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Council Decision (Cfsp) 2020/1269

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Council Decision (Cfsp) 2020/1269 11.9.2020 EN Offi cial Jour nal of the European Union L 298/23 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/1269 of 10 September 2020 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Whereas: (1) On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP (1). (2) On 13 March 2020, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/399 (2), thereby renewing the measures provided for in Decision 2014/145/CFSP for a further six months. (3) In view of the continuing undermining or threatening of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Decision 2014/145/CFSP should be renewed for a further six months. (4) The Council has reviewed the individual designations set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP and decided to amend the information concerning 41 individuals and 28 entities. (5) Decision 2014/145/CFSP should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 Decision 2014/145/CFSP is amended as follows: (1) in Article 6, the second paragraph is replaced by the following: ‘This Decision shall apply until 15 March 2021.’; (2) the Annex is amended as set out in the Annex to this Decision. Article 2 This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Done at Brussels, 10 September 2020. For the Council The President M. ROTH (1) Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 16). (2) Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/399 of 13 March 2020 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 78, 13.3.2020, p. 44). L ANNEX 298/24 In the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP, the entries concerning the persons and entities listed below are replaced by the following entries: ‘Persons Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing EN 4. Denis Valentinovich Gender: male Berezovskiy was appointed commander of the Ukrainian Navy on 1 March 2014 but thereafter 17.3.2014 BEREZOVSKIY DOB: 15.7.1974 swore an oath to the Crimean armed forces, thereby breaking his oath to the Ukrainian Navy. (Денис Валентинович POB: Kharkiv, Ukrainian SSR He was Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation until БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ) (now Ukraine) October 2015. Denys Valentynovych Currently Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation and Vice-Admiral. BEREZOVSKYY (Денис Валентинович БЕРЕЗОВСЬКИЙ) Offi 19. Aleksandr Viktorovich VITKO Gender: male Former Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral. 17.3.2014 cial (Александр Викторович DOB: 13.9.1961 Responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory. Jour ВИТКО) Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy. POB: Vitebsk (Belarusian SSR), nal now Belarus of 29. Vladislav Yurievich SURKOV Gender: male Former Aide to the President of the Russian Federation. He was an organiser of the process in 21.3.2014 the (Владислав Юрьевич СУРКОВ) DOB: 21.9.1964 Crimea by which local Crimean communities were mobilised to stage actions undermining the European Ukrainian authorities in Crimea. POB: Solntsevo, Lipetsk region, Russian Federation Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. Uni 34. Dmitry Nikolayevich KOZAK Gender: male Former Deputy Prime Minister. Responsible for overseeing the integration of the annexed 29.4.2014 (Дмитрий Николаевич КОЗАК) DOB: 7.11.1958 Autonomous 'Republic of Crimea' into the Russian Federation. Deputy Chief of Staff of the on Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. POB: Bandurovo, Kirovograd re­ gion, Ukrainian SSR, now Uk­ raine Nationality: Russian 40. Sergei Ivanovich NEVEROV Gender: male Former Deputy Chairman of State Duma. Responsible for initiating legislation to integrate the 29.4.2014 (Сергей Иванович НЕВЕРОВ) DOB: 21.12.1961 annexed Autonomous 'Republic of Crimea' into the Russian Federation. Member of the Duma, head of the United Russia faction. POB: Tashtagol, USSR (now Rus­ sian Federation) 43. German PROKOPIV Gender: male Active member of the 'Luhansk Guard'. Took part in the seizure of the building of the Luhansk 29.4.2014 (Герман ПРОКОПИВ) DOB: 6.7.1993 or 6.7.1991 regional office of the Security Service. Remains an active military fighter of the LNR. 11.9.2020 Herman PROKOPIV POB: Prague, Czech Republic (Герман ПРОКОПIВ) (a.k.a. Li Van Chol, Ли Ван Чоль) 11.9.2020 Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing 47. Sergey Gennadevich Gender: male One of the leaders of the ideologically radical organisation 'People's Militia of Donbas'. He took 29.4.2014 TSYPLAKOV DOB: 1.5.1983 active part in the seizure of a number of State buildings in the Donetsk region. (Сергей Геннадьевич POB: Khartsyzsk, Donetsk Former Member of the 'People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic', and of its ЦЫПЛАКОВ) region, Ukraine Committee on Foreign Policy, External Relations, Information Policy and Information EN Serhiy Hennadiyovych Technology. TSYPLAKOV (Сергiй Геннадiйович ЦИПЛАКОВ) 55. Igor Nikolaevich BEZLER (a.k. Gender: male One of the former leaders of the self-proclaimed militia of Horlivka. He took control of the 12.5.2014 a. Bes (devil)) DOB: 30.12.1965 Security Service of Ukraine's Office in Donetsk region building and afterwards seized the Ministry of Internal Affairs' district station in the town of Horlivka. He has links to Igor (Игорь Николаевич БЕЗЛЕР) POB: Simferopol, Crimea, Strelkov/Girkin under whose command he was involved in the murder of the Peoples' Ihor Mykolayovych BEZLER Ukraine Offi Deputy of the Horlivka's Municipal Council Volodymyr Rybak. (Iгор Миколайович БЕЗЛЕР) cial Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. a.k.a. Igor Nikolaevich Jour BEREGOVOY (Игорь Николаевич nal БЕРЕГОВОЙ) of the 76. Rashid Gumarovich Gender: male Member and Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. As a member 25.7.2014 European NURGALIEV DOB: 8.10.1956 of the Security Council, which provides advice on and coordinates national security affairs, he was involved in shaping the policy of the Russian Government threatening the territorial (Рашид Гумарович POB: Zhetikara, Kazakh Soviet НУРГАЛИЕВ) integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Socialist Republic (now Kazakh­ Uni stan) on 86. Serhii Anatoliyovych Gender: male Senior aid to Igor Strelkov/Girkin who is responsible for actions which undermine or threaten 25.7.2014 ZDRILIUK (a.k.a. Abwehr) DOB: 23.6.1972 (or 23.7.1972) the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this capacity, Zdriliuk has therefore supported actions and policies which undermine the (Сергей Анатольевич POB: Frontovka village, Vinnytsia territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. ЗДРИЛЮК) region, Ukraine (Сергiй Анатолiйович Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. ЗДРИЛЮК) 87. Vladimir ANTYUFEYEV (a.k.a. Gender: male Former 'Minister of State Security' in the separatist region of Transnistria. Former vice-prime 25.7.2014 Vladimir SHEVTSOV, Vladimir DOB: 19.2.1951 minister of the 'Donetsk People's Republic', responsible for security and law enforcement. In Iurievici ANTIUFEEV, Vladimir his capacity, he was responsible for the separatist 'governmental' activities of the so-called POB: Novosibirsk, Russian Gheorghievici ALEXANDROV, 'government of the Donetsk People's Republic'. Federation Vadim Gheorghievici Board member and Deputy Director General of the State-owned enterprise 'United Engine SHEVTSOV) L Corporation', board member of the State-owned JSC Research and Production Enterprise 298/25 (Владимир АНТЮФЕЕВ) 'Temp' named after F. Korotkov. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. L Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing 298/26 92. Arkady Romanovich Gender: male Arkady Rotenberg is a prominent Russian businessman who has close personal ties to 30.7.2014 ROTENBERG DOB: 15.12.1951 President Putin. Since March 2014, Rotenberg, or his companies, have received State contracts totalling over USD 7 billion. In 2015, Rotenberg led the annual list of government contracts in Arkadii Romanovich POB: Leningrad, USSR (St. Peters­ EN terms of value, after being awarded contracts worth RUB 555 billion from the Russian ROTENBERG burg, Russian Federation) Government. Many of these contracts were awarded without formal competitive processes. On (Аркадий Романович 30 January 2015, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree that awarded to РОТЕНБЕРГ) Rotenberg's company, Stroygazmontazh, a State contract for the construction of the Kerch bridge from Russia to the illegally annexed Autonomous 'Republic of Crimea'. Through these contracts, he has financially benefited from Russian decision‐makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. Former owner of the company Stroygazmontazh, which has been awarded a State contract for Offi the construction of the Kerch bridge from Russia to
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