Cumtux Article: Väinö and Lempi Koskela and the Finnish-Russian War 1939-40

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Cumtux Article: Väinö and Lempi Koskela and the Finnish-Russian War 1939-40 Väino and Lempi Koskela and the Finnish-Russian War 1939-40 By Greg Jacob Overview of the War When the Russian troops overran he Winter War, a military the Finnish defenses on the Karelian conflict between the Soviet Union Isthmus, known as the “Mannerheim T and Finland, began November 30, 1939. Line,” Finland, facing exhaustion and It was a short-lived conflict, ending depletion of ammunition, agreed to on March 13, 1940 with the Moscow peace terms. Peace Treaty. Finland had to cede eleven percent In 1939, Joseph Stalin, worried that of their territory (western Karelia), German aggression would threaten St. 22,000 square miles, to the Soviet Petersburg, wanted to install Soviet Union and agree to the construction military facilities on Finnish soil, of a Soviet naval base on the Hanko acquire territories on the Karelian Peninsula. The Moscow Peace Treaty Isthmus and the islands of the Gulf came at a heavy cost for the Soviet of Finland, and secure a 30-year lease Union, which lost over 300,000 men for a naval base at Hanko (Hangö). compared to 65,000 for the Finns. Fearing Soviet expansion, Finland refused those demands, and Stalin, Väino and Lempi Koskela sure of expending little effort to get Väino and Lempi Koskela, 94 and his demands, sent almost one million 93 years old, both served in the Winter troops of the Red Army into Finland War and the Continuation War. On an on November 30. invite from Väino’s uncle Sam, Väino The Finns were led by Marshal moved to Duluth, MN in 1956. Uncle Mannerheim who had his troops Sam lived in Floodwood, MN, but hunker down behind trenches and Väino landed in Duluth because of concrete bunkers, and had Finnish ski a job at a clothing store. A year later troops dressed in white conduct hit he sponsored his wife and brother. and run attacks on Soviet units during Twenty-one years later they moved the freezing Finnish winter. to Astoria, Oregon where Väino got a Even though the Russians lost job in the plywood mill. They bought five men for every one Finn, they Ralph and Nancy Mattilas’s house had superior numbers, tanks, and (Faith Swanson is their daughter) on relentless artillery bombardments. S. Denver St. For several years Lempi 38 Clatsop County Historical Society Image courtesy of Greg Jacob Väino and Lempi Kaskela with the awards presented by the Finnish government. worked at Bumblebee Cannery where uniforms. Väino went to Lappenranta she filleted fish. Their daughter, Leila for six months of boot camp in 1939, Collier, and her husband Mike live in and then he was shipped to the front Warrenton, Oregon. Their son, George lines in places such as Sykiälä Kylä, and his wife Sherry live in Waldport, Kanneljärvi, and Ilomansti. The condi- OR. tions were rough. It was an unusual Väino was born in Kurikka, Finland cold winter. The uniforms got so dirty on February 17, 1924 and Lempi in the trenches that troops used their Airitsalo was born in Uukuniemi knives to clean the seams of their (Karelia) on November 24, 1924. overcoats. Many days went by without Both of them came from a large fam- showers. Food wasn’t easy to come ily, Väino one of nine children and by, except for potatoes and bread. the same with Lempi. She served in All soldiers were issued ration cards. the Finnish Army for four years as Trench warfare and guerilla tactics a seamstress (likaviemäri) of army were used against the Soviet Army Cumtux — Vol. 37, No. 1 — Winter 2017 39 who vastly outnumbered the Finns. planes when they got word that Adolph “We spent much of our time digging Hitler was secretly landing to celebrate a ‘korsu’ or dugout into the frozen Mannerheim’s 75th birthday. They ground,” said Vaino. were ordered to hide in the woods, and In one battle, his unit sneaked they watched Hitler and his contingent behind the Russian lines by crawling land and drive to a secret rendezvous through the woods for several days point with Mannerheim. Most Finns and nights to a bridge where they set viewed The Continuation War as the explosives, thereby preventing Soviet second part of the Winter War. The tanks and weaponry from crossing Finns hoped to take back the lands a river. Väino said, “It was strange. lost in the Winter War, but after losing Here we were on the enemy side of over 60,000 soldiers and seeing the the line. The Russians were shooting Germans losing their offensive against at us like crazy. They managed to get the Russians, they signed a harsh out of the area, but they left behind peace agreement that reestablished the lots of heavy equipment, which we borders from 1940, resulting in the loss Finns made use of.” A month later in of the Petsamo area, and required the Ilomansti, Väino was shot in the left payment of massive war reparations to leg during a furious firefight. “We had the Soviet Union. no place to hide other than to run and After the end of WWII, Lempi went dive behind stumps. A bullet hit me in to work for Leevi Koskela, Väino’s the leg. Eventually after the shooting older brother. Lempi took Väino’s died down, I was taken to first aid place at his brother’s tailor shop and from that make-shift station to because Väino opened his own tailor Tampere by train. After two months I shop in Kurikka. Väino and Lempi was sent back to the front, but by then had already met, of course, at Leevi’s peace was only a few days away. You shop, but one evening they showed know, after 70 years my leg still hurts.” up at a dance hall and that evening Väino was awarded two Purple Hearts was the beginning of a courtship. On for his valor during the four-month August 21, 1948 they were married, Winter War. and on August 21, 2018 the two Winter He served two years during the War veterans will celebrate their 70th Continuation War of 1941-1944, and wedding anniversary. during the summer before the war A special thank you to Leila Collier started, Väino was at Rovaniemi. He for arranging the interviews and to and other soldiers were widening a Karin Lahti for helping with information landing strip to accommodate larger gathering and proofreading. • 40 Clatsop County Historical Society.
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