Nepal general evaluation 1

NEPAL A COUNTRY PROFILE

Nepal is a land-locked country sandwiched between two neighbouring giants China (in the north) and India (in the east, south and west). One of the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with an annual per capita income of US$ 230, Nepal is ranked as 143rd (out of 175 countries) in the Human Development Index (HDI) of UNDP, and falls under the category of ‘low human development’ countries in the human development aggregates (UNDP 2003).

Nepal, which stretches in an area of 147,181 sq km, is a land of enormous geographical diversity divided east-west into three distinct ecological zones: the plains (terai) on the south, hills and mountains in the middle and the Himalayas on the north. Thousands of rivers and streams that flow north-south bisect the landscape into hundreds of small hills and hillocks isolating the residents from each other and from the rapidly evolving world of information and development because of the lack of linking infrastructure (transport and communication). These three regions also display an immense diversity of human settlement patterns, population, land distribution, productive resources and levels of economic development.

Home to nearly 24 million people, Nepal is a mosaic of over 61 ethnic groups who have their own distinct languages, cultures life styles. Officially, however, it is a Hindu State with a rigid caste system that compartmentalizes the people into 4-tire hierarchy. This caste framework finds a close nexus historically with the system of governance, in which the upper caste, the bahun and chhettri castes in particular, have always held the positions of power and privileges, and by virtue of their being in lower tiers, other groups are routinely discriminated against and deprived of accessing decisive State structures and institutions.

1. CULTURE

Nepalese culture builds on its unique geographical, socio-economic and political histories and structures. Its geographical distinctiveness has given rise to diverse cultural structures and practices in different ecological zones. The terai, hills and mountains thus are mutually exclusive in terms of cultural practises. Cultural distinctiveness is also conspicuous along ethnic lines (to which we return shortly). Feudal and subsistence-based socio-economic structures also have implications for cultural practices and manifestations. The following are some of key cultural institutions.

Religion Table 1: Population by Religion (No &%) Hindu 18,330,121 80.6 The Hindu religion provides an overarching Boudha 2,442,520 10.7 cultural ideology to the nation. Hinduism is the Islam 954,023 4.2 state religion and thus influential in shaping State policies as well. Treating Hinduism as Kirat 818,106 3.6 state religion has long been a contentious issue, Others 117,482 0.5 particularly amongst non-Hindu communities Not Stated 74,682 0.3 who find their religious ideologies and cultural Total Pupulation 22,736,934 100 practices neglected by the state. Nearly 81 Source: CBS (2002) percent of the total population professes

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Hinduism as their religion. Buddhism, the second main religion, is professed by around 11 per cent of the population. Islam and Kirat, the other main religions, are practised respectively by around four per cent of the population. Other religious groups which include, Christian, Sikh, Jain, Garaute, Tapjura and Bahai, make up below one per cent of the total population (Table 1). Of these minority religious groups, Christian is the biggest one with around 100 thousand people practising it followed by Sikh and Jain with around five thousand people practising each of them.

Caste and Ethnicity Table 2: People of Nepal Nepalese people are socially segmented Groups Population Percent along lines of caste and ethnicity. The caste system, which flows from the Hindu Bahun 2 ,896,477 13 ideology, compartmentalizes people into 4 Chhetri 3 ,593,496 16 rigidly vertical hierarchies. A person retains Other caste groups 3 ,850,999 17 caste position by birth, and there is no Newar 1 ,245,232 5 possibility of change in this position Ethnic Communities 7 ,027,319 31 regardless of one’s educational performance Dalits 2 ,902,907 13 and economic or social achievements. The Religious-linguistic groups 988,863 4 caste position has implications for career Unidentified groups 231,641 1 development and other life-opportunities one would get from the State. Those in the upper hierarchies often maintain a close interaction with the state apparatus whereas those in the lower echelon find themselves discriminated against in political, economic and social decision-making and accessing opportunities available.

The caste system is responsible for maintaining inequality amongst groups of people. By its very nature, it restricts the types of work people are allowed to undertake, with the most demeaning and menial work being the role of the lowest caste groups. The feudal nature of the caste system leaves lower caste people economically dependent on higher castes. Refusal to do the allotted work leads to reprisals including cases of economic and social boycotts of the whole community. Other rights denied include opportunities for employment, and the right to marry freely, let alone their right to participation in socio- political decision making structures and processes.

The linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities and Madhises (people of of terai origin) are other discriminated groups. The Brahmins and Chhetris, which occupy the first and second position from the top in the caste ladder, constitute 29 percent of the total population but control 77 per cent of bureaucracy, and senior positions in army and police; 67 per cent of state and constitutional bodies; and 63 per cent of current legislature (ESP, 2001:13; 184-185). The Dalits who, according to 2001 census, constitute around 13 percent of the total population do not have a single position of policymaking status in the bureaucracy, army or police. Similarly the ethnic groups who constitute 31 percent1 of the total population do have a very negligible participation in state and constitutional policymaking bodies (see Table 3). The only group that enjoys State privileges besides Brahmin and Chhetris is Newar, constituting 5 percent of the total population. The Newars

1 Calculating the percent of ethnicity, the Newars, which constitute around 5 percent of the total population (CBS 2002), have been excluded in this report. In the national discourse on ethnicity, the Newars find a confusing place in terms of whether or not they constitute an ethnic identity as other groups do (see ESP 2001:180-182).

Nepal Interim Report Page 2 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 3 are predominantly the residents of the Kathmandu valley, and the descendants of the rulers who ruled the principalities that existed in the Valley before 1769.

Table 3: Participation of caste and ethnic groups in policymaking and policy enforcing bodies (in %)

Rank Bahun & Mangol (Ethnic Madhise+ Dalit Newar# Chhetri people) Bureaucracy, army and police 77 1 4 0 18 Judiciary, constitutional bodies, 67 8 13 1 11 cabinet and parliament

+ The inhabitants of the Terai (madesh) are called Madhise. The term has more a geo-ecological connotation than a caste and ethnic one. The data are good to speak of regional disparity. # Newars are predominantly the inhabitants of Kathmandu Valley.

Source: Extracted from ESP 2001:13, 184-185

According to the caste worldview, a person attains social position by birth, not by merits and qualifications. And it is an unwritten law that the opportunities available in the State Table 4: Discrimination against Dalits in Nepal are the privileges of those borne to upper Denial of Entry 10 castes. For the lower caste people, it is just Denial of Services 14 a matter of chance to be able to access the Denial of Access to common services 16 position of power and privileges. The caste Denial of Participation 14 worldview is, therefore, inherently torturous, discriminatory and divisive. Forced Discrimination 9 Dominance 20 The 1990 Constitution, drawn in the Attrocities 20 aftermath of the 1990 People’s Movement Social boycott 3 for the Restoration of Democracy, prohibits Attitudional untouchability 18 through Article 11 (2) any discrimination on Occupational discrimination 18 grounds of religion, race, sex, caste tribe or Educational discrimination 11 ideological conviction. However, the practice of ‘untouchability’ continues to Political discrimination 10 stigmatize some 3 million Dalits even today. Government policy and program 10 The caste system sustains due to the failure Government and NGO Offices 11 of the State to implement stringent Development programmes 13 measures to protect and promote the rights Religious and cultural discrimination 8 of Dalits and to hold the perpetrators—the Total 205 so-called high caste people—accountable for their actions.

A recent study (ActionAid Nepal, 2003)—quite comprehensive of its kind— reports 205 kinds of discriminatory practices existing in Nepal (Table 3, also see box 1). Major discriminations include (a) denial (of entry into the house of upper castes as well as public places such as temple and shops; of services such as the sale of milk product; of access to common resources such as drinking water; of kinship such as inter-caste marriage; of participation such as festivals and public programmes), (b) forced labour (no wages for work), (c) atrocities (beatings, burning houses), (d) social boycott (in case of inter-caste marriages or denial of traditional services such as disposing of dead bodies from high-

Nepal Interim Report Page 3 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 4 caste houses), (e) discrimination (in getting occupation, bank loans in some cases, participating in socio-cultural life).

The 1991 census included data on the Box 1: A dalit house burnt down literacy levels of the different caste and ethnic groups in Nepal. It revealed that the On the night of 13 November 2003, family members four groups with the lowest literacy levels of Komalnath Kandel, an upper caste, burnt down were all Dalit groups, and they had a the house of their Dalit neighbors Manmaya BK, located in Dhamja VDC-7 of Baglung district, Nepal literacy level below the national average. after Manmaya BK refused to move away despite Although the 2001 census shows that levels Komalnath Kandel's repeated warnings. At the time of literacy has improved across the country of the incident, Manmaya was at a distant bazaar in (59.6%) since 1991, more than 40 per cent order to call her husband employed abroad and was of the population is still deprived of not at home. She has left her children in her education, and the Dalit people could parent¡¦s house. make only the smallest gains. According to Family of Manmaya BK, a Dalit, has been staying in Gurung (2003), the highest literacy level is the area for years with her house close to that of 98.5 percent and the lowest one is 11.1. Komalnath Kandel. Recently, Manmaya sold some of This indicates the level of disparity of her land to her brother Ram Bahadur BK who was to access to education between different construct a house on it. Fearing that a Dalit groups. The literacy level of all Dalit settlement would come up around his residence, groups and some of ethnic groups is below Kandel had been threatening Manmaya to move away from the area. However, Manmaya refused to do it national average with a Dalit group having and paid no heed to the threats. According to her, the lowest level. Similarly, Dalit women the fire caused a loss of over Nepali Rs. 300,000 have a literacy rate of 9% against 42% for (about US$ 4055). women generally, and a life expectancy of 42, against the national average of 59.8 After the incident, Manmaya has lodged a complaint (Kathmandu Post 21st March 2004) with the Baglung District Police Office (DPO) demanding compensation to the loss by fire. Balaram Bista, the Sub-Inspector of Police at the Baglung DPO In 2001, 80 percent of Dalits lived below promised to complete the investigation on the the poverty line, compared to a total incident by this week. However, there has not been population figure of 42 per cent. Dalits any serious action taken by the police on this case owned only 1 per cent of cultivable land until now. According to the reliable source, a police and 70 per cent were malnourished. officer said that it would take at least one month to investigate the case because the area, where incident happened, is remote and unstable because SAAPE (2003:131) noted that the incidence of Maoist activities. The victim and human rights of poverty was highest among Limbus, one activists worry that the police will hush up the case. of over 60 ethnic groups, followed by Dalits, and lowest among Newars, the http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2003/513?pri predominant residents of the Kathmandu nt=yes Valley, followed by Brahmins, the group that sits on the top of the caste ladder.

Gender

Discrimination on the basis of gender is rife in Nepal. And it cuts across all classes and ages. In rural areas, where patriarchal traditions remain strong, the intensity of violence and discrimination is severe. Women run the households, do much of the fieldwork, but they have a low status in society. They have no right to property.

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Discrimination against women starts from home and right after the birth; it is varied and far-reaching. Parents are reluctant to invest in a girl's education because her major role is viewed as nurturing children and remaining in the traditional sector of society. Women are often denied the right to parental property. They are seen as “second class citizen, discriminated against in social, cultural, economic, religious and political fronts, and oppressed, exploited and dominated…” (FWLD, 2000:1).

Although Nepal’s literacy rate has increased in recent years, the percentage of literate women lags far behind the percentage of literate men. The overall literacy rate of Nepal is 53.74 percent but the female literacy rate is only 42.49 percent (CBS, 2001). In 1996, primary school enrolment for girls ranged from 52% of that of boys down to 32%; only 1% of working women held the status of ‘employer’; and less than 1% of candidates in local elections were women (HMG, 1996).

The maternal mortality ratio in the country, at 540 per 100,000 live births, is one of the highest in the region (UNDP, 2003). It is proximately linked, among others, to the low level of access to antenatal, delivery and postnatal care. Over 90 percent of births in the country takes place at home and without professional assistance (NESAC, 1998).

The ongoing Maoist insurgency adds another dimension to gendered violence. Women have been displaced from their homes and communities, and the killing of male members of the family has increased their burden of family responsibilities (see Section 4).

2. POLITY

In 1769, Prithvi Narayan Shah, the king of Gorkha principality, some 80kms northwest of Kathmandu, established the modern Nepali state by conquering dozens of petty hill states. Politically, Nepal is now 235 years old; 219.5 years (93.4%) of its life have been characterized by autocracy and government repression, the remaining 15.5 years (6.6%) have seen intermittent democracy (between 1959-1960), which was toppled after 18 months in function by King Mahendra, the father of the current monarch). And from 1990 to the present, Nepal formally remains a multi-party democracy, although the present king Gyanendra has taken over much of executive power after deposing an elected prime minister on November 4, 2002.

Trapped in the grips of a handful of aristocrat elites, Nepal’s political history is the one of conspiracy and in-fighting amidst the rulers. Until 1990, the commoners had hardly an access to politics. The rule of law, human rights and democracy were considered (by the rulers) as alien concepts; the voice for which would mete out severe state repression. In 1990, democracy was introduced as a result of a peaceful mass movement (known as the People’s Movement for Democracy) which toppled the authoritarian polity—the Panchayat system—that ruled Nepal for 30 years (between 1960 and 1990) with the king as an absolute ruler. The preceding 10 years (1950-1960) were a period of transition from a 104- year old hereditary Rana regime (1846-1950) to one in which the commoners would be able to participate and articulate. But taking advantage of the 10-year wrangling the monarchy, which was reduced to titular head of the State during the Rana regime, consolidated its position as an absolute ruler while the peoples, who fought the Ranas in favour of monarchy, were reduced to passive subjects.

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In 1990, an interim government formed after the success of the People’s Movement promulgated the 1990 Constitution, and, as per the Constitution, held national elections for bicameral parliament in 1992. Thirty-two years after the short-lived democracy, Nepal re-entered into a democratic regime with people having high hopes and aspirations that their days of agony were over.

Formally, Nepal is a democratic polity now. But since 4 October 2002, following King Gyanendra’s takeover of executive powers after deposing an elected government and forming one of his yes-men, consisting of the stalwarts of erstwhile Panchayat regime, Parliament does not exist now; nor do local elected bodies. National election is held pending for the last two years.

Street protests and demonstrations by parliamentary parties have been the order of the day in order to rectify what they call the ‘royal regressive move’ of October 4, 2002. On the other side of the political landscape lies an 8-year old armed struggle—the People’s War—launched since 1996 by the then fledgling hard-liner communist group—Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)—aimed at toppling the present state and government to establish a regime styled after the one formed by Mao Tsetung in China in 1945 (see Bhattarai 2003; Prachanda 2003).

Currently, the Maoist People’s War has been a major source of political unrest in Nepal. Except in the cities and Kathmandu Valley, the presence of the state is almost non- existent. The rural areas daily get caught in crossfire between Maoist militia and security forces. Between 1996 and 2003, 8,675 people have been killed, 2792 by Maoists; many thousands have been injured and much infrastructure has been destroyed (see Section 4).

So far, two ceasefires have been observed, one starting July 2001, which lasted 5 months, and the other starting January 2003, which lasted 7 months, with purported aims of finding a negotiated settlement. But both have failed without any outcomes. Instead, the warring parties have blamed each other for using the ceasefires to consolidate their military logistics. What is true is after the break-up of the ceasefire, the Maoist have seemingly mounted heavier attacks than before on the security installations.

Politically speaking, Nepal is at the cross-roads trapped between ‘ultra-leftist’ and ‘ultra- rightist’ extremism led respectively by the Maoists and the monarchy. Mainstream politics—that stands for genuine democracy and the rule of law—is in retreat.

3. ECONOMY

Agriculture is the mainspring of Nepal’s economy. It provides livelihoods for a striking majority of the nation’s population, and employment for four fifths of the total labour force, “possibly the highest ratio in the world” (NESAC 1998: 100). Nepalese agriculture operates in a semi-feudal framework. Arable land is very scarce in Nepal. It is in a fragmented and unevenly distributed. Only 20 percent of the total land area is cultivable, and of the total cultivable land, 69 percent of the landholdings are less than one hectare in size. The bottom 40 percent of agricultural households owns only nine percent of the total agricultural land, while the top six percent occupies more than 33 percent (NESAC 1998: 117-8). And, 24.4 percent households do not own any land (CSRC 2003:8), which means over 5.5 million Nepali people are landless (the average household size of Nepal, according to 2001 census, is 5.45).

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In the landless category are primarily two groups of people: the sukumbasis, a name given to the peoples deprived of land over history for various reasons, and the kamaiays—the Tharu people in the western terai of Nepal who resisted malaria and nurtured the arable land there for over 600 years (see Karki 2002). But these people were tricked into bondage after malaria was eradicated in 1950, which paved the way for migration from the hills. These people soon held control over the arable land pushing the real masters, the kamaiyas into margin, and, gradually, into bondage. Losing their land, the only means of subsistence, to the invaders, the Tharus were forced to work for them for very nominal wages. To meet socio-cultural obligations (costs for marriages, rites, festivals), they started borrowing money from the masters pledging their labour as surety. As social obligations grew, so did the amount of loan which would accrue a large amount of interest solely imposed by the lenders. Over years a point came where, despite working long hours—as many as 18 hours a day—by the whole family members, the loan became so huge that it could not be settled. Instead, it chained them as bonded labourers of the masters. It is estimated that around 100 thousand kamaiyas are landless.

Having no land of their own, the landless (sukumbasis) and land-poor are left at the mercy of big farmers and landlords, often forced to sell their labour for a negligible wage. The surplus so appropriated is diverted to other sectors which do not necessarily support agricultural growth (Acharya 2003). Appropriating a surplus from a majority in the rural areas to a minority residing in urban centres is widening a gap between the rich and the poor. Today, some nine million people are estimated to be below the poverty line with earnings less than 1 US$ a day.

The dominant mode of production is feudal-agrarian and subsistence-oriented. And the nation’s economy operates in a neo-liberal framework. The road to economic liberalization began in Nepal with the reinstatement of democracy in 1990. To globalise the national economy, trade investment, foreign exchange, financial and industrial sectors were deregulated, de-licensed and privatized. However, the experience of privatization has not been encouraging. “Out of 17 enterprises privatised, 4 have already closed down while others are struggling to survive. For instance, Nepal Bank Limited (NLB), the oldest bank of the country, which was privatised in 1997, is in a very critical situation” (SAAPE 2003: 129). Privatization has hit hard the education and health sectors by decreasing the quality and quantity of public health and education provisions. There is no evidence that privatization has led to improved services in any sectors.

To look at the current performance of key economic sectors shows the deteriorating situation of national economy. During the 1990s, the economic growth was 5 percent per annum. But with the start of the New Millennium, overall growth failed down to become “negative (-0.6%), for the first time in 19 years” (NPC 2003). Agriculture, the mainstay of national economy, “which provides employment to 81 per cent of the total population and contributes to over 80 per cent to the export sector” is not performing well. The performance has not exceeded over 3.3 percent over years against the planned target of annual 4 percent growth.

Manufacture industry, the other important sector, faces similar fate, particularly after the start of the Maoist People’s War in 1996 (See the relevant section). Industrial production in the fiscal year 2001/02 reduced to 5.9 per cent from the 10.8 per cent production level of the first half of 1990s.

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Trade accounts for a relatively small percentage of GDP. In 2002, exports accounted for 11.3 per cent of GDP, while the agricultural sector accounted for 40 per cent (ADB 2003), and the trade deficit stood at 14.1 per cent of GDP (SAAPE 2003).

Foreign aid forms an integral part of Nepal’s economy ever since the door to foreign aid was opened in 1952. Nepal’s dependency on foreign aid is on the rise as compared to other countries in South Asia. This dependence on foreign aid has contributed to an alarming amount of foreign debt accumulation. As commentators argue, more than half the annual government revenue goes to foreign debt servicing today with each citizen owing more than US$ 100 to foreign creditors (Pradhan 2000). Currently, NRs. 221.99 billion (approximately US$ 3 billion) stands as outstanding loan.2

4. THE MAOIST PEOPLE’S WAR

On 13 February 1996, six years after the restoration of democracy by the 1990 People’s Movement, a faction of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) declared an armed insurgency (the People’s War) against the present socio-economic structure and state with the aim of establishing, what they called, a New Democratic State (see Prachanda, 2003; and Bhattarai, 2003).

Pointing to the failure of the successive governments of the last 150 years, including those formed in the 1990s, to guarantee equality and justice in all fronts affecting the personal as well as collective life of the people, the Maoists saw the inevitability of an armed struggle against the State which, in their judgment, imposed ‘unjust war’ on the peoples. To right the wrongs of the “unjust war”, they declared a “just war”. A leaflet, which was distributed widely to herald the People’s War on 13th February, speaks of the method as well as the goal of the People’s War—“March along the Path of the People’s War to Smash the Reactionary State and Establish a New Democratic State” (Karki and Seddon 2003:187).

Prior to the start of the War, the Maoists had submitted a 40-point demand to the government addressing nationalism (9 demands), issues related to the public and its wellbeing (17 demands) and people’s livelihoods (14 demands). They had set a dead-line for government response at 17th February 1996, but 5 days before the deadline, they launched series of attacks and assaults on police posts, development project offices, private and public infrastructure.

People’s War feeds on the frustrated experience of the masses, particularly of the youth. It is a common perception that the change of polity in 1990 only changed the political figures, but not the style of governance (Karki 2001). The change did not contribute to decentralization of opportunities and resources nor did it make “any attempts to radically change the stagnant socio-economic structure” (Kattel 2000:2). Resultantly, the people, as in the erstwhile regimes, continued to languish in want, deprived of basic amenities, whereas their leaders soon found themselves at luxury with house servants, imported alcohol, computers, cars, name-brand imports and grotesque modern cement houses (Miksell 1998). Corruption increased. Politics was criminalized and state institutions and government bureaucracy was politicised to serve the interest of the party in power.

2 See, http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishmonthly/businessage/2003/nov/cover.htm

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Increasing unemployment and unchecked inflation of basic commodities made the life of the people more miserable and difficult. Maoists seized rightly on all this characterising the state as an instrument of corruption, exploitation and injustice thereby garnering the support of socio-economically and culturally marginalised people in their favour.

The War started from a few western districts of Nepal: Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot and Salyan, which are treated still today as private estates of the descendants of pre-1800 feudal kings who ruled the then Karnali province with utmost barbarism. During the 30 years of the Panchayat regime, not to speak of the previous ones, no developmental works were initiated in the areas of education, health, transport and communication “because by doing so people would have become conscious of their social deprivation, which would have weakened the political power base of privileged feudal elites” (Karki 2001:184). Following the advent of democracy the local feudal lords, moneylenders and elites, the stalwarts of the previous panchayat regime, joined the Nepali Congress Party (ibid: 185). The commoners joined leftist parties, particularly the United People’s Front (UPF) as evidenced by the results of 1991 general elections, which brought 9 UPF MPs to the House of Representatives, including 2 MPs from Rolpa and 1 from Rukum.

Overall, the Nepali Congress Party won majority in 1991 elections and formed the first democratically elected government (excepting a short-lived one in early 1960s) in the history of Nepali politics, long tainted with authoritarianism. Unfortunately, as soon as the Congress Party, the major architect of the 1990 People’s Movement, came to power, it adopted a policy of political confrontation against communist parties, the allies of the 1990 Movement that toppled the Panchayat system and paved the way for the Congress to come to power. In Rolpa and Rukum, a large number of people, other than Congress supporters, were implicated in fabricated criminal cases, charged and convicted with the help of Chief District Officers (the senior-most government officials responsible for law and order in the district). Having all door to legal adjudication closed, most of the accused had to run away from their homes and villages (see Karki 2001: 184-187). Unlike popular expectations that things would better following democracy, the situation turned more barbaric than it was during the time of Rana regime and the autocratic Panchayat System (ibid). The people in Rolpa and Rukum were thus left in a dilemma like the one Peter Limqueco (1997) visualizes:

“If poverty, oppression and government neglect gets unbearable, the people have a choice either to take up arms or to move elsewhere. It is more likely that they will take up arms because usually such people have nowhere to go. Ruling elites who have no concerns for social justice and equity, driven as they are only by greed and the quest for power, should not be surprised when peasants, workers and ordinary people decide enough is enough. And the banners need not be red, they can be green or blue or pink.”

Reading Karki (2001) and INSEC (1996) suggests that the ordinary people in those parts of the country were compelled somehow to carry a ‘banner’ against repression. And, the banner available to them was ‘red’.

The root causes of the People’s War are thus “the complex web of interacting factors” that include what Loocke and Philipson (2002) have rightly noted:

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uneven development within the country; endemic corruption; the politics of the Palace, both internally and externally, and their relationship with the army; ethnic and caste inequalities; intense politicisation; human rights abuse; social exclusion and deprivation, and inadequate infrastructure development.

Eight years into full swing, it has spread nation-wide, 73 (of 75) districts are under its direct effect. The state has seemingly withdrawn from rural areas, which make up nearly 90 per cent of the country. The Maoist insurgency and the State counterinsurgency has resulted in the conflict to become one of the ‘highest intensity internal conflicts in the word’ as Murshed and Gates (2003) have noted. Consequently, the situation of law and order has reached an all-time low level. All the organic social security systems, which were functional in societies and communities over times providing social and community- level safety measures for the people concerned, have broken down completely. What prevails now is the psyche of terror and fear of what-would-happen-next. Killing, decimation and destruction has become an order of the day. Just in between 2 and 20 March 2004, within three weeks, two major bloody assaults were made by Maoists, one in Bhojpur in the eastern hills and the other in Myagdi in the western hills, the fiercest of its kind ever since the People’s War has started. In these two assaults, over 500 people, including unarmed civilians, have been feared dead, at least 250 confirmed. A number of private houses and almost all public infrastructures were destroyed. And, there is no sigh of abetment. In the last eight years, nearly a dozen of such assaults have been made.

The real cost, impact and implications of the War is beyond one’s imagination as various sources suggest various estimates, which too are mostly tentative than real. In addition to the data of those killed and variously tortured—as reviewed in the following sections— near-true data are not available in relation to displacement, migration, destruction, school closure and other kinds of impact. Preliminary estimates have already painted a horrible picture. In 2002, 17,564 people were reported to have displaced throughout the country (INSEC 2003). A Geneva-based organization—the Global IDP Project, estimates the total number of the displaced to be somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000. The displaced are believed to have fled to urban district headquarters, big cities like Kathmandu, Nepalgunj and Biratnagar and to India. The reasons for displacement are many: the fear of being caught in the crossfire; fear of food blockades, torture and killings by both the Maoists and security forces; and, the fear of forceful enlistment of youths in the Maoist army. The displaced live in “very varied conditions.” Young children particularly fall into “unhygienic conditions and hostile environments… some live on the street, denied an education and exposed to a variety of threats, including sexual exploitation and other forms of child labour.” Those who could not leave their places— particularly the elderly, women, children and poor villagers—are left behind to “face worsening poverty, food shortages, and harassment by both the Maoists and security forces” (Global IDP Project, 2003).

By the end of 2003, around 3,000 teachers were estimated to have left teaching in highly conflict affected districts affecting as many as 100,000 students; around 700 schools across the country were reported to have been closed. The Maoists, through its student wing (All Nepal National Independent Free Student Union), disrupted school education throughout the country through a series of bandhs (shut-downs) and protests. Most horrendous of all, the Maoists are using children directly in the War “as human shields, as porters to carry dead Maoist fighters, as housekeepers and cooks and in some extreme cases, as sex slaves” (Thapa with Sijapati, 2003:161-162). In one of the fiercest attacks

Nepal Interim Report Page 10 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 11 made so far (in Myagdi), the Maoists are blamed for using a large number of children as reported by The Kathmandu Post in its commentary of March 26, 2004. According to a recent study, 156 children have lost their lives so far; at least 2000 children lost at least one parent and more than 4000 have been displaced (FDM, 2004:46). Besides being direct victims of its kind, the series of killing, looting and terror—that children have been compelled to watch—have developed a psyche of violence, hatred, and fear in their fledgling minds. The implication of all this is very grave.

By 2003, 8,688 people have been killed, at the rate of three lives a day, 5,883 by the State. Many thousands have been reported injured. The cost of infrastructural destruction is paramount. Nearly half of VDC Offices have already been destroyed. Telecommunication system was destroyed in 13 districts, 5 hydropower plants ceased functioning and 6 airports stopped operations due to conflict. Last year, it was estimated that at least 20 billion rupees—US$13.7 million—could be required for the reparation of the damage (Kantipur daily, 5 April 2003). Given that the scale of destruction has been intense after the breakdown of ceasefire in August 2003, currently it is difficult to imagine the real financial cost the War has claimed.

The effect of People’s War on women is worse and multifaceted. Besides being directly victimized as Maoist members and combatants, for, which they could be prepared, they have to often pay price for their family members’ participation in the War. They are targeted by security forces when their husbands or sons are identified as Maoists. Sita Devi Chaudhary of Kailali was widowed when she was 19: “They [police] killed my husband before my eyes and raped me in front of everyone during broad daylight” (FDM 2004:43). She was not only widowed, psychologically decimated as well. During the last eight years, as many as 48 women have been raped by security personnel, 600 have been killed and around 70 disappeared. The displacement of youths and able-bodied men has added additional burden on women to take up agricultural works, which would otherwise be the domain of male chores.

The insurgency has weighed heavily on the overall socio-economic life. Tourism, one of the main sources of income, has suffered badly. The destruction of infrastructure, including airports, bridges, power plants and telecommunication centres has posed a serious obstacle to communication, transport and development. Rural areas are running short of food and medical supplies because of restrictions imposed both by Maoists and government. The displacement of able-bodied men and women has had a serious impact on agricultural growth. All this dangerously points to impending crisis that may result in famine and hunger, which have time and again haunted the western hills known for a long time to be food insecure (SAPEE 2003).

That militarization has been the system of governance is revealed by the unnatural rise in military expenditure in recent years. The expenses rose 7 fold between 1991 and 2003. Slightly more than 14 per cent of the total budget (including the one allocated for the Ministry of Home) was allocated for security in 2002/2003, which was higher than the one allocated for social services (Table 7). The increase in security expenses has been at a cost: “thousands of teachers could not draw their salary, smooth operation of schools were disrupted in many villages, development activities had to be stalled in many cases” (FDM 2004: 31-32) because the money allocated for these headings was diverted to finance rising military demands.

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To sum-up, the People’s War has been a major Table 5: Occupation-wise Killing (in%) source of direct violence in Nepal for nearly a Occupation State Maoists decade now. It is in the locus of national, Political Workers 65 10 regional and internal concerns when it comes to Agricultural Workers 16 14 developmental, social security and peace Police Personnel 0 33 discourses. Just to look at the background Unidentified Persons 11 3 suggests two primary factors responsible for the upsurge of the War: deprivation and inequality. Civil Servants 0 15 It started from one of the least developed parts General People 3 9 of the country which were from time Army Personnel 0 8 immemorial under a strong influence of feudal practices and which unfortunately underwent state repression even after the change of polity in the 1990s. The participation of unemployed youths and poor farmers in the War shows the correlation between resource deprivation—the violation of economic and social rights—and violence.

Looking at the Maoist targeted infrastructure and the category of people also indicates an interesting correlation. The centre of Maoist targets have been banks, security installations and communication infrastructure, which, as the rebels see, are the support base of feudal elements. Most of those killed by Maoists, except security personnel (33%), are civil servants (15%) and political opponents (10%) seen as belonging to or having close nexus with the socio-economically affluent class. ‘Agricultural workers’ (which includes small farmers, landless/land-poor and the farmers with some land and land-based business)—the other category of those killed—are targeted by the State as potential Maoists. Because they are poor, they are perceived to be violence-prone. Agricultural workers are targeted by Maoists for, arguably, two reasons. First, the middle class farmers have some good land in villages; some of them also operate money-lending or other agro- based business. They thus have some influence in socio-political decision making. This perceived ‘resourcefulness’ position has made them vulnerable although they may not be so in reality. Second, they are killed for failing to provide what Maoists call ‘donations.’ Some of them have been killed for failing to feed them.

Table 6: Trend of Budget Distribution in Some of Key Areas (Nepali Rupees in millions).

Fiscal Total General Royal Defence Home Social Dept Year Budget Expenditure Palace Services* Servicing 1990/91 1979 764 04 111 75 75 231 1995/96 5165 2282 06 219 193 159 723 2000/01 9162 4351 09 381 781 948 1276 2001/02 9979 4932 11 582 753 1353 1411 2002/03 9612 5744 39 728 753 1413 1635

* Expenses for education, health, drinking water and local development are included in the expenditure for social services. See, SAAPE (2003:144)

5. LAWS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

5.1 THE LAWS

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Nepal’s modern legal system is less than half-a-decade old (see, CVICT 2001). Until 1960s, Hindu shastras (religious scriptures) would form the basis of laws interpreted locally—by local priests, mostly Brahmin graduates of Sanskrit education—in the light of the traditions of local customs and practices. As the interpretation would vary along diverse socio- cultural make-up of Nepal, so would justice addressing the same case/issue in a particular cultural set-up.

The Muluki Ain (National Code)

The Muluki Ain (translated variously as ‘Civil Code’, ‘Country Code’ or ‘National Code’; we use ‘National Code’ in this context) sets the history of the legal system of Nepal. Jung Bahadur Rana, the founder of the hereditary-dictatorial Rana Regime that ruled Nepal between 1846 and 1950 completely centralized and closed, introduced in 1854 the National Code thereby bringing uniformity in penal system and practices. Initiated by a dictator who came to power following a bloodiest massacre of kin and kiths, the Code might have been drawn—basing solely on the Hindu value systems—to further his personal and familial interests by imposing heavily punitive measures on his opponents. It was utterly against women, workers and the so-called low-caste, and loaded with grossly discriminatory provisions which legally sanctified sati system3, bonded labour system4 and slavery system. One of the serious implications of the National Code is the legal formalization of the caste system compartmentalizing the Nepali people into four vertical strata with no possibility of upward mobility. But an upper group could move downwards on certain conditions. In sum, “the Code was discriminatory in the application of laws on the ground of religion, race, sex, caste and tribe. There was difference in punishment for men and women and for the person of ‘lower caste’ and ‘upper cast’” (FDLD, 2000: 5).

By default, one could argue, the Code helped to synchronize legal practices scattered otherwise variously throughout the country.

From 1854 and now, the Code has undergone a dozen of amendments, and each amendment has seen a bit of progressive step forward but a number of discriminatory clauses still remain in place. The first amendment was done in 1963, after 1010 years of its life, and this amended version, with other minor subsequent amendments, provides a major legal reference till today.

The provisions of the Code are wide-ranging covering matters from development related issues to the inheritance rights of women to lost and found animals to adoption. In recent years some of the issues it used to address have been superseded by new legislation. For example, cases pertaining to ‘adoption’ are now handled as per the Child Act 1992 (see below). But where no specific laws exist, the Code stands as the only reference point. Of particular reference here are the issues relating to women’s rights—such as the provisions on rape, inheritance and marriage—which are discriminatory and unconstitutional as per the 1990 Constitution, but still in practice.

3 The practice of self-immolation of widows on dead husband’s funeral pyres 4 A social system where laborers and/or their family members work for the masters—mostly the landlords—in repayment of debts taken by them or their forefathers for various socio-economic purposes. Tied to debts, the account of which is maintained unilaterally by the masters and interest rates are imposed by them on their will, the labourers do not get wages despite working for infinite working hours. Once in bondage, the exit is hardly possible.

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However, the provisions on rape, which are still the only legal provisions under Section 3 of the National Code, are of particular relevance to this discussion. As per the provisions, rape of a girl of 14 or below is punishable by six to 10 years' imprisonment; rape of a woman above 14 amounts to three to five years' imprisonment. The Code treats rape in custody more seriously imposing punishment by an additional year's imprisonment over the maximum punishments specified in Section 3.

The Social Welfare Act 1992

The Social Welfare Act 1992 sets up a framework for HMG to undertake social welfare activities through social organizations or associations. It vests authority on Social Welfare Council to coordinate between HMG and social organizations and associations, and monitor social welfare activities of the organizations/associations.

The Act also enables HMG to undertake social welfare programmes through appropriate ministries and social organizations for the purpose of supporting the all-round development of the nation. It empowers HMG to undertake ‘special programmes’ aimed to serve the interests and ensure the welfare of children, the old, disabled; protect and promote the rights of women; ensure a respectable life for unemployed, poor and illiterate people.

The Child Act 1992

The Child Act 1992 aims to establish a comprehensive structure for the protection of child rights, and for the physical, mental and intellectual development of children. The Act protects the rights to maintenance, upbringing, education and health care, rights not to be discriminated on the ground of sex, rights not to be tortured or cruelly treated, the right to contact with biological parents, right not to be forced into begging, and the right to protect the rights guaranteed by the Act in the courts.

The Act imposes duties on different adults vis-à-vis the protection and promotion of the rights set out in the Act. It also attempts to create a framework of administrative agencies, agents and other institutions to regulate activities in relation to young people. These administrative agencies range from the Central Child Welfare Committee and District Child Welfare Committees to Child Reform Homes, Orphanages, and Centres for the Mentally Retarded, Management Committee and Administrators for the supervision and running of Child Reform Homes. Through Article 55 (4), the Act provides for a child bench in each district court.

Section 11 (1.2.3) spells out conditions for imposing punishment for child: children below 10 are not liable for any punishment, those between 10 and 14 at the time of offence shall be warned and, if it is grave in nature punishable with imprisonment, they shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six month. If the children are between 14 and 16 at the time of offence, they shall be punished with half of the penalty to be imposed by law on adults.

The functions, powers and duties of each of the administrative agencies, agents and institutions created by the Act are set out in the Act and have been supplemented by the Child Rights Rules 1995. The Act, above all, purports to implement Nepal’s obligations to the UNCRC into Nepali law.

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The Labour Act 1992

The Labour Act 1992 prohibits the employment of under-14 children in any establishment. It also regulates working hours for women and children between age 14 and 18. It draws a lot on the UNCRC and CEDAW. Chapter 3 limits the working hours for the workers at 48 hours a week at the maximum. Chapter 5 sets out minimum levels of health and safety protection and Chapter 6 details relating to pension funds. It also provides for the creation of Central Labour Advisory Board, Labour Relations Committees and a Labour Court to hear complaints and settle disputes.

The Human Trafficking Control Act 1986

This pre-democracy Act seeks only to prevent traffic of any sort inhuman beings. It defines trafficking as buying and selling of a human person, as well as forcing a woman into prostitution.

Its has two significant features: (a), if a complaint is made under the Act, the onus of proof lies with the offender to prove that he is not guilty, and that the contents of the complainant’s statement are false; and (b) the Act claims jurisdiction for Nepali courts over offences committed elsewhere which are punishable under the Act.

5.2 LAW ENFORMCEMENT

The Courts

Nepal has a three-tier court system: District Courts (75), Appellate Courts (16) and Supreme Court (1). All 75 districts of Nepal have a District Court, appellate (appeal) courts are spread across Nepal and the Supreme Court—the highest court—is in Kathmandu, the capital city of the country.

The District Courts are the first instance courts which hear and decide cases both of civil and criminal nature. The Appellate Courts hear complaints against the District Courts. The Supreme Court is the final avenue for legal adjudication for all cases except those falling under the jurisdiction of the Military Court. The interpretation given to a law or any principle established in course of hearing a case by the Supreme Court is binding on government, all offices and courts. The Constitution also provides for the provision of establishing especial courts or tribunals if required to hear special types of cases (Art 85).

The courts are independent entities with fairly comprehensive scope. But they are not free of the allegations of undue influence, corruption and inefficiency (CVICT, 2001). The Nepalese justice system is thus marred by the low rate of conviction and long delays in holding trials. According to Pathak (2000), the conviction rate for government cases for the year 1995-1997 was around 45 percent. In the year 2001/2002, the clearance rate was found to have increased to 55.31 percent (Supreme Court, 2058/2059BS).

Besides, the inherent weakness of Nepal’s court system is that the sentence orders are frequently amended by higher courts, sometimes contradicting with the subsidiary courts. The other flaw is linked to the socio-economic status of the judges and legal professionals, who, in majority of cases, are high-caste, come from better-off socio-

Nepal Interim Report Page 15 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 16 economic status, and are predominantly males (CVICT, 2001). This asymmetrical make-up of the justice system is said to have affected in the delivery of justice as the better-off are alleged of not being sensitive to the plight of the disadvantaged and the high-caste ones would tend to reinforce the patriarchal values and norms of the Hindu ideology.

To see from human rights perspective, “most of Nepal’s judges are reluctant” about “applying the principles of international human rights laws at the national level for the protection and promotion of human rights” partly because of their “unfamiliarity with” the principles and partly because of their “conservative outlook” (CVICT, 2001: 36).

The Police

Nepal’s police force, which operates under the Ministry of Home Affairs, is responsible for maintaining law and order, domestic security, apprehending criminals and guarding Nepal’s prisons which are managed by the Prison Management Department. There is a separate crime investigation department within the force and several specialized cells, one of them human rights cell.

Although there is no direct provision in the Constitution regarding the power of police, the Police Act 1955, the Essential Services Act 1957, the Customs Act 1962, the Anti-State Crimes and Penalties 1989 and the Public Security Act 1989, all predating the Constitution, give power to police to investigate crime and maintain law and order. Enacted during the authoritarian regime, when suppressing dissent and opposition would mean maintaining law and order, most of these acts are discriminatory, repressive, contrary to human rights principles and, hence, out-dated. But they still remain in place by virtue of Article 131 of the 1990 Constitution—the ‘inconsistency’ proviso—which provides that all laws in force at the time of the commencement of the Constitution shall remain in force until repealed and amended.

There are two types of police officials in Nepal: the civil police and armed police. The total number of civil police is 46’851 and the armed police are to the tune of 17’000. The institution of armed police, which is seen as an extended arm of the Royal Nepal Army, was specifically arranged for border security, the security of airport and places of its kind in response to the security threat created by the Maoists Insurgency.

To speak numerically, the number of civil police as a proportion of Nepal’s population is 1:512 today. As CVICT (2001) has recorded, in 1995, it was 1:515 and in 1998 the proportion slightly increased to 1:486. On average, the police-population ratio of the last 10 years has remained at 1:504.

An efficient and independent police force is crucial for the enforcement of law, thereby to maintain law and order in society. However, the Nepalese police force has a tarnished image historically. It is often seen as an ally of those holding Executive portfolios of the State rather than a friend of the people in need. For the common people, the police force maintains an image of a coercive institution responsible for maintaining the interest of the powerful. It is well noted that “personal and politically motivated nepotism in appointment and promotion has beset Nepal’s police at all levels” (CVICT, 2001: 34), not only in the ancien regime, but also during democratic era, which marked frequent changes of governments, with each change resulting in the change in high-ranking police personnel.

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Police institution thus stands as a failed institution in the minds of the commoner. Its image has further tarnished particularly after the start of the People’s War, when it has completely failed to take into confidence the trust of peoples.

6. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

In the case of Nepal, human rights are relatively new, both in concepts and practices. As reviewed earlier, Nepal’s history has not been human rights friendly for centuries. Only in the late 80s, in the run-up to the People’s Movement, were human rights brought to public discourse, and from the 1990s, they form part of the governance process, at least in theory. The following sections critically look into key structures protecting and promoting human rights and, then, performance in the light of human rights practices of the last 14 years with the help of relevant data.

6.1. STRUCTURES/LAWS THAT BACK-UP HUMAN RIGHTS a. The 1990 Constitution

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 seeks—through Part 3 and 4—to protect most of the human rights recognized by international law. Part 3 lists down 'fundamental rights,' most of what is understood as 'civil and political' rights, and some of 'social and cultural' rights. The fundamental rights are enforceable in the courts. Article 88 (2) of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court "extraordinary powers to issue necessary and appropriate orders to enforce such rights or settle the dispute" arising from the violation or infringement of these rights. Part 4 provides for 'directive principles and policies' vis-à- vis what can be termed as 'economic rights.' As principles, they are not enforceable in any court, but are "fundamental to the activities and governance of the State…" (Art. 24 (2)), which is obligated "to promote conditions of welfare on the basis of the principles of an open society, by establishing a just system in all aspects of national life…” (Art. 25 (1)), and by pursuing "a policy of raising the standard of living of the general public…" (Art. 26(1)).

More than anything else, the 1990 Constitution helped institutionalise human rights movement in the country by providing an open environment for civil society organizations to operate, which so far was legally prohibited. Now human rights monitoring has been one of key NGO contributions to the country—thanks to the 1990 Constitution—thereby to obligate the State to reform its performance. Although the State may deny the NGO claims, it cannot defy them.

The following presents a brief commentary of human-rights specific laws (also refer to the previous section) and, then, a cursory analysis of human rights performance. b. National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

To give effect to the constitutional provision protecting and promoting human rights, a few institutions have been developed. One of such institutions is the National Human Rights Commission established in the year 2000 as per the Human Rights Commission Act 1997 and what is known internationally as Paris Principles. The Commission is vested with responsibility to protect and promote human rights. It is mandated to investigate into

Nepal Interim Report Page 17 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 18 complaints, monitor and report on human rights situation, inspect prison conditions and other institutions under His Majesty's Government (HMG) with a view to assessing their compliance with human rights standards, submit to the government opinions or recommendations, promote research on human rights, disseminate information on human rights, laws/mechanisms protecting human rights through interactions, seminars, media and publications, contribute to the reports the State is to submit to UN and other bodies.

The mandate of the commission does not cover three areas: (a) issues under military jurisdiction, (b) issues being dealt with under prevailing criminal laws and procedures as notified by the Attorney General of the country, and (c) issues claimed by the Principal Secretary of HMGN as having adverse effect in the security of the kingdom and in relations or treaties entered into between HMG Nepal and foreign governments or other international institutions.

The only statutory body responsible for human rights is thus not without obstructions. And it has no mandate to adjudicate in cases of allegations. Yet the role of the Commission is crucial to “bring the culprit to book, if not to justice” thereby creating “moral pressure on the government and other concerned institutions to respond accordingly” (Kattel 1999). c. Torture Compensation Act (TCA) 1996

The Torture Compensation Act deals with the cases of torture at the hand of the State. Article 3 (1) stipulates that no one can be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment while under investigation or awaiting trial. If any person is proven to have been torture-inflicted, compensation is provided to the victims or their relatives by the government of Nepal with an amount not exceeding to Rs. 100’000, which is paid to cover any loss of earnings or, in the event of death due to torture, the expenses required for the livelihood of the dependants of the victim. Compensation claims are decided by districts courts, and if a decision is made in favour of the victim, compensations are to be claimed (by the victim themselves or their families) within a year after the court decision.

The TCA is however blamed for its inherent faults more than it is praised as a tool to aid torture victims. And the faults start right from the definition.

The definition: The TCA defines BOX 2: KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS ‘torture’ very narrowly and NEPAL HAS RATIFIED simplistically, as a civil offence and not as a criminal offence. Convention Status Date Further, Amnesty International CAT, 1984 Accession 14/05/1991 contends that the definition “is CCPR, 1966 Accession 14/08/1991 CCPR-OP 1, 1966 Accession 14/08/1991 not in line with the definition in CCPR-OP 2, 1989 Accession 04/06/1998 the Convention against Torture” CEDAW, 1979 Ratification 22/05/1991 (AI 2001), to which Nepal is a CEDAW OP Signature only State Party. Since torture is not CERD, 1965 Accession 01/03/1971 defined as a crime, impunity CECSR, 1966 Accession 14/08/1991 prevails, and no judicial CRC, 1989 Ratification 14/10/1990 inquiries of alleged incidents CRC-OP (re armed conflict) Signature only are conducted. CRC-OP (re sale of children…) Signature only

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Further, Article 11 may encourage the perpetrators to shroud their guilt when it says that “the pain that may occur due to being in prison as per the existing law shall not be considered as torture for the purpose of this Act.”

Torture compensation: The ceiling of the amount is very low; it does not really compensate the loss, particularly in the event of the loss of earning due to the result of torture or death of the victim, which puts the livelihood of dependants under threat. The way the compensation is paid, if any, does not hold perpetrators responsible since the payment is made by the State. Rather, it winks at the perpetrators to continue what they are doing giving them—the police in particular—a sense of protection rather than scrutiny of their actions.

Legal remedy: Under the Act, the judge can only recommend departmental action against the perpetrator, but is not authorized to order investigations into the incidences of torture thereby to bring alleged perpetrators to justice. ‘Departmental action’ is discretionary upon the concerned department. It may or may not be implemented (mostly not). There is no provision that the department concerned report back to the court about the action taken or that the court intervene into follow up information. As per the Act, government attorneys can appear on behalf of the alleged perpetrators. But in the case of victims, they should have their own lawyers. All this discourages the victims to file for compensation which is not only unworthy, for the reasons mentioned above, but risky as well as the victims have, in some cases, been reported being threatened and intimidated by the police for filing cases against them (AI 2001). d. International Instruments

Nepal is the State Party to almost all measure international human rights instruments ranging from Slavery Convention (1926) to CRC (1989). It has also ratified key ILO Conventions abolishing forced labour, guaranteeing equal remuneration for equal work, granting rights to association and collective bargaining, eliminating worst forms of child labour, and setting standards for entry into employment (Box 2 and 3). Protecting and promoting all human rights is thus obligatory upon the Nepali government.

6.2 HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE

The unprecedented advancement made in legal promotion of human rights in the 1990s however did not match with practical actions protection. The State acted swiftly and boldly when it came to being Party to intern ational instruments. But, back home, it often chose to deny the required actions to domesticate the international commitments until civil society pressure became insurmountable. (It is the pressure that forced the government to enact Human Rights Commission Act and the Torture Compensation Act). When the State was left to act on its own accord, its actions appeared contrary to human rights norms and principles. The State deviation is exemplary in various harassing provisions inserted in the Acts cited above thereby making the implementation complex and lengthy. This State defiance to human rights encouraged the perpetuation of household and societal level violations as well, contrary to the popular expectation that anti-human rights socio-cultural values would be discoursed by the rule of law. The People’s War—perhaps the bloodiest armed insurgency in Asia now—stems in large part from the inactions and wrong actions vis-à-vis human rights of democratic governments of

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BOX 3: OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED INSTRUMENTS NEPAL HAS RATIFIED

a. Slavery Convention, 1926 b. Protocol amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva, 1926 c. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956 d. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1952 e. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1949 f. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973 g. International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985 h. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 1948

Nepal has also ratified the following key ILO Conventions.

a. No 98: Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 b. No 100: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 c. No 105: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 d. No 111: Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 e. No 138: Minimum Age Convention, 1973 f. No 182: Convention for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 the 1990s. The following gives a short overview of the trend of human rights violations in relation to a few key torture-specific variables. a. Killings

Talking of killing events in Nepal, the Maoist Insurgency comes to limelight today, which claims 12 lives a day comparing the data between 28 August 2003 and 9 February 2004. In the hands of Maoists, 3 people are losing lives where as the State is responsible for killing 9 persons a day in a manner that would amount to ‘encounter killings’.5 The dearth of pre-1990 data makes it impossible to compare the trend of killings between democratic and non-democratic regimes. But in the pre-1990 era, Nepal never experienced the trend of killings of the kind it is today. Table 1 presents the trend of killings starting from the year 1996, the year that marked the start of the People’s War. Ever since, by the end of 2003, Table 1: Killings by State and Maoists 8,675 people have been killed, 5883 by the By State By Maoists Total State. Over the last 8 years, 3 people are being Year 1996 59 22 81 killed daily. Today’s Nepal is trapped into the crossfire between Maoist guerrillas and the state Year 1997 16 32 48 security forces. Year 1998 334 75 409 Year 1999 328 141 469 Most of the killings in the context of the Year 2000 179 219 398 People’s War are believed to be ‘extrajudicial’ Year 2001 244 390 634 ones although the State has reported them to be ‘encounter killings’, until forced to refute, as, Year 2002 3297 1358 4655 for example, in the case of Doramba incident Year 2003 1426 555 1981 (see below). The state has not taken any Total 5883 2792 8675 accountability in relation to extrajudicial

Nepal Interim Report Page 20 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 21 executions as in other forms of human rights violation. The bodies of those killed are either disposed of on the spot or left unaccounted. This stands contrary to existing legal provisions that the body of anyone who has died in suspicious circumstances has to undergo post-mortem. Immune as the security force is, this legal provision is overlooked (AI 2002).

A few cases of ‘extrajudicial killings’ follow:

• On 28 November 2001 at Tribhuvannagar, Dang district, 11 farmers (Asharam, Krishna, Jogi, Ripu, Ramu, Parashu, Situ, Jagaman, Khushilal, Rup Lal and Sangra Chaudhari) were reportedly lined up by the army after they had admitted to being sympathizers of the Maoists and deliberately killed. These people were not armed (AI 2002). • Chandradip Yadav, Uttimlal Yadav and Devkumar Yadav, relatives of a known Maoist leader, were reportedly killed by police at Janakpur town, Dhanusha district on 6 December 2001. According to the Superintendent of Police, they were killed while trying to escape from a police van on their way to the district police office, after arrest. However, other sources allege they were forced to get out of the van and told to run, and then deliberately killed by police (AI 2002). • On 17 August, just when the government and Maoist rebels were sitting down for official peace talks in Nepalgunj and Dang, 20 unarmed people (18 Maoists and 2 civilians) were killed by army, 19 of them after taking into control from the house of Yubaraj Moktan, a local resident, where the Maoists were holding a clandestine meeting. They were arrested at 10:30 in the morning. A little earlier, a person called Bibek (Take Bahadur Thapa) was shot dead while he was coming towards the meeting place.

An hour after the arrest, all the 20 people were taken on a three-hour trek away from the house, with their hands tied up at the back, to a place called Dandakateri. There, 18 of them were lined up and shot dead from a close range. The fate of a lady identified as Usha, who was one of the 20 arrested from Yubaraj’s house, remained unclear. “There had been no encounter at the place; people were brutally killed by making them stand in rows,” the report quotes a local, name withheld for security reason, as saying.

Physical examination of 18 dead bodies—done by the fact-finding committee sent by the National Human Rights Commission which also included a doctor, lawyers and journalists—showed that 15 had bullet injuries on the head, 10 were hit from the front side and the rest from other sides.6

Maoists have been no less brutal in killing common people (teachers, political opponents, common farmers) after taking them into their control. Some representative cases have been discussed below.

6 See, the NHRC report of the fact finding mission of Doramba Incident at (www. http://www.nhrc- nepal.org/doclinks.asp?group=Reports).

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b. Death in detention

After the start of democracy in 1990, no cases of detention- Table 7: Death in Detention deaths were reported until 1996. But in 1997, a horrible Year 1997 25 record of 25 detention deaths was recorded, the highest Year 1998 8 number so far. Ever since, detention deaths have been a Year 1999 4 regular pattern of Nepalese criminology. It is crystal clear Year 2000 7 that detention deaths have emerged as a way of State Year 2001 12 response to the Maoist insurgency. Until the end of 2002, 66 Year 2002 10 detention deaths have been recorded. It is likely that a dozen more will be added to this number by the time the Total 66 number of detention deaths of 2003 will come to public. However, “not a single police officer suspected of being responsible for a death in custody in the context of the ''people's war'' has been brought to justice (AI 2002). c. Disappearances

Disappearance is a disturbing phenomenon in Nepal and it cuts across all regimes. It was a major tool of pre-1990 regime to silence perceived dissidents. And, the democratic government has also burrowed it in ditto, particularly after the start of the People’s War in 1996. Amnesty International (2003) has recorded “over 250 cases of disappearances throughout the country”. INSEC sources estimate that only in the last 8 years, a total of 717 people became victims of disappearances, while Maoists abducted 2,744 people at various times.7 But, the NHRC estimation of the last four years (2000-2003) puts the number of disappeared to 812, 666 by the State, and the rest by Maoists.8 Although the exact number of the disappeared is contentious, what is doubtless is the distracting pattern of disappearance the State has adopted to deal with the opponents.

After the state of emergency was imposed on 26 November 2001, “there was an alarming rise in reports of "disappearance" and Amnesty International recorded over 100 cases of "disappearance" from this period” (AI 2003) at the hands of the military. Today, anyone suspected to be a Maoist becomes an easy victim of military disappearance. Nearly a dozen of disappearances have been unresolved so far starting from 1985. The State has often turned a deaf year in disappearances claims (see AI 2003). d. Torture

Torture, it goes without saying, is a longstanding phenomenon in a country characterized by a long history of despotism. Expectations were high that with the introduction of the multi-party democracy, no one would be subjected to torture and cruel treatment. But all hopes were dashed as soon as a democratically elected government came to power. Just because of participating in demonstrations against the government, 350 people were arrested in the year 1992 and 137 of them were tortured in custody. As in the ancien regime, the police authority was trained violent so that they would contain any kind of things perceived by the ministers to be threatening to them. The police highhandedness of

7 The number of those abducted and arrested refers to the total number of those who have disappeared and abducted during this period time and again and were released. 8 See, www. http://www.nhrc-nepal.org

Nepal Interim Report Page 22 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 23 the newly democratized regime can best be described by the following incident: Kajiman Kami, a resident of Makawnapur district, was tortured dead by police for denying giving them a chicken which he bought to feed his wife who had just given birth to a baby (INSEC 1993:328).But The culprits were never brought to justice.

“Nepal has a historical tradition of torture and humiliation of criminals by police and local authorities” (AI 2001). Despite the prohibition of torture in the 1990 Constitution, and later in the Torture Compensation Act, it is still in widespread acceptance to extract information from the suspects and make them confess the crime, sometimes even non- committed. Torture methods include many, the most common ones are:

falanga (beatings on the soles of the feet) with bamboo sticks, iron or PVC pipes; belana (rolling a weighted bamboo stick or other round object along the prisoner's thighs, resulting in muscle damage); telephono (simultaneous boxing on the ears), rape, electric Table 8: Torture Victims shock and beatings with sisnu ( a plant which causes Year 1996 2071 painful swellings on the skin). The latter method of Year 1997 1568 torture is often inflicted on women, more particularly on their private parts (AI 2001). Year 1998 2665 Year 1999 1139 The victims of torture include criminal suspects, political Year 2000 1035 opponents, currently Maoist sympathisers, and people Year 2001 2195 taken into custody in relation to disputes over land or other private matters. Mainly police are responsible for Year 2002 3430 torture. In recent years, added to police are military Total 1 4,103 personnel.

To speak in the context of the People’s War, rape and attempted rape has been used by security personnel (police, armed police and army) as a systematic tool of revenge and harassment. Maoist cadres, sympathisers or family members of suspected Maoists have been the victims of this atrocity. After the start of the People’s War, increasing cases of rapes have been reported at the hand of security personnel. The year 2002—which was nearly completely under the state-of-emergency—has seen the highest cases of rapes and attempted rapes so far.

Given that rape victims face social stigma and apathy because of the context of culture and religion, many cases of rape go unreported. The state of impunity, which the security personnel have entertained over history, does not encourage rape victims to report rape cases. It instead backfires on them. Amnesty International (2002) has, however, reported a case of legal action—the rarest of its kind—taken against an assistant sub-inspector of the District Police Office in Sindhuli district for raping an 18-year-old woman in 2001. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment; the court also ordered that half his property be transferred to the victim. Such a verdict is very rare.

Between 1996 and 2003 48 have been raped and 29 have suffered rape attempts. In 2002, which saw the emergency rule almost round the year, there had been 12 reported rapes, including 5 gang-rapes (in which 2 or more security personnel were involved), and six attempted rapes which victimised 13 and 6 females respectively, including a child as old as 11, (INSEC 2003), the highest number to be recorded after the People’s War started.

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The following two examples explain the mentality of the security personnel towards the ‘suspects’ and the level of impunity they enjoy despite the public knowledge of their crimes.

• A woman aged, 30, of Bardibas VDC-3 was gang-raped by a group of armed police on 7 July 2002. Before being gang-raped, she was dragged to a nearby jungle from her house. After rape, she was left in the jungle to be found unconscious by herdsmen the next day. The trauma and wound was so serious that she could not be treated in Janakpur Zonal Hospital. She was referred to the Teaching Hospital, Kathmandu and was treated with the help of CVICT (Centre for Victims of Torture). A case was filed against the perpetrators, but no action was reported to have taken until the end of the year (INSEC 2003: ).

• On 3 April 2002, about 15 army personnel with Captain Ramesh Swar leading them came to Masgit Maniyar's home. When they found he had gone to India they asked for the young girls, Tarnum and Tabsum Maniyar. The girls tried to hide on the roof of the house but were arrested by the soldiers. After their arrest, the two girls were taken to army vehicles parked near their house. Captain Ramesh Swar kept Tarnum with him in his own vehicle while Tabsum was asked to stay with the other army men in the next vehicle. On the way to Chisapani army camp, Captain Ramesh Swar repeatedly told Tarnum that the reason for their arrest is the "escape of Masgit", their father. At about 9pm, Tarnum was taken to the room of Captain Ramesh Swar, where she found him drinking beer. He reportedly told her that she has to pay for her uncle's mistake. She cried and pleaded her innocence but was threatened to obey his orders if she cared for her life. She reports that he then raped her. In the meantime, Tabsum was taken to another officer, referred to by everyone at the army camp as "Saheb". She was also allegedly raped.

After about two and a half hours, Tarnum was again taken to Captain Ramesh Swar's room. The captain gave her a toothbrush and towel and asked her to brush her teeth and take a shower. She did so. Then she was raped again. Tarnum alleges that Captain Ramesh Swar raped her three times during that night.

Both the sisters were told by Captain Ramesh Swar that the reason why he raped them was just to take revenge against their father and uncle. He said he would release them if they did not tell anyone. They were then threatened that if they told anyone, they will be caught again, raped and shot dead. He also told them that he would visit them every week to make sure that they had not left the place and had not told anybody (Also see, AI INDEX: ASA 31/016/2002)

These cases represent only a tip of iceberg. There are dozens of reported cases of rapes and attempted rapes. There could be dozens more not brought to public attention because of socio-cultural reason and the state denial of justice to the victims.

To look at the available data, the number of victims (who suffered all kinds of tortures) seems on the rise (Table 2) every passing year. Between 1996 and 2002, a total of 14,103 people have been subjected to torture, at the rate of 6 persons a day, at the hand of the security personnel. (Basing on this trend, it can be argued that around 2000 torture victims have been added to this list in the year 2003.)The number of torture victims has increased in a terrible proportion in the year 2002 when the nation was under the

Nepal Interim Report Page 24 of 44 Nepal general evaluation 25 emergency rule imposed to deal with the Maoists. Ever since, torture has been a systematic tool to deal with the opponents, Maoists as well as others perceived to be standing against the repressive dictums and rules imposed by the current cabinet formed by the king which does not enjoy popular support. The actions of the security forces today are protected by a draconian law--the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Act (TADA) 2002—which gives security forces the power to arrest without warrant and detain suspects in police custody for up to 90 days. The TADA was enacted, despite heightened opposition from human rights groups, with the sole aim of giving security forces all powers required to contain the Maoists. It is after the enactment of TADA that the cases of disappearances and ‘extrajudicial’ killings have been on daily records.

Whereas the number of torture victims is so alarmingly on the rise, the efforts to get torture claims investigated, and victims compensated, have been very slow. In the last 8 years (1996-2003), only 117 cases of torture allegations Table 9:Number of Victims and Compensation Claims have been filed in various Total Victims (TV) Compensation Claims Total Clearance courts nationwide. In No. % (of TV) For Against percentage terms, the rate 14,103.00 117.00 0.83 13 12 of compensation claims stands below 1 per cent of the cases of torture. Of the 117 cases filed, 25 have been cleared by the courts with 13 for the victims and 13 against them. Three cases were settled by the victims and perpetrators themselves without referring the case to the court. The highest amount decided to be paid so far is Nrs 100,000 (US$ 135.14), the amount set as the ceiling in the Compensation ACT, and the lowest amount is NRs 1,000 (US$ 1.35). It needs to be noted however that these are just court decisions and none has been implemented so far. Except in the 3 self-settled cases, no victim has so far received the compensation to be paid (as per the Act) by the State. In the case of the 3, the perpetrator (police) paid Nrs 9000 (US$ 121.62) to each victim.

On 20 May 2001 The Katmandu Post reported that the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Pradeep S.J.B. Rana had acknowledged that human rights violations by police had been a significant factor in the escalation of human rights abuses generally. The IGP was reported to have stated: ''The police killed innocent people, discriminated against ordinary people based on their social status and maltreated the locals during their patrols.''

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Scenario of Non-State Torture and Violence The presence of violence is not surprising in any society which is in short supply of livelihood opportunities and productive resources. Table 10: The Scenario of Violence Table 11: Number of Violence Victims State Non-State Total State Non-State Total Year 1996 438 1 ,247 1,685 Year 1996 NA NA 4,343 Year 1997 449 3 ,770 4,219 Year 1997 2,616 7 ,722 10,338 Year 1998 1,020 3 ,383 4,403 Year 1998 4,537 4 ,509 9,046 Year 1999 783 3 ,877 4,660 Year 1999 1,938 4 ,624 6,562 Year 2000 3,663 4 ,638 8,301 Year 2000 2,774 3 ,704 6,478 Year 2001 1,458 3 ,689 5,147 Year 2001 4,256 5 ,876 10,132 Year 2002 996 2 ,705 3,701 Year 2002 13,847 22,542 36,389 Total 8,807 23,309 3 2,116 Total 29,968 48,977 8 3,288 To buy a tablet of medicine, a pair of trousers and arrange a handful of grains or a loaf of bread to feed themselves and their family members, people would be forced to beg in the street or commit to theft or robbery or killing. Everyone’s conscience condemns this but in the face of a hard choice between a death and a life; people would do still commit such crimes for want of living, whatever the consequences. Nepali society is not an exception to this scenario. The household level and societal level violence are thus as common as the State-involved one. Table 4 and 5 present a comparative picture of the incidences of violence and the number of people affected both at the State and non-State level.9

The analysis of the data of the last 7 years shows that 12 incidences of violence take place every day in Nepal victimizing 33 people each day, nearly 20 of them at the household and societal level. Being itself a perpetrator, the State has failed to protect the victims, who are mostly resource poor caste and ethnic minorities. Gendered-based violence has a lot to do with women being deprived of property rights. Nepalese women suffer various levels of violence: household level, societal level, Maoists level (as everyone is affected) and State level. However, in recent years the Maoist violence has been very alarming. The following presents some examples of violence occurred in the context of the People’s War.

• On 16 January 2002, Muktinath Adhikari was reportedly abducted by Maoists while teaching at the Pandini Sanskrit Secondary school at Duradanda, Lamjung district. A group of four Maoists tied his hands behind his back, and took him about 200 metres from the school. There he was tied to a tree and shot in the head. He died on the spot. It is suspected that the reason for the killing was Muktinath Adhikari's membership of the Nepal Teachers' Association (NTA) considered close to the NC. According to a communication purportedly from the Maoists to Amnesty International, Muktinath Adhikari was killed because he was ''a person with long record of anti-people activities and had proven charges against him of being an informer leading to the killing of a number of innocent people by the royal army in Lamjung''. According to other sources, however, he was killed because he had earlier refused to give ''donations'' demanded by the Maoists and had received several threats as a result (See, AI 2002).

9 The term violence refers, to speak in the household and societal context, to killing, manhandling, abduction, verbal abuse, threats and intimidations, social boycotts, land disputes, discrimination on grounds of caste and ethnicity, gendered violence and so on. The Maoist involvement finds a significant share in all these incidences.

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• In November 2003, Maoist buried alive a 27-year-old farmer (Kal Bahadur Budha) of Pals Village in the remote Kalika Village Development Committee. After abduction from his him village Budha was moved to Seri Village of the neighbouring Madana VDC where he was buried alive in a ditch he was forced to dig himself. Villagers at Seri said that the rebels first goaded him to dig a ditch and then forced him to lie in it. "When he resisted lying down in the ditch, the Maoists chopped off his legs and buried him alive despite pleas for mercy," said the villagers, who were forced to watch the gory act. Locals said that Budha was an ordinary farmer and had no links with any political parties (Source: The Kathmandu Post, 21 November 2003) • Women, children and elderly—as old as 80—are forced by Maoists to work as their sentries in rural areas in Doti where most of youths have left villages due to Maoist terror. Ram Bohara, a victim, told Nepal Samacharpatra that women had been forced to work as sentries—even carrying a baby—if they were no males. Another victim said, ‘We need to work as sentry for the security of Maoists from nearby hilltop, stone or tree. Maoists sleep in our house, we stay in jungles.” (Nepal Samacharpatra March 30) • On September 1, 2003 Maoist rebels killed Relimai Moktan, a woman health worker, in Doramba, Ramechhap, after abducting from her home. The Maoists killed her on charges of tipping-off the security forces about their activities in Doramba, where the security forces had shot dead 18 rebels and two civilians on August 17. (The Kathmandu Post, 4 September 2003)

1. OVERVIEW OF ESCR VIOLATIONS

“… it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law …” (UDHR, Preambular Para 3)

The foregoing discussion suggests that the systematic denial of economic, social and cultural rights in the poorest parts of the country has led to the current insurgency, which in fact has turned to be a civil war in Nepal. INSEC (2003, p.75) rightly notes that the human rights abuses from 1992 to 1995 show that “…government indifference towards the structural problems existent in the society and dependence on police and administration for the maintenance of authority was resulting in conflict and violence. The government’s policy of oppression had pushed the nation to the threshold of violence.” Similarly, in 2000, Amnesty International had stated “Continued poverty and corruption are seen as among the main factors behind this conflict. Support for the ''people's war'' has been particularly strong in the most economically and socially deprived areas of Nepal.”

The human development statistics for Nepal demonstrate the level of denial of the right to a dignified life for the population in general, and deprived groups in particular.

The 2001 census shows that, across the country, the male literacy rate is 65.08%, while only 42.49% of the female population is literate. In rural areas, the female literacy rate sinks to 32.3%. Across the country the population per doctor is 18,439, and the overall HDI is 0.466. Enrolment in secondary school is only 20%, and the mean number of years of education is 2.9. 54% of households have no access to toilet facilities and 33% do not have access to safe drinking water.

These statistics give some indication of the inability of Nepalis to access their rights to health, education and a dignified life. But regional comparisons demonstrate that the

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situation is much worse in the poorer regions of the country, namely the mid-western and far-western mountains and hills.

Table 12: Human Development Index (HDI)

Region HDI value Life expectancy Mean years of GDP per Ratio to 2000 at birth 2000 schooling 2000 capita (PPP national HDI US$) 1999 NEPAL 0.466 59.5 2.89 1237 100 Rural 0.446 58.7 2.5 1094 95.65 Urban 0.616 71.1 4.87 2133 132.18 Mountains 0.378 49.8 2.52 898 81.05 Hills 0.510 65.1 3.04 1262 109.36 Terai 0.474 62.4 2.81 1267 101.73 Eastern 0.484 62 2.76 1073 103.89 Central 0.493 61.3 2.98 1713 105.75 Western 0.479 62.8 3.33 1022 102.76 Mid-West 0.402 53.2 2.69 861 86.37 Far-West 0.385 52.1 2.19 899 82.52 Eastern Mountains 0.424 52.4 2.83 1003 91.09 Eastern Hill 0.513 66.7 2.79 1012 110.03 Eastern Terai 0.488 62.9 2.74 1109 104.80 Central Mountain 0.437 57.2 2.97 1023 93.75 Central Hill 0.510 58.5 3.37 2059 109.54 Central Terai 0.462 63.1 2.57 1520 99.14 Western Mountain 0.414 55.5 2.87 731 88.86 Western Hill 0.487 64.8 3.22 858 104.62 Western Terai 0.435 53.5 3.52 1276 93.45 Midwestern Mountain 0.322 45.9 2.76 731 69.12 Midwestern Hill 0.433 58.3 2.74 741 92.84 Midwestern Terai 0.458 60 2.71 1040 98.21 Far-western Mountain 0.286 41.6 1.25 629 61.29 Far-western Hill 0.393 56.9 1.86 744 84.41 Far-western Terai 0.425 53.5 3.05 1144 91.14 District Demographic Profile of Nepal, INSEC, 2002, p.41

This information demonstrates the regional differences across the country, but there is little information available about the different access to services and rights for different caste/ethnic groups or different socio-economic groups at the micro-level. Nationally, however, statistics show that low caste groups, some ethnic groups and women all have disproportionately little access to socio-economic resources.

Some information is available about the levels of abuses of ESCR across the country. For 2002, INSEC (2003) separately enumerated abuses of ESCR, abuses against women and children, racial discrimination and inhuman behaviour.

Table 13: Violation of ESCR in 2002

Event State: State: % Maoists: Maoists: % Non- Non- % Total No. of No of female No. of No. of female state: state: female no. of events victims events victims No. of No of victims events victims

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Racial 5 5 0 0 0 0 38 50 26 55 discrimination Landless and 18 1263 Na 0 0 0 0 0 0 1263 squatter Abuse of 18 19 100 7 10 100 348 409 100 438 women* Abuse of child 3 5 Na 14 756 Na 138 171 67 932 rights ESCR 11 123 Na 39 41 Na 27 278 1 442 Inhuman 0 0 0 8 10 Na 13 18 27 28 behaviour+ State Maoist Non-state Total ESCR abuses (no. of victims) 1,415 817 926 3,158 Total no. of victims of hr abuses 13,847 18,795 3,747 36,389 ESCR as a % of total 10.2 4.3 25 8.7

* includes trafficking, attempted trafficking, rape, attempted rape, torture, polygamy, sexual abuse and family violence. + includes punishment for witchcraft and other culturally demeaning practices, like being wreathed with shoes

Specific abuses of ESCR included:

• Gender discrimination: women charged with practicing witchcraft were beaten, tortured, forced to eat excrement, and expelled from their houses; domestic violence (including in relation to not providing a dowry) included murder; rape; trafficking. • Caste discrimination: social boycott and expulsion from their house because of inter-caste marriage; low-caste people forbidden from entering public places; beatings for drinking water from a public tap; beatings for participating in public / political activities; loss of jobs. • Child rights: child workers, including living with employers; rape of children; child soldiers. • Abuse of religious rights: Dalilts being refused entry to temples, other abuses included Maoists not allowing proper burial rites to be performed (INSEC, 2003, p.123)

In many of the reported cases, the perpetrators do not face trial, and enjoy impunity.

Apart from cases where the rights of individuals have been abused, the population in general has suffered abuses of their ESCR, often as a direct consequence of the conflict. These include:

• Right to earn one’s own living: War has closed schools, hospitals, and cut off access to district headquarters by people from the surrounding villages, thus disrupting economic activity and making it impossible for public employees to work. The fear of being caught between the Maoist offensive and State counteroffensive has caused many to leave their land, the primary means of livelihood for the majority of the rural people. • Right to adequate food and freedom from hunger: Government embargoes on the transportation of food in Maoist-affected areas has also affected the local

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population; In 2002, the State placed an embargo on the supply of rice to hilly districts like Mugu (INSEC 2003), while in march 2004 Maoist declared a two-week bandh in 17 western districts, stopping the movement of goods and people. The bandh, as Chandi Raj Dhakal, first vice president of Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) noted, paralysed the entire western region. “Thirty districts are now directly affected and all industries west of Butwal are closed.” Ram Shankar Kandu, the Chairman of the Siddharthanagar Chambers of Commerce and Industries (SCCI), pointed to a more alarming scenario. He said that unless the embargo was lifted, it would severely affect public life in the entire region (The Himalayan Times, March 16, 2004). • Right to adequate housing: The internally displaced people have been deprived of their right to housing. The response of the government to this has “remained quite inadequate and turned out to be a complete failure” (FDM, 39). • In addition, the kamaiyas (former bonded labourers) are denied of proper housing. Similar is the status of the sukumbasis (the landless). • Right to health: A policy paper prepared by the Ministry of Health (MoH) states that there exists a wide health disparity in the country. “The life expectancy in Kathmandu is 74.4 years, whereas it is only 37 years in Mugu (one of the mid- western hill districts). Ninety percent of maternal deaths occur in rural areas compared to only 9.8 percent in urban centres.”10 In the context of the People’s War, the health scenario has further worsened. Health services have been used as a weapon of counterinsurgency by the State embargoing the supply of medicines in conflict-hit districts with the fear that “the Maoists would use such medicines if taken to village health posts” (FDM, 2004:48). The Maoist imposed blockades at various times has added additional insult to the already injured health sector. Health workers face “harassment from both sides, from the Maoists, who force them to treat their cadres anywhere, anytime, and from the security forces who, under draconian seize and interrogate laws, can hold anyone without trial for up to three months.” Health workers working in rural areas are often accused by the security forces of working for the Maoists, when in fact they have been compelled by the insurgents to treat their colleagues.11 • Right to education: The conflict has disrupted education, with schools being closed, and them being used by the Army as camps, and by Maoists for meetings. • Rights of Women: the State still does not meet the requirements of CEDAW particularly in relation to nationality rights. Violence against women continues (see above), and in particular the conflict has led to many more women becoming widows. Many cultural taboos apply to widows, who are condemned to live at the margins of society because of their widow status. • Rights of Children: children have been affected by the conflict through curtailment of their education, through economic hardships faced by their communities and families, and by their direct involvement as child soldiers or porters and messengers for the Maoists. Child marriage, child labour and trafficking of children continues. According to the 2001 census, 63,231 children under 16 live with their employer. A report by CWISH (Children-Women in Social Service and Human Rights) states that 80% of domestic workers they surveyed were under 14. (Himalayan Times, 22 March 2004). Only 19% received their own wages. More broadly, high

10 See, the Kathmandu Post, April 6, 2004 at www.kantipuronline.com 11 See, “NEPAL :: ‘Destruction before Construction’ Civil war grips western Nepal, making humanitarian aid difficult, but essential” at http://www.msf.org.au/tw-project/027twp.html

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levels of poverty seriously hinder children’s rights to development - nearly 50% of children are stunted, and the child mortality rate is 91/1000.

2. CORRELATION OF VIOLENCE AND POVERTY

This section has made an attempt examine the relationship between socio-economic factors, specifically development indicators, and levels of violence experienced at the district level. The correlation has been based on the cases reported in the Human Rights Yearbook 2003, covering events in 2002. This information provides a snapshot, rather than a detailed analysis of the situation. It is likely that different districts have been differently affected by violence during 2003 and 2004, as the civil war has entered new phases and the Maoist tactics have developed.

It should also be noted that assessments of levels of violence can only be based on reported cases, and it is likely that many cases go unreported, particularly in remote or conflict-affected districts. A gap in the information is in relation to the socio-economic status of victims of abuses. Whilst it is possible to identify the caste/ethnicity of victims from their names when available, no information about their employment or economic status is available. In addition, little information is available about the broader circumstances surrounding abuses, particularly those relating to arbitrary arrests and disappearances, or civilians caught in the crossfire of the conflict.

The development indicators are also limited in their range. Although they provide a broad overview of which rights e.g. to food, shelter and education are not available to what percentage of the population, no statistics are available with which to examine access to services for different communities within districts. Similarly, no data is available about which groups or communities are suffering violence, except in relation to specific caste or gender based discrimination. Data is not available to enable an analysis of violence experienced by different socio-economic groups.

In order to try to ascertain the impact of socio-economic factors on the incidence of violence, development indicators have been correlated against levels of violence for each district. The development indicators were taken from ICIMOD & CBS 2003b, while the information on levels of violence was collated from INSEC 2003, based on 2002 data. Please see table, appendix 1 for details.

Overall, the districts that were least developed by all indicators are all in the mid or far west. (ICIMOD, CBS 2003b: p11). The mid and far west have the largest number of least developed districts, but there is also a block of contiguous districts in the central Terai which are least developed. Child deprivation, gender discrimination and women’s empowerment are all worst in districts with lower literacy rates. The gender imbalance for literacy is worst in the mid and far west, and in the least developed districts of the central Terai.

The percentage of the population from educationally disadvantaged groups is highest in the same least developed districts.

Generally, the least developed districts are also those which have experienced the highest levels of violence. In particular, there are 13 districts in the mid and far west which fall into the bottom 20 for almost all indicators.

Overall rank compared to violence

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Of the top 20 districts (i.e. those with the best overall development indicators) 12 also fall into the top 20 for the lowest levels of overall violence. This is also the case for the top 20 according to the poverty indicator.

Conversely, of the 20 districts with the worst overall development indicator, 13 also experience the highest levels of violence. For the poverty indicator, of the worst 20, 12 fall into the worst twenty for violence.

Of the 20 districts experiencing the least state violence, 5 fall into the worst 20 for non- state violence, and a further 3 record very high levels of non-state violence. Of the 20 experiencing the least Maoist violence, 4 fall into the worst 20 for non-state violence and a further 4 record very high levels of non-state violence.

Of the 20 districts experiencing the most state violence, all except two experienced low levels of non-state violence. Similarly for the 20 experiencing high levels of Maoist violence, only 5 experienced high levels of non-state violence. These correlations seem to imply that conflict-related violence displaces community violence to some extent. However, these statistics should be considered with caution because of the practical difficulties of reporting abuses.

Of the 20 districts experiencing the highest levels of state violence, six also experienced high levels of Maoist violence. Of the districts experiencing high levels of Maoist violence, 14 also experienced high levels of state violence.

Of the 15 districts that experienced the highest levels of violence (total number of victims more than 150 / 100,000 or total number of events greater than 100 / 100,000 population) in 2002, 11 fall into the category of least developed districts (ICIMOD & CBS, 2003b). Six have been classified as “highly conflict-affected” districts by the Government of Nepal.

Of the 20 districts that experienced lower levels of violence (total number of victims fewer than 30 / 100,000 and total number of events fewer than 20 / 100,000 population) in 2002, 10 fall into the category of most developed districts.

Gender

Women are major victims of community violence, but less so of conflict-related violence. This is not surprising, given women’s relatively lower involvement in activities outside the home and community, which means they are likely to have less contact with state or political forces.

Table 14: Gender Violence Index

Region % total % victims % total % victims % total % victims abuses of state abuses of Maoist abuses of non- committed abuse are committed abuse are committed state by State women by Maoists women by non-state abuse are women Eastern 54.2 8 21.3 6 24.4 52 Central 54.8 7 25.4 n/a 19.8 34 Western 77.8 n/a 14.5 5 7.7 51 Mid 62.5 n/a 34.5 n/a 3 52

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Western Far 36.5 n/a 59.4 n/a 4 42 Western

For the gender index, of the top 20 districts, i.e. those with highest indicator of women’s empowerment, 13 are also in the top twenty for the lowest levels of violence against women. However, there is no correlation between the gender indicator and violence against women for the 20 districts with the lowest gender indicator, perhaps because the gender indicator is low because of overall poverty rather than specifically gendered poverty.

Of the nine districts where abuses of women are more than 70%, the gap in levels of literacy between men and women was more than 10% in all of them.

Out of 75 districts, the literacy difference between men and women is greater than 10% in 49. Of the 11 districts where abuses of women are less than 20% of the total, only 3 have a literacy difference of more than 10%

Violence against women constitutes more than 50% of non-state violence in 28 out of 71 districts for which information was available, and there is some evidence that there are more abuses of women in districts where the disparities between the genders are higher.

Despite the fact that women are less likely to be direct victims of conflict-related violence, the conflict has affected them in several ways. The conflict has increased the number of widows and female-headed households and women have had to take on different roles within the village because of the exodus of men from conflict-affected communities. Conversely, some women are directly involved in the conflict, with large numbers reportedly joining the Maoist forces. Eye witness accounts of the Maoist attack in Beni in March 2004 report that around 50% of the Maoist combatants were women. The eye witnesses also reported their shock at seeing women in positions of power and authority.

Caste and ethnicity

Little information is available about the levels of violence experienced by different caste and ethnic groups. However, ICIMOD &CBS (2003b) ranks districts according to the percentage of the population belonging to educationally disadvantaged ethnic and caste groups. These are defined as groups whose literacy rates were below 30% of the general population of the district. Of the ten districts with the highest proportion of the population from these groups, seven are among the twenty districts with the worst development indicator and 4 experience high levels of violence.

Despite the fact that untouchability and caste-based discrimination are outlawed by the constitution, no enforcement mechanism exists. The ALRC report (2003) notes the lack of effective legal avenues for the prosecution of perpetrators and redress for victims, and the lack of legislation for the protection of dalits, who make up 20% of the population. The institutions set up to address caste-based discrimination are ineffective and subject to political influence.

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Dalits are also increasingly identified with the Maoist insurgency, and therefore increasingly targeted by the security forces. In this sense, the socio-economic status of this group is a direct contributing factor to the levels of abuses of civil and political rights which they experience. In addition, the involvement of the security forces in attacks on dalits, empowers the general public to do likewise, thus ensuring the culture of impunity spreads downwards from the state authority.

At the same time, the denial of economic, social and cultural rights to different ethnic groups fuels the conflict. The madhesis of the Terai are denied opportunities to work in public posts and actively excluded from the police and army, because they are not considered to be Nepalis. This reinforces the sense of alienation from the state and increases the likelihood that the army and police – recruited from non-local ethnic groups – will be viewed more as the security wing of an occupying power than as protectors of the population. Thus, the Maoists find ready recruits because the population is already alienated from the state and the divisive state policies (ethnic, political, economic) fuel the conflict.

Analysis of appeals

Very little data is available about the socio-economic status of victims of human rights abuses. Therefore it is very difficult to draw any conclusions about the link between socio- economic conditions and abuses of civil and political rights. However, an analysis of Urgent Appeals issued by human rights organisations sheds some light on the issue.

Appeals issued by the Asian Human Rights Commission, for 2004 and 2003, were studied. For 2004, 12 cases were recorded up to March 2004. Of those, five incidents affected Dalits - though the number of individuals involved was much higher, as one case involved a family and another case involved a village of 80 people; three incidents affected chhetris, 2 janajatis and 2 brahmins. In each case the police either failed to investigate, or protected the perpetrator for instance by claiming that the victims were Maoists killed in an ‘encounter’.

In 2003, of 27 cases reported, 14 incidents involved (52%) janajatis, 6 (22%) brahmins, 3 chhetris, 1 Newar, 2 dalit (but the number of individuals was higher because one case involved a whole family), and 1 unknown. In cases where the perpetrators were members of the public (for instance the property of a dalit family destroyed by a neighbour), state inaction was recorded. In other cases, where the state forces were the perpetrators, the state refused to comply with court orders relating to allowing access to lawyers and medical facilities, or denied the event had taken place, or pressurised the victims to drop charges. The majority of state-perpetrated abuses were arbitrary arrest, torture, denial of access to family or lawyers and disappearances. The majority of arrests recorded by AHRC, particularly in Kathmandu, were related to criminal activity.

Appeals from Amnesty International for 2004 (up to March 2004) were also studied. AI’s urgent appeals are all for cases perpetrated by the state, in relation to the abuse of civil and political rights. The majority of cases involved arbitrary arrest, disappearances and torture, and the majority of arrests were related to terrorism, suspected connections to the Maoists or other political activity. A large number of the recorded cases took place in Kathmandu (47%). Of the 34 cases recorded by March 2004, 20 victims (59%) were brahmins, 7 (21%) were janajatis, 4 were dalit, 1 chhetri and 2 unknown.

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Although only a small sample has been examined, it is possible to identify a trend: in urban areas the state targets the politically active class, which is predominantly brahmin, thus the high-caste group disproportionately suffers arbitrary arrests, disappearances and torture. However, across the country as a whole, janajatis are the victims of state abuses in disproportionate numbers.

6. THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The State plays a vital role in enabling the continuing abuse of human rights by different groups in society. Despite the outlawing of caste-based discrimination, the kamaiya system and certain forms of discrimination against women, perpetrators of such abuses rarely face justice. In many cases, the perpetrators are state actors themselves, and the culture of impunity for such crimes pervades society. In 2000, Amnesty International stated that “… although many changes occurred throughout society following the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1990, the civil service and police force have so far not been the subject of major reforms. They wield substantial power, often without being subjected to close scrutiny by the legislative or judicial authorities. .. There is a complete lack of accountability in relation to alleged unlawful killings, including extrajudicial executions and indeed in relation to many other forms of human rights violation.” (AI, 2000)

Similarly, in 2002, AI reported:

“.. On 20 May 2001 The Kathmandu Post reported that the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Pradeep S.J.B. Rana had acknowledged that human rights violations by police had been a significant factor in the escalation of human rights abuses generally. The IGP was reported to have stated: ''The police killed innocent people, discriminated against ordinary people based on their social status and maltreated the locals during their patrols.'' (AI, 2002)

These comments all refer to violence perpetrated by state actors, and the impunity they enjoy. However, in many of the cases of abuse reported by AI, AHRC and INSEC, the perpetrators, whether state or non-state actors, do not face trial or any punishment. State inaction in relation to abuses committed by others is a key factor in enabling the continuation of the abuse of the human rights of deprived sectors of the population. ALRC (2003) condemns the government approach to reducing caste-based discrimination, which is limited to education programmes and poverty alleviation programmes. ALRC reports that experience shows that education without enforcement fails, and that the approach undermines the principle of the rule of law.

This state inaction is also visible in terms of the provision of basic services to deprived communities, and demonstrates the lack of motivation on the part of the state to address the rights to food, freedom from hunger, development, education and health for vast swathes of the population.

7. CONCLUDING NOTE

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Nepal is a poor country both in terms of economic and social development. Violence is rampant at all levels extending from household level up to the State. Resource denial and deprivation lies in the heart of violence.

Despite the 1990 change in polity, there could not be any substantial change in the nature of governance, in the structure of economy and social institutions. Frustrated by the failure of the 1990 governments to create livelihood opportunities, the People’s War broke out from western hills in 1996 which now extends nationwide. People’s War has been a major source of violence and a pretext of State inaction. The cumulative effect of all this has been the persistence of violence and degrading treatments. Looking at the data of the agricultural workers killed (16%), next to political activists (47 per cent), it can be argued that the poor and oppressed centre around the People’s War, a fact indicative of a correlation between denial and violence.

There is a very limited study of violence linked purely to economic and social structures and institutions. This makes a comparable or contrasting analysis, in statistical terms, difficult. But given the experience, crimes and disturbances, some of them very grave, attributable to socio-economic deprivation have been regular. The State response to them has been harsh punishment.

Nonetheless it is clear from the available data that there is a correlation between levels of violence and poverty. It is also clear that the poorest groups of society experience systematic discrimination and denial of their basic rights to food, shelter, education, health and a dignified life. This denial of rights is a major contributory factor to the conflict, and the abuse of civil and political rights by the state has contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The situation in Nepal highlights the indivisibility of all human rights and the correlation between the denial of human rights and the escalation of violence.

6. REFERENCES

Acharya, M. 2003. “Towards Conflict Transformation in Nepal: Recent Trends in Government Maoist Dialogue.” In Shrestha, AP and Hari Uprety (eds.) Conflict Resolution and Governance in Nepal. NEFAS: Kathmandu AHRC (Asian Human Rights Commission). 2004. Urgent Appeals for 2003 and 2004, www.ahrchk.net/ua AI (Amnesty International). 2000. Human Rights and Security. Available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports AI (Amnesty International). 2001. Nepal: Make Torture a Crime. At http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports AI (Amnesty International). 2002. Nepal, a Spiralling Human Rights Crisis. Available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports AI (Amnesty International). 2003. Nepal Widespread “disappearances" in the context. At (http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA310452003?open&of=ENG-NPL) ALRC (Asian Legal Resource Centre). 2003. Alternative Report on CERD in Nepal. Available at http://www.alrc.net/index.php Bhattarai, BR. 2003. “Political Economy of the People’s War.” In Karki, A and D Seddon (eds.) The People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspectives. Adroit Publishers: Delhi CBS (Centre Bureau of Statistics). 2001. Statistical Pocket Book. CBS/HMGN: Kathmandu

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CBS. 2002. Statistical Pocket Book. CBS/HMGN: Kathmandu Central Bureau of Statistics (2003) Statistical Yearbook of Nepal 2003, CBS, Kathmandu CSRC (Community Self Reliance Centre). 2003. Land Rights in Nepal: Present Realities and Strategies for Future. CSRC: Kathmandu CVICT (Centre for Victims of Torture). 2001. Nepal’s Penal System: An Agenda for Change. CVICT: Kathmandu Enabling State Programme (ESP). 2001. Pro-Poor Governance Assessment Nepal. ESP: Kathmandu FDN (Foundation for Development Management). 2004. Cost of War: Economic and Socio- cultural Impacts of the People’s War. (Unpublished report available at RRN Library) FWLD (Forum for Women, Law and Development). 2000. Discriminatory Laws in Nepal and their Impact on Women. FWLD, Kathmandu Gurung, H. (2003), Social Demography of Nepal – Census 2001, Himal Books, Lalitpur HMG Nepal (1996), Children and Women of Nepal, Situation Analysis, 1996 - Unicef Beijing Plus Five Country Report, HMG, Nepal downloaded from: http://www.azeecon- lwf.com/lwf/burning_issues/women.html ICIMOC (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development) and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 2003a. Mapping Nepal Census Indicators 2001 and Trends. ICIMOD: Kathmandu Informal Sector Research and Study Centre. 2002. District Demographic Profile of Nepal. Informal Sector Research and Study Centre, Kathmandu INSEC (Informal Sector Service Centre). 2002. Nepal Human Rights Yearbook 2002. INSEC: Kathmandu INSEC. 2003. Human Rights Yearbook 2003. INSEC: Kathmandu International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 2003b. Districts of Nepal Indicators of Development – update 2003. ICIMOD: Kathmandu Karki, A and D Seddon. 2003. The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives. Adroit Publishers: New Delhi Karki, A. 2001. The Politics of Poverty and Movement from Below in Nepal. PhD Thesis, University of East Anglia, School of Development of Studies, UK Karki, AK. 2002. “Movements from Below: Land Rights Movement in Nepal.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies (Vol 3, No 2, August) Kattel, Mukunda. 1999. “An Act without Action: A Nepalese Experience.” FOCUS Asia- Pacific, December 1999, Vol. 18. HURIGHTS OSAKA: Japan Limqueco, Peter. 1997. “No Revolution without Democracy, No Democracy without Revolution.” HImal. Kathmandu September/October 1997 Murshed, SM and Gates, S. 2003. Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. NESAC (Nepal South Asia Centre). 1998. Nepal Human Development Report 1998. NESAC: Kathmandu NPC (Nepal Planning Commission). 2003. The Tenth Plan (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). NPC/HMGN: Kathmandu Prachanda. 2003. “Inside the Revolution in Nepal.” In Karki, A and D Seddon (eds.) The People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspectives. Adroit Publishers: Delhi Pradhan, S. 2000. Foreign Aid No Answer to Nepalese Poverty. Asia Times Online, May 9, 2000 (http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BE09Df02.html) SAAPE (South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication). 2003. Poverty in South Asia 2003. SAAPE: Kathmandu Supreme Court. 2058/2059 BS. Annual Report of the Supreme Court. Kathmandu

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The Global IDP Project. 2003. Nepal: A hidden IDP crisis. Available at http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/$$SearchTemplateD efault?CreateDocument UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2003. Human Development Report 2003. Oxford University Press: New York

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Annex 1: Development indicators and human rights abuses by district (based on 2002 information)

District Population Literacy Women’s HDI Pop. Abuses State: State: Abuses Maoist: Maoist: Abuses Non- Non- Literacy per by No. of % of by No. of % of by state: state: doctor state – victims victims Maoists victims victims others No. of % of events that – that - victims victims are events are events that women women are women Eastern Region Jhapa 688,109 66.93 58.65 0.421 30,145 62 75 8 7 11 27 84 / 12 113 58 Ilam 282,806 66.23 58.23 0.38 47,134 21 22 5 14 17 6 17 / 6 24 54 Panchthar 202,056 55.31 45.51 0.328 40,411 22 27 7 15 38 5 18 / 9 24 46 Taplejung 134,698 52.21 42.34 0.328 33,675 34 40 3 51 53 2 12 / 9 12 2 Morang 843,220 56.74 46.21 0.421 14,054 32 66 11 32 45 4 45 / 5 68 66 Sunsari 625,633 60.38 50 0.382 69,515 66 83 11 6 7 20 / 3 52 42 Dhankuta 166,479 63.98 54.13 0.401 27,747 12 13 0 4 6 0 1 / 0.6 1 0 Tehrathum 113,111 59.02 47.85 0.339 28,278 31 60 7 9 10 0 18 21 38 Bhojpur 203,018 54.52 44.15 0.351 40,604 11 17 24 15 17 6 5 5 60 Sankhuwasabha 159,203 55.31 45.51 0.365 39,801 101 180 8 25 42 0 11 11 45 Saptari 570,282 42.8 35.18 0.374 28,514 49 62 6 4 4 14 21 52 Siraha 572399 40.31 26.8 0.35 6332 46 76 5 9 22 0 12 16 38 Udayapur 287689 53.31 42.16 0.355 57,538 46 100 9 28 48 15 45 58 55 Khotang 231,385 49.87 38.44 0.318 46,277 29 66 17 16 27 11 6 10 30 Okhaldhunga 156,702 49.12 36.12 0.34 78,351 24 79 14 22 9 1 1 100 Solukhumbu 107,686 45.81 35.41 0.354 26,922 14 27 12 22 14 5 10 40

Central Region Dhanusa 671,364 48.37 36.07 0.329 19,746 83 120 8 17 20 5 69 76 67 Mahottari 553,481 34.36 22.3 0.322 79.069 50 75 11 4 7 43 56 95 Sarlahi 635,701 36.17 25.13 0.295 79,463 68 73 8 32 51 8 17 19 53 Sindhuli 279,829 50.13 38.11 0.295 55,452 73 240 7 41 104 8 30 43 60 Ramechhap 212,408 39.05 26.37 0.315 70,803 89 101 5 48 258 32 36 47 Dolakha 204,229 50.64 36.32 0.34 58,637 39 68 21 36 90 3 5 6 50 Rautahat 545,132 32.5 20.3 0.308 21,805 51 126 1 23 37 5 21 25 48 Bara 559,135 4235 17.5 0.309 93,189 23 40 15 15 24 0 24 38 34 Parsa 497,219 42.4 14.5 0.355 12,127 15 20 0 1 4 0 35 35 43 Chitwan 472,048 70.76 62.84 0.37 14,752 128 400 29 42 5 19 22 68 Makwanpur 392,604 63.18 53.71 0.309 35,691 12 14 14 16 25 27 28 46 Lalitpur 337,785 70.77 60.26 0.523 21,112 34 145 28 37 17 36 14 Kabhre 385,672 63.75 52.53 0.38 96,418 47 157 6 21 51 8 22 23 43 Bhaktapur 225,461 59.15 49.8 0.393 10,248 36 122 4 14 17 58 265 10 Kathmandu 1,081,845 77 66.44 0.603 3,948 69 101 9 33 100 12 12 14 3 Dhading 338,658 43.48 33.81 0.258 67,732 59 216 6 25 42 2 14 19 37 Sindhupalchowk 305,857 40.19 29.12 0.277 58,744 53 107 8 46 76 3 6 6 33 Nuwakot 288,478 51.15 40.41 0.312 48,080 21 42 14 18 25 0 2 2 0 Rasuwa 44,731 33.96 24.53 0.246 22,386 9 17 6 3 3 0 1 1 0

Western Region Tanahun 315,237 61.68 52.68 0.384 21,016 38 92 14 25 37 11 15 17 41 Gorkha 288,134 53.85 45.18 0.308 48,022 31 56 18 21 40 5 2 2 0 Lamjung* 177,149 56.61 46.04 0.375 44,287 40 122 10 14 15 0 1 1 0 Syangja 317,320 66.32 57.31 0.378 45,331 46 64 12 10 10 0 2 2 0 Kaski 380,527 71.9 61.52 0.45 7180 18 68 4 14 16 25 21 30 60 Manang 9,587 59.91 52.11 0.306 4994 4 5 0 4 4 0 Nawalparasi 562,870 52.99 40.68 0.3 70,359 32 69 6 15 20 15 54 67 73 Rupandehi 708,419 65.95 55.71 0.361 18,643 16 26 4 4 5 0 29 30 40 Palpa 268,558 65.96 57.55 0.337 44,597 9 44 18 5 5 0 10 10 40 Kapilvastu 481,976 41.46 29.27 0.286 68,854 35 1,013 18 34 3 14 18 20 Arghakhanchi 208,391 55.9 46.72 0.331 41,678 26 111 19 82 1 5 6 33 Gulmi 296,654 57.78 47.78 0.326 49,442 53 81 9 44 62 2 7 7 29 Baglung 269,937 61.4 52.02 0.337 29,882 51 81 12 25 35 3 4 4 25 Parvat 157,862 56.82 47.52 0.357 52,609 177 237 7 18 18 5 13 13 69

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Myagdi 114,447 55.74 45.6 0.309 38,149 26 56 17 19 0 Mustang 14,981 51.75 40.7 0.316 38,149 2 4 0

Mid Western Dang* 462,380 57.7 46.72 0.299 46,238 83 393 5 53 196 1 17 24 29 Pyuthan 212,484 35 33.71 0.323 14,166 24 36 17 13 23 0 3 3 67 Rolpa* 210,004 37.25 22.88 0.264 105,002 123 285 18 45 164 3 1 1 100 Salyan* 213,500 48.15 35.98 0.25 15,161 66 198 45 124 4 7 7 71 Rukum* 188,438 39.75 28.6 0.27 62,813 71 496 107 199 11 16 20 25 Banke 585,840 57.36 48.9 0.309 12,446 207 452 44 90 29 32 69 Bardiya* 382,639 45.41 35.64 0.304 63,775 142 313 71 108 7 8 8 50 Surkhet* 288,521 62.48 51.49 0.357 26,987 184 339 5 97 167 7 14 17 70 Jajarkot 134,868 39.36 28.36 0.21 44,956 24 36 11 100 116 3 4 4 100 Dailekh 225,201 47.44 31.82 0.246 56,300 95 176 4 138 182 7 8 9 11 Dolpa 29,545 34.66 19.61 0.218 22,071 14 43 23 11 12 17 2 2 50 Jumla* 89,427 32.41 16.7 0.218 23,075 63 178 5 32 204 4 5 80 Kalikot 105,580 37.51 16.98 0.177 5,755 25 72 7 33 43 9 4 4 75 Mugu 43,937 27.79 9.19 0.147 31,465 13 33 21 12 18 0 Humla 40,595 26.62 11.52 0.244 13,532 34 97 71 92 9 12 13 54

Far Western Kailali 616,697 52.06 47.71 0.299 28,032 65 123 74 123 4 4 50 Achham* 231,285 33.36 15.8 0.235 77,095 39 124 17 156 2 2 0 Doti* 207,066 42.56 25.18 0.249 34,511 9 124 19 227 12 12 75 Bajura 108,781 33.73 17.07 0.201 50,313 21 86 38 74 Bajhang 167,026 35.26 15.08 0.201 41,757 30 54 45 300 34 34 47 Kanchanpur 377,899 59.65 46.91 0.332 20,994 35 170 29 38 3 9 10 40 Dadeldhura 126,162 51.62 35.06 0.265 42,054 53 85 8 61 374 17 18 28 Baitadi 234,418 51.55 33.43 0.256 46,884 24 40 10 26 78 13 13 23 Darchula 121,996 49.39 32.38 0.286 40,665 35 44 0 11 11 0 2 2 50

* Identified at “most conflict-affected” districts by the Government of Nepal.

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Annex 2: Correlation of development indicators and levels of human rights abuses, by district.

In the table below, ranking of districts is based on the development indicators developed by ICIMOD and CBS – see ICIMOD&CBS 2003b. Twenty-nine indicators were used to develop composite indices of development. The indicators capture various dimensions of socio-economic conditions. All 29 indicators were used to develop the overall index; eight indicators (measuring child deprivation, gender discrimination, concentration of disadvantaged groups, marginal farm households and food production) were used to develop the poverty and deprivation index; four indicators (examining aspects of women’s participation in economic activity and education) were used to develop the gender index. In the table, districts are ranked according to their relative development, with 1 implying the highest level of development, and 75 the lowest amongst the districts.

The levels of violence recorded in each district are based on the events reported in INSEC 2003. The districts are ranked according to relative levels of violence, with 1 implying the lowest level of violence and 75 the highest, or worst violence situation.

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Rank by Rank by Rank by Rank by % Rank by state Maoist non- women Rank by Rank by Rank by total no. of violence violence state affected Overall Poverty and Women's victims per (victims per (victims per violence by non- Development Deprivation Empowerment 100,000 100,000 100,000 (per state District Index Index Index population population) population) 100,000) violence Eastern Region Jhapa 3 1 16 19 11 7 63 52 Ilam 12 6 19 12 5 17 53 49 Panchthar 23 17 23 27 16 44 59 37 Taplejung 33 27 28 44 34 53 54 9 Morang 11 5 24 10 7 16 50 56 Sunsari 14 10 27 14 14 5 52 33 Dhankuta 7 2 12 3 6 12 3 1 Tehrathum 17 13 25 46 49 27 66 27 Bhojpur 31 15 36 7 8 24 18 53 Sankhuwasabha 18 7 22 59 67 49 46 36 Saptari 47 37 62 4 10 2 26 47 Siraha 58 49 65 9 15 13 20 26 Udayapur 43 41 39 42 38 43 67 51 Khotang 38 30 29 29 32 35 32 21 Okhaldhunga 39 32 37 41 47 41 5 70 Solukhumbu 29 28 20 35 28 46 55 31

Central region Dhanusa 46 46 59 23 23 9 58 58 Mahottari 65 61 71 22 17 6 65 72 Sarlahi 61 57 64 13 12 23 24 48 Sindhuli 49 56 35 58 65 52 62 54 Ramechhap 51 53 50 67 45 69 64 39 Dolakha 41 47 41 45 37 59 22 43 Rautahat 68 68 72 25 27 20 33 41 Bara 55 42 67 6 4 15 45 24 Parsa 52 43 63 2 3 4 47 34 Chitwan 2 3 8 51 63 28 34 59 Makwanpur 26 26 35 5 1 18 48 38 Lalitpur 5 21 9 40 43 33 57 13 Kabhre 15 18 21 38 42 39 43 35 Bhaktapur 4 12 13 65 52 22 71 11 Kathmandu 1 9 2 8 9 30 10 10 Dhading 44 51 30 47 54 37 40 25 Sindhupalchowk 48 60 43 39 39 48 14 23 Nuwakot 36 29 38 15 18 26 7 5 Rasuwa 53 62 44 32 41 19 16 2

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Western region Tanahun 16 23 7 30 33 36 36 32 Gorkha 32 34 18 24 24 40 8 6 Lamjung 22 35 14 43 57 25 2 3 Syangja 9 22 1 16 26 10 4 4 Kaski 6 4 3 21 22 14 49 55 Manang 10 25 5 48 48 na 70 7 Nawalparasi 37 36 33 18 13 11 60 64 Rupandehi 13 11 31 1 2 3 31 28 Palpa 8 14 4 11 19 8 27 29 Kapilvastu 54 48 58 70 73 21 28 14 Arghakhanchi 42 50 26 49 50 54 21 22 Gulmi 27 38 15 34 31 47 17 20 Baglung 24 45 10 28 35 38 12 16 Parvat 20 39 11 63 71 34 51 60 Myagdi 25 44 6 33 46 1 na na Mustang 19 33 17 17 30 na na na

Mid Western Dang 21 8 32 57 64 58 35 19 Pyuthan 50 54 48 20 20 32 11 57 Rolpa 64 65 54 69 69 64 1 69 Salyan 45 40 46 61 66 61 25 63 Rukum 60 55 53 73 75 67 56 17 Banke 30 16 47 50 59 42 37 61 Bardiya 34 20 40 52 62 50 15 44 Surkhet 28 24 34 66 68 60 42 62 Jajarkot 59 58 51 54 29 66 23 68 Dailekh 63 64 55 62 60 65 30 12 Dolpa 67 69 56 68 70 55 44 45 Jumla 69 67 70 74 72 72 39 67 Kalikot 70 71 69 53 56 56 29 65 Mugu 75 75 75 55 58 57 na na Humla 74 73 73 75 74 71 69 50

Far Western Kailali 40 31 42 26 25 45 6 46 Achham 72 74 68 56 51 62 9 8 Doti 66 66 61 64 53 68 41 66 Bajura 71 72 66 60 61 63 na na Bajhang 73 70 74 71 36 70 68 40 Kanchanpur 35 19 49 37 44 31 19 30 Dadeldhura 56 52 57 72 55 73 61 18 Baitadi 62 63 60 36 21 51 38 15

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Darchula 57 59 52 31 40 29 13 42

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