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Ukraine – Russia: Relationships 2014 – Present

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Ukraine – Russia: Relationships 2014 – Present Ukraine – Russia: Relationships 2014 – present Simulation of Negotiations: Ukraine-Russia-European Union Relations Dr. Vitalijs Butenko Dr. Sibylle Zürcher NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 1 1. Introduction NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 2 Ukraine Situation as of 2013: - Form of government: Semi-presidential republic - Administrative units: - 24 regions (“oblast”) - 2 cities of republican subordination (Kiev and Sevastopol) - Autonomous Republic of Crimea - Population*: - 48.4 m (2001 census) - 42.5 m (2016 estimate) - GDP (current prices)*: - $179.5 b (2013) - $87.2 b (2016 estimate) - Security: - 250’000 army personnel0 - Following Budapest agreement in 1994 the nuclear arsenal is removed to Russia in exchange for assurances against threats or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine and admission to Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 3 * Note from IMF: 2013 data excludes Crimea and Sevastopol for comparison purposes with 2014 data. 2. Background on the crisis in Ukraine 5. Sept. 2014: Minsk protocol, Convoy cease fire Nov 2013 – Sept 2014 Odessa Dec 2014-Feb Conflict intensity 2015: Debaltseve “Pocket” War Mar. 2014: MH17 Civil war erupts in Luhansk and Donetsk regions 12. Sept. 2014: Ratification of the Mar. 2014: UKR-EU association US and EU agreement Crisis sanctions 21 Feb. 2014: Mar. 2014: Crisis settlement deal Incorporation of Crimea by Russia 22-23 Feb. 2014: Yanukovitch leaves Ukraine; Maidan leaders take over Open the government conflict 26. Sept. 2014 Another gas- Nov. 2013: UKR: repays $3.1 bn price crisis Euromaidan debt in steps UKR-RUS, EU begins RUS: Resumes as mediator supply at price $385 per 1,000 m2 Unstable peace StableNov. 2013: Yanukovitch peacerefuses to sign UKR-EU association agreement time with EU. NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 4 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides an interactive timeline of events of the crisis in Ukraine: http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm «Wendet euch von Russland ab», Interview mit David Usupaschwili, Tages Anzeiger, 17.10.14. NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 5 3. Sanctions . US and EU decided to implement . Russia responded by embargo on sanctions against apples, milk, meat, fish and other individuals related to the crisis in products from EU, US and Norway Ukraine banks, energy and defense companies NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 6 Example of EU sanctions. Subject to semiannual review. NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 7 NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 8 4. Negotiations on Ukrainian crisis NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 9 4.1. Development of the crisis and related negotiations Timeline Date: Event: November 2013 Yanukovich rejects agreement with EU November 21, 2013 Euromaidan starts February 21, 2014 Agreement with opposition and departure of Yanukovich (→ document 1) NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 10 4.1.1. Kiev Agreement: Agreement on Settlement of the Crisis in Ukraine (21 February 2014, Kiev) Signatories: Witnessed by: • Viktor Yanukovych, president of Ukraine For the EU: For the Opposition: • Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish foreign minister • Vitaliy Klichko, UDAR • Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German foreign minister • Oleh Tyahnibok, Svoboda • Laurent Fabius, French foreign minister • Arsenij Yatseniuk, Batkivshchyna For the Russian Federation: • Vladimir Lukin, Russian special envoy NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 11 → document 1 Kiev agreement NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 12 Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine Signatories Concerned with the tragic loss of life in Ukraine, seeking an immediate end of Viktor Yanukovych, president of Ukraine bloodshed and determined to pave the way for a political resolution of the crisis, For the Opposition We, the signing parties, have agreed upon the following: Vitaliy Klichko, UDAR 1. Within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement, a special law will be Oleh Tyahnibok, Svoboda adopted, signed and promulgated, which will restore the Constitution of 2004 Arsenij Yatseniuk, Batkivshchyna including amendments passed until now. Signatories declare their intention to Witnessed by create a coalition and form a national unity government within 10 days For the EU thereafter. Radoslaw Sikorski, Polish foreign minister 2. Constitutional reform, balancing the powers of the President, the government Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German foreign minister and parliament, will start immediately and be completed in September 2014. Laurent Fabius, French foreign minister 3. Presidential elections will be held as soon as the new Constitution is adopted For the Russian Federation but no later than December 2014. New electoral laws will be passed and a new Vladimir Lukin, Russian special envoy Central Election Commission will be formed on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the OSCE & Venice commission rules. 4. Investigation into recent acts of violence will be conducted under joint monitoring from the authorities, the opposition and the Council of Europe. 5. The authorities will not impose a state of emergency. The authorities and the opposition will refrain from the use of violence. The Parliament will adopt the 3rd amnesty, covering the same range of illegal actions as the 17th February 2014 law. Both parties will undertake serious efforts for the normalisation of life in the cities and villages by withdrawing from administrative and public buildings and unblocking streets, city parks and squares. Illegal weapons should be handed over to the Ministry of Interior bodies within 24 hours of the special law, referred to in point 1 hereof, coming into force. After the aforementioned period, all cases of illegal carrying and storage of weapons will fall under the law of Ukraine. The forces of authorities and of the opposition will step back from confrontational posture. The Government will use law enforcement forces exclusively for the physical protection of public buildings. 6. The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Poland and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation call for an immediate end to all violence and confrontation. Kyiv, 21 February 2014 NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 13 Timeline Date: Event: November 2013 Yanukovich rejects agreement with EU November 21, 2013 Euromaidan starts February 21, 2014 Agreement with opposition and departure of Yanukovich (→ document 1) March 1, 2014 Uprising in Luhansk and Donetsk regions March 17, 2014 First sanctions against Russia March 21, 2014 Annexation of Crimea April 17, 2014 Geneva statement on Ukraine (→ document 2) NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 14 4.1.2. Geneva Statement on Ukraine (17 April 2014, Geneva) Foreign ministers of Ukraine, Russia, EU and US NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 15 → document 2 Geneva statement NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 16 Geneva Statement on Ukraine Representatives of the European Union, the United States, Ukraine and the Russia Federation issued today following statement: The Geneva meeting on the situation in Ukraine agreed on initial concrete steps to de- escalate tensions and restore security for all citizens. All sides must refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions. The participants strongly condemned and rejected all expressions of extremism, racism and religious intolerance, including anti-semitism. All illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned to legitimate owners; all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns must be vacated. Amnesty will be granted to protestors and to those who have left buildings and other public places and surrendered weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of capital crimes. It was agreed that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission should play a leading role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and local communities in the immediate implementation of these de-escalation measures wherever they are needed most, beginning in the coming days. The U.S., E.U. and Russia commit to support this mission, including by providing monitors. The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and accountable. It will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all of Ukraine’s regions and political constituencies, and allow for the consideration of public comments and proposed amendments. The participants underlined the importance of economic and financial stability in Ukraine and would be ready to discuss additional support as the above steps are implemented. NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 17 Timeline Date: Event: November 2013 Yanukovich rejects agreement with EU November 21, 2013 Euromaidan starts February 21, 2014 Agreement with opposition and departure of Yanukovich (→ document 1) March 1, 2014 Uprising in Luhansk and Donetsk regions March 17, 2014 First sanctions against Russia March 21, 2014 Annexation of Crimea April 17, 2014 Geneva statement on Ukraine (→ document 2) May, 2014 Begin of counter terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine June 6, 2014 Normandy Four first meeting NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 18 Celebration of D-Day 70th commemoration day (6 June 2014) First Normandy Four meeting (F, D, UKR, RUS) NECOM | 07.03.2017 | 19 Timeline Date: Event: November 2013 Yanukovich rejects agreement with EU November 21, 2013 Euromaidan starts February 21, 2014 Agreement with opposition and departure of Yanukovich (→ document 1) March 1, 2014 Uprising in Luhansk and Donetsk regions March 17, 2014 First sanctions against Russia March 21, 2014 Annexation of Crimea April 17, 2014 Geneva statement on Ukraine (→ document 2) May, 2014 Begin of counter terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine June 6, 2014 Normandy four first
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