never be permitted to their fears of a Rold6s victory rested Francisco Huerta, and the repeated take office or, if he did do so, that he not so much with the candidate postponement of round two, all would be ousted soon after his himself (whom they conceded to be convinced most Ecuadorians that inauguration. In short, the cause of a reasonably capable and honorable those in power could change the political legitimacy had clearly not person), but rather with Assad rules of the political process at will been well served. Bucaram and Osvaldo Hurtado. to serve their own needs. The open RoldGs, several of them insisted, calls by leaders of the Supreme Why the Fear of Rold6s? was nothing more than a puppet of Electoral Tribunal and by Chief The extreme reactions precipitated Bucaram, a man who still evoked Supreme Court Justice Gonzalo by the prospect of a CFP intense hostility outside the CFP Karolys (the man who named many administration raises a basic (indeed, one politician who backed of the TSE members) for annulment question: "Why were large Rold6s called Bucaram "foul of the elections, further heightened segments of Ecuador's economic, mouthed, arbitrary, and a liar"). public distrust of Ecuador's political political, and military elite so fearful leaders. Moreover, high-ranking of Jaime Rold6s?" Interviews with Opponents of Osvaldo Hurtado and leaders of both the Liberal and leaders of the conservative parties the Christian Democratic movement Conservative Parties (including Raul represented in the National warned ominously of "foreign Clemente Huerta's faction) were Constitutional Front (backing Sixto influences over their ideology," known to be involved in attempts to Dursn) evoked a welter of suggesting a Marxist orientation. manipulate the recount and cancel contradictory responses. Some of Conservative politicians frequently the second round. Finally, the Rold6s1political opponents charged Hurtado and his supporters apparently critical role of the simultaneously accused him of with fomenting class conflict. A Minister of Government in the being dangerously radical (or allied strident example of such CalderGn murder and the with radical elements represented accusations can be found in an involvement in the plot of several by Osvaldo Hurtado) and of being official campaign biography of Sixto undercover police agents (who were allied with powerful banking DurSn written by a member of the members of the rightist terrorist interests. Others charged Rold6s far-right ARNE Party. Noting that group that carried out the attack) and Hurtado with planning to use the Chilean Christian Democratic did little to enhance the reputation Ecuador as a "laboratory for testing Party had recently joined with the of the military government.33 their social theories," then admitted Marxist Popular Unity (UP) in Indeed, throughout this period, only that the CFP candidates were common opposition to their nation's Rold6s-Hurtado-who both simply unlikely to change the country military dictatorship, the author insisted that the law be carried out greatly. The greatest danger, one facilely suggested that "the in regard to the election and the critic warned, was that the young christian democratic movement assassination-and Sixto Duran- candidates were raising false hopes throughout the world.. .plays the who steadfastly resisted pressures among the poor for changes that communists' game."35 Sixto Duran to join the antielectoral movement- could not be attained. himself, while refusing to call Hurtado a Marxist, likened the acquitted themselves honorably. A published interview with Dr. Luis Rold6s-Hurtado position to Ponce Palacios, national director of Salvador Allende's. Of course, the mere fact that the the Social Christian Party, clearly Calder6n family and the mass media illustrated the contradictory and What did Rold6s and Hurtado had been able to bring the full confusing character of the charges Really Represent? assassination plot to light and to leveled against the CFP team. If the Ecuadorian upper classes force the removal and trial of Accusing Rold6s of being backed by viewed Rold6s and Hurtado's General Jarrfn suggested that "powerful members of the appeals for change with Ecuador enjoyed a more open economic elite" (within which apprehension, the nation's Left political system tham many of its Ponce was a central figure), Dr. surely refused to include the CFP's authoritarian neighbors in Latin Ponce suggested that the CFP and candidates in their ranks. When an America. Yet, most "typical voters" Assad Bucaram were "rightist Ecuadorian political journal asked interviewed by this author in early neofascists." At the same time, four Marxist academics and leftist 1979 felt that Jarrfn would receive a however, he labeled Osvaldo union leaders to evaluate the front- running team, all the respondents of agrarian reform, for example, his backers favor government depicted them as bourgeois they stress that considerations of promotion of economic reformers. Said Telmo Hidalgo, social equity and economic infrastructure and other statist president of the Pichincha redistribution must always be policies, though they remain quite Federation of Workers, they are balanced with productivity criteria. conservative on issues such as land reform. Finally, RoldOs is "populists representing bourgeois My own interviews with Osvaldo representative of the most interests and are.. .in no way a Hurtado and with the Roldfis policy workers or peasants party." 36 advisers suggested they are men progressive, modernizing sector of Indeed, coming out of an anti- deeply concerned with redressing Ecuador's professional and capitalist Marxist political party (the CFP), a the many social and economic class. Hence, while his views are well-to-do landowning family, and a inequities characterizing Ecuadorian considered radical by conservative law practice whose clients included society. When they talk of taxing military officers and the old the powerful Bank of Guayaquil the rich more heavily, they are as oligarchy, his goal is not to weaken (where his brother was a vice- concerned with the plight of the capitalism but to make it more president), Rold6s hardly seemed to small businessman and the middle humane, efficient, and stable." qualify as a radical or revolutionary. class as they are with the peasantry Speaking to reporters several and urban slum dwellers. One Accepting the validity of the above months after his first-round victory, prominent businessman backing the assessment, Osvaldo Hurtado Roldos declared, "we may define CFP candidates confided, "if we in added, "We realistically accept the ourselves as men of the left, that is, the middle class don't reform the fact that only moderate reforms are we propose structural changes. We system, we will eventually face possible in this country and we are not in agreement with the serious class conflict in this propose no more than that. We will present structures.. . [but] we country." work entirely within the existing believe in giving private enterprise framework." To be sure, when one considers the the possibility of ample high-ranking advisers to the development.. '137 In an earlier "Why, then," I asked, "the apparent . . Rold6s-Hurtado campaign, it is interview, the CFP standard-bearer panic of the oligarchy and the talk of difficult to believe the right's strongly rejected both "orthodox pre-emptive coups?" "It is not fear allegations of "dangerous Marxist socialism and Leninism" in favor of of our alleged radicalism," Hurtado tendencies." Fernando AspiazG (a "more reformist so~utions."~~ replied, but rather "the realization of leading Guayaquil banker), Rodrigo the traditional political leaders that Osvaldo Hurtado appeared to Paz (head of Quito's major currency their days of back-room clique endorse an ideology somewhat to exchange house) and Mauricio politics are over. Our ticket the left of his running mate. In 1976 DSvalos (former vice-president of represents a new era of he characterized the goals of his Citibank of Quito) are among programmatic, open politics. In Christian Democratic movement as RoldOs' most important advisers addition, there are elements of the "a socialist project" and rejected the and supporters. military and economic elite (though type of capitalism that had A leading Ecuadorian political not all of either group) who strongly developed in Ecuador as "having oppose our election because we will generated intolerable forms of scientist suggested to me that rather than viewing Rold6s-Hurtado as put an end to corruption and Since that time, influence buying. We will be the first however, as the young professor antiestablishment, the leading candidates in the first presidential government that cannot be entered into the political arena he bought." moderated his position and, by his round could be more fruitfully own admission, moved toward the characterized as follows: "Raul While Dr. Hurtado may have political center on purely pragmatic Clemente Huerta represented the interests of the Guayaquil overstated the capacity of any grounds. Moreover, even in his commercial barons, particularly administration to eliminate more radical academic years, agricultural exporters. He was the entrenched corruption, his Hurtado's Christian Democratic most laissez faire and conservative evaluation was endorsed by most philosophy was always offered as an of all six candidates, seeking to independent political experts to alternative to Marxism. protect the entrenched coastal elite whom I talked. They agreed that the In short, while both Rold6s and and to limit the role of the state. most radical threat a Rold6s- Hurtado stand to the left of the Sixto Durh, though allied with Hurtado administration would pose Ecuadorian political spectrum and traditionally conservative Andean to the oligarchy would simply be left of previous administrations, they landowners, is also linked to a new, making the rich pay taxes already on are reformers and not radicals. Their Quito-based industrial and the books and in cutting their major 21-point campaign program and technocratic group that has "lines of corruption." Within the their highest-rankingadvisers benefited greatly from the context of the current Ecuadorian emphasize administrative reform petroleum boom and associated political system that would and efficiency. In their discussions public works projects. Thus, he and represent major change. Second-Round Campaigning Ecuador. The Democratic Left was their traditional opponents for the The clouded electoral recount, the able to present candidates in 19 and second slot, had been badly split ongoing possibility of a coup, and the Conservatives in 18, but the after the first round by a bitter fight the Calder6n Affair brought Liberals only qualified in 15 for control of the party between electoral activity to a virtual halt well provinces and the Social Christians adherents of Raul Clemente Huerta into 1979. It was not until March, in 12. Another indication of weak and those supporting his nephew after the TSE finally issued its party structures-or at least limited ~rancisco?~The Democratic Left regulations for the congressional party identification within the fielded an impressive list of young elections, that campaigning for the electorate-was the fact that and dynamic candidates (mostly April run-off really resumed4' Until campaign propaganda generally from the newly emerging that point, all the parties and many urged voters to support list 6,8,12, professional and technocratic class), political insiders retained serious or whatever (as they would be hoping to recoup from their doubts about whether a second numbered on the ballot), with no disappointing presidential showing round would be permitted. The mention of the name of the party in the first round. Finally, the Social mobilization of pro-election being endorsed. Christians (Sixto DurGn's party) mounted a very aggressive (indeed spokesmen by former President The CFP, its congressional slate pugnacious) campaign led by its Lazo, pressures from the headed by Assad Bucaram, had first-ranking congressional Ecuadorian mass media and the emerged as the acknowledged candidate, Le6n Febres Cordero, a U.S. Embassy, and the commitment front-runner in both the presidential spokesman for the Guayaquil of junta chief Vice Admiral Alfredo and congressional races. The CFP business community. Poveda, all were critical elements in list was strengthened by the maintaining momentum toward inclusion of nearly ten members of As for the presidential campaign, retorno. Perhaps equally important, the Popular DemocraticIChristian the second-round race had gotten secret talks between Rold6s and the Democratic movement. The most off to a tentative start in February armed forces convinced key officers important of these candidates was with a radio-televisiondebate that a CFP government would pose Dr. Julio CSsar Trujillo, who had between the two front-running no threat to critical military interests. masterminded RoldOs-Hurtado's candidates (this was to be the only The electoral process was allowed impressive showing in the highlands debate of the second round). Taking to continue, said political insiders, during the first round. when RoldOs pledged that, if a more aggressive stance than he elected, his government would not The Conservatives, benefiting from had previously, Sixto DurSn prosecute major military figures for the overrepresentation of small accused Bucaram of mud slinging acts of corruption.41 Andean provinces (each province and attacked Osvaldo Hurtado's was allocated at least two deputies Christian Democrats as leftists. Once the campaigning actually got regardless of size) was generally During the weeks that followed, under way, public attention was expected to run second to the CFP national attention focused on a divided between the congressional in congress. The Liberals, who series of attacks on the CFP ticket and presidential races. Twelve might normally have challenged by the Social Christian's Le6n political parties satisfied Electoral Tribunal requirements permitting them to field congressional lists. These slates could include up to 57 candidates spread throughout the nation's 20 provinces and 12 positions elected at large from the entire country. Both the at-large seats and the delegates allocated to each of the provinces were to be elected through proportional representation. Parties fielding congressional slates ranged from the Marxist UDP and MDP through the rightist CID, Social Christians, and Conservatives. That only the CFP met the TSE's modest requirements for fielding candidates in all 20 provinces revealed the weakness of party organization in Quito balcony, from which Rold6s and Hurtado addressed a large audience at an evening rally. Febres Cordero. Using the mass media, the Guayaquil businessman accused Rold6s and Hurtado of tax evasion and of having come to an accommodation with the increasingly unpopular military government (or "the dictatorship" as it was generally called). Febres Cordero thus established himself as the "point man" of the Social Christian-Conservative campaign, trying to take the label of "the military's candidate" off Sixto DurSn's shoulders. To be sure, Rold6s had apparently committed himself to not prosecuting military corruption too zealously if elected. The fact remained, however, that the links between DurSn and the military would make such an agreement superfluous on Sixto's part.

Jaime Rold6s and the Popular Democrats' Julio C@sarTrujillo took to the air waves to angrily rebut Febres Cordero's charges. Taking a more aggressive tone than was his custom, Rold6s lashed out at "the [military] dictatorship" and suggested that the Guayaquil oligarchs represented by Febres Cordero might be connected with the Calderfin assassination. Dr.Trujillo attacked Febres Cordero as the voice of the coastal oligarchy. This confrontation during the closing weeks of February constituted an atypical departure from an otherwise lifeless race.

Once the two presidential candidates began their respective campaigns in earnest-only seven weeks before the scheduled April 29 election-they each manifested markedly different styles and strategies. At CFP rallies and in campaign posters and propaganda, Osvaldo Hurtado received virtually equal billing with RoldOs. Despite the attacks against him leveled by the right, the handsome and articulate young professor was Sixto DurSn on walking tour of Quito, engages in discussion with a market vendor, then chats with workmen and local residents. considered a strong campaign asset and the limited size of all the The Voters Decide by Rold6s and his strategists. In campaign budgets, no voter surveys On April 29, 1978, some 1.7 million contrast, Sixto DurSn Ballen seemed to be conducted in the Ecuadorian voters overwhelmingly generally campaigned by himself run-off. Yet political analysts were elected Jaime Rold6s to the nation's and made very little use of his so sure of a CFP presidential victory presidency. While the turnout was running mate. that the opposition-particularly the slightly higher than on the first round Conservatives and Liberals- (1.68 million versus 1.61 1, it was Sixto's campaign concentrated on a concentrated on gaining a lower than the vote in the January series of walking tours through the congressional majority to stymie the 1978 constitutional referendum, principal cities and addresses to new administration. At the same suggesting somewhat less public various small gatherings, while time, parties endorsing RoldOs- interest in the presidential race. Over Rold6s and Hurtado stressed mass Hurtado-particularly the 10 percent of the ballots cast rallies throughout the nation. If Democratic Left-sought to (184,481) were void or blank. DurSn Ballen had shown himself to associate their congressional slates However, if the turnout was be a weak campaigner in the first with the CFP presidential ticket.44 disappointing, and the round, he seemed even more Rold6s-Hurtado victory surprising to reluctant in the run-off. Indeed, his On the whole, the run-off was as virtually no one, the magnitude of self-description as a technocrat and lacking in concrete issues as the first the CFP sweep exceeded even their not a politician proved all too true. round had been. Sixto Dur5nfs supporters' most optimistic The Social Christian-Conservative campaign, led by Leon Febres expectations. Jaime Rold6s took campaign management was Cordero (head of the Social every province in the country, save amateurish in the extreme, with the Christian congressional list), tried, one, and amassed nearly 70 percent candidate himself having to attend rather unsuccessfully, to depict the of the valid votes: 1,025,148 to to minor details which should have CFP team (particularly Hurtado and DurSn ~all~n's471~657.~5 Even in been handled by advance men. (I Bucaram) as dangerous his home city of Quito, the former watched Dur8n spend considerable authoritarians who might lead the mayor lost by a two-to-one margin. time on the phone making his own country down the road to Marxism. plane reservations during the Durtln Ballen media advertisements Jaime Rold6s thanked the military closing weeks of the campaign.) admonished citizens to "Conserve government for resisting pressures Sixto's insistence on driving his own the future with your vote-Only to annul the elections, while car to rallies and walking tours (and your vote can save the country from Osvaldo Hurtado (as always, the in looking for parking space) chaos and misery." CFP newspaper more combative member of the reflected both the candidate's ads countered: "On April 29, your team) still warned of possible admirable lack of pretentiousness vote will decide between the rightist attempts to stop the CFP and his concomitant lack of political oligarchy and the people; between from taking office. For his part, professionalism. Similarly, this lies and truths; between oppression Sixto DurSn graciously wished the author watched DurSn waste and liberty; between dependency winners well and announced his precious time fruitlessly arguing and independence.. . ; between retirement from politics. His poorly with hecklers and die-hard Rold6s privilege and equality.. . ; between supporters during a walking tour of exploitation and justice; between northern ~uito?~Observing the the past and the future." Social Christian campaign shortly Beyond such generalized assertions, before the election and talking to neither candidate offered much in DurSn Ballon about his prospects, I the way of specific policy sensed that he and his more recommendations. While the objective aides knew he was beaten. Rold6s-Hurtado ticket generated Even the financial advantage that some excitement, on the whole the his campaign had enjoyed in the first electorate seemed apathetic and round evaporated in the run-off as cynical-a result, perhaps, of the erstwhile backers refused to pour political maneuvers and good money after bad. conspiracies of the previous In contrast, the Rold6s-Hurtado months. While the CFP candidates campaign was a triumphant tour of had apparently convinced a majority the nation. At mass rallies they were of Ecuadorians that they were more introduced as "President RoldOs likely to challenge the status quo and Vice-president Hurtado" while than were the traditional parties, CFP literature described their few voters expected a great deal candidate as "president of the from any administration. people." Given the unreliability of polls conducted in the first round Jaime Roldiis Aguilera. Table 5

Provisional Results of the Congressional Election*

Oriente (jungle) and Galapagos National Party Coastal Seats Andean Seats Islands (at large) Total

CFP 13 12 2 4 3 1 Democratic Left (ID) 2 8 3 2 15 Conservatives 0 8 0 1 9 Liberals 1 1 0 1 3 Social Christians 2 0 0 1 3 Others

*The figures reflect congressional recount results as of July 1979. At that time some seats were still being disputed, but no change in party strength was expected. managed campaign ran true to form more than 20-22 of the 69 deputies the presidential results that the old until the very end: on election day, (all chosen through proportional political order was coming to an end. Sixto had arrived at the polling place representation).The Conservatives, assisted by the overrepresentation without his voting card and had to The CFP and ID, the two major of the less populous and send an aide home to retrieve it parties most clearly identified with traditionally conservative Andean before he could cast his ballot. anti-status quo reformism (excluding provinces, were expected to take as the weak Marxist parties) have The congressional election results many as 14-16 seats. The Liberals emerged as Ecuador's dominant were more surprising than the had run a poor list of congressional political forces. For the CFP the presidential tallies and possibly more candidates and knew they would election meant political power after significant as an indicator of voter suffer from the bitter internal split two decades of frustration. In taking discontent with the traditional between supporters of the two the largest bloc of deputies from the parties. While political analysts had Huertas. Based on their strong Andean provinces, and two of four conceded the CFP the largest second place finish in the July 1978 seats in the Oriente (eastern jungle), number of seats in the new local elections (only 3% nationally it had impressively stretched beyond congress, it was expected to win no behind the CFP), they nevertheless its coastal stronghold and hoped to elect 10-12 deputies. established itself as a national party. The electoral results were strikingly By running far ahead of his party's different. The CFP swept to a list and undoubtedly adding to its 31-seat plurality, while the congressional strength, Jaime Democratic Left surprised the Rold6s had challenged Assad "experts" and exceeded their own Bucaram's position as the CFP's expectations with 15 positions. leader. Indeed, in retrospect it was Among the major traditional parties, clear that the cosmopolitan young the Conservatives elected a lawyer had garnered far more votes disappointing nine deputies while from the middle class (and from the the Liberals were virtually more staid Andean provinces, in obliterated as a major party with general) than his flamboyant only three, as did Sixto Duran's political mentor could have done. Social Christians. The poor showing Ironically, in raising dubious legal of the three parties most identified road blocks to Bucaram's with the status quo, coupled with nomination, the CFP's opponents the even sharper decline of had forced that party to select a personalistic parties (the stronger candidate. More important, Velasquistas, CID, and PNR), the elimination of the aging suggested more forcefully than did Guayaquil strongman had brought Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea, the country a far more qualified Vice-president of the Republic. president. The Democratic Left, for its part, On August 10,1979, Ecuador's public works projects (such as road had successfully established itself as Supreme Military Command fulfilled construction) -a major area of the major alternative to the CFP as its pledge and handed over the investment by the military "the party of the future." reigns of power to the civilian regime-into education, public Undoubtedly it had gained government. At 38, Jaime Rold6s health, and the like. Such transfers, congressional votes by wisely became the youngest popularly however, are unlikely to produce identifying its slate with Jaime elected president in Latin American major new expenditures in Rold6s. In the closing weeks, ID history. What kinds of policy is the low-income housing or agrarian advertisements offered the simple new administration likely to pursue? reform. message, "Rold6s: List 12," leading some voters to believe it the slate for In post-election interviews, Vice- In short, contrary to the fears of its Rold6s' party (the CFP was List 4). President Hurtado and top Rold6s opponents and the hopes of many The real key to the ID'S strong economic advisers noted to this of its supporters, the Rold6s showing, however, was an author that, despite the country's government will be moderately impressive slate of dynamic, relatively sound economy, financial progressive rather than radical. Dr. professional (generally young) constraints preclude expensive new Hurtado listed three reasons for candidates, many with personal social welfare or development such moderation: first, he said, the followings in their home regions. programs. Oil revenues, while CFP is essentially a center-left party, significant, have been stagnant less change-oriented than the vice- As for the losers, the Conservatives since 1974 (indeed the volume of president's Christian Democrats; were reduced to an Andean party petroleum exports in 1977 was at its second, as indicated, the short-term (Table 5). Indeed, they would have lowest point since 1972), as economic picture precludes bold won even fewer congressional seats domestic petroleum consumption new ventures; and, perhaps most were it not for the over- (rising at the alarming rate of 15% important, Rold6s and Hurtado are representation of the highlands. The annually) takes an increasing slice of well aware that the military and ten sierra provinces have a slightly production. The external debt- now economic power structure would smaller population than the five over $1.4 billion-currently not tolerate radical change. coastal states. But, due to the accounts for nearly 30 percent of Primary emphasis in the new allocation of at least two deputies to export earnings and that proportion administration's early policies will be each province regardless of size, the is expected to rise. The outgoing placed on tax and administrative Andes elected 8 more military regime had already issued a reform. One high-level representatives (30 to 22). In the "bare bones" budget for 1979, only administration economist insisted election of nation-wide (at-large) 6.6 percent above the preliminary that the current income tax deputies, the Conservatives (with level for 1978. The new structure-which is not graduated 113,000 votes for those positions) administration will put a high priority beyond incomes of 3 million sucres actually ran behind the Social on debt servicing and budgetary ($107,000) -weighs too heavily Christians (123,000) and Liberals austerity. on the shoulders of the middle class (115,000) and received one-fourth and insufficiently on the rich. the number of votes garnered by ID While the Ecuadorian economy and Moreover, any informed observer (445,000). government treasury are sounder knows there is massive tax evasion than those of most of its South and corruption. Rather than press The Liberals-who had dominated American neighbors, business and for major changes in the tax Ecuadorian national politics for political leaders expect a recession structure, therefore, the most of the first half of the of some sort in 1980. Distrust of the government will concentrate on twentieth century-were reduced to new administration in important more honest and efficient collection minor party status. Shortly after the segments of the business of already existing income, sales, election, Francisco Huerta community has already decreased and import taxes. announced that he was leaving the private investment somewhat and party to form a new political this trend will likely continue. In Administrative reform will focus on movement. If he brings much of the short, said Osvaldo Hurtado, "we streamlining the overbloated party's youth with him (a likely are entering a period of economic Ecuadorian bureaucracy and in prospect), the Liberals will fade difficulty due to a huge debt and improving the quality and honesty further. Finally, the Social weak export prospects." Both of its operations. Rold6s' advisers Christians, lacking a national Hurtado and the administration's have repeatedly stressed their political figure after Sixto Dursn's economic advisers feel the commitment to terminating retirement, also show little economic role of the state has been influence peddling, bribery, and prospects of a quick recovery. expanded to its current financial and other forms of corruption. administrative limits. Any additions Bureaucratic incompetence and Prospects for the Rold6s to social programs, said Hurtado, inefficiency were also seen as major Administration: A Look at the will be financed by transferring problems. Yet changes in all these Short Term government oil revenues from areas will be slow. Even the most well-intentioned government is Velasco governments alternated which Rold6s rejects and which unlikely to change overnight with military regimes (generally would surely reduce the President's bureaucratic behavior that has been corrupt and ill-equipped to govern) capacity to introduce meaningful manifested for generations. and mediocre interim presidents reforms. At the same time, Bucaram (installed by constituent assemblies has publicly demanded sharp Beyond these two generalized between coups). One must go back increases in the minimum wage and reforms, the Rold6s government will to the Galo Plaza administration large social service and housing seek to improve the quality of (1948-1952)to find a president with expenditures which administration various ongoing programs. In the strong leadership and administrative economists feel the country cannot relatively stagnant agricultural capabilities. afford.What is not clear at this point sector, for example, efforts will be is whether Bucaram will maintain made to increase output. The Rold6s campaign swept over its control of his hand-picked CFP Consequently, the agrarian reform opponents because it was directed delegation or whether they will program (introduced by an earlier by competent professionals who follow the ascending star of their military government) will stress only were opposing traditionalist president.47 the redistribution of inefficiently amateurs (with the obvious farmed estates, with no major new exception of the Democratic Left Even if Rold6s is able to gain the expropriations. Productivity criteria whose organizational talents helped support of most CFP deputies, he will be given equal or greater earn the party second place in the will need additional votes in order to emphasis than equity. Recently congressional race). Presumably, forge a congressional majority. One introduced (military government) those organizational and might expect these votes to come decrees opening up the eastern administrative skills will now be from the Democratic Left, a party Amazonian jungle (the Oriente) to carried into government. whose ideology and political style large agrobusiness exploitation may seem highly compatible with Rold6s be reversed in a return to past Of course, successful and Hurtado (whose candidacy ID programs limiting colonization to implementation of such reforms supported in the presidential middle-sized holdings. depends on the new government's run-off), Yet neither the CFP nor ID capacity to stay in power for its full seems interested in a congressional Finally, educational reform will be five-year term of office. In the final alliance and the parties' leaders given high priority. During the past analysis, Rold6s and his aides see were not even speaking to each decade, the number of students this as a primary goal (explaining, in other after the April election. attending Ecuadorian secondary part, why they will not attempt schools and universities has radical change). They insist that this Bucaram remained bitter over ID'S expanded rapidly, often, however, is not a question of self interest, but use of Rold6sf name in order to at the cost of educational quality. rather a means of legitimizing boost its own congressional slate. Consequently, attempts will be civilian government and opening up The Democratic Left, for its part, made to improve the quality of channels for ongoing reforms in the sees itself as the CFP's primary education, particularly in the areas future. To provoke a coup, they opponent in the next presidential of occupational-professional argue, would only serve the and congressional elections. ID training. defenders of the status quo. leader Rodrigo Borja still harbors Programs such as these do not strong presidential aspirations and Consequently, if Rold6s fails to represent a dramatic departure from has no desire to strengthen the complete his term in office-as administration's position. Borja the policies of the progressive many political analysts predict-it military government headed by makes no attempt to hide his will not be because of the distaste for Bucaram and Hurtado General Rodriguez Lara (1972-1975) administration's radicalism, but or even from those of Admiral (whom he labels rank opportunists) because of its failure to manage the Poveda's outgoing junta?6 But the and he indicated to me that ID anticipated economic downturn or Rold6s-Hurtado team insists that its support of the Rold6s-Hurtado to govern effectively. Rold6s' major contribution will come in the candidacies on the second round success will depend in large part on form of more professional, was merely a case of supporting his ability to work with the congress. competent implementation of these "the lesser of two evils." Thus, Cynics expect the CFP policies. As one adviser put it, "we while the Democratic Left (which congressional bloc to be controlled are the first Ecuadorian government sees itself as more progressive than by an obstreperous Assad Bucaram, to come to office with a the CFP) will probably offer who leads the delegation, out to comprehensive economic program selective support of some of Rold6s regain center stage from his former and with well-trained people who programs, the President will lack a aide. The CFP party boss has know what they are doing." dependable congressional majority. already made clear that he will be a To be sure, the quality of thorn in Rold6s1side. On the one Beyond Rold6s: A New Political Ecuadorian political leadership in hand, he has negotiated a Order? recent decades has not been strong. congressional alliance with the The 1978-79 national elections The demagogic and inefficient Conservative Party, an alliance represented an important step in Ecuador's political development. civilian government, further opposition parties-particularly the They produced a president and changes will be needed. The CFP is Conservatives and Social administrative team aware of the a party with a strong organizational Christians-and of the nation's need for socioeconomic and base, widespread popular support, economic elite to accept political modernization. Perhaps and a capable new leader. However, modernization and reform of the more important, they seem to have its past history of highly socioeconomic order and to marked the demise of the traditional personalistic, populistic leadership reinforce the legitimacy of civilian (Liberal and Conservative) and has prevented it from developing an rule. Finally, institutional personalist (Velasquista, CID) intellectual base or coherent development will require the military parties which had heretofore so ideology. Jaime Rold6sf well- to stay in the barracks and allow successfully defended the status conceived electoral alliance with the this, and future, civilian quo. Two political parties-CFP and Popular Democratic movement governments reasonable room for ID-with programmatic, (DP1CDU)-particularly its Christian maneuver. Currently, the armed modernizing orientations emerged Democratic component- provided forces includes a progressive sector as the nation's dominant political the CFP with badly needed of young officers who endorse forces and are likely to retain that intellectual and technical skills. One Rold6s' reformist orientation. If they position in the forseeable future. of the greatest tests facing the new can restrain the senior officers who President will be his ability to draw Yet, the very fact that so many are still aligned with oligarchical such talent into the CFP (either from Ecuadorians do not expect Jaime interests, and if the reformist and the Christian Democrats or from conservative wings of the armed Rold6s to finish his term of office, outside the party system) and forces can control their despite his overwhelming popular thereby permanently transform the interventionist inclinations, Ecuador mandate, suggests the continuing CFP into more than the political arm may make progress along the road instability and fragility of the of Assad Bucaram. to political development. nation's political institutions. If the country is to proceed further along Long term political change will the path of stable and responsive further depend on the willingness of (August 1979)

NOTES 6. This Report is based in part on 7. A North American political scientist 1. Readers not already familiar with interviews with the following who has lived and worked for extended Ecuadorian politics are referred to Ecuadorian political leaders and party periods of time in Colombia and Ecuador Thomas Sanders, "Ecuador: Politics of spokesmen: Sixto DurSn Ballen (former suggested to me that even the most Transition" [TGS-8-'771, AUFS Reports, mayor of Quito and 1978-79 presidential conservative Ecuadorian politicians use West Coast South America Series, Vol. candidate of the National Constitutional rhetoric that would place them on the XXIV, No. 1,1977, to which this Report Front and Social Christian Party); left of the Colombian political spectrum. serves as a sequel. See also, Gerhad Osvaldo Hurtado (recently inaugurated Drekonja, et al., Ecuador Hoy (Bogota, as Vice- and leader 8. Indeed, Colonel Rafael Armijos, the Colombia: Siglo XXI, 1978); Osvaldo of the Christian Democratic movement); man who succeeded Trujillo as leader of Hurtado, El Poder ~olihoen el Ecuador Dr. Rodrigo Borja (presidential the Conservatives, informed me that he (Quito, Ecuador: Universidad CatSlica, candidate of the Democratic Left); wouldn't allow Trujillo to address party 1977); John Martz, Ecuador: Conflicting Professor Julio Prado (Secretary meetings in Armijos' home province of Political Culture and the Quest for General of the CID Party and Dean of Loja when the Colonel was provincial Progress (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, International Studies at the Central secretary of the party and Dr. Trujillo 1972). University); Galo Plaza Laso (former was national secretary. 2. The other four years witnessed the President of Ecuador); Pedro Jose 9. Martz, Ecuador, p. 108. full term of civilian president Camilo Arteta (former Secretary General of the Ponce (1956-1960). who was elected by Liberal Party); Dr. Fabian AlarcSn 10. On Velasco and on Ecuadorian a controversial 3,000-vote margin and (Secretary General of the PPP Party); populism see: Pablo Cuvi, Velasco only received 29.5 percent of the total Mauricio D5valos (formerly economic Ibarra: el Gltimo caudillo de la oligarqufa vote. adviser to presidential candidate Jaime (Quito: Institute de Investigaciones Rold6s and now Minister of Natural Economicas, 1977); Esteban del Campo, 3. Miguel Murmis et al., "Research Resources); Dr. Blasco Pefiaherrera El Populismo en Ecuador (Quito: Proposal on Ecuadorian Development" (editor of Vistazo magazine; former FLACSO, 1978). Some scholars (Toronto: York University-unpublished Minister of Government; former Liberal question the utility of the concept of mimeo). Party Vice Presidential candidate); Dr. populism in Latin America, arguing that Luis Ponce (Secretary General, Social 4. Rafael Quinteros, "Los Partidos it is too broad and all-encompassing a ~oliticosen el Ecuador y la Clase Christian Party); Colonel Rafael Armijos term. Terrateniente en las Transformaciones (Secretary General, Conservative Party); 11. With a population of over one del Estado" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dr. Julio C6sar Trujillo (Secretary million, Guayaquil is both Ecuador's Dissertation, University of North General, Popular ); Carolina, 1978), p. 299. Galo Vayas Salazar (Deputy, CFP most populous city and its dominant Party); and others who wished to remain industrial and commercial center. The 5. Martz, Ecuador, p. 28. anonymous. CFP's political power base extends from --

the city into the encompassing province wife planned to run for mayor of 28. An article in the March 1979 issue of of Guayas (the nation's most populous Guayaquil, she was also eliminated on a Nueva (a leading Ecuadorian news province and a major agricultural export technicality. Assad Bucaram was journal subsequently closed down by region) and adjoining areas of the coast. ultimately able to qualify as a the military government) charged DurSn congressional candidate, heading the Ball& with using his position as mayor 12. Bucaram's high-handed tactics CFP slate. to benefit himself and friends in real have antagonized political opponents estate deals. Whatever the validity of from all sides of the Ecuadorian political 21. Huerta sought to eliminate the such charges, Dursn was respected by spectrum. Sixto DurSn, the presidential conflict of interest by resigning from his his political opponents for his opposition candidate of a coalition opposing the position at the research institute (called to the various legal maneuvers against CFP, indignantly told me that Bucaram Fedesarrollo), but the board of Bucaram and his refusal to support anti- had distributed purposely mistranslated directors-drawn largely from the Roldfis coup preparations (preparations copies of DurSn's English-language birth Guayaquil oligarchy- refused to accept which key Liberal leaders endorsed). certificate (DurSn was born in the his resignation. United States). The words "mother's 29. Impacto (June 1978). The maiden name" had allegedly been 22. Some observers were initially Ecuadorian elite was not assuaged by translated to "name of unmarried reminded of the 1971 Argentine election Rold6s' qualification, "But we must mother" so as to make it appear that in which Hector CSmpora ran as a distinguish between the ideal and the DurSn's birth was illegitimate. stand-in for Juan Peron using the possible." rallying cry, "Camp6ra to the 13. Between 1962 and 1975, presidency, Per6n to power." In 30. See: Joaquh Loyola, "El minigolpe Guayaquil's population more than Ecuador, however, Rold6s1stature rose de 10s triCinviros," Nueva, No. 52 doubled from 510,785 to 1,077,152 while quickly and dramatically. (October 1978); Interview with Quito grew from 355,183 to 592,606. See Francisco Huerta, "No Propongo Osvaldo Hurtado, Dos Mundos 23. Ironically, both Rold6s and Sixto golpismo, pero.. . ," Nueva, No. 53 Superpuestos (Quito: Inedes, 1975). Durgn's brothers were high-ranking (November 1978); Nueva, No. 54 officials of the Bank of Guayaquil. A (December 1978). Twice in recent 14. See, Osvaldo Barsky, "Iniciativa significant number of "middle class decades interim presidents have been terrateniente en la reestructuracion de votersw- ranging from taxicab drivers to selected by a constituent assembly. The las relaciones sociales en la sierra professionals-told me that they would power of traditional parties would Ecuatoriana: 1959-64," Revista de vote for Rold6s (whom they considered normally be much greater in the dencias Sociales (Quito), 1978. distinguished) but would never have assembly than in popular election. 15. See Sanders, "Ecuador: Politics of voted for Assad Bucaram. Transition." 31. M6ndez belonged to Atala, a 24. Dr. Hurtado's El Poder Politico.. . is terrorist organization associated with a a widely used text in the nation's 16. One encounters, for example, many number of political bombings in universities and many secondary physicians in Quito who had been Guayaquil. He had recently been schools. practicing in the United States prior to expelled from the university's medical 1974, but returned to Ecuador when oil 25. Dr. Trujillo, one of the country's faculty. Coincidentally, the witnesses money created a profitable clientele most respected political leaders (among who recognized him were fellow among the new bourgeoisie. politically active Ecuadorians), directed medical students. theCFP1s impressive campaign in the 17. Of some 3.1 million Ecuadorian 32. Ecuadorians with inside knowledge Andean highlands, an area in which the adults in 1978, apprpoximately 2.6 of their political system often expressed party had previously been very weak. million were literate of whom 1.8 million the belief that Jarrfn had to be acting Persons close to Drs. Hurtado and registered for that year's election. with the tacit approval of somebody Trujillo assured me that neither man above him, probably army commander 18. Huerta lost to the Social Christian would have formed a political alliance Dursn. It was generally felt that Admiral candidate by a paper-thin (3,000 vote) with Assad Bucaram had he been the Poveda and the ruling junta per se were margin in the 1956 popular elections and CFP candidate. was an unsuccessful candidate in the not involved in the Calder6n Affair 1966 election of a provisional president 26. The Liberal Party historically has (though General Dur5n was a member by a Constituent Assembly. dominated much of the coast, due of the junta). largely to that region's long-standing 19. The absurdity of eliminating opposition to the Church and the Quito- 33. It might also be noted that several Bucaram on the basis of his parents' based Andean elite. Huerta performed men involved in the Calder6n murder were formerly bodyguards for Liberal nationality was highlighted by the fact so poorly on the first televised Party candidate Raul Clemente Huerta. that Sixto DurSn was fully eligible presidential debate (including all six Although no link was found between despite the fact that he had been born in candidates) that he withdrew from Huerta or other Liberal leaders and the Boston (but was of Ecuadorian subsequent joint television appearances assassination, the events hardly spoke parentage and had been declared an with his opponents. Ecuadorian citizen at birth). well for the people they hired. While 27. Both polls were conducted three to attacks on local politicians are not 20. Soon after being eliminated from four weeks before the election. Results uncommon in Guayaquil, no national the presidential race, Bucaram was of the IECOP poll (showing Huerta political figure had been assassinated declared ineligible to run for mayor of ahead of Dur5n) were suspect since that since Liberal President Alfaro in 1912, Guayaquil (on another technicality survey was commissioned by the Liberal making the murder all the more tailor-made for him). Finally, when his Party. shocking to the public generally. 34. "RoldOs-Hurtado: Una puerta 41. Corruption in the military regime "RoldOs and List 12" (the ID abierta.. . Hacia Donde?" Nueva, No. 53 was fairly extensive at all levels. General congressional slate). Roldfis was (November 1978). My own interviews Guillermo Dur5n was believed to have apparently happy to accept such with Ponce and other opposition leaders been associated with a scandal that support. However, Assad Bucaram saw brought out the same kind of resulted in the closing of the La these ads as taking votes from his CFP contradictory analysis. Thus Pedro Previsora Bank. In March 1979, congressional slate by leading voters to Arteta, former national secretary of the Ecuador's leading news magazine, think that List 12, rather than the CFP's Liberal Party-a man closely associated Nueva, was closed down because of its List 4, represented Rold6si party. with foreign corporations and widely revelations of military corruption. believed to be an active golpista- Insiders insisted that while a Roldfis 45. This represents the final presidential accused the U.S. Embassy and State administration would probably recount issued on June 6. Unlike the Department of interfering in Ecuadorian prosecute lower-ranking officers for first round, the run-off recount did not politics by backing Rold6s. corruption, Rold6s had made a tacit differ substantially from the preliminary agreement with the military not to go results announced the day after the 35. Frederico Veintimilla Salcedo, Sixto after the most senior officers. Only then election nor did it involve much drama. DurSn BallSn: Enjuiciamiento de su obra could he be sure of being allowed to 46. On the Rodrrguez Lara and Poveda (Quito: 1978). take office. juntas, see: Thomas Sanders, "Ecuador: Politics of Transition." 36. "RoldOs-Huerta: Una puerta 42. After Francisco Huerta was abierta.. . Hacia donde?" Nueva, No. 52 47. Several months have passed since deposed as the party's presidential (October 1978). candidate, his uncle's supporters ousted the initial writing of this Report. As it him as the party's national director. A goes to press, an open and hostile break 37. El Universo (Guayaquil): July2, bitter legal battle ensued between the has developed between President 1978. Rold6s and Congressional chief two Huerta factions. Bucaram. In an attempt to reassert his 38. Nueva (March 1978). political power, Assad Bucaram- 43. Dur5n stopped for nearly 15 backed by the CFP delegation and its 39. Nueva, No. 34 (October 1976). minutes to engage several highly Conservative allies- has engineered the antagonistic Indian-vendors (in an congressional defeat of most of Roldfis 40. Actually, the TSE issued its outdoor market) in heated debate. The major proposals. The Bucaram-Roldfis regulations in late January, but women were followers of the FAD1 confrontation and the aging party boss' congressional lists were not filed until Marxist faction. Thus, Sixto violated a ability to control CFP congressional February 28. The election date was cardinal rule of political campaigning by votes have fulfilled the most pessimistic pushed back from April 8 to April 29 losing valuable time debating firmly predictions of Ecuadorian political because several parties complained that convinced opponents. experts. Thus, in late November, I am they lacked time to get their less sanguine about the new congressional campaigns organized in 44. Newspaper ads for the Democratic administrations prospects than I was in time. Left (ID) urged voters to support August.