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Security Council Provisional Asdf Seventieth Year 7368Th Meeting Monday, 26 January 2015, 1 P.M United Nations S/PV.7368 Security Council Provisional asdf Seventieth year 7368th meeting Monday, 26 January 2015, 1 p.m. New York President: Mr. Barros Melet . ................................ (Chile) Members: Angola .. Mr. Lucas Chad .......................................... Mr. Gombo China . ......................................... Mr. Liu Jieyi France ......................................... Mr. Delattre Jordan ......................................... Mr. Hmoud Lithuania . ...................................... Ms. Murmokaitė Malaysia ....................................... Mr. Haniff New Zealand .................................... Mr. McLay Nigeria . ........................................ Mr. Laro Russian Federation ............................... Mr. Churkin Spain .......................................... Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ... Sir Mark Lyall Grant United States of America . .......................... Ms. Power Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) ................... Mr. Ramírez Carreño Agenda Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 ([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 15-02222 (E) *1502222* S/PV.7368 Ukraine 26/01/2015 The meeting was called to order at 1.40 p.m. unequivocal message — the perpetrators must be held accountable and brought to justice. Adoption of the agenda On 23 January, the leader of the so-called Donetsk The agenda was adopted. People’s Republic announced a boycott of future consultations with the trilateral contact group, a Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the unilateral withdrawal from the ceasefire and threatened Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the to seize further territory, with a plan that includes United Nations addressed to the President of the pushing the front line all the way to the borders of Security Council (S/2014/136) Donetsk oblast. As the Secretary-General stated on 24 January (SG/SM/16485), this constitutes a violation The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance of their commitments under the Minsk accords. We with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of call directly on the rebels to immediately cease their procedure, I invite the representative of Ukraine to provocative and violent actions, to abide by international participate in this meeting. law and to make good on their commitments. We also In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s urge the leadership of the Russian Federation to use provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jeffrey its influence to call on the rebels to cease hostilities Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, immediately. This will be a critical step in stopping the to participate in this meeting. bloodshed. The Security Council will now begin its consideration The Ukrainian leadership has been vocal about its of the item on its agenda. commitment to the Minsk accords and has asserted that it remains in a defensive position. However, we note I give the floor to Mr. Feltman. the recent emergency measures adopted by the National Mr. Feltman: Throughout the conflict in Ukraine, Security and Defence Council, particularly those in and repeatedly in recent weeks, the Secretary-General relation to “strengthening counter-terrorism measures”, has called for de-escalation, restraint and the protection and appeal for the application of maximum restraint. of civilians. We deeply regret that these calls appear to In light of the just-declared state of emergency in have fallen on deaf ears. Donbas, it has never been more important to guarantee humanitarian workers and goods full and unhindered In just five days since we last met on 21 January access. Bureaucratic hurdles on both sides of the (see S/PV.7365), close to 50 civilians have been killed conflict line are impeding humanitarian access and and nearly 150 have been seriously wounded. On must be eased. We also call on the Government of 22 January, over a dozen civilians died when rockets Ukraine to ensure that humanitarian operations are free hit their trolleybus in Donetsk city. The same day, at from taxation. least 10 civilians were killed amid heavy fighting in the city of Horlivka. On Saturday, 24 January, a barrage of We recognize the difficulty of diplomatic discussions attacks with multiple rocket launcher systems hit the aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to this conflict, city of Mariupol, destroying buildings and impacting given entrenched positions. Nonetheless, efforts to find a market filled with civilians. Dozens of people lost a political solution must urgently be redoubled. President their lives, including women and children, and over 100 Poroshenko’s announcement that an agreement has been were wounded. The Special Monitoring Mission of the reached on the necessity of holding negotiations in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Geneva format, with the participation of the European reported, based on crater analysis, that the rockets Union, the United States, Ukraine and Russia, is originated from territory controlled by the so-called welcome. “Donetsk People’s Republic”. Before I close, let me share our assessment of the Mariupol lies outside of the immediate conflict way forward, with an emphasis on reviving the Minsk zone. The conclusion can thus be drawn that the accords. As agreed at Minsk, all sides must immediately entity that fired these rockets knowingly targeted a cease hostilities, with the onus particularly on the rebels civilian population. This would constitute a violation to recommit to the ceasefire and back down from their of international humanitarian law. We must send an offensive. We sincerely hope that the trilateral contact 2/19 15-02222 26/01/2015 Ukraine S/PV.7368 group will reconvene in consultations with rebel 11,000 injured and about 1.5 million displaced — such leadership, as envisaged this week, to work towards is the cost of Russia’s continued aggression against a sustainable ceasefire and the implementation of the Ukraine. Almost 50,000 people have fled their homes broader Minsk accords. Most importantly, all sides since 14 January; at least 262 people were killed must commit to the protection of civilians and letting between 13 and 21 January alone. Last week again, assistance reach those in need. from 75 to 115 shelling attacks on Ukrainian positions took place every day. The Donetsk airport, which the Finally, there must be full political recommitment Kremlin-sponsored militants captured last week, has to a peaceful and lasting solution to this conflict been pounded to rubble by months of attacks, causing at the highest levels. I reiterate our encouragement destruction seen only in the worst of wars. Some 550 of a convening of the Geneva format at the earliest square kilometres of land have been captured by the opportunity. The United Nations also remains ready to illegal militants since the beginning of the ceasefire. support the consolidation of a sustainable and lasting Such are the realities of what we continue to call a peace process, as may be required. Over 5,000 lives ceasefire. have already been lost in this conflict. We must find a way to stop it, and we must do so now. Just like the breaches of the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank Mr. Feltman Security Assurances, the 1997 Black Sea Fleet for his briefing. Agreement Between the Russian Federation and I shall now give the floor to the members of the Ukraine and various other documents, including the Security Council. more recent the Geneva statement and the Berlin joint declaration, the Minsk agreements are just another Ms. Murmokaitė (Lithuania): I would like to casualty of Russia’s aggression against neighbouring thank you, Sir, for convening this urgent meeting on Ukraine. the situation in Ukraine. Let me also thank Under- Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing and One does not seek peace by arming illegal fighters insights into the current situation. in a neighbouring country with advanced artillery systems, multiple rocket launchers, truckloads of arms Lithuania condemns in the strongest terms the and ammunition, and tanks. One does not seek peace by attacks on Mariupol and extends its sincere condolences sending one’s own troops and commandos to fight on to the families of those who have lost their lives or have the soil of one’s neighbour. One does not seek peace by been injured during these attacks. issuing continuous threats and intimidations vis-à-vis The bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Balkan one’s neighbour, or by annexing parts of the neighbour’s wars is taking place as we speak. Last Wednesday in territory. One does not seek peace by unleashing a this Chamber (see S/PV.7365), the Security Council continuous barrage of hate-mongering propaganda members once again expressed concern at the situation and
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