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Council Implementing Regulation (Eu 15.3.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 73/9 REGULATIONS COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/408 of 14 March 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1), and in particular Article 14(1), (3) and (4) thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Whereas: (1) On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. (2) On the basis of a review by the Council, the information concerning certain persons and entities in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 should be amended and the entry for one deceased person should be deleted. (3) Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 should therefore be amended accordingly, HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation. Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 14 March 2019. For the Council The President G. CIAMBA (1) OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6. L 73/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 15.3.2019 ANNEX Annex I to Regulation (EU) Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 is amended as follows: (1) the entry concerning the following person is deleted: 96. Alexander Vladimirovich ZAKHARCHENKO; (2) the entries concerning the persons and entities listed below are replaced by the following entries: Persons Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing ‘19. Aleksandr DOB: 13.9.1961 Former Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral. 17.3.2014 Viktorovich VITKO POB: Vitebsk (Belarusian Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy. (Александр SSR) Responsible for commanding Russian forces that Викторович ВИТКО) have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory. 22. Dmitry Olegovich DOB: 21.12.1963 Former Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Fed­ 21.3.2014 ROGOZIN POB: Moscow eration. Publicly called for the annexation of Crimea. (Дмитрий Олегович Since 2018 holds the position of General Director in РОГОЗИН) a State corporation. 31. Valery Kirillovich DOB: 21.8.1946 Former Chair of Sevastopol Electoral Commission 21.3.2014 MEDVEDEV POB: Shmakovka, (until 26 May 2017). Responsible for administering (Валерий Primorsky region the Crimean referendum. Responsible under the Rus­ Кириллович sian system for signing referendum results. МЕДВЕДЕВ) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or Valeriy Kyrylovych policies. MEDVEDIEV (Валерiй Кирилович МЕДВЕДЄВ) 35. Oleg Yevgenyvich DOB: 15.9.1949 Former Plenipotentiary Representative of the Presi­ 29.4.2014 BELAVENTSEV POB: Moscow dent of the Russian Federation into the so-called (Олег Евгеньевич “Crimean Federal District”, responsible for the imple­ БЕЛАВЕНЦЕВ) mentation of the constitutional prerogatives of the Russian Head of State on the territory of the an­ nexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Former non-permanent member of the Russian Security Council. Former Plenipotentiary Representative of the Presi­ dent of the Russian Federation into the North Cauca­ sus Federal District (until June 2018). Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. 36. Oleg Genrikhovich DOB: 27.10.1965 Former Minister for Crimean Affairs. Responsible for 29.4.2014 SAVELYEV POB: Leningrad the integration of the annexed Autonomous Repub­ (Олег Генрихович lic of Crimea into the Russian Federation. САВЕЛЬЕВ) Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Govern­ ment, responsible for the organisation of the work of the Governmental Commission on the socioecon­ omic development of the so-called “Republic of Crimea”. Chief of Staff of the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation. 15.3.2019 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 73/11 Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing 46. Denys DOB: 9.5.1981 One of the leaders of the “Donetsk People's Repub­ 29.4.2014 Volodymyrovych or 9.5.1982 lic”. Participated in the seizure and occupation of the PUSHYLIN (Денис POB: Makiivka (Donetsk regional administration in Donetsk in 2014. Until Володимирович oblast) 4 September 2015 so-called Deputy Chairman of ПУШИЛIН) the “People's Council” of the so-called “Donetsk Peo­ Denis Vladimirovich ple's Republic”. Since 4 September 2015 “Chairman” PUSHILIN (Денис of the “People's Council of the Donetsk People's Re­ Владимирович public”. So-called “acting Head of the Donetsk Peo­ ПУШИЛИН) ple's Republic” after 7 September 2018. So-called “Head of the Donetsk People's Republic” following the so-called elections of 11 November 2018. 55. Igor Nikolaevich DOB: 30.12.1965 One of the former leaders of the self-proclaimed 12.5.2014 BEZLER (a.k.a. Bes POB: Simferopol, Crimea militia of Horlivka. He took control of the Security (devil)) Service of Ukraine's Office in Donetsk region build­ (Игорь Николаевич ing and afterwards seized the Ministry of Internal Af­ БЕЗЛЕР) fairs' district station in the town of Horlivka. He has links to Igor Strelkov/Girkin under whose command Ihor Mykolayovych he was involved in the murder of the Peoples' Dep­ BEZLER uty of the Horlivka's Municipal Council Volodymyr (Iгор Миколайович Rybak. БЕЗЛЕР) Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. 83. Ekaterina Yurievna DOB: 5.7.1983 In her capacity of former so-called “Minister of For­ 25.7.2014 GUBAREVA or 10.3.1983 eign Affairs” she was responsible for defending the (Екатерина Юрьевна POB: Kakhovka (Kherson so-called “Donetsk People's Republic”, thus under­ ГУБАРЕВА) oblast) mining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and inde­ pendence of Ukraine. In taking on and acting in this Kateryna Yuriyivna capacity she has therefore supported actions and po­ GUBARIEVA licies which undermine the territorial integrity, sov­ (HUBARIEVA) ereignty and independence of Ukraine. Remains ac­ (Катерина Юрiївна tive in supporting separatist actions and policies. ГУБАРЄВА) Former Member of the so-called “People's Council” of the “Donetsk People's Republic” (until November 2018). 89. Oksana TCHIGRINA DOB: possibly 23.7.1981 Former spokesperson of the so-called “government” 30.7.2014 Oksana of the so-called “Lugansk People's Republic” who Aleksandrovna made declarations justifying, inter alia, the shooting CHIGRINA down of a Ukrainian military airplane, the taking of (CHYHRYNA) hostages, fighting activities by the illegal armed groups, which have as a consequence undermined (Оксана the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Александровна Ukraine. ЧИГРИНА) Former spokesperson of the Press Service of LNR. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. 91. Sergey Vadimovich DOB 27.11.1967 By accepting his appointment as so-called “Minister 30.7.2014 ABISOV POB: Simferopol, Crimea of Interior of the Republic of Crimea” by the Presi­ (Сергей Вадимович dent of Russia (decree No 301) on 5 May 2014 and АБИСОВ) by his actions as so-called “Minister of Interior” he has undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty Sergiy (Serhiy) and unity of Ukraine. Vadymovych ABISOV Dismissed as so-called “Minister of Interior of the (Сергiй Вадимович Republic of Crimea” in June 2018. АБIСОВ) L 73/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 15.3.2019 Name Identifying information Reasons Date of listing 97. Vladimir Petrovich DOB: 14.10.1974 As of 14 August 2014, he replaced Igor Strelk­ 12.9.2014 KONONOV (a.k.a. POB: Gorsky, Luhansk ov/Girkin, as the so-called “Defence minister” of the “Tsar”) Oblast “Donetsk People's Republic”. He has reportedly com­ (Владимир Петровнч manded a division of separatist fighters in Donetsk КОНОНОВ) since April 2014 and has promised to solve the stra­ tegic task of repelling Ukraine's military aggression. Volodymyr Kononov has therefore supported actions and poli­ Petrovych KONONOV cies which undermine the territorial integrity, sover­ (Володимир eignty and independence of Ukraine. Петрович КОНОНОВ) Dismissed as so-called “Defence minister” in Septem­ ber 2018. 102. Andrei Nikolaevich DOB: 23.9.1976 Former Moscow Representative of the so-called “Do­ 12.9.2014 RODKIN POB: Moscow netsk People's Republic”. In his statements he has, in­ (Андрей Николаевич ter alia, talked about the militias' readiness to con­ РОДКИН) duct a guerrilla war and their seizure of weapon systems from the Ukrainian armed forces. He has therefore supported actions and policies which un­ dermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and in­ dependence of Ukraine. One of the former leaders of the “Union of Donbas Volunteers”. Remains active in supporting separatist actions or policies. 103. Aleksandr DOB: 26.7.1956 Former so-called “Deputy Prime Minister for Social 12.9.2014 Akimovich POB Cioburciu, Slobozia Issues” of the “Donetsk People's Republic”. Asso­ KARAMAN district, now Republic of ciated with Vladimir Antyufeyev, who was respon­ (Александр Moldova sible for the separatist “governmental” activities of Акимович КАРАМАН) the so-called “Government of the Donetsk People's Republic”. He has therefore supported actions and Alexandru policies which
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