Migrant Integration Between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2 How Countries of Origin Impact Migrant Integration Outcomes: an Analysis

Global Migration Issues 8

Anna Di Bartolomeo Sona Kalantaryan Justyna Salamońska Philippe Fargues Editors Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2 How countries of origin impact migrant integration outcomes: an analysis

International Organization for Migration (IOM) Global Migration Issues

Volume 8

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[email protected] This book series contributes to the global discussion about the future of migration policy through the publication of a series of books on emerging migration issues. Most reports on migration policy tend to focus on national or regional perspectives; books in this series will focus on global policy challenges, such as the impact of climate change or the global economic crisis, on migration. This series is closely linked to the production of IOM’s World Migration Report. Some of the books in this series will be based on research which has been prepared for the World Migration Report. The series also includes a special focus on the linkages between migration and development, and the themes discussed each year at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), given the growing policy interest in harnessing the benefits of migration for development.

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[email protected] Anna Di Bartolomeo • Sona Kalantaryan Justyna Salamońska • Philippe Fargues Editors

Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2 How countries of origin impact migrant integration outcomes: an analysis

[email protected] Editors Anna Di Bartolomeo Sona Kalantaryan Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre Studies, Migration Policy Centre European University Institute European University Institute Florence, Italy Florence, Italy

Justyna Salamońska Philippe Fargues Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre Studies, Migration Policy Centre European University Institute European University Institute Florence, Italy Florence, Italy

ISSN 2213-2511 ISSN 2213-252X (electronic) Global Migration Issues ISBN 978-3-319-56368-8 ISBN 978-3-319-56370-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1

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[email protected] Foreword

In every immigrant, there is always also an emigrant. This truth, which lies at the core of Algerian-French Abdelmalek Sayad’s sociology, inspired INTERACT, a project conducted, in 2011–2015, by the Migration Policy Centre of the European University Institute. INTERACT focussed on the integration of first-generation migrants from outside the European Union (EU) and looked, too, at their numerous links with their country of origin. The project’s backdrop was the protracted economic downturn that started in 2008, and that affected economies and societies in the EU, as well as in countries of origin. When the project started, there was the idea in migration studies that immigration from third countries would slow down in response to the employment crisis. A return movement to the origin countries would soon begin, and intra-EU mobility would dominate. The reality, however, proved to be rather different. Immigration kept growing. Between 2009 and 2013 in the aggregate EU28, the overall stock of those born outside their country of residence rose by 4.4 million, from 47.0, million to 51.4 million, comprising a 1.6 million increase in intra-EU migration (from 15.8 to 17.4 million) and a 2.7 million increase in the migrant stock from outside the EU (from 31.3 to 34.0 million). Contrary to expectations, a crisis-ridden Europe still attracts migrants. But does Europe manage to integrate these newcomers? To integrate migrants ideally means providing them with rights and duties, opportunities and responsibilities comparable to those of natives. Put in other terms, newcomers become full-fledged members of the host society. When migrants are many and the host society is in (economic) crisis, integration is not a straightforward process, however. In the aggregate EU, migrant labour-market integration has worsened during the crisis. Between 2007 and 2013, rates of unemployment rose from 6.7% to 10.1% amongst non-migrants, from 7.2% to 13.3% amongst intra-EU migrants and from 11.1% to 20.4% amongst migrants from outside the EU. In some EU member states, such as the United Kingdom and Belgium, changes in non-EU migrants’ rate of unemployment were not dramatic (from 8.2% to 9.8% in the former and from 15.2% to 19.7% in the latter). In most states, however, the fall-off was severe, with the worst cases being Italy (from 7.9% to 17.2%), Spain (from 12.1% to 38.1%) and Greece (from 7.6% to 39.2%).

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Social conditions worsened in several member states, too. In the same period (2009 to 2013), the at-risk-of-poverty rate increased only slightly for natives: from 14.5% to 14.8% at EU28 aggregate level. This was also true of non-EU migrants, though at a much higher level than natives: from 28.3% in 2009 to 29.6% in 2013. But in some states, an acute and sudden deterioration has been observed. It was nowhere as impressive as in Greece, where the proportion of migrants from third countries at risk of poverty jumped, in just 4 years, from an already impressive 32.9% to a record 54.3%. The above figures suggest that the tension between immigration and integration, between managing new flows of migrants and accommodat- ing old ones, has become more dangerous than in the “good old” pre-crisis times. Then, integration is not, we must remember, only about labour market and economic conditions. It is also about the fabric of a given society. Did the crisis affect non-European migrants’ social, cultural and civil integration? We have no quantitative evidence but many clues that anti-immigration sentiment and xenophobia are on the rise in every EU member state and across the political spectrum. Intolerance is no longer confined to extremist parties. Some state leaders do not hesitate to declare that multiculturalism has failed and others that immigration endangers the Christian identity of Europe. Finally, there is the alarming rise of home-grown Islamic terrorism. Immigration is commonly blamed for attacks conducted by European citizens born in Europe and for the part played by young Europeans of both sexes in global Jihadism. What is at stake, however, is not immigration so much as the failed integration of disadvantaged, and often discriminated against, segments of European populations with a migrant background. Integration is, then, extremely topical. Migration studies usually treat integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation (or the failure to accommodate) by immigrants and natives. Instead, we postulate that integration should rather be looked at as a three-way process. The third player comprises all the actors, both physical and virtual, in the origin country, who play a part, consciously or not, in migrant integration in the destination country. Origin states, first, developed “diaspora policies” to foster ties with their expatri- ate nationals. Looking at migrants as resources, they have established specific institutions for facilitating transnational contacts. Economic links with diasporas have been a goal for governments of major migrant-sending countries in the developing world since the 1980s. There have been attempts to attract migrant money, to mobilise migrant skills and to tap migrant business networks. Cultural links followed with attempts to revive a sense of belonging to the homeland amongst émigrés. Political links are, finally, now being strengthened: expatriates are often granted voting and sometimes eligibility rights, and their sons and daughters, though born abroad, are given dual citizenship. New terms are coined such as “citizens abroad”, “NRIs” (non-resident Indians) and “PIOs” (persons of Indian origin), “Algériens de l’étranger”, etc. A number of new non-state connectors bridge diasporas and societies of origin: cheap or no-cost communication allows regular or continuous individual links between relatives and friends separated by geography; conventional and new social media, as well as a multitude of transnational organisations, foster collective links

[email protected] Foreword vii with the migrant’s homeland and keep migrants exposed, in real time, to developments in the home country. Whether dual identities are competing or complement- ing each other has become the crucial question. Migrant integration is a complex process that can be looked at from a number of points of view. It can mean having opportunities and outcomes comparable to those of natives in the labour market. It can also mean living in the same neighbourhoods as locals; sharing their language; making friends with natives; finding a place in one’s religious community, which may or may not be that of mainstream society; taking part in local civic or political life; etc. To what extent do different dimensions work independently, or negatively or positively, as migrants integrate into their new society? Practising the language of the origin country can, for example, turn into either a handicap or an asset in migrant integration, according to how other factors play out. Through immigration, languages that were barely spoken in Europe have become established there: the EU has five million native Arabic speakers, three million Turkish speakers, one million Chinese and Russian speakers, etc. Some of these new languages are in use across the entire EU. In that sense they have become European languages. But, at the same time, they are minority languages. They are spoken in families and in circles of friends sharing a common origin: but they are rarely shared beyond this. Moreover, they are often viewed as a handicap at school and seldom taught. For example, in France in 2014, 2,111 foreign language posts were created: 2,092 teachers for EU languages (mostly English), 15 for Chinese, 2 for Russian, 2 for Arabic and none for Turkish. In many cases, speaking these languages is perceived negatively not only by schools but by society as a whole: they are seen as markers of low integration, and they can become a source of shame for migrants. But the handicap can be turned into an asset. The host society benefits if a language is used to extend business activities to foreign markets (Arab States, Turkey, China, etc.), to enhance security (intelligence, phone taping, etc.), to enrich cultural production, etc. It can also be an asset for individual students. Indeed PISA surveys of performances at 15 years of age have shown that children of multilingual families fare better than others, once social background has been controlled for. INTERACT developed an original three-step methodology. The first step consisted in identifying topics: the “dimensions” of integration. Nine dimensions were selected and framed through a literature review focusing on transnational processes and actors in the origin countries. The second step was dedicated to measuring integration, at the level of subpopulations, defined by common origins rather than at the individual level. Integration was assumed to be a function of three sets of variables: dimension, country of origin and country of destination. A matrix was constructed combining the nine dimensions, 54 countries of origin (all those with an aggregate number of first-generation migrants greater than 100,000 at EU28 level) and 28 countries of destination (all the EU member states). This large (13,608 cells) and, therefore, unreadable matrix was then reduced through statistical techniques into an intelligible set of indicators. In this way, it was possible to compare corridors, as well as dimensions.

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The third step aimed at explaining variations in both quantitative and qualitative terms: why, say, does corridor A fare better than corridor B regarding a given dimension C, and why is it that scores in dimension C differ from scores in dimension D for corridor A? State policies can make the difference. Country reports were prepared to analyse integration and diaspora policies in selected origin and destination countries. Diaspora policies differ greatly according to states, and, in the same state, they may also differ between categories of émigrés, according to the perceived util- ity of a group of migrants for their country of origin. NGO practices can also explain differences in migrant integration. In order to document this issue, INTERACT conducted a survey of migrant NGOs in close to 80 countries of origin and destination. How do migrant NGOs view the integration of their community and their role in the process? The present volume gathers the most significant findings produced in the framework of the INTERACT project, and I would like to express my deep gratitude to all the contributors. I have no doubt, however, that the wealth of data collected by the project has not yet been exhausted. Rather there will be further insights into a phenomenon that, after all, lies at the core of the reproduction of societies, in terms both of change and continuity.

Florence, Italy Philippe Fargues

[email protected] Contents

1 Introduction �� 1 Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan, and Justyna Salamońska 2 Introducing Emigration and Diaspora Policies in Integration Studies �� 9 Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan, Justyna Salamońska, and Cameron Thibos 3 Counting the Uncountable – Measuring Migrant Integration Between Origin and Destination �� 29 Anna Di Bartolomeo and Sona Kalantaryan 4 Civil Society Organisations and the Diaspora-Integration Nexus �� 39 Justyna Salamońska and Anne Unterreiner 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium �� 61 Sonia Gsir, Jérémy Mandin, and Elsa Mescoli 6 Asylum Seekers in Diaspora: Turks and Iranians in Sweden �� 81 Francesco Pasetti 7 Following the Global Competition for Talent: What Risks to Integration in the UK? �� 103 Anne Unterreiner 8 Turkish and Russian Pathways to Integration in Germany �� 123 Agnieszka Weinar and Jan Schneider 9 Ukrainian and Russian Immigrants in Poland: Whither Integration? �� 151 Magdalena Lesińska

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10 Integration in Italy Among Selected Migrant Communities: Does Country of Origin Matter? �� 169 Anna Di Bartolomeo, Giuseppe Gabrielli, and Salvatore Strozza 11 Historical vs. Geographical Proximity. The Integration of Ecuadorian and Moroccan Migrants in Spain �� 187 Lorenzo Gabrielli 12 A Comparative Analysis of the Migration and Integration of Indian and Chinese Immigrants in the United States �� 211 Kate Hooper and Susanna Groves 13 Conclusions �� 233 Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan, and Justyna Salamońska

[email protected] Chapter 1 Introduction

Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan, and Justyna Salamońska

Integration has long been perceived and approached as a matter pertaining primarily to destination societies and to migrants themselves. While destination societies seek the most efficient ways to accommodate migrants and maintain social cohesion, migrants for their part do tend to invest in human and social capital skills to address the needs and characteristics of their host societies. At present, it seems that integration is increasingly perceived as a major problem in today’s societies and that this may depend not only on the destination society itself but also on where the migrants are from. Some specific groups such as Muslims or forced migrants fleeing war seem particularly likely to be perceived as a threat to social cohesion in Western societies. Within this context, at an academic level, scholars have reacted in quite a homogeneous manner. Theorising and empirically evaluating the integration of particular groups of migrants, classified on the basis of their nationality or migrant category, has been the most commonly adopted approach. Individual characteristics have been assumed to play a major role in the scientific production including labour market analyses and studies on education trajectories, as well as to research on other fields of integration. In other words, the major emphasis has been on individuals and their cultural, social and personal characteristics. In the meantime, at an empirical level, this approach has been constrained by the lack of comparable data which would allow scholars to draw more general conclusions. It was only recently that Kirişci’s pioneering work (2008) shifted the perspective on integration by adding the “country of origin” to the equation. By acknowledging that the role of sending countries “is construed in terms of controlling and curbing immigration, supporting return migration and, to a limited extent, assisting local development” (Kirişci 2008), he was the first to advocate for a “three-way approach”

[email protected] 2 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. to integration. Putting equal attention on the roles played by both destination and origin societies as well as by migrants themselves, he posited, would help to stimulate better management of immigrants’ incorporation within the EU. On the policy side, this new perspective was finally embraced by the European Commission in 2011, when integration shifted from being conceived as a two-way to a “three-way” process, with a major role played by the countries of origin. In particular, countries of origin may impact integration in three ways: (1) by preparing for integration prior to a migrant’s departure; (2) by supporting the migrant while in the EU, for example via the embassies; and (3) by preparing for the migrant's temporary or definitive return to the origin country with his or her acquired experience and knowledge (EC 2011). Accordingly, the underlying assumption in this volume is that integration processes depend not only on the destination but also on the contexts from which the migrants arrive. Bringing in the country of origin perspective is crucial to understanding why some migrants fare better than others in certain EU Member States. To this aim, the units of analysis of all the studies are the “migrant corridors” – that is, a migrant community x in a destination country y. What is more, integration across different life spheres may take different shapes; we can observe how some migrants perform well in certain integration dimensions and not so well in others. The origin and the dimension are thus two key variables when approaching integration studies. In line with this approach, we propose that in order to understand what is hap- pening in European societies we need to take into account the various ways that a country of origin can have an impact: through the emigration and diaspora policies that it develops and implements; through the different kinds of ties and agreements that link origin countries to some of the destinations; through non-state actors, which often operate transnationally and support integration processes; and finally, through selection effects (with the migrant profile being one of the key determinants of successful integration). While the policies of European destination countries are crucial for migrant incorporation, in this volume we also focus on how policies operating in the host countries interact with the ones designed and implemented in the origin countries. Some states of origin may only have policies regulating outflows or the return of its population. However, recently we have seen an increase in the development of diaspora policies as well. Thus the research questions that this volume addresses are the following: What is the role of the country of origin with respect to migrant integration in Europe? How do integration processes differ, depending on the integration dimension? These questions have been addressed by the INTERACT project “Integration as a three- way process – the role of the countries and communities of origin in the integration of Third-Country Nationals in the EU”. INTERACT, co-financed by the European Fund of Integration, was implemented by a consortium that includes the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, CEDEM (Université de Liège), GRITIM (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and Migration Policy Institute Europe. The study examines the impact of emigration and diaspora policies on integration outcomes in the EU. The project covers all 28 EU member states as well as the 55 third countries that each have more than 100,000 emigrants in the EU28.

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The INTERACT project utilised various tools to address the question of integration. First, the project built an extensive network of researchers in 28 EU destination countries and in 55 countries of origin. Based on their work, the project created a database that included integration policy frameworks in the EU and diaspora and emigration policies in the countries of origin. This database outlines policy frameworks examining the reality of integration processes in Europe. With regard to the labour market, education and access to citizenship, aggregated data from a number of national sources shows how migrants fare in selected countries of Western Europe. As this dataset offers a comparative overview of migrant situations in different national contexts, the INTERACT project also carried out a survey among civil society organisations which collected the views of non-state actors assisting migrants in the host countries. This volume is the second part of a book presenting the results of the project. The first volume “Migrant integration between Homeland and Host society. Vol. 1. Where does the country of origin fit?” focuses on the theoretical background and selects key integration areas, including the labour market, culture (language, religion, social relations), residential integration, access to citizenship, political and civic integration, education and housing. This holistic conceptual framework for studying integration provides a theoretical background for this volume, aiming at empirically verifying the role played by variables related to the country of origin in supporting or constraining integration processes at destination. The migrant corridors analysed in this volume cut across different integration domains, shedding light on how integration processes take place (or do not) in specific origin-destination configurations and domains. In particular, migrant corridors bring in a comparative logic as the integration of different migrant groups are compared in one destination. What is more, the same migrant groups can be compared across several destinations, including in Europe and the US. Building on the extensive network of INTERACT’s researchers, Chap. 2, by Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan, Justyna Salamońska and Cameron Thibos, provides background information about the country-of-origin policies that deal with diasporas and emigration. First, the chapter makes a distinction between emigration and diaspora policies as, respectively, those aimed at regulating outward and return mobility and those designed to maintain different kinds of linkages between the country of origin and diaspora communities. The authors focus on a set of origin countries, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, Morocco, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, which take different stands towards emigration and diasporas and are examined in detail in the following empirical chapters. Chapter 3, by Anna Di Bartolomeo and Sona Kalantaryan, shifts the focus to measuring the integration of migrants from the above countries living in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The authors provide composite indicators of integration in three key dimensions (labour market, education and access to citizenship) which allows them to rank migrant corridors in terms of the absolute performances of migrants and comparisons with the outcomes of natives. In Chap. 4, Justyna Salamońska and Anne Unterreiner introduce a survey of civil society organisations as a complementary source of information developed by the

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INTERACT project. The novelty of this survey lies in its cross-national approach, which studies civil society organisations based at both destination and origin. The insight of non-state actors matters, as their activities impact migrant integration at destination. The survey also allows us to understand how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of migrants’ day-to-day reality of incorporation into the receiving society. Chapter 5 by Sonia Gsir, Jeremy Mandin and Elsa Mescoli presents a typical case of organised migration developed within the context of 1960s labour agreements: the integration of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium. In both cases, mass migration started with the signature of the two respective labour transfer agreements in 1964. Beyond regulating quotas, these deals included a wide range of attractive conditions, such as opportunities for family reunification after a few months of arrival and adequate housing. Another peculiarity shared by these two migrant corridors is their extremely favourable integration conditions. For instance, intercultural dialogue and religious tolerance were promoted. At the same time, beginning in the mid-1980s, Belgian policies were promoting access to citizenship and voting rights. It was only in 2012, after a long period of steady improvements, that the acquisition of Belgian nationality became restricted through the introduction of stricter residence criteria and integration conditions. Labour market integration was also well supported by a wide range of initiatives. In spite of its homogeneous context, this case contains elements of heterogeneity at both destination and origin which are responsible for producing differentiated integration outputs between Moroccan and Turkish migrants. At destination, as a federal state, Belgium has created different integration models over time in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. At origin, different approaches to labour market insertion, dual citizenship facilitations and diaspora legacies make the difference. Chapter 6 by Francesco Pasetti moves to examining the Swedish case. Here, in the context of relatively recent integration assets (the first integration law was set up only in 1998), the role played by origin determinants is captured by looking at the integration performances of two very different migrant communities: Iranian and Turkish. Their diversity stems mostly from their different migration histories and motivations to reach Sweden: Turkish people have moved to Sweden for work while Iranian immigrants fled to Sweden from Iran, leading to two different patterns which have an impact on these groups’ integration abroad: individual characteristics and group compositions; and the support and involvement of state and non-state actors in emigration and diaspora affairs. As regards the former, Turkish migrants are mainly composed of unskilled labourers and family members who later reunified with primary migrants, while Iranian migrants remain refugees for the most part with relatively high levels of education. The Turkish diaspora can rely on a number of state actions targeting the socio-economic conditions of migrants abroad (pre-departure training; double taxation and social security agreements; incentives for dual citizenship; etc.) which are supported by a large network of state and non-state actors at both origin and destination. On the contrary, Iranian emigrants can only rely on civil society associations which are active at destination and pursue goals in opposition to Tehran’s government.

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In Chap. 7, Anne Unterreiner focuses on the Chinese-UK and the Indian-UK migrant corridors. The UK approach to integration and migration management is very specific in the EU context. Over time, it has evolved from a laissez-faire to a managed-migration approach, and finally to a selective (point-based) system that prioritises highly skilled workers and student migration. In terms of multicultural assets, the UK’s integration framework has culminated in a “beyond multiculturalism” approach that demands more of migrants in terms of adherence to and acceptance of British “values”. Beyond state policies and actions, the length of presence of individuals and communities should also be considered when looking at integration trajectories. The Chinese and Indian communities living in the UK are two peculiar cases among the migrant corridors considered in this chapter. Both migrant communities are highly educated and composed of large shares of international students. As it is frequently recognised that highly skilled individuals are more prone to integrate, this chapter analyses whether this characteristic is sufficient in order to achieve high levels of integration in integration domains other than education, particularly in the labour market. Chapter 8 compares the integration trajectories of Russian and Turkish migrants in Germany. It is a challenging chapter, but not just because Russian and Turkish communities living in Germany are significantly different in terms of skill composition, migrants’ main motivation to migrate, etc. While Turkish migrants have been mostly composed of guest workers followed by family migrants, Russians have mainly migrated to Germany as ethnic Germans. In light of these differences, these two groups have found very different welcoming policies – with different rights and obligations – as well as different social contexts at destination. For instance, the authors have noticed that while Turkish migrants end up in a very different cultural context, becoming a relatively stigmatised group of strangers, Russian migrants are part of the Aussiedler community and as such are not perceived as being as diverse in ethnic and cultural terms. Chapter 9 by Magdalena Lesińska focuses on the integration of Russian and Ukrainian migrants in Poland. These migrant corridors illustrate integration outcomes within a context of under-developed integration policies at both destination and origin. In Poland, immigration has only recently entered into the public debate as a reaction to two phenomena: a) significant inflows of short-term workers attracted by new employment opportunities created by the fast-developing Polish economy in the 2000s and b) the on-going refugee crisis and possible forced immigration inflows. Accordingly, over recent years, although there has been a noticeable evolution of admission policies towards a slow and controlled opening-up to foreign inflows, the legal and policy asset of integration is still lacking. At origin as well – with the exception of the Ukraine-Poland bilateral agreement on social security targeting Ukrainian migrants – emigration/diaspora policy assets are significantly under-developed. In this “unmanaged context”, however, a more active approach to migrant integration is noticeable in the NGO sector. The chapter thus verifies whether relying on under-developed integration policies has an impact on integration by using the results of the expert survey that was conducted among representatives of organisations working with Russian and Ukrainian migrants in Poland.

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Chapter 10 is dedicated to analysing the integration outcomes of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in Italy. The two migrant communities are very different in terms of demographic characteristics, migration patterns and insertion modalities as well as emigration and diaspora policies. The chapter outlines these differences in order to better emphasise origin-country effects on integration outcomes. In particular, the different policy approaches at origin are assumed to impact integration; most (but not all) of the policies in the Moroccan case are diaspora-oriented whereas those in the Ukrainian case are “unmanaged”. At destination, Italy has a still incomplete institutional framework for integration which primarily focuses on economic integration. The multiple levels of actors responsible for integration policy implementation (central and local institutions and non-state actors) is also used as a reference point in the discussion. In Chap. 11, the focus is on the integration of Ecuadorian and Moroccan migrant communities living in Spain. These two migrant corridors offer us a unique opportunity to verify the impact of bilateral agreements on integration outcomes. Both Ecuador and Morocco have signed a range of agreements with Spain pertaining to several dimensions of integration, guided by their respective historical and geographical proximities. As Spain is still a major receiver of labour migration inflows, recruitment procedures and the portability of social rights are the core of these agreements. In addition, agreements on multiple citizenship and voting rights were stipulated in the agreements with Ecuador while deals on language, cultural rights and readmission procedures were signed with Morocco. Eventually, the role of non- state actors was also widened, given the relevant role they have played in the Spanish context, implementing regional and local policies as well as formulating their own projects and delivering a broad array of services. Finally, Chap. 12 by Kate Hooper and Susanna Groves serves as a comparison and frame of reference for European destinations. Here, while the context of integration is different, we see that Chinese and Indian migrants also face integration challenges. This chapter also invites us to draw lessons from studying Europe and the US in a comparative manner. The chapters, apart from providing an empirical overview of integration processes for selected countries and migrant groups, also offer important policy insights. Due to the range of corridors covered we can see how different policy configurations work on both the origin and destination side. We can also examine what the consequences are of a relative lack of immigration and emigration policies for migrant integration. What this volume highlights, above all, though, is how policies for migrant integration will only work should they take into account the three sides of the equation: destination countries, countries of origin and the migrants themselves.

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References

EC. (2011). European agenda for the integration of third-country nationals. COM (2011) 455 final. Brussels: European Commission. Kirişci, K. (2008). “Three way approach” to meeting the challenges of migrant incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective. CARIM Research Reports 2008/03. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/8291/CARIM_RR_2008_03. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 19 July 2016.

[email protected] Chapter 2 Introducing Emigration and Diaspora Policies in Integration Studies

Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan, Justyna Salamońska, and Cameron Thibos

Introduction

The integration of migrants has long been perceived as being shaped by policies designed and implemented by immigrant destination countries. Searching for the best “model” of integration or the most efficient citizenship policy is still a highly debated issue within destination societies. This chapter aims to push the debate a step forward by focusing upon the potential role that the policies of origin states play on migrants’ integration. Specifically, it will present a landscape of the policies enacted at the origin end which may (or may not) contribute to the integration of migrants in the EU. In terms of geographical scope, it will encompass the policy framework of the origin countries analysed in this volume, namely China, Ecuador, India, Iran, Morocco, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. As a whole, there are a variety of tools through which origin countries attempt to address the needs of their populations living abroad, which can be broadly catego- rised as emigration and diaspora policies. The former reflect “all policies that regulate (either facilitate or limit) outward migration, mobility across countries and possible return”, while the latter are “policies that engage emigrants and members of diaspora communities (both organised communities and individuals) with the countries of origin, building a sense of belonging and strengthening ties” (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014).

A. Di Bartolomeo (*) • S. Kalantaryan • J. Salamońska Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] C. Thibos Beyond Trafficking and Slavery and Mediterranean Journeys in Hope, openDemocracy, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

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Firstly, emigration policies are designed through various constellations of tools and mainly refer to the labour market and education dimensions of integration. Imposing a strict control on the magnitude and characteristics of outward and return migration flows is, for instance, used by origin states to control emigration effects on the inflows of remittances, human capital and demographic consequences (brain drain; brain gain; population and skills’ ageing, etc.). Indirectly, states may also invest in education and training and expand employment with the aim of retaining potential emigrants. Emigration may be also managed in cooperation with destination countries through bilateral and multilateral agreements. These normally concern labour recruitment and transfer; cross-border mobility facilitations; worker social benefits and taxation; worker rights and protections; anti-discrimination regulations; pre-departure trainings; language training; recognition of qualifications, etc. Secondly, origin countries are increasingly engaged in “building bridges” to reach their diasporas. Diaspora policies aim to reinforce both individual ties, such as dual nationality and voting rights, as well as collective ties, such as community schools abroad, associations’ actions, etc. (Unterreiner and Weinar 2014). Though they refer to a large variety of integration dimensions (labour market, education, access to citizenship, culture, language, religion, etc.), they are not explicitly conceived to support migrants’ integration trajectories. Emigration and diaspora policies are not necessarily exclusionary. In most cases, diaspora policies follow emigration policies as soon as members of the diaspora begin to confront their governments for rights and support from abroad. This was the case for Morocco and Turkey. In other cases, diaspora policies are designed along an ethnic basis, as in the case of Russia. Finally, in the case of China and India, economic reasons are the determinant for the development of diaspora policies that aim to attract financial investments at home. In any case, emigration and diaspora policies frequently coexist within government legislation, with one being more prevalent than the other depending on social and economic conjunctures. Interestingly enough, emigration and diaspora policies become coterminous with regard to return migration. In fact, while emigration policies define who is prioritised for return, diaspora policies create incentives and facilitate support for an effective return and re-integration process. The first section of the chapter will focus on emigration policies that are related to the labour market and education. It will also describe the agreements that pertain to migration at various levels of governance. The following section will catalogue diaspora policies according to their different focuses on culture, religion, language, political rights and the economy. The emigration and diaspora policies presented in this chapter also draw a conceptual framework on the country-of-origin side that interacts with the integration policies operating in EU-destination contexts. The framework set up in this chapter will be developed in the empirical chapters, which examine the integration of migrants in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the United States.

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Emigration Policies

National governments attempt to formalise, regulate, protect, and direct migration outflows in several ways. Some countries adopt macro-level policies and strategic planning documents to maintain broad control over migration and mobility. Others have patchwork, and often overlapping systems of regulation and legislation that have developed over time and across many different parts of the government. And still others evince little interest in controlling outward migration and instead allow the market, individual and family decision-making, and other push-pull factors to regulate and direct this flow. These overarching approaches at the domestic level frequently exist alongside bilateral agreements between individual sending and receiving countries. States negotiate many such agreements, weaving a thick net of obligations and privileges that connect European receiving states to different parts of the globe beyond the external border. Bilateral agreements most commonly concern labour recruitment and transfer; workers’ social benefits and taxation; and worker rights and protections. Finally, some states attempt, or have in the past attempted, to better protect (and control) potential labour migrants by either regulating commercial recruitment agencies or by setting up their own labour placement services for overseas work. Each of these types of governmental intervention will be discussed in turn below, as they all relate to the countries of the European Union. It is important to note, however, that while many countries establish such frameworks and programmes with EU member states, this is not always where sending states concentrate their efforts. More precisely, it may not be where they focus certain types of efforts, since different destination countries and migrant populations may require different services and protections than others. The number of Indian labourers going to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for example, has prompted the Indian government to establish many bilateral agreements regarding worker protections there. Thus it is important to remember that while some states seem relatively light on emigration-related policies from a European perspective, this does not necessarily mean that their interest in migrant affairs is light overall.

Macro-level Approach

Within the eight countries discussed in this current volume, only China has adopted a macro-level comprehensive approach for managing the size and characteristics of outward migration.1 Specifically, in terms of emigration policies, China’s approach

1 In 2012, Ukraine also drafted a “Law on External Labour Migration”, which was conceived to regulate the economic, social and political rights of Ukrianian emigrants. In particular, the law dealt with welfare support for migrants’ children; technical provisions for the protection of voting rights abroad; and migrants’ reintegration issues upon their return to Ukraine. Today, however, the law is still unratified and any future development is largely unpredictable.

[email protected] 12 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. evolved from rigorous control to better management of outward and inward migration in the 1980s. This was made possible through the “1985 Law on the control of exit and entry of citizens” and other “relaxed policies” which have ultimately facilitated the emigration of students and entrepreneurs from China. Students in particular were the target of numerous governmental initiatives. For instance, education agencies were created to recruit students for international educational institutions. These agencies operate under strict state control and provide information about opportunities for studying abroad and assistance with school (and visa) application processes. In recent times, students and entrepreneurs have also been encouraged to return to China. To attract students, Chinese provinces and municipalities have increased salaries, offered tax benefits and loans for businesses, and provided subsidies for accommodation and the education of returnees’ children. The return of students is also supported through Returned Overseas Students Industry Parks, which have excellent facilities and governmental funding. Entrepreneurs are also incentivised to return through new legislation targeting overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese holding foreign passports and wishing to invest in China. In addition to return migration, the Chinese government so encourages and facilitates circulation between China and countries overseas, for instance in the case of academics and professionals (Biao 2003). Thus emigration policies have clearly been shaped by diaspora policies. It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the existence of a clear macro-level approach, Chinese emigration policies remain fragmented across several ministries (Biao 2003). For instance, labour migration is under the Ministry of Commerce while student migration is governed by the Ministry of Education. In addition, student return migration falls under a variety of Ministries: Human Resources and Social Security; Science and Technology; Public Security; and, ultimately, the Ministry of Commerce if returnees settle in a science and innovation park (Pieke and Speelman 2013).

Bilateral and EU-Level Agreements

More common than overall migration plans and broad laws are bilateral agreements between countries. These cover a variety of issues, but the most relevant for our current purposes are: those which create and regulate labour transfer and recruitment programmes; those which establish mechanisms for the transfer of social security and other benefits; and those which stipulate worker protections and conditions. With regard to labour transfer agreements, Turkey serves as a paradigmatic case. In the 1960s, it signed a wide range of formal labour agreements for the circular migration of guest workers (Gastarbeiter) with West Germany (1961), Belgium (1964), France (1965), and Sweden (1967), among others. The recruitment of migrants on a temporary basis was governed by the Turkish Employment Service (TES) in conjunction with authorities from the receiving states. These were popular programmes before they were discontinued during the 1970s. According to TES data, more than 612,000 Turkish workers were dispatched to eleven European states between 1961 and 1972, with the lion’s share (512,000) going to West Germany

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(Paine 1974). This mass migration was accompanied by significant flows of unof- ficial workers who later reunified with their family members. In 1974, according to German official sources, the Turkish-born population living in Germany numbered over one million people. Still, bilateral labour-transfer agreements remain a major tool in the attempt to better govern labour mobility to the EU. Compared with past agreements, they involve a far lower number of migrants and also target specific groups, such as skilled migrants, seasonal workers, and so on. For instance, in 2009, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to begin a Labour Mobility Partnership with Denmark. The MoU aims to expand cooperation in five areas, namely: labour market expansion, employment facilitation, orderly entry and migration, and information exchange (Art. 2). Specifically, it promotes “the migration of qualified workers from India to meet the growing demand for the supply of qualified employment in the Danish economy and enhances the recruitment of workers from India” (Art. 6). The Indian government has also expressed interest in developing high-skilled recruitment programmes with several other European states. In Morocco the government signed bilateral agreements with Spain in 2001 and 2005, and with Italy in 2005. The agreements with Spain concern the employment of Moroccan seasonal agricultural workers and put national authorities in charge of verifying that Moroccan workers wishing to leave the country have both a medical certificate and regular work contract, and also respect entry conditions. The agreement with Italy guarantees Moroccan workers priority in the Italian labour market and provide them with pre-departure job and language training. Labour transfer mechanisms between Ecuador and Spain are regulated by the 2001 bilateral agreement on the “Regulation and Management of Migration Flows”. The agreement targets both skilled and unskilled workers and defines the number and characteristics of workers needed in the Spanish labour market. The pre- selection of candidates is made by a Spanish-Ecuadorian selection committee which may engage the employer or his representative. The agreement also establishes that temporary workers shall commit to returning to Ecuador. In cases in which they fail to return, they are “banned from all future contracts in Spain” (Gabrielli 2015). Ukraine has signed a wide range of bilateral agreements regulating labour transfer with several EU states including Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. Their efficacy, however, was frequently called into question given the extremely complex bureaucratic procedures required to access them. For instance, although the agreement with Spain (2009) is one of the most elaborated, no single person has been hired through the adopted procedure to date (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015). Both Ecuador and Ukraine have also negotiated numerous agreements concerning the portability of pensions and other social security benefits. According to the 2009 Social Security Agreement between Ecuador and Spain, Spanish and Ecuadorian citizens are provided equal treatment in the field of social security. In addition, the agreement ensures that the rights acquired by workers in either country will be maintained when entering the territory of the other (Gabrielli 2015). In Ukraine, social security agreements have been signed with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.

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Many other agreements either address the issue of double taxation or relate to workers’ rights, standards and protections. None of the nine countries under study here have negotiated separate agreements on worker rights with individual member states of the European Union, however, there are relevant provisions in broader agreements such as the India-Denmark mobility partnership. Article 4 notes that all legally employed Indian nationals “shall receive equal treatment with nationals of the receiving state in application of the relevant labour and employment laws of that Contracting State. Reiterating this, Article 11 of the section titled ‘Provisions Concerning Workers’ Welfare and Social Protection’, states that workers hired under the MoU” shall enjoy full rights and privileges accorded to any worker in Denmark in accordance with the provisions of the labour and social security laws of that country.” Agreements are not always negotiated between two states, however; they may be developed at a higher level. For instance, within the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), a large number of agreements or macro policies were developed between EU institutions and GAMM-priority origin countries, namely China, India and Russia (in Asia), Ukraine (in Europe) and Morocco and Turkey (in the Southern-Eastern Mediterranean). The EU-China strategic partnership dates back to 2003. In 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding on visas was signed. In addition, there were consultations on illegal migration and trafficking. In 2007, the EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations were initiated regarding readmission and visas, among other issues. The 15th EU-China summit took place in 2012. Discussed objectives included facilitating mobility between the EU and China, fighting unauthorised migration, and visa exemptions for individuals holding diplomatic passports. The parties also called for a launch of EU-China Dialogue on Mobility and Migration. In the case of India, the adoption and revision of the Strategic Partnership Joint- Action Plan took place at the EU-India summits in 2005 and 2008, respectively (Fargues and Lum 2014). India’s cooperation with the EU includes an India-EU Joint Working Group on Consular Issues, initiated following the first India-EU summit in Portugal in 2000. Its aim is the facilitation of human mobility between India and the EU, in the area of consular and visa services provision and also in business and tourism. A High-Level EU-India Dialogue on Migration and Mobility was launched in 2006, and was further developed after the EU-India Summit in 2010. In 2006, agreements on the facilitation of visa issuance and the readmission of persons entered into force. The EU-Russia migration dialogue was initiated in 2011 and involves consulta- tion on issues of unauthorised migration, international protection and the migration-development nexus. Projects addressing irregular migration, human trafficking and asylum in Russia were funded by the EU. In 1994, Russia also signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA, in force since 1997). The PCA includes articles on the prevention of discrimination of the legally employed and on the coordination of social security.

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As regards Ukraine, it signed an agreement with the EU in 2007 on the facilitation of visa issuance and the readmission of persons. With regard to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, Morocco signed a Mobility Partnership with nine EU Member States in 2013. The aims of the mobility partnerships include the management of mobility and legal migration, including the provision of information on employment, education and training, the prevention of irregular migration and human trafficking, links between migration and development and asylum issues. In contrast, the EU-Turkey Association Agreement dates back to 1963. It guarantees new rights, including anti-discrimination norms, to Turkish workers living in the EU. Along with a renewed dialogue on visa liberalisation, Turkey and the EU signed two readmission agreements in 2013 and 2014.

Labour Placement and Recruitment Regulation

Provisions for governmental support of labour placement are sometimes included in bilateral agreements, as demonstrated in the previous section by the joint pre- selection committee contained in the 2001 Ecuador-Spain agreement. They can also come about as a result of bilateral agreements, such as the Turkish Employment Service. Government help with recruitment can also happen on a more independent bureaucratic or ad-hoc basis. State-organised recruitment agencies in Morocco, known as Amicales, have proliferated as Morocco has moved to embrace the export of labour. These agencies were built to manage migrants’ relations with host countries, by helping potential migrants search for jobs abroad and by navigating pertinent employment and social security rights. India, meanwhile, maintains a registry of recruitment agencies as well as Overseas Workers Resource Centres, which attempt to ensure that only these registered agents are able to hire potential migrants. While these provisions primarily apply to low-skilled migrant labour destined for locales outside Europe, the MoU between India and Denmark also seeks to maintain some control of recruitment agencies. This document stipulates that recruiters must not only be authorised but must also countersign all employment contracts. It also stipulates that the recruiting agent must ensure the employer honours the terms of the contract (Art. 9).

Education and Emigration Policies: Matching Skills and Promoting Student Migration

Policy makers at both origin and destination have a mutual interest in matching migrants’ skills with the needs of the labour market at destination. To this end, professional skill-development trainings are frequently implemented on a bilateral

[email protected] 16 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. basis. They are designed to ease the transition of potential migrants into destination labour markets by giving them all the relevant information that will allow them to take full advantage of employment abroad. Their degree of efficiency, however, depends largely on the existence of concrete opportunities abroad (ETF 2015). Of the countries of interest to our study, Morocco is a valuable example. Here, the National Agency for Employment and Skills Promotion (Agence Nationale de Promotion et des Compétences, ANAPEC), has since 2001 acted as a labour market intermediary that provides information to job seekers and employers and organises specific pre-departure skill trainings. Among their trainings, it is worth mentioning the courses that target migrants willing to work in Germany in the tourism and catering sectors, and in Italy in the agricultural and tourism areas. In both cases, trainings include several activities, such as language tuition, inter-cultural orientation modules and, in the Italian case, the teaching of Italian civic values and rules governing admission, citizenship and security in the workplace. Another way in which emigration policies are related to education is through the support and enhancement of student migration abroad. Here, Chinese and Indian policies deserve considerable attention as the two countries that are the world’s main exporters of international students worldwide. As noted above, student emigration from China is primarily supported by governmental associations based in loco which help students apply to universities, obtain visas and settle abroad. For instance, the UK is a preferred destination for Chinese students, where they can count on a wide range of well-networked associations. Information on career opportunities, student exchanges, job openings, etc. are all shared within these informal networks. Studying in the United Kingdom is also a tradition for many Indian middle-class families, and in recent times has again been on the rise following UK facilitations of student mobility and direct recruitment from universities (Naujoks 2009). In particular, within the UK-India context, the bilateral programme “UK-India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI)” aims at enhancing student mobility through strengthening cultural links between the two countries. Accordingly, the programme has supported the creation of mutual opportunities for student mobility and working on key areas, such as the mutual recognition of qualifications and credit transferability. Institutional partnerships to support study tours, summer programmes and other short-term visiting opportunities with special emphasis on India’s heritage and culture are also being structured in the programme delivery. Key objectives include the development of policies to support the mutual recognition of learning and achievement; the development of joint doctoral and master’s programmes between India and the UK; the creation of opportunities for student mobility and the strengthening of cultural linkages (Consterdine and Everton 2012). The link between education and integration has long been debated in international migration studies. Overall, there is a general consensus that skilled migrants are by far the most integrated from a social perspective as they are better equipped to decode destination-country settings. Nevertheless, when entering the labour mar-

[email protected] 2 Introducing Emigration and Diaspora Policies in Integration Studies 17 ket, they frequently end up in underpaid and underqualified positions for one main reason: it is difficult for their formal qualifications to be recognised abroad. Discrimination may be another issue. The absence of a framework enabling the vali- dation and recognition of skills and qualifications of third-country nationals in EU states is a loss for both destination societies that wish to attract talent and for migrants themselves. This makes the non-visibility and the underutilisation of migrants’ skills an important issue that requires the attention of policymakers in field of migration management (Schuster et al. 2013; Sumption 2013). With regard to the countries examined by our study, some steps have been undertaken by the EU towards the recognition of qualifications for migrants coming from Morocco and Ukraine. Accordingly, the improvement of mechanisms making mutual recognition of professional and university qualifications easier was set up as a primary objective of the 2013 EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership (and reaffirmed in thePlan d’action UE-Maroc mettant en œuvre le statut avancé 2013–2017) as well as in the 2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Diaspora Policies

As noted in the introduction, for the purpose of the present discussion we have ana- lytically separated national diaspora laws from national emigration laws, although we acknowledge that the line is fuzzy and in many cases there is overlap. Broadly speaking, we frame diaspora laws as focusing primarily on relations and ties with permanent overseas populations of sending-country nationals or heritage members. This population may contain revolving elements – not all members must be permanently settled – but as a group it has taken its place within the fabric of the receiving country. Emigration policies, in contrast, seek primarily to regulate, promote, or hinder the flow of people leaving the sending country. Needless to say, the same people are targets of these two types of policies at different points in their migration journeys. Many countries have established laws that specifically target overseas communities, while others have built diaspora communities and their all-important remittances into development strategies and planning documents. This has often led to the creation of dedicated bureaucratic units, at times even at the ministerial level, to engage with overseas communities and to serve as liaisons between the diaspora and the central state. It can also involve modifying laws to extend/maintain political inclusion for those residing overseas, especially with regard to citizenship and voting rights. Each of these three ideas – national diaspora laws, dedicated bureaucratic units, and the extension of political rights for members of the diaspora – are discussed in turn below.

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National Diaspora Regulations and Bureaucratic Units

Ukraine serves as a good example of a country that has produced several iterations of a strategic plan for ‘its’ diaspora, even if few signs of implementation have reportedly followed (Ivashchenko 2014). These include the national programme “Ukrainian Diaspora” (1996–2000), the National Action Plan “Foreign Ukrainians” (2001–2005), and the presidential decree “the Main Directions of Social Policy until 2004”. In addition, the 1996 Constitution contains several provisions that guarantee a number of rights to Ukrainian nationals residing abroad. Among others, it is worth mentioning the right to return at any time, access to voting rights in national elections, social benefits, cultural and educational services, and the care and protection of emigrants. More substantially, Ecuador has formally integrated migration into its development plans and long-term thinking, giving it an overall strategic vision for how it would like the movement of its citizens to take place. The first attempt to do this took place in 2005 with the “National Plan for Ecuadorian Migrants Abroad”, which was then followed by the 2010 “Human Development Plan for Migration” and the 2013–2017 “National Plan for Good Living”. The last of these outlines the following goals: (i) establishing comprehensive care programmes for migrants and their families in their place of origin and destination; (ii) promoting the consolidation of citizens, social networks, organisations and institutions to safeguard migrants’ rights; (iii) implementing policies agreed upon between Ecuador and destination countries with a comprehensive and long-term perspective; and (iv) promoting a dignified voluntary return programme. Turkey, as previously noted, experienced its largest era of outward migration back in the 1960s. During this time, it explicitly included migration and remittances into its development planning. According to World Bank data, the Turkish economy has since grown to be the 18th-largest in the world (by GDP measures), and while remittances were once of national importance they now account for only a small fraction of the economy. Their approach to migration planning has also changed, with “The Tenth Development plan 2014–2018” now focusing on inward and internal migration management, as well as on the need to attract more skilled migrants. The creation of dedicated bureaucratic units for migrant and overseas citizen affairs has proved a popular way for governments to demonstrate their continued commitment to migrants. In order to maximise the number of persons included under their purview, many of these institutions also include later generations and ‘heritage members’ within their working definition of overseas communities. Turkey maintains both a migrant advisory board and a ‘diaspora affairs’ department. The first of these, the Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad, has existed since the 1990s and includes migrant representatives from several different countries. More recently, it established the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities under the office of the prime ministry. Set up to coordinate the activities of different institutions dealing with Turkish citizens abroad, its main objectives are: (1) the improvement of Turks’ situations abroad; (2) the

[email protected] 2 Introducing Emigration and Diaspora Policies in Integration Studies 19 strengthening of social, cultural and economic ties with communities abroad; (3) the development of higher education for international students in Turkey; and (4) support for civil society organisations in Turkey and abroad. Importantly, it focuses more on diaspora policies than on integration issues (Pusch and Splitt 2013). India has gone one step further, establishing the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs in May 2004 and almost immediately renaming it the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in September 2004. This re-branding, which oriented the new ministry toward both Non-Resident Indians (NRI) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) (Lum 2012), is a conspicuous example of an attempt to include heritage members within their scope of their operations. MOIA has separated operations into ‘emigration’ and ‘diaspora’ service divisions, indicating that conceptually it finds both similarities and differences between the two projects. “State Diaspora policy is geared towards an enhanced association with the successful Indians abroad whose professional or entrepreneurial skills and expertise as well as investment potential are seen as assets for the country of origin” (Thapan 2014). This framework may be changing, however; MOIA was merged with the Ministry of External Affairs in January 2016. Iran and Russia have also developed bureaucratic systems to expand their operations and influence into overseas communities. In 2005, the Iranian government established the High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad, first as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later under the Office of the President. Though there are other bodies involved in handing relations with Iranians residing abroad (such as the Parliamentary Faction in Support of Iranian Nationals Living Abroad, the Department of International Affairs and the Ministry of Education’s Department of Schools Abroad), the council remains the leading institution dealing with Iranian affairs overseas. It is responsible for: examining and ratifying macro-policies and programmes that concern Iranian expatriates; supporting the Iranian identity of expatriates; and protecting the social, cultural, economic, consular and judicial concerns of Iranians abroad. Russian engagement is spearheaded by the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation—established September 2008—otherwise known as Rossotrudnichestvo.

Political Inclusion

Most diaspora policies are pursued, in one way or another, in order to maintain ties with overseas populations. This objective means – although in many cases only just barely – the extension of political rights to include people beyond a country’s territorial boundaries and the modification of citizenship law to allow for dual citizenship. In some cases, it has also meant the creation of categories of pseudo-citizenship that allow for a person to maintain some of their rights in a country of origin even after formally renouncing that country’s citizenship.

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India has created the category of ‘non-resident Indian’ (NRI) as one way of identifying and assigning rights to certain Indian citizens who spend substantial time overseas. A law enacted in 2006 allowed this group of people to vote, however this right was removed if an NRI stayed abroad for more than six months. This was changed in 2010 to achieve a more inclusive policy. Now, an NRI – defined for the purposes of voting as a person who (a) is a citizen of India; (b) has not enrolled in electoral rolls; (c) has not taken up the citizenship of any other country; and (d) is absent from their ordinary place of residence (Thapan 2014) – may vote even after being away for more than six months if they are registered and present in India on the day of polling. Furthermore, an amendment to the Citizenship Act in 2003 gave the right to dual citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin living in sixteen countries (Thapan 2014). This was followed in 2006 by the creation of a class of pseudo-citizenship called Overseas Citizenship of India. This partially answered demand for a broader application of the dual citizenship concept, as it grants a multiple-entry, multi-purpose lifelong visa to visit India; exemption from the requirement to report to police authorities for any length of stay; and parity with NRIs in the areas of finance, economy and education except for the acquisition of agricultural land (passport.gov. in).2 This is available to anyone who was an Indian citizen as well as to their children and grandchildren (unless one of their parents or grandparents was a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh). It does not, however, grant political rights. Turkey legalised dual citizenship in 1981, upon the realisation that large numbers of Turkish citizens were choosing long-term settlement abroad. This was followed in 1995 by the creation of the ‘pink card’ (now re-branded the ‘blue card’), a form of pseudo-citizenship similar to the Overseas Citizenship of India. This allows individuals to formally end their Turkish citizenship yet maintain several key rights in Turkey – especially with regard to property rights – but does not allow for the continued right to vote (Caglar 2004). The extension of voting rights to Turkish citizens residing abroad follows a more tortured history. While authorisation was first given to establish consular voting systems in 1979 (Law 2243), and while this was amended into the constitution in 1995 (Law 4121), it wasn’t until the June 2011 election that voting in overseas polling stations actually became a reality (Sabah 2012). Thus for most of the past three decades, Turkish citizens wishing to vote were required to fly back and vote at a customs point anytime up to 75 days before the election, a right which was accorded to them in 1987 by Law 3377 (Thibos 2014). While the Indian and Turkish cases serve as good examples of the spectrum of policies created for the full or partial inclusion of overseas groups into the politics of the country of origin, they are hardly alone. Morocco, Ukraine, Ecuador, Russia and Iran all offer—to a greater or lesser extent—the possibility of voting from overseas. These countries, except for Ukraine and Iran, also permit dual citizenship, although Iran reportedly tolerates it.

2 https://passport.gov.in/oci/ [accessed on 24 January 2016]

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Cultural, Linguistic and Religious Outreach

Many countries engage in different types of cultural and religious outreach and promotion overseas. The main states involved in active religious promotion are Morocco and Turkey. Both countries work to set up mosques, distribute written materials (e.g. Qur’ans), and send imams abroad to provide religious services and religious education to overseas groups. The Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs oversees a large number of mosques, especially in Germany, through the Turkish- Islamic Union for Religious Affairs that it set up in 1984. The Russian state, while it does not engage in promoting religious activities directly, supports the Russian Orthodox Church. For instance, in 2010, Parliament passed a bill for returning to the Church up to 17,000 building and churches nationalised after the 1917 Revolution. In addition, the Russian Orthodox Church and affiliated organizations are the main receivers of recent presidential grants, amounting to more than 256 million roubles in the period 2013–2015 (Soroka 2016). Many countries also maintain cultural centres to teach heritage members and ‘foreigners’ alike about their languages, cultures, and histories. Turkey, for example, maintains the Yunus Emre Institutes (est. 2007), and in 2004 China set up the Confucius Institutes in conjunction with many university departments. The Moroccan Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocaines résidents à l’étranger, founded in 1990, is a crucial institution for fostering links between Moroccans and home. Eighty-five percent of its budget goes to language and cultural education, and it reportedly employs more than 570 teachers. Russia, meanwhile, has created a licensed ‘e-learning school’ that not only provides classes on the Russian language but also makes it possible to study the Russian school curriculum while abroad and obtain an official certificate approved by the Russian Ministry of Education.

Fostering the Link Between Migration and Development

Searching for a link between migration and development is a priority when design- ing migration policies at all ends of migration. For origin states, development outcomes may include receiving high amounts of financial and social remittances; attracting investments at home; supporting the circulation or return of talented nationals, etc. Fostering the link between migration and development may thus include a variety of initiatives which target a large spectrum of migrant populations, i.e. labour migrants, diaspora members, circular migrants, returnees etc. Though remitting behaviours are widespread among temporary labour migrants, it is not surprising that the propensity for remitting and investing at origin tends to diminish over time and over a generation. Accordingly, origin states’ approaches have frequently evolved from an emigration to a diaspora approach in concomitance with a fall in remittances and investing behaviours. Consequently, in order to keep ties

[email protected] 22 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. with their expatriates, diaspora policies involving all kind of dimensions have been developed in countries such as Morocco and Turkey In other states, specific programmes for attracting or profiting from economic remittances have been set up. In Ecuador, for instance, an agreement was signed between the Central Bank of Ecuador and the Caja de Ahorro y Pensiones de Barcelona La Caixa aimed at reducing the cost of sending remittances home. It also supports campaigns for redirecting financial remittances to enterprise projects (Gabrielli 2015). In Ukraine, the National Bank adopted a regulation in 2012 making it mandatory to convert foreign currency transfers sent to physical persons (residents and non-residents) from abroad at the Ukrainian interbank currency market, if those transfers equal or exceed a fixed amount. This means that for every large financial transfer from abroad, the recipient would have to lose a considerable amount due to the currency exchange rate difference. Countries such as China and India have relatively recently focused upon supporting investments from abroad. In China, since the early 1990s, the government’s interest has shifted from attracting remittances to incentivising investments at home, targeting recent migrants as well as people of Chinese origin with foreign citizenship and their descendants (Barabantseva 2005). New legislation followed, targeting overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese holding foreign passports and wishing to invest in China. Similarly, in India, the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre was set up in 2007 with the scope of encouraging foreign investments in the country from abroad. Beyond attracting remittances and supporting investments, the Indian government has fostered the link between migration and development by investing in networking among high-profile diaspora members. Since 2003, the government has hosted an annual conference – the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas – conceived to serve as a platform for interaction between overseas Indians, the Indian government, and interested segments of the Indian society, such as businessmen and cultural and charity organisations. High-level political leaders, including the prime minister, the president, and union ministers, address more than 1,000 overseas Indians on topics such as investment and philanthropic activities in India as well as concerns of the diaspora communities the world over (Naujoks 2009). Development policies are also built within the framework of return incentives, as described in the next paragraph.

Return-Oriented Policies and Projects

One of the possible scenarios of migration is return. Returnees usually bring back material resources and experience they gained abroad. This fact attracts the attention of policymakers who aim to develop policies/tools that both guarantee a smooth reintegration of returnees on the one hand, and help contribute to homeland development on the other.

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The slowdown in departures from Ecuador to some destination countries, and an increase in the return of Ecuadorian migrants to Ecuador made the state refocus its migration-related policies towards the relatives of migrants in origin and returnees. The National Plan for Good Living (2013–2017) of Ecuador defines the guideline targeting the dignified voluntary return of migrants. For instance, the REDIEM‘ Project: Network Productive Branch for Support of Migrant Initiatives’ was one of the first initiatives that offered technical and financial counselling to families of migrants and returnees for productive initiatives, as well as courses and business training workshops. The current Ecuadorian government runs a programme accessible to all Ecuadorians and health professionals living abroad who want to return home and obtain employment with the national public health network. The programme includes an increase in wages, plus fringe benefits (Gabrielli 2015).3 In the Iranian case, return migration is better perceived (and somehow incentiv- ized) than outward migration. For instance, Iranians draftees who have left the country before 2004 (and lived abroad for at least 2 years after entering 13 years of age) can be exempted by the military service upon paying the sum of 100,000 Rials (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014). Other states such as China and Turkey adopt a kind of selective-return migration policy. In the case of China, the government has developed a comprehensive policy framework for incentivizing the return of students and entrepreneurs as well as the circulation of academics and professionals. Turkish graduates who studied abroad are encouraged to return home as well. They are offered a 2-year International Post- Doctoral Research Scholarship by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK). Encouraging and supporting the voluntary resettlement of Russians from abroad – especially from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Baltic countries – is a major priority of the Russian diaspora policy framework. This state action is implemented through the 2002 State Programme for Assisting Compatriots Residing Abroad in their Voluntary Resettlement in the Russian Federation. The programme offers state-supported social and financial aid, such as a relocation fee, a moving allowance, and a fast-track naturalization process to Russian compatriots who are willing to return (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2011). Return migration schemes are certainly more efficient when the portability of social rights is guaranteed, i.e. when bilateral agreements of this nature already exist between countries. The more complete and exhaustive the agreements, the more incentivised people are to return to their origin country. In general, the basic content of these agreements ensures the portability of pensions and the totalisation of contribution periods. Among our countries of interest, such social security agreements have been signed by Ecuador with Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands; by India with several EU Member States (including Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,

3 Other important projects implemented by the government which target returnees are “The Cucayo Fund” (Seed Money), Housing Grants, Contingency Funds, Support for the Vulnerable, etc.

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Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands); by Russia and most EU states;4 and by Turkey with all EU states.

Conclusions

This chapter focused on a selection of countries which feature among the main senders of migrants to Europe. At a macro-level, this is a varied group with regard to geographical location, migration history, historical and language ties, religion, cultural norms and the magnitude and characteristics of migration flows. The combination of these factors have historically produced different approaches towards outward migration flows, which is reflected in a rich and diverse constellation of policies. Origin countries’ characteristics and related policies can potentially interact differently with the policies in the destination country, thereby producing diverse integration outcomes. With regard to emigration policies, the examined countries have, to various extents, established structures which deal specifically with emigration. The management of emigration can be missing or fragmented but it can also be a part of strategic planning as in case of China, India or Turkey. The countries of origin can manage migration bi- and multi-laterally by signing agreements that secure new rights for migrant workers in the EU destinations. To a different extent, these agreements are part of a strategy for all the countries examined in this chapter. The agreements are designed not only to improve workers’ situations in the destinations, but also to allow workers to transfer their pension rights between countries (they also potentially facilitate options for returning to the origin country). Putting controls over the functioning of the agencies that assist workers and students with international mobility is another area of state intervention which can ensure that migrant rights are protected. Part of emigration policy can include pre-departure measures, but as the Moroccan examples show, their effectiveness should not be overestimated as they need to link directly to job opportunities abroad. In the area of human capital transferability there is certainly space for new initiatives in the countries of origin for the development of frameworks that recognise qualifications, and these are already being developed between the EU and Morocco and the EU and Ukraine. Finally, countries of origin do not seem to engage in pre-departure destination- language teaching, which could greatly improve migrants’ situation upon arrival to the destination and their chances for successful integration there. With time, diaspora policies have received growing attention. As with emigration, the concept of the diaspora is to a various extent present in strategic planning at origin. China, India and Turkey have built an encompassing approach to diaspora, including the establishment of appropriate bureaucratic structures which over

4 For the list of countries, see http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base= LAW;n=63276 [accessed on 06 June, 2016]

[email protected] 2 Introducing Emigration and Diaspora Policies in Integration Studies 25 decades have shifted their focus from emigration to diaspora policies. In contrast, Iran and Ukraine do not seem to have a structured approach towards their diasporas. At the same time, the absence of a diaspora policy may be in contrast to the impact that migrants abroad have on their home country, as in case of remittances for Ukraine. Origin countries make links with diasporas by focusing on common culture/language (Russia) and/ or religion (Turkey, Morocco). Political inclusion is an important part of diaspora policies in examined countries, but to different extents. One instrument of inclusion is dual citizenship. However, origin countries tend to prefer to provide their diaspora members with a set of social, economic and political rights. This is the case with the Turkish Blue Card or India’s Overseas Citizenship. The description of policy frameworks established to manage emigration and to build and engage with diasporas constitutes one of the explanatory variables which we will use in the following chapters in order to better understand the patterns of integration in selected EU Member States. Policies at origin will be analysed in order to explain the differing outcomes of migrants groups (of different origin) with regard to the labour market, education and access to citizenship. However, before moving to empirical examples, the following two chapters explain the methodology of the study which uses composite indicators of integration and a survey of civil society organisations in the origin and destination.

References

Barabantseva, E. (2005). The party-state’s transnational outreach: Overseas Chinese policies of the PRC’s central government. Greater China Occasional Paper 2. Tübingen: Institute of Chinese and Korean Studies, University of Tübingen. Biao, X. (2003). Emigration from China: A sending country perspective. International Migration, 41(3), 21–48. Caglar, A. (2004). ‘Citizenship Light’: Transnational ties, multiple rules of membership, and ‘The Pink Card’. In J. Friedmann & S. Randeria (Eds.), Worlds on the move globalization, migration, and cultural security (pp. 273–291). London/New York: I. B. Tauris. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. (2014). Iran: Military service, including recruitment age, length of service, reasons for exemption, the possibility of performing a replacement service and the treatment of people who refuse military service by authorities; whether there are sanctions against conscientious objectors, IRN104809.E. http://www.refworld.org/docid/550fd7e64.html. Accessed 6 June 2016. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. (2011). Russia: Information on the state program for assisting compatriots residing abroad in their voluntary resettlement in the Russian Federation (2007–October 2011). RUS103900.E. http://www.refworld.org/docid/5072b7952. html. Accessed 25 May 2016. Consterdine, E., & Everton, A. (2012). European migration network: Immigration of international students to the EU: empirical evidence and current policy practice. Technical Report. Home Office: UK National Point.http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/ european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/immigration-students/27.united_ kingdom_national_report_immigration_of_international_students_final_oct2012_en.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016.

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Di Bartolomeo A., Gabrielli G., & Strozza S. (2015). The migration and integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in Italy: Policies and measures. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report 2015/08. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute. ISBN: 978-92-9084-280-4. doi: 10.2870/870237. ETF. (2015). Migrant Support Measures From An Employment And Skills Perspective (MISMES): Global inventory with a focus on countries of origin. European Training Foundation. http://www.etf.europa.eu/webatt.nsf/0/58594C046A08A6E3C1257EB2003A85FC/$file/ MISMES%20Global%20Inventory.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Fargues P., & Lum K. (2014). India-EU migration: A relationship with untapped potential. Migration Policy Centre. CARIM-India Research Report 2014/01. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute. http://cadmus. eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31305/CARIM-India-2014-01.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 19 July 2016. Gabrielli, L. (2015). Corridor report on Spain the case of Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrants. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report 2015/15. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute. ISBN: 978-92- 9084-290–293. doi: 10.2870/02623. Ivashchenko, K. (2014). Policy and institutional frameworks – Country report – Ukraine. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute, unpublished. Lum, K. (2012). India’s engagement with its diaspora in comparative perspective with China. Migration Policy Centre. Analytical and Synthetic Note Policy Brief CARIM-India AS2012/01. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute. http://www.india-eu-migration.eu/media/CARIM-India-ASN2012-01. pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Naujoks, D. (2009). Emigration, immigration, and diaspora relations in India. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/emigration-immigration- and-diaspora-relations-india. Accessed 19 July 2016. Paine, S. (1974). Exporting workers: The Turkish case. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pieke, F. N. & Speelman, T. (2013). Chinese investment strategies and migration: Does diaspora matter? Report for the Migration Policy Centre European University Institute, Florence. Leiden University, the Netherlands. http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/pieke---mpc-report- final-draft-130117.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Pusch, B., & Splitt, J. (2013). Binding the Almancı to the homeland – Notes from Turkey. Perception, 18(3), 129–166. Sabah, A. (2012). ‘50. Yılda oy hakkı’, Avrupa Sabah, 10 May 2012; ‘Yurtdışında yaşayan vatandaşlar bulundukları yerde oy kullanabilecek’, Zaman. Schuster, A., Desiderio, M.V. & Urso, G. (2013). Recognition of qualifications and competences of migrants. Independent network of labour migration and integration experts. Brussels: IOM. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/recognition_qualifications_competencesofmi- grants.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Soroka, G. (2016). Putin’s Patriarch. Does the Kremlin control the Church? FOREIGNAFFAIRS. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-02-11/putins-patriarch. Accessed 25 May 2016. Sumption, M. (2013). Tackling brain waste: Strategies to improve the recognition of immigrants’ foreign qualifications. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/tackling-brain-waste-strategies-improve-recognition-immigrants-foreign- qualifications. Accessed 24 Jan 2016. Thapan, M. (2014). Policy and institutional frameworks – India Country Report. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report 2014/28. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/33214/INTERACT_RR_2014_28.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 19 July 2016.

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Thibos C. (2014). Competitive identity formation in the Turkish diaspora. Ph D Thesis, Department of International Development, University of Oxford, unpublished. Unterreiner, A., & Weinar, A. (2014). The conceptual framework of the INTERACT project. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report 2014/01. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29566/INTERACT-2014%20-%2001.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 19 July 2016.

[email protected] Chapter 3 Counting the Uncountable – Measuring Migrant Integration Between Origin and Destination

Anna Di Bartolomeo and Sona Kalantaryan

Introduction

Immigrant integration is one of the main challenges European societies have to face today. Successful integration has significant and positive implications not only for individuals and their personal autonomy, but also for society as a whole, in terms of social cohesion (OECD 2009). Given the need for migrants in today’s European labour markets, investing resources on the integration of migrants and on social cohesion would help with the creation of admission policies that can be more easily accepted by European civil societies. Integration is an inherently multidimensional phenomenon, with labour market and education representing two of its most relevant and interrelated domains. Better educated migrants are likely to be more productive and, in turn, better accepted by receiving societies. Moreover, for immigrants who frequently arrive in a new country with low skills, without an established family business, accumulated wealth or long-standing local social networks, the educational system represents a unique channel for social mobility and for success in the labour market (Di Bartolomeo 2011). Another key dimension of integration is access to citizenship. Rapid and smooth naturalization might positively affect migrant integration both directly – through the expansion of the rights granted to foreign-born citizens – and indirectly, by enhancing their sense of belonging in the host society. This paper aims at building-up composite indicators of integration that allow comparison for the level of integration of ‘specific group of migrants residing in selected EU Member States’ (migrant corridors). It does so in the following three

A. Di Bartolomeo (*) • S. Kalantaryan Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 29 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_3

[email protected] 30 A. Di Bartolomeo and S. Kalantaryan key dimensions of integration: labour market, education and access to citizenship. For this purpose, the Principal Component Analysis technique is employed. To date, few studies have approached the topic of migrant integration from a comparative perspective, i.e. using datasets that are standardised between European countries. Notable examples are the EUROSTAT report “Indicators of Immigrant Integration. A Pilot Study” (EUROSTAT 2011) and the OECD publication “Settling In. OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012” (OECD 2012). This paper presents several innovative traits, not to be found in these previous papers. First, equal emphasis is put on both ends of migration, i.e. destination and origin. Accordingly, this paper measures the integration of migrant corridors, i.e. groups of migrants defined on the basis of both their country of origin and destination. More specifically, the migrant corridors on which this paper is based are the following: Morocco and Turkey in Belgium, Tunisia and Turkey in France, Turkey and Russia in Germany, Morocco and Ukraine in Italy, Ecuador and Morocco in Spain, Iran and Turkey in Sweden, China and India in the UK. Second, by building-up composite indicators, which allow for the ranking of the integration outcomes of migrant corridors by dimension, this study provides useful information for policy analysis and public dissemination.

Previous Research

The economic and social integration of immigrants is a key policy challenge for all Western countries. This is witnessed by the growing number of policy oriented studies which have dealt with the theme in the last few years. Since 2007 the OECD has been assessing the labour market integration of immigrants and their children through in-depth country reviews published in the series “Jobs for Immigrants”.1 The findings of these reports reveal that, in spite of the strong differences existing both among destination countries and between different immigrant groups, in almost all OECD countries the unemployment rate of immigrants is higher than that of the native-born. With regard to the determinants of such an unfavourable inclusion, these studies clearly show that the observed differences between migrant and native labour market outcomes can only be partially attributed to immigrants’ lower qualifications (OECD 2009). A key milestone in integration studies was posed by the Zaragoza Declaration (Council of the European Union, 2010), which was adopted, April 2010, by the EU Ministers responsible for immigrant integration issues at the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Integration. The “Zaragoza Declaration” is – at the time of writing – the reference document concerning the key aspects of immigrants’ integration in the EU: dimensions, indicators, data sources, etc…. In the framework of this declaration, EUROSTAT drafted a key report which summarised the results of a pilot study whose aim was to identify to what extent existing harmonized data

1 For more info see http://www.oecd.org/els/jobsforimmigrantsseries.htm [Accessed 25 January 2015].

[email protected] 3 Counting the Uncountable – Measuring Migrant Integration Between Origin… 31 sources could provide adequate data on migrant populations (EUROSTAT 2011). Based on a variety of data sources, this study presents, for each Member State, a range of common indicators of migrants’ integration. These cover four policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship. The multidimensional approach to integration introduced by the Zaragoza declaration was adopted, too, in 2012, by the OECD. Drawing on the data gathered for the “Jobs for Immigrants” series and other studies on integration, the OECD produced “Settling In: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012”, i.e. the first international comparison across OECD countries of outcomes for immigrants and their children in economic and social integration. Three main findings emerge from this publication. First, outcomes differ considerably according to integration domain. Second, the composition of the immigrant population by reason for settlement, educational attainment and duration of stay is an important determinant of variations across countries. Third, the differences detected between immigrants and the native-born cannot be entirely attributed to observable socio-demographic variables, and the share that can be explained through such measurable factors varies according to the specific integration domain (OECD2012 ). Unlike the studies presented so far, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston et al. 2011) aims at assessing, comparing and improving integration policies. For present purposes the most relevant finding emerging from the MIPEX report is that there are strong positive statistical correlations between its different strands. Most countries that do well (or poorly) in one area of integration do well (or poorly) in the others. For instance, countries where immigrant adults can improve their careers, skills and qualifications are more likely to see and address their children’s specific needs and opportunities. As compared with the studies revised in this section, this paper presents several innovative aspects. First, equal emphasis is put at both ends of migration, i.e. destination and origin. Indeed, this paper measures the integration of migrant corridors, i.e. groups of migrants defined by their country of origin and destination. Second, this study proposes a revision of the indicators usually employed to assess migrants’ integration, which are critically assessed from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Finally, by building-up composite indicators, which allows a ranking of the integration outcomes of migrant corridors by dimension, this study provides useful information for policy analysis and public dissemination.

The Construction of Integration Indexes

Integration is a complex social phenomenon. This is, in part, because it concerns several life domains (labour market, education, etc.), but also because in order to measure each of these dimensions it is necessary to resort to a wide range of indicators. As a result, a comprehensive picture of integration levels in migrant corridors requires the use of composite indicators. In order to build indicators of this kind it

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Table 3.1 Set of indicators used to build the composite indexes by dimension Dimension Indicators Labour market integration Employment rate index Unemployment rate Activity rate Overqualification rate Education Highest educational attainment School enrolment rate at age 15–25 School enrolment rate at age 25–35 Percentage of international students at age 20–24 Citizenship Citizenship acquisition rate Percentage of naturalized citizens on the total born abroad population is necessary to compile a single index of basic indicators with an underlying model (OECD 2008). A major advantage of using composite indicators is that, by sum- marizing complex realities into a single number, they can be interpreted more easily than a battery of several indicators. Conversely, their main drawback is that they may send misleading policy recommendations, when poorly constructed or misin- terpreted (OECD 2008). Accordingly, in order to draw consistent and reliable policy conclusions from such indicators, their construction has to be rigorous and informed by both theoretical and technical considerations. Methods, data, reference population and definitions should also be clarified in detail. In this paper, for each integration dimension, the construction of composite indicators involved the following two steps: 1) the definition and construction of basic indicators measuring each dimension of interest; 2) the aggregation of these basic indicators through the estimation of composite indicators assessing the level of integration of “a migrant community x in a destination country y” (migrant corridor) by dimension z. Table 3.1 presents the set of indicators used to build the composite index in each dimension. To address a crucial question – do basic indicators form a statistical coherent framework in order to correctly measure each dimension of interest? – it is necessary to verify whether all indicators within each dimension point in the same direction. For this purpose, basic indicators were first normalised and re-oriented in a coherent way. Then, their statistical coherence within each dimension was tested through correlation analysis. When evaluating migrant integration outcomes across countries, it is, therefore, useful to compare migrants’ performances in the different life domains with those reported by the native-born population. Accordingly, for all indicators related to the labour and education domains “relative indicators” or “gap indexes” were produced. Gap indexes were obtained by computing the ratio between migrant and native values. Through relative indicators it is also possible to account for the selection of migrants by destination. The two sets of basic indicators we built in the table above (absolute and relative indicators) were then aggregated into composite indicators. To build-up composite

[email protected] 3 Counting the Uncountable – Measuring Migrant Integration Between Origin… 33 indicators, this paper makes use of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Specifically, it aggregates basic indicators using the weights estimated by means of PCA on each principal component. In lines with previous works (see e.g. Di Bartolomeo and Strozza 2014; Nicoletti et al. 2000; Wenzel and Wolf 2013), each principal component (of integration) is weighted according to its contribution to the overall variance in the data. In so doing, this technique groups together basic col- linear indicators to form a composite indicator that captures the biggest amount of information common to basic indicators (OECD 2008). Three reasons make the PCA methodology particularly suitable for the measure- ment of migrants’ integration across corridors and across countries. First, it is data- based: i.e. the weights are neither equally set nor depend on subjective views of the phenomenon. As a result, it allows for the construction of composite indicators without pre-empting the conclusions of the analysis. Second, it summarises the basic indicators while preserving the maximum possible proportion of variation of original data. Third, it gives the largest weights to the indicators that have the largest variation across corridors, independently of prior views of their relative integration importance. Indicators that are similar across corridors are of little interest because they cannot explain differences in integration (Nicoletti et al. 2000) and are hardly susceptible to be politically addressed and modified. The final result of the PCA consists of five composite indicators. These rank migrant corridor integration in three dimensions – labour market, education and access to citizenship – both in absolute and relative (i.e. compared with natives) terms.

Results

The PCA technique described in Sect. 3 provides two indexes which map the integration of migrants in the following dimensions: labour market, education and citizenship. The index – i.e. the absolute index – should be interpreted in the following way: the higher the index the better the integration of a certain corridor (origin- destination pair) as compared to others. The second index – i.e. the “gap index” – is calculated by taking into account migrants’ position with respect to the native population of their host country. The higher the gap index, the smaller the gap between immigrant and native performances in a certain country, relative to others. Being normalised, absolute and gap indexes rank the corridors according to their level of integration by assigning numbers from 0 to 1. The obtained results should be interpreted taking into account the following aspects. First, due to information constraints, the set of countries of origin considered differs in terms of the countries of destination studied. Second, the ranking of integration level of different corridors is sensitive to the set of indicators considered in each dimension, hence one should always keep in mind the underlying information the synthetic index is built upon. Table 3.2 summarises the obtained results regarding the level of integration of considered migrant corridors in the three dimensions of interest.

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Table 3.2 Level of Integration of migrant corridors by dimension Access to Labour Market Education citizenship Index Gap index Index Gap index Index Destination Origin (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Germany Turkey 0.85 0.55 0.15 0.08 0.16 Germany Russia 0.94 0.61 0.45 0.34 0.77 Spain Morocco 0.00 0.37 0.14 0.04 0.05 Spain Ecuador 0.39 0.71 0.27 0.13 0.38 France Turkey 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.41 France Tunisia 0.50 0.43 0.21 0.33 0.77 Italy Ukraine 0.89 1.00 0.23 0.28 0.08 Italy Morocco 0.79 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 UK China 0.11 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.16 UK India 1.00 0.77 0.61 0.59 0.44 Sweden Iran 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.33 0.82 Sweden Turkey 0.51 0.42 0.17 0.16 0.90 Belgium Morocco 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.93 Belgium Turkey 0.26 0.18 0.03 0.02 1.00 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.2 summarise the results of PCA for the labour market dimension (the absolute and gap indexes respectively).

Figures reported in the table above point to the fact that both origin and destination are important factors. They define the position of migrant corridors along the distribution of labour market integration index. According to the absolute indicator based analysis the worst and the best integrated corridors are, respectively, Moroccans in Spain and Indians in the UK. Migrants from India, Ukraine and Russia are among the best integrated in the labour markets of destination countries. Migrants from these countries of origin are almost exclusively labour migrants. 66 percent of first residence permits issued in EU 28 countries for Ukrainian citizens were for “remunerated activities”. The corresponding values are smaller for Indians (33 percent), but still higher than the average for the origin countries considered2. The active labour market participation of these migrant groups is, though, accompanied by extremely high over-qualification rates. Looking at the opposite end of the distribution, it is possible to notice that corridors including Turkish, Moroccans and Tunisian migrants appear below the median of the gap index in almost all destination countries. Some insights come from comparing corridors belonging to the same destination or to the same origin countries. For example, Turkish and Iranian migrants in Sweden have similar ranking; they are in the middle of the absolute index distribution and well below it when the deviation from natives is considered. Moreover, the unemployment rate of both groups is considerably higher than native unemploy-

2 The reported estimates refer to the period 2008-2013 and are based on Eurostat statistics on first permits by reason.

[email protected] 3 Counting the Uncountable – Measuring Migrant Integration Between Origin… 35 ment: 15.4 percent and 15.6 percent for Turkish and Iranian migrants respectively, 4.3 percent for native Swedes. However, the drivers for such poor integration are different for the two groups. A relatively low level of education can explain the low level of integration of Turkish migrants. But it cannot justify the poor performances of Iranians. Indeed, the latter have the highest share of tertiary educated in Sweden, thus outperforming even native Swedes. According to Kelly (2011), many tertiary educated Iranians living in Sweden prefer to rely on the generosity of the Swedish welfare system, rather than accepting low-skilled jobs. Integration patterns detected in the education dimension are similar to those observed in the labour market domain. Education performances of migrants from China and India are close to those of natives, while the biggest gaps are found for migrants coming from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. The destination countries where the gap between migrants and natives is the narrowest is in the UK. Instead, the widest gap is observed in Italy and Spain. In order to correctly interpret the results shown in Column (3) and (4) the set of indicators used to develop the composite education indexes should be kept in mind. Two out of the four indicators used refer to enrolment status and one to the share of international students. The focus of the composite index is, therefore, on migrants’ enrolment rate rather than on their educational achievements. The relatively good performances of UK related corridors are driven by high enrolment rates and by the high share of international students. 74 percent of residence permits issued in UK from 2010 to 2012 were granted for education reasons. Such a high figure can be driven by different factors. First, the British system of education relies heavily on international students. The tuition fees paid by the latter are an important source of revenue for British universities. Second, the recent development in the UK labour migration policies made the entrance through working visas more challenging. As a result, some potential labour migrants may have decided to enter the labour market through educational institutions. For example, in 2006 the UK government removed general nurses from the government’s shortage occupation list, but nurses from the Philippines and India continued arriving in the UK as students, with the intention of working later (Calenda 2014). Acquisition of citizenship is frequently used as measure of integration. It is considered as an important step in the integration of migrants in host society. However, it is also a tool enabling further integration as it gives migrants wider civic rights in the destination country, including the possibility of being politically active: to elect and to be elected. The results reported in Column (5) of Table 3.1 present the ranking of corridors in terms of citizenship acquisition. The synthetic index is based on two indicators representing stock (the percentage of naturalized citizens out of the total born abroad population) and flow (citizenship acquisition rate) dynamics of naturalization. The results of PCA reveal that the obtained ranking is mainly driven by the following factors: legislation on naturalization (including repatriation programs), colonial ties and the duration stay of the migrant group. Relatively relaxed naturalization regimes in the UK, Belgium and France moved the related corridors to the right wing of distribution. One of the eligibility criteria for obtaining citizenship is

[email protected] 36 A. Di Bartolomeo and S. Kalantaryan duration of stay in the destination country. Hence, countries with a long history of migration to Europe have relatively big stocks of migrants who have become citizens of their host countries. The only exception is represented by the Turks in Germany who, in spite of their long standing presence in the country, acquired the opportunity to apply for citizenship only recently. Corridors that are subject to special repatriation programs (Ecuadorians in Spain, ethnic Germans from Russia in Germany) are well integrated in citizenship terms due to the simplified naturalization procedures from which they benefit.

Conclusions and Further Direction of Research

This study has compared the integration outcomes of a number of migrant corridors – i.e. groups of migrants defined on the basis of both their origin and destination countries – across three key dimensions of integration, namely, labour market, education and access to citizenship. This has been done by applying Principal Component Analysis, a multivariate statistical technique that allows the building-up of synthetic indexes of integration on the basis of basic indicators of integration, with a minimum loss of information. This paper offers a key contribution to the literature about migrants’ integration for three main reasons. First it puts equal emphasis on both ends of migration, i.e. destination and origin. It does so, by comparing the level of integration of migrants born in different countries, but residing in the same host country. This article, in fact, points to the key role played by factors related to migrants’ country of origin in shaping integration outcomes and to the fact that the impact of these factors varies according to the considered dimension of integration. But it also compares the performances of migrants sharing the same country of origin but living in different destination countries. This study, in fact, confirms that migrant integration processes are considerably affected by host country related factors. Among such factors, this study considers not only those more strictly connected to the host country approach towards migrants, but also those related to its socio-economic characteristics and conditions. The latter aspect is factored in by benchmarking migrant outcomes with the performances of the native population. Second, the present paper proposes an empirically and theoretically driven critical revision of the indicators employed by the literature on this topic to assess migrants’ integration. Third, by building-up synthetic composite indicators, which allows a ranking of the integration outcomes of migrant corridors by dimension, this study provides useful information for policy analysis and public dissemination.

[email protected] 3 Counting the Uncountable – Measuring Migrant Integration Between Origin… 37

References

Calenda, D. (2014). Investigating the working conditions of Filipino and Indian-born nurses in the UK. International Labour Organization, ILO Country Office for the Philippines. ILO Asia- Pacific Working Paper Series. Makati City: ILO. ISSN: 2227–4391; 2227–4405 (web pdf) Council of the European Union. (2010). Declaration of the European Ministerial Conference on Integration (Zaragoza, 15 & 16 April 2010). https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library- doc/declaration-of-the-european-ministerial-conference-on-integration-zaragoza-15-16- april-2010. Accessed 19 July 2016. Di Bartolomeo, A. (2011). Explaining the educational achievement’s gap between second generation immigrants and natives: The Italian Case. Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Special Issue: Children of Immigrants in Italy – Part 2, 16(4):437–449. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ 1354571X.2011.593749. EUROSTAT. (2011). Indicators of immigrant integration. A pilot study. Methodologies & Working papers. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/ documents/alle_emner/juridiske/110720_eurostatrapport_integration_en.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Huddleston, T., Niessen, J., Chaoimh, E.N., & White, E. (2011). Migrant integration policy index III. Brussels: British Council and Migration Policy Group. http://www.mipex.eu/sites/default/ files/downloads/migrant_integration_policy_index_mipexiii_2011.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Kelly, M. (2011). Transnational diasporic identities: Unity and diversity in Iranian-focused organizations in Sweden. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 31(2), 443–454. Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., & Boylaud, O. (2000). Summary indicators of product market regulation with an extension to employment protection legislation. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 226, ECO/WKP(99)18. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/doc- server/download/5lgsjhvj846b.pdf?expires=1469004633&id=id&accname=guest&checksum =B9857DDCE76B434FE166D05234D8D861. Accessed 19 July 2016. OECD. (2008). Handbook on constructing composite indicators, methodology and user guide. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd.org/std/42495745.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. OECD. (2009). The labour market Integration of Immigrants and their Children. Key Findings from OECD Country Reviews. OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd.org/migration/policyfo- rum/43124607.pdf. Accessed 21 January 2015. OECD. (2012). Settling in: OECD indicators of immigrant integration 2012. OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/9789264171534-en. Wenzel, L., & Wolf, A. (2013). Towards a new measure of a country’s competitiveness: Applying canonical correlation. HWWI Research Paper 144. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics. ISSN 1861-504X.

[email protected] Chapter 4 Civil Society Organisations and the Diaspora- Integration Nexus

Justyna Salamońska and Anne Unterreiner

Introduction

Migrant integration is a multidimensional process, but the literature has traditionally focused on only two of the parties involved: individual migrants and receiving countries. A more recent approach proposes to include one more actor in the investigation of migrant integration: the countries that migrants come from. Policies designed and implemented by sending countries and ties between origin and destination countries arguably matter for integration outcomes (see e.g. Faist 2010; Kirişci 2008; Moya 2005; Unterreiner and Weinar 2014). The question remains, however: how can the origin effect on migrant integration outcomes be detected? This chapter presents a rationale for a survey of civil society organisations that was carried out in order to address this issue. Civil society organisations are observers of migrants and their relations with the countries of destination and origin. Civil society organisations are also actors that engage with public institutions and migrants on a daily basis. This is why their practices and views are crucial to analysing the role that origin and destination contexts play in migrant integration outcomes. The INTERACT project designed and carried out an extensive exploratory survey directed at civil society organisations. Using a novel approach, which under- stands integration as a three-way process, the survey explored the issues involved in the work of civil society organisations in order to gain insights into how (and whether) migrants’ origin contexts affect incorporation. Previous research on the relationship between civil society organisations and states of origin, on the one hand, and their impact on migrants’ integration, on the other, had led to different conclusions: migrant organisations can be in alignment or in conflict with the origin

J. Salamońska (*) • A. Unterreiner Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 39 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_4

[email protected] 40 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner state’s policy towards migrants; and migrant organisations can help migrants to integrate within their country of destination or form ethnic niches at destination (Gsir 2014). The INTERACT survey built on this knowledge in order to address the following research questions: what are the views of civil society organisations on the emigration and diaspora policies that countries of origin have designed to facilitate emigrant integration in the EU? What is the role and impact of these organisations on the integration of non-EU migrants in the EU? The following sections will first introduce cross-national research on migrant organisations and then present a rationale for the cross-national exploratory survey of civil society organisations at origin and destination. Fieldwork for the INTERACT survey will be presented, followed by a general overview of the migrant organisations that took part in the survey, which allows us to provide some explanation about migrant integration as detailed in other chapters and especially in the integration index developed by Di Bartolomeo et al. and presented in Chap. 3.

A Cross-National Survey of Migrant Organisations

Rationale of the Survey

International comparisons on the study of migrant organisations are relatively scarce and have a limited scope (see e.g. Koopmans 2004 or Pries and Sezgin 2012). However, as Pries and Sezgin (2012) have noted, migrant organisations have ties both at origin and destination and can thus “cross borders”. The INTERACT survey was built on this recognition that the activities of migrant organisations’ cross national borders. To this end, the INTERACT survey examined organisations operating in 82 countries (28 EU destination countries and 54 migrant origin countries). The survey targeted a broad pool of civil society organisations (namely any organisation dealing with migrant integration issues). Existing cross-national research in migration studies targets migrants as a sample unit, but rarely targets civil society organisations. Studies on migrant organisations are usually carried out qualitatively and are limited to specific populations. On the quantitative side, cross-national surveys on first and/or second generation migrants have been designed in recent years (such as the EFFNATIS, TIES or MAFE surveys). However, the sample units of these surveys are individuals (or households), and therefore there is a niche for research that targets civil society organisations. The novelty of our approach is thus to propose a cross-national survey in 82 countries which targets civil society organisations dealing with migrants rather than migrants themselves. Importantly, INTERACT’s cross-national focus not only examines destinations, but includes the country of origin perspective as well. Most research on civil society organisations that deal with migrants are mono- graphs with a very specific focus. Some consider only one migrant population (Fitzgerald 2008; Amelina and Faist 2008) or one migrant association (Gonzalez 2012). These studies are predominantly local in character. Some examine a city perspective (Jacobs et al. 2004; Cordero-Guzman 2005; Brettell 2005). For instance, a

[email protected] 4 Civil Society Organisations and the Diaspora-Integration Nexus 41 research project by REMESEO, “Partnerships, Anti-Discrimination and the Role of Immigrant Associations”, focused on associations based in Stockholm, while “Development in the city of Antwerp” (research project conducted by CeMIS in 2012) evaluated local policies in Antwerp. Other studies examine one country, usually the country of residence (Ejorh 2012; Caponio 2005). Research projects by the University of Deusto, “Digital Exclusion and Immigrant Associationism in Spain” (2011–2013), and the “Integration and Participation of Immigrant Associations in the Information Society” (2013–2015), focus on Spain. The “Diaspora as an instance of transnational governance” programme is an exception (REMESEO, 2010–2012), but it studies development issues at origin rather than migrant integration in destination countries.1 We also want to emphasise that our understanding of a cross-national survey is not limited to organisations from different countries of origin operating in one country of destination. Our focus is on civil society organisations operating in origin countries as well. The purpose of this exploratory survey was to collect information on the views and practices of civil society organisations that deal with migrants in the countries of destination and with future emigrants in the countries of origin. This broad focus allows us to compare the views and practices of civil society organisations with origin state laws and practices and to compare official declarations and laws with their implementation. In addition, this cross-national survey was designed to help us analyse how public discourse about the various dimensions of integration identified within the INTERACT framework (Unterreiner and Weinar2014 ) relates to the work of migrant organisations.

A Cross-National Survey at Destination and Origin: The Countries Involved

The INTERACT project examined integration processes in the 28 EU countries of destination for migrants from 54 countries that have at least 100,000 emigrants in the EU-28 (see the list in Appendix 1).2 Additionally, the survey targeted organisations operating in migrant countries of origin. Among these destination and origin countries, some were defined as priority countries on the basis of the number of migrants/emigrants, feasibility, data accessibility and diversity. In order to compare the impact of the countries of origin on integration at various destinations, as well as to compare various migrant communities at the same destination, we selected

1 Here we would like to thank Sonia Gsir for her valuable insights regarding past and current research projects on migrants’ civil society organisations. 2 These countries are: Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, India, Albania, Ukraine, Russia, China, Pakistan, Ecuador, the United States, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tunisia, Brazil, Colombia, the Philippines, Iraq, Bangladesh, Peru, Vietnam, Argentina, South Africa, Nigeria, Serbia, Iran, Sri Lanka, Moldova, Senegal, Bolivia, Suriname, Egypt, Ghana, Venezuela, Somalia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Thailand, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Canada, Australia, Angola, Dominican, Republic, Jamaica, the DR Congo, Kenya, Belarus, Lebanon, Chile, Cuba, Japan, Madagascar, Syria, South Korea, Cameroon.

[email protected] 42 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner various “corridors”. By “corridor” we mean a pair of countries: a country of destination and a country of origin. The corridors were chosen to allow for destination- origin comparison. The aim was to disentangle the role of the countries of origin and destination in migrant integration processes. The INTERACT survey also included a specific focus on civil society organisations in a set of corridors: Turkish migrants (especially in Turkey, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium); Russian migrants (mainly in Russia, Germany and Poland), Ukrainian migrants (in Ukraine, Italy and Poland), migrants from Morocco (in Morocco, Spain, France and Belgium); Tunisian migrants (in Tunisia and France); migrants from Ecuador (in Ecuador and Spain); Chinese migrants (in China, the Netherlands and the UK), Indian migrants (in India and the UK); and finally migrants from Iran (in Iran and Sweden).

Building a Cross-National Survey of Origin and Destination Migrant Organisations

The INTERACT survey gathered responses from individuals working or volunteering in civil society organisations dealing with migrants from one or more of 50 origin countries and/or in one of the EU destination countries. The survey design had to confront different methodological challenges related to the large scale of the project and the lack of a sampling frame for civil society organisations working with migrants. In many countries there is no list of non-governmental organisations. Importantly, even if lists of organisations are available, there is no systematic correspondence between an organisation’s name and its field of action. It is thus necessary to adopt a bottom-up approach to identifying organisations working on the integration of migrants at destination. To do so, experts in each country had to be consulted. Cross-national survey researchers face the challenge of gathering comparable data in different national and cultural settings. The questionnaires must be standardised and understandable in different linguistic and cultural contexts. In addition, data collection modes have to allow for comparable data collection, while adapting to specific fieldwork contexts. Implementing a survey in over 80 countries thus raises various challenges including the data gathering process and language issues. There are several different survey modes (Skjak and Van de Vijver 2003): face-to- face interviews, mail, phone and online modes. The first one, although it allows the researcher to obtain a higher response rate and high quality of data, is very costly (both timewise and financially), and thus unfeasible for fieldwork in over 80 countries. A mail survey is not appropriate either, due to the changeability of civil society organisations (in terms of location, staff or areas of focus). Given the high geographical dispersion of organisations, the researchers selected phone and online survey modes. Past research showed that each data collection method had specific effects on the research findings due to “sociocultural and cognitive factors” (Skjak and Van de Vijver 2003: 180). Using the same mode would ensure data comparability, but “to some extent this depends on the spread of countries or regions involved and on the techno-

[email protected] 4 Civil Society Organisations and the Diaspora-Integration Nexus 43 logical and infrastructure differences across these” (Skjak and Van de Vijver 2003: 191). Having this in mind, INTERACT’s researchers selected a mixed-mode of data collection, which included both phone and online questionnaires. An advantage of using both the phone and online mode is that one can reach a wider pool of organisations. Trained interviewers convinced persons working in the civil society organisations to take part in the survey over the phone or to fill in the questionnaire online. The interviewers provided additional explanations if needed. The self-administered online survey allowed researchers to gather data from people who were motivated to answer the survey, but were not easily reachable over the phone due to time differences, language issues, the lack of a known phone number, lack of trust, etc. However, care has to be taken when comparing the results from phone and online questionnaires. Another important issue regarding cross-national surveys is the language in which the questionnaire was written. Writing a questionnaire in English alone would strongly bias the sample towards the Anglophone world, and exclude people with no knowledge of English. In addition, past research has shown that answering a questionnaire in a foreign language affected the response style of the respondent (Harzing 2006). Thus translations in many languages potentially widen the pool of potential respondents and the quality of their answers. Parallel to the language issue, the survey raised another important socio-linguistic issue: how can you build a standardised questionnaire to fit each national context and each migration flow at origin and destination? In order to allow for data comparability and the comprehensiveness of the questionnaire, we used both the “adaptation” and “adoption” (Harkness 2003) modes of data translation in different national contexts. The vocabulary used had to be both the same for everyone, and not too complex or academic. The use of a standardised questionnaire in a cross-national and cross-cultural survey is thus a big challenge. However, previous research has shown that social desirability and response styles (Johnson and Van de Vijver 2003; Harzing 2006; Goerman 2006; Smith 1988) can differ from one country to another, and even from one group to another. It is thus essential to control for both the country of origin and the country of destination. These and other issues were considered when making choices about the INTERACT survey. The following section moves to the survey fieldwork in order to describe data collection and the issues involved.

Fieldwork Description

Target Group and Identification of the Respondents

Gsir (2014) shows that there are different types of civil society organisations dealing with migrants: mainstream organisations dealing with general issues (home, education, etc.); migrant organisations (including hometown associations) focusing on migrants from a specific country of origin; and binational organisations which enable contact between natives and migrants. We can also include associations dealing with migrants from diverse backgrounds, such as Caritas or the Red Cross.

[email protected] 44 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner

The INTERACT survey’s target group included diverse organisations dealing with non-EU immigrants and diaspora in the EU. We focused on civil society organisations (associations, NGOs, international organisations, churches, trade unions, schools, media, etc.), which support migrants and diasporas. They can be based either in the countries of destination or in the countries of origin. First we needed to identify people working or volunteering in these organisations to ask them to take part in the survey. However, no sampling frame of this target population exists. Civil society organisations dealing with migrant integration are neither easy to define nor easily “detectable” (Moya 2005: 834). There is considerable turnover both of organisations and of the people working/volunteering in these organisations. Because of the evolution of the migrant community, internal and external power structures and the existence of formal but also informal organisations (Schrover and Vermeulen 2005), organisations dealing with migrants are rather unstable. As it was not possible to identify our sample based on official listings or mapping (Häder and Gabler 2003), we hired external collaborators. One of their tasks was to compile a list of people working/volunteering in the organisations in the relevant country. Lists were based on collaborators’ networks and their knowledge of local contexts. Additional online searches of organisations were conducted by the INTERACT team. Furthermore, specific questions in the survey were designed to gather new contacts from respondents (in both online and phone surveys). These different strategies were used to identify contact details for the widest possible pool of organisations. The purpose of the use of multiple key strategies was also to increase representativeness and to avoid potential biases that could occur if only one strategy was mobilised. Since no sampling frame for this specific population exists, due to the context of high turnover for organisations and their staff, it is not possible to evaluate the representativeness of the sample. First, large and well-established organisations might be overrepresented compared to newer organisations that lack visibility. Some organisations operate less formally, and others focus on organising specific events and are less visible for this reason. Moreover, it might be more difficult to gain the trust of smaller community-oriented organisations and organisations that are concerned about an authoritarian regime at origin (for instance political refugee organisations). It is therefore important to highlight that the INTERACT survey is an exploratory survey, which was designed to give insights about trends and patterns in the activities of migrant organisations. As such, the survey provides a non-random mapping of migrant associations in over 80 countries and necessarily does not gen- eralise the results to the whole population of migrant organisations in the origin and destination countries. The survey allows us to identify previously under-researched phenomena and to formulate new hypotheses.

Survey Structure

At the beginning of the interview, objectives of the survey were presented to respondents. In order to make sure that the respondents to the survey were part of the target group, various filters were implemented at the beginning of the survey. To answer

[email protected] 4 Civil Society Organisations and the Diaspora-Integration Nexus 45 the questionnaire, a respondent had to: give informed consent to take part in the survey; work or volunteer in a civil society organisation dealing with emigrants to the EU or immigrants in the EU; be based in one of the INTERACT project’s target countries; and deal with at least one dimension of integration identified within the INTERACT framework. While giving informed consent to take part in the survey, the respondents were assured that their answers would be kept anonymous and confidential.

Survey Calendar

The INTERACT survey was prepared in three stages: a design phase during which the survey questionnaire was written and translated, a pre-testing phase when data were gathered through phone interviews and a main period of survey data collection (Table 4.1). The initial stage of the questionnaire design took place at the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) and produced the English version of the questionnaire. We decided to ask the external collaborators, as experts in migration studies in their own country of focus, which languages the questionnaire should be translated into. This was because first, the survey was implemented both at origin and at destination. Second, we did not know if people working in civil society organisations were all fluent in the language of the country of destination or in the language spoken by the migrants that the organisation in question dealt with. After the consultations we selected 28

Table 4.1 Survey calendar Time Tasks September–October 2013 Survey design November–December 2013 Translation of the questionnaire put online December 2013–January Lists of contacts provided by external collaborators 2014 December 2013–Early 2014 Phone interviews carried out by external collaborators; feedback on the survey March 2014 First invitation letter to the online survey sent out March 2014 Second invitation letter to the online survey sent out Personal reminders sent out by external collaborators April 2014 Newsletter sent out to the contacts Invitation letter to the online survey sent out to new contacts May 2014 Recruitment of additional phone interviewers to boost response rate Invitation letter to the online survey sent out June-September 2014 Phone interviewing September 2014 Final invitation to the survey sent Closure of the survey Source: INTERACT team

[email protected] 46 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner languages to translate the survey into: Albanian, Arabic, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Latvian, Lithuanian, Mandarin, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovenian, Spanish, Swedish, Thai, Turkish and Vietnamese. The questionnaire design was developed “sequentially” (Harkness et al. 2003). After the questionnaire was designed in English, it was translated by a translation agency, before being reviewed by the MPC and/or by external collaborators, adjudicated internally, and pretested (Harkness 2003). The French questionnaire, for instance, was first translated from the English version by the translation agency, then proofread by an external collaborator who was a native French speaker and finally checked internally by an MPC team member.3 The translated questionnaire was then sent for pretesting to all collaborators whose interview language was French (Belgium, Morocco, Tunisia, Madagascar, etc.), who could then send their feedback. The collaborators also tested the questionnaire over the phone (or face-to-face if necessary)4 with a small number of respondents. The first phone interviews tested the questionnaire in each language. After this first wave, adjustments were made and the main online survey was implemented. Lists of potential respondents were compiled by external collaborators and double-checked internally in order to make sure that they fit the survey’s target group. Additional lists were prepared by the INTERACT team. These potential respondents were invited to take part in the survey via email. The first invitation letter was sent to these contacts in the language of the country of origin (if available), followed by the language of the country of destination and finally by the English version. Two weeks later, the same letter was sent in another order of languages: the language of the country of destination, the language of the country of origin, and then in English. The INTERACT survey was designed to reach a wide pool of civil society organisations working in the countries of origin and destination. Combining CATI (computer assisted telephone interviews) and CAWI (computer assisted web interviews) was a strategy aimed at increasing the number of responses. However, difficulties in reaching these organisations were related to the changeability of both organisations and the people working or volunteering for them, and the absence of up-to-date information online or in official registers. Collaborators also suggested that in some countries respondents did not want to take part because they did not see the financial, political or symbolic benefits of the survey, or even saw a danger in answering it. Furthermore, due to the standardised structure of the questionnaire some respondents perceived the survey as being too broad. There are different strategies for increasing the number of survey responses (Couper and de Leeuw 2003). One is to increase the number of contacts in order to increase the sample size. While we sent out an invitation letter to each of the potential respondents, we could not be sure that it was received in the first place, that the

3 For other languages which were commonly used by the respondents (e.g. Arabic, Chinese or Turkish) an external proof-reader was hired. 4 In countries at war or with poor internet/phone coverage, face-to-face interviews were carried out.

[email protected] 4 Civil Society Organisations and the Diaspora-Integration Nexus 47 right person had received it, and finally, that the person had decided to answer. Due to the low number of self-completed online questionnaires, external collaborators were asked to contact the potential respondents to convince them to take part to the survey. In parallel, additional interviewers were hired (both in-house and externally) in May 2014 in order to identify new respondents and increase the response rate. The focus was on corridor countries, so experienced interviewers speaking relevant languages called the persons included in the contacts lists. Direct phone contact allowed us to confirm that the right person had been identified, and helped to convince this person to take part in the survey. In addition, direct interaction helped us to gain the respondent’s trust and reassure him/her regarding confidentiality issues, which were of particular importance for respondents concerned with authoritarian regimes.

Challenges and Solutions

Collecting data across many destination and origin countries poses a series of issues. We outline some of these below in order to put some of the results in context and also as a lesson to other researchers who wish to undertake similar research. Firstly, the challenges encountered were related to the cross-national nature of the survey. Although the questionnaire was translated into 28 languages, this number did not include all the official languages of the countries of origin covered by INTERACT. For instance, there was no Ukrainian translation of the questionnaire,5 which resulted in initial hostility towards an interviewer who used the Russian language when contacting Ukrainian organisations based in the EU. To overcome this issue, the interviewer switched to Ukrainian and conducted the interview in Ukrainian (simultaneously translating the Russian questionnaire). Similarly, Bosnian organisations expressed displeasure at being sent the Serbian version of the questionnaire. Moreover, organisations based in zones of conflict are necessarily under-sampled in the survey. So are organisations based in places with poor phone and internet coverage. Some respondents were hesitant and suspicious about answering the questionnaire. This was especially true of organisations dealing with groups coming from countries with dictatorships or organisations that were receiving funding from such regimes. This is why qualitative interviews with selected groups were designed as a follow-up to the survey. Some organisations expressed their concerns about data confidentiality. Take, for instance, this feedback from a Turkish language interviewer: “[An interviewee] was ok in the beginning of the interview but when it came to questions related to political and social activities, he got suspicious and answered those questions hesitantly”; or this message sent from a respondent to another Turkish language interviewer “I didn’t feel secure and comfortable with their questions. They are asking many personal questions which I believe are not

5 The translation of the questionnaire took place before the conflict in Ukraine broke out.

[email protected] 48 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner necessary”. Interestingly, some respondents did not want to participate in the survey because they did not identify the population they were serving as migrants. For instance, an interviewer sent additional explanations to organisations dealing with American expatriates inviting them to take part in the survey. One email was answered by the organisation in the following words: “we are not migrants in the normal sense of the word, but expatriates, and do not think our contribution would be useful to your study”. It is important to note that the issues of anonymity per- tained not only interviewees, but also to interviewers. In one case the interviewer, a refugee, was concerned about revealing his name when introducing the survey to potential phone interviewees. Management of the interview team proved to be another challenge. It was relatively easy to manage human resources in house with a team of interviewers working in five languages. It proved more difficult to manage external staff, especially because they came from diverse cultural and linguistic contexts. Moreover, in some cases the initial survey did not manage to elicit a sufficient number of responses and follow-up qualitative interviews with organisations were carried out instead (for instance with organisations serving Chinese and Iranian migrants). It was not only associations dealing with particular migrant groups that were more difficult to reach. This was also the case with small organisations, which are less visible. Interviewers highlighted that it proved far less easy to convince smaller organisations to take part. Indeed, individuals in these organisations argued on the phone that they had limited time resources and could not dedicate time for the interview. Finally, in order to adapt to each cultural context, open questions were asked at the end of each questionnaire regarding integration. In addition, we added an “Other, please specify” modality to our questions. Another adaptative strategy was possible in the phone interviews: external collaborators were given specific documentation and training in order to explain problematic questions and to introduce themselves and the survey over the phone (see also Kleiner and Pan 2006). Even considering the challenges to the survey, the final result was a survey of migrant organisations with a world-wide reach. With translations into 28 languages, the survey reached a diverse pool of organisations. The survey provided an overview of issues related to migrant integration in eight dimensions. In cases where the number of responses to the survey was deemed insufficient, qualitative interviews were carried out to shed light on the work of these organisations. Unlike existing literature, the focus of the INTERACT survey is on countries of origin, and includes both origin and destination perspectives. This is an exciting pool of data for migration researchers. Having said this, the INTERACT survey highlights a series of issues. Because of non-representative sampling and the lack of a sampling frame, the results of the survey are not generalisable to all migrant organisations. The modes of the survey (phone and online) favoured the participation of organisations based in countries with phone and internet coverage. The survey also favoured the participation of organisations operating in one of the languages in which the questionnaire had been translated.

[email protected] 4 Civil Society Organisations and the Diaspora-Integration Nexus 49

Survey Results

Overview of the Results

In total, 910 respondents took part in the INTERACT survey, 136 from countries of origin (15% of the sample) and 774 from destination countries. Among destination countries, most interviews came from Spain, Germany, France, Italy and Belgium (see Table 4.2), all of which are also examined in detail in this volume. Fewer responses came from smaller countries and from the new EU member states, mainly due to the particular “corridors” of countries that were selected (see above). With regard to responses coming from organisations working with future emigrants or returnees in the countries of origin, the country with the most responses was Moldova (24) due to the efforts made by the INTERACT collaborator there. For all other countries of origin, the INTERACT survey did not score more than ten responses. Moving to the origin countries, Table 4.3 shows that one fifth of the organisations operating in one of the EU countries dealt with more than one migrant group. Among the remaining organisations (that dealt with one primary migrant group), 100 ques-

Table 4.2 Number of organisations interviewed by EU country of destination Number of Destination country organisations Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium 64–97 Poland, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Austria 29–48 Greece, Finland, Portugal, Romania, Ireland 10–19 Luxembourg, Malta, Estonia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia, 2–8 Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Slovakia Total 774 Countries listed in decreasing order Source: INTERACT survey

Table 4.3 Non-EU countries of origin that the organisation at destination primarily deals with Number of Non-EU country of origin organisations Many countries, equally represented 166 Turkey 100 Ukraine, Russia, Morocco, Somalia, Tunisia, Ecuador, Brazil 21–57 Afghanistan, US, China (including Hong Kong), Senegal, Syria, Iraq, 10–17 Moldova, Philippines, Bolivia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Pakistan Thailand, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, 1–9 Egypt, Nigeria, Belarus, Macedonia, Japan, Albania, Cuba, Algeria, Cameroon, Canada, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Kenya, Lebanon, Suriname, Venezuela, Angola, Madagascar, South Africa, South Korea, Australia, Bangladesh, Vietnam Total 773 Number of organisations listed in decreasing order Source: INTERACT survey

[email protected] 50 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner tionnaires came from organisations dealing with Turks. Other numerous migrant groups included Ukraine, Russia, Morocco, Somalia, Tunisia, Ecuador and Brazil. In general, INTERACT’s efforts were focused on analysing “corridors” of countries. For instance, in Poland the majority of responses came from organisations working with Ukrainian and Russian migrants. In Italy, the majority of questionnaires were conducted with associations assisting Moroccan, Ecuadorian and Ukrainian migrants. The INTERACT survey was directed to organisations working with migrant integration. Almost seven out of ten respondents worked/volunteered in associations. Foundations accounted for 8% of the sample. Between 5 and 6% of answers came from governmental institutions and international organisations. Other types of organisations accounted for the remaining 13% of the sample. The organisations were also probed about their reach, that is the number of people who contact them requesting assistance. Generally, in the countries of origin, organisations with a rather small reach were predominant. Destination organisations in most cases operated middle- or large-scale operations. This may be the result of the sampling strategy, which relied on online records of organisations, in which big- ger associations are more visible. Furthermore, smaller organisations based in the destination countries reportedly refused to participate in the research due to the time constraints they faced. The different reach of origin and destination organisations may also reflect the reality of smaller scale organisations which operate in the origin countries with less funding. In the destination countries, by contrast, the organisations are likely to have greater reach since they work with different migrant groups on a more diverse range of integration issues. The survey was designed to address issues about the eight dimensions of integration (see Fig. 4.1). Each of the respondents could choose from one to three integration fields in which the organisation was active. Out of 774 organisations surveyed, almost half selected a labour market questionnaire in one of the destination countries, reflecting a strong focus on employment issues for persons migrating to the EU (Fig. 4.1). Over a third of the respondents answered questionnaires about education issues, linguistic support and social relations. The smallest number of organisations interviewed were those who worked with religious issues. This may be due to the smaller number of associations dealing with religious issues, their smaller visibility or a higher reluctance to answer the survey questions. Out of 136 questionnaires coming from organisations operating in the countries of origin, almost seven out of ten dealt with employment issues (Fig. 4.2). Another 42% of respondents talked about social relations as well. Between 20 and 30% answered questions about nationality issues, education and political and civic participation. As with the countries of destination, the smallest proportion of the sample dealt with religion and housing. As mentioned above, each respondent could choose between one and three integration domains in which their organisation was active. This meant that the total number of questionnaires collected was much higher than the 910 respondents who took part in the survey. Both at destination and origin, most organisations multitask, dealing with more than one area of migrant integration (see Table 4.4). Table 4.5

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400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 s n n Housing Educatio and rights participatio Social relations Religious support Nationality issues Political and civic Linguistic support Employment statu

Fig. 4.1 Areas of migrant integration identified by organisations in countries of destination through the INTERACT survey (number of interviews) (Source: INTERACT survey)

120 100 80 60 40 20 0 s n n Housing Educatio and rights participatio Social relations Religious support Nationality issues Political and civic Linguistic support Employment statu

Fig. 4.2 Areas of migrant integration identified by organisations in countries of origin through the INTERACT survey (number of interviews) (Source: INTERACT survey)

Table 4.4 Number of questionnaires selected by respondents in countries of origin and destinationa Countries of destination Countries of origin Number of questionnaires N % N % 1 questionnaire 208 26.9 43 31.6 2 questionnaires 213 27.6 31 22.8 3 questionnaires 352 45.5 62 45.6 Total 773 100 136 100 Source: INTERACT survey aDue to a survey software mistake one organisation responded to 4 questionnaires

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Table 4.5 Dimensions of integration mentioned most frequently by organisations operating in the EU, by country of origin 1st most frequently 2nd most frequently 3rd most frequently Country of selected integration selected integration selected integration origin dimension dimension dimension Total Turkey Political and civic Education Language 100 participation Ukraine Labour market Education Language 57 Russia Language Education Labour market 43 Morocco Labour market Access to nationality Language 35 Tunisia Political and civic Labour market Education 23 participation Ecuador Social interactions Labour market Access to nationality 22 Source: INTERACT survey provides information about organisations operating in the EU destinations and, depending on the country of origin of the migrants they serve, the most common fields of assistance offered. If we focus on countries of origin analysed in detail in this volume, the labour market scored in the top three most often chosen dimensions in questionnaires in all countries except Turkey. This seems to be in line with the agenda of the Turkish state, which focuses more on diasporic links than on economic integration issues (see other chapters in this volume). Other important spheres of intervention of organisations surveyed included education and/or language. These, however, seemed less common in the case of organisations working with migrants from Ecuador. For migrants from Ecuador and from Morocco, many organisations also provided assistance with access to nationality in the destination countries.

Migrant Integration – Labour Market, Education/Language, Access to Citizenship

Below we offer a general overview of collected data which refers to organisations operating in the EU destinations and focusing on migrants coming from Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Morocco, Tunisia and Ecuador as these are analysed in detail in this volume.6 Pairs of corridors are examined in more detail in the empirical chapters that follow. Here we summarise information about four areas of integration (labour market, education, language and access to nationality) which relate to the composite measures of integration offered by the integration indexes (see Chap. 3 by Di Bartolomeo et al.).

6 Because the survey did not manage to reach organisations assisting Iranian and Chinese migrants, in-depth interviews were conducted with these organisations instead.

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According to the survey, the most common services offered by the organisations facilitating labour market integration were related to providing migrants with information concerning employment opportunities as well as with more general information about the legal and institutional context of the destination. By providing this information the organisations decrease the risks related to migration. Additionally, organisations working with Turkish, Moroccan and Ecuadorian migrants often reported that they also provided support for migrant training, enhancing the transferability of human capital across the borders. The majority of organisations dealing with migrants from Tunisia and Ecuador also lobbied for the recognition of qualifications. In the case of Ukraine, other services were common, including legal counselling, but also job search preparation such as language training and CV writing. The area of intervention also translated into the impact that organisations had on the labour market integration of migrants; access to employment was generally assessed as the most important area of intervention. This was related to organisations’ assessments of the particular difficulties of migrants’ economic integration. Problems with access to any employment were often mentioned by organisations working with migrants from Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco. In the case of Turkish and Ukrainian migrants, but also Russian and Ecuadorian, access to skilled employment in line with their qualifications was seen as problematic as well. Legal issues related to employment were raised by organisations assisting Ukraininian and Moroccan migrants. Importantly, and particularly in the Ukrainian case, several organisations added that their work had an impact on legal issues. In the case of migrants originating from Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Morocco and Ecuador, the biggest organisational impact was seen in facilitating migrants’ access to employment. Organisations working with Turkish and Tunisian migrants mentioned having an impact through their work matching migrant skills with jobs. While associations identified challenges to economic integration, some of the labour market problems experienced by migrants may have been related to the recognition of qualifications. For all origin groups, the qualification recognition rate was predominantly assessed as low or medium in the best case. Blame for this was put largely on the receiving countries, which apply restrictive criteria and burden migrants with long and difficult bureaucratic procedures. In the case of Turkey, several organisations mentioned a country-of-origin impact, explaining that the low quality of education that migrants had received in Turkey served as an obstacle to qualification recognition in the EU. Importantly, associations working with Turkish, Tunisian, Ukrainian and Russian migrants generally felt that governments and associations administering origin and pre-departure programmes to help migrants to find jobs in the EU had only a limited impact. In the case of Morocco and Ecuador there was mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of pre-departure programmes. A few organisations, in the case of Ecuador for example, also reported that governmental policies at origin are effective. The focus on the labour market dimension provides insight into integration outcomes. Organisations also facilitate migrant integration in other dimensions, for instance by teaching migrants the destination language, enabling them to utilise their skills in the labour market and communicate better within hosting communi-

[email protected] 54 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner ties. Teaching the language of the country of origin also allows migrants to reach specific market niches, such as translation agencies, import-export, etc. However, moving to language and education dimensions also shifts us towards another area where countries of origin policies may matter: namely making links and connections between countries and their diasporas. Sending states may make efforts to keep economic, cultural or language links with their emigrants. For instance, sending countries may provide support for migrants and their children to learn the country of origin language. Countries such as Turkey support the acquisition of migrants’ origin language by sending language teachers abroad. Survey data provides information as to whether and to what extent these origin programmes have effects and visibility in migrants’ destinations. Regarding the acquisition of the language of origin by immigrants and their children, generally the surveyed associations working with Turkish, Russian, Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants highlighted various informal contexts in which language learning takes place, that is in family, through the consumption of media and cultural productions and also when traveling. Religious and other associations are also active in teaching the language of origin (except in the case of Ukraine). Additionally, in the case of Turkey there seems to be some impact by state policies which aim to keep language links with the diaspora. Organisations felt that both Turkish state schools and private schools played some role in teaching the Turkish language. Private schools are also seen as relatively important for Russian language acquisition. Schools established by Morocco are assessed as relatively important for origin language acquisition. The survey also indicated that immigrants were able to use their native language in different sectors of paid activities, such as translation services, tourism, cultural productions, etc. In addition to the labour market and education, the quantitative index presented in the previous chapter focuses on access to citizenship as a measure of integration and also as a facilitating factor in other areas of migrant integration. Survey data shed some light on the naturalization of migrants and in particular on attitudes towards naturalization. With regards to the dimension of access to nationality, there is a predominant trend for migrants in all the destination countries examined to keep the passport of their origin country when they naturalize. However, citizenship acquisition is very much driven by the destination government’s policies. Organisations highlighted the attitudes towards naturalization in the destination countries where they operate. Positive attitudes were reported in Sweden. In Italy there was a wide range of responses but most associations stated that there were negative attitudes towards naturalization, which was similar to the UK. In other countries (Belgium, France, Poland, Spain) attitudes tend to depend on the origin of the migrants who wish to naturalize, with perhaps more positive attitudes towards the naturalization of migrant groups with colonial or other historical, cultural and linguistic links to the destination country. Comparisons between the pairs of corridors examined in the empirical chapters point to how these ties translate into facilitated access to citizenship for groups of migrants depending on their origin.

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While the quantitative index measured integration by corridors, the survey shed light on how this integration takes place through the work of migrant associations. Analysing the labour market, education, language and citizenship dimensions, we can better understand how organisations operate in order to provide migrants with support and how they complement the policies and activities of destination and origin states.

Conclusions

The INTERACT survey provides a new tool for researching migrant integration. Its novelty lies in a cross-national approach, studying civil society organisations as actors that take part in migrant integration in EU destination countries. INTERACT explores their views and roles with special attention to the country of origin perspective. This is why the survey incorporated organisations based not only in the receiving societies but also in migrants’ origin countries. In this respect the INTERACT survey has proved itself a precious research tool which allows for cross-national comparisons between different origin and destination contexts. The survey design and fieldwork proved to be a challenging task, something which has also been demonstrated by existing research involving cross-national studies. Broad coverage of the INTERACT survey made the task all the more difficult, as it involved the management of a large team of external collaborators and interviewers coming from different cultural and linguistic contexts. Furthermore, targeting migrant organisations was challenging, due to the lack of a sampling frame and time pressures faced by the organisations working with migrants. There were also more general concerns about revealing information, concerns which were raised insistently by some organisations. Upon completion, the survey had gathered over 900 responses from diverse types of organisations working predominantly (but not exclusively) on integration activities relating to employment, education, language and social interactions. These organisations had different reaches, but their voices give us a better understanding of how they support migrants’ efforts to integrate within the EU. Although the exploratory character of the survey does not allow for generalisations to all civil society organisations, it sheds light onto how these actors’ activities affect migrant integration in terms of origin and destination countries. However, the survey does much more than simply map these activities comparatively. It also shows how organisations perceive migrant origin and receiving states and their policies in the day-to-day reality of migrant incorporation in the receiving society. The associations provide information crucial for successful access and skills utilisation in the labour market, and shed light on the relatively low effectiveness of origin impacts on access to jobs in the destination country. Organisations also help migrants to optimise the allocation of their skills, highlighting issues with qualification recognition that persist irrespective of the destination. Apart from facilitating integration, organisations also enhance the building of connections between the state of origin and its diaspora (see chapter by Anne Unterreiner regarding Chinese organisations

[email protected] 56 J. Salamońska and A. Unterreiner in this volume). Origin language teaching to immigrants and their children is one of the examples. Finally, the INTERACT project provides complementary views on migrant integration in the EU by analysing data from the exploratory survey on the migrant and diaspora policies designed and/or implemented by both the countries of origin and destination. Both origin countries’ policies and views, as expressed by migrant associations, are used in the following chapters as explanatory factors in order to explain diverging paths to integration in different EU countries.

Appendix 1: Population Born Outside the EU and Residing in the EU, by Country of Birth (*), Circa 2010, 1st Jan (**)

Country of birth Number Turkey 2,604,772 Morocco 2,366,388 Algeria 1,473,913 India 1,034,297 Albania 995,992 Ukraine 798,048 Russia 791,028 China (including Hong Kong) 673,346 Pakistan 658,574 Ecuador 590,119 United States 520,918 Bosnia and Herzegovina 504,018 Serbia and Montenegro (before 2006) 503,778 Tunisia 500,341 Brazil 496,331 Colombia 427,310 Philippines 378,040 Iraq 362,314 Croatia 349,035 Bangladesh 326,720 Peru 322,267 Vietnam 322,159 Argentina 312,938 South Africa 286,720 Nigeria 285,876 Serbia 283,020 Iran 278,400 Sri Lanka 270,197 Moldova 236,185 Senegal 222,114 (continued)

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Country of birth Number Bolivia 217,446 Suriname 210,717 Egypt 201,450 Ghana 195,748 Venezuela 192,414 Somalia 189,157 Republic of Macedonia 184,716 Thailand 180,206 Afghanistan 179,141 Indonesia 168,053 Canada 162,959 Australia 162,229 Angola 158,427 Dominican Republic 157,492 Jamaica 154,377 Democratic Republic of the Congo 151,274 Kenya 149,876 Belarus 138,819 Lebanon 134,599 Chile 124,043 Cuba 123,821 Japan 115,618 Madagascar 110,678 Syria 103,774 South Korea 102,472 Cameroon 100,999 Notes: (*) Immigrants are defined as foreign nationals (i.e. according to the country of nationality criteria) in Germany, Estonia, Greece and Malta. (**) Figures refer to 2010 (1st January) for all countries of destination except Austria, Malta, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia (2009), Lithuania (2008), Greece (2006), France (2005), Cyprus and Hungary (2002), Bulgaria, Luxembourg (2001) and Estonia (2000). Source: Eurostat and National Statistical institutes.

References

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Cordero-Guzman, H. R. (2005). Community-based organisations and migration in New York City. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(5), 889–909. Couper, M. P., & de Leeuw, E. D. (2003). Nonresponse in cross-cultural and cross-national surveys. In J. A. Harkness, F.,. J. R. Van de Vijver, & P. P. Mohler (Eds.), Cross-cultural survey methods (pp. 157–178). Hoboken: Wiley. Ejorh, T. (2012). Challenging times: Migrant organisations & the current recession in Ireland. http://www.newcommunities.ie/download/pdf/challenging_times_2012.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Faist, T. (2010). Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners? In R. Bauböck & T. Faist (Eds.), Diaspora and transnationalism: Concepts, theories and methods (pp. 9–34). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Fitzgerald, D. (2008). Colonies of the Little Motherland: Membership, space, and time in Mexican Migrant Hometown Associations. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 50(1), 145–169. Goerman, P. L. (2006). An examination of pretesting methods for multicultural, multilingual surveys: The use of cognitive interviews to test Spanish instruments. In J. A. Harkness (Ed.), Conducting cross-national and cross-cultural surveys, Spezial Band 12 (pp. 67–80). Mannheim: ZUMA. Gonzalez, E. A. (2012). Ethnography and human rights: The experience of APDHA with Nigerian sex workers in Andalusia. In P. Nyers & K. Rygiel (Eds.), Citizenship, migrant activism and the politics of movement (pp. 92–108). Abingdon: Routledge. Gsir, S. (2014). Civic participation and integration: A country-of-origin perspective. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report 2014/03. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/ bitstream/handle/1814/31244/INTERACT-RR-2014_03.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 19 July 2016. Häder, S., & Gabler, S. (2003). Sampling and estimation. In J. A. Harkness, F.,. J. R. Van de Vijver, & P. P. Mohler (Eds.), Cross-cultural survey methods (pp. 157–178). Hoboken: Wiley. Harkness, J. A. (2003). Questionnaire translation. In J. A. Harkness, F.,. J. R. Van de Vijver, & P. P. Mohler (Eds.), Cross-cultural survey methods (pp. 157–178). Hoboken: Wiley. Harkness, J. A., Van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Johnson, T. P. (2003). Questionnaire design in comparative research. In J. A. Harkness, F.,. J. R. Van de Vijver, & P. P. Mohler (Eds.), Cross-cultural survey methods (pp. 157–178). Hoboken: Wiley. Harzing, A. (2006). Response styles in cross-national survey research: A 26-country study. International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 6(2), 243–266. Jacobs, D., Phalet, K., & Swyngedouw, M. (2004). Associational membership and political involvement among ethnic minority groups in Brussels. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(3), 543–559. Johnson, T. P., & Van de Vijver, F.,. J. R. (2003). Social desirability in cross-cultural research. In J. A. Harkness, F.,. J. R. Van de Vijver, & P. P. Mohler (Eds.), Cross-cultural survey methods (pp. 157–178). Hoboken: Wiley. Kirişci, K. (2008). “Three Way Approach” to meeting the challenges of migrant incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective. CARIM Research Report 3. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/8291/CARIM_RR_2008_03. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 19 July 2016. Kleiner, B., & Pan, Y. (2006). Cross-cultural communication and the telephone survey interview. In J. A. Harkness (Ed.), Conducting cross-national and cross-cultural surveys, Spezial Band 12 (pp. 67–80). Mannheim: ZUMA. Koopmans, R. (2004). Migrant mobilisation and political opportunities: Variation among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(3), 449–470. Moya, J. C. (2005). Immigrants and associations: A global and historical perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(5), 833–864.

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Pries, L., & Sezgin, Z. (2012). Cross border migrant organizations in comparative perspective. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Schrover, M., & Vermeulen, F. (2005). Immigrant organisations. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(5), 823–832. Skjak, K. K., & Van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2003). Data Collection Methods. In J. A. Harkness, F.,. J. R. Van de Vijver, & P. P. Mohler (Eds.), Cross-cultural survey methods (pp. 157–178). Hoboken: Wiley. Smith, T.W. (1988). The ups and downs of cross-national survey research. GSS Cross-National Report 8. http://www.iassistdata.org/sites/default/files/iq/iqvol124smith.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Unterreiner, A., & Weinar, A. (2014). The conceptual framework of the INTERACT Project. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report 2014/01. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http:// cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29566/INTERACT-2014%20-%2001.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 19 July 2016.

[email protected] Chapter 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium

Sonia Gsir, Jérémy Mandin, and Elsa Mescoli

Introduction

Belgium has been an immigration country since the 1920s. Agreements were signed with Turkey and Morocco in 1964 in order to recruit migrant workers. At present, the country has a total population of 11,099,554, approximately 11% of whom are migrants.1 The majority of migrants are from European member states, especially Italy, France and the Netherlands. The largest migrant groups in the non-EU foreign population are Moroccans (83,271) and Turks (37,989). Their geographic settlement patterns in Belgium differ. The Turks are more numerous in Flanders, whereas the Moroccans live mainly in the Brussels-Capital Region, although their numbers have decreased overall since 2002 (Martiniello and Rea 2002; Martiniello et al. 2010). In the 1980s, facing the permanent character of the labour immigration – which was earlier assumed to be temporary – the Belgian government began to develop a

1 Population on 1 January 2013: 1,195,122 foreigners; source: National Register and General Direction of National Statistics (Vause 2014). In this report, we mainly use the term “migrant”, in keeping with the book’s focus on first-generation migrants. However, Belgian statistics refer to foreign nationality rather than to migration, and they do not include immigrants who became Belgian by naturalization. S. Gsir (*) Centre d’Etudes de l’Ethnicité et des Migrations, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium e-mail: [email protected] J. Mandin Centre d’Etudes de l’Ethnicité et des Migrations, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium E. Mescoli Centre d’Etudes de l’Ethnicité et des Migrations, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 61 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_5

[email protected] 62 S. Gsir et al. policy aimed at encouraging immigrants’ integration into society (Wets 2006). Flanders, the Walloon region and the Brussels-Capital region have developed their own integration policies, each according to its own debates and objectives regarding the management of cultural diversity. Moroccan and Turkish migrants were the first migrants targeted by these policies. For several years, Flanders has had a compulsory integration programme for newcomers. More recently, Walloon and the Brussels-Capital region have also developed integration programmes. New Moroccan and Turkish migrants are thus differently affected by integration programmes, depending on the region in which they settle. This chapter provides insights on integration from the immigration-country perspective as well as from the countries of origin, seeking to understand the impact of the emigration and diaspora policies of Morocco and Turkey on the integration of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium.

Immigration Trends of Moroccans and Turkish People into Belgium

In 1946, Belgium started an active immigration policy by signing bilateral agreements with countries from southern Europe in order to recruit temporary migrant workers. This policy officially stopped with the mid-1970s oil crisis, yet immigration continued, and since the mid-1980s Belgium has experienced a new phase of growing migration, a trend common to European countries. New patterns of migration as well as new streams from countries such as Poland, Romania, China and India contributed to the diversification of the migrant profiles in terms of status, origin, education and gender (Martiniello et al. 2010).

Temporary Labour Migration and First Family-Migration (1960–1974)

The organised migration of Moroccans and Turks to Belgium dates back fifty years, to the signing of bilateral agreements between Belgium and Morocco (17 February 1964) and Belgium and Turkey (17 July 1964) (Moniteur belge 1977a, b). Following World War II, Belgium had a critical need for manpower to rebuild the country. After the recruitment of Italian workers in the immediate postwar period, followed by Spaniards and Greeks, Belgian authorities continued to look for new migrant workers. Moreover, estimates of the population decline in the Wallonia region, according to the 1962 Sauvy and Delpérée reports, encouraged the Belgian authorities to organise a massive recruitment of workers from beyond southern Europe. The two new bilateral agreements organised the immigration of workers and their families from Morocco and Turkey – although the majority of Moroccans continued to arrive spontaneously, as they had at the beginning of the 1960s, rather than exclusively through the organised recruitment channels (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b).

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Authorities in the countries of origin supported emigration (Lievens 1999). Moroccan authorities had contacted the Belgian government to propose Moroccan workers for Belgian coal mines as early as 1957 (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b). Turkey, with its surplus of labour due to the mechanization of agricultural work, had already signed a bilateral agreement with Germany in 1961 (Bayar et al. 2004). Morocco also sought to facilitate emigration from some underdeveloped rural areas, such as the Rif, where the lack of resources had led the population to revolt (Aziza 2004). Encouraging Moroccan emigration occurred due to both economic and political reasons, as the population of these areas was dominated by Berbers, who had a difficult relationship with the dominant Arab-speaking population (Lesthaeghe2000 ). Unlike the Belgian-Moroccan bilateral agreement, which was based on the models of previous agreements that Belgium had signed with Italy, Spain and Greece, the Belgian-Turkish agreement organised immigration to the Belgian mining industry with quotas (Khoojinian 2007), and it included protocol relating to various social aspects of the lives of Turkish immigrants, such as access to housing.2 In addition, the agreement signed with Turkey allowed parents to join their children living in Belgium if the latter could prove that particular circumstances made their parents dependant on them and that they had the means to support them (Nys 2002). Both bilateral agreements included attractive conditions, such as opportunities for family reunification after three months of work for Moroccans and after just one month for Turks, as well as the provision of adequate housing (Gsir and Meireman 2005). Family life was presented as important for the well-being of workers and as a means to keep the workers in Belgium and to resolve the demographic decline. Concerning Turkish migrants, from 1964 the proportion of female migrants grew to reach 35% in 1966 (Schoonvaere 2013). After 1964, deteriorating economic conditions and increased unemployment led to a progressive policy of changes (ibid.). Restrictive measures drastically reduced Moroccan and Turkish labour immigration in 1965 and 1966 (ibid.). Nevertheless, clandestine immigration continued. From 1969 to 1974, spontaneous Turkish immigration occurred for jobs in the wood industry in south Belgium and in construction (Bayar et al. 2004). In 1974 the Belgian government decided to stop all active recruitment of migrant workers. Simultaneously, an amnesty to regularise irregular migrant workers was organised the same year. Around 8420 applications, mostly from Moroccan and Turkish migrants, were submitted, and 7448 were accepted (EMN 2005).

Family Migration and Other Migrations (1975–2014)

After 1974, Turkish and Moroccan immigrant workers who settled in Belgium were joined by their spouses and children – or sometimes by their dependent parents, in the case of Turks. This period of family reunification for the first generation of Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers lasted until the mid-1980s. Afterward, a period of family formation or marriage migration began. Turkish and Moroccan

2 This was not the case for the agreement with Morocco, which would be completed by a technical cooperation agreement in 1965 and a social security agreement in 1968.

[email protected] 64 S. Gsir et al. immigrants married spouses in Turkey or Morocco who then also immigrated to Belgium. Moroccans and Turks are the two nationalities in Belgium receiving the highest numbers of sojourn permits for family reunification reasons (Lodewyckx et .al 2011). In 2008, Moroccan and Turkish migrants represented 40% of the total number of migrants admitted to Belgium for family reasons. Nevertheless, they progressively diminished and in 2013 represented only 23%. Since the end of the 2000s, a new type of family migration has been the arrival of elderly Turkish people who have joined their children living in Belgium (Manço 2012). While most immigrants during this period came through family reunification, others arrived as workers, students, asylum seekers (Kurdish people from Turkey, for example), irregular migrants or as persons who overstayed their visas.3 Access to citizenship also influenced statistics concerning the presence of Moroccan and Turkish migrants in Belgium. Both populations in Belgium have not stopped growing: eight out of ten immigrants coming from North Africa are Moroccan (Vause 2014). The Moroccan population has been always larger than the Turkish population.4 In the 1990s, the number of Moroccan migrants residing in Belgium reached its peak of 140,000 persons (Bousetta 2010). In the same period, the number of Turkish migrants peaked at approximately 90,000 and then decreased and stabilised around 40,000 (Manço 2012).

Integration Policies

Above all, three elements need to be emphasized. First, the 1974 amnesty can defin- itively be considered a one-shot integration measure. Second, in the same year, Islam was officially recognised as a Belgian religion. As a consequence, public schools were required to offer Islamic classes, and, under the supervision of Belgian and Turkish authorities, teachers were sent to Belgium to provide them (Khoojinian 2006). Third, the issue of political participation by foreigners emerged quite early in Belgium, where voting is compulsory. After long and heated debates, the Belgian Constitution was modified in 1998 in order to allow foreigners to vote in local elections. It was only in 2004, after the approval of the new electoral law, that Turkish

3 Figures regarding irregular migrants are difficult to establish. During the period 1998–2004, 10,560 Moroccan and 5856 Turkish migrants were intercepted because they were “illegal” immigrants or asylum seekers (whether or not their applications were subsequently rejected) (EMN 2005). During the regularization campaign of January 2000, of the 37,152 applications (concerning around 50,000 migrants), 4.7% were from Turks and 14.5% from Moroccans (ibid.). 4 The following figures are based on nationality (and not on ethnic background). They give an account of the number of Turkish and Moroccan nationals. As soon as they are naturalized as Belgians, immigrants appear only as Belgian in the National Register. These figures do not take into consideration the number of Turks and Moroccans who obtained refugee status or those who are undocumented.

[email protected] 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium 65 and Moroccan migrants residing legally in Belgium for at least five years could participate for the first time in local elections. The Belgian integration policy began in the mid-1980s with awareness of the sustainable settlement of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants (Rea 2003). The federal policy has three main axes: nationality acquisition, fighting racism and fighting social inequalities (Rea 2003, quoted by Mandin 2014). In 1984 the new nationality code introduced ius soli elements. The acquisition of nationality has been considered a fundamental tool of integration, and dual citizenship has also been allowed. Accordingly, the nationality law changed several times, in the 1990s and in 2000, in order to facilitate the acquisition of Belgian nationality, which has mainly been based on duration of residence and the ius soli principle. The number of Moroccans and Turks naturalizing progressively decreased following changes to the law during the 1990s and the 2000s. However, a recent change in the Belgian nationality code, adopted in 2012, critically restricted the acquisition of nationality by extending the residence requirement to a minimum of 5 years and reintroducing detailed integration conditions, such as the knowledge of one of three official languages.5 At this stage, it is still too early to evaluate the consequences of these changes. A special fund was created in 1991 in order to sustain social integration projects, prevent discrimination and promote intercultural dialogue. Seventy-five percent of the available funds must target projects located in the five largest cities in the country (Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi, Gent and Liege),6 where many migrants live, particularly those of Moroccan and Turkish origin. Another instrument, urban policy, which targets zones rather than immigrants and specifically aims to support integration, was established in 1999. Aside from the federal level, the communities (Flemish, German-speaking and French-speaking) have jurisdiction over so-called “person-related matters,” such as immigrant integration.

Integration Policies in Belgian Regions

In Flanders

A policy addressing migrants developed progressively in Flanders in the 1990s.7 The goal of this policy was to recognise ethnic minorities and their cultural identities, and to encourage migrant associations to self-organise, assuming that original cultural identity is a means of emancipation (De Smet 2012). The Flemish minori-

5 Law of 4 December 2012 modifying the Belgian Nationality Code in order to make the acquisition of Belgian nationality neutral from an immigration perspective. 14 January 2013 Royal Decree implementing the Law of 4 December 2014. 6 http://www.diversitybelgium.be/impulse-fund#Doelstellingen%20van%20het%20Impulsfonds, visited on 31 March 2014. 7 In Flanders, community and regional institutions are merged, and there is a policy developed at the Flemish level in Flanders; in Wallonia, there are two authorities dealing with integration: the Waloon government (regional level) and the Franch-speaking government (community level).

[email protected] 66 S. Gsir et al. ties’ policy, adopted in 1995, calls for migrants’ participation as full citizens in Flemish society and includes a reception policy for newcomers and an assistance policy for undocumented migrants. In 1998, the Minorities decree defined precisely five target groups of the minorities’ policy: the so-called “allochtonous” (at least one parent is born abroad), refugees, travelling groups, non-Dutch-speaking foreign newcomers and undocumented migrants (Jacobs 2004). At the beginning of 2002, fourteen regional associations were recognised, including three Turkish migrant associations and two Moroccan ones. Since 2004, all new immigrants settling in Flanders must participate in a civic integration programme. As the target group also includes migrants who became naturalised citizens of Belgium as well as migrants with at least one parent who was not born in Belgium, Turkish and Moroccan newcomers (but also Belgians with a Turkish or Moroccan background) may have to sign a civic integration contract and follow the programme. It is compulsory for the first groups and available to the latter. Failing to attend a mandatory civic integration programme can result in administrative fines. These measures reveal a hybrid policy combining elements of both multiculturalist and assimilationist approaches (Jacobs 2004).

In Wallonia

The French community and Walloon government have been reluctant to recognise ethnic minorities, in contrast with Flanders (Jacobs 2004). Immigrant integration is embraced in the broader policies of social action targeting the disadvantaged classes but especially serving immigrants in certain neighbourhoods. In 1998, the French community adopted the affirmative action decree, which called for support for schools in which pupils had weak socio-economic backgrounds. The schools receiving support were mainly schools where the majority of pupils had immigration backgrounds, in particular second- and third-generation Turks and Moroccans. New, young Moroccan and Turkish migrants also benefit from it. The target group defined by the decree on the integration of foreigners or persons of foreign origin, adopted in 1996, includes both foreign nationals and Belgians with a foreign background. The decree established and sponsored regional integration centres in several Walloon cities, which work closely with local authorities and associations. However, in 2014, the Walloon Parliament adopted integration programmes for new immigrants. Within three months of arrival in a Walloon town, each newcomer must attend a reception module or face fines. After that, three other modules of the integration programme, such as French language courses, are available but not compulsory.

In Brussels-Capital

Since the 1990s, the government of the Brussels-Capital region has developed neighbourhood revitalization and housing renovation policies. Because Turkish and Moroccan migrants in particular have lived in certain ethnically segregated and

[email protected] 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium 67 deprived municipalities and neighbourhoods in Brussels, they have been targeted by these policies. These various policies have consisted of security contracts that aim to prevent delinquency, neighbourhood contracts for the rehabilitation and renovation of vulnerable neighbourhoods and shopping area contracts aimed at revitalizing commercial districts. Employment policies were also implemented through nine local missions for employment in order to include, in particular, Turkish and Moroccan populations in the labour market. The immigrants’ integration policies also reflect the region’s bilingualism and relied on the Flemish minorities policy and on the French community commission. Since 2004 migrants may follow Flemish civic integration programmes but can also attend French classes provided by the social cohesion decree aimed at welcoming newcomers. They can also benefit from inclusion and cohabitation policies, including the social inclusion of residents living in deprived areas and cohabitation and integration programmes to improve relations between local communities, developed by the region.

Integration Policies at Origin

Turkish Emigration and Diaspora Policies

During the guest-workers era, Turkish authorities negotiated specific provisions for their nationals with the Belgian government (Frennet-De Keyser 2004b). Reducing unemployment was an important objective; another was the prospect of remittances from Turkish migrants (Bayar et al. 2004: 358). Moreover, the Turkish government also expected that, once they returned to Turkey, migrant workers trained in European industries would support Turkey’s development and modernization (Manço and Manço 1992). Further, Turkey allows Turkish adults living abroad to vote in general and presidential elections as well as for referendums in Turkey. They are also allowed to stand for election. In the 1980s, in several countries, the Turkish government initiated the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs, which has become the largest Turkish diaspora organization in Europe. In Belgium, it is the Belçika Turk Islam Diyanet Vakfi, established in Brussels in 1982 (El Battiui et al. 2004). It receives teachers trained and funded by the Turkish government and manages almost half of the Turkish mosques in Belgium (Kanmaz 2003). Second, the Yunus Emere Institute was created in 2009 in order to ensure Turkish language classes for young generations of the Turkish population in Brussels. Moreover, the Turkish culture programme provides Turkish language classes at school, and some Turkish private schools were opened in Belgian cities under the roof of the Gulen Movement. Third, several migrant organizations have been established in Belgium by the Turkish population. At least until the end of the 1980s (Kanmaz 2003), Turkish organizations developed along political and ideological cleavages in Turkey (right vs. left or secular vs. religious). After that, the civic participation of Turkish migrants was influenced by Turks born in Belgium, who helped to open the agenda of former Turkish-migrant

[email protected] 68 S. Gsir et al. organizations. New organizations, such as women’s associations or multicultural associations, have been created, rather than exclusively Turkish ones (ibid.). Since the 1960s, the Turkish authorities have shifted from an emigration policy focusing on Turkish workers to a policy focusing on the Turkish diaspora as a whole.

Moroccan Emigration and Diaspora Policies

When Morocco signed the bilateral agreement, its government’s interests were quite similar to those of the Turkish government. Morocco wanted to reduce unemployment, bring in currency through expected remittances, contribute to financing domestic investment and support modernization and development with the expected return of trained Moroccan workers (de Haas 2007; Brand 2010). Another interest was political, aiming to “mitigate rebellious tendencies in several Berber areas,” such as the Rif area (de Haas 2007). The bilateral agreement was above all an economic agreement (Brand 2010), and it contained very few elements regarding Moroccan migrant workers’ living conditions. Caring about yearly remittances, Moroccan authorities encouraged the creation of bank branches abroad (de Haas 2007), beginning in 1973. They also set up a network of government-controlled migrant associations called Amicales, which were charged with controlling the socio-cultural and political activities of Moroccan emigrants in Belgium (Ouali 2004a) and which reminded Moroccan emigrants of their duty of allegiance and respect to the Moroccan royal authority (Brand 2010). Furthermore (and this is an important difference with Turkey), according to the Moroccan constitution, Islam is the religion of the state, and the Moroccan king claims his legitimacy as a descendant of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Political allegiance thus overlaps with religious allegiance, whereas secularism is the basis of the Turkish constitution. Ties between Morocco and Moroccan migrants in Belgium are also sustained through different organizations and through Moroccan unions and political parties (Saïdi 1997). In the 1970s, Moroccan migrants created organizations to help migrant workers but also in order to maintain links with their place of origin from a return perspective. These organizations progressively diversified their objectives from social and labour claims to identity and cultural claims and, finally, to integration demands (Ouali 2004b). Some were created independently from the Moroccan government, in particular those criticizing the Moroccan state. In 2003, Morocco also adopted a law on immigration, irregular emigration, and the entry and sojourn of foreigners. With European support, it has also developed a policy to more strictly control irregular emigration to Europe and to increase border controls. Finally, in 2013, a migration and mobility partnership was signed between Morocco and the European Union. Belgium was one of the nine European member states involved in this mobility partnership, which aims to provide mobility measures such as visa facilitation for some categories of Moroccan migrants. One objective of the partner-

[email protected] 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium 69 ship is to improve the information available to qualified Moroccan citizens on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU. Another objective is to support the integration of Moroccan migrants who regularly visit an EU member state. After the closure of Belgium’s official borders, both Morocco and Turkey gradually realized that their emigrants who went to Belgium would rather settle there than return and that they needed another approach. This shift in approach is illustrated by a change in the way they referred to these emigrants, calling them “citizens abroad” instead of “migrant workers” (Ouali 2004a; de Haas 2007). Both Turkey and Morocco understood their interests in maintaining ties with these sources of remittances, and they estimated that migrants could also better serve their respective political interests from where they resided. They developed measures oriented to their diasporas in quite different ways. Turkey has been more quick to consider the importance of the diaspora and has been more proactive, whereas Morocco, despite the huge number of Moroccans in Belgium, was slower and perhaps less efficient (see the voting rights implementation, for example). Turkish diaspora policy may also be influenced by Turkey’s prospects for EU membership. The relations between Morocco and the EU are different, limited to the development of mobility partnerships. From the 1960s to the early 1980s, no major contradictions appeared between the Belgian government and Turkey’s efforts to maintain links with emigrants. During the 1980s, it was realized that migrant workers had settled and that (from the perspective of the destination country) integration policies had been progressively designed. Indeed, the Turkish government developed a diaspora policy aiming to foster ties with migrants as well as nourish and strengthen the feeling of belonging to the Turkish or even Ottoman identity – the national identity. The Moroccan government has also been keen to maintain close ties with Moroccan migrants and to foster their sense of identity and belonging to Morocco. However, since the change of king in 1999, the Moroccan authorities have shown more openness toward multiple allegiances and political integration abroad. Turkish migrants complied with the Flemish minorities policy developed in Flanders and the Brussels-Capital region when they self- organised. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the self-organization of minorities has been highly promoted and considered a means of emancipation by the Flemish government, which is also anx- ious to organise self-mobilization (Kanmaz 2003). Most Turkish organizations in Flanders are now federated under Flemish structures and funded by Flemish authorities, which helps them overcome the influence coming from Turkey and its internal political and religious cleavages and focus instead on migrants’ common difficulties and interests when living in Belgium (ibid.). Finally, Turkish authorities have adopted various actions shaped on the basis of the different social, economic and cultural characteristics of the groups constituting the Turkish diaspora, particularly Kurdish emigrants, whom they have tried to control and track in Belgium, even in collaboration with Belgian authorities (Østergaard-

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Nielsen 2003a). In other words, Turkey tried to protect the rights of Turkish emigrants abroad if they adopted the Turkish nationalist ideology (Østergaard- Nielsen 2003b). This may also be the case for Moroccan migrants, as some of them have been in opposition to the Moroccan regime and have denounced it for human rights violations.

Integration Trends of Turkish and Moroccan Migrants in Belgium

In this section, the integration of Turkish and Moroccan migrants is analysed according to different dimensions: the labour market, education, citizenship and civic and political participation and, finally, residence and housing.

Labour Market Integration

As mentioned in Chap. 3, the labour market integration index is 0.14 for Moroccan migrants and 0.26 for Turkish migrants, indicating better integration into the labour market for the latter. During the active recruitment period, both Turkish and Moroccan migrants were integrated into the labour market. They worked in coal mines and, afterwards, in other sectors abandoned by Belgian workers. They were thus confined to hard, dirty and dangerous occupations (Rea2003 ). After 1974, the context of high unemployment made it difficult for their descendants to enter the labour market (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a). Within the Belgian working population, according to the quantitative analysis based on the labour force survey, migrant populations have a high share of employed workers (90.8% of Moroccans and 81.9% of Turks). Concerning self-employed migrants, Turks are represented at twice the rate of Moroccans (18.1% Turks and 9.2% Moroccans). In response to unemployment pressures and to difficulties accessing the labour market, some immigrants have opted for self-employment (Wets 2006). In the last decades, the number of businesses owned by Moroccan and Turkish migrants, such as grocery stores, bakeries, snack bars and restaurants has doubled (ibid.). The unemployment rate is higher among the migrant population in comparison with natives, and it is higher among Moroccan migrants (27.2%) than among Turkish migrants (18.7%). Both Moroccan and Turkish migrants are dominant in the service sector. However, Moroccan migrants work more in this sector than Turkish migrants, with a respective share of 78% versus 67%. In the manufacturing sector, it is the reverse; there are more Turkish migrants (33%) than Moroccan migrants (22%). However, the distribution of both Turkish and Moroccan migrants regarding their occupational levels, as defined by the International Standard Classification of Occupations

[email protected] 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium 71 classification, is quite similar. Indeed, only 17% of Moroccans and 16.2% of Turks are in high-qualification occupations (ISCO 1, 2 and 3), versus 46.2% of Belgians. Finally, there are also important differences between men and women regarding access to the labour market. Forty-four percent of Turkish migrant women are active in the labour market versus 23% of female Moroccan migrants (Manço 2012). Considering the data collected through the qualitative survey,8 it appears that the labour market constitutes a crucial issue that both groups encounter. Labour market integration is the first subject addressed by Moroccan-related associations that are mainly focused on strengthening occupation – skills matching and providing employment-search services. Another relevant activity carried out by associations is lobbying for credential recognition, which presents a problem for migrants in Belgium, where administrative procedures of diploma recognition are long and expensive. Associations also provide information about legal frameworks and the institutional setting in Belgium related to the labour domain. Both Turkish- and Moroccan-oriented associations believe that associations in the country of origin do not have a serious impact on migrants’ employment in Belgium. Concerning governmental policies and the initiatives of Turkish or Moroccan authorities, respondents working with both Turkish and Moroccan migrant groups consider official pre-departure programs to be relevant to integration into the Belgian labour market.

Education

The education integration index was calculated on the basis of several indicators. Regarding the percentage of international students ages 20–30, the number of students coming from Morocco and Turkey are quite similar; the average numbers for 2005–2012 are, respectively, 122 and 112. The education index is higher in the case of Moroccan migrants, 0.17, indicating that they integrate better in terms of education than Turkish migrants, whose index is 0.03. The share of tertiary educated is two times higher for Moroccan migrants (10.8%) than for Turkish migrants (5.6%). The data on school enrolment shows varying rates among the populations studied. These rates differ according to age. For the Belgian population between 15 and 25 years old, the rate of enrolment is 66%. For Moroccan and Turkish migrants, it is lower; only 31% of Turkish migrants are enrolled versus 53% of Moroccans. At ages 25–35, only 4% of Belgians are enrolled, which is the same for Turks, whereas

8 The qualitative survey consisted of phone interviews with resource persons in organizations working with migrants. These interviews were based on pre-established questionnaires and were carried out with twenty-seven organizations working mostly with Turkish migrants and with twenty-four organizations mostly working with Moroccan migrants. Most of them were non-profit associations; others were international organizations, governmental organizations, trade unions or religious institutions. Most associations have been classified as medium to large or medium-sized organizations because of the number of migrants who contacted them.

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8% of Moroccans tend to attend school even when they are older, demonstrating the importance to Moroccans of attaining a degree even at a later stage. The children of Turkish and Moroccan migrant workers in Belgium were oriented differently in secondary school; the former chose technical and vocational training whereas the latter focused on general education leading to higher education (Neels and Stoop 1998). Ouali also highlighted the fact that – since the beginning of the 1980s, but particularly since the 1990s – the daughters of Moroccan migrant workers attained high levels of education (Ouali 2004a). However, access to university differs between children of Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds, with 10–11% of Turks accessing university, compared to 25–30% of Moroccans (Manço 2012). Turkish-oriented associations provide homework assistance and offer services informing immigrants about study opportunities abroad. Both actions are aimed at providing migrants with a Belgian – or at least a European – degree in order to avoid constraints in labour market integration that could be caused by a diploma obtained in the country of origin. Teaching immigrants the official language of the destination country also constituted an important action carried out by associations working with migrants. These organizations also consider it important for migrants to learn the language of their countries of origin, and they lobby institutions in Belgium and abroad accordingly. This is implemented with the aim of ensuring double linguistic competence for migrants, thus recognising the relevance of this skill. Kinship, religious organizations and media – above schools or other courses – are considered the principal vehicles for learning one’s language of origin well. Schools play a role but to a lesser extent and outside the national curricula.

Citizenship, Civic and Political Participation

In the case of Turkish migrants, the citizenship integration index indicates the maximum score (1.0). For Moroccan migrants, it is only slightly lower, at 0.93. Both Turkish and Moroccan migrants have benefited from facilitated access to citizenship. However, the Turkish government has been formally encouraging Turkish migrants to naturalize as Belgians since 1981, when it authorized dual citizenship (Kadirbeyoğlu 2007). On the contrary, Moroccan migrants were discouraged from obtaining another nationality. Nevertheless, destination context remains a powerful factor for citizenship. In order to understand the variation in numbers, it is important to take into consideration the evolution of the process of naturalization, including the introduction of the ius soli and the simplification of the procedure to access Belgian nationality. Such changes allowed second- and third-generation migrants to acquire Belgian nationality automatically. The number of naturalized Moroccans and Turks has increased since the mid-1990s. In 2000, the required duration of residence was shortened to three consecutive years instead of five; moreover, after seven years of residence, any foreigner with a permanent residence permit could obtain Belgian nationality (Wets 2006). As a consequence, during the last decade (2001–2013), the

[email protected] 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium 73 number of Turkish nationals progressively decreased from 58,027 to 37,989 (Vause 2014). The number of Moroccan nationals also decreased during the same period, from 106,840 to 83,271; however, since 2010 it has been growing slightly (ibid.). Once naturalised, Turkish and Moroccan migrants are entitled to full citizenship and civic rights and duties. Turkish migrants seem more civically active than Moroccan migrants; for instance, 42% of Turkish migrants were members of an ethnic association whereas only 29% of Moroccans were members of an association in 2011 (Manço 2012). Moroccans tend to participate in multicultural associations as opposed to ethnic or hometown associations, as the Turks do (ibid.). The civic and political participation of Turkish migrants is oriented toward homeland politics, whereas Moroccan migrants seem more interested in local politics (Manço 2012). In local elections in 2000, seventy-two candidates of Moroccan origin, out of eighty- nine persons of non-European origin, were elected (ibid.). According to the survey results, political and civic participation, is not considered a basic need despite the fact that it is perceived as integral to the definition of migrants’ active status within the political and civic dynamics of the countries of both immigration and emigration. For both groups, the most relevant action consists of providing information on immigrants’ civic and political rights and duties in the country of destination. Because Turkey and Morocco allow dual citizenship, respondents to the survey affirmed that migrants tended to keep the passport of their countries of origin when they naturalized. This is considered an asset, particularly for Moroccan migrants. In fact, Turkey also developed an alternative status for Turkish migrants who lost their nationality of origin, in order to maintain specific rights for them in Turkey. In this context, abandoning the nationality of origin can be seen as less problematic for Turkish migrants. Keeping the passport is also strongly linked to a sentimental attachment that migrants have with their countries of origin, more than to a desire to maintain their political rights. The majority of both groups of associations also recognised the importance of transmitting the nationality of origin to children born in Belgium.

Residence and Housing in the Belgian Regions

Both Moroccan and Turkish migrants came from specific regions of Morocco and Turkey at the time of their early arrivals. Moroccans have come mainly from the Rif region and the Souss region (Ouali 2004a). More than half of Turkish migrants originated in the Central Anatolian provinces (Wets 2006)9. Both populations originated in rural areas but settled mainly in urban areas of Belgium. After living in accommodations near the coal mines, many ended up in deprived zones of the city centres (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a).

9 Even if the regions of migrants’ origins have diversified, there are still significant flows coming from these specific regions due to the phenomenon of chain migration.

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Moroccan and Turkish migrant workers immigrated first to Wallonia. Later, they moved to other regions and to cities such as Brussels, Antwerp and Gent in Flanders. They also settled in the Flemish province of Limburg, which the Moroccans left after its economic decline (whereas the Turks did not) (Frennet-De Keyser 2004a). In the 1990s, the distribution was more balanced among the three regions (Lepage 2001). Comprehensively, more than half of the Moroccan and Turkish populations live in no more than ten communes, mostly located in the industrial belt, where the coalfields were situated. Sixty percent of the Moroccans live in the Brussels-Capital Region. Forty-five percent of them are located in the cities of Brussels, Molenbeek- Saint-Jean, Schaerbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Saint-Gilles and Forest (Bousetta 2010). In Flanders, they live in the cities of Antwerp and Mechelen, and in Wallonia they are located in Liege and its suburbs (ibid.). More than half of the Turkish migrants settled in Flanders, in Genk, Gent and Antwerp (Manço 2012). A quarter of them live in the Brussels-Capital Region, particularly in the city of Brussels and in the municipalities of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode and Schaerbeek. Finally, another quarter lives in Wallonia, particularly in Liege and Charleroi (Manço 2012). Turkish migrants also tend to select residences in neighbourhoods where there are already concentrations of Turks (Manço 2012). Access to ownership developed differently for Turks and Moroccans. It appears that 52% of Turkish households own their housing, and 61% also have a house in Turkey, whereas only 30% of Moroccans own their houses, but, like Turks, they tend to have houses in their home country (60%) (Manço 2012; Saaf et al. 2009). This difference can be explained, first, because the agreement with Turkey included a provision to facilitate access to social housing. Consequently, many Turks living in social housing could buy their homes. Second, attitudes of Turkish migrants regarding mortgage loans were different from those of Moroccan migrants, who did not want to infringe upon the Islamic principle of prohibiting usury or interest (Kesteloot 2006). With reference to the survey, few respondents addressed the question of migrants’ residential integration in Belgium. The reason could lie in the fact that to solve residential concerns migrants mainly turn to national or federal institutions, more than to associations. However, for those respondents who deal with this issue, it seems that country-of-origin organizations have had an impact on the local environment in which migrants settled. Local associations, such as schools, official representations, religious institutions or cultural centres located in certain areas where significant migrant populations are settled, perceived support from Turkish and Moroccan organizations.

Main Conclusions

Two bilateral agreements for temporary labour migration initiated significant flows of Moroccan and Turkish migrants into Belgium. Both Morocco and Turkey encouraged emigration, expecting remittances and the return of their emigrants along with

[email protected] 5 Countries of Origin as Organisers of Emigration: Moroccans and Turks in Belgium 75 new professional skills. But, historically, Turkey demonstrated a greater interest in the protection of Turkish migrant workers’ interests. Specific provisions were thus included in the bilateral agreement, such as the possible reunification of dependent parents and access to social housing. A first key finding is that bilateral agreements, and, more broadly, emigration/immigration policies, constitute a basis for differentiated integration between migration corridors. Furthermore, a second key finding is that the countries of origin may have an impact on integration from the beginning, when emigration starts. The Turkish authorities negotiated specific provisions within the bilateral agreement in order to support Turkish migrant workers. The Turkish and Moroccan association survey shows that respondents consider official pre-departure programs to be relevant to integration in the Belgian labour market. A mobility partnership involving Belgium and Morocco has been recently signed. It aims in particular to improve the information available to qualified Moroccan citizens on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU. Another objective is to support the integration of Moroccan migrants who regularly visit an EU member state. It is too early to assess the implementation of this mobility partnership for Belgium. In general, migration patterns for Moroccan and Turkish migrants seem similar. They began with temporary labour migration that ended in permanent settlement, followed by family and marriage migration through a similar mechanism of chain migration. Nevertheless, patterns of integration differ. The integration index was particularly obvious regarding two closely related dimensions: labour market and education. Neither of the two groups has been well integrated into the labour market or education. One could expect that accurate integration in education would go hand in hand with efficient integration into the labour market, but the results are far from that. Although Moroccan migrants seem to be better integrated into education, they are less integrated into the labour market. Turkish migrants, however, who seem very weakly integrated in education, are more integrated into the labour market. The explanations are structural. The Belgian labour market is highly segmented, and Turkish migrants are employed in sectors where a low level of education is required (Wets 2006). Furthermore, in order to combat unemployment, Turkish immigrants have opted for self-employment by opening ethnic businesses, among other activities. The segmented labour market may also highlight the fact that educated Moroccans have difficulty accessing positions that match their qualifications. Other factors can explain these trends: discrimination in the labour market and the specific dynamics of both groups, especially stronger solidarity mechanisms among Turkish migrants. What can the impact of the countries of origin be, given these specific results? Since the end of active labour recruitment in 1974, most Moroccan and Turkish migrants who legally entered Belgium during the four last decades have been admitted for family reasons. Less than 10% came for work, a very small share came for studies and even fewer obtained protection for humanitarian reasons. In other words, this dominant migration channel does not allow the countries of origin to try to have an impact on integration into the labour market, as in the case of bilateral agreements for labour migration. But the qualitative survey showed that labour market

[email protected] 76 S. Gsir et al. integration is a critical issue, and that organizations oriented toward both Turkish and Moroccan migrants are active in this particular field of integration. Another key finding is thus that countries of origin may have no impact on certain integration dimensions. In education and labour market, integration relies instead on other key elements, namely the opportunity structures available in the destination country and migrants’ capacity for mobilization. The citizenship integration indexes demonstrate a high rate of acquisition of Belgian nationality for both Moroccan and Turkish migrants, with respective scores of 0.93 and 1. One can infer that, in this particular dimension, integration succeeded because (until recently) the federal Belgian government considered the acquisition of Belgian nationality to be a major tool of integration. Belgian integration policy was developed accordingly, facilitating access to Belgian nationality for foreign residents. Nevertheless, the recent change in the Belgian nationality code reveals a shift in approach; nationality acquisition is now used to recompense integration. Here, the slight differences between the two groups could be attributed to the different attitudes of the countries of origin regarding dual citizenship. Indeed, Turkey allowed and promoted the acquisition of citizenship from the new country of residence earlier than Morocco. Moroccan authorities have been more reluctant and were slow to accept dual citizenship, which was strongly discouraged until the early 1990s (de Haas 2007). Thus, it seems that for some specific dimensions of integration, the countries of origin may have a positive or negative impact. In this case, the dimension is citizenship. This is not a surprise, as with the acquisition of new citizenship there lies a risk of loosened links with emigrants. The country of origin may then demonstrate opposition to dual citizenship and dual allegiance (as Morocco did for a while). Or, on the contrary, the country of origin may bet on the permanence of links with emigrants despite an additional citizenship (Turkey). To conclude, both Moroccan and Turkish governments have been inclined to protect their economic and political interests through a growing engagement with migrants in Belgium. At the beginning of the mass migration, they mainly supported the economic dimension of integration into the Belgian labour market. After the end of migration recruitment, other dimensions of integration were taken into account progressively. Morocco and Turkey have developed legal frameworks and measures that are oriented toward their diasporas in quite different ways. Turkey has certainly been quicker to consider the importance of the diaspora and has been more proactive, whereas Morocco, despite the huge number of Moroccans in Belgium, has been slower and perhaps less efficient in this respect. Countries of origin can have a significant role in encouraging and accelerating integration into the country of destination, or, on the contrary, they can have a significant role in delaying the integration process. The main objectives of both Moroccan and Turkish diaspora policies seem to be to maintain and develop links with their respective diasporas. They want to benefit from Moroccan or Turkish migrants residing in Belgium. The survey results show that associations were quite doubtful about the impact of countries of origin on integration into Belgium and that this impact is quite difficult to measure or even evaluate. It would be consistent to recognise that the initial objectives of Turkish and Moroccan diaspora policies are not directly focused on integration into

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Belgium. Migrant integration can instead be considered an “unstated objective” of diaspora policies (Délano 2010). Nevertheless, engagement to maintain and develop links and to protect Turkish and Moroccan migrants’ rights abroad can be considered a way of empowering migrants. The countries of origin can thus facilitate integration, but only indirectly.

Acknowledgment We are grateful for helpful comments from Agnieszka Weinar, Anne Unterreiner, Justyna Salamonska and Sona Kalantaryan on earlier drafts of this chapter.

References

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Jacobs, D. (2004). Alive and kicking? Multiculturalism in flanders. International Journal of Multicultural Societies, 6(2), 280–299. Kadirbeyoğlu, Z. (2007). National transnationalism: Dual citizenship in Turkey. In T. Faist (Ed.), Dual citizenship in Europe. From Nationhood to societal integration (pp. 127–146). Aldershot: Ashgate. Kanmaz, M. (2003, December). Des organisations turques aux fédérations flamandes: 40 ans de vie associative en Flandre. Nouvelle Tribune, 34. Kesteloot, C. (2006). La répartition géographique de l’immigration étrangère: fondements, dynamiques et conséquences sociales. In B. Khader, M. Martiniello, A. Rea, & C. Timmermans (Eds.), Penser l’immigration et l’intégration autrement (pp. 73–103). Brussels: Bruylant. Khoojinian, M. (2007). Fixer la main d’œuvre turque en Belgique: la tâche d’un mensuel officiel (1964-1970). Revue belge d’histoire contemporaine, 37(3-4), 517–556. Khoojinian, M. (2006). L’accueil et la stabilisation des travailleurs immigrés turcs en Belgique, 1963-1980. Cahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent, 17, 73–116. Lepage, Y. (2001). Les populations étrangères en Belgique au 20èmesiècle. Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles. Lesthaeghe, R. (2000). Transnational Islamic communities in a multilingual secular society. In R. Lesthaeghe (Ed.), Communities and generations: Turkish and Moroccan population in Belgium (pp. 1–55). Brussels/The Hague: VUB University Press. Lievens, J. (1999). Family-forming migration from Turkey and Morocco to Belgium: The demand for marriage partners from the countries of origin. International Migration Review, 33(3), 717–744. Lodewyckx, I., Timmerman, C., & Wets, J. (2011). Le regroupement familial en Belgique: les chif- fres derrière le mythe. Brussels: Fondation Roi Baudouin. Manço, A. (2012). Approche sociodémographique de l’immigration turque en Belgique dans ses rapports aux autres populations. Brussels-Liège: IRFAM. http://irfam.org/assets/File/rechac- tion/Analyse%2012_2012_Approche_sociodemographique_de_l_immigration_turque_en_ Belgique_dans_ses_rapports_aux_autres_populations-A_Manco_IRFAM.pdf. Accessed 17 Dec 2015. Manço, A., & Manço, U. (1992). Turcs de Belgique. Identités et trajectoire d’une minorité. Brussels: Info-Türk. Mandin, J. (2014). An overview of integration policies in Belgium. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report 2014/20. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole, FI: European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33133/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-%2020.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 17 Dec 2015. Martiniello, M. and Rea, A. (2002). Belgium’s immigration policy brings renewal and challenges. Migration Information Source. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belgiums-immigration- policy-brings-renewal-and-challenges. Accessed 19 July 2016. Martiniello, M., Rea, A., Timmerman, C., & Wets, J. (Eds.). (2010). Nouvelles migrations et nou- veaux migrants en Belgique. Gent: Academia Press and Politique Scientifique fédérale. Moniteur belge (1977a). Convention entre la Belgique et le Maroc relative à l’occupation des travailleurs marocains en Belgique (17 février 1964). Moniteur belge, 17 juin. Moniteur belge (1977b). Accord entre la Belgique et la Turquie relatif à l’occupation de travailleurs turcs en Belgique, protocole et annexes, signés à Bruxelles le 16 juillet 1964, approuvés par la loi du 13 décembre 1976. Moniteur belge, 17 juin. Neels, K., & Stoop, R. (1998). Social mobility and equal opportunities: The case of Turkish and Moroccan minorities in Belgium (pp. 1998–1993). Gent: University of Gent/Free University of Brussels, Interuniversity Papers in Demography. Nys, M. (2002). L’Immigration familiale à l’épreuve du droit: le droit de l’étranger à mener une vie familiale normale. Brussels: Bruylant. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003a). Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’: Overseas nationals as an ambiguous asset. In E. Østergaard-Nielsen (Ed.), International migration and sending countries:

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Perceptions, policies and transnational relations (pp. 77–98). Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003b). Transnational politics, Turks and Kurds in Germany. London: Routledge. Ouali, N. (2004a). Quarante ans de présence marocaine en Belgique. In N. Ouali (Ed.), Trajectoires et dynamiques migratoires de l’immigration marocaine en Belgique (pp. 19–61). Louvain-La- Neuve: Bruylant-Academia. Ouali, N. (2004b). Le mouvement associatif marocain de Belgique: quelques repères. In N. Ouali (Ed.), Trajectoires et dynamiques migratoires de l’immigration marocaine en Belgique (pp. 303–325). Louvain-La-Neuve: Bruylant-Academia. Rea, A. (2003). L’intégration des immigrés et la lutte contre les discriminations: bilan et perspectives, Nouvelle Tribune. Numéro spécial. Quand la Belgique intègre…, 31/32, mars-mai. Saaf, A., Sidi Hida, B., & Aghbal, A. (2009). Belgo-Marocains des deux rives. Une identité multiple en évolution. Bruxelles: Fondation Roi Baudouin. Saïdi, A. (1997). Les stratégies des associations marocaines bruxelloises: une comparaison avec les Noirs Américains et les Franco-Maghrébins. Unpublished Dissertation, Namur. Schoonvaere, Q. (2013). Belgique-Turquie: 50 années de migration. Etude démographique de la population d’origine turque en Belgique. Leuven-Brussels: Université Catholique de Louvain, Centre de recherche en démographie et sociétés (DEMO) & Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme. Vause, S. (2014). Rapport statistique et démographique 2013. Migrations et populations issues de l’immigration en Belgique. Leuven-Brussels: Université Catholique de Louvain, Centre de recherche en démographie et sociétés (DEMO), Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme. Wets, J. (2006). The Turkish community in Austria and Belgium: The challenge of integration. Turkish Studies, 7(1), 85–100.

[email protected] Chapter 6 Asylum Seekers in Diaspora: Turks and Iranians in Sweden

Francesco Pasetti

Introduction

Since the introduction of new rules on labour migration in 2008, Sweden’s integration policy has been recognised as among the most open and liberal of all OECD countries (Andersson and Weinar 2014, see also Wiesbrock 2011). Still, even in what is widely regarded as a “best case” country, there are recurrent problems with integration policies. The 2013 riots in the suburbs of Stockholm are only a recent example of such difficulties. The present chapter addresses these matters and the issue of immigrant integration more generally, focusing on specific immigrant groups, namely Turks1 and Iranians. These constitute two of the most prominent non-EU foreign communities in the country and they represent two different migratory realities at various levels. At destination, different policies apply as the migration channels differ: Turks come mainly as immigrant workers or family members of workers whereas Iranians as refugees. Significant differences also appear at origin. Turkey is a close EU ally, with a history of EU ties and the wish to become a new EU member. The same does not apply to Iran, which has never been a close EU partner, and whose policies targeting emigrants seem to clash with the Swedish integration framework. The ultimate aim of the chapter is to shed light on how the configuration of policies in force at origin and at destination influence the integration performance of the groups of immigrants. Particular attention will be paid to the influence of theformer,

1 The chapter does not differentiate among ethnicities, such as between Turks, Kurds, and Syrians for Turkish immigrants. This choice is due to the availability of data offered by the Swedish census, which does not provide information about immigrants’ ethnic background. For this, “Turkish immigrants” and “Turks” will be used as synonymous in the text. F. Pasetti (*) GRITIM-UPF Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 81 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_6

[email protected] 82 F. Pasetti something which has been labelled as the “origin effect”. To what extent do Swedish policies on immigrant integration and the emigrant policies pursued by governments and non-state actors from Iran and Turkey complement or contradict each other? What effective contributions do they make to the successful integration of migrants and what obstacles do they put in their way? The study employs the trian- gulation of both data sources and methods of analysis, following the INTERACT methodology (see the third chapter in this volume for the details of the research design and methodology). The chapter is structured in the following way. It begins by offering a general overview of immigration trends from Turkey and Iran to Sweden, in order to show similarities and differences between the two groups. The following section examines the integration policies in force at destination, as well as diaspora and emigration policies set by sending countries affecting respective emigrants living in Sweden. This entails, on the one hand, a description of the legal, institutional and policy framework in force in Sweden and, on the other, an account of policy tools arranged by Teheran and Ankara’s governments targeting respective communities of expatriates in Sweden. The fourth section gets back to the synthetic measures illustrated in Chap. 3 of this volume, and it points to account for “integration performances” of Iranians and Turks in Sweden, relying on quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Here, special attention is given to the integration process taking place in the labour market, in the educational context, and in terms of citizenship. Besides, moving from comparisons with the Belgian and German cases – as treated in other chapters of this volume – additional insights about Turkish immigrants are offered. The chapter concludes with some remarks concerning the role played by origin countries in facilitating or constraining integration process. Particular attention is given to the role of state and non-state actors who are active at origin and to their (mutual) relations with the Swedish integration framework on the one hand, and with their diaspora communities on the other.

Immigration Size, Characteristics, and Trends: Turkish and Iranian Immigrants in Sweden2

Sweden’s modern era of immigration began after the Second World War, and can be divided into two distinct periods: the first characterised primarily by labour-force immigration and the second marked by a shift towards refugees and family migration (Bevelander 2004). During the former, which lasted from 1945 to the first half

2 Given limitations in terms of data availability, the study of integration processes and dynamics in the Swedish context is a particularly challenging task. Due to the policy of the Swedish National Institute of Statistics, disaggregated data accessible outside the country, free of charge, are very limited. Thus, in order to offer a richer analysis, the study has relied on other sources of data (i.e. the Migration Board, or Migrationsverket) and on specific literature focused on such communities.

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Table 6.1 Top 10 foreign groups, 2014 # Country of origin Total Percentage 1 Finland 158,488 9.9 2 Iraq 130,178 8.1 3 Poland 81,697 5.1 4 Iran 68,436 4.3 5 Syria 67,671 4.2 6 Somalia 57,906 3.6 7 Bosnia and Herzegovina 57,289 3.6 8 Germany 49,359 3.1 9 Turkey 46,146 2.9 10 Denmark 42,374 2.6 Source: Statistics Sweden, own elaboration of the 1970s, two different migration trends alternated, both pushed by the expansion of the Swedish economy and the flourishing of its industry. The first of these comprised of skilled migrants coming mainly from Germany and the Nordic countries (during the 1950s), and another made up of unskilled and low-skilled workers coming from Southern European countries such as Greece and Yugoslavia (during the 1960s) (Envall 2012). In order to meet labour demand, Sweden did not set up a guest worker program as other countries did, but opted for a policy of permanent immigration that treated labour migrants as future citizens (Roth et al. 2013). All of this changed at the beginning of the 1970s when, due to the economic downturn and increased unemployment, the demand for foreign labour declined, and the government restricted the access to work and residence permits for non- Nordic applicants (which would bring about a drastic reduction of labour inflows in the following decades). The first half of the 1970s marked the start of a new era of immigration. The severe reduction of labour inflows was offset by an increase of refugees and family migration. The new entries were predominantly made up of tied movers and various categories of refugees, many of which came from outside Europe (Bevelander 2004). As of 31 December 2014, foreign-born residents in Sweden numbered 1,603,551, representing 16.5% of the total population (Statistics Sweden 2015). Two-thirds come from non-EU countries, primarily from Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The once- dominant Scandinavians, who composed well over half of Sweden’s foreign-born population in 1960, make up less than one-seventh of it today (Table 6.1). Taken together, Iranian and Turkish communities represent more than 7% of the immigrant population living in Sweden: the former constitutes the fourth largest foreign community, with 68,436 individuals, whereas the latter ranks in 9th place, made up of 46,146 people. These groups present similar distributions as regards both age and gender, with the great majority of both communities concentrated in the range of 25–54 years old. There are only small percentages of children and elderly, and a slight majority

[email protected] 84 F. Pasetti of men compared to women.3 The main differences between these groups, pertain to the educational domain, in which Iranians “perform” much better than the Turks. According to Swedish national statistics (Statistics Sweden 2015) the main segment of Turkish immigrants is made of people with primary or lower secondary education, while for Iranians the main segment includes people with upper-secondary and post-secondary education. Despite slightly narrowing over the last three decades, this difference presents itself as a distinctive trait of comparison between the two groups. Another distinctive trait concerns their migratory paths to Sweden. Notwithstanding comparable growths over time, inflows coming from Turkey and those from Iran show significant differences. Iranian immigration began at end of the 1970s, in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, and drastically increased in the following years, marked by the war with Iraq (1980–1988). This happened at the same time that traditional destination countries (the United States, France and the United Kingdom) started to close their borders to migration inflows. This made Iranian migrants turned their gaze toward Northern Europe and, in particular, toward Sweden (Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly 2012). The vast majority of refugees, characterizing the second phase of immigration to Sweden, had Iranian citizenship: between 1978 and 1991, more than 23,000 Iranian asylum seekers received legal refugee status in Sweden (Almqvist and Hwang 1999). Many of them had been part of the leftist opposition at the time of the revolution and found the Swedish socialist model appealing (Hosseini-Kaladjahi 1997). Some had suffered persecution by the Iranian regime and had very strong reasons for applying for asylum, while others sought asylum in order to preserve their pre- revolutionary lifestyles or to protect their children (Kelly 2013). Immigration coming from Turkey followed a different path. It began in the second half of the 1960s with the inflows of male labour, pushed by the difficult economic situation in Turkey and drawn by the job opportunities available in prosperous Sweden. Back then, Turkish immigrants were a small foreign community in the country, who came primarily from the districts of Konya, Kulu and, to a lesser extent, from the Istanbul region (Bayram et al. 2009). Although there were some city-born skilled workers among early emigrants, most belonged to the rural-born unskilled workforce, which had first migrated to large cities and then moved to Western Europe (Karci Korfali et al. 2014). Such flows were framed within and coordinated by the First Five-year Development Plan (1962–1967) of the Turkish government, a strategic programme aimed at reducing unemployment and stimulating prospective flows of remittances, through the export of labour surplus (Icduygu 2008). According to the same rationale, Turkey signed bilateral agreements on labour recruitment with Western European countries, including: Austria, Belgium,

3 The age distribution between genders approximately follows this general pattern for both groups, with the great majority of men and women concentrated in the range of 25–54 years old. From a historical perspective, the first inflows were predominately men. Then since the 1990s, the balance between men and women equalled out, mostly as a result of family reunifications (Karci Korfali et al. 2014).

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80,000

70,000

60,000 Iranian 50,000 immigrants

40,000 Turkish immigrants 30,000

20,000

10,000

0 1960 1970 1975* 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014

Fig. 6.1 Stocks of foreign-born people in Sweden. Notes: (*) For 1975, foreign-born people includes the number of aliens with certificates of registration plus the number of aliens with residence permits (Source: Statistics Sweden, 2015, own elaboration)

Holland, France, Germany, and Sweden (the latter in 1967). Notwithstanding the original intention of the policymakers, Turkish immigrants admitted on guest worker schemes settled permanently in western host countries, acquiring permanent resident and, in some cases, citizenship status. This was even more prevalent in Sweden where long-term settlement was fostered by a policy of permanent immigration. Here, as occurred in other European destinations, the Turkish community continued to increase due to family reunification and the admission of refugees, which became the two dominant forms of entrance. The channel of admission under refugee status was used predominantly by the Kurdish population, who sought political asylum after the insurgency for Kurdish rights was launched in the early 1980s. Figure 6.1 captures the migratory flows from Turkey and Iran to Sweden over time. While the majority of inflows from Iran have always been made up of asylum seekers and tied migrants, Turkish immigration came into being as labour market mobility, but changed over time, with the growth of refugees and family reunifications. As pointed out by the literature, such differences concerning migratory paths are related to the historical contingencies of each country, to the micro and macro characteristics of these populations, as well as to the specific institutional structures within which the migratory movements took place (Bayram et al. 2009; Hosseini- Kaladjahi and Kelly 2012; Kelly 2013; Westin 2006).

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Integration Policies4

Integration Policies at Destination

In Sweden there has been no proper migration policy as such until the mid-1970s. Only then were comprehensive policies introduced, driven by the need to cope with growing unemployment among foreigners. During the 1980s, the concerns about refugees overlaid labour market issues, and a specific housing policy (1985) was implemented in order to cope with the new challenges. Still, we had to wait until the creation of the Integration Board, in 1998, for a specific policy framework addressing integration. Its creation symbolised the acknowledgment of a new core area of policymaking, which, in the following years, has assumed increasing relevance in Swedish politics. In line with the country’s legislative tradition, the Integration Board pursued the equality between foreigners and natives according to an understanding of integration as a mutual process of adaptation between host society and incoming immigrants. As stated by the Fact Sheet on Integration, published by the former Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, the goal of Sweden’s integration policy is to “ensure equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, irrespective of their ethnic and cultural background” (Regeringskansliet 2009:1). Integration policies unfolded within – and relied on – the welfare state architecture and proceeded along the lines of an empowerment policy generally applied to groups suffering from social exclusion, discrimination and lack of opportunities. The same instruments developed in the area of public education, public health, and political participation, which had taken shape during the building of the welfare state, were then employed for integration purposes (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003). The latest comprehensive integration strategy was formally launched in 2008 and was driven by seven main objectives: to ensure a faster introduction for new arrivals, to create jobs and to stimulate entrepreneurship among foreigners, to get better education results and to achieve greater equality in school, to attain better language skills and to enhance adult education opportunities, to deploy effective anti-discrimination measures, to enhance the urban development of districts and suburbs with extensive social exclusion, and, finally, to share and sustain common basic values. The labour market integration represents the core focus of Swedish policymakers. Since 2010, the Public Employment Agency has been in charge of coordinating introduction activities and of fostering labour market incorporation. With this goal in mind an “introduction plan”, soliciting new immigrants to participate in civic orientation courses, has been put in place.5 In addition, a set of different activities

4 This section relies on the information provided by Andersson and Weinar (2014) on Sweden, along with two internal INTERACT reports on Turkey and Iran. 5 While participation is not compulsory, a benefit is paid to immigrants who take part in introduction activities.

[email protected] 6 Asylum Seekers in Diaspora: Turks and Iranians in Sweden 87 has been established to improve job placement for immigrants, including: (a) the nystartsjobb (“new start jobs”) under which employers can obtain subventions for hiring foreigners, (b) the prova-på-plats (“try-place”) that represents a form of structured work experience, along with (c) mentorships, advice and networking for foreign entrepreneurs and business owners. Pre-departure initiatives are consistent with such view. Since the 2008 reform, employers are responsible for the evaluation of skills in the recruitment process abroad. Unlike in many other European countries, citizenship in Sweden can be granted regardless of language/knowledge skills, the Swedish system allows foreigners with a permanent residence permit, who have lived in the country for at least 5 years, to apply for naturalisation. With the view of using citizenship as a tool for integration, part of the Budget plan of 2014 was dedicated to carrying out citizenship ceremo- nies in all municipalities. Anti-discrimination measures represent another important dimension of the integration framework: a specific policy targeting this area was issued in 2009 and a new public entity – the Equality Ombudsman – was created to ensure implementation. To this end, an extra fund was set up in 2014 to put in place new measures for fighting xenophobia and intolerance. All the different dimensions and phases of the integration process are managed according to a multi-level governance model involving the collaboration of different actors. At national level, a key role is played by the Minister of Integration (under the Ministry of Employment), who is directly in charge of integration matters. These include: the incorporation of new arrivals into the labour market and into the Swedish society as a whole, the distribution of resources among municipalities for refugee reception, the supervision of naturalisation procedure, and the management of urban development. This work is complemented by the joint action of several ministries and agencies, as reported in the Table 6.2. At the local level a key role is played by the kommuner (municipalities) whose actions cover several policy-areas, ranging from the labour market, to the areas of housing and education. As for the latter, local authorities are in charge of providing the Swedish language courses for immigrants (Svenska för invandrare or simply SFI),6 which represent a cornerstone of Sweden’s integration policy. Beyond these – and other actions targeting immigrant youth and children – municipalities are also responsible for the crucial stage of refugee reception.7

6 Courses are available to immigrants older than 16 and who possess both a residence permit and a Swedish national registration number. Professional specializations are also available. Recently, the results-based incentives – the so called “SFI bonus” – have been removed. 7 To this regard it is worth noting that, due to its voluntary nature, this task has been taken on in an uneven fashion, according to the willingness of each local authority. A fact that caused both problems for refugees and significant difficulties for some municipalities.

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Table 6.2 Institutional actors dealing with integration at national level Actor Tasks/Policy-areas Minister of Integration New arrivals Resource distribution for refugee management Naturalisation procedure Urban development Ministry of Justice (Swedish Migration Board) Migration policies (and related administrative matters) Police (reporting to the Ministry of Justice) Border control and return procedures Migration courts (Migrationsdomstolar) and Citizenship acquisition Migration Court of Appeal Asylum seekers admission (Migrationsöverdomstol) Return procedures County Administrative Boards (Länsstyrelserna) Reception of unaccompanied minors Public Employment Service New arrivals (Arbetsförmedlingen) Youth Board (Ungdomsstyrelsen) Anti-discrimination (endowing NGOs) Swedish ESF Council (under the Ministry of Management of the Social Fund Labour) (Socialfonden) and the Integration Fund (Integrationsfonden). National Agency for Education (Skolverket). Education National Board on Health and Welfare Health (Socialstyrelsen). National Board of Housing, Building and Housing and residential integration Planning (Boverket). Embassies, consulates and diplomatic agencies Visa-issuing and related matters

Integration Policies at Origin

The countries of origin in this study present different institutional frameworks dealing with respective emigrants and diaspora communities abroad.8 On the one hand, Turkey has established an active policy providing legal channels for outflow migration and granting a variegated set of rights to its citizens living abroad. On the other, Iran has been averse to emigration and diaspora, focusing more on the fight against political dissidents and on return migration. In Iran there is no single comprehensive legal act addressing emigration and diaspora. It is only possible to find scattered legal norms and administrative regulations that govern different aspects of such policy areas. This fact has specific historical reasons, rooted in the conflictual relation between Teheran’s governments and Iranian diaspora. Most of migratory outflows, and thus most of the diaspora

8 See Chap. 2 in this volume for the details of the emigration and diaspora policies arranged by Ankara and Teheran’s governments. Even though the description offered here refers to their general policy models, such comparison represents a necessary step in order to understand the integration processes of Turks and Iranians in Sweden, which will be the issue of the next section.

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communities that took shape over time, were made up of people who fled from the political regime in the country. That said, the last decade has seen a few signs of change. The most important of them regards return migration, which represents the new policymakers’ overriding concern. This means, in practice, that expatriates, including those who have illegally exited the country in the past, can easily return by completing a series of administrative procedures and formalities at an Iranian embassy or consulate. New efforts have been directed towards the preservation of ties with diaspora, by stressing the promotion of Iranian and Islamic identities and the spread of the Persian language. Some improvements also took place in the area of employment and labour market. One of the main objectives set by the Fourth and the Fifth Development Plans was, indeed, the adoption of measures to support the dispatch of the labour force abroad.9 In 2013, in order to promote emigrants’ employment abroad and to further support the presence of Iranian experts in foreign markets, a tripartite memorandum was concluded between the Ministry of Labour and Social welfare, the Trade Promotion Organisation of Iran, and the Iranian Trade Association of International Recruitment Offices. From that year onwards, Iranians working abroad could also rely on a retirement plan and on disability insurance. In the area of citizenship, although the Iranian civil code does not formally recognise dual nationality, the public administration implicitly acknowledges it at the level of administrative practice, effectively meaning many citizens are able to preserve their nationality while acquiring a foreign one. Despite the recent signs of enhanced openness towards emigrants, Turkish policymakers have proved to be more than a step ahead of Iranian ones when emigration and diaspora policies are at stake. Turkish emigrants count on an extensive network of actors and political measures addressing their interests and needs. Turkey’s systematic approach towards emigration is gradually becoming more visible with the general expansion of political, civic, socio-economic, and cultural rights. The institutional framework targeting emigrants and diaspora communities has undergone a complex transformation over the last decades. In particular, it is possible to identify four distinct phases, each one driven by a precise rationale: the first phase (1960s) favoured return migration; the second one (1970s) pointed at maintaining economic and social ties with emigrants; the third one (1980s) aimed at institutionalising the monitoring and control of Turkish populations overseas; and the last one (1990s and 2000s) sees active state involvement in diaspora policies. Policymaking in these areas began in the 1960s with the First Five-year Development Plan (1962–1967), which pointed at exporting the surplus of labour force in order to revive the national economy. With the aim of reducing unemployment and increasing remittances, bilateral labour agreements were signed with several Western countries. As for Sweden, a bilateral treaty on double taxation was signed in 196710 and, in line with the same rationale, an agreement on social security was issued in 1977, allowing the

9 To this end, a comprehensive and strategic legislation is under codification. 10 Currently there is no functioning bilateral agreement on labour migration between Turkey and Sweden.

[email protected] 90 F. Pasetti portability of social rights and health benefits for both emigrants visiting Turkey and retired emigrants returning to Turkey. Policies changed in the 1980s, when emigrants’ permanent settlement abroad became generally accepted, and policymakers’ concerns shifted toward return migration and the integration of the Turkish diaspora at destination. In the following decades the governments have increased their engagement with emigrants and diaspora communities: legal and official incentives have been created, monitoring tools have been implemented, and a diversified set of political measures have been carried out to secure links and to improve emigrants’ living conditions abroad. The area of culture received special attention. In Sweden, as in many other countries, Turkish language is taught in line with the “Turkish Language and Culture Programme”, allowing Turkish children living abroad to benefit from elective Turkish classes in their schools. As regards the legal aspects of the diaspora policy there are three developments which are particularly relevant for the Swedish case and deserve our attention. The first one is the introduction of dual citizenship (1981), which significantly increased the number of Turkish citizens who obtained Swedish nationality. The second concerns the inclusion of Turkish emigrants in the 1982 Constitution, which formally ratified the relevance of Turkish diaspora.11 The last one refers to the Blue Card procedure. Since 1995, this tool grants political, economic and social rights to Turkish emigrants who quit their home-country nationality to become citizens in their country of residence. The Table 6.3 tries to sum up the main dimensions that characterise the policies of Iran and Turkey targeting respective groups of emigrants living abroad. Differences between the cases selected are not limited to the sphere of state-level policies, but apply to the dimension of practical actions carried out by non-state actors, such as migrant organizations, NGOs, and associations. According to the theoretical grounds laid in the first volume, these entities, despite operating at a different level of governance than state-actors, are no less important for immigrants’ integration at destination. As for the case of Iranians, Hosseini-Kaladjahi and Kelly (2012) have estimated that there are approximately 125–130 Iranian-focused organizations throughout Sweden, mostly based in Stockholm, Goteborg, Malmö, and Uppsala. According to Kelly (2011), these organizations aim to meet the social, cultural, and political needs of their members. When they started to develop their own associations nearly a decade after their arrival, Iranian emigrants did so largely along political lines, so that many were set up as “cultural” associations, despite their political activities.12 Iranian associations that are currently active in Sweden deal with many dimensions of integration, especially concerning the labour market, education, and language.

11 The article 62 of the 1982 Constitution noted: “The Government takes measures to ensure the family unity of Turkish citizens working in foreign countries, to educate their children, to meet their cultural needs and to provide social security, to protect their link to the motherland and to facilitate their return”. 12 Many others were created purely for social or for philanthropic reasons.

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Table 6.3 Framework of emigration/diaspora policies: Iran vs. Turkey Iran Turkey Legal framework for No formal structure Formal and organised structure emigrants/diaspora Approach towards Indifference (feeble Control, protection and emigrants recognition of diaspora) empowerment of diaspora Main state-actors High Council of Iranian Prime Ministry Presidency for Affairs Abroad Turks Abroad and Relative Communities Advisory Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad High Committee for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad Socio-economic rights Retirement plan ensured in Blue Card special cases Bilateral agreement on Social Security Political rights Right to vote in general Right to vote in presidential election election, general election and in referendums Language and cultural Informal support for the Cultural programmes and rights preservation of the Islamic language courses identity abroad Turkish teaching staff sent abroad Dual citizenship Legally not acknowledged, but Actively supported as a tool for increasingly tolerated at the integration abroad administrative level

These associations encourage bonding between Iranians in the diaspora, and make it possible for Iranians to keep their ties with Iran through charitable work (i.e. by making donations to Iranian societies, raising awareness of social issues in Iran) without being overtly political. Rather than circumscribed to the Iranian community, their scope is extended to other foreign-born groups and often to Swedish natives as well, according to a conception of integration as a mutual process of adaptation. Another important dimension in terms of integration, which is strictly related to the actions of immigrant associations, is represented by cultural events related to Iranian traditions, such as Eldfest, Melagan, Yalda, Caharsanba-sur, and Nowruz. These events represent important occasions for both getting to know and strengthening community ties at destination. At the same time, they give Iranians the opportunity to share aspects of their culture with the host society. In this respect it is worth mentioning the Persian New Year, which brings together many Iranians from different ethnic backgrounds in Sweden’s public parks and squares. Such dem- onstrations of culture and identity seem to be taking on more importance with time, as Iranians have slowly built up the resources and support to mobilise their cause (Kelly 2011, 2013).

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Regarding Turkish associations, emigrant solidarity networks in host countries have been the most visible non-state actors engaged in emigrant-centred activities. Since the mass migration flows of the 1960s, Turkish emigrants have established non-governmental organizations that aim to create cohesion among Turkish expatriates by serving origin towns or villages through provision of services. Today, the first task of emigrant associations is creating a channel of information among Turkish immigrants in the destination country and between the origin area and people living abroad. Websites established by solidarity networks include news from a town’s people, business advertisements, and calls for business partnerships. On the whole, they merge homeland news with news from abroad under the same roof. These non-governmental organisations perform two other important tasks: they create solidarity ties in the destination country and provide a wide range of services for their hometown, such as organising campaigns for low-income families or building libraries for schools and mosques. Frequently, activities are organised in cooperation with the local authorities in Turkey. One of the main important actors is the Swedish-Turkish National Association (STRF) (Svensk-Turkiska Riksförbudet). Established in 2003, this association includes 15 different entities from nine cities (Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg, Varberg, Norrköping, Västerås, Eskilstuna, Linköping, and Jönköping) and counts around 3800 members. Its focus is on Turkish integration in Sweden as well as on the development and promotion of Turkish culture. The Assyrian Federation in Sweden (Assyriska Riksförbundet i Sverige) represents another influential entity. It groups together 28 different associations that work to support the integration and inclusion of Assyrian people (many of whom are immigrants coming from Turkey). This association actively works to represent Swedish-Assyrian interests, to increase awareness and recognition of the genocide of Assyrians and to support the democratic aspirations of Assyria. The overall picture of non-state actors intervening in integration processes appears heterogeneous and variegated. Both immigrant groups are able to count on a network of associations and organisations. Yet, there is a crucial difference between the Turkish case and the Iranian one: the relationship between state-actors at origin and the network of non-state actors. While associations targeting Turks work in co-operation with state-actors, those addressing Iranians abroad tend to operate in opposition to the central government. These opposite dynamics are crucial to evaluate integration processes of these immigrant groups in the Swedish context. Still, before giving an appraisal of such combined effect on integration processes, one must examine integration performances.

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What Explains Integration Trends from a Quantitative and a Qualitative Perspective

In order to assesses and to interpret the integration processes of Iranians and Turks in Sweden, INTERACT synthetic indexes13 are used. These scores give us valuable insights into the respective levels of integration in three main areas of inquiry: labour market, education, and citizenship. Considering different indexes altogether, the Iranian and Turkish communities show average levels of integration, with the former performing better than the latter in two of the three dimensions analysed. Iranians show a higher level of integration as regards the labour market (0.59 vs. 0.51 for Turks) and the educational context (0.34 vs. 0.17), whereas Turks perform better in terms of access to citizenship (0.82 for Iranians vs. 0.90 for Turks).14 Still, it is interesting to delve into each dimension individually, in order to have a more precise idea about the integration of these groups.

Labour Market

As regards labour market indicators, Iranian and Turkish immigrants present analogous results. Active labour forces are similar to each other, equal to 65% for Iranians and 62% for Turks. Despite being comparable to the native population (63%), such scores are particularly worrying in terms of integration given that working age population among immigrants is much higher than among natives. These figures, which match the groups’ profiles depicted above (see section “Immigration size, characteristics, and trends: Turkish and Iranian immigrants in Sweden”), show that a considerable share of Turks and Iranians living in Sweden are not active in the labour market. Looking at the unemployment rates confirms integration concerns. The groups selected presents similar results both in their absolute scores (respectively 15.4% for Turks and 15.6% for Iranians) as well as in the difference with natives’, for whom unemployment rate is only about 4.3% (Fig. 6.2). According to the literature, the difficulties experienced by these groups in the labour market can be connected to multiples drivers, different for each group. Whereas for Turkish immigrants it is reasonable to assume a lack of human capital, due to the low levels of education found in the majority (Icduygu 2008), the same cannot be said for Iranians, who represent the foreign-born community with the

13 For scores’ details, see the third chapter of this volume. Along with INTERACT indexes, other traditional indicators of integration are referred to in the text. 14 Despite low scores in absolute terms, Turks’ living in Sweden show better integration levels than in the rest of the countries taken into exam, namely Belgium and Germany (see Chaps. 5 and 8 in this volume).

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100% 90% 80% 70% ShareSha of inactive 60% SShareha of unemployed 50% Share of employed 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Iranian Turkish Swedish immigrants immigrants natives

Fig. 6.2 Labour market integration in Sweden: Iranians vs. Turks (Source: Statistics Sweden, 2014, INTERACT team elaboration) highest share of tertiary-educated immigrants (about the 30% of the total).15 In this case, other dynamics can take shape, influencing the integration process. Status is one such factor which, as Kelly (2013) suggested, might lead tertiary-educated Iranians to decide to remain outside the Swedish labour market rather than to accept low-skilled jobs. At the same time, it is difficult to exclude a priori the potential effects of domestic constraints like labour market segmentation. As pointed out in chapter five for the Belgian case, labour market segmentation penalises immigrants with higher educational levels. Thus, just as the Belgian labour market structure has hindered Moroccans’ incorporation, the Swedish one might have an analogous effect on Iranians.

Education

As regards the educational context, integration problems are even more pronounced than problems in the labour market, with scores of 0.34 and 0.17 for Iranians and Turks, respectively. Notwithstanding a lower score than both Iranians and natives (0.33), Turks appear better incorporated in Sweden than seen in Belgium and Germany, which are countries with a higher score of labour market integration.16

15 A notable fact given that it is even higher than among natives, whose score of tertiary educated is about the 18%. As regards Turks this figure is halved (9%). 16 See, again, chapters five and eight in this volume. For a comparison with the case of France, see the contribution of Gabrielli (2015).

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The difference between them and Iranians could be attributed to the educational levels achieved at origin. As for the German case, an “origin effect” linked to differences between education systems in home countries could be involved. This hypothesis finds support in the data regarding student mobility. Between 2005 and 2012, approximately 1125 students born in Iran came to Sweden every year to study, while there were only 281 students born in Turkey doing likewise. Unfortunately, the lack of data concerning the educational context in Iran – especially as regards secondary and tertiary education – makes it difficult to further corroborate such hypothesis. That said, as confirmed by an aggregated score which is higher than natives, Iranian migration appears clearly to be a skilled one.17 A final dimension that could have negatively affected the integration process in the area of education, has to do with the recognition of educational qualifications. The lack of agreements between the countries of origin and Sweden surely represents an important barrier for the integration of both immigrant groups.

Citizenship

The last aspect of integration taken into account is the policy area of citizenship and, in particular, the access to nationality. In this respect, Iranian and Turkish people living in Sweden appear highly integrated, with nearly 1700 Swedish passports given every year, on average, to each group.18 Based on the evidence provided by qualitative surveys, it is reasonable to assume a significant “origin effect” at play, exerted by sending states, even if it seems to work according to opposite rationales. In the case of Turks, the “origin effect” can be traced back to the reform of dual citizenship (1981) as well as to the new policy goals being pursued by policymakers in the last decades, which have had a positive impact on the naturalisation process. It is also possible to speak of an “origin effect” in the case of Iranians, even if it follows a different logic. Since the early 1980s most of the emigrants left the country to escape from the Islamic regimes brought in with the 1979 Revolution. In these cases, the decision to acquire Swedish nationality represents a rupture with the past and with the sending state. Such difference concerning the nature and logic of the “origin effect” is confirmed by data regarding onward migration: both Turkish and Iranian immigrants present high rates of onward migration. However, while the former tend to return to their home country, the latter are inclined to move onward to other Western countries (Klinthäll 2006; Kelly 2013).

17 To this regard, it is worth noticing that the Education Integration Index – along with other synthetic indexes elaborated – is sensitive to underlying indicators and to the selectivity of the migrant group considered. Iranians in Sweden, for instance, represent one of the more educated groups among foreigners, but score low on this Index, compared to other groups. This fact is related to their historical migratory profile, which is essentially comprised of family migrants and political refugees. 18 Data source: EUDO-Citizenship Statistics, 2008–2012.

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Fig. 6.3 The impact of ties between institutional actors on migrant integration in Sweden

Assessing the “Origin Effect”: Integration Amid Origin and Destination

The overall scenario of integration appears tangled and complex for the immigrant groups taken into account. If we consider the citizenship dimension, both seem significantly prone to being integrated into the host society. However, the scores concerning education and the labour market highlight significant difficulties. The high rates of unemployment point to significant barriers for labour inclusion, and the situation in terms of education is even more critical. Given some limitations concerning data availability and the difficulty of finding specific information in the literature regarding the immigrant groups examined here, it is difficult to come up with a clear-cut picture concerning the “origin effect”. The result of such an effect is ambiguous and appears to be strictly related to the actors involved, the relations among them, and the historic migratory profile. Figure 6.3 attempts to sketch the network between destination and origin countries, relevant for Turkish and Iranian immigrant groups living in Sweden Differences are clear-cut: on the one hand the Turkish network, which is made of trans-national relations involving state and non-state actors both in Turkey and in Sweden; and on the other, the network of Iranian immigrants living in Sweden, which is built essentially around civil society organisations and Swedish institutions, but often in contrast with Teheran’s governments. Diaspora and emigration policies arranged by Turkish state actors are complemented by multiple actions carried out by non-state actors at origin and at destina-

[email protected] 6 Asylum Seekers in Diaspora: Turks and Iranians in Sweden 97 tion, to which state-actors are often linked by agreements and practices. The purpose of emigrant-solidarity associations providing services to both the emigrants in the host country and to people in their hometowns, fits well with government ideal of diaspora engagement. On the one hand, they contribute to keep cultural bonds alive by creating awareness about responsibilities towards one’s hometown. On the other, through a wide range of activities from language courses to counselling services, they favour integration in the host country (INTERACT internal Report on Turkey).19 Both state and non-state actors strive for the social and economic integration of emigrants in the host countries, while aiming at strengthening the cultural ties link- ing diaspora and the home country. In contrast, Iranian migrants rely on a network with fewer “prongs”, as it is predominantly built around civil society organisations. If these represent a positive factor, the central government constitutes a concrete obstacle for integration in the host country. In-depth interviews highlight the “obstructionist” approach followed by the Teheran government, which seems to take advantage of difficulties experienced by Iranians residing in Sweden in order to instigate nationalistic sentiments. In this sense, two competing identity-building processes seem to clash over the Iranian diaspora community in Sweden: on the one hand the religious and nationalistic process supported by the Iranian government, and on the other a secular and “more open” process fomented by immigrant associations that are active in Sweden. Such centripetal forces seem to have opposite effects in terms of the integration of Iranians. Yet, notwithstanding a substantial convergence of interests between central administration and the civil society, even in the case of Turks it is difficult to identify a sharp “origin effect”. As highlighted by the literature, the policy framework issued by Ankara’s governments on the one hand favours the socio-economic integration of emigrants into the host society, but on the other, sustains a conservative position on the defence of Turkish culture and language abroad (Bilgili and Siegel 2011). A kind of approach that could entail contrasting effects on emigrant’s integration at destination. In the light of these remarks, Table 6.4 tries to capture the complex nature of the “origin effect”, by sketching the different configurations of actors and relationships characterising the cases of Iranian and Turkish immigrants in Sweden.

Conclusions

The present chapter has investigated the process of integration of Iranian and Turkish immigrant communities in Sweden in comparative terms. As highlighted by the statistical indexes and indicators considered, both communities present relevant

19 There is no data on whether emigrant solidarity associations receive funding from the Turkish state.

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Table 6.4 The origin effect: actors and their relationships Iran Turkey Historic emigration profile Refugees (and family Labour migrants (and migrants) family migrants) Actors involved Few state-actors at origin Several state-actors at origin Few non-state actors at Several non-state actors at origin origin Several non-state actors Several non-state actors at at destination destination Relationships between actors 1. Origin state-actors/Diaspora Discordance Concordance community 2. Origin state-actors/Destination Discordance Concordance state-actors 3. Origin state-actors/Origin Discordance Concordance non-state actors 4. Origin state-actors/Destination Discordance Concordance non-state actors 5. Origin non-state-actors/ Concordance Concordance Destination non-state actors

difficulties in terms of integration, especially as regards the labour market and the educational context. Overall, it is worth noting a similarity between these groups in their respective trends of integration. On the one hand, both show a high tendency to acquire the nationality of their country of destination – which is widely regarded as an important factor of immigrant integration – and on the other, they show poor results in education, which on the contrary, illustrates considerable difficulties with the integration process. Opposite trends include the labour market’s score in which, once again, the groups present interesting similarities with integration outcomes, barely higher than the average threshold considering INTERACT indexes scores (for details, see Chap. 3 of this volume). Notwithstanding the importance of migrants’ individual characteristics, this represents a puzzling outcome for Sweden, which is acknowledged as one of the most tolerant and open countries when it comes to policymaking in the area of integration. The theoretical approach undertaken points out that the “origin effect” constitutes a crucial dimension for understanding integration process and integration outcomes. In particular, the analysis carried out identifies some concrete dimensions related to this effect that deserve special attention. The first one regards the historic emigration profile of the origin country. An historical assessment of the migratory outflows of sending countries appears to be a vital dimension of analyses aimed at developing a sound understating of integration processes in the host countries. While integration outcomes at destination can be attributed – among others

[email protected] 6 Asylum Seekers in Diaspora: Turks and Iranians in Sweden 99 factors – to immigrants’ motivations, aspirations and individual characteristics, these are in turn strictly related to social, economic and political junctures present at origin. That may seem obvious, but it is only by gearing the analytical lens towards origin and extending the scope of inquiry to include actors and factors relevant here, that it is possible to capture a fuller understanding of the reasons under- pinning integration at destination. In this line two others key elements emerged from the analysis, one concerns the number and typology of actors at origin that are involved in the integration process of emigrants abroad, and the other regards the mutual relationships between such actors and those at destination. In this sense, Iranian and Turkish immigrants represent two opposite and paradigmatic cases: they depict two different configurations of actors and relationships. The Turkish diaspora community relies on a network of state and non-state actors active in both Sweden and Turkey, who share interests and coordinate actions concerning emigrants’ integration. On the contrary, Iranian emigrants can only rely on civil society associations which are active at their destination, and which work and pursue goals in opposition to the Tehran’s government. That said, despite different configurations of actors and relationships, the reciprocal dynamics of interactions among the actors involved can lead to analogous effects in terms of integration. Thus, for instance, a convergent attitude on dual nationality between the governments of Stockholm and Ankara, backed by information and the support of civil society, could be conceived as an additional driver underlying the high rate of naturalisation among Turks living in Sweden. On the other hand, the similar naturalization rates among Iranians could be related to the historical profile of emigrants (who tend to leave the country in opposition to the central government) in conjunction with the support of NGOs, which tend to favour the integration of the target community at destination (in contrast with the state- actors at origin). The magnitude and the direction of the overall “origin effect” depend on both the configuration of relationship (and tensions) among state and non-state actors at origin and at destination, and on how such pool of actors relate to diaspora community. Reframing integration as a three-way process expands the analytical perspective and allows us to consider actors, relationships, and dynamics that have so far received scant attention. The “origin effect” adds a degree of complexity to the analysis of immigrants’ integration process in host countries and, at the same time, presents itself as a new standpoint to address past and present issues in the research field on immigrant integration. A fuller understanding of integration processes requires the consideration of the role played by state and non-state actors in the countries of origin and, more generally, a thorough analysis of the configurations of relationships that they have with the set of actors at destination and with their diaspora. The importance of the “origin effect” as a conceptual construct does not only rest in its relevance for future theoretical development and empirical studies, but also in its importance as analytical tool for policymaking.

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References

Almqvist, K., & Hwang, P. (1999). Iranian refugees in Sweden: Coping processes in children and their families. Childhood, 6, 167–188. Andersson, R., & Weinar, A. (2014). Integration policies – Sweden country report. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT Research Report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/32656/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-%2014.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 17 Jan 2015. Bayram, N., Nyquist, H., Thorburn, D., & Bilgel, N. (2009). Turkish immigrants in Sweden: Are they integrated? International Migration Review, 43(1), 90–111. Bevelander, P. (2004). Immigration patterns, economic integration and residential segregation: Sweden in the late 20th century. Current Themes in IMER Research, http://dspace.mah.se/ dspace/bitstream/handle/2043/1219/386.pdf;jsessionid=3FD65A8F04854C30E0715858D615 9BEE?sequence=3. Accessed 17 Jan 2015. Bilgili, O., & Siegel, M. (2011). Understanding the changing role of the Turkish diaspora (UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series). http://migration.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/ understanding-the-changing-role-of-the-turkish-diaspora.html. Accessed 15 Mar 2014. Envall, A. (2012). Monitoring integration in Sweden. In R. Bijl & A. Verweij (Eds.), Measuring and monitoring immigrant integration in Europe: Integration policies and monitoring efforts in 17 European countries (pp. 313–325). The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research. Gabrielli, L. (2015). Corridor Report on France The case of Turkish and Tunisian immigrants. Migration Policy Centre (INTERACT Research Report 2015/14. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. ISBN: 978- 92-9084-294-1. doi:10.2870/739531. Heckmann, F., & Schnapper, D. (2003). The integration of immigrants in European Societies: National differences and trends of convergence. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. Hosseini-Kaladjahi, H. (1997). Iranians in Sweden: Economic, cultural and social integration. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International. Hosseini-Kaladjahi, H., & Kelly, M. (2012). Iranians and the Swedish labour market. In H. Hosseini-Kaladjahi (Ed.), The Iranian community in Sweden: Multidisciplinary perspectives (pp. 23–44). Tumba: The Multicultural Centre. Icduygu, A. (2008). Circular migration and Turkey. An overview of the past and present – Some demo-economic implications (CARIM AS 2008/10. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/ bitstream/handle/1814/8331/CARIM_AS%26N_2008_10.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 17 Jan 2015. Karci Korfali, D., Üstübici, A., & De Clerck, H. (2014). Turkey: Country and Research Areas Report (Mirekoç Project Reports 2/2014). Migration Research Center, https://mirekoc.ku.edu. tr/sites/mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/files/PP5%20-%20Turkey%20Country%20and%20Research%20 Areas%20Report.pdf. Accessed 17 Jan 2015. Kelly, M. (2011). Transnational diasporic identities: Unity and diversity in Iranian-Focused Organizations in Sweden. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 31(2), 443–454. Kelly, M. (2013). Onward migration: The Transnational Trajectories of Iranians Leaving Sweden. Thesis (PhD). Uppsala Universitet. Klinthäll, M. (2006). Immigration, integration and return migration. International Symposium on International Migration and Development. http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/ Symposium_Turin_files/P06_Klinthall.pdf. Accessed 14 Mar 2014. Regeringskansliet. (2009). Swedish integration policy. Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/13/77/34/5b7683a6.pdf. Accessed 24 Mar 2014.

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Roth, H.I., Hertzberg, F., Morkenstam, U., & Gottardis, A. (2013). Tolerance and cultural diversity discourses and practices in Sweden. ACCEPT PLURALISM Research Project. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27518/ ACCEPT_WP5_2013-24_Country-synthesis-report_Sweden.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 17 Jan 2015. Westin, C. (2006). Country profiles. Sweden: Restrictive immigration policy and multiculturalism. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/sweden- restrictive-immigration-policy-and-multiculturalism. Accessed 24 Mar 2014. Wiesbrock, A. (2011). The integration of immigrants in Sweden: A model for the European Union? International Migration, 49(4), 48–66.

[email protected] Chapter 7 Following the Global Competition for Talent: What Risks to Integration in the UK?

Anne Unterreiner

Introduction: Comparing Chinese and Indian Migrants in the UK

With 7.8 million migrants living in the country in 2013, the UK has among the largest foreign-born populations in the EU, just after Germany (10.2 million) and before France (7.5 million, Eurostat). In the last decade, the UK experienced a high diversification of its migrant population. While Indian migration flows became significant after World War II, given that India remained part of the British Commonwealth after its independence (in 1947), the significant migration flows from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are relatively recent, beginning in the 1990s. Differences also appear once we look at the policies in these countries of origin. While the Chinese state still controls its borders, determining both who gets in and who gets out, Indian emigration policy is much more liberal. However, migrants from the PRC and India have commonalities. In the UK, earlier migration waves from these two origin countries were characterised by a lower social background. In contrast, the new migrants from these countries are increasingly highly skilled.1 At origin, the current policies of India and the PRC also share common threads: they both see migration as being beneficial to the country whether migrants return or keep ties at origin while being abroad. And while neither

1 We focus here on 1st generation migrants from the PRC and India. Past research however frequently used self-declared ethnicity, thus including 1st, 2nd and 3rd generations, the “twice migrants” from Africa (migrants of India to former British colonies in Africa and their descendants) in the Indian case, migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan and Chinese ethnic minorities from South East Asia. A. Unterreiner (*) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 103 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_7

[email protected] 104 A. Unterreiner country recognizes dual citizenship, both the PRC and India give special status to people of Chinese/Indian ancestry, respectively. Although these groups’ migration flows vary deeply in terms of their past numbers, they currently share similar diaspora policies. Both are also comprised of highly skilled migrants. In this chapter, we will thus compare Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration in the UK, in order to understand how it is affected by destination and origin policies. To do so, we used a mixed methods approach. In parallel with a policy analysis, the INTERACT Quantitative team built a set of indexes of integration using a Principal Component Analysis (see Chap. 3), complete with descriptive statistics regarding other dimensions of integration (housing, language and national identity) obtained by the author from the Census bureau. In addition, nine qualitative interviews were carried out between August and October 2014 with representatives of Chinese organisations based in the UK. These interviews were conducted either face-to-face or over the phone. The study focuses only on legal migrants born in India or in Mainland China. Migrants of Indian origin who settled in Africa under the British Empire and then migrated to the UK after the independence of colonial African states, and migrants of Chinese origin who settled in South-East Asia (Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.) before relocating to the UK are not studied in this chapter. First, we will give an overview of the Chinese and Indian migration flows in the UK (section “Chinese and Indian Past and Present Migration Flows to the UK”). We will then present the policy framework that can influence migrants’ integration, at both origin and destination (section “Public policies at destination and origin affecting migrants’ integration in the UK”). Finally, we compare the integration of Chinese and Indian migrants living in the UK and examine whether the combination of destination and origin policies with the actions of civil society organisations helps to explain the current integration trends of Chinese and Indian migrants in the UK (section “The impact of destination and origin countries’ policies on Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration in the UK”).

Chinese and Indian Past and Present Migration Flows to the UK

Although the size of these migration waves differs widely, both Chinese and Indian migrants experienced a similar evolution: migration started with low-skilled flows from the British Commonwealth (Hong Kong in the Chinese case), and became a highly-skilled migration from the 1990s onwards.

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From Low-Skilled Migration from the British Commonwealth…

The first migration waves from India and China were comprised of relatively low- skilled migrants, and constituted migration from two countries that were highly connected to the UK. India was part of the British Empire, while the main migration flows from present-day China came from Hong Kong, a former British territory. At origin, the majority of the first migrants from India came from the Punjab, Gujarat, and Kashmir states. The migration flows were chain migrations from specific regions, religious groups, castes and villages (Williams2013 ). While 80% of British Sikhs2 are from the Jullundur District (Punjab), 70% of Indian Hindus and Muslims are from the Gujarat State (Peach 2006). This ethno-religious distinction coupled with a specific local background was imported to the UK. According to Peach (2006), Sikhs are mainly in London, Birmingham and Wolverhampton, while Hindus are in London and Leicester. Chain migration, job opportunities and the housing market influenced the implantation of Indian migrants (Castles 2009) until the 1990s as well as the diversification of Indian migration flows with respect to occupation and place of origin in India. In the 1950s and 1960s, Indian migrants were typically unskilled single males coming to work in British industries; the Sikhs typically worked in the West Midlands and the Indian Muslims, in the northern industrial cities (Peach 2006). Family reunification started after the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 (see below). The current literature regarding Chinese migrants’ socio-characteristics is very poor (Pang and Lau 1998). Since British statistics focus primarily on ethnic Chinese, they blur together different generations of Chinese, from different regions of origin (the PRC, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc.). Data from past research on Chinese migrants defined ethnically thus does not say much about legal Chinese migrants living in the UK. It is necessary to take into account the characteristics of the migration waves while analysing the integration of both Chinese and Indian migrants. What we know however is that, as with Indian migrants, past Chinese migrants had specific ties to the UK, since until the 1980s they came mainly from Hong Kong. From the nineteenth century until 1997, Hong Kong was a British Territory. Since then, Hong Kong has become a Special Administrative Region of China. The Hong Kong government enjoys significant autonomy. After the Tiananmen events, an important wave of emigration from Hong Kong took place, leading the British Parliament to pass the 1990 British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act (Chan and Chan 1997). Once in the UK, these migrants were highly represented in the catering industry (Pang and Lau 1998).

2 Within the Indian ethnic group, 45% are Hindu, 29.1% are Sikh, and 12.7% are Muslim (Peach 2006).

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… To Highly-Skilled Contemporary Migration

The majority of current Indian and Chinese migrants seem to be highly skilled people. Past research and census data show an evolution in this population since the 1950s. Since the 1990s–2000s, students and professionals from diverse regions of India came in significant numbers. At the same time, in 1997, family reunification rules were liberalized and men were allowed to enter the country as husbands, resulting in increased migration on these grounds. However, in 2008, the legislation became more restrictive (Williams 2013).3 Thus, depending on the migration wave from India under consideration, Indian migrants’ position in the labour market varies widely. The first migrants to come after WWII had manual positions. They were followed by their wives who were either homemakers or took the same type of jobs. In contrast, the most recent migrants, who came from the 1990s on, in general work as highly skilled professionals in the service industry, or work part-time in parallel with their studies and are willing to either return to India, or become professionals themselves (Williams 2013). In the mid-2000s, for instance, Indian nationals were the largest group of migrants benefiting from the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP, see below) (Somerville and Dhudwar 2010). In 2006 alone, around 81,000 Indian nationals entered the UK as highly skilled migrants or students (Ibid.). However, among Indian nationals who obtained a Tier 1 visa (see below), 62% worked in unskilled occupations, even though they came from well-off families, were highly educated and had studied in the UK (Williams 2013). Out of current Indian students around ¾ are men. They come predominantly from North and South-West Indian cities, and study scientific or business subjects in England at the postgraduate level. The importance of student migration from India can be explained both by pull factors in the UK (see below), and push factors from India, namely: the lack of university opportunities in India, the internationalization of higher education and the culture of migration among the Indian middle-class (Williams 2012). The Chinese migrants, although not as numerous as Indian migrants living in the UK, share this highly skilled profile. The migrants from Mainland China started to arrive in the 1990s. The majority come from the Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. The student population among them has increased over time, to the point of becoming the main group of migrants from the PRC (Latham and Wu 2013). This phenomenon is due to both push factors – China opening its borders, especially to students, and a limited number of university seats in the PRC – and to pull factors, namely British universities needing international students (see below). These migrants seem to be short-term. In 2011, the mean duration of residence in the UK was 2.1 years, given that half of these migrants arrived a year prior to 2011 (Wu 2014).

3 Language and income requirements and probationary periods were introduced. In addition, the allowable age of a spouse was increased (from 18 to 21) (Williams 2013).

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According to Census data, 92% of the international migrants to the UK were living in England in 2011, Indian (94%), PRC (86%), and migrants from Hong Kong (88%) following the same trend. Migrants born in India seem to be more concentrated by region than Chinese migrants. 36% of Indian migrants live in London, along with 23% of PRC migrants and 24% of the migrants born in Hong Kong. There is no important difference regarding the place of residence of Chinese from the PRC and Hong Kong, except for the fact that 19% of migrants from Hong Kong live in the South East, where only 11% are from mainland China. However, the spread of Indian migrants by region is close from the one of the international migrants in general. In addition, since current Chinese migrants are mainly students, Wu (2014) noticed a higher concentration of this population around universities: the more universities in one district, the more Chinese students in that area, and in consequence the higher the rate of Chinese students among the Chinese population there. In England and Wales specifically,4 Indian migrants are the largest group of migrants, representing 9.2% of the foreign-born population.5 Of this group, 23% arrived before 1971, and 38% before 1981. In 1951, it was the second largest group of migrants (5.9%). Many were descendants of British settlers. It remained the second largest group between 1961 and 2001, almost doubling in size between 1961 and 1971, and representing 10% of the migrants living in England and Wales in 1971 (Office for National Statistics2013 ). According to the 2011 Census, migrants from China (the PRC, excluding Hong Kong) residing in England and Wales were 152,498.6 China was the 11th most common country of origin of the migrant group that year. Three-quarters of the migrants from Mainland China have arrived in England and Wales over the last decade, mainly due to student migration, which represents 45% of this group (Office for National Statistics 2013). In 2009/2010, there were 60,705 international students from China in the UK, making China the principal country of origin for student migrants, before India (40,475). 45% of Chinese students studied business and management (compared with 37% of Indian students) (Williams 2012). At the same time, 102,241 migrants from Hong Kong were living in England and Wales in 2011. In both cases, the majority are skilled migrants: 89.7% of Chinese and 61.7% Indian residence permit holders came to study or work (see Table 7.1). Indian and Chinese students currently comprise the two largest groups of migrants coming from outside European Economic Area. However, as we can see from the type of residence permits given to Indian and Chinese migrants from 2010 to 2012, Chinese

4 When this chapter was written, data on the year of arrival of Indian and Chinese migrants living in Scotland was not publicly available. In Northern Ireland, over half of the Chinese (52% out of 2,223 migrants) and Indian migrants (57% out of 4,796) did not state their year of arrival in the 2011 Census. Data on Northern Ireland was thus not included here. 5 They are the 4th largest group (4% of the foreign born population) in Northern Ireland and the second largest group (6.4%) in Scotland. 6 They were 22,000 in 1992, and 48,000 in 2001. In 2011, they were the 10th largest group (1.9%) in Northern Ireland, and the 7th largest (4.2%) in Scotland.

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Table 7.1 Number of valid residence permits by reason for issuance (2010–2012) China (Including Hong Kong) India Number of Number of permits % permits % Family reasons 17,098 9.5 102,990 37.1 Education reasons 133,889 74.4 59,740 21.5 Remunerated activity reasons 27,296 15.2 111,467 40.2 Refugee status 405 0.2 17 0.0 Other reasons 1339 0.7 3159 1.1 Total 180,027 100.0 277,373 100.0 Source: Eurostat, MPC Team own calculation migrants mainly hold temporary visas (74.4% came with a student residence permit), while Indian migrants tend to hold mid-term visas, if not long-term ones (more than ¾ came for family or work reasons). These different types of residence permits might have implications for Indian and Chinese migrants’ integration to the UK, since temporary visa holders might not be able to stay in the country, and thus to actually integrate in the long run. At the same time, the number of asylum seekers from India and China has been relatively low and seems to be converging (Eurostat). Between 1998 and 2013, the highest number of applicants from India was 2410 (in 2003). And since 2005, the UK has considered India a safe country, which explains why among migrants from India, asylum seekers have become even scarcer (Williams 2013). Since 2002, the number of applicants who are PRC citizens has been declining, reaching 1040 asylum seekers in 2013, which was close to the number of applicants (1145) from India that year. Both the past and present migration flows described here and the integration of Chinese and Indian migrants in the UK are shaped by origin and destination policies to which I will turn now.

Public Policies at Destination and Origin Affecting Migrants’ Integration in the UK

In the past, Chinese (PRC and Hong Kong) and Indian migrants benefited from different entry conditions to the UK and different exit conditions from their countries of origin. In addition, Hong Kong migrants, migrants from Mainland China and Indian migrants were under different legislation based on their nationality. And at origin, they were, and still are, subject to different emigration and diaspora policies. However, the highly skilled migrants from both the PRC and India are a target group both at origin and at destination.

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From Laissez-Faire to British Policies Favouring Highly-Skilled Migrants

The British integration policy underwent significant changes during the post-war era. During the 1950s, the British authorities followed a “laissez-faire” (Castles 1995) integration model with respect to the New Commonwealth migrants. According to the 1948 Citizenship Act, any subject of the British Crown could enter the UK – that is to say, migrants from both India and Hong Kong. From the early 1950s, the issue of the migration “of colour” was raised in the political debate, in parallel with a strong extreme-right movement (Lapeyronnie 1993). Racial tensions led policy makers to implement a new integration model based on stricter entry conditions and the desire to combat discrimination within British territory. In this state of crisis, due to widespread questioning of New Commonwealth integration, the national cohesion model built before WWII and the decline of the Empire, measures following a multi-cultural approach were adopted from the 1960s on (Brighton 2007). The entry right of British subjects was limited in 1962, even though such a decision was against the interests of the British economy, which was in need of larger labour force. This measure led to a restriction of labour migration and an increase in family reunification. As a consequence, Britain focused on ethnic minorities and intergroup relations rather than on economic integration (Lapeyronnie 1993). After 20 years of restricted entry rights for migrants coming from the New Commonwealth to the UK, the 1981 Nationality Act was passed, which redefined British nationality as well as creating other categories of nationality. According to this Act, British subjects from India would lose their British nationality in the event that they acquired another one. At the same time, according to the 1985 Hong Kong Act and the British Nationality Order (1986), people from Hong Kong were either British Nationals Overseas (BNO), British Overseas citizens (BOC) or citizens of the PRC. The migrants who obtained the right of abode according to the 1971 Act were granted British citizenship in 1983. In Britain, nationality was not expected to lead to the integration of migrants and their descendants. The focus rather, was put on “race”: social cohesion was supposed to occur once racial discriminations were totally eliminated (Favell 1998). Pursuant to this goal, laws on interracial relations were passed during the 1960s. Because this legislation targeted direct discrimination, the Race Relations Act of 1976 was passed in order to fight indirect discrimination, creating the administrative framework to achieve this goal. In the 1960s–1970s, schools were active actors implementing this policy, and the idea of a “multi-cultural education” in order to achieve interracial respect and self-esteem at school emerged (Castles 2009). The multicultural approach set up in the UK followed the idea that different groups exist, each with their own identity, and that a single policy addressing these different groups should not be followed (Modood 2006). This policy has been delegated to local governments and to departments specializing in a specific field of action (Brighton 2007). It is based on collaboration between representatives of ethnic minorities and different public institutions fighting against discrimination.

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According to Brighton (2007), multiculturalism is of major concern to the central authorities in times of crises such as the Brixton riots of 1981 or the Rushdie affair (1988). At these times, the policy was questioned due to its failure to counter racial discrimination, leading to a lack of integration among the discriminated groups. This “Race Relations” policy, coupled with a restrictive immigration policy, was thus the British integration model until 2000, when this approach was questioned, leading to “civic integration” (Joppke 2004) measures. The summer riots of 2001, and the increasing visibility of far-right movements, the 9/11 attacks, the subsequent “war on terrorism” and the 2005 London bombing led policy makers to recon- sider the former British model of integration (Castles 2009), and to define a new integration policy called “beyond multiculturalism”. Policy makers still assert that Britain is a multicultural society. However, integration became one of the main goals of the policies implemented from 2000 on. Since 2004, naturalization cere- mony takes place (Latour 2007). And since 2005, naturalization has become condi- tional upon language skills and certain knowledge of British “core values.” In addition, compulsory “citizenship and democracy” courses have been introduced (Joppke 2004). These policies influenced both who could enter the country and how they could integrate within the country. However, as integration is a long-term process, and as Indian migration flows are older than the ones from the PRC, these policies impact Indian migrants much more than the migrants born in the PRC. Indeed, as we have seen above, three-quarter of Chinese migrants arrived between 2001 and 2011, and over half between 2007 and 2011. In parallel with these measures, which aim to integrate long-term migrants, including migrants from India and China, it is also essential to analyse British policies towards international students, even though these migrants comprise the majority of new and short-term migrants. During the 1990s, and especially after the Labour government came to power (1997–2010), the conception of labour migration had been deeply modified. In the context of economic growth in a globalized economy, which led to specific labour force shortages, employers lobbied for an opening of labour migration to fit their needs, while trade unions favoured a state controlled system as opposed to non- regulated illegal migration (Devitt 2012). This consensus led to the 2002 HSMP being replaced by the PBS (Point Based System) in 2008. Both migrants from India and China (except asylum seekers) must currently follow the PBS visa application procedure. Depending on the category or “Tier” in which they are in, they must provide proof of various requirements (a job offer, wages, language skills, financial resources, etc.). The procedure gives them a certain number of points, which may or may not allow them to obtain a visa, depending on the Tier that they are in: high- value migrants (Tier 1), skilled workers (Tier 2), low-skilled workers (Tier 3), students (Tier 4), temporary workers and youth mobility (Tier 5). At present, the UK strongly favours international student migrants, as it is the second most popular destination OECD country for international full-degree programmes just after the US, and has the most significant share of international students (15%), after Australia (Cerna 2014). These migrants currently hold a Tier 4 visa. To obtain such a visa, the applicants must have a Certificate of Acceptance

[email protected] 7 Following the Global Competition for Talent: What Risks to Integration in the UK? 111 from one of the 2,372 sponsoring universities (House of Commons and Home Affairs Committee 2011). From 1979 on, international students began to be seen as a source of revenue for universities (Cerna 2014). In the 1980s and 1990s, British universities faced significant reforms. The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act multiplied the number of universities while converting former polytechnics managed locally into “new” universities. At the same time, significant cuts in university budgets led them to look for other sources of funding (Williams 2012). By the end of the 1990s, international students were expected to “boost export earnings” (Cerna 2014). Many universities thus developed strategies to attract international students, through their websites, consultancies, fairs abroad and scholarships to foreign students. In India, the promotion of British universities has been well developed by the British Council, overseas campuses and exchange programmes (Williams 2012). Such strategies seem to pay off: international student fees represented £14.1 billion in the UK in 2008–09 (Ibid.). Their average fee is £8600 compared to £2200 for an EEA student (House of Commons and Home Affairs Committee 2011). Between 2001 and 2008, international students were encouraged to stay in the country and maintain ties with the UK through easy access to a work permit (Cerna 2014). From the PBS implementation on, students had to be sponsored by universities. The right to stay for 2 years upon graduation (Tier 1) was replaced in 2012 by the obligation to be sponsored by an employer for a highly skilled position (Tier 2). These restrictions for international students explain why this flow started to decrease from 2011 on. One exception to the rule came into force in 2013, allowing PhDs a year to remain in the country to conduct a job search. The current policy towards international students is not an integration policy as such; it is led by economic imperatives. It might, however, have an impact on the integration of migrants from China and India in the long run. Indeed, it deeply modified migration flows with respect to categories of migrants – the majority are currently highly skilled migrants with diversified places of residence at origin before migration to the UK.

Emigration, Return and Diaspora Policies in Mainland China and India

Emigration and diaspora policies are intertwined and shifted at the same time in both India and China. Emigration policies can be said to frame the mobility of Indian and Chinese citizens across the Indian and Chinese borders, respectively. Diaspora policies, however, are the public policies, which aim to create a common sense of “Indianness” or “Chineseness” among people belong to the Indian and Chinese diaspora due to their respective states of origin. In both countries, emigrants were first seen with suspicion, or ignored, while nowadays they are targeted as potential benefactors. This conception of Indian and Chinese emigrants could

[email protected] 112 A. Unterreiner impact their integration at destination, since it influences both who leaves the country and what are there opportunities at origin. From the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the opening up of the country and the economic reforms which followed the Cultural Revolution in 1978, emigration was strictly controlled by the Chinese State. Since 1978, China has been more and more open to the emigration of its nationals. Emigration policy aimed to benefit from emigration within the country and to improve the Chinese position in the geopoliti- cal order. From the 1990s on, the Chinese government started to build strong links with its international students, preferably postgraduates socialized in China with a strong Chinese identity, whereas the objective before was return migration. While in the 1980s these migrants were considered traitors to the Chinese nation under the State’s ideology, over 20 years later student migration became patriotic (Nyíri 2001). In parallel, the Chinese government started to encourage transnational entrepreneurship rather than return migration (Barabantseva 2005b). Compared to China, India has much lighter emigration legislation, focusing on the rights and duties of its emigrants. India became independent from the British Empire in 1947. Unless they had acquired another citizenship, people residing in Indian territory were British subjects. Following the 1950 Constitution, they lost this status and became Indian and British Commonwealth citizens. In the Cold War context, emigrants were viewed as traitors to the Indian nation. The evolution of the conception of the Indian emigrant started in the early 1980s. Now emigrants are seen as agents of development for the country (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). Indian emigration policies focus on labour migration, rather than on any other category of emigrants (Thapan 2014). Both countries are thus actively trying to benefit from emigration. However, contrary to the Chinese government, which is aiming at avoiding brain drain and benefit from brain gain, the Indian government currently seems to be focusing on the exit conditions of low-skilled labour migrants and remittances, and on the brain gain and remittances from emigration. Ethnic Indians and Chinese now enjoy more rights than other foreigners in their respective countries of origin, including an easier return to their country of origin. In China for instance, “ethnic Chinese are much easier given long-term or permanent residency” (Pieke and Speelman 2013). China seems much more active regarding returnees compared to India, although return migration for Chinese migrants is not legislated. According to Liu (2007), China seems rather uninterested in political, demographic or economic return migration. China has instead favoured the integration of these emigrants in their countries of residence (Ibid.). One exception is the Overseas Chinese with important human capital that could be shared with Chinese co-nationals: “Chinese administrations actively recruit overseas graduates and scholars and encourage them to set up businesses or contribute their knowledge, skills and patents to partnerships with Chinese businesses” (Pieke and Speelman 2013). If China is currently trying to benefit from the brain gain of Chinese nationals’ return migration, India does not seem to have such policy. “[T]he government has been more concerned with securing the investments of the Indian diaspora, than with attracting the return of expatriates themselves” (Giordano and Terranova 2012).

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China and India thus share common characteristics regarding their diaspora policies. From 1912 to 1955, Chinese citizenship was given to any ethnic Chinese. From 1955, dual citizenship was prohibited. Chinese living abroad were strongly encouraged to take the citizenship of their country of residence. At the end of the 1970s, this policy was maintained, but efforts were made to create links with Overseas Chinese in order to obtain remittances and visits from overseas Chinese, whatever their nationality (Pieke and Speelman 2013). “In the early 1990s a major break from the initial strategy of reliance on overseas Chinese citizens, returnees and their dependants took place, which points to flexible and de-territorial interpretation of citizenship by the PRC” (Barabantseva 2005b). This new definition of “Chineseness” was influenced by the fact that 90% of the ethnic Chinese living abroad were not Chinese nationals (Barabantseva 2005a). In order to increase the Chinese sense of belonging among ethnic Chinese, the Chinese government targeted young people. In addition, the State is actively working on the building of a Chinese pro-Beijing diaspora, through its associative network abroad (Ibid.). Like China, India developed a growing interest in its diaspora once it opened its economy. “[D]iasporic Indians became more useful as agents of trade, investment, and technology” (Naujoks 2009), because they could lobby foreign States on Indian interests. Like China, India did not recognize dual citizenship in its 1950 First Constitution. This prohibition was confirmed in the 1955 Citizenship Act. However, once it understood the benefits of an extended conception of “Indianness”, India recognized a specific status for foreign ethnic Indians. In 1999, the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) status was created. PIO cardholders benefit from simplified entry and have rights close to that of NRIs (National Resident of India), with the exception of political rights. The rights of foreign ethnic Indians were extended thanks to the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) status (2003 Amendment to the 1955 Citizenship Act). Thanks to this status, ethnic Indians can benefit from rights close those of NRIs, except the right to vote. Indeed, since 2010 (Representation of People Amendment Act), Overseas Indians holding an Indian passport can vote. In China, only Chinese citizens are allowed to vote and stand for Chinese elections. And for those residing abroad, these rights are limited to the county level of the people’s congress and below (Liu and Du 2014). Parallel to these measures regarding nationality and political rights, other measures were taken in both China and in India, in order to create a national sense of belonging to the country of origin, and thus maintain ties between the emigrants and their country of origin. The Chinese government realized the importance of overseas Chinese thanks to various conferences, which took place in China in 1977– 1978. As a first stage, the Chinese government recognized specific rights of overseas Chinese relatives in the 1982 Constitution and in the 1990 Special Protection Law. In parallel, different institutions were established such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and its local dependents (OCAO; 1978) and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and its local dependents (ACFROC; 1978)7 (Barabantseva 2005a). Different policies were implemented in order to give specific

7 The ACFROC was suspended from 1956 to 1978.

[email protected] 114 A. Unterreiner rights to overseas Chinese and returnees: university quotas, investment advantages, simplified entry procedures, etc. The OCAO launched a three-year plan on “Developing Motherland and Benefiting/Assisting Overseas Chinese” (2002) for instance, in order to link new migrants with overseas communities, and the latter with China (Ibid.). In parallel, different events have been organized for young overseas Chinese: the annual “Summer Camps for Foreign Youths of Chinese Origin on a Root-Seeking Trip to China” (since 2000) and the “Solidarity of Overseas Chinese and Foreign Nationals of Chinese Origin in the New Century” (2000) (Ibid). The first goal of these policies was to gather remittances and donations from Overseas Chinese. However, at present, the purpose of these policies is the transmission of human capital and lobbying and the promotion of a positive image of China abroad. In India, different programmes have been implemented by the Government in order to strengthen the ties of ethnic Indians with the country. Since 2003, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, an annual conference on the anniversary date of the return of Gandhi from South Africa, has been welcoming key personnel and politicians from the Indian State, Indian civil society representatives, and overseas Indians (Naujoks 2009). In parallel, specific programmes have been implemented in order to bind ethnic Indians with their country of origin: the Know India Programme (KIP, 2004); the Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC, 2006); the “Tracing the roots” programme (2008); the Global Indian Network of Knowledge (Global INK, 2009); and the Study India Programme (2012), for instance. The main goal of these policies is to encourage both remittances and investment in India from overseas Indians. Remittances procedures were eased from the end of the 1990s on (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). “India (…) has prioritised policies to encourage diaspora entrepreneurs and highly skilled individuals to invest in India” (Ibid.). Thus, both the destination and origin governments aim to benefit from highly skilled migrations. However, as we will now see, this political framework leads to debatable integration trends at destination.

The Impact of Destination and Origin Countries’ Policies on Chinese and Indian Migrants’ Integration in the UK

The combination of origin and destination policies is a key explanatory factor of Chinese and Indian migrant integration in the UK. It explains both who comes and who stays. This selectivity effect affects their education, labour market outcomes and access to citizenship. The policy frameworks and their evolution, both at destination and origin, indeed impact Indian and Chinese migrants’ opportunities to leave their country of origin, stay in the UK and return back home. Current Indian migrants are coming to the UK for the purpose of family reunion, as highly skilled professionals or as students; the first two categories are mid- and long-term migration, whereas students have more opportunities to migrate back to India or elsewhere. While at present Chinese migrants are mainly students, the majority do not

[email protected] 7 Following the Global Competition for Talent: What Risks to Integration in the UK? 115 stay in the UK. Up until the end of the 1990s, they were supposed to come back to their country of origin just after graduating (according to PRC state policies). They are now encouraged to participate in the human development of the country from abroad, and to return to the PRC whenever they choose (Xiang 2003). As we can see in Chap. 3, both Indian and Chinese migrants show good indicators of educational performance. If we look at the share of tertiary-educated, both Indian (46%) and Chinese (50%) migrants outperform the natives (31%). Educational performance, and the fact the Chinese migrants outperform Indian migrants in this regard thus seems to be driven by migrant selectivity effects, which could be influenced both by emigration and immigration policies. The same combination of origin/destination policies leads to a different conclusion, however, if we consider labour market integration. Indian migrants are indeed better integrated into the labour market than Chinese. This is due to the fact that Chinese migrants have a higher unemployment rate (14% versus 8%, compared to 8% of the natives), and are also mainly students. Both Chinese and British authorities are focusing on student migration, which seems to have a negative effect on successful labour market entry. When unemployed, the duration of the job search seemed shorter for Chinese migrants. One hypothesis is that they find jobs quickly. Another is that among recent graduate students, many are not allowed to stay in the UK. If they do not find a highly skilled sponsored job or lost it, they must leave the country (see above). However, due to the policy targeting highly skilled migrants, Chinese and Indian migrants occupy high-ranking positions once they are hired. Thus, the integration of Indian migrants into the labour market is much better than that of Chinese. Targeting students from China and highly skilled professionals from India in Britain, pushing for temporary student migration in China, and maintaining close ties with highly skilled emigrants in India has thus led to good labour market integration for Indians in the UK, but to a much more problematic integration for Chinese migrants. If we look at the gap between Chinese and Indian migrants regarding their access to citizenship (LFS, 2011, weighted data), migrants born in India more frequently hold British citizenship (35%) than migrants from the PRC (22%). This phenomenon can still be observed if we look at the recent acquisition of citizenship. The average number of citizenships granted from 2004 to 2008 was 2,778 for China (including Hong Kong)8 and 13,828 for India. In 2010, 15% of naturalized people were former Indian nationals, thus making them the largest group of immigrants to obtain citizenship by naturalization (Binder 2013), while fewer Chinese migrants tend to naturalize. In 2010, 4% of naturalized people were former Chinese nationals, thus being the sixth group of citizenship to be naturalized (Ibid.). However, the Indian share of British citizens is still not high. These findings cannot be explained by different policies at origin. Indeed, neither of these countries allows dual citizenship. One explanation might be that in the past, Indians belonged to the British Empire. Before the 1981 Nationality Act, people born in India were British subjects. This connection also led to important migration flows from India to the UK much

8 As we have seen above, migration flows from Hong Kong are older than those from the PRC. Thus current figures most likely involve migrants from the PRC, excluding Hong Kong.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% PRC IndiaPRC India PRC India PRC Arrived before 1981 Arrived 1981-2000 Arrived 2001-2006Arrived 2007-2011

Main language is not English and cannot speak English well or cannot speak English Main language is not English but can speak English very well or well Main language is English*

Fig. 7.1 Language skills of migrants born in India and the PRC living in England or Wales in 2011 (in %) (Source: Census 2011, own calculations) before migration from the PRC became significant.9 Thus if we consider access to nationality as an indicator of the integration of Chinese and Indian migrants living in the UK, the picture is thus less optimistic than with the short-term education indicator. In parallel with destination and origin policies’ effects and impacts on migration flows, one major explanatory factor of Chinese and Indian migrants’ integration is their year of arrival, and thus their length of stay in the UK. If we look at housing types, for instance, the year of arrival is essential data. According to Census data, while 64% of Indian migrants living in England or Wales in 2011 owned their own house, only 40% of Chinese migrants did, which is mainly due to their year of arrival. Among the Indian owners, 50% arrived before 1981, while among the Chinese migrants renting a private housing, 88% arrived in England and Wales between 2001 and 2011. The same applies when we look at migrants’ language skills (see Fig. 7.1). Although Indian migrants speak better English than Chinese migrants (regardless of their year of arrival), their language difficulties could be an explanatory factor of their integration during previous migration waves. However, the English skills of newer migrants have been better; of those who arrived between 2007 and 2011, only 7.8% of Indian migrants and 16.1% of Chinese migrants spoke English either not very well or not at all. In this case, the year of arrival reveals the characteristics of migrants, who at present have a highly skilled profile. English is indeed one of the official languages of the Indian State, which is taught at school. And in the PRC, English is taught both in high school and, since 1977, in Chinese universities (Liu and Du 2014). In

9 Previous ‘Chinese’ migration flows were actually from Hong Kong, not the PRC.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

PRC India

Fig. 7.2 Share of British citizens among migrants born in India and the PRC living in England and Wales, by year of arrival (in %) (Source: Census 2011, own calculations)

parallel, since 2010, student migrants need to prove that they have good English skills (close to the GCSE level) at destination (Cerna 2014). These language skills could explain both why students entering the UK both graduate from British universities and reach top-rank positions once they are employed. The year of arrival alone could explain Chinese migrants’ low access to citizenship (see Fig. 7.2); one condition of naturalization is a minimum 5-year residence in the UK. 51% of Chinese migrants and 21% of Indian migrants arrived between 2006 and 2011. This is also the main reason why Indian migrants naturalize much more than Chinese. The share of Indian migrants holding British citizenship is more significant than that of Chinese migrants. The fact that Indian migrants hold British citizenship more frequently overall is thus a consequence of the size of the group, and of the fact that Indian migration flows are much older than Chinese ones, which could be explained by the past connections between India and the UK. In addition, in the past, the PRC encouraged its migrants to integrate into their country of destination and take its citizenship. However, since the 1990s, in parallel with the opening of its borders, the PRC redefined “Chineseness” to include its migrants and their descendants in order to help them to keep their ties with China (Nyíri 2001); this could explain their current lower naturalization rate. Thus, origin and destination policies have both direct and indirect effects on Indian and Chinese migrants’ integration in the UK. In addition to their push and pull power over who comes and who stays, these policies differently influence migrant organisations in the UK. Indeed, from the 1970s on, the multicultural British policy towards ethnic minorities supported integration and interaction by the community and its representatives rather than by individuals. Civil society organisations are consequently major actors of migrant integration, according to the British State. In both the Chinese and Indian case, migrants’ civil society organisations are an old phenomenon (Benton 2003; Vertovec 1995). Another consequence of the multicultural discourse is the maintenance of “seg- mentary identities, traditions, and institutions among the Hindu population of

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Britain” (Vertovec 1995), parallel to the emergence of common Hindu organizations. The existence of different types of organisations is also observed within the Chinese community. Each type is represented in the interviews we conducted in the UK, allowing us to further analyse the position of these Chinese organisations within the Chinese community in the UK, and towards both the Chinese and British States. According to Xiang, there are first the “traditional community leaders”, who tend to “keep a distance from mainstream society” and who strongly feel Chinese without being close to the PRC State (Xiang 2003).10 Second, there are local civil society organisations with a strong local network, which are trying to benefit from state funding at destination. These local organisations emphasize integration and minority-majority mutual understanding as their main goals. Third, “new migrant” organisations with close ties with Beijing emerged in the 1990s (Xiang 2003; Nyíri 2001). These organisations are in charge of maintaining ties between migrants and the PRC, and disseminating the State’s conception of “Chineseness” abroad. In parallel, Confucius Centres were opened abroad by the Chinese State beginning in 2004 (Liu and Du 2014). In contrast, Indian state policy does not seem to structure Indian civil society organisations abroad. “Interviews with Indian migrant organisations show that such organisations either ignore the opportunities offered through the various schemes or declare that they have received no response to their request for support” (Vezzoli and Lacroix 2010). Finally, Chinese student organisations emerged on university campuses in the UK (Wu 2014). They are not necessarily connected to the other organisations. Their main goal is to integrate Chinese students within the campus, in order to avoid individual isolation (sometimes called the “Chinese Phantom” phenomenon), and within the Chinese community and the UK in general. One student organisation’s interviewee, for instance, considers loneliness to be an integration issue. This organisation has actively engaged in measures to deal with it through integration within the Chinese community in the UK: they organised a dating event for single Chinese students, a lecture on Han Costume (a type of traditional Chinese costume in the Han Dynasty), and the Spring Festival Gala to celebrate the Chinese New Year. This association is also aware of the current situation regarding work visas for Chinese students and is providing information on this issue, as well as organising business training and events. Another one of their primary aims is to serve alumni who intend to work in the UK by creating a platform for them to exchange career information. Thus, some Chinese organisations’ goals are to improve Chinese labour integration in the UK, thus mitigating the effect of the restrictive British policy towards international migrants. The Chinese community seems much more connected to the Chinese State than the Indian one. This is confirmed by the interviews we conducted. Among the six civil society organizations interviewed, five had either official or personal (through their president) relationships with the Chinese Embassy – even student organisations. One association, for instance, promotes Chinese education in the UK. It dis- tributes free Chinese textbooks and materials to UK schools through its relationship

10 Many of them migrated before 1949 or migrated from Hong Kong or Taiwan.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% PRCIndia PRCIndia PRCIndia PRCIndia Arrived before Arrived 1981-2000 Arrived 2001-2006 Arrived 2007-2011 1981

One or more UK identity only UK identity and non-UK identity Non-UK identity only

Fig. 7.3 National identity of migrants born in India and the PRC living in England and Wales, by year of arrival (in %) (Source: Census 2011, own elaboration) with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council in China. Whereas another organisation was a traditional organisation of migrants from Hong Kong with more limited ties to the Embassy but which organised events in both China and the UK. This might explain why the Chinese migrants who arrived in the UK from 1981 on, and who currently live in England or Wales, feel less British (or English or Welsh) than Indian migrants (see Fig. 7.3). They also feel less British than older Chinese migrants who arrived in the UK when the Chinese State considered them traitors to the country, and pushed them to assimilate in their country of residence rather than favouring return or transnational ties as it did later on. Thus, Indian and Chinese migrants’ national identification might be the consequence of both their duration of stay in the UK and different community structures that are more or less connected to the country of origin.

Conclusion: Contemporary Highly Skilled Migration Is Not Synonymous with Long-Term Integration

Even though contemporary Indian and Chinese migrants living in the UK are highly skilled migrants, they do not automatically integrate into British society. Depending on the indicator of integration under consideration, one might conclude that one group is better integrated than the other. Chinese migrants are better educated than Indian migrants. However, fewer hold a British passport, and more are unemployed.

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The position of Chinese and Indian migrants in British society seems to be the consequence of the combination of the origin and destination countries’ policies. These policies have indeed affected those who came to the UK and who stayed there in the past – as well as those who come and leave currently. At present, the countries of origin and destination are in a competition for talent. And in a context of stricter immigration policies, the countries of origin, especially China, are relatively more attractive to return migrants. State policies at destination and origin also influence the way the migrant community is organized and integrated into mainstream society. The structure of the Indian and Chinese communities is changing according to migration flows and evolving state policies. Integration is a long-term process. It is thus essential to consider the changing nature of the policy framework which constrains both the mobility and integration of migrants. In addition, this paper has shown that both the year of arrival and the duration of stay impact migrants’ integration. Since migration flows from India are older than the ones from the PRC, Indian migrants speak better English and more often own homes, have British nationality and identify as British than Chinese migrants. Destination and origin policies can thus affect migrants’ opportunity structures differently over time and have a direct and indirect effect on their integration in the long run. In addition, civil society organisations can both maintain ties with the country of origin and try to counterbalance the difficulties of integration in the UK.

References

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Oxford. http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2014/ WP14114_Cerna.pdf, Accessed 17 Nov 2014. Chan, Y. M., & Chan, C. (1997). The Chinese in Britain. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 23(1), 123–131. Devitt, C. (2012). Labour migration Governance in contemporary Europe. The UK case (FIERI Working Paper). http://www.labmiggov.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/UK-case-study- FINAL.pdf, Accessed 6 Nov 2014. Favell, A. (1998). Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain. London: MacMillan Press. Giordano, A., & Terranova, G. (2012). The Indian policy of skilled migration: Brain return versus diaspora benefits. Journal of Global Policy and Governance, 1(1), 17–28. House of Commons, & Home Affairs Committee. (2011). “Student Visas.” Report of session 2010– 11 7. http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/home-affairs/Studentvisas. pdf. Accessed 6 Nov 2014. Joppke, C. (2004). The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and policy. The British Journal of Sociology, 55(2), 237–257. Lapeyronnie, D. (1993). L’individu et les minorités: La France et la Grande-Bretagne face à leurs immigrés. Paris: PUF. Latham, K., & Wu, B. (2013). Chinese immigration into the EU: New trends, dynamics and implications. Europe China Research and Advice Network. http://www.euecran.eu/Long%20Papers/ ECRAN%20Chinese%20Immigration%20into%20the%20EU_%20Kevin%20Latham%20 and%20Bin%20Wu.pdf. Accessed 13 June 2014. Latour, V. (2007). Converging at Last? France, Britain and their Minorities. In G. G. Raymond & T. Modood (Eds.), The construction of minority identities in France and Britain (pp. 98–116). New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Liu, G. (2007). The right to leave and return and Chinese migration law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Liu, G., & Du, Z. (2014). The People’s Republic of China Policy and Institutional Frameworks, National Report (INTERACT Research Report 19). Florence: MPC. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32660/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-%2019.pdf?sequence=1, Accessed 10 July 2014. Modood, T. (2006). Multiculturalism, ethnicity and integration: Contemporary challenges. Communication. Leverhulme Programme on Migration and Citizenship Conference, “Ethnicity, Mobility and Society.” Bristol University. http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sociology/leverhulme/conference/conferencepapers/tmodood.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2012. Naujoks, D. (2009). Emigration, immigration, and diaspora relations in India. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/emigration-immigration- and-diaspora-relations-india. Accessed 16 June 2014. Nyíri, P. (2001). Expatriating is patriotic? The discourse on ‘new migrants’ in the People’s Republic of China and identity construction among recent migrants from the PRC. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27(4), 635–653. Office for National Statistics. (2013).Immigration patterns of non-UK born populations in England and Wales in 2011. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_346219.pdf. Accessed 6 Sept 2014. Pang, M., & Lau, A. (1998). The Chinese in Britain: Working towards success? The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 9(5), 862–874. Peach, C. (2006). South Asian migration and settlement in Great Britain, 1951–2001. Contemporary South Asia, 15(2), 133–146. Pieke, F.N., & Speelman, T. (2013). Chinese investment strategies and migration: Does diaspora matter? (Migration Policy Centre Research Report 6). Somerville, W., & Dhudwar, A. (2010). Indian immigration to the United Kingdom (International Migration and Diaspora Studies Working Paper 21). http://www.jnu.ac.in/library/IMDS_ Working_Papers/IMDS_Mar_2010_WP_21_37-520001.pdf. Accessed 6 Oct 2014.

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Thapan, M. (2014). Policy and institutional frameworks: India country report (INTERACT Research Report 28). Florence: MPC. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33214/ INTERACT_RR_2014_28.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 17 Nov 2014. Vertovec, S. (1995). Hindus in Trinidad and Britain: Ethnic Religion, Reification and the Politics of Public Space. In P. Van der Veer (Ed.), Nation and migration: The politics of space in the South Asian diaspora (pp. 132–156). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Vezzoli, S., & Lacroix, T. (2010). Building bonds for migration and development: Diaspora engagement policies of Ghana, India and Serbia (Discussion Paper). http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/ pdfs/building-bonds-for-migration-and-development/view. Accessed 16 June 2014. Williams, L. (2012). Indian student mobility in the UK: Opportunity and challenges. Migration Policy Centre (CARIM-India Research Report 2012/17. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Williams, L. (2013). Indian diversity in the UK: An overview of a complex and varied population. Migration Policy Centre (CARIM-India Research Report 2013/14. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Wu, B. (2014). Chinese student migration and integration in the UK: An exploration of links to and engagement with local communities in Nottingham (Working Paper, pp. 14–118). Oxford: COMPAS, University of Oxford. http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/ working_papers/WP_2014/WP14118_Chinese_Students_Integration_final_BW_1_ June_2014.pdf. Accessed 17 Nov 2014. Xiang, B. (2003). Emigration from China: A sending country perspective. International Migration, 41(3), 21–48.

[email protected] Chapter 8 Turkish and Russian Pathways to Integration in Germany

Agnieszka Weinar and Jan Schneider

Introduction

Germany has become an important immigration country in the European Union as it receives a major share of both total migration flows into the EU and intra-EU migrations. After a decade of relatively balanced or even negative net migration rates in the early 2000s, inflow picked up significantly and net migration to Germany reached well above 500,000 in 2014, its highest level since 1992. Given that 2015 marked a new all-time high for the intake of asylum seekers, numbering more than one million individuals, the net migration rate is likely to rise even further. Historically, the two most prominent groups of non-EU migrants in the country come from Turkey and Russia. Both groups represent different migratory realities on various levels. At the destination, different welcoming policies apply to these two groups since Turks come mainly as immigrant workers or as family members, while migrants from Russia come as a part of the German ethnic stream or as asylum seekers. The social context at the destination also matters: Turks come to a society that is very different ethnically and culturally, while migrants from Russia land in a not-so dra- matically different ethnic and cultural reality. While new Turkish immigrants come to join communities of Turkish ex-guest workers who stayed in Germany after the recruitment ban in late 1973 and became a stigmatized group, most Russians are a part of a broader Aussiedler community and have a different image among the German mainstream population.

A. Weinar (*) Migration Policy Center, European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected] J. Schneider Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), Berlin, Germany

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 123 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_8

[email protected] 124 A. Weinar and J. Schneider

But the differences also appear at the origin. Turkey is a close EU partner and a candidate for accession. Turkish migrants coming to Germany, however, are from various ethnic groups within Turkey. Many of them are in fact Kurds, who are in opposition to the Turkish state. The diversity of Turkish migrants is reflected in the way the Turkish state relates to its migrants abroad and especially to those in Germany. Russia perceives the EU primarily as a competitor on the European continent. Also, Russian-speaking Aussiedler have not necessarily come to Germany from Russia proper, but rather from ex-Soviet republics. Nevertheless, the Russian state claims a cultural affinity with these emigrants based on language. In this chapter we will analyse the differences and similarities between the two groups at the destination as well as between the two countries of origin in order to assess the integration outcomes of Turkish and Russian migrants in Germany. We will investigate the following question: what is the effect and what is the impact of the country of origin (Russia and Turkey) on integration outcomes in Germany? By “effect” we mean a two dimensional phenomenon: the socio-economic characteristics of a migrant originating from a specific country, i.e. the social and cultural capital brought with the individual, but also a host society’s set of beliefs about a given country of origin and its inhabitants which in turn shapes the limits of integration through different measures of distance and acceptance (see Unterreiner and Weinar, vol. 1, and Desiderio, Thibos and Weinar vol. 1). Country of origin effects can also be discernible when looking at the indirect effect of certain diaspora policies, for instance those which enhance cultural attachment to the home culture or forbid dual citizenship (we understand citizenship to be a form of social capital, see Bauböck and Vink 2013 and vol. 1). In order to address this question, the chapter is organised as follows. First, we give a general overview of migration trends from Turkey and Russia to Germany, showing differences between the two groups. Second, we briefly look into peculiarities of the labour market integration policies that concern the two groups, taking into account various migration categories that are relevant in each case (family reunification, refugees etc.). Third, we identify peculiarities of emigration and diaspora policies with links to populations in Germany. Finally, in the fourth section we discuss our empirical findings.

Immigration Flows to Germany Originating in Turkey and the Russian Federation

Even though migration studies have long focused on the Gastarbeiter who arrived from the 1960s in Germany, it would be inaccurate to state that Germany is a “late” or “new” immigration country. From the nineteenth century to the early 1900s, there have been mass movements of people to and from what is now the Federal Republic of Germany, due to emigration from impoverished regions such as Eastern Prussia and immigration to developing industrial areas (e.g. Ruhr region).

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Table 8.1 Bilateral agreements on guest workers (Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic) Parties of the agreement (or else, Other Western Other Communist/ but don’t leave this European neighbouring Socialist cell blank) countries countries countries Other countries Federal Republic Italy (1955), Turkey (1961 Yugoslavia South Korea of Germany (FRG) Greece (1960), and 1964), (1968) (1970) Spain (1960), Tunisia (1964), Portugal (1965) Morocco (1963) German Poland (1965), Mozambique Democratic Hungary (1967), (1979) Republic (GDR) Vietnam (1980) Source: Özcan (2007) and Flam (2007)

In 1960s, most German industries faced serious labour shortages in their fast growing economies. They thus introduced guest-worker programmes (see Table 8.1). Turkey was one of the countries with the largest number of guest workers in West Germany. Even though the Gastarbeiter policy officially ended in 1973, labour migration continuously constituted a significant share of foreign immigration, particularly since the end of the 1980s. At the time, the general recruitment ban was eased and selected groups were allowed for labour migration through ministerial regulations. In 1990, an “ordinance on exemptions from the recruitment ban” (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung) was adopted (and altered several times in the following years, according to labour market needs). Inter alia, it covered seasonal and contract workers, specialty cooks (chefs), and household aids. Furthermore, the ordinance unconditionally allowed for the immigration of researchers and qualified workers with special skills, as long as their admittance would be “in the public interest” of the country.1 However, most labour migration concerned low-skill occupations; for example 320,383 permits were granted for seasonal work and for help in the fairground and showmen business in 2005 (Özcan 2007). In addition, from 1 August 2000 until 31 December 2004, close to 18,000 “green cards” were issued for skilled workers in information technology (Özcan 2007).2 Turkish migrants are traditionally considered Gastarbeiter par excellence while Russian immigrants were predominantly perceived as ethnic German resettlers (Aussiedler). However, the picture is more nuanced, even in historical perspective. As shown in detail by Sirkeci and his colleagues, Turkish migration outflows were a result of labour migration in the 1960s, then family reunification in the 1970s–1980s, refugees and asylum seekers in the 1990s, and irregular migration in the 2000s (Sirkeci et al. 2012). Between 1999 and 2003, 12% of asylum seekers

1 Section 5, Nos. 1 and 2, Verordnung über Ausnahmeregelungen für die Erteilung einer Arbeitserlaubnis an neueinreisende ausländischeArbeitnehmer (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung). 2 In 2005, a new immigration law came into force, consolidating the various exceptions from the recruitment ban within a new Residence Act and a revamped ordinance for employment. The EU Blue Card for highly-skilled employment was incorporated into German regulations only in 2012.

[email protected] 126 A. Weinar and J. Schneider were from Turkey, 81% of whom were Kurds (Özcan 2007). This last significant migration flow was primarily a result of the repression of Kurds in the 1980s–1990s. The immigration of populations from Russia to Germany is to a large extent linked to the past settlement of “Germans” within the Russian Empire. There were 2.4 million Germans living in the Russian Empire in 1914 (Ingenhorst 1997). To open the door to the return of German minorities after World War II, the West German state adopted a broad definition of German nationality in its 1949 Constitution.3 In 1953, a special legal base, the so-called Federal Expellees Act (Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz – BVFG) came into force, regulating the admittance of several million expellees and refugees, who had dwelled in for- merly German territory in Eastern Europe. To this day, following several amend- ments, the BVFG governs also the immigration, distribution, and integration of ethnic German repatriates and their dependents from all parts of Europe and the former Soviet Union. In addition, people identifying themselves as Jewish could also migrate to Germany from the (Post-)Soviet States, both to the Democratic Republic (GDR) and then to unified Germany, as “Kontingentflüchtlinge”. However, Aussiedler migration has become all but a quantité négligéable, if compared to the general inflow from Russia. Figure 8.1 below illustrates the decreasing trend of ethnic migrations to Germany. Since 2007, less than 5000 ethnic Germans per year (including spouses and descendants) immigrate to Germany from the Russian Federation. This reflects a longer trend that started in 2006, when the official ethnic migration policy was phased out.4 Thus, it is safe to assume that majority of Russians migrating to Germany since 2006 have not been ethnic Germans.

Recent Migration from Turkey and the Russian Federation

As a consequence of differentiated immigration paths, the total stock and characteristics of the migrants originating in Turkey and the Russian Federation differ significantly.

3 Art 116 of the Constitution states: (1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within its boundaries as they existed on 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such a person. (2) Former German citizens who between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945 were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall on application have their citizenship restored. They shall be deemed never to have been deprived of their citizenship if they have established their domicile in Germany after 8 May 1945 and have not expressed a contrary intention. 4 The small, yet significant increase for 2014 and 2015 can be attributed to 2013 legislative changes, which facilitated the policy of family reunification for ethnic Germans.

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240,000 220,000 200,000 180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 * 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 15 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 2002 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 2014 20

All Countries of Origin thereof Russian Fed.

Fig. 8.1 Inflows of ethnic Germans to Germany, 1992–2015 (*). Notes: (*) preliminary data as of January, 2016 (Source: Bundesverwaltungsamt (BVA, Federal Administrative Office), Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees))

In 2013, out of 7,633,628 foreigners (people who do not have a German passport) who were registered in the Central Register of Foreigners, roughly 20% (1,549,808) were born in Turkey while less than 3% were born in the Russian Federation. These numbers reflect a differentiated policy towards the two groups: a much higher number of ethnic Germans born in the Russian Federation reside in Germany but they receive German citizenship at entry and thus can no longer be identified in the statistics on foreigners. This data issue can be remedied by using census data. According to the 2011 census, there were 1,366,920 migrants born in Turkey (8.9% of the total migrant population) and 864,120 migrants born in Russia (5.6% of the total migrant population) living in Germany. Thus, migrants from Turkey remain non-citizens in Germany to a much larger extent that migrants from Russia. As regards current migration patterns, in 2014, 20,748 Turkish nationals (4.0% of the total non-EU immigration) and 19,335 Russian nationals (3.7%) entered Germany for various purposes (see Table 8.2). Both groups of migrants enter Germany through the family reunification channel, but this is more relevant in the case of Turkish newcomers. In 2014, 35% (36% in 2013) of the entrants coming from Turkey fell in this category, in contrast to 22% (15% in 2013) of those coming from the Russian Federation. The longer-term trend confirms the importance of this channel of migration for both groups, albeit with varied patterns. Turkish and Russian immigrants have consistently been the top two groups applying for family reunification. It must be noted, however, that many of the Russian applicants are related to ethnic Germans. The trends show that Turkish family reunifications have been gradually decreasing, while Russian family migration was on the rise, especially coinciding with the financial crisis.

[email protected] 128 A. Weinar and J. Schneider Humanitarian Reasons(*) 1,619 4,957 191,523 Family 7,317 4,286 63,677 Employment 1,352 1,404 37,252 Education/studies 1,526 2,504 57,759 , own elaboration) , own Settlement Permit 2,818 321 5,911 2014 Female 8,338 11,773 210,179 and other forms of (preliminary) protection Total 20,748 19,335 518,802 Duldung Top residence purposes and residence titles issued to Turkish and Russian nationals in 2014 Turkish residence purposes and titles issued to Top

Origin/ Residence title Turkey Russian Federation All Other Non-EU nationals Table 8.2 Table Notes: (*) Includes the Nationals (BAMF of Foreign Source: Central Register

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Another important migration channel is employment (for more details see section “Integration trends of Turkish and Russian migrants in Germany”). The important feature of labour migration from Russia is that over 60% of people coming to Germany for work are women (Table 8.3). Russian nationals are featured more often than Turkish among the EU Blue Card holders (512 to 184) and professionals (258 to 109) in 2014. They also entered the country more often as self-employed (83 cases in 2014 to 51 cases of Turkish nationals). However, Russian workers tend to obtain more often permits for work requiring no professional skills (50% in 2014) than Turkish (11% in 2014). As regards further differences in migration patterns, Russian nationals enter Germany seeking international protection much more frequently than Turkish nationals. In fact, it is the most important reason for immigrant entry in the case of Russian Federation. Turkey is no longer an important country of origin for asylum seekers coming to Germany. 2015, when Germany received a total of 476,649 applications for international protection, was the fourth year in a row in which Turkey, with 1767 asylum seekers, was not among the top ten countries of origin. In the same year, there were 6,200 applications from Russian nationals, making the Russian Federation the eleventh most important country of origin for asylum seekers in 2015. The majority of applicants from Russia are Muslims, which suggests Chechen asylum seekers. The gross protection rate, i.e. the percentage of asylum seekers who receive asylum, refugee status or subsidiary protection, also differs between the countries of origin. While in 2015, almost 14.7% of Turkish applicants were granted international protection, the rate among Russians was only 8.3%. All in all, Turkish and Russian migration reveals diverse patterns that in turn foretell diverse integration outcomes. Differences as regards purpose of entry, different gender structure and important differences in skills stem from the different cultural background and are obvious country of origin effect. But as we will explain in the next section, integration policies towards these groups can strengthen this effect, offering diverging integration pathways.

Table 8.3 Entry for employment purposes according to Section 18 of the Residence Act (*), 2008–2013, by country and sex Turkey Russian Federation Year/country of origin Total % of women Total % of women 2008 1,417 14.5 1,701 63.7 2009 1,029 15.3 1,460 69.2 2010 912 21.5 1,411 67.1 2011 1,209 16.2 1,553 62.2 2012 1,473 12.0 1,329 64.7 2013 1,133 13.9 1,020 66.5 2014 1,115 16.4 797 69.8 Notes: (*) not including Blue Card holders, highly skilled and self-employed Source: BAMF (2014)

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Institutional and Policy Framework of Integration in Germany

The current legal and institutional framework of integration in Germany has several institutional sources and involves a plethora of actors, including both public administration and civil society organizations on different levels of the Federation. While the establishment and explicit promulgation of “integration policy” at the national government level occurred only recently, dating to the Immigration Law of 2005, specific policies have been in place even before 2005 which fostered the inclusion of particular migrant groups into German society. Migrants from the Republic of Turkey and from the Russian Federation (or other successor states of the Soviet Union) belong to a variety of status groups. Ethnic German resettlers and their descendants (Aussiedler or Spätaussiedler) disposed of an elaborate system of measures that fostered integration up until the 1990s. On the contrary, the majority of persons with a Turkish background share links to the peak of labour migration to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, in the light of the German citizenship law, which was dominated by the principle of an “ethnic nation” up until 1999 (jus sanguinis), a significant proportion of Turkish-origin migrants still reside in Germany as denizens, more than 55 percent of whom are Turkish nationals (se section “Immigration flows to Germany originating in Turkey and the Russian Federation”). As such, there was no comprehensive integration policy available to them for the greater part of post-World War II German migration history. Eventually, migrants from Turkey and Russia are represented in other distinct categories such as asylum applicants, recognized refugees, or students. The following sections provide an overview of German policies and institutions – both current and former – for immigrant integration, with particular emphasis on migrant groups from Turkey and the Russian Federation.

Integration of Turkish Guest Workers and Aussiedler from the USSR Before 2004

The underlying idea of the German guest-worker model of the 1950s and 1960s was the establishment of a flexible system of temporary labour migration. Official policy denied that Germany had established immigrant settlement and refrained from any attempt to foster integration. However, integration became a bottom-up process, predominantly at the local level and at the workplace, through trade unions and welfare associations. A crucial prerequisite for the pragmatic approach to integration was the fact that foreign migrants were able to comprehensively participate in the German system of social security from the very beginning of their employment (Heckmann 2003). Yet their political or cultural integration was not at the scope of the policy.

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Unlike in the case of foreign workers, an elaborated infrastructure for integration had been set up for Aussiedler from the beginning. Beyond the immediate granting of German citizenship, ethnic Germans and their spouses and children had benefit- ted from a comprehensive and coordinated package of support measures and financial aid since 1976, which formed a pathway to social, educational, vocational, and linguistic inclusion (see Table 8.4). Originally, they could receive full unemployment benefits. This benefit was capped and a (much lower) “inclusion” aid was introduced in 1990. Furthermore, pensions were paid to the retirees according to German assessment criteria, since the countries of origin did not provide pension- schemes for emigrants. After leaving the initial Aussiedler reception centre, transi- tional homes were financed through Federal,Länder , or municipal budgets. Despite the fact that the measures for inclusion were severely curtailed after 1992, Aussiedler remained a privileged immigrant group for whom a distinguished system of integration continued to exist until the Immigration Law came into force in 2005, when rights associated with integration were largely approximated for the major immigrant groups.

Table 8.4 Federal measures for the inclusion of ethnic German resettlers (1976–1992) Area of integration Measures Language acquisition Extensive language courses for all demographic groups, including workforce, retirees, and home-maker family members (women) Youth/education Measures targeting all young Aussiedler between 6 and 30 years of age for up to 30 months (Federal budget entitled Garantiefonds): Language support School/homework aid Vocational training aids Social, cultural, and recreational activities Social establishment/compensation Federally subsidised low-interest loans to start one’s own household; Equalisation of burdens through state subsidies covering lost households and a general compensation (according to the Equalisation of Burdens Act) Vocational/labour market Facilitated recognition of qualifications and certificates acquired in foreign countries; Referral into employment, taking into account personal qualifications (according to the Employment Promotion Act); Financing of special retraining and advanced education measures Self-employment Start-up aids for entrepreneurs Low-interest loans for self-employed Privileges for enterprises run by Aussiedler in public tenders Source: Own non-exhaustive compilation based on Haberland (1994), IB (1995), and other sources

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Establishment and Coordination of Integration Policies

The 2004 immigration law contributed to the goal of reorganizing and clarifying responsibilities for integration measures assigned to the different governmental levels within the German body politic. One task was to overcome the rather rigorous differentiation of target groups such as labour migrants, refugees, and ethnic Germans in favour of a needs-based approach. Therefore, in the specific case of Turkish and Russian migrants, we can discern a similar approach to fostering integration ever since. For the first time, specific measures to promote integration were enshrined in legislation: integration courses with defined standards,5 uniform migration counselling (merging the former foreigners’ social counselling and the Aussiedler social counselling), and the establishment of a programme on integration,6 all to be carried out by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Bundesamt( für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) through a special integration department. Thus, migrant workers, self-employed persons, family members, persons entitled to asylum, refugees (as defined by the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees), Jewish immigrants, as well as ethnic German resettlers all have a legal claim to participate in an integration course. The course generally consists of 600 teaching units of German language instruction and 60 hours of orientation instruction on everyday knowledge of topics such as rights and obligations, democracy, history, culture, and everyday customs. Immigrants with additional advancement needs (e.g. parents, women, youth) may take a course of up to 900 teaching units. In individual cases, attendance of integration courses may amount to a total of 1,245 h. However, integration remains a political task with multiple vertical competencies. Responsibilities for integration policy, with different legal and political definitions, exist at Federal, Laender, and local levels. For instance, the responsibility for education and the school system – undoubtedly the most pivotal sphere with regard to young immigrants’ opportunities and thus a powerful integration tool – is fully under the auspices of the Laender: “it is no exaggeration to say that in Germany there are basically sixteen different school systems” (Bommes and Kolb 2012). For instance, not all Federal States cater for mother-tongue instruction in schools; in some Länder, Turkish consulates offer classes in the afternoon; only very few Länder also cover the Kurdish language. The different integration-related tasks of the three government levels are partly distinct from one another, yet still overlap in some areas (see Table 8.5).

5 Implementation and delivery continue to follow the principle of subsidiarity. For instance, integration courses are offered by the local community colleges (Volkshochschulen) and a range of third-sector organisations. 6 See Sections 43–45 and 75 of the Residence Act. The Federal Integration Programme is coordinated by the BAMF and regularly involves representatives of the Länder, the municipalities, integration commissioners from all state levels, trade unions, industry associations, and religious organisations. Its focus is on language acquisition, labour market integration, integration through education, and social integration.

[email protected] 8 Turkish and Russian Pathways to Integration in Germany 133 School Maintenance and Financing care Youth of Child and Organisation and crèche) institutions (e.g. kindergarten Cultural services or general social advisory services and municipal housing Urban development (Main supporting scheme, funded by the and the States: “Urban Federal Government Needs – Special Development With Districts The Social City“) Municipal Governments part of the Local municipalities are States, of the Federal organisation administrative serving as implementing authorities. But they municipal self-governance: also practice

) Länder ) and other sources Exclusive legislation in Education Policy in Education Policy legislation Exclusive (School and University) Naturalization authority (implementation of naturalization courses shall be citizenship law; for preparatory purposes) offered Implementation of school-based vocational Implementation of school-based vocational training or Freedom to adopt additional laws (e.g. diversity fostering integration regulations in public administration) Recognition of Foreign Professional Recognition of Foreign Qualifications (for most professions) Adopting laws specifying the national Adopting laws on child/youth care (e.g. legislation framework early child care in kindergarten) 2012 State Government ( State Government for the responsible States are The Federal and implementation of national administration and have their own specific legislative legislation competencies:

Service (Federal Ministry for Discrimination Agency)

Competencies for integration-related policy areas within German Federalism policy Competencies for integration-related

Integration courses for immigrants Integration Migration Advisory Service for adult immigrants Migration (Federal Ministry of the Interior) Social Code (most labour/welfare legislation, legislation, Social Code (most labour/welfare for child/youth care) including frame legislation Professional Recognition of Foreign Qualifications (for some professions) Citizenship law (Non-EU nationals may obtain Citizenship law stay of 8 years) citizenship after a legal Anti-Discrimination (General Equal Treatment Treatment Anti-Discrimination (General Equal Act, Federal Anti- Youth Migration Youth and Women Senior Citizens, Affairs, Family Youth) Federal (National) Government Following the 2004 Immigration Act, the promotion Act, the promotion the 2004 Immigration Following transferring was centralised, of integration States to the Federal the Federal authority from in the following areas: Government

The Federal level has legislative responsibilities for responsibilities has legislative level The Federal may have which a number of other policy areas, integration: on migrant effects or indirect direct

Source: non-exhaustive own compilation based on SVR ( own Source: non-exhaustive Table 8.5 Table

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Over the past 15 years, there has been a clear trend towards “streamlined” and extended integration policies for the various migrant groups when it comes to measures such as language courses or counselling structures. The special treatment of ethnic Germans was for the most part abandoned and now all migrants benefit largely from the same public integration measures, whether they come from Turkey, the Russian Federation, or any other non-EU country; whether they migrate for the purpose of labour, family reunion, or education; or whether they are granted protection. However, several groups whose stay is deemed temporary are excluded from integration classes, including asylum seekers and persons with exceptional leave to remain (toleration despite the obligation to depart), as well as the contract workers. However, the number of Turkish contract workers is currently down to a few hun- dred per year.

Recent Policy Changes

A number of quite recent changes in public policy have the potential to make strong impact on the conditions for the integration for immigrants from non-EU countries and for their offspring, particularly with regard to communities with Turkish roots. Three of them sparked particular attention: In April 2012, an Act to Improve the Assessment and Recognition of Professional Qualifications Obtained Abroad entered into force. It creates a general legal entitlement to an assessment procedure for foreign professional qualifications that are equal to the same or similar qualifications or certificates in Germany. The act eases the inclusion of migrants into Germany’s regulated labour market, thus facilitating their integration into society. The act also broadly nullifies the connection between employment and German citizenship, since applications can also be submitted from abroad. However, for a significant number of professions, the FederalLaender needs to adopt separate recognition laws at the state-level, a process which has proceeded at a slow pace (see SVR 2014). In July, 2014, the German parliament adopted legislation that allows young people of migrant backgrounds, who were raised in Germany and who are in possession of a dual citizenship, to keep both nationalities upon reaching legal age. Hitherto, these young adults would have had to opt for one nationality between ages 18 and 23 (the so-called option scheme), which marked the strongest constraint to the jus soli legislation for children born to foreigners residing in Germany, in force since the year 2000. In particular, second-generation migrants with a Turkish background will benefit from the 2014 law, since Turkey is by far the most important country of origin for parents whose children were previously affected by the option Scheme (42% of all those born as “children of foreign parents” after January of 2000, which comprises approximately 200,000 young adults; see Worbs 2014). On 10 July 2014, the EU Court of Justice ruled that requiring a basic knowledge of the German language as a condition for granting a visa for the purpose of reunification of spouses of Turkish nationals residing lawfully in Germany is contrary to

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EU law, because it is incompatible with the ‘standstill’ clause of the Association Agreement with Turkey.7 Since 2007, foreign spouses of most non-EU nationals living in Germany have had to demonstrate basic command of the German language prior to being granted entry. Proof of language ability is waived for dependents who are nationals of certain countries. These countries, whose citizens also benefit from visa-free travel to Germany, include Australia, Israel, Japan, Canada, and the United States – but not Turkey or the Russian Federation. Officially, the language requirement is supposed to foster integration and prevent forced marriages; yet, due to its selectivity, the German “pre-departure integration strategy” is strongly opposed by migrant organisations as being discriminatory and constituting an instrument for restrictive migration control (Groenendijk 2011). At the end of July 2014, following the ECJ judgement, the Federal Foreign Office issued a circular decreeing that German consulates in Turkey may not decline a visa application solely because a language test has not been completed. Despite the fact that is still mandatory to prove appropriate language skills, this ministerial decree will most likely facilitate the migration of spouses from Turkey, at least to some degree.

The Role of Migrant Associations

Beyond the concrete integration-related legislation, policies, and measures provided for by the German government and bureaucracies on the different federal levels, a number of other actors may affect (either positively or negatively) the integration of migrants from Russia and Turkey. As regards the major countries of origin, out of the roughly 16,000 “associations of foreigners”, approximately 11,000 can be regarded as associations dominated by people of Turkish origin (Pries 2013, citing 2001 data). Furthermore, many of these Turkish organisations keep up strong ties with their countries of origin: “in fact it is rather difficult to find an organisation, which does not deal with the political agenda of the country of origin or which does not represent a distinct position towards the Turkish Government and its foreign policy” (Sezgin 2010; own translation). There are more than 20 umbrella organisations alone, most of which focus on fostering integration, although not exclusively. For instance, the “Turkish Community in Germany” (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland e.V.) has become a firm voice in almost all integration debates. It was only recently that the association lobbied for the adoption of a Federal Law for the Inclusion and Participation of Migrants.8 The spectrum is not as elaborated among the associations of Russian-origin migrants. This can be attributed primarily to the fact that for the most part, as ethnic German immigrants, migrants from Russia or the Soviet Union were in a privileged

7 Case C-138/13 (Naime Dogan vs. Bundesrepublik Deutschland). 8 See http://www.tgd.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Teilhabe-Gesetz_3.%20Entwurf.TGD. BK.16.3.2012.pdf [Accessed 8 December 2015].

[email protected] 136 A. Weinar and J. Schneider situation of reception entitlements, lacking the need to fill gaps and lobby for support and integration or to establish a strong interest representation. On the contrary, it was the established German Welfare organisations competing with concepts and project proposals for integration measures to cater for the needs of Aussiedler, particularly since the late 1980s (see Hunger and Metzger 2011: 58). The central political interest organisation representing ethnic Germans since 1958 is the Association of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen). As an umbrella lobbying organisation, it comprises 20 different national kin associations (Landsmannschaften), such as the Federation of German Compatriots from Russia (Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland) for those Aussiedler from the ex-Soviet states. These kin associations consider their role to be interest representation. They include cultural associations as well as social support organisations that provide integration measures, among other things. With a focus on trade and entrepreneurship, migrant business associations sometimes take over integration-related tasks as well, particularly with regard to labour market integration, anti-discrimination, diversity, and inter-culturalism. There is a well established spectrum for both countries of origin, with organisations such as the Federal Association of German-Russian Entrepreneurs (Bundesverband Deutsch-Russischer Unternehmer e. V.), the Russian-German Entrepreneurs’ Association (Russlanddeutscher Unternehmensverband e. V.), the Association of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Industrialists (Verband Türkischer Unternehmer und Industrieller in Europa e. V.), the Turkish-German Chamber of Commerce and Trade (Türkisch-Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer) and the Association of Turkish-European Entrepreneurs (Bund Türkisch-Europäischer Unternehmer e. V.). In addition to these, migrant associations and cooperative networks with specific agendas have been established, e.g. to support the educational attainment of their communities, both in the formal and non-formal educational sector. Parents’ associations are becoming more and more meaningful in this context, as the average performance gap between migrant and mainstream pupils in public schools is still huge, particularly among Turkish-origin youth. For instance, the Federation of Turkish Parents’ Associations (Föderation Türkischer Elternvereine in Deutschland e. V.), serves as an umbrella interest-representation organisation for all Turkish parents’ associations, fostering education, schooling, and general youth advancement for young Turkish-origin migrants. Similarly, as an umbrella organisation for a number of regional or local parents’ associations, the Federal Association of Russian-Speaking Parents (Bundesverband russischsprachiger Eltern e. V.) takes a stand for equal educational opportunities, competitiveness, and bilingualism for Russian-speaking children and youth in Germany. However, the various integration policy provisions within Germany and the spectrum of state and non-state actors are not the only elements shaping integration outcomes. The influence of the country of origin should also be taken into account. And not surprisingly the policies of the countries of origin affect some groups of emigrants more than others.

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Emigration and Diaspora Policies of Russia and Turkey Towards Migrant Communities in Germany

Emigration Policies

As already discussed in the introduction, the emigration policies of these states deal with all forms of regulations on outward mobility, be it facilitating such movements (e.g. agreements on preferential mobility) or making them more difficult (e.g. through exit restrictions) or less desirable (e.g. retention strategies). Turkey and the Russian Federation represent two different approaches to emigration and to outward mobility in general. Soviet Union and also Russian governments have not been particularly interested in facilitating outward mobility and the authorities reacted largely indifferent to emigration of Aussiedler as well as Chechen asylum seekers. Russia has no large migration or mobility program with Germany, with the exception of a so-called guest worker agreement dating from 1993, providing a maximum quota of 2000 Russians per year to be employed for up to 18 months for the purpose of occupational or language-related further training in Germany (the actual numbers are negligible and the agreement is not used). However, the quota has never been exhausted and in 2014, there were no more than nine referrals. Furthermore, there is some bilateral or multilateral agreements fostering tourism, business, youth or cultural exchange (Parusel and Schneider 2012). Thus, Germany and Russia agreed on a visa facilitation agreement in 2003, which was supplemented in 2007 by a similar agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU. A particular Russian- German agreement on youth policy is in place since 2004. It commits the two governments to support in every way the promotion of friendly relations between the youth of both countries by encounters, meetings and more intense cooperation on the basis of reciprocity. The agreement also provides that both countries will establish national coordination offices for its execution. Further bilateral agreements, which might have an (in)direct impact also on migration, relate to cooperation and partnership in the educational and cultural fields as well as language teaching for German and Russian in the respective other country: The Agreement on Cultural Cooperation, e.g., provides for the placement and deployment of teachers, lecturers, and advisors, the participation of teachers and students in educational events in the other country as well as for the exchange of scientists, teachers, postgraduates, pupils and students, education experts, university administrators, trainers and apprentices. Thus, the contracting states commit to “facilitate obtaining residence permits and the general conditions for staying in the host country”.9 In the agreement on language teaching both governments agree to support the “acquisition of language skills […] by a maximum number of population groups, foremost by stu-

9 Article 5 of the Agreement between the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation on Promoting Cultural Cooperation of 16 December 1992 (Entry into force on 8 July 1993), German Federal Law Gazette II, 1993, p. 1256–1258.

[email protected] 138 A. Weinar and J. Schneider dents in schools and universities”. This shall be fostered by exchanges of qualified experts, scientists and educationalists, of students learning German or Russian respectively to improve their training as well as of teachers for study visits, advanced training and research projects. What is more, Russia does not support mobility of ethnic Germans from or to Germany. Russia is among the top senders of asylum seekers to the European Union (41,000 in 2013, over 10,000 of whom are in Germany, mainly of Chechen origin). The Russian government has been slow to deliver policies that could limit this particular outflow (COM2013 ). It is worth mentioning that Chechens are not the target group of Russian emigration and diaspora policies. The focus is on return policies addressing Russians from other parts of ex-Soviet Union, largely inspired by the German resettlement policy. Quite on the contrary, Turkey has had always a more mobility-focus approach to emigration, from the policies on the circulation of the workforce between Turkey and the Western European countries (Germany was the most important partner ever since the first recruitment agreement in 1961). Particularly the so-called Ankara Agreement (agreement creating an association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community) of 1963 and the Additional Protocol of 1970 became an important facilitator for outward mobility from Turkey to Germany, even beyond the official German recruitment ban for guest workers in 1973. The contract entitles Turkish nationals legally employed in an EU Member State for certain periods to particular rights to remain or switch employment. In more recent times, Germany and Turkey have concluded a bilateral contract worker agreement, enabling Turkish companies to send their employees to Germany for a limited duration for project work, dating back to 1991. However, this agreement never became a significant driver for migration, as the annual number of employees is regulated by quota; in 2014 there were only on average 311 Turkish contract workers employed in Germany. Contemporary emigration from Turkey, which continues, is not seen as a threat- ening phenomenon. It is perceived rather as a welcome promise of remittances and stronger international ties, especially towards Germany, home to the biggest Turkish community in the EU. Turkey is also a major sender of asylum seekers, many of whom have Kurdish ethnicity. This group’s situation in Turkey has had a clear push effect and thus has encouraged emigration. As in the case of the Chechens in Russia, this group is not necessarily a target of emigration and diaspora policies. Turkey, however, has had a very recent history of politically-motivated emigration. Some social and political movements which were banned, oppressed, or stigmatized in Turkey, have continued their activities in the European Union. Different emigration paths have created heterogeneous Turkish migrant communities in the destination country. As explained in more detail in Chap. 2, Turkey and Russia have had different pathways to greater mobility worldwide and especially in relation to the European Union. However, in the course of 2015, Turkey has managed to significantly push for greater mobility of its own citizens, among others, by obtaining an agreement from the EU to negotiate visa liberalisation. In contrast, mobility of Russian citizens

[email protected] 8 Turkish and Russian Pathways to Integration in Germany 139 has been hindered by specific measures freezing visa liberalisation talks, not least as result of tense foreign policy relations between the EU and Russia.

Diaspora Policies

In the Russian vision of diaspora policy, ethnicity is not the primary identification. Also Russian citizenship is not considered an ultimate sign of belonging to the wider Russian community. Instead the first language a person speaks is the marker of belonging and thus Russian diaspora is defined as Russophone diaspora. Following this logic, Russian-speaking Aussiedler in Germany are considered a part of a wider Russian diaspora, even if they are not of ethnic Russian origin (can be e.g. Ukrainian russophones). The diaspora policies for Russian speakers in Germany are built first and foremost to communicate the ideological and cultural messages of the Russian government and its institutions, support language heritage and indirectly develop business ties. Russian outreach includes Institutes of culture providing language courses (for general public) and cultural activities. German Turks figure high on the diaspora engagement agenda of the Turkish government as a strong political lobby and an abundant source of votes for the AKP (conservative Turkish party). In 2012, the Prime Minister himself has actively supported segmented integration in destination countries, particularly in Germany, and has called assimilation a crime against humanity.10 It is not excessive to state that majority of the current Turkish diaspora policies are focused on Germany and that Turkey and Germany create a policy constellation in that sense. Some policy solutions set up in the context of migrant communities in Germany, have benefits for Turkish communities worldwide. This is especially clear in the case of the Blue Card (“Mavi Card”), a document created especially for the German Turks, who had to give up Turkish citizenship in order to be naturalized in Germany, providing them with most rights and entitlements that Turkish nationals enjoy (yet no right to vote) (Table 8.6).

Integration Trends of Turkish and Russian Migrants in Germany

Integration of the two groups into German society can be measured across the main dimensions of integration. We focus on three dimensions for which the most reliable and robust data has been obtained, both in qualitative surveys and in quantitative data collection. These are: access to citizenship, education, and labour market integration. Turkish immigrants score systematically lower on each of these indices (see Chap. 1).

10 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1578451/Turkish-PM-speaks-out-against- assimilation.html [Accessed 8 December 2015].

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Table 8.6 Main axis of diaspora policy: the Russian Federation and Turkey compared Policy area/country Russian Federation Turkey Language and Governmental network of the Yunus Emre Institutes Culture Russian Centres for Science and Culture (operated by Rossotrudnichestvo). Religion No governmental institution; Government support through the support for the Russian Orthodox Turkish Islamic Association of Church Religious Affairs [DITIB], present in 17 countries worldwide; over 900 chapters/subsidiary associations in Germany. Organising diaspora Yes; support for cultural activities. Yes; intensive support for all types (e.g. support for of activities. associations) Political rights for Voting rights for Russian citizens Voting rights for Turkish citizens the diaspora living abroad, including external living abroad, including external voting. voting. Limited political rights for Blue Card holders. Economic and No Yes (Blue Card) social rights in the country of origin for non-citizens and descendants Support for Yes No returnees Citizenship of Dual citizenship tolerated, but Dual citizenship allowed non-residents legally allowed only in the case of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. As of 2014 – obligation to inform authorities about possession of another passport. Source: own elaboration

Immigrants born in Russia seem to fare better in each dimension of integration. However, a detailed analysis of the individual indicators can show us a more complex and nuanced picture.

Access to Citizenship

Naturalization is one of the most common indicators of integration. It is the moment when immigrants become part of a community and obtain equal rights, but also become bound by equal obligations.

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Analysing the data collected by the EUDO-Citizenship project at the EUI11 we observed that in the period 1991–2008 Turkish and Russian acquisition patterns dif- fered substantially. It is important to notice that more Turkish immigrants (or their children born in Germany) applied for German citizenship than Russians (772,106 vs. 418,303). This is clearly related to eligibility criteria (see section “Institutional and policy framework of integration in Germany” above): there are more Turkish migrants who have stayed in Germany for more than 10 years and more young Turks born and brought up in Germany. For the same reasons, the average age of naturalized Turks is much lower than that of Russians. Also, it is clear that the average stay of naturalized Turks is longer, ca. 20 years (BAMF 2014), which reflects the requirement that young people born in Germany until recently had to choose their citizenship when they reach 23 years of age. Both groups saw the high rate of naturalization in the late 1990s: Turks in 1999 (at ca 100,000) and Russians in 1998 (ca. 66,000). Since then the rates have gone down quite considerably, reaching the lowest point in 2008 (Turks: ca 25,000, Russians: ca 2500). As regards dual citizenship, Russian-born migrants (stock) who acquired German citizenship are 85% ethnic Germans. Out of all Russian nationals (not necessarily born in Russia) who are not ethnic Germans and who naturalized in 2013, over one third kept Russian citizenship, even if it was not clearly encouraged by the Russian state; on the contrary, double citizens are treated with suspicion. In contrast, very few Turkish-born migrants hold German citizenship. Out of all Turkish nationals who naturalized in 2013, only 17.5% kept Turkish citizenship, shedding doubts on the effectiveness of the policies of the Turkish government to encourage and promote dual citizenship.

Education

As in the case of access to citizenship, Russian migrants in general display better education indicators than Turkish migrants. They are more likely to be enrolled in school between ages 15–25. They also outperform native Germans in this regard. Russian immigrants are also twice as likely as Turkish immigrants to be enrolled in educational institutions between ages 25–35. The same pattern is visible when comparing indicators of the tertiary-educated in the migrant population. Russian migrants tend to have a four-times greater share of tertiary-educated persons than Turkish migrants and a slightly higher share than in the German population. The differences are related to the education systems in the country of origin: Russia has a higher share of secondary and tertiary-educated persons in its total population than Turkey: in 2012 the share of secondary-educated in Russia and Turkey was 41% to 18%, respectively; and tertiary-educated, 53% to 14%. (OECD2011).

11 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-statistics/data/?stype=1&coun=Germany accessed 2 June 2016.

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The pattern thus reflects the effect of the country of origin on skill levels. Clearly the Russian score is high here, even when compared to the German population, and in contrast to the Turkish population. Russian migration is clearly a skilled one. However, educational attainment does not entirely translate to better achievements on the labour market.

Labour Market Integration

Contrary to the previous indicators of integration, the labour market outcome of the Russian migrants seems to be more problematic. What comes to light is a clear gap between the migrants (from Turkey and Russia) and the majority group (see Fig. 8.2 and Table 8.7). In general, Russian immigrants have a higher unemployment rate than Turks. However, due to the fact that women from Russia are more active in the labour market, overall they have a higher share of participation in the labour force than Turks. Still, it is lower than the natives’. Russian-born immigrants also have a high over- qualification rate, which is the same for Turkish migrants. If these results could be expected in the case of regular migration flows, in the specific case of Russian-born immigrants, given their relatively high skill levels, they are disappointing. They can be explained by the specific policies covering ethnic Germans, who entered the country in the 1990s. The unemployment rate for Russian-born immigrants is a consequence of protective welfare policies and an

100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0

Activity rate Employment rate Unemployment rate Overqualification rate

Turkey-born Russia-born German-born

Fig. 8.2 Labour market indicators of population born in Germany, Russia and Turkey living in Germany, 2012 (Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015)

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Table 8.7 Employment according to occupation, sector and type of employment of population born in Germany, Russia and Turkey living in Germany, 2012 (%) Employment by occupation groups Employment by sector Type of employment Origin/ ISCO employment ISCO 1, from 4 Self- type 2 and 3 to 9 Agriculture Manufacturing Services employed Employees Turkey 20.7 79.3 1.0 37.0 62.0 10.2 89.8 Russia 18.9 81.1 2.0 57.0 41.0 2.9 97.1 Germany 51.5 48.5 2.0 27.0 71.0 9.4 90.6 Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), wave 2012; Di Bartolomeo et al. (2015) unselective policy that disregarded labour matching. As a consequence, the mis- match is so large that the migrants born in Russia cannot make up for it even in the presence of strong performance in other integration measures (high share of naturalizations) or a strong country-of-origin effect (high educational attainment). Not surprisingly, Russian immigrants have more students among their inactive population than do Turkish migrants (20.9% to 6%). Interestingly enough, Turkish migrants, although faring worse in educational attainment, manage to occupy skilled positions more often than Russian migrants. This can be explained by the fact that Russian women workers migrate more (comprising over 60% of the flow of Russian workers) and suffer the typical gender gap. Also, Russian nationals come as asylum seekers and thus they do not have the opportunity to put their skills to use. Both groups, however, fare worse than natives, as their ratios of higher-skilled employment are nearly four times lower than lower- skilled, while in case of Germans higher-skilled occupations are more often held than lower-skilled. Also, Russians seem to come to Germany to take jobs in manufacturing more often than the Turks. It is a reverse trend to the guest-worker image of Turkish migrants. Turks tend to work in services more often than Russians (but still less than Germans) – and this can also explain their occupational levels (higher-skilled than Russians). Turkish migrants also have higher dynamics as regards self-employment. They are more often self-employed than Russians and even Germans. This is a well- known adjustment mechanism of ethnic populations to adverse conditions in the labour market, as well as cultural background (Zhou 2004; Van Tubergren 2005, Khattab 2009; Modood and Khattab 2015). However, it must be kept in mind that we are discussing migrants who decided to open up a business when already in Germany, changing their employment status. New arrivals on self-employment visas are more represented among Russians, who have enough capital to invest (see section “Immigration flows to Germany originating in Turkey and the Russian Federation” above). Russians, however, are more often employees than the natives – this can be explained by the primary sector of their employment, i.e. manufacturing.

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All in all, the quoted data clearly shows that integration depends primarily on the policies of the destination country and the characteristics of the migrants. It is not clear from this analysis if the policies of the country of origin matter. In fact, the findings show contradictory results. It seems that the choice of dual citizenship is not merely a combination of two sets of policies: of the country of origin and destination. In the German context, where dual citizenship is allowed only in some exceptional cases, the effects of the citizenship policies of Turkey and Russia have adverse effects, respectively, on the Turkish and Russian nationals naturalized in Germany. There has been no positive effect of the Turkish policies that encourage dual citizenship, nor a negative effect of the discouraging policies of Russian government. As regards educational attainment, the policies of the country of destination might be more relevant. It is true that the country of origin is crucial to shaping the educational context of migration. But it is also true that the country of destination creates conditions for this educational attainment to flourish. For reasons of simple policy intervention, which, for example, supports the education of ethnic Germans more intensely than other migrants, Russian-born immigrants find it easier to attend schools and universities than Turkish nationals. The labour market is the real test of integration, as it is the key channel of migration and the most important tool for insertion into society. It is true that the specific cases of Turkish and Russian immigrants are quite difficult to compare. On the one hand, at the destination the condition they begin their integration differ not so much according to nationality but as to the category of immigrant who comes (see section “Institutional and policy framework of integration in Germany”). The effect of the country of destination is also important as regards closeness or openness to foreign workers, especially those who are visibly different. On the other hand, the policies of sending countries also focus on some groups and not others: e.g. labour-market related policies designed by the Turkish government, including bilateral agreements, which concern all Turkish nationals, while the policies of the Russian government concern only those Russian-born who are not ethnic-Germans. We can see some level of impact of the country of origin when considering the legal framework for Turkish workers in the EU, and thus also in Germany. It might be that this legal framework improves their labour market outcomes. But there are also some other factors that may influence it, related mainly to the country of destination context (need for specific skills, feminization of some occupations or vice versa, working welfare system) or to migrant characteristics (sex, age, length of stay in the country). The effect of the country of origin can be best discerned when discussing, for instance, the development of transferrable human capital at home (transferable skills), which in the case of Turkish and Russian migrants is proxied here by educational attainment rates at home. The indicators reflected above show us a story of the limited impact of official policies of the country of origin on the integration of migrants in the destination country. The role of the support measures provided by civil society organizations can shed more light on the role of the communities of origin in bridging the gap.

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Integration, Third Country Influence and Migrant Associations

The present section is based on the INTERACT survey, presented in the Chap. 4 in this volume. Thirty-seven organisations catering for the needs of Turkish immigrants in Germany answered the survey compared with seventeen that were helping Russian immigrants. In both cases these were mainly migrant associations: 73% in the Turkish case and 85% in the Russian case. Most answers came from medium-large organizations helping between 151 and 601 migrants a year, and from large organizations assisting over 601 migrants a year. The data come from organizations operating in various domains of integration: in the case of associations supporting Turkish immigrants, the main areas were political participation, education, labour market integration, and language support. In the case of organizations working with Russian immigrants, the main domains of intervention were language support, social interactions, and education. No Russian- oriented organization surveyed worked on religion, compared with 12 organizations that worked with Turkish migrants in this area. The answers focused primarily on the three main dimensions discussed in the previous statistical section.

Labour Market Integration

Turkish migrants receive support in labour market integration mainly in the form of job matching. Associations offer information about vacancies open to Turkish migrants in Germany and in this sense complement the German state employment services. They also offer information about the legal framework in Germany, which helps migrants navigate the institutional framework of the country. In addition, they get involved in training support for job seekers. Interestingly enough, organizations working with Turkish migrants seemed to be more specialized than those working with Russian migrants. However in both cases, the vast majority stated that the biggest impact they have on integration outcomes is, in fact, finding a job for a migrant at their destination. They also very occasionally work on bridging country of origin and destination work experience, e.g. by promoting skill-matching or recognition of qualifications obtained in the home country. The respondents widely agreed that the policies and support of the country of origin governments have negligible impacts on the employability of migrants abroad (this was very clear in the case of Russian migrants). Slightly more importance was given to the work of associations in the country of origin, presumably due to their support for migrant worker rights. Interestingly enough, pre-departure programs were not considered relevant by associations working with Turkish migrants but were deemed more important by those working with Russian migrants. This might

[email protected] 146 A. Weinar and J. Schneider reflect the character of migration: the majority of Turkish immigrants do not have access to pre-departure programs, while some portion of Russian migrants migrate as ethnic Germans, with pre-departure support that organizations knew about.

Access to Citizenship

Turkish and Russian passports carry different weight in the world and in the European Union. They also are attached to two legal frameworks that mutually reinforce each other. Organisations supporting Russian migrants have not answered this questionnaire. The Turkish-oriented ones did answer, but unfortunately not in large numbers. Those who answered told us that the main reason that Turks keep their passports is to have the opportunity to vote in Turkey and to keep their property rights. All other reasons are secondary. It is notable that the Turkish passport was not seen as an asset in Germany.

Education and Language Acquisition

Communities of origin have a clear impact on language acquisition among the children of immigrants. Kinship, visits to Turkey or Russia, media, and cultural activities all enhance non-German language skills. According to the respondents, more Russian-speaking than Turkish-speaking children learn the language of their country of origin through foreign language schools. Turkish seems to be more often spread by interactions with community of origin, while in the case of Russian it is more institutionalized. In both cases, the country-of-origin sponsored schools seem to have very limited effect on language acquisition for a simple reason: there are no such Turkish or Russian schools in Germany. However, participation in activities organized by other dedicated associations that are sponsored by the country of origin (e.g. cultural institutes) seems to have a large impact on language skills. The language of the country of origin is also a needed skill that helps migrants establish themselves in the labour market. They use it in several sectors of commercial activity, most prominently as teachers and translators/interpreters. Turkish and Russian is also frequently used in tourism and in multinational companies. In all these cases this use was more relevant for Russian-speakers than for Turkish speakers. Turkish seems to be used more frequently in cultural activities and in the places of worship. This duality reflects the different status of Russian language versus Turkish, the former being the language of a European economic powerhouse and the lingua franca of over 250 million people east of the EU border, while the latter is still viewed as a non-European language enclosed in an ethnic enclave, only recently elevated by international economic interests to commercial use by the country of destination. As regards support by the origin country, Russian has for decades been taught and promoted by Soviet and Russian governments, while Turkish language learning has only very recently been supported by the Turkish government.

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Social Interaction

Organizations working with Russian migrants have a conservative profile with respect to their focus on the country of destination. They organize a limited number of Russian cultural activities, primarily events in Germany for the members of the local diaspora. To a lesser extent they do organize activities such as trips and cultural tours for migrants and German nationals together (but when they do, it is mostly for ethnic Germans coming from Russia). On the contrary, organizations supporting Turkish migrants’ social interactions, offer a whole array of activities, ranging from events in Germany to mentoring programmes. These organizations reported activities that attempted to bring German nationals and immigrants together. When asked about the extent to which policies relating to social life and implemented by the country of origin impact integration outcomes in Germany, our respondents chose to differ. Russian-oriented organisations praised the Russian government’s efforts and saw its engagement as positive or at most ambiguous. Turkish-oriented associations see the engagement of the Turkish government in this domain as having rather negative effects. This knowing that 30% of these respondents were not aware of any relevant policies in this field. This can be however explained by the fact that many organisations working on social interactions are not strictly speaking “migrant associations” and thus do not necessarily focus on Turkish migrants only. Thus they do not pay a lot of attention to the Turkish state priorities and initiatives.

Political Participation

The different role organizations play in this domain is striking. The respondents helping Russian migrants rarely get involved in this domain of integration in the first place. When they do, they tend to support their clients in a rather narrow area, i.e. giving information about the political rights of migrants in the destination country. By contrast, Turkish migrants have wide support to exercise their political rights in various ways: the associations provide information about political participation rights both at the destination and origin; the associations get involved in organizing external voting for migrants (i.e. voting in Turkish elections in Germany); they also support immigrants in electoral campaigns in German elections. To a lesser extent they engage in lobbying activities in the country of destination. It is important to note, however, that the majority of their activities support formal political and civic participation. Both types of organizations rarely support activities in the countries of origin, either with funding or political action. Also, respondents working with Turkish migrants do not generally collaborate with any well-defined political force in Germany, while those working with Russian migrants do. However, some specific activities are in fact implemented in collaboration with both German and Turkish civil society organizations, and to a lesser extent with governmental bodies and

[email protected] 148 A. Weinar and J. Schneider political forces. In the case of the Russian-oriented associations, the element of cooperation with the country of origin is almost absolutely absent. It is notable that the respondents to the survey clearly expressed the view that the civic and political participation of migrants in the country of destination has a positive impact on their integration across various dimensions. Active citizenship beyond one’s group seems to be the best way forward towards integration: it builds social ties and networks and provides immigrants with a sense of attachment.

Residential Integration

Establishing one’s home in a place is an important indicator of integration. Organisations tend to support immigrants in their quest for housing, but mainly through advice. This advice is needed, since immigrants largely invest in housing from their own private means. They either have savings or sell real estate in the country of origin to boost their chances of obtaining a place to live. In fact, Turkish migrants seem to rely more on individual support than Russian migrants, who sometimes get support from their community in their hometown (private loans). In both cases, neither the country of origin and its financial institutions nor the country of destination and its financial institutions have any visible impact on home ownership among migrants. It is also important to note that in the case of Turkish migrants, the Turkish state and Turkish institutions (public and private) are seen as actively shaping migrant neighbourhoods, e.g. through the establishment of mosques, consulates, cultural centres, or schools. This interference is not seen positively by many of the respondents to our survey.

Conclusions

In this chapter we have attempted a comparative analysis of two corridors: Germany- Turkey and Germany-Russia. The two groups migrating along these corridors have different characteristics: while Turkish migrants used to be guest workers in Germany, at present they come primarily as family members. Migrants from Russia, on the other hand, arrived as ethnic Germans and family members until 2006. Both groups also have important refugee subgroups: Kurds from Turkey (particularly in the 1980s) and Chechens from Russia (since the 1990s). The differences in the characteristics of their respective migration flows is reflected in the different characteristics of their population stocks; each group has been subject to different policies, including different rights and obligations. In fact, the structural and policy factors at the destination are the key elements that influence the success or failure of their integration. The impact of the country of origin, which is understood to be the policies and practices that target diaspora with the aim of improving their integration, is for the

[email protected] 8 Turkish and Russian Pathways to Integration in Germany 149 most part negligible. In the case of Turkey and Russia, diaspora policies do not support integration. On the contrary, they aim to re-focus migrants’ attention back to the country of origin and distract from their integration efforts in the new home country. However, these diaspora policies can still have positive ramifications for integration outcomes, for example when they support Turkish migrants’ cross- border business activities or enhance Russian language proficiency among the diaspora, leading to use of the language in international business environments. As the above data on Turkish and Russian immigrants in Germany suggest, the main impact of the country of origin lies in the human capital that individuals bring to the destination. This conclusion may be a cliché, but it needs to be repeated: overall, the better the conditions in the country of origin and the better the position of the migrant at the point of departure, the better the integration outcomes upon arrival. We should not think, however, that we face a predetermined outcome when the conditions at departure and arrival are not favourable for a migrant. As we have shown, there is an important group of actors at various levels of governance that work to improve the final outcome. Migrant organisations and organisations that help migrants in Germany form an additional arm of integration policy. Because they are close to migrants and have an intimate knowledge of their integration needs, they focus on topics and fields of action that are most relevant for a successful migration story. They also form the most tangible bridge between the origin and destination. As we observed, however, not many actually have support from the country for origin for their pro-integration work; funding for their integration measures comes from the destination country, while the country of origin usually focuses on skills and activities for returning migrants. None of the organisations surveyed have advocated for pre-departure training of migrants and there is no evidence of pre-departure support that is provided in the countries of origin. But as we have already observed, even the absence of these activities can have unaccounted- for consequences: migrants are likely use the skills that are relevant for the country of origin to build a better employment future in the country of destination.

References

BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge). (2014). Das Bundesamt in Zahlen. In Asyl, Migration und Integration. Nuremberg: BAMF. Bommes, M., & Kolb, H. (2012). Germany. In C. Joppke, F. L. Seidle (Eds.), Immigrant integration in Federal countries (pp. 112–133). Montreal: Published for Forum of Federations = Forum des federations by McGill-Queen’s University Press. Di Bartolomeo, A., Kalantaryan, S., & Bonfanti, S. (2015). Measuring integration of migrants: A multivariate approach, Migration Policy Centre (INTERACT Research Report 2015/01. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. ISBN: 978–92–9084-263-7. doi: 10.2870/010531. European Commission. (2013, December 18). First progress report on the implementation by Russia of the common steps towards visa-free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens under the EU-Russia Visa Dialogue. COM, 923 final.http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/ what-is-new/news/news/docs/20131218_commission_report_on_the_implementation_by_ russia_of_the_common_steps_for_visa_free_regime_en.pdf. Accessed 8 Dec 2015.

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Flam, H. (2007). Migranten in Deutschland: Statistiken, Fakten, Diskurse. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft. Groenendijk, K. (2011). Pre-departure integration strategies in the European Union: Integration or immigration policy? European Journal of Migration and Law, 13(1), 1–30. Haberland, J. (1994). Eingliederung von Aussiedlern. Sammlung von Texten, die für die Eingliederung von Aussiedlern (Spätaussiedlern) aus den osteuropäischen Staaten von Bedeutung sind (6th Rev. ed). Leverkusen: Heggen. Heckmann, F. (2003). From ethnic nation to universalistic immigrant integration: Germany. In F. Heckmann & D. Schnapper (Eds.), The integration of immigrants in European societies. National differences and trends of convergence (pp. 45–78). Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. Hunger, U., & Metzger, S. (2011). Kooperation mit Migrantenorganisationen. Studie im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Migration und Flüchtlinge. Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/ Studien/2011-kooperationmigrantenorganisationen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. Accessed 8 Dec 2015. IB. Internationaler Bund. (1995). Informationen für die Eingliederungshilfe für junge Aussiedler und Spätaussiedler. IB: Frankfurt am Main. Ingenhorst, H. (1997). Die Russlanddeutschen: Aussiedler zwischen Tradition und Moderne (Vol. 747). Campus. Khattab, N. (2009). Ethno-religious background as a determinant of educational and occupational attainment in Britain. Sociology, 4(2), 304–322. Modood, T., & Khattab, N. (2015). Explaining ethnic differences: Can ethnic minority strategies reduce the effects of ethnic penalties? Sociology, 0038038515575858. OECD. (2011). Education at a glance 2011: OECD indicators. OECD Publishing. https://www. oecd.org/edu/eag2013%20(eng)--FINAL%2020%20June%202013.pdf. Accessed 8 Dec 2015. Özcan, V. (2007). Country profile: Germany. Focus migration. Country Profile no. 1. IMIS, Netzwerk Migration in Europa, BPB. http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/ focus_Migration_Publikationen/Laenderprofile/CP01_Germany_v2.pdf. Accessed 8 Dec 2015. Parusel, B., & Schneider, J. (2012). Visa policy as migration channel. The impact of visa policy on migration control (Research Study in the Framework of the European Migration Network (EMN)). Nuremberg: BAMF. Pries, L. (2013). Migrant organizations: Size, structures, and significance. Focus Migration Policy Brief, no. 21. IMIS, Netzwerk Migration in Europa, BPB. http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/ migration/kurzdossiers/158906/migrant-organizations. Accessed 8 Dec 2015. Sezgin, Z. (2010). Türkische Migrantenorganisationen in Deutschland – Zwischen Mitgliederinteressen und institutioneller Umwelt. In L. Pries & Z. Sezgin (Eds.), Jenseits von “Identität oder Integration”. Grenzen überspannende Migrantenorganisationen (pp. 201– 232). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften-GWV Fachverlage GmbH: Wiesbaden. Sirkeci, I., Cohen, J., & Yazgan, P. (2012). Turkish culture of migration: Flows between Turkey and Germany, Socio-economic development and conflict. Migration Letters, 9(1), 33–46. SVR (Sachverständigenrat Deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration). (2012). Integration im föderalen System: Bund, Länder und die Rolle der Kommunen. Jahresgutachten 2012 mit Integrationsbarometer. Berlin: SVR. SVR (Sachverständigenrat Deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration). (2014). Deutschlands Wandel zum modernen Einwanderungsland. Jahresgutachten 2014 mit Integrationsbarometer. Berlin: SVR. Van Tubergen, F. (2005). Self-employment of immigrants: A cross-national study of 17 Western societies. Social Forces, 84(2), 709–732. Vink, M. P., & Bauböck, R. (2013) Citizenship configurations: Analysing the multiple purposes of citizenship regimes in Europe. Comparative European Politics, 11(5), pp. 621–648. Worbs, S. (2014). Bürger auf Zeit. Die Wahl der Staatsangehörigkeit im Kontext der deutschen Optionsregelung. Nuremberg: BAMF. Zhou, M. (2004). Revisiting ethnic entrepreneurship: Convergencies, controversies, and conceptual advancements. International Migration Review, 38(3), 1040–1074.

[email protected] Chapter 9 Ukrainian and Russian Immigrants in Poland: Whither Integration?

Magdalena Lesińska

Introduction

Although Poland has been and still remains a net emigration country, its migration status is changing, and the transformation process into an emigration-immigration country is (slowly but steadily) becoming noticeable (see Górny et al. 2010). The size of the foreign population in Poland is still relatively small in comparison with other countries in Europe; it constitutes less than 2% of the resident population. The major groups of migrants come from eastern neighbouring countries. Of these, Ukrainians dominate in all statistics related to the entry, stay and work of foreigners in Poland. Poland’s profile as a migration country is shaped first and foremost by its geo- political position in the European continent. Its accession to the European Union (the EU) in May 2004 and the fact that Poland became an EU border country influenced the dynamics and trends of human in- and outflows. As a result of EU member states opening their labour markets, a massive outflow of Poles took place within a short period after the date of the accession (Fihel 2011). The unexpected mass outflow on the one hand, and the intensive economic growth and large investments in infrastructure and regional development (also due to EU funds) on the other, generated significant shortages in the labour market and a growing demand for a foreign workforce in a relatively short time. Additionally, long-term processes such as serious depopulation (presently noticeable in some regions) and an aging population are expected to have a negative impact on the economy and the society in Poland in the long run. Migration and integration policy in Poland can be described as being in the process of formation. Until now, due to its marginal scale, immigration has not been of interest to any of the political parties in Poland and is not a topic of any serious

M. Lesińska (*) Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 151 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_9

[email protected] 152 M. Lesińska political or public debate, in contrast with Western European countries where immigration is at the centre of political struggles. This has changed very recently in response to the refugee crisis; the possible inflow of immigrants was widely discussed during the 2015 electoral campaign, for instance. Despite the political and public “silence” over immigration issues, they have attracted increased attention from public administration bodies in recent years. The central administration, and in particular the Ministry of Interior, plays the key role within the legal and political framework that relates to immigration. Polish authorities perceive the increasing scale of foreigner inflows to Poland as an inevitable phenomenon due to the global processes taking place in Europe and worldwide. This perception is also related to the fact that as a member of the EU and as part of the EU migration regime, Poland’s control over human flows within EU borders is limited in practice. Moreover, the negative demographic trends mentioned above, together with a growing demand for a foreign workforce (especially in some sectors of the economy such as agriculture and construction), require wise political intervention and a thorough strategy. In Poland, there are noticeable signs of the migration policy transforming from an abandonment approach to an “opening-up” course of action, especially in the case of the strategy which addresses neighbouring countries (more precisely, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries). Aside from the formulation of the state’s migration strategy, some other important and promising developments have appeared over recent years which could have an impact on increasing foreigner inflows to Poland and their further integration, especially through labour market institutions. The most important has been the liberalisation of labour-market admission rules for foreigners, including the implementation in 2007 of a new simplified scheme addressing short-term foreign workers. The aim of the system is to encourage employers to employ foreigners on a regular basis and to persuade foreign workers to use a legal option to enter and work in Poland. Ukrainians constitute the vast majority of the foreigners who have entered Poland and obtained employment there under this simplified scheme. The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the migration and integration processes of immigrants from Ukraine and Russia in Poland, with special attention to the role that the countries and communities of origin play in the integration process at destination. Ukrainians and Russians are the two most numerous foreign groups in Poland, taking into account the number of valid residence permits issued in Poland for third-country nationals. Moreover, both groups have long traditions of immigration to Poland as well as established ethnic organisational structures there. The text consists of following sections. The introduction presents an overview of recent immigration flows of Ukrainian and Russian citizens into Poland, including their main characteristics and trends. The next section takes a political perspective, focusing on the specificities of Poland’s migration and integration policy as a destination country, but also on the diaspora and emigration policies of Ukraine and Russia as countries of origin, and in particular on specific policy tools developed in these countries towards their emigrants residing in Poland. The purpose is to analyse the extent to which these policies either complement or conflict with each other. The final section analyses Ukrainian and Russian immigrants’ integration trends in

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Poland and explains factors that influence these trends from a quantitative and qualitative perspective, based on the results of a qualitative survey which targeted civil society organisations dealing with migrant integration in Poland.

Immigration Flows of Ukrainian and Russian Nationals into Poland – General Overview

During Soviet times, the flows between Poland and the USSR were limited. The most numerous groups circulating between the two countries were petty traders and “false tourists”, the entering Poland on a tourist status and engaging in casual work were well known practices and remained popular until the late 1990s. (Okólski 1997a; Kępińska and Stola 2004). As a result, a high level of trans-border mobility was recorded: according to official data, between 1988–1995 the number of foreign citizens entering Poland increased from 6 million to 82 million (predominantly citizens of ex-Soviet republics, and of Ukraine in particular). In the 1990s, the main type of foreigner inflow to Poland was still a short-term, economic, circular (‘incomplete’) migration (Jaźwińska and Okólski 1996; Okólski 1997b; Stola 1997). Migrants’ principal goal was to benefit economically through genuine tourism or business (including shopping). They often stayed or worked on an irregular basis, and maintained close and steady contacts with their household in the home country (by means of regular communication, frequent home visits, remitting money, etc.) (Okólski 1997b: 10). Another important type of migration in this period was a transit one; migrants treated Poland as a stopping point on their way to Western Europe (Okólski 1997b: 12). Poland’s accession to the EU and Schengen zone and its visa and border-control system restrictions had an impact on the number of people coming to Poland from eastern neighbouring countries (the visa regime for neighbouring countries was introduced in 2003; up until 2007, visas for Ukrainians were issued free of charge). There was a serious drop just after the introduction of the visa regime, but shortly afterwards the number of border crossings increased again. This means that migrants acknowledged the new rules and got used to the new application procedures. The population of foreigners residing in Poland is quite small in comparison with other EU countries, however its size is dynamically growing in recent years. According to the recent National Population and Housing Census (2011), 99.7% of permanent residents of Poland are persons with Polish citizenship. The number of foreigners registered in the Census as having a permit for settlement or for a fixed period in Poland reached 63,000 (what is very small compared to 38 million of population of Poland). The most numerous group are Ukrainians, followed by Germans, Belarusians and Russians. This means that the population of Poland is one of the most homogenised in Europe (in ethnic and cultural terms). However, it is commonly thought that the real number of foreigners residing in Poland (especially on a short-term basis) is much higher than recorded in the Census. The most impor-

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Table 9.1 Number of nationals of Ukraine and Russia with valid residence permits in Poland (on 1 January 2015) acc. to status of residence Long- Long- term stay term permit Tolerated and Residence Country Complementary residence for UE Humanitarian Refugee on fixed of origin Protection permit resident Stay status term Total Ukraine 43 18,637 2761 117 1 19,323 40,979 Russia 2734 4192 520 177 700 2361 10,739 All 3160 48,186 6806 829 1408 49,649 175,006 nationalities Source: The Office for Foreigners tant source of data comes from the Office for Foreigners. According to its records of 2015 (1st January), more than 175,000 foreign nationals with valid residence permits (of all kinds) were registered in Poland (see Table 9.1).1 Just as in previous years, they were mostly permits for a fixed period (49,600, 47%). Among the most important nationalities were: citizens of Ukraine (40,900, 23% of all foreigners with valid residence permits), Russia (10,700, 6%), Belarus (9900, 5%) and Vietnam (9000, 5%). Together, the citizens of three neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) comprised approximately 35% of the foreign population possessing residence permits in Poland at the beginning of 2015. The citizens of the EU countries comprised 38% of foreign population in Poland (66,500). Since beginning of 2014 a dynamic increase of applications for residence permit was registered: 50% more in comparison with 2013. What is important, 44% of them were submitted by Ukrainian citizens. Moreover, the statistics show that many Ukrainians who till now stayed in Poland on short term basis, recently applied for long-term residence permit. One of the important categories of foreigners (not included in the Office for Foreigners’ records) is seasonal workers. They come to Poland using a scheme based on their employer’s declaration which allows them to stay and work for six months within a one-year period. In 2014 there were 387,398 employer declarations issued (a year before the number reached 235,000). This group is five times as large as the population of foreigners with long-term stay permits or foreigners possessing temporary-stay permits. Moreover, most of the short-term migrants come from Eastern Partnership countries, among them Ukraine is definitely the most important origin country. Other categories of migrants include asylum seekers and recognised refugees. The number of persons under international protection in Poland is small – 5100 persons under different forms of protection or possessing valid stay permits were registered at the end of 2013 (including 800 refugees, 2400 persons with a tolerated- stay status and 1800 with complementary protection status). A significant increase in the number of applications for refugee status was noticeable in the last 2 years.

1 It was not possible to elaborate relevant statistics for the migrant groups in Poland based on the Polish Labour Force Survey data due to too small sample of migrants present in the survey.

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The highest number of applications ever registered was in 2013 (15,000), in 2014 the number of applications was two times less (6600). The vast majority of them were submitted by Russian citizens (almost 86% of which declared Chechen nationality), followed by Ukrainians (as a direct results of military conflict with Russia), Georgians, Armenians and Syrians. Most of the applications were denied as unjusti- fied. Asylum seekers from Chechnya started to arrive to Poland when the military conflict between Russia and Chechnya began (December 1994). There was a growth in applications around 2000, when the second wave of conflict took place. Poland was that time one the few countries receiving refugees from Chechnya: in 1992– 2007 more than 37 thousand Chechens applied for refugee status in Poland. Most of them, however, treated Poland as a transit country on the way to Western Europe. The data from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education shows a steady increase in the number of foreign students coming to Poland every year. In the academic year 2014/2015, more than 46,000 foreign students were registered (28% more than a year before). The most numerous groups were Ukrainians (23,000, +8%), who at present constituted more than a half of all foreign students in Poland, the number of Russians studying in Poland is less than 1000.2 An important characteristic of the inflows, which should be mentioned here, is related to ethnic patterns that were institutionalised by the Polish state through the introduction of a Card of the Pole (Karta Polaka) in 2007. These cards directly target ethnic Poles who are citizens of the former Soviet states. The main conditions for obtaining a Card of the Pole can be fulfilled by confirming Polish origin; confirming an active connection to “Polishness” by demonstrating at least a basic knowledge of the Polish language; and by proving that at least one parent, grandpar- ent or two great grandparents were of Polish nationality or had Polish citizenship. Applicants must also confirm active involvement in Polish linguistic and cultural activities within the Polish community of their region for a period of at least the past 3 years.3 The Card of the Pole entitles its holders to apply for a visa that allows multiple entrances to Poland (the cost can be reimbursed by the Polish state). It also provides a set of practical entitlements to its holders, such as an exemption from the obligation to have a work permit, the right to set up a company on the same basis as Polish citizens, and the right to study and participate in other forms of education. In practice, having a Card of the Pole simplifies the most difficult legal obstacles, such as the obligation to obtain a work permit and go through frequent visa-application procedures, and therefore serves as a pull factor, enabling migrants to come and work in Poland. The Card of the Pole became more and more popular among persons of Polish decent who were willing to come and live in Poland. In 2008–2013, more than 130,000 Cards were issued, approximately 90% of which were granted to citizens of Ukraine and Belarus. Far fewer were issued to Lithuanians, Russians and other nationalities. The majority of applicants have been young persons, often students, who use the Card as a tool to simplify procedures related to arrival, stay and study in Poland.

2 Data according to Fundacja Edukacyjna Perspektywy 2014. 3 Act of 7 September 2007 on the Card of the Pole (Journal of Laws of 2007, No 180, item 1280).

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Taking into account the different statistics, it can be assumed that the stock of foreigners in Poland is approximately 200,000–250,000 (meaning those who possess stay permits for longer than 3 months). Additionally, the number of seasonal foreign workers is approximately 300,000 a year. The largest and most frequent group of foreigners arriving to Poland are citizens of Ukraine. They represent an immigrant group perceived to be the closest to Polish society due to geographic, cultural and linguistic proximity, past and present ties between the two nations, common history and last but not least, well-developed migration networks. The majority of Ukrainian migrants who reside in Poland come from Western Ukraine, which has historic connections with the Polish state, and where a substantial Polish minority continues to live. As a result, widespread cross-border contacts and mobility have existed over the Polish-Ukrainian border for decades. In structural terms, Ukrainian immigration to Poland is strongly feminine, young and relatively well-educated. In contrast with Ukrainian migrants, who were intensively investigated by researchers over the last two decades (Jaźwińska and Okólski 1996; Stola 1997; Górny et al. 2010; Kindler 2011), migration strategies and structural features of Russian nationals in Poland are far less recognised and studied. The scale of the inflow of Russians to Poland is marginal in comparison with that of Ukrainians. However, it must be noted that Russians (of Chechen origin) are the top nationality registered in asylum-seeker statistics, as it was already mentioned above. Both groups – Ukrainian and Russian nationals – are spatially dispersed over the territory of Poland. The only region with a high concentration of these migrants is the Mazowieckie region (which includes the capital city of Warsaw). They are also noticeable in eastern (border) regions (Podkarpackie and Lubelskie), which have relatively weak economic potential but a strong presence of migrant networks, in Małopolskie (in Kraków), Śląskie (in Katowice), and Pomorskie (in Gdańsk) (Fihel 2007; Duszczyk et al. 2013). Poland’s eastern neighbours are recognized as its most important source countries for labour migration. When analysing the data related to work permits issued, it is clear that firstly, the overall number of work permits is growing dynamically year after year and that, secondly, citizens of eastern neighbouring countries prevail in the statistics. In 2014, more than a half the work permits (57.1%) were issued to Ukrainians and 1.3% to Russians (see Table 9.2). The majority of Ukrainian migrants (up to 90%) undertake work while staying in Poland, and thus the notion ‘labour migrants’ seems particularly fitting. The majority of them work in Poland in the secondary sectors of the labour market (such as agriculture, the construction sector and household services). According to data from Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the sectors of the labour market in which Ukrainians are most commonly employed using the work permit scheme are construction and household services. Russians, on the other hand, are present in trade and the professional services sector. In 2007, the supplementary scheme to the work-permit system, namely an employer’s declaration of his or her intent to employ a foreigner, was implemented. Its main aim was to simplify access to the labour market for short-term (seasonal) workers and to reinforce circular migration from eastern neighbouring countries.

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Table 9.2 Work permits issued in Poland for citizens of Russia and Ukraine, 2008–2014 Country Ukraine Russia Year/country Total % of total Total % of total Total foreign citizens 2008 5400 29.9 420 2.3 18,022 2009 9504 32.3 540 1.8 29,340 2010 12,894 35.2 491 1.3 36,622 2011 18,669 45.7 549 1.3 40,808 2012 20,295 51.8 719 1.8 39,144 2013 20,416 52.2 822 2.1 39,078 2014 24,945 57.1 576 1.3 43,663 Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy

Table 9.3 The number of employer declarations, by nationality of workers, 2007–2014 Ukraine Russia Year/country Total % of total Total % of total Total foreign citizens 2007 20,260 92.9 190 0.8 21,797 2008 142,960 91.2 1147 0.7 156,713 2009 180,133 95.6 674 0.3 188,414 2010 169,490 94.1 595 0.3 180,073 2011 239,646 92.2 963 0.3 259,777 2012 223,671 91.7 1624 0.6 243,736 2013 217,571 92.3 1260 0.5 235,616 2014 372,946 96.2 1227 0.3 387,398 Source: Own elaboration based on the data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy

The foreigners employed on the basis of the employer declaration system are not obliged to have a work permit. Just within the last 2–3 years this scheme became an entry gate for thousands of labour migrants). A year after the declaration scheme came into force, the number of employees hired in this manner began to rise significantly (from 21,000 in 2007 to 387,000 in 2014). Especially among Ukrainians, the employer declaration scheme has gained growing popularity over last years (see Table 9.3). In 2014, more than 372,000 declarations (96% of the total) were issued for Ukrainians. The scale of declarations issued for Russians is at a much more moderate level: 1200 declarations were issued in 2014 (0.3%). Analysing the official statistical data, one notices that Ukrainian citizens employed in Poland on a temporary basis are particularly concentrated in agriculture, construction and service sectors (around 2/3 of all employer declarations are received from the first two sectors). In cases of more settled Ukrainian migrants, the variety of sectors is wider, including education and health services (Fihel 2007). Russians are characterised by much less sectoral concentration, and in addition, the sectors are different – most of them are employed as professionals and in the trade sector. The distribution of declarations issued over a calendar year clearly shows the

[email protected] 158 M. Lesińska seasonality of employment based on the employer declaration scheme, what is clearly connected to sectors they are concentrated: agriculture and construction. It should be stressed that when analysing the available data on immigration to Poland, the temporary (seasonal) type of inflows clearly dominated in recent decades (Górny et al. 2010). The factors influencing this fact were related to the immigrants’ main strategy, which can be described as “earn here, spend there”, and to their motivation to work abroad to improve living conditions at home. Moreover, the current legal and political framework (in terms of admission and employment) gives them the opportunity to circulate, encourages and sustains short-term mobility, and at the same time discourages long-term or settlement migration (Lesińska 2013). However, the recent statistics presented above clearly show not only growing inflow, but also changing profile of Ukrainian immigration to Poland – from short term and circular towards more stable, long term immigration (Jaroszewicz 2015). Several important factors support this change: unstable political and economic situation in Ukraine on one hand, liberalisation of admission rules to labour market, economic growth and increasing demand for foreign labour force in Poland, on the other.

The Impact of Legal and Political Framework Existed in Countries of Destination and of Origin on Immigration Flows: Ukrainian and Russian Nationals in Poland

Amidst the factors influencing the patterns, types and scale of inflows, a key role is played by the legal, political and institutional frameworks implemented in both destination and source countries, which include entry/exit rules and the general situation of the economy and labour market. Therefore, a general overview of the policies currently in force in Poland related in particular to labour market admission and integration, as well as in Ukraine and Russia addressing emigration and nationals abroad will be presented below. The aim of the overview is to identify any potential clash or convergence with the migration and integration policies of Poland as a destination country and emigration/diaspora policies of the countries of origin. In the early 1990s, Poland, among many other challenges related to its transition period, had to face its own transformation from a state with a restrictive exit policy and the forcibly- repressed spatial mobility characteristic of the communist regime (Stola 1997; Okólski 2004) to a democratic state with open borders. This change was difficult, given the fact that Poland has traditionally been a country of emigration, with little experience in regulating foreign inflows. After a relatively liberal admission policy post-1989, Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU led to the introduction of new and stricter rules and regulations. There is no doubt that membership in the EU is a crucial milestone in the development of immigration policy in Poland (Kicinger 2005; Weinar 2006; Duszczyk 2012). The requirements that Poland was obliged to fulfill as a new member constitute the key impulse for the

[email protected] 9 Ukrainian and Russian Immigrants in Poland: Whither Integration? 159 development of the current legal and institutional system. Moreover, this process has been top-down, in response to external EU administrative guidance and pressures rather than to local immigration processes (Lesińska 2010). In fact, the process of the formulation and implementation of the policy can be described as a purely technocratic one. Over last years, several important developments related to immigration policy have been implemented, among them the regularisation programme (2012) and the new Polish Citizenship Act (2012), which included new naturalization rules, such as the shortening of the qualifying period of residence from 5 to 3 years and the acceptance of dual or multiple citizenship. In 2012 a document entitled “Migration policy of Poland – the current state of play and further actions” which can be described as the national migration strategy was approved by the government (Ministry of Interior 2012). It includes an overview of the present migration policy and recommendations for its further development in the area of law, institutional frameworks and integration programmes. All the mentioned novelties followed a trend which can be summarised as an evolution towards the slow and controlled opening-up of Poland to foreigner inflows. These developments have some serious limitations, however. Direct incentives to encourage inflows are directed primarily to EU citizens and nationals from eastern neighbouring countries, and are focused on legal and economic spheres (not on socio-cultural or political ones). Poland’s migration policy has shifted from protection against inflows to facilitation for desirable groups of migrants. The most important legal and political provisions which can be perceived as drivers of migration are related to the liberalisation of labour-market entry rules for foreigners (the far-reaching simplification of legislation concerning work permits in 2008, and the introduction of the employer declaration system – already mentioned above). Integration policy in Poland is a set of ad hoc measures dedicated to particular groups. There is no coherent integration doctrine, and any legal provisions and integration programmes offered by state institutions have until now been addressed only to recognised refugees. This can be explained first of all by Poland’s limited experiences with long-term immigrants requiring integration programmes, and secondly – by policy makers’ lack of interest in encouraging settlement migration. The state policy towards immigrants that has been implemented in Poland since the 1990s can be described as incorporation ‘via abandonment’ (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Weinar 2006). This means that there was limited institutional support from the state and NGOs. In addition, the migrant communities are poorly developed (with few exceptions), and the adaptation of immigrants to life in Poland has been difficult, especially for those of non-European origin. Up until 2005, there was no official document detailing the integration issue and its scope in a manner other than in simple, general statements. The ‘Proposals of Actions Aimed at Establishing a Comprehensive Immigrant Integration Policy in Poland’, a document issued in 2013 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (which is officially responsible for integration policy), clearly confirms thatat “ present, integrative actions in Poland, within special individual integration programmes, are focused on one group of people only – those with refugee status”.

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Since then, the scope of beneficiaries of the state’s integration programmes has not changed. The only progress is visible in the development of the institutional structure. In 2013, the Working Group on the Integration of Foreigners was established within the Department of Aid and Social Integration (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs). The main aim of the group was to prepare the document “the Polish integration policy on foreigners – assumptions and guidelines”, which at present is being reviewed by non-governmental partners. It is very small, but still, this initiative is progress within the area of integration policy in Poland, given that this subject has been of little interest to policy makers over the last decades. At present, the document has not yet been accepted as an official document by the administration, which means that it currently has no impact in practice. As regards legislation related to the incorporation of foreigners into the social security entitlements system, Polish law meets European standards. Foreign nationals working legally in Poland possess the same package of social rights as Polish citizens, including entitlements to pensions, medical care and unemployment benefits. With regard to the incorporation of foreigners into its legal-political system, Poland is still one of the most restrictive countries in Europe. Foreign residents have no voting rights at any level (with the exception of EU citizens, whose right to vote and be elected at the local level has been secured in EU law). In addition, foreigners are not represented in any labour union or political party in Poland. This explains why these institutions do not normally include immigration-related issues on their agendas. Moreover, even if the immigrants have the right to establish associations, their number and impact is very limited. Immigrant organisations are not recognised as influential actors by the state administration, and there is no institution – such as a consultative or advisory body – that could function as a forum for communication between immigrants and authorities at the central level. Despite the state’s generally passive attitude to the integration of foreigners, a more active approach is noticeable in the NGO sector. The interest in the implementation of projects aimed at migrants and in supporting their integration is strictly related to opportunities to apply for financial support from the EU (particularly from the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, EIF Fund). Since 2007, diverse integration activities have been implemented by non- governmental and local institutions following best practices adopted in other EU countries (language and adaptation courses, information campaigns, intercultural education programmes and training courses) using the support of the EIF fund. This means that in practice, the NGO sector is a partial substitute for state administration when it comes to the implementation of integration policy. To sum up, there is no complex, long-term and systematic state strategy concerning the integration of foreigners in Poland. Moreover, the legal and institutional framework created to address this issue has been developed mostly in response to EU requirements and under EU guidance in order to align Polish migration law with relevant EU legislation. To a lesser extent, it has been developed to solve specific administrative problems that have emerged in practice (in order to remove loopholes and avoid interpretational discrepancies). Therefore, the development of integration policy in Poland can be portrayed as a reactive, centralised and top-down process.

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After brief summary of immigration and integration policies of Poland as a country of destination, let look closer into diaspora/emigration policies of Ukraine and Russia as origin countries. Taking into account that these policies were a subject of investigation of Chap. 2 in this book, here the focus will be put on specific traits within legal and political framework existed in these two countries which concern Poland as a country of destination. Although it is difficult to say that there are separate diaspora policies adopted by the authorities of Russia and Ukraine, the emigration issue is included in various legislative acts and in bilateral agreements that regulate various aspects of the movement of people and the employment of nationals abroad. The legal framework is focused mostly on the protection of the rights of labour migrants abroad as guaranteed by bi- and multilateral agreements. The available analyses of emigration/diaspora policies in Ukraine and Russia underline that the primary focus of decision makers is linked to labour migration (specifically to nationals working abroad as a part of the international labour market) and to its negative consequences to the country, such as brain-drain. Ukraine is a net emigration country. The size of the Ukrainian population residing abroad is estimated to be more than 6 million people, which means approximately 13% of the country’s population. Taking this into account, the emigration / diaspora policy should therefore be one of the priorities of Ukrainian authorities. According to the experts’ opinion, however, it is underdeveloped in terms of its strategy, legal and political framework and practical measures (Jaroszewicz and Szerepka 2007; Chumak and Kaźmierkiewicz 2009; Tolstokorova 2012; Ivashchenko 2014). The migration policy stresses the state’s role particularly with respect to strengthening the social and legal protections of Ukrainian citizens working abroad. The main political instruments are international cooperation and bilateral treaties aimed at the protection of migrant workers’ rights. As a result, bilateral intergovern- mental agreements on social security for Ukrainian migrants were signed between Ukraine and many countries from Central Eastern Europe (including Poland). Under the agreements, labour migrants are to be accorded the same rights and obligations as nationals, and benefits acquired in one country may be transferred to another. The bilateral agreement on Social Security between Ukraine and Poland was signed in 2012 (and came into force 1 January 2014). The agreement, which Poles and Ukrainians were deprived of before, guarantees that there will be no negative impact on insurance for citizens of Ukraine and Poland if they change their place of residence or employment to the other signatory country. Provisions of the agreement apply to contract workers and self-employed persons (as well as to members of their families) who are entitled to social insurance in the territories of both countries. It is expected that the agreement, by encouraging the elimination of double payments for businesses operating in both countries, will have a favourable impact on economic cooperation between the two countries. Although bilateral agreements on social security are a step in the right direction (to encourage legal employment and to provide incentives for migrant workers to return to Ukraine), their impacts are limited; they ensure social security rights only for the Ukrainian labour migrants who work legally in the signatory countries (ILO 2012).

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Russia is first and foremost a net immigration country, pulling massive numbers of labour migrants from ex-Soviet countries. In contrast with issues relating to immigration and foreigners in Russia, which became a huge political and social problem over last decade, there has been little interest in emigration and diaspora issues. The situation has changed recently, however, in light of the recent crisis with Ukraine and conflict in the Crimea region. The wide debate on Russian state- obligations towards Russian-speaking persons residing abroad started at that point and the concept of Russian nationals abroad became highly politicised. Over the last years, there has also been a noticeable active development of a legal and institutional framework related to Russian nationals living abroad. The dominant idea of a Russian policy towards Russian nationals residing abroad is based on two main objectives: developing and maintaining cultural ties between Russians abroad and the mother country, and facilitating voluntary resettlement (from the CIS and the Baltic states, in particular) (Tkach 2014). There are variety of political tools and projects to strengthen international ties, to support closer cooperation with Russians living abroad and to promote a positive image of Russia abroad, however the CIS countries remain the top priority in implementation of diaspora policy. There are no particular agreements on sending Russian workers abroad. The legal framework on cooperation between Russia and the EU includes the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, Establishing a Partnership between the Russian Federation and the EU (1994). It guarantees that Russian citizens can be legally recruited, on equal terms with the citizens of the EU states with regard to working conditions, benefits or dismissal. In 2006, the Agreement on Readmission between the Russian Federation and the EU was also signed. There are also a number of bilateral agreements on double taxation signed with more than 80 states, including EU countries. The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Poland on the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Property had already been signed in 1992. To summarise, in all three cases, the state policies – the integration policy in Poland as destination and emigration/diaspora policies of Ukraine and Russia as countries of origin – could be described as underdeveloped. Moreover, it is difficult neither to point out any clashes between them, nor to indicate any important convergences. While policy of Ukraine is particularly focus on emigration (not on diaspora), in case of Russia the recent shift towards building the diaspora policy addressed to Russian speaking community worldwide is clearly noticeable. The common elements of these policies which strengthen each other are focusing on labour migration and treating migrants’ flows as an integral part of labour market and economic realm. Moreover, the existed bilateral agreements are directly related and restricted to international law framework (focusing on protection of migrant workers’ rights and taxation law), rather than originated from specific national interests. To sum up, the policies of both group of countries – at origin and at destination – remain rather complement than in conflict with each other.

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Integration Trends of Ukrainian and Russian Migrants in Poland in Light of the Survey

In this chapter the results from the exploratory survey targeted civil society organisations dealing with migrant integration will be presented, which was introduced in Chap. 4 of this book. The respondents which took a part in the survey were organisations dealing with migrant integration in at least one of the eight dimensions (labour market, education, language, social interactions, religion, political and civic participation, nationality issues, housing). The survey maps the activities of organizations in a comparative context, in this particular case – Ukrainian and Russian migrant groups in Poland; it shows how organisations perceive states of origin and their policies in the context of the day-to-day reality of incorporating migrants into the receiving society. In Poland, 24 representatives of organisations working with migrants took part in the survey. Those organizations claimed to work with Russian and Ukrainians migrants residing in Poland, in addition to other migrant groups. The most common profiles of organisations whose representatives took part in the survey were foundations and associations. Several international organizations with agencies in Poland also participated. Before presenting the general conclusions from the survey, an important point should be noted concerning the profile of Russian and Ukrainian migrants who receive assistance from the surveyed organisations. The organisations which work with the Russian migrant population in Poland deal with refugees and/or asylum seekers who have Russian nationality (and Chechen ethnicity), but this group is not representative of the population of Russian migrants residing in Poland, which are to large extent labour migrants. On the other hand, the Ukrainian migrants who contacted the organisations serving migrants in Poland were usually labour migrants pursuing temporary stay and employment in Poland. It is also important to be noticed, that the survey took place between December 2013 and September 2014, before the military conflict between Ukraine and Russia has occurred, it means that recent growth of inflows of Ukrainians to Poland are not reflected in the results. Taking this into account, the survey evidence must be interpreted with some reser- vations, and should not be interpreted as referring to the general population of Ukrainian and Russian migrants residing at present in Poland. It is difficult to estimate the real interest of migrants in obtaining assistance from migrant organisations. The organisations that took part in the survey reported that approximately 50 migrants (of Ukrainian and Russian nationality) contacted them asking for assistance in the period of the last twelve consecutive months. According to data collected in survey, the migrant organisations were the popular destinations for migrants searching for assistance. However, small number of migrants who contact organisations confirms that the most common source of assistance and information for migrants are other migrants and representatives of their social networks, what could mean that migrants visit organisations when they are not able to solve their problems by themselves or with a help from migrant fellows.

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The results of the survey show that the most common tasks of the organisations that participated in the research first and foremost include the provision of up-to- date and reliable information related to the legal and institutional framework and labour-market conditions in Poland (including information about available jobs). Other possible areas of service, beyond labour market, offered by these organisations (such as lobbying for recognition of qualifications or support for training) appeared to be much less important. Additionally, the surveyed organisations’ areas of activity that address Ukrainian migrants seem to be more diverse (in comparison with activities addressing to Russian migrants). Another important area of service is related to informing Ukrainian migrants about student opportunities in Poland. This is probably related to the fact that among foreign students at Polish universities, Ukrainians are the predominant group. To study in Poland gives an easy opportunity to enter Poland and to work without obligatory work permit. One of the sections of the survey was dedicated to the labour market. In one of the questions, respondents were asked to indicate the effectiveness of particular instruments in helping migrants to find a job in the destination country. The representatives of organisations working with Ukrainian and Russian migrants tend to believe that associations in the country of origin are more important in this respect than any official instruments implemented by the country of origin (such as governmental policies, initiatives supporting the employability of migrants abroad or official pre-departure programmes). In the case of organisations working with Russian migrants, there was significantly less belief in the importance of measures provided by either associations or the government in the country of origin. The representatives surveyed also admit that their organisations’ impacts on migrants’ position in the Polish labour market is in practice very limited. Furthermore, it seems that their impacts on other issues related to the labour market, such as wage levels or occupational skills-matching, also remains marginal. Several questions in the survey were linked directly to the role of language in relation to the country of origin and country of destination. The representatives of the surveyed organisations were asked to identify the main channels for learning the language of the country of origin while being in Poland. According to their responses, it can be assumed that the main ways are related to kinship, on the one hand, and to national media, on the other. Travelling back to the country of origin appears to be another important situation that facilitates the process of learning the country-of- origin language. At the same time, the respondents indicated that schools, religious organisations and other associations play a less important role with respect to migrants and their children learning the country-of-origin language. When asked about the sectors of labour market where the native language could be used and be an added value, respondents indicated sectors such as teaching and translation services, as well as tourism, international organisations and diplomatic missions. A separate section of the survey was dedicated to the social integration and civic and political participation of migrants. In general terms, the representatives of the organisations surveyed believe that the country-of-origin policies that pertain to migrants’ social relations have a positive impact on migrants’ integration in the

[email protected] 9 Ukrainian and Russian Immigrants in Poland: Whither Integration? 165 destination country (however, there were also a few responses that indicated both positive and negative impacts). At the same time, what should be underlined here, in both cases –the Ukrainian and Russian migrant populations in Poland – is that governmental support from the country of origin is in practice very low, and is generally limited to legal assistance available from consulates. All respondents provided negative answers to the question related to country-of-origin governmental support for the establishment of organisations such as official representations, schools, religious institutions or cultural centres in the destination country. It clearly shows a serious gap between the legal and institutional frameworks that officially exist within the state political system in the countries of origin, and their implementation in practice. One of the most striking outcomes of the survey is related to the civic and political participation of migrants. Generally, its level is very low in practice (Zapata- Barrero et al. 2013), and moreover, organisations working with migrants do not provide any services in the area of civic and political participation in the country of origin. According to survey results, respondents felt that the civic and political participation of migrants in the country of origin had no effect on any area of their lives in the country of destination. In other words, participation (or non- participation) in the political and public spheres of the country of origin does not influence social relations, school performance, religious practices or the residential integration of migrants in the country of residence (this is especially clear in case of Russians). It can be explained, on the one hand, by the characteristics of migrant groups that were the subject of the survey. Ukrainians are not interested in deeper integration into the social and political sphere in Poland because they believe that their residence there is temporary. Moreover, it is difficult to expect that Russian migrants (who are in fact Chechen asylum seekers) would be engaged in any political or public activities taking place in Russia, and they are not engaged in political life in Poland, because most of them treat Poland as a transit country and not stay in Poland for longer time. Additionally, the lack of visible institutional support from the countries of origin is an important piece of the puzzle in this picture. Although, there is no data indicating the number of migrants who keep the passport (and citizenship) from their previous country while naturalizing in Poland, it can be assumed that many do; moreover, Polish law accepts double citizenship (similarly to Ukrainian and Russian ones). According to respondents, migrants most commonly decide to keep the passport of their country of origin because it is seen as an asset in the country of destination (as in the case of Ukrainian migrants), it allows to vote in elections in country of origin (citizens residing abroad have right to vote in Ukraine in parliamentary elections and in Russia in presidential and parliamentary elections), as well as for sentimental reasons (migrants generally feel attached to their country of origin). To conclude, the survey shows that organisations working with migrants have limited role in Ukrainian and Russian migrants’ integration process in the country of destination. Their activities are focused on assisting them with their process of adaptation in the labour market in the country of destination. At the same time, their role in other areas such as education or social integration remains marginal.

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Moreover, there is no evidence of any organised support from the country of origin for migrants’ integration process in the country of destination; in other words – there is a gap between the legal and institutional frameworks that officially exist within Russian and Ukrainian state systems to address nationals living abroad and their implementation in practice.

Main Conclusions

The chapter’s analysis of the immigration and integration patterns of Ukrainians and Russians residing in Poland covers the role of both the country of destination and countries of origin and shows that the migrant profile of Poland is dynamic. Although it remains a net emigration country, the size of the foreign population in Poland is growing. The major groups of migrants come from eastern neighbouring countries, with Ukraine being the main source country. Moreover, there is a dynamic trend towards more stable and long-term immigration, which is particularly noticeable in case of Ukrainian immigrants. The main reasons for this change are related to factors both in the country of origin – the political and economic instability in Ukraine as a result of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia – as well as in the country of destination – the growing demand for a foreign labour force in a fast- developing Polish economy. The second migrant group investigated in this report were Russians, who constitute a much less numerous group of migrants, but at the same time, a much more diverse group. Within the category of Russian migrants in Poland we find specialists and highly qualified workers on the one hand, and refugees and asylum seekers on the other (however, the latter are not targeted by Russian diaspora policy in any way). Over recent years, there has been a noticeable evolution of migration policy in Poland towards a slow and controlled opening-up to foreigner inflows. This evolution has serious limitations however, such as the promotion of specific types of inflows (short-term labour migration, as opposed to settlement) and the fact that the policy targets particular groups of migrants: EU citizens and nationals from eastern neighbouring countries. The most important legal and political provisions which could be perceived as drivers of immigration are related to the liberalisation of labour-market entry rules for foreigners (via the simplification of legislation concerning work permits and the introduction of an employer declaration system). Moreover, another important factor influencing corridors of migrant flows and integration patterns is the lack of a long-term and systematic integration policy addressing foreigners residing in Poland. The legal and institutional framework related to migrant integration can be portrayed as a reactive, centralised and top-down system, and should by no means be treated as a driver that encourages migrant inflows and settlement processes. Despite the state’s generally passive attitude toward the integration of foreigners, a more active approach to the integration of foreigners is noticeable in the NGO sector, which can be described as a partial substitute for state administration when it comes to the implementation of integration policy.

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In analysing the emigration / diaspora policies of Ukraine and Russia, it must be stressed that the primary focus of these policies are nationals working abroad and the resulting negative consequences to the country such as brain-drain and depopulation. Although it is difficult to say whether there are any separate diaspora policies that have been adopted by Russian and Ukrainian authorities, the emigration issue is included in various legislative acts and in bilateral agreements that regulate various aspects of the movement of people and the employment of nationals abroad. The legal framework is focused mostly on the protection of the rights of labour migrants abroad, as guaranteed by bi- and multilateral agreements, and on keeping relations between nationals residing abroad and the country of origin as active as possible. The survey, which was conducted with representatives from various organisations in Poland that work with migrants, adds yet another layer to the picture. The survey results confirm several important conclusions: firstly that, in this particular case, neither the country-of-destination nor the country-of-origin governments have an impact on migrant integration. Moreover, the activities of organisations working with migrants are predominantly focused on assisting migrants with their process of adaptation within the labour market, while their role in other areas (education or social integration, for instance), remains negligible.

References

Chumak, V., & Kaźmierkiewicz, P. (2009). Coordinating migration policy in Ukraine: Lessons from Poland. Warsaw-Kiev: IPA-ICPS. Duszczyk, M. (2012). Polska polityka imigracyjna a rynek pracy [Poland’s migration policy and labour market]. Warszawa: ASPRA-JR. Duszczyk, M., Góra, M. & Kaczmarczyk P. (2013). Costs and benefits of labour mobility between the EU and the Eastern partnership countries – The case of Poland (IZA Discussion Paper). Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, 7664. http://ftp.iza.org/dp7664.pdf. Accessed 16 Sept 2015. Fihel, A. (2007). Cechy społeczno-demograficzne i rozmieszczenie przestrzenne cudzoziemców w Polsce [The socio-demographic features and spatial allocation of foreigners in Poland]. In A. Górny, A. Grzymała-Kazłowska, E. Kępińska, A. Fihel, A. Piekut, (Eds.), Od zbiorowości do społeczności: rola migrantów osiedleńczych w tworzeniu się społeczności imigranckich w Polsce [From population to community: the role of settled immigrants in the development of immigrant communities in Poland] (CMR Working Papers 27/85, pp. 11–38). Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research. http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/site_media/files/027_85.pdf. Accessed 25 Sept 2015. Fihel, A. (Ed.). (2011). Recent Trends in international migration in Poland. The 2011 SOPEMI report (CMR Working Papers 52 (110)). Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research. http://www. migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/1778/. Accessed 15 Sept 2015. Fundacja Edukacyjna Perspektywy. (2014). Raport Studenci zagraniczni w Polsce 2014 [Raport on Foreign students in Poland 2014]. Warszzawa: Fundacja Edukacyjna Perspektywy. Górny, A., Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Lesińska, M., & Okólski, M. (Eds.). (2010). Immigration to Poland: Policy, employment, integration. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Grzymała-Kazłowska, A., & Weinar, A. (2006). The Polish approach to integration. Canadian Diversity, 5(1), 72–75. ILO. (2012). Ensuring social security benefits for Ukrainian migrant workers. Kiev: ILO. http:// www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---sro-budapest/documents/publication/wcms_205317.pdf. Accessed 6 Oct 2015.

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Ivashchenko, K. (2014). Interact country report – Ukraine. INTERACT Report. Migration Policy Centre (INTERACT Research Report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, unpublished. Jaroszewicz, M. (2015). The migration of Ukrainians in times of crisis. OSW Commentary 187. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw- commentary/2015-10-19/migration-ukrainians-times-crisis. Accessed 26 Sept 2015. Jaroszewicz, M., & Szerepka, L. (2007). Migration challenges in the EU Eastern neighbourhood. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies. Jaźwińska, E., & Okólski, M. (1996). Causes and consequences of migration in Central and Eastern Europe. In Podlasie and Śląsk Opolski: Basic Trends in 1975–1994. Warsaw: ISS- University of Warsaw. Kępińska, E., & Stola, D. (2004). Migration policies and politics in Poland. In A. Górny & P. Ruspini (Eds.), Migration in the New Europe. East-West Revised (pp. 159–176). Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. Kicinger, A. (2005). Between Polish interests and the EU influence – Polish migration policy development 1989–2004, CEFMR Working Paper, nr 9. Kindler, M. (2011). Risk and risk strategies in economic migration from Ukraine: the case of migrant women working in the domestic work sector in Poland. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Lesińska, M. (2010). Integration policy. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Lesińska, & M. Okólski (Eds.), Immigration to Poland: Policy, employment, integration (pp. 76–80). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Lesińska, M. (2013). Polityka migracyjna Polski a procesy napływowe z Ukrainy [Polish migration policy and migration inflows from Ukraine]. In Z. Brunarska, M. Grotte & M. Lesińska (Eds.), Migracje obywateli Ukrainy do Polski w kontekście rozwoju społeczno- gospodarczego: stan obecny, polityka, transfery pieniężne [Migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland in the context of socio-economic development: The state, politics and remittances] (CMR Working Paper, 60 (118)). Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/ publ/2017/. Accessed 14 Sept 2015. Ministry of the Interior. (2012). Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania [The migration policy of Poland – The current state of play and further actions]. Warsaw. Okólski, M. (1997a). Najnowszy ruch wędrówkowy z Ukrainy do Polski [The current flows from Ukraine to Poland] (Prace Migracyjne 14). Warszawa: ISS-Uniwersytet Warszawski. http:// www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/publ/563/. Accessed 7 Oct 2015. Okólski, M. (1997b). Recent migration in Poland: trends and causes. A preliminary assessment (Prace Migracyjne 6). Warsaw: ISS-University of Warsaw. http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/ publ/334/. Accessed 25 Sept 2015. Okólski, M. (2004). The effects of political and economic transition on international migration in Central and Eastern Europe. In J. E. Taylor & D. S. Massey (Eds.), International migration. Prospects and policies (pp. 35–58). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stola, D. (1997). Mechanizmy i uwarunkowania migracji zarobkowych do Polski [The mechanisms and factors influencing labour migration to Poland] (CMR Working Papers, no. 11). Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research. Tkach, O. (2014). Policy and institutional frameworks, Russia country report. Migration Policy Centre (INTERACT Research Report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, unpublished. Tolstokorova, A. (2012). State policy on emigration and diasporas in Ukraine. (CARIM-East Explanatory Note 12/29, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://www.carim-east.eu/media/exno/ Explanatory%20Notes_2012-29.pdf. Accessed 26 Jan 2015. Weinar, A. (2006). Europeizacja polskiej polityki wobec cudzoziemców 1990–2003 [Europenization of Polish migration policy 1990–2003]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Zapata-Barrero R., Gabrielli L., Sanchez-Montijano E., Jaulin T. (2013). The political participation of immigrants in host countries: An interpretative framework from perspective of origin countries and societies (INTERACT Research Report, p. 7). http://cadmus.eui.eu/ handle/1814/29565

[email protected] Chapter 10 Integration in Italy Among Selected Migrant Communities: Does Country of Origin Matter?

Anna Di Bartolomeo, Giuseppe Gabrielli, and Salvatore Strozza

Introduction

Although traditionally an emigration area, since the late 1970s Italy has become an immigration country as well. Due to recent intense immigration, today Italy is the major pole of attraction for labour migrants in the EU (together with Spain and the United Kingdom). In 2014 (1st January), there were more than 4.9 million foreign residents in Italy, a number which peaks at around 6 million when non-resident regular and irregular immigrants are included. They represent around 10% of the total population residing in the country. Belonging to the Southern European Model of Migration, Italy is characterized by a set of specific features in terms of international migration (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2016). First, the absence or lack of effectiveness of migration policies has made irregular migration more prevalent than in the countries of Western and Northern Europe. Meanwhile, the large presence of informal economic activities has created a great demand for low-skilled profiles in certain sectors that are also filled by regular migrants. Accordingly, immigrants work in a wide variety of labour market segments (King and DeBono 2013). A complex segmentation of the labour market has been achieved along gender and ethnic lines (Bettio et al. 2006; Strozza et al. 2009). In particular, domestic service (for women) and agriculture and construction (for men) are the main sectors that attract low-skilled regular and irregular migrants arriving in Southern Europe (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2016). Eventually, together with labour immigration, family migration has gradually become another important

A. Di Bartolomeo (*) Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, Italy e-mail: [email protected] G. Gabrielli • S. Strozza Department of Political Sciences, University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 169 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_10

[email protected] 170 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. channel of entry to Italy for those communities – e.g. Moroccans, Albanians – which have a longer presence on the territory. Notwithstanding Italy’s predominant role in the European international-migration panorama, its integration institutional framework is still incomplete and lacking a model of reference. Historically, the integration of immigrants in Italy was long perceived as a de facto process taking place within the labour market and depending upon economic performance. At the end of 1990s, the Turco-Napolitano Law (40/1998) recognised integration for the first time as a topic per se by enlarging its focus on labour market, health, education, housing and civic participation topics. The implementation of this law was challenging, however, mostly due to the lack of national coordination over local institutions and the disproportionate role put on economic issues, while social and cultural policies instead remained marginal (Caponio and Zincone 2011). Only recently (in the mid-2000s), was the Italian government able to reach a re-conceptualisation of integration in other than economic terms. Following the September 11th attacks in 2001 and other dramatic events – including the homicide of Theo Van Gogh (2004) and the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) – integration and social cohesion become more and more publicly debated. The link between migration and social security was prevailing. As in many other European countries, Italian politics addressed public concerns by adopting an identitarian (or neo-assimilationist) approach (Joppke 2007; Zincone 2011), which resulted in the low recognition of other cultural identities together with a full adhesion to host societies’ values (Caponio 2013). Today, Italian integration policies are jeopardized largely by a high degree of heterogeneity at a territorial level. The present chapter looks at the level of integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy with specific attention to the role played by origin and destination determinants. Origin determinants include diaspora and emigration policies at origin and the engagement and role of non-state organisations, ties between migrants and their country-of-origin and country-fixed characteristics. With respect to destination determinants, the role of integration policies and country-specific characteristics is discussed. The focus is on Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants because these two groups are quantitatively important in the Italian case and are very different in terms of demographic characteristics, migration patterns and insertion modalities, as well as in terms of the emigration and diaspora policies in their home countries. This diversity allows us to better emphasise origin-country factors. Dating back more than 30 years, Moroccan emigration is still quantitatively important. Initially characterized by single young males, it continues today through female family reunification channels. The stabilisation of Moroccan migration in Italy is confirmed by the high share of minors. Started in the late 1990s, Ukrainian migration became quantitatively important after the 2002 regularisation, and then continued to grow. Ukrainian migrants are mostly women aged 40+ who have often left their husbands and children behind in order to provide them with financial support from abroad. They are mainly employed in household services, taking care of elderly people. Today Ukrainian migration is occurring on a more permanent basis due to an increase in mixed marriages and in the number of minors reunifying with their mothers to complete their studies or look for jobs (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2015).

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It is not only emigration history but also (and especially) the approach of state (and non-state) authorities towards their emigrants abroad which substantially differs between the Moroccan and Ukrainian policy frameworks. As seen in Chap. 2, Moroccan policies are largely – but not exclusively – diaspora-policy oriented. Education, language and religion are all topics that receive large investments from Moroccan authorities. However, although Italy is a country with a relatively small Moroccan diaspora (when compared with other traditional European destinations such as France and Belgium, for instance) it has large shares of labour migrants, and therefore labour migration agreements are a major area of cooperation between Morocco and Italy. Bilateral agreements that call for preferential quotas and pre- departure trainings are at the core of Italian-Moroccan bilateral cooperation in international migration movements. As noted in Chap. 2, Italian and Ukrainian relationships in this field are by contrast developed in a largely “unmanaged context” in which diaspora members and labour migrants are not the focus of any official Ukrainian policy framework. On the other hand, the role of NGOs as vehicles of information and intermediaries between migrants and Italian institutions in various fields (e.g. labour market, education) appears to be quite relevant. This chapter thus tries to evaluate the level of integration of these two communities by emphasising their differences and similarities. The following research questions are addressed. What is the level of integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy in the fields of labour market, education and access to citizenship? To what extent do Italian integration policies and Moroccan and Ukrainian migration policies contribute to determining migrants’ integration performances? What is the role played by NGOs? To answer these questions, the INTERACT methodological framework – described in Chaps. 3 and 4– is used. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Paragraph 10.2 presents the size and core characteristics of Moroccan and Ukrainian migration to Italy. In paragraph 10.3, Italian integration policies are presented together with a brief summary of the specific traits of Moroccan and Ukrainian migration policies that concern Italy. Specifically, potential convergences and clashes between origin and destination assets are discussed. Paragraph 10.4 discusses the integration performance of these two communities with respect to the labour market, education and access to citizenship, in light of quantitative and qualitative evidence found by the two INTERACT studies. Paragraph 10.5 concludes the report, summing up findings and proposing a coherent framework of integration levels and determinants.

Immigration Size, Characteristics, and Trends of Moroccan and Ukrainian Migration to Italy

In 2014 (Jan. 1st), there were more than 4.9 million foreign residents in Italy, a number which peaks at around 6 million when non-resident regular and irregular immigrants are included. They represent around 10% of the total population residing in the country. Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants are among the largest migrant groups – being the 3rd and 5th most numerous communities – with, respectively, 454,773 and 219,050 individuals.

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These two communities differ significantly in terms of numbers and profiles as a result of their different migration histories. Moroccan migration to Italy started first in the mid-1980s composed of single young males migrating for labour reasons. In 1991 there were already almost 40,000 Moroccans residing in Italy and, until the mid-2000s, they represented the major migrant group (Paterno et al. 2006). In the inter-census period (2001–2011), Moroccans more than doubled, reaching a peak of 400,000 persons. Such growth was due to a positive balance both in migration and natural (births minus deaths) terms. Moroccan migration today is indeed more and more stable being also characterized by large inflows of family migrants and a high share of minors. Ukrainian migration to Italy, on the other hand, started to boom only at the end of 1990s. In the 2001–2011 period, an impressive growth was also observed among Ukrainians, when their presence passed from 8,600 to almost 180,000 people. Unlike in the Moroccan case, this growth is largely due to positive net migration dynamics. Ukrainian migration is indeed largely composed of middle aged women migrating for labour reasons and, only recently, it is occurring on a more permanent basis. In terms of profiles, age pyramids are a synthetic and analytic way to get an immediate understanding of demographic differences between the two migrant groups (Fig. 10.1). The Moroccan pyramid is large at the bottom (reflecting both family reunifications and births in Italy) and diminishes progressively until 15–19 years of age and then increases again until the modal age of 30–34 for women and 35–39 for men. There is an evident imbalance in terms of gender among the working age population, with a large prevalence of men even if the high percentage of minors suggests the progressive stabilization of the Moroccan presence in Italy. The Ukrainian age pyramid is a case in point. The very large prevalence of women is particularly evident starting from 35 years of age and signals the significant presence of middle aged women (with a modal age of 50–54 years of age). The bottom of the pyramid is instead very thin due to the very scarce presence of chil- ab

80+ MALE FEMALE 80+ MALE FEMALE 75-79 75-79 70-74 70-74 65-69 65-69 60-64 60-64 55-59 55-59 50-54 50-54 45-49 45-49 40-44 40-44 35-39 35-39 30-34 30-34 25-29 25-29 20-24 20-24 15-19 15-19 10-14 10-14 5-9 5-9 0-4 0-4 10.08.0 6.04.0 2.0 0.02.0 4.06.0 8.0 4.02.0 0.02.0 4.06.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0

Fig. 10.1 Population pyramids for Moroccans and Ukrainians who have a residence permit or are inserted into a parent’s. Italy, 31 December 2012. Percentage sex and age distribution. (a) Morocco. (b) Ukraine (Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Ministry of Interior revised and provided by ISTAT)

[email protected] 10 Integration in Italy Among Selected Migrant Communities: Does Country… 173 dren, at least those aged less than 20. Indeed, the gender balance in the 20–29 age group also seems to signalling a large number of children arriving with their parents or following their aged mothers. While the mean age of regular Moroccans does not reach 30 years of age without significant differences by sex, among Ukrainians it is higher than 42 with large differences between men (31.5) and women (higher than 45) (Table 10.1). Such a gap is due to the scarce weight of Ukrainian underage women (less than 6% vs. 24% among men). The higher degree of stabilization of the Moroccan community compared with the Ukrainian one is also visible when comparing migrants holding a valid residence permit who, depending on the type of permit, include both permanent and temporary stayers. Around two out of three regular Moroccan migrants have a permanent residence permit vs. around one out of two Ukrainians (Table 10.1). Moroccan migrants with permanent residence permits have specific characteristics that indicate a more stable presence on the territory together with a high presence of family members. For instance, the percentage of minors is 36% for permanent residents vs. only 21% for temporary stayers. The share of people aged 35–54 (potential parents) is close to 35% for permanent permit holders while for temporary permit holders, the share of people aged 18–34 prevails (40%). Overall, the values of the dependency and child-woman ratios of Moroccans are higher than those recorded for all other migrant groups. Also, these ratios are especially high among those holding a permanent RP. The regular Moroccan presence thus appears family oriented and stable (Table 10.1). Among Ukrainians, the owners of permanent permits are people who have a longer presence in the country than those with a temporary permit. However, unlike in the Moroccan case, it cannot be said whether or not they have more stable roots in the country. Indeed, they not only show a more unbalanced gender composition but also the share of minors and of people aged 18–34 is less significant compared to those who hold temporary permits. Without any doubt, the differences between Ukrainians and Moroccans do not depend on their different compositions by type of permit but rather on the different migration models and strategies, as well as the different length of stay of the two diasporas in Italy. Moroccan immigration today is linked to family reunification dynamics and births by Moroccan parents in Italy. Immigration from Ukraine has rather a more individual trait. First-migrants are mainly composed of middle-aged women, married or with previous marriage experiences for whom – it can be hypothesized – de facto family reunifications will mostly involve adult children arriving to complete studies and/or look for a job. The statistical data presented here allow us to track average profiles clearly distinguished between immigrants from Morocco and Ukraine. Dating back more than thirty years, Moroccan immigration continues to be quantitatively important. Initially characterised by single young males, since the mid-1990s migrants have been predominately female, arriving through family reunification channels and creating a gender structure that at present is almost rebal- anced. The stabilisation of Moroccan migration to Italy is confirmed by a high share of minors and an increased importance of families in a community that still contin-

[email protected] 174 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. 9.3 7.8 6.5 34.9 32.0 23.8 35.6 32.0 32.4 24.1 36.2 31.5 32.9 48.0 24.4 31.0 30.4 23.6 100.0 3,026,274 Total 9.3 8.5 7.6 36.6 25.0 29.1 39.0 31.4 22.9 29.7 41.2 31.3 20.9 48.4 30.3 53.1 31.3 39.8 27.7 1,606,213 Permanent RP 9.3 7.1 5.2 33.0 40.0 17.7 31.8 32.7 43.3 17.8 30.7 31.6 46.2 47.6 17.9 46.9 30.6 21.2 19.7 1,420,061 Other third countries RP Temporary 5.7 7.9 9.2 5.6 27.4 50.6 16.3 23.5 47.4 45.2 19.9 35.1 42.4 33.8 79.8 23.2 31.5 11.2 100.0 224,588 Total 5.4 9.1 8.8 5.0 30.8 52.5 11.3 26.8 50.2 46.8 14.1 39.9 44.2 26.6 81.7 24.3 49.2 32.5 11.1 110,588 Permanent RP 6.1 7.0 9.6 6.2 24.0 48.5 21.4 20.3 44.7 43.6 25.4 31.2 40.8 39.7 78.0 22.2 50.8 30.8 11.3 114,000 Ukraine RP Temporary 8.8 8.0 7.4 27.1 30.7 33.4 33.0 28.5 28.2 30.8 37.7 29.7 26.2 43.9 28.7 30.7 44.9 45.0 100.0 513,374 Total 6.9 7.7 8.3 27.5 26.4 39.2 34.2 26.9 21.7 36.4 39.5 28.8 18.0 44.1 34.1 64.1 30.3 55.3 50.9 328,861 Permanent RP 8.6 5.8 12.1 26.3 38.6 22.9 30.9 31.4 39.8 20.8 34.3 31.4 40.7 43.4 19.2 31.3 29.4 35.8 35.9 184,513 Temporary RP Temporary Morocco b a Demographic characteristics of Moroccans, Ukrainians and other third-country nationals who have a residence permit (RP) or are inserted into Demographic characteristics of Moroccans, Ukrainians and other third-country nationals who have

Population under 15 and over 65 years old per 100 people 15–64 Population under 15 and over a % 55 and over % 35–54 Dependency ratio Dependency % 18–34 % 55 and over % under 18 % 35–54 Female Mean age % 18–34 % 55 and over % under 18 % 35–54 Mean age % 18–34 Total % female % under 18 % by type of RP Child-woman ratio Child-woman Male Mean age No. of RPs Values and indices Values Children under 5 years old per 100 women 15–49 years old Children under 5 years old per 100 women Notes: b by ISTAT and provided revised Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Ministry of Interior, Table 10.1 Table 31 December 2012 by type of permit. Italy, parent’s,

[email protected] 10 Integration in Italy Among Selected Migrant Communities: Does Country… 175 ues to have quite high fertility levels, much higher than those of the Italian population. Over time, the Moroccan territorial concentration has increased in the North of Italy, where the range of employment opportunities is broader, thus increasing the chances of stabilization and integration for these migrants. In contrast, Ukrainian migration started only in the late 1990s. It became quantitatively significant following the 2002 regularization, after which it continued to grow. Ukrainian migrants are composed mainly of women aged 40 and older, who often left their husbands and children behind in order to provide them with financial support from abroad. For instance, a significant share of Ukrainian immigrants is comprised of separated and divorced women who need to provide support to their children at home. Recently there has been a slight shift toward more permanent migration for Ukrainian women. This has happened in part because mixed marriages are becoming increasingly frequent, and in part because minors are reunifying with their mothers in Italy in order to complete their studies or look for a job. The economic crisis has slowed down economic migration from Ukraine, resulting in an increasing importance of children’s reunification channels. The two groups show significant differences not only in terms of migratory trends (reasons and strategies), demographic characteristics and territorial distribution in Italy, but also with respect to their insertion in the Italian labour market. While Moroccans are inserted across a wide range of occupations (including self- employment), Ukrainians are strongly characterized by an impressive concentration of elderly-care workers in private household services. In this report, these differences and their relationships to integration outcomes will be analysed in detail.

Integration Policies1

The Italian Integration Policy Framework

In Italy, the integration of immigrants was long perceived as a de facto process taking place within the labour market and depending upon economic performance. Only in 1998 did the Turco-Napolitano Law (40/1998) recognise it as a topic per se, although in the absence of public debate (Caponio 2013). Specifically, Title V included a range of measures to be adopted on the labour market, health, education, housing and civic participation. To a large extent, these measures were designed by looking at local practices, namely multi-cultural courses and cultural mediation at school, Italian language courses for adults, housing benefits, etc. The implementation of this law was challenging, however, mostly due to the lack of national coordination over local institutions and the disproportionate role put on economic issues while social and cultural policies instead remained marginal (Caponio and Zincone 2011).

1 This section is partly based on the following INTERACT Country Reports: Caneva 2014 (Italy), Ivashchenko 2014 (Ukraine), and Ait Madani 2014 (Morocco).

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The shift towards a re-conceptualization of integration in other than economic terms is a recent process which started only in the mid-2000s. Following the September 11th attacks in 2001 and other dramatic events – including the homicide of Theo Van Gogh (2004) and the terrorist attacks of Madrid (2004) and London (2005) – integration and social cohesion become more and more publicly debated. The link between migration and social security was prevailing. Like in many other European countries, Italian politics addressed public concerns by adopting an identitarian (or neo-assimilationist) approach (Joppke 2007; Zincone 2011), that resulted in the low recognition of other cultural identities together with a full adhesion to host societies’ values (Caponio 2013). This new approach was pursued by the Berlusconi IV government (May 2008–November 2011) with the introduction of the “Accordo di integrazione” (in force by March 2012) and the “Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza”, the latter included in the “Pacchetto sicurezza” Law (Law 94/2009). These legislative acts are still in force today. At the time of writing, the “Accordo di integrazione” and the “Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza” are the core documents managing the integration of immigrants in Italy. In addition, bilateral agreements with origin countries have long characterized Italian immigration policies in the sphere of labour migration and economic integration. Accordingly, Law no. 94/2009 inaugurated a new set of agreements.

“Accordo di integrazione”

In keeping with the renewed Italian neo-assimilationist approach, when issued a residence permit, immigrants have to sign the “Accordo di integrazione”, according to which they commit themselves to achieving the following “integration goals” (within 2 years): (a) learning Italian (level A2); (b) obtaining a sufficient knowledge of the Italian Constitution and institutions; (c) acquiring a deep knowledge of Italian civic values together with the functioning of health, educational and social services systems, the labour market and taxes; (d) obliging children to attend school until 16 years of age (i.e. 10 years of schooling). The agreement is articulated into credits: initially, immigrants are given 16 credits but are required to reach 30 credits in two years. They can be obtained through participation in certified Italian language courses, Italian history and civic courses, professional and vocational training, etc. These courses are not compulsory, except for one 5–10 h session to be attended in the first three months. It aims at improving immigrants’ knowledge about points (c) and (d), described above. As regards language courses (point (a)), although they are not compulsory, immigrants must pass an Italian language exam (level A2). Credits can also be lost if an immigrant does not: (a) pass the language test; (b) attend the 5–10 h compulsory session and/or (c) respect Italian laws. In extreme cases they lose all credits, the residence permit is revoked and expulsion enforced.

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“Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza”

The “Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza” includes five priority areas where integration policies need to be implemented: (a) the knowledge of Italian language, values and civic culture should be promoted both at school (for young people) and out of school (for adults) through the implementation of language and training courses. Women are in this case considered a priority group; (b) within the labour market dimension, the necessity of fighting against informal recruiting and employment is envisaged, supporting immigrants’ entrepreneurship and developing pre- departure trainings; (c) housing policies should both facilitate immigrants’ search for a house and avoid ethnic segregation enclaves; (d) access to social and health services needs to be promoted by means of public advertising, multi-cultural mediation, training programs for health and social workers and cooperation between national and local institutions; (e) finally, a focus needs to be put on immigrants’ children, for whom the right to be educated needs be guaranteed. The document establishes an ad hoc Committee for Foreign Minors to promote integration policies.

Bilateral Agreements and Pre-departure Trainings

Bilateral agreements have long characterized the Italian approach to the labour market and to economic migration (Ambrosetti and Paparusso 2013). The “Pacchetto sicurezza” emphasized a renewed phase of bilateral agreements to support supply/ demand matching at origin and destination. To this end, it includes the following tools: (a) supporting the exchange of information; (b) promoting training courses and educational cooperation programmes; (c) assigning preferential quotas to those who attend pre-departure courses. The latter can be considered the main innovative instrument envisaged here. For the first time, these pre-departure courses have been conceived not only as vocational courses but also as training on the Italian language, civic values, the functioning of the educational system, security at work, etc. Also the way the courses are organized is quite innovative. The majority are meant to be organized and managed by private intermediation agencies that recruit workers at origin, in accordance with Italian labour market needs. Such a renewed approach thus gives major emphasis to the external dimension of migration being based on a three-win solution: origin countries may benefit from preferential quotas while implicitly guaranteeing Italian authorities more rigid control of irregular outward migration out-flows (Caponio2013 ). In the end, immigrants are supported at both the origin and destination points.

Integration Policy Implementation and the Role of Local and Non-state Actors

Despite the renewed role of public national policies in the framework of integration and the recent shift towards individuating a major link between admission and integration, the overall implementation of integration policies is still largely challenged

[email protected] 178 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. by two sets of reasons: (a) the extraordinary role assumed by local institutions and, consequently, the existence of strong regional disparities and (b) budgetary constraints. With respect to the former, integration policies are today largely implemented and designed at the local level, namely by local institutions (regions, provinces and municipalities) and NGOs. This has two main consequences. On the one hand, integration measures have provided users with a high degree of heterogeneity. Striking differences are observed between opportunities and incentives in the North and the South of Italy, large and small cities, urban and rural zones. On the other hand, the engagement of such actors has resulted in many more ad hoc interventions in accordance with local needs and priorities. In so doing, local actors have been able to address specific territorial needs and counterbalance the shortcomings of national policies. Some notable tools adopted at a local level are (a) information points; (b) cultural mediation activities and linguistic courses; (c) local financing for housing. Budgetary constraints are another major issue for Italian integration policies. Today, public funds include: (a) financial resources managed by the Directorate- General for Immigration and Integration Policies within the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies; (b) European funds (namely the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, which has now been replaced by the European Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration). In recent years, the latter has been the major resource for financing Italian integration policies (Table 10.2, columns 3–4). In the period 2007–2013, this Fund targeted a wide range of objectives in all spheres of life (economic, religious, social, political, linguistic.). It co-finances from 50% to 75% of national integration projects. Funds were given directly to national institutions if projects were designed at a state level, or through tenders for local projects. Major fields of intervention were linguistic and civic education projects, youth initiatives, and cultural mediation. For the period 2014–2020, the Fund has been replaced by the European Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration. To summarize, Italian integration policies are still largely jeopardized by a high degree of heterogeneity at a territorial level; the nature of policy implementation is contingent upon the sensitiveness and efficiency of local actors. The lack of coordination at the national level is frequently cited as a major issue (Lunaria 2014; OECD 2014) in today’s context where the EU is the major financial actor funding the development of integration policies in the country.

Integration Policies Towards Moroccan and Ukrainian Migrants

Though integration policy tools do not discriminate by origin – so that all migrant groups are treated the same – there are groups that are considered as ‘most vulnerable’, namely women and children. Accordingly, they are the target of specific integration measures. As a matter of fact, there are some migrants’ groups which have implicitly become the target of integration interventions, especially at a sub-national level. In

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Table 10.2 Public funding to integration policies, 2005–2013 (values in thousands of euros) European fund for the integration of third- National fund for migration country nationals Year policies EU funds Italian funds 2005 4,429 – – 2006 16,477 – – 2007 5,347 6,315 2,452 2008 6,450 8,591 3,858 2009 24,357 15,062 6,557 2010 28,732 20,445 8,945 2011 7,560 27,137 11,486 2012 6,250 34,174 14,324 2013 – 36,957 22,657 Source: Lunaria (2014) this sense, Ukrainian migrants are – potentially – a privileged group in integration terms, given that women represent the large majority and that they are especially prevalent in the work force. At a state level, the “Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza” explicitly calls for women migrants to be integration agents, stating that “the inclusion of foreign women mirrors the degree of integration reached by a society”. However, it fails to recognize the growing role assumed by women migrants in the Italian labour market, especially in the care-giving sector, where the majority of Ukrainian women are inserted. Indeed, in the “Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza”, women are targeted only as potential beneficiaries of linguistic integration measures for whom the state should promote “TV programs in specific daily hours to improve the knowledge and use of the Italian language and to get viewers closer to the Italian culture”. Such tools specifically address only those female migrants who are not in the workforce and who have been granted family permits. In this sense, paradoxically, these tools better address the needs of Moroccan women – who are still scarcely active in the labour market – than those of Ukrainian women. The gap left by national practices is, however, filled by local institutions which instead target female labour migrants. Within the official list of good practices addressing women migrant’s integration, 19 out of 53 activities are dedicated to courses of Italian and more general cultural assimilation (e.g. teaching Italian civic values), 9 to health education and 6 to work training activities. The rest focuses on various topics, such as gender-based violence, self-defence, social exclusion, etc. Thus cultural assimilation and language issues are not the only issues tackled. The most active regions are Lazio (with 14 on-going projects), Campania (11 projects), and Veneto (6 projects), Toscana, Piedmont and Marche (4 projects each). By looking at the type of intervention and region together, some interesting conclusions may be drawn. The Campania region comprises 67% of all courses dedicated to training female labour migrants in Italy. Training activities include family care- giving courses, sewing and darning classes, etc. These offerings clearly reflect the high concentration of Eastern European women in this region, and especially female

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Ukrainian labour migrants. In the Lazio region, activities are much more varied: health education (39%), Italian courses (31%), work activities (15%), etc. Some of these activities are specifically dedicated to the family reunification of female migrants, which reflect a much greater diversification of female migrants’ origins. Moroccan migrants are by contrast targeted by the 2005 bilateral agreement, in which the parties pledge their support for activities that promote educational and vocational training as well as language courses in Morocco. As a result, Moroccan authorities give preferential treatment to Moroccan workers who participate in work and linguistic training activities when asking to enter Italy, in accordance with Italian labour market needs. In addition, as mentioned before, Moroccan women are implicitly targeted by integration measures aimed at integrating reunified women.

Integration Policies at Origin

Looking at Moroccan and Italian migration history, it should be recalled that Italy represents only a recent – though important – destination compared with more ancient routes (e.g. migration to France). This implies that the Moroccan diaspora living in Italy has to a large extent benefited from increased support from Moroccan authorities, compared with other diasporas living in other European countries. The renewed diaspora-oriented Moroccan approach and the newly created Italian integration policy have thus evolved and changed in the same period. Major convergences are certainly found in the labour market dimension. Beyond the bilateral agreement which guarantees Moroccan migrants priority in the Italian labour market, several other initiatives tend to converge. Specifically, Moroccan and Italian institutions show a high degree of collaboration in the domain of pre- departure programmes. For instance, in the framework of the “European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals 2007–2013”, the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies promoted the development of a wide range of trainings in loco, in collaboration with local Moroccan institutions (such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Maritime Fishing) and other agencies. Unlike those developed for other nationalities (e.g. migrants from Sri Lanka and Mauritius), these programmes were focused on seasonal workers in order to allow them to “acquire knowledge and competencies [..] that fit Italian labour market characteristics” in sectors as tourism and agriculture. Such courses (each of them at least 104 h) included a theoretical and practical training section, the teaching of Italian civic values and rules governing citizenship, security in the workplace and admission. In contrast, if we look at the legal dimension, the recent support given by Moroccan authorities to naturalization processes is in contradiction with the still many constraints that migrants face to obtaining the Italian citizenship. However, the major clash between Moroccan and Italian policies is to be found in the cultural and religious dimension. The renewed neo-assimilationist Italian approach (Caponio and Zincone 2011) towards migrants’ integration is certainly the opposite of the extremely significant support given by Moroccan authorities to sup-

[email protected] 10 Integration in Italy Among Selected Migrant Communities: Does Country… 181 porting cultural and religious values among expatriates. Nevertheless, it should be noted that today, of the large amount of resources invested by the Moroccan state in these fields, only a minimal part is devoted to Moroccans living in Italy. In 2012, for example, the number of Arabic teachers employed abroad equalled 60.9% in France, 17.4% in Belgium, 10.2% in Spain and only 4.2% in Italy. As highlighted in Chap. 2, due to historical, ethnic, cultural and political reasons, Ukrainian diaspora policies are largely oriented towards (and efficient in) the post- Soviet space and EU Eastern European countries than in other EU countries. Members of the old ethnic diaspora are thus privileged beneficiaries of state actions while no actions or very few initiatives are envisaged for new labour migrants living in other EU states, such as Italy. In these countries, emigration policies are quite absent or – when they do exist – quite problematic (e.g. the project for taxing remittances). This issue applies to all dimensions. On the other hand, a very important role in the EU seems to be being played by NGOs, which in several cases work as intermediaries with Ukrainian authorities to convey migrants’ claims. For the time being, an examination of Ukrainian and Italian integration approaches shows no specific clashes or convergences that are worth highlighting. Even in the labour market dimension, there are neither bilateral agreements signed between the two countries nor specific measures undertaken by the Ukrainian government towards women migrants. From a political, cultural and religious perspective, again, there are no Ukrainian initiatives to be highlighted, except for the overall commitment of various NGOs that are devoted to a variety of issues, namely labour market insertion, the protection of female migrants’ rights at work, the fight against trafficked women, etc. What will come later? At the time of writing, due to the unstable political situation in the country, no exhaustive answer can be given on the current and future developments of Ukrainian policies towards its emigrants.

What Explains Integration: A Quantitative and Qualitative Approach

In order to measure the level of integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian immigrants living in Italy, we refer to the results of the INTERACT Quantitative Study presented in Chap. 3.

Labour Market

In the labour market, at an international level, both Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy show high levels of integration. Few migrant corridors perform better (Indian migrants in United Kingdom; Russian and Turkish migrants in Germany). Once controlled for natives’ performances (gap Index), they are even at

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Table 10.3 Labour market basic indicators of people born in Ukraine, Morocco and Italy Country of Activity birth Employment rate Unemployment rate rate Over-qualification rate Ukraine 67.3% 7.6% 72.8% 81.4% Morocco 62.8% 9.8% 69.7% 68.7% Italy 58.7% 7.1% 63.2% 13.4% Source: See Chap. 3 the top positions of the Labour Market Index. Very high employment and activity rates – even higher than their native counterparts – and quite low unemployment rates (see Table 10.3) are the main drivers of these results.

Education

In the education dimension, thinks do differ. At an international level, Ukrainians living in Italy show good levels of integration also once controlled for natives’ performance. Ukrainian migrants, as other migrants originating in post-Soviet states, show indeed high educational performances which however frequently end in over- qualification jobs. On the contrary, Moroccan migrants living in Italy tend to be less qualified than other migrant corridors. They are indeed in the last positions of both absolute and gap indexes.

Access to Citizenship

The last positions of the Access to Citizenship Index are of Moroccan migrants living in Italy and Spain and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy. Italy is still one of the countries where getting citizenship is one of the main constraints for migrants for both recent (Ukrainians) and well established communities (Moroccans).

Explanatory Factors

Origin and destination macro-determinants of integration seem playing a different role according to dimension. In the labour market, the extremely positive performances of Moroccans and Ukrainians seem due more to destination than origin factors. Indeed, with few exceptions, similar positions in the indexes are found in all migrant communities living in the same destination country while, on the contrary, different performances are instead showed by the same national group living in different contexts. Accordingly, Italian labour market specificities and migration history seem largely explain this

[email protected] 10 Integration in Italy Among Selected Migrant Communities: Does Country… 183 pattern. Overall, migration to Italy is still largely composed of first-generation working migrants (Donadio et al. 2014) with very high employment and activity rates, higher than those of natives. This applies to both Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants, for whom employment rates respectively equal 67.3% and 62.8% (vs. 58.7% of people born in Italy) while activity rates stand at 72.8% and 69.7% (vs. 63.2% of Italians) (Table 10.3). Several reasons explain this. With the exception of the most recent few years, labour migration has long been the first channel of migration to Italy for both communities, who have been attracted by the availability of a large spectrum of low- skilled jobs as well as by the possibility of being regularized a few years after entry. Both Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants are indeed largely employed in labour market niches (e.g. agriculture and household activities) where there is no competition with the Italian population. At the same time, living in Italy without being employed is challenging for foreigners because of the difficulties they encounter in accessing any kind of welfare or unemployment benefits (see Chap. 2). Conversely, origin determinants presumably have a lower impact on the labour market dimension. Moroccan and Ukrainian performances – in terms of activity, employment and unemployment rates – are indeed very similar (Table 10.3) despite Moroccan policies have long been engaged in cooperating with Italian authorities in terms of preferential quotas and pre-departure trainings while Ukrainian migrants do live and work in Italy in a relatively “unmanaged context”. The over-qualification rate is the only indicator where Moroccans and Ukrainians show a significant difference. In this case, education at home matters. As mentioned above, migrants are over-represented in low-skilled jobs where they easily end up being overqualified (Reyneri and Fullin 2011). This is particularly true for Ukrainian migrants who, on average, are much more educated than Moroccan migrants and thus are more likely to be affected by over-qualification dynamics. In this sense, the difficult position of Ukrainian migrants is worsened not only by the fact that they do not show high levels of over-qualification but also because once in the labour market, it is extremely difficult for them to upgrade their position due to the scarcity of labour mobility dynamics that characterize their jobs (Migration Policy Centre 2014). On the other hand, from the Interact Qualitative Survey (see Chap. 4) it emerges that for both communities the role played by organizations and networks appears relevant in helping migrants finding an employment (providing migrants with information about available jobs, intermediation role between local market agents and migrants, etc.). Not a good employment, not a well-remunerated employment but just an employment. No – or a very scarce – impact is indeed noted on skills’ matching, wages, or career advancement. A main difference is instead observed regarding their perception about the role of the country of origin in the integration process: governmental policies at origin are seen as relevant by Moroccan organisations but not by Ukrainian organisations. The engagement of Moroccan authorities in pre-departure trainings and cooperation agreements with the Italian government is thus well perceived by non-governmental agents. On the contrary, it appears to be confirmed the lack of coherence and engagement of Ukrainian migration policies in the labour market towards its emigrants, that is frequently invoked by Ukrainian NGOs as a main constraint to the improvement of Ukrainian migrants’ working conditions’ (Ivashchenko 2014).

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In the education dimension, origin determinants – in terms of conditions at home – seem instead to make the difference. With very few exceptions, migrants from the Southern-Eastern Mediterranean all rank in the low-median part of the ranking whereas the other part is composed of migrants born in the rest of the world (Chap. 2). Here, Moroccan migrants perform indeed significantly worse than Ukrainian migrants. Again, it is not only their origin, but also their destination that is important. Indeed, Moroccan migrants living in Italy perform significantly worse than other Moroccans living in Belgium and Spain or other Maghreb migrants (Tunisians) living in France. It has been already noted that in these destinations, as in Italy, not only are Arab migrants’ educations lower than average, but the education level decreases over time, from old to young generations (Di Bartolomeo and Fargues 2015). Specific labour market needs have indeed attracted unskilled labour since the 1980s. On the other hand, origin policies and NGOs’ role is less straightforward. According to the INTERACT Qualitative Survey, the large majority of organisations are devoted to informing migrants about existing opportunities for studying abroad. Again, the role of organisations as informers and intermediaries is confirmed here as well. In the Moroccan case, then, much of the efforts put by organizations are also devoted to increasing the degree of diplomas’ recognition, the most critical aspect. The very low level of integration of Moroccans in the education dimension is indeed largely attributable to two core indicators: (a) the low average level of education achieved and (b) the scarce number of international students. Thus the engagement of organisations in these two directions seems coherent and appropriate. The degree of integration in the “access to citizenship” dimension (see Chap. 2) is most certainly connected to the degree of openness/restrictiveness of host citizenship laws and, accordingly, to the length of a migrant’s presence in the country. Our results confirm that Italy is still one of the countries where getting citizenship is one of the main constraints for migrants for both recent communities (Ukrainians) as well as well-established ones (Moroccans). Origin, thus, seems to have a very limited importance here.

Conclusions

The present chapter looked at the integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants living in Italy in three different dimensions, namely the labour market, education and access to citizenship. It tried to shed light on the levels and determinants of their integration with a specific focus on the role played by destination and origin factors. The latter includes the ties between migrants and their country of origin, the characteristics of migrants coming from specific countries, diaspora and emigration policies at origin and the engagement and role of organisations. As a whole, origin and destination macro-determinants of integration have different effects and strengths depending on the dimension. Overall, the “labour market” and “access to citizenship” dimensions appear to be much more linked to

[email protected] 10 Integration in Italy Among Selected Migrant Communities: Does Country… 185 destination determinants. Here the performances of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants are not significantly different even though they are characterised by very different origin country approaches. Respectively, they are among the best and the worst performers in the “labour market” and “access to citizenship” dimensions. As regards the former, the core determinant is found in the Italian labour market structure. Attracted by a huge demand for low-qualified workers in certain economic sectors, migration to Italy is still composed largely of first-generation working migrants with very high employment and activity rates, higher than those of natives. The latter characteristics are certainly driving factors in our results. Conversely, origin determinants presumably have a lower impact. Specifically, the bilateral agreements and preferential quotas assigned to Moroccans do not seem to make any difference with respect to integration. The performance of Moroccan migrants is not significantly different from that of Ukrainian migrants either in terms of the Labour Market Index or basic indicators, although Ukrainian migrants do live and work in a relatively “unmanaged context”. On the other hand, the role played by organisations appears relevant to helping migrants find employment – not good employment, not well-remunerated employment – just employment. What counts again, is the attractiveness of foreigners in specific Italian labour market niches – and where Moroccan and Ukrainian migrant profiles are appropriate – namely agriculture, construction and, especially for Ukrainians, household activities. With respect to the access to citizenship dimension, not surprisingly, the restrictiveness of Italian citizenship law appears to drive these results. By contrast, the integration of Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants in the education dimension seems more linked to origin factors. In this field, Ukrainian migrants do perform substantially better than Moroccan migrants. Without exception in the absolute index and with only two exceptions in the gap index, migrants from the Southern-Eastern Mediterranean all rank in the low-median part of the indexes, whereas the higher rankings are comprised of migrants born in the rest of the world. On the other hand, the roles of origin policies and NGOs are unclear. According to the INTERACT Qualitative Survey, much of the effort that organisations put into helping Moroccans in Italy is devoted to supporting migrants who are studying abroad as well as to increasing the recognition of diplomas and degrees. In fact, the INTERACT Quantitative Study reveals and confirms that these two domains are the most critical to integration in the Moroccan case.

References

Ait Madani, F. (2014). Policy and institutional frameworks – Moroccan country report, Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT research report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, unpublished. Ambrosetti, E., & Paparusso, A. (2013). Which future for migration in Europe? A brief analysis of the EU migration policies in the Mediterranean area, Annali del Dipartimento di Metodi e Modelli per l’Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza, (1), 13–28. http://www.memotef.uni- roma1.it/sites/dipartimento/files/ElenaAmbrosetti-AngelaPaparusso_13-38.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2015.

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Bettio, F., Simonazzi, A., & Villa, P. (2006). Change in care and female migration: The ‘care drain’ in the Mediterranean. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(3), 271–285. Caneva, E. (2014). The integration of migrants in Italy: An overview of policy instruments and actors, Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT research report 2014/05. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32019/INTERACT-RR-2014_05. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 19 July 2016. Caponio, T. (2013). Dall’ammissione all’inclusione: verso un approccio integrato? Un percorso di approfondimento comparativo a partire da alcune recenti esperienze europee. FIERI Rapporti Di Ricerca. http://fieri.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/rapporto-CNEL_definitivo_sett2013. pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Caponio, T., & Zincone, G. (2011). The national policy frame for the integration of newcomers in Italy. PROSINT country report WP2. http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/ Project_material/PROSINT/Reports/IT_WP2_Final.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Di Bartolomeo, A., & Fargues, P. (2015). The geography of highly-skilled Arab migration. In P. Fargues & A. Venturini (Eds.), Arab migrants and the global competition for talents. London: IB Tauris. Di Bartolomeo, A., Gabrielli, G., & Strozza, S. (2015). Corridor report on Italy: The case of Moroccan and Ukrainian immigrants. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT key findings 2015/09. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. ISBN: 978-92-9084-276-7. doi:10.2870/41916 Di Bartolomeo, A., Gabrielli, G., & Strozza, S. (2016). The labour market insertion of immigrants into Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom: Similarities and differences and the Southern European model of migration. In E. Ambrosetti, D. Strangio, & C. Wihtol de Wenden (Eds.), Migration in the mediterranean. Socio-economic perspectives, Routledge studies in the European economy. London: Routledge. Donadio, P., Gabrielli, G., & Massari, M. (2014). Uno come te. Europei e nuovi europei nei per- corsi di integrazione. Milan: FrancoAngeli-Ismu. Ivashchenko, K. (2014). Policy and institutional frameworks – country report – Ukraine. INTERACT research report. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. Unpublished. Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe. West European Politics, 30(1), 1–22. King, R., & DeBono, D. (2013). Irregular migration and the ‘Southern European model’ of migration. Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 22(1), 1–31. Lunaria. (2014). I diritti non sono un costo. Immigrazione, welfare e finanza pubblica. Rome: Lunaria. Migration Policy Centre, A. (2014). BACKGROUND PAPER – Tre aspetti cruciali per compren- dere il futuro delle migrazioni internazionali nell’Unione Europea. Deliberation workshop POLITICALLY.EU “l’Europa e le politiche di migrazione”, Naples, 31 March. http://www. politically.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Background_Paper_POLITICALLY-EU_ Migrazione.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2015. OECD. (2014). Jobs for Immigrants (Vol. 4): Labour market integration in Italy. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264214712-en. Accessed 10 Apr 2015. Paterno, A., Strozza, S., & Terzera, L. (2006). Sospesi tra due rive. Migrazioni e insediamenti di albanesi e marocchini. Milan: Franco Angeli. Reyneri, E., & Fullin, F. (2011). Labour market penalties of new immigrants in new and old receiving West European countries. International Migration, 49(1), 31–57. Strozza, S., Paterno, A., Bernardi, L., & Gabrielli, G. (2009). Migrants in the Italian labour market: Gender differences and regional disparities. In H. Stalford, S. Currie, & S. Velluti (Eds.), Gender and migration in 21st century Europe (pp. 131–162). Aldershot: Ashgate. Zincone, G. (2011). The case of Italy. In G. Zincone, R. Penninx, & M. Borkert (Eds.), Migration policymaking in Europe: The dynamics of actors and contexts in past and present (pp. 247– 290). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

[email protected] Chapter 11 Historical vs. Geographical Proximity. The Integration of Ecuadorian and Moroccan Migrants in Spain

Lorenzo Gabrielli

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to understand the role of policies and actions of origin countries and societies in the integration process of Ecuadorian and Moroccan migrants in Spain. We consider that comparing Ecuadorian and Moroccan migrants in Spain is particularly interesting due to the fact that they differ on several elements: language, religion, new and old migration, different perception of these two groups in society and media. These elements can play a role in integration patterns, jointly or independently from the action of origin countries and societies. Language is a key element that may play a significant role, directly or indirectly, in the different dimensions of integration such as education, social and civic participation, access to the labour market, residential integration and political participation (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013; Gsir 2014). Ecuador is a Spanish-speaking country. Consequently, Ecuadorian migrants speak the language of the destination country from their arrival. This is not the case for Moroccan migrants. In the case of Ecuadorian immigrants, the absence of one of the main barrier for integration, language knowledge, can facilitate integration though an easier access to employment, education, and also to social and civic life of destination communities. Religion is another element influencing the integration path (Cesari2013 ). Almost the entire population in Morocco is Muslim (following the Sunni Islam of the Mālikī rite) and Islam is the official religion of the country. The vast majority of

L. Gabrielli (*) GRITIM-UPF Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 187 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_11

[email protected] 188 L. Gabrielli the Ecuadorian population is Roman Catholic (following the Latin Rite)1, therefore there is more religious proximity to the destination country. In Spain about 69% of the population considers itself Catholic (26% self-identify with no religion; 9.4% are atheists)2. Concerning religion, this issue can play a role in integration and also in perception by destination society. As regards social perceptions of migrants in Spanish society, the discourse held by politicians, as well as by the media, tends to identify concrete immigrant groups as especially problematic in terms of integration (Zapata-Barrero and Garcés- Mascareñas 2012): between others, Latin Americans, particularly with regard to issues of youth violence and street gangs; Muslims, with regard to conflicts concerning mosques, education and dress code (Pasetti 2014). Meanwhile, in the case of Latin Americans, the negative perception linked with youth street groups is not addressed to the entire population. However, stereotypes and discrimination practices are generally directed to the Moroccan community as a whole. The transcrip- tion of the Moorish domination of an important part of the Iberian peninsula (Al-Andalus, between 711 and 1492), as well as of the subsequent “reconquista” in the Spanish national historiography, constitutes an important element which still contributes to determine the contemporary social perception towards Moroccans (Flesler 2008; Zapata-Barrero and De Witte 2010). In this sense, it is also necessary to mention, even if it is difficult to evaluate, the issue of religion, and the possible effects of the recently growing Islamophobia towards Moroccan immigrants. Unlike previous characteristics, entry requirements are similar: in both cases, the requirement of a visa to enter Spain is relatively new even if some time-related differences emerge. In the case of Moroccans, a bilateral agreement, signed in 1964 by an exchange of notes, established a mutual suppression of the visa for citizens of the two countries. The visa obligation for Moroccans to enter in Spain was adopted in July 19913, 40 days before the Spanish signature of the Schengen agreement, under the pressure of European partners. No visa was required for Ecuadorians to enter Spain until August 2003, when the EU Regulation 453/2003 of the Council modified the EU regulation 539/2001, establishing a common EU visa list of third-country citizens entering the EU, including Ecuadorians (Ayuso and Sánchez-Montijano 2012). In order to understand the role of origin countries and societies in the integration paths of Moroccan and Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain, we will start analysing the size, characteristics and trends of the two immigration flows and stocks in the country. Then, we will look more specifically at integration policies in Spain and at

1 According to data from 2012, produced by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC) of Ecuador. 2 According to a 2014 study by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (CIS – Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), “Barómetro Abril 2014”, available online at http://datos.cis.es/pdf/ Es3021sd_A.pdf/ 3 This visa imposition, created some political tensions between the two countries, and pushed the Spanish government to organise a regularisation process, targeted mainly at Moroccans, during the same year (Gabrielli 2011). Due to the important commercial links connecting these two cities and their Moroccan environment, a different visa regulation was adopted for the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla: multiple visa concession was established for inhabitants of the Moroccan zones around the enclaves, allowing them to repeated entry only into the territory of Ceuta and Melilla.

[email protected] 11 Historical vs. Geographical Proximity. The Integration of Ecuadorian… 189 emigration and diaspora policies of Ecuador and Morocco, underlying finally which institutional instruments and actions of origin countries and societies had an impact on integration paths of their emigrants in Spain.

Moroccan and Ecuadorian Migrants in Spain: Size, Characteristics and Trends

Ecuadorian and Moroccan migrations to Spain have very different evolution. Movement between the two shores of the Gibraltar strait has been a constant in the history, due to the geographical proximity and historical links between the two spaces. Ecuador also has strong historical and cultural links with Spain due to Spanish colonisation in Latin America, but until the second half of 1990s the number of Ecuadorian citizens moving to Spain was relatively low. Looking at Moroccan migration towards Spain, the flows developed later with respect to other long-standing European countries of immigration. Despite its geographic proximity and the colonial link, after the end of protectorate in the 1950s and Moroccan independence, Spain did not become an important migrant destination for Moroccan migrants. It is only from the beginning of the 1970s that the economic development of the Catalonian region raised its attractiveness to Moroccan migration flows. At this time, some Moroccans moved to Catalonia in order to wait for an improvement in economic conditions in traditional immigration countries, after the interruption of the formal foreign-worker recruitment that followed the ‘oil crisis’. It is difficult to quantify Moroccan arrivals in Spain between the 1970s and the 1980s. López Garcia (2004: 213), based on consular information, estimates a yearly arrival of around 450 people during the period 1970–1974, with an increase of more than 1400 people from 19754. Numbers grew progressively during the second half of the 1970s and during the 1980s, as shown by the data of the first regularisation process of 1986. Still, according to the official statistics, at the beginning of the 1990, only 16,650 Moroccans were residing regularly in Spain (López Garcia 2004). The real number of Moroccans in the country was surely higher as after the regularisation of 1991 the number of Moroccans residing in Spain reached 64,500 peoples (Barbulo 2004). Despite the establishment of more rigid entry conditions in 1991, Moroccan flows accelerated during the 1990s through the use of temporary touristic visas, family reunification dynamics and also irregular migration entrances (López García 1996). The latter was pushed by the Spanish economic growth and labour market opportunities for unskilled workers in the country. Especially during the late 1990s and early 2000s, undocumented Moroccan migrants were attracted by the increasing demand for cheap and underground labour in intensive agriculture (in the

4 In 1972, the growing presence of Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia pushed the Moroccan government to open a Consulate in Barcelona. In 1976, a new consulate opened in Las Palmas (the Canary Islands), and in 1979 the existing consulate of Algeciras (a port in the Gibraltar strait) moved to the city of Malaga.

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900,000 800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Residence Permits Padrón Municipal

Fig. 11.1 Comparing Residence permits and the Padrón municipal registration – Moroccan nationals (2002–2012) (Source: Residence permits, Secretaría General de Inmigración y Emigración, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Padrón Municipal, INE, Main population series since 1998)

Mediterranean zone of the country and mainly in Andalusia or Catalonia), the service and care sector (even if at a lower level than other immigrant communities) and particularly in the construction sector (Berriane 2004; Bodega et al. 1995). Due to the legal framework in Spain (Gabrielli 2011), the ‘extraordinary’, but cyclical regularisation process (1985/1986, 1991, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001, and 2005) has been the main channel for undocumented Moroccan migrants to acquire residence permits, as well as working permits in the countries. López Garcia (2004: 215) notes that between 1991 and 2001 more than 171,000 residence permits were granted to Moroccans in Spain through the different regularisation processes. To a lesser extent, the regularisation of Moroccan migrants also happened through the individual regularisation process (i.e. arraigo). As we can see in Fig. 11.1, the share of Moroccan immigrants in irregular situation, as illustrated by the difference between the number of residence permits and the data of municipal registries (Padrón municipal), has decreased in the last decade. Looking at Ecuadorian emigration, the decades of 1960–1970 can be considered the starting point of the development of these flows (Herrera et al. 2005; Colectivo IOÉ 2007b; Gómez Ciriano 2001), even if at this point Spain did not constitute the main destination. The growing limitations of immigration to the US and, at the same time, the exemption of a visa requirement (until 2003) for Ecuadorians to enter Spain, played a large role in this migrant reorientation (Colectivo IOÉ 2007a: 186). It became cheaper and easier to migrate to Spain than to the US, despite the larger possibilities of income gains in the US (Bertoli et al.2011). In addition, Ecuadorian immigrants had a facilitated access to the Spanish labour market due to the Agreement on double nationality between Spain and Ecuador, signed in 1964. These elements have to be connected with the specific economic conjuncture of this period in Spain, which is characterised by the availability of jobs in low-skilled sectors (mainly care and domestic services for women, and agriculture or building sectors for men).

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At the time of the first Spanish migrant legislation (1985), a little community of Ecuadorians was already living in the country, as evidenced by the number of people (around 500) applying for the 1985/1986 regularisation process (Gómez Ciriano 2007: 23). Ecuadorian immigration to Spain experienced some important changes around 1995, with regard to both the composition of flows and migrants’ destinations. The principal drivers of Ecuadorian emigration from 1995 to 2000 were the push factors at origin: worsened economic situation in Ecuador, the growing mis- trust of population towards institutions and the political class, political instability, and the raise of inequalities and poverty rate (Larrea Maldonado 2004: 86; World Bank data5). Between 1994 and 1996, around 10,000 Ecuadorians entered yearly into Spain (Gómez Ciriano 2007: 26). The Ecuadorian immigration between 1994 and 1998 is characterised by migrants’ high level of education (more elevated than the average in the origin country), but they were recruited mainly for low-skilled jobs (Colectivo IOÉ 2007a: 186; Gómez Ciriano 2007: 41). The years 2000s shows the consolidation of Spain as a migratory destination for Ecuadorian migrants. The first main peak occurred during the year 2000, when the number of Ecuadorian immigrants grew almost 6 times with respect to the previous year. The Ecuadorian nationals registered in the municipal registry (padrón municipal) grew to 140,000 people at the beginning of 2001, to 260,000 in 2002, and to around 400,000 in 2003. At the beginning of 2005, there were almost 500,000 Ecuadorian migrants in Spain (Colectivo IOÉ 2007a: 189); they were relatively young and mainly employed in domestic service (Gómez Ciriano 2007: 83–84)6. The comparison of the number of residence permits with information regarding the number of individuals recorded at the municipal registry, showed in Fig. 11.2, points to the significant share of irregular migrants during the “boom years” (around 175,000 at the end of 2001, and approximately 300,000 at the end of 2003), at least until the regularisation process of 2005 (when the number decreased to 100,000 people) (Colectivo IOÉ 2007a: 189). A comparison of the stock of the two migrant communities (Fig. 11.3) indicates that the evolution of these two migration stocks in Spain at more recent times was quite different. The number of Moroccan residents in Spain grew progressively during this entire period. In 1998, their presence in the country was already important (more than 110,000 Moroccans were living in Spain in 1998). During the end of the 1990s and the year 2000s, the number of Moroccan immigrants in Spain is characterised by a generally stable pattern of growth, with a main change only after the public disclosure of the economic crisis (Colectivo IOÉ 2012; Domingo and Sabater 2013). The trend of Ecuadorian immigration in Spain is quite different. In 1998, the number of Ecuadorian nationals in Spain was less than 4000. The evolution of their

5 See World Bank, Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population), http://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/EC?page=2&display=default 6 At the beginning of 2001, 62% of Ecuadorians registered in municipal registries were between 15 and 34 years of age, even if this age group loose weight progressively and the share decrease to 50% at the end of 2002 (Colectivo IOÉ 2007a: 192–3). The fact that children under the age of 18 constituted 10% of Ecuadorians in Spain at the beginning of 2001, underlying the family nature of a portion of those migration flows.

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600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Residence Permits Padrón Municipal

Fig. 11.2 Comparing residence permits and the Padrón municipal registration – Ecuadorian nationals (2002–2012) (Source: Residence permits, Secretaría General de Inmigración y Emigración, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social; Padrón Municipal, INE, Main population series since 1998)

900,000 800,000 700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 0

Moroccans Ecuadorians

Fig. 11.3 Evolution trend of Moroccan and Ecuadorian nationals in Spain, 1998–2013 (stock) (Source: INE, Main population series since 1998. Note: yearly data from 1 January; data based on the Padrón Municipal (municipal registers)) numbers shows an important growing tendency from 2000 until 2004. The “boom” of Ecuadorian immigration to Spain is followed by a phase, between 2004 and 2009, in which a stabilization and also a decrease appeared (475,698 people in 2004, 421,426 in 2009, and only 263,398 in 2013 according to data from INE based on municipal registers). The “decrease” phase is characterised by a return to the home country, due to the materialization of the economic crisis in Spain and economic growth in Ecuador. Nevertheless, one must also consider the large number of Ecuadorians who acquired Spanish nationality during those years (252,650 between 2001 and 2013), as shown by Fig. 11.4.

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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fig. 11.4 Concessions of Spanish nationality to Ecuadorians, 2001–2009 (Source: Ayuso and Sánchez-Montijano 2012: 164; Secretaría General de Inmigración y Emigración, Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Concesiones de nacionalidad)

70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0%

Morocan woman Ecuadorian woman

Fig. 11.5 Share of women of Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrant stocks in Spain (1998–2015) (Source: INE, Main population series since 1998)

Figure 11.5 demonstrates that gender composition is another key element dif- ferentiating these two migration flows. At the beginning of Ecuadorian immigration to Spain, women constituted the majority (65% in 1998). From 2000, the gender composition started to equilibrate; Ecuadorian men and women followed parallel migration paths, connected with different access possibilities to the Spanish labour market (Colectivo IOÉ 2007a: 189–190). The stock of Moroccan immigrants shows that men are in majority. It is necessary to stress that the share of women is higher than in previous flows towards traditional Western European destinations, and also that the number of women has grown over time. After looking at characteristics of flows and stocks of Ecuadorian and Moroccan migration, is necessary to analyse the political framework of integration in Spain, as well as at the diaspora and emigration policies of origin countries and actions of civil society in order to evaluate which role they play in integration patterns.

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Integration Policy in Spain

In Spain, the integration issue began to be incorporated into the political agenda and social debates later than in traditional destination countries in Europe. Only after the elaboration process of the law in April 2000 (Ley Organica de Extranjeria) and the 2001 elections did immigration become a significantly more crucial issue for Spanish political parties (Gabrielli 2011; Sanchez-Montijano 2008). From then on, immigration and immigrant integration in particular were increasingly in the political limelight (Zapata-Barrero et al. 2008), becoming permanent, established features of the political parties’ agendas (Zapata-Barrero and Rubio Carbonero 2014). At present, according to the MIPEX index for 2010, Spain has a “slightly favourable” institutional framework for immigrant integration (a level of 63, the 8th position of the general ranking). This is mainly driven by a quite elevated “labour market mobility” index (84), while other indexes measuring “political participation” (56), “education” (48), and “access to nationality” (39) are significantly lower. In Spain, integration is managed through a model of multi-level governance involving different levels of government and social actors. Until 2014, the Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (henceforth PECI, from the Spanish acronym) has been the core tool deployed by Spanish legislators on integration matters. To date, only two plans have been issued: one for the period 2007–2010 (PECI I) and another for the period 2011–2014 (PECI II). The integration approach is diversified and responsive to the diverse dimensions related to integration. For example, the PECI II established a framework of 11 areas of intervention, to be deployed at regional and local levels. Local governments in Spain have a key role in the design and implementation of integration programmes. Meanwhile, the main focus of Spain’s integration efforts is on the areas of reception, education and employment, with the latter receiving the most financial alloca- tions from the national Integration Fund (Pasetti 2014). The fact that employment stands out as the primary target of the executed budget underlines policymakers’ wide-ranging intent: to consolidate an immigration model based on legal, orderly and especially job-market-related migration (as mandated by the Law 2/2009 and the Royal Decree 557/2011). It has to be mentioned that after the new Rajoy government came into force at the end of 2011, the national Fund for the Integration of Immigrants was suspended in 2012, as well as in 2013 and 2014. Financial support for the development of integration policies at the regional and local level was instead available from the European Integration Fund, as well as from local governments’ own funds. Moreover, since 2014, the government in charge has not developed any new strategic plan of integration, which once more underlines the reduced interest actually paid to this issue. Joint efforts by regional governments, town and city councils, Spanish NGOs and immigrant associations (managing specific programmes directed towards local communities) also play also a very important role in the implementation of integration policy. The Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants represents the main channel of participation by NGOs and immigrant associations in the management of

[email protected] 11 Historical vs. Geographical Proximity. The Integration of Ecuadorian… 195 integration policies). Among migrant groups participating in the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants, the Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrant communities are the most represented. Two organisations represent Ecuadorian immigrants (Asociación Rumiñahui – Hispano Ecuatoriana para la colaboración al desarrollo, and Federación Nacional de Asociaciones de Ecuatorianos en España – FENADEE), and two represent Moroccan immigrants (Asociación de Trabajadores e Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España-ATIME, and Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta).

Ecuadorian and Moroccan Approaches to Emigration and Diaspora Policies Towards Migrant Communities in Spain

Looking at differences and similarities of Ecuador and Morocco’s emigration and diaspora policies, we see that Ecuador, a relatively new source of migrants, has a very proactive emigration policy when compared with Morocco, which has a longer tradition of emigration. Since the year 2000, the Ecuadorian State has started to recognise the migration status of the country, and to adapt institutions to address migration. This was done though the creation of several policy frameworks and state structures: the first National Plan for Ecuadorian Migrants Abroad in 2005, the National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI), the Human Development Plan for Migration (2007–2010),7 the Migration Policy of Ecuador in 2007,8 and the National Plan for Good Living 2013–2017 (PNBV) in 2013.9 In 2008, the Ecuadorian Constitution10 also raised the profile of migration topics through key emigration policy provisions on the recognition of political and socio-economic rights for Ecuadorians abroad; respect for the labour rights of Ecuadorian workers abroad; and Ecuadorian migrants’ role in the country’s development. Moreover, in terms of dual citizenship, Ecuador’s Constitution of 2008 is particularly liberal and specifies that Ecuadorian nationality is not lost through marriage or its dissolution, or through the acquisition of another nationality. In more recent years, Ecuadorian emigration and diaspora policy has become comprehensive, and notably, various measures have placed a particular emphasis on the return of Ecuadorians from abroad (Sanchez-Bautista 2014). Morocco does not have a very complete emigration and diaspora policy, despite the long temporal trajectory of emigration. State actions concentrate on specific areas that particularly interest the government. Particularly since its independence, the country has shown a very active policy of stimulating the placement of Moroccan

7 Available at: http://plan.senplades.gob.ec/c/document_library /get_file?uuid=6e9bc368-ce48-4ab5- bf70-f8a5f164a359&groupId=10136 8 Available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/49002e312.pdf 9 Available at: http://documentos.senplades.gob.ec/Plan%20Nacional %20Buen%20Vivir%20 2,013–2017.pdf 10 Available at: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html

[email protected] 196 L. Gabrielli workers in foreign labour markets, mainly in Europe, for political and economic reasons. In 1990, Morocco started reforming existing structures concerned with emigration and diaspora policies, searching for a larger centralisation and a rein- forcement of linkages with emigrants, through the creation of a new ‘Ministry del- egate to the Prime Minister in charge of the affairs of the Moroccan community living abroad’ and the ‘Foundation Hassan II for Moroccans residing abroad’. Concerning Moroccan diaspora policy, two clear axes have historically guided the State’s actions towards its emigrants: the need to maintain strong linkages with emigrants11 to sustain remittances and investment flows, and to foster economic development (de Haas and Plug 2006); and the need to control and limit political opposition by Moroccans abroad, through the activities of different state or state- controlled institutions, such as embassies, consulates, mosques or the Fédération des Amicales des Marocains (De Haas 2007: 17). However, from the end of the 1990s Moroccan diaspora policy changed progressively and the State responded to emigrants’ cultural and political claims by re-formulating its cultural offerings and creating new institutions. At that point, Morocco started to see the integration of its emigrants, and particularly economic integration, as a more positive factor, given the contribution that more integrated emigrants could make (De Haas 2007). In a similar vein, the State position on dual citizenship acquisition for Moroccans abroad also changed. This evolution contributed to the reduction of tensions with the destination countries (de Hass 2007: 19–20; Belguendouz 2006). Looking at specific policy tools developed by Ecuador and Morocco, as well as the programmes that directly or indirectly address the integration of these countries’ migrants in Spain, we see that some dissimilarities between the two countries emerge. In both cases, bilateral agreements carry important weight, but in the case of Ecuador, certain programmes are also relevant. Ecuador and Morocco have signed various bilateral and multilateral agreements with Spain, covering different integration dimensions (Table 11.1). A bilateral agreement on double nationality (Convenio de doble Nacionalidad con Ecuador del 4 de Mayo de 1964), signed between Spain and Ecuador in May 1964, has a particular importance in integration dimensions such as citizenship and access to the labour market, as we will see more in detail later. In 2001, Morocco and Ecuador signed bilateral agreements with Spain concerning the recruitment of these two countries’ citizens for the Spanish labour market.12 Concerning the portability of social rights, Spain has signed several agreements with Ecuador, both bilateral and multilateral. A bilateral agreement on social security was signed with

11 The naturalization of Moroccan emigrants in their destination countries, or double nationality, was seen by the Moroccan government as a threat to existing linkages with the country of origin, as well as to political participation; in response, the State sent Moroccan teachers and imams abroad, within the framework of the LACM programme. 12 Acuerdo sobre mano de obra entre el Reino de España y el Reino de Marruecos firmado en Madrid el 25 de julio de 2001; Acuerdo entre el Reino de España y la República del Ecuador rela- tivo a la regulación y ordenación de los flujos migratorios, hecho en Madrid, el 29 de mayo de 2001.

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Table 11.1 Bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning Ecuador and Morocco Vote Access to Multiple Social in local Language labour citizenship rights election and culture market Readmission Ecuador x x x x Morocco x x x x Source: Gabrielli and Pasetti (2014)

Ecuador in May 1964.13 Spain also signed a multilateral Ibero-American agreement on Social Security in 200714 and a new Latin American Multilateral Agreement on Social Security in 2011. A bilateral agreement on the same issue was signed between Spain and Morocco in 1979, and then modified in 1998.15 A bilateral agreement also exists between Ecuador and Spain to avoid double taxation. Finally, a social security agreement between Ecuador and Spain, signed in December 2009, gives equal treatment to Spanish and Ecuadorian citizens in both countries on issues related to social security and moreover stipulates that rights acquired in either country when entering the territory of the other shall be maintained. Concerning political rights, important differences exist between the two cases. Bilateral agreements between Spain and Ecuador, as well as the effective implementation of overseas voting rights, give Ecuadorian migrants many ways to participate in political life in both destination and origin countries. The political participation of Ecuadorians in municipal elections in Spain is permitted by the bilateral agreement on reciprocal participation in municipal elections signed between Spain and Ecuador in 2009.16 According to Art. 63 of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, Ecuadorian migrants abroad can also exercise the right to vote and elect a president, vice president and national representatives of the constituency abroad, as well be elected to any office themselves.17 No similar agreement has been signed between Spain and Morocco; Moroccan immigrants cannot vote in Spain, unless they acquire Spanish nationality, or in Morocco, unless they are in the country during elections. Given the strong demands of the Moroccan diaspora, King

13 Convenio de Seguridad Social entre el Reino de España y la República del Ecuador, de 4 de Diciembre de 2009. 14 Convenio Multilateral Iberoamericano de Seguridad Social, de 10 de noviembre de 2007. 15 Convenio de Seguridad Social entre el Reino de España y el Reino de Marruecos, de 8 de Noviembre de 1979, modificado por el Protocolo adicional al convenio de 27 de Enero de 1998. 16 Acuerdo entre el Reino de España y la República de Ecuador de 25 de Febrero de 2009. 17 To be able to exercise their right to vote, Ecuadorians residing abroad must register on the electoral roll in diplomatic offices and consulates, presenting an original passport or identity card. Voting takes place in the same consular offices. Although voting in Ecuador is compulsory for citizens over 18 years old, it is optional for Ecuadorians abroad. According to the Ecuadorian Democracy Code (Código de la Democracia), the sanction for not voting is 10% of the ‘minimum living wage’ (318 US dollars) plus taxes, which is around 40 US dollars. See: http://www.eleccio- nesenecuador.com/informacion-voto-obligatorio-ecuador-49.html/. The Constitution (Art. 102) also allows Ecuadorians living abroad to submit proposals and projects, either individually and collectively, enabling their participation in all levels of government.

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Mohammed VI in his royal speech of 6 November 2005 announced the decision to grant Moroccans residing abroad the right to vote and to stand for election on the basis of constituencies in the country of residence. The right was reaffirmed in the new constitution of 2011, and particularly in Art. 17. However, the Organic Law, which is supposed to set the terms and conditions of the external vote, has not yet been approved. The Moroccan electoral code has in effect only given a proxy-vote to Moroccans abroad. In order to cast their own vote, emigrants must still be linked to a district in the country of origin and must move back to Morocco. Various bilateral agreements have been signed between Spain and Morocco regarding a strategic partnership on Culture, Education and Sports, establishing cooperation in these fields between the two countries in 1979, 1980, 1990, 1991, and 2012.18 Among the measures implemented through these agreements are the teaching of Spanish language as an elective subject in the educational system of Morocco, and a programme for teaching Arabic language and Moroccan culture courses in the Spanish educational system (in an extracurricular format as well as during school hours).19 In this framework, courses on Islam (in cooperation with the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain) are available in some Spanish schools as an alternative to both civic education and ‘common’ religious courses. However, very few Moroccan immigrants make use of this programme: in 2009, only 4.6% of Moroccan immigrants who enrolled in the pre-university Spanish education system participated in the Arab language and Moroccan Culture programme.20 Finally, concerning the readmission of irregular migrants, Spain and Morocco signed a bilateral readmission agreement in 1992 that was never formally implemented by Morocco. Even if Morocco has accepted the readmission of migrants from Spain from time to time, the authorities in Rabat have never considered this to be an application of the 1992 agreement, but rather a case-by-case cooperation (Aneas Álvarez et al. 2010; Gabrielli 2011). No readmission agreement exists between Ecuador and Spain. Looking at programmes and measures implemented by Ecuador, we see that some of them may have an impact on Ecuadorians’ integration in Spain and deserve to be mentioned.21 In the field of emigrant rights and living conditions, the programme ‘Migrant housing network for family care’ serves migrants and their families, specifically in vulnerable cases, providing material, psychosocial and legal advice on specific subjects by country of destination. In the case of Spain, preliminary legal advice (Servicio de asesoria juridical hipotecaria gratuita) was provided on the issue of house mortgages, which is a key issue in the destination country that can affect different integration dimensions (residential and economic integration, among others).

18 Convenio del 3 de octubre de 2012; Tratado de 4 de julio de 1991; Protocolo de 2 de julio de 1990; Convenio de 14 de octubre de 1980; Convenio de 8 de noviembre de 1979. 19 Programa de lengua árabe y cultura marroquí – LACM. 20 Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco in Madrid – Cultural mission in Spain, (n.d.), “Programa hispano-marroquí de enseñanza de lengua árabe y cultura marroquí”, p. 9. 21 For more references on concrete measures, see Sanchez Bautista 2014.

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Meanwhile, programmes aimed at helping migrants abroad have addressed information needs, provided through the so-called Migrant House Abroad, which offers short courses and training for migrant labour practices in the areas of care and crafts- manship. Abroad, the impetus for the formation of leaders and organisations has had visible and sustained support in recent times. Another relevant programme is the ‘Organisational Strengthening Programme and the Social Network Construction on Migration Issues – FORES’, which supports the organisational strengthening of associations, cooperatives, committees and clubs of Ecuadorians abroad. In the field of return, the Ecuadorian government has been very active through various programmes, such as the ‘Welcome home’ programme, and the ‘Contingency Fund and Support for the Vulnerable’ programme, offering services to migrants abroad who want to return and for any reason are not able to, and providing information and services for the protection of rights. In the field of returning skilled workers, two plans should be mentioned: the ‘Healthy Ecuador Plan for Health Professionals’ aimed at creating attractive conditions in order to facilitate the return of Ecuadorian health professionals, and the ‘Education Return Plan’, which encourages the return of Ecuadorian education professionals. It is worth mentioning that the SENAMI has provided assistance to returnees (both voluntary and forced) and to vulnerable people, with the support of different Ministries and organisations such as the IOM. Unlike Ecuador, Morocco has never developed a very proactive policy concerning the return of Moroccans abroad. While it is possible that this difference is linked with the countries’ different economic conditions, it is probably even more linked with the development strategies of the two countries. For Morocco, it seems to be more profitable to have a Moroccan labour force that is abroad but linked economically to the country of origin (through remittances, and more recently, investments). Thus, once we have analysed the institutional and political framework of integration from the point of view of destination and origin countries, it is possible to analyse the integration patterns of Moroccan and Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain to understand the role that origin countries and their societies play in this process.

Integration Trends of Moroccan and Ecuadorian Migrants in Spain

In order to evaluate the integration trends of Moroccan and Ecuadorian migrants in Spain, we will analyse existing data concerning three specific dimensions of integration: the labour market, education, and access to citizenship (see Chap. 3). We will also consider civil society organisations perceptions recollected through an exploratory survey (see Chap. 4). The integration indexes for Moroccan and Ecuadorian migrants in Spain (presented in Chap. 3) show that in all the fields analysed, the level of integration of

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Ecuadorian immigrants is higher than that of Moroccans. In the case of the labour market and access to citizenship the difference between the two communities’ indexes is larger, while in the education dimension, the distance between the performances of the two communities is smaller.

Labour Market

The data on the status in the labour market (see the corresponding table in Chap. 3 of this volume) underlines that immigrants born in Ecuador have a higher employment rate than Moroccan ones (47.7% vs. 34.7%), while the latter have a higher inactive rate (27% vs. 16.2%). The participation rate is higher in the Ecuadorian born community (83.8% vs. 73%), and this explains why the unemployment rate is higher for Moroccan born immigrants (38.3% vs. 36.2%), while the share of the unemployed between the active population is similar (38.3 for Moroccan born immigrants vs. 36.2 for Ecuadorian born immigrants). Concerning inactivity rates, we can observe a difference between immigrants born in Morocco (27%) and Ecuador (16.2%). This diversity may result from a low participation of Moroccan women in the labour market, as working at origin before migrating is an element that facilitates the entry of women in the labour market22. It will, however, take further research focused specifically on the gender issue to confirm this as the root cause of this finding. A difference between the two communities emerges also in their types and sectors of employment (see tables on Labour Market status and Employment type in Chap. 3 of this volume). The self-employment rate of Ecuadorian born immigrants is particularly low (3.5%), compared both to Moroccan born immigrants (10.3%) and also to Spaniards (17.3%). The share of Ecuadorian workers employed in services (70%) is comparable to that of Spaniards (76%), whereas the portion of Moroccan born immigrants in the service sector is significantly lower (57%). However, more than a quarter of Moroccan born immigrants (26%) are employed in agriculture, in comparison to merely 12% of Ecuadorian born immigrants. A key element favouring integration of Ecuadorian immigrants, compared to Moroccan ones, has been the aforementioned 1964 bilateral agreement on double nationality. More specifically, two elements of this agreement significantly facilitated the entrance of Ecuadorian immigrants into the Spanish labour market: on one hand, the agreement made it possible to obtain Spanish nationality without losing Ecuadorian nationality, after only 2 years of legal residence in the country; and on the other hand, the agreement provided a guarantee of a “maximum level of rights”

22 According to the World Bank’s data on the participation rates of the female labour force in the origin country, it appears that in Ecuador 55% of women were in the labour market in 2013, while in Morocco the share was only 27% in the same year. The World Bank, Labour force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate), available at: http://data. worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS

[email protected] 11 Historical vs. Geographical Proximity. The Integration of Ecuadorian… 201 to those immigrants who did not acquire Spanish citizenship. In practice, this guarantee to Ecuadorian immigrants access to all social and economic rights, including the application of the “clause of national priority” in the access to the labour market (Gómez Ciriano 2007: 29–30). It is also important to underline that in 2000 the bilateral agreement on double nationality with Ecuador was amended, and the access mechanism to the labour market became the same as for immigrants of other nationalities. In 2001, Ecuador sign a new agreement on labour migrant with Spain, similarly to Morocco that also conclude the same year a bilateral agreement on labour migration with Spain. The two bilateral agreements of 2001 are very similar in their content and form, but more research on the practical implementation of those agreements, their effective impacts, as well as on the functioning bilateral commis- sions for recruitment in third countries may add more interpretative elements to this point. That said, the different sectoral distribution in the Spanish labour market can also be strictly linked to other elements, such as language, formation, the urban/ rural origin of immigrants, previous job experience, as well as existing ‘ethnic niches’ in the labour market (Pedreño 2001; Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas 2012). Concerning the type of occupation, according to ISCO categories, the share of Moroccan and Ecuadorian born immigrants employed in higher-skilled occupations is similar, but much lower than that of Spanish populations (5.4% for both communities vs. 35.7% for Spaniards. However, it is difficult to link this trend to the actions of origin countries: it is possible that this difference is more closely linked to the characteristics of migrants, their access to networks, and to specific accommodation paths within the Spanish labour market. Data on the duration of job searches show differences between the two communities when it comes to long-term unemployment (more than 2 years). The current long-term unemployment rate for Moroccan nationals is 43%, well above the 34% rate for Spaniards. Ecuadorian nationals have a lower rate (21%) than both these populations. It should be considered that the fact that Ecuadorian immigrant have a common language with Spain, as well as the higher access to naturalization could partially explain these data (see Fig. 11.4). Meanwhile, this difference may be also be explained by Ecuador’s highly developed political framework which encourages the voluntary return of emigrants, both high- and low-skilled, in conjunction with the country’s positive economic outlook over the past decade, especially in contrast to the economies of both Spain and Morocco. It is thus possible that returning to the country of origin is more attractive for Ecuadorians facing long-term unemployment than for Moroccans, as shown by stock numbers and also by recent researches on return migration from Spain (García Ballesteros et al. 2014). In the field of voluntary return of Ecuadorian immigrants from Spain, Ecuadorian migrant associations and NGO play a key role, as in the case of the Spanish-Ecuadorian association Rumiñahui, as well as IOM in collaboration with SENAMI.

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Education

Looking at integration in education field, data on the educational enrolment of Moroccan and Ecuadorian born immigrants between 15 and 25 years old – 28.6% vs. 57.4%, respectively – also show an important disparity between the two groups (see Chap. 3 of this volume). The data on education enrolment for immigrants between 25 and 35 years old (see also Chap. 3 of this volume) also show a higher share of Ecuadorian born students, even if the difference is smaller. Nevertheless, both communities’ enrolment is particularly distant from that of Spaniards. Again, the issue of the origin country’s language plays a main role in this dimension along with other variables linked with parents’ status that are not analysed here (i.e.: their socio-economic status and educational level). Concerning the recognition of educational qualifications, a legal difference exists between the two origin countries because Ecuador is a signatory of the “Andres Bello” convention regulating this issue, whereas Morocco is not. A special Order of 200123 is applied to Ecuadorian qualifications, while a different Order of 1996 is applied to Moroccan ones.24 That said, the existing equivalency tables do not substantially differentiate between Ecuadorian and Moroccan qualifications. Indeed, the only major difference appears to be that qualifications from Ecuador do not require official translation, with the respective expenses and time delay, as they are already in Spanish. This can play a role in different integration dimensions, as education enrolment but also in occupation attainment.

Citizenship

Statistics on citizenship and access to nationality show that, on average, 7152 Moroccans and 16,557 Ecuadorians acquire citizenship every year (see Chap. 3 of this volume). This difference results from the disparate treatment of the two groups in Spanish legislation. Ecuadorians are permitted to ask for citizenship after 2 years of uninter- rupted residence in the country – an artefact of the historical linkages between Spain and Latin American countries – while Moroccans have to prove an interrupted residence of 10 years. The difference can also be linked to the aforementioned bilateral regulation on dual nationality between Spain and Ecuador Moreover, the Constitution of Ecuador

23 Orden de 20 de marzo de 2001, por la que se regula el régimen de equivalencias de los estudios básicos y medios cursados en los países signatarios del Convenio “Andrés Bello” con los correspondientes españoles de Educación Secundaria Obligatoria y Bachillerato establecidos por la Ley Orgánica 1/1990, de 3 de octubre, de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo. 24 Orden de 30 de abril de 1996, por la que se adecuan a la nueva ordenación educativa determi- nados criterios en materia de homologación y convalidación de títulos y estudios extranjeros de niveles no universitarios y se fija el régimen de equivalencias con los correspondientes españoles.

[email protected] 11 Historical vs. Geographical Proximity. The Integration of Ecuadorian… 203 of 2008 is particularly liberal in terms of dual citizenship, providing that Ecuadorian nationality is not lost through the acquisition of another nationality. In the case of Morocco, the origin country tolerates dual nationality in practice even if no explicit legal disposition exists in this sense. The 1958 Code of nationality formally states that a Moroccan citizen, whether an adult or a minor, can lose their Moroccan citizenship by decree, if they have acquired another nationality abroad (Perrin, 2011). Meanwhile, cases of Moroccans losing citizenship have been very limited. The effective conception of Moroccan citizenship by the State is “steady and permanent”, as summed up by the expression “on naît et on meurt Marocain” (one is born and die Moroccan) (Perrin 2011). The 2007 reform retained ‘ius sanguinis’ as the basis for Moroccan citizenship25, one of the main pillars of the State strategy to maintain strong linkages with the diaspora (Perrin 2011).

Actions of Civic Society Organizations Dealing with Ecuadorian and Moroccan Migrants in Spain.

The role of non-state actors, associations and immigrant-oriented civil society organisations (CSOs) in the integration process of Ecuadorian and Moroccan immigrants in Spain is surely important, but is also difficult to quantify. Comparing the actions of non-state actors in Spain and in origin countries, the deeper effects on immigrants’ integration are produced by actors operating in destination countries. Both will be examined in more detail below. In the case of Spain, as we mentioned before, immigrant NGOs and associations play a main role in the governance of the integration process. Beyond implementing regional or local policies, social actors formulate their own projects and deliver a broad array of services, focusing both on specific communities and more broadly (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2008). As underlined before, two Moroccan and two Ecuadorian immigrant associations play an important role in the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants. With regard to the two main Ecuadorian associations in Spain, also members of the forum, the Federación Nacional de Asociaciones de Ecuatorianos en España – FENADEE (the National federation of associations of Ecuadorians in Spain) provides Ecuadorian immigrants with legal counselling, cultural activities, and different measures for immigrant inclusion in the host society. Furthermore, the Asociación Rumiñahui Hispano Ecuatoriana (Spanish-Ecuadorian association Rumiñahui)

25 Morocco has also made progress regarding the granting of Moroccan nationality to children of Moroccan parents born abroad. The right has been automatic for children born to Moroccan fathers, but was also made possible for those born to Moroccan mothers as of 2005, in accordance with the royal speech on 30 July of that same year and Law 62–02, established by the Dahir n° 1–07-80 in March 2007. In the same vein, Article 17 of Law 62–06 states that the children of a mixed marriage are considered Moroccan and may address the Ministry of Justice to declare their desire to retain one of the nationalities of their parents, provided that they are between 18 and 20 years of age.

[email protected] 204 L. Gabrielli aims, since its establishment in 1997, to defend the rights of migrants and facilitate their integration by improving their living conditions through different activities. In recent years, the association has been very active in the field of Ecuadorian migrants’ voluntary return to their country of origin. As regards the two main Moroccan associations in Spain, the Asociación de Trabajadores e Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España ATIME (Association of Moroccan workers and immigrants in Spain) provides a broad array of actions, including legal advice, orientation to health services, housing, job and social counselling. The Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta (Socio-cultural association Ibn Batuta) is also a very active association founded by Moroccan immigrants in 1994, and organise various activities, such as intercultural and awareness-raising actions, attention to women and young people, language and formation, mediation and accompaniment, social and labour orientation and inclusion, as well as cooperation and co-development. Concerning non-state actors in origin countries, until the year 2000, civil society in Ecuador did not have strengthened organizations devoted to migration. The main non-state actor found in Ecuador is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which develops five different programmes in the country. Of these programmes, some deal directly with the interests of Ecuadorian immigrants in Spain but deal very indirectly the issue of their integration.26 In the case of Moroccan CSOs, during the last decades, interest in the issue of migration has grown in Moroccan civil society. Thus, we saw the creation or transformation of certain associations. Meanwhile, most of them are oriented mainly to development or co-development activities, linked in different ways with migration. In this sense, it is possible to consider that co-development activities can have some impact on the integration of Moroccan migrants in Spain emerges (due to the social capital acquired by migrants towards these activities) (Gabrielli 2013). Some of the actions and perceptions of non-state actors on Ecuadorian and Moroccan integration in Spain were probed with the INTERACT exploratory survey (see Chap. 4). For Ecuadorian CSOs surveyed, the main fields of activity are the labour market, access to nationality and social interaction, while Moroccan CSOs are mainly working in labour market, language, access to nationality and education. With respect to services offered in the field of labour market integration, the provision of support for training, information about available jobs and information about the legal framework and institutional settings at destination were the most common services for Moroccans as well as for Ecuadorians. Both Ecuadorian and Moroccan CSOs saw also some effectiveness of pre-departure programmes, and the activities of associations based in the country of origin in helping migrants find a job in the destination.

26 For instance, the Regulated Migration Programme runs through a voluntary and assisted return and orderly reintegration of migrants who cannot stay in host countries and wish to return volun- tarily; the Stranded Migrants Programme aims to promote humanitarian assistance for migrants in difficult situations who cannot immediately access existing programmes.

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Concerning CSO actions in the field of education, the main activities for both communities were informing immigrants about student opportunities abroad and providing homework assistance, although more Moroccan CSOs are engaged in this integration field than Ecuadorian ones. From the exploratory survey it also emerges that regarding origin language acquisition by immigrants and their children, kinship and associations are perceived by CSOs as the key instruments to learn the language of the country of origin. This is of course more relevant in the case of Moroccans, except for some autonomous communities where a vehicular language different from Spanish is used in the education System.

Conclusions

In general terms, we can consider that, despite Morocco closer geographical proximity to Spain, historical proximity of Ecuador has fostered more cultural links with Spain, sharing the Spanish language with the destination country. Historical proximity has also fostered a more open architecture of bilateral regulation addressing Ecuadorians immigrants’ access to Spain labour market, as well as to nationality. Looking at origin countries action, Ecuador has developed, at least during the last decade, a very proactive emigration policy when compared with a country such as Morocco that has a longer tradition of emigration. In particular, Ecuador has developed a broad array of measures in order to maintain linkages with his citizens abroad, to support them in specific fields and to facilitate their voluntary return. It must be stressed also the existence of specific measures addressed toward the facilitation of the return of highly qualified Ecuadorians abroad. The growing phenomenon of the return of Ecuadorian immigrants from Spain has to be also linked with opposite economic conjunctures in the two countries: the effects of economic crisis in Spain, and the momentum of economic growth in Ecuador. Nevertheless, it is possible that the existence of different policies and programmes in this field has also encouraged or fostered the return flows of Ecuadorians abroad. In the case of Morocco, emigration and diaspora policies are mainly still oriented towards sustaining emigrants’ relations with their origin country, in order to maintain the flow of remittances and the foster the involvement of Moroccans abroad in development activities in their origin countries. Even if in the last decade Moroccan policies have shown a progressive evolution with respect to their focus on the integration of emigrants in their countries of destination, the instruments employed have not drastically changed. It is then difficult to discover a clear impact of specific measures and actions implemented by Moroccan authorities. Indeed, if we look at the action of Ecuadorian and Moroccan State actors, bilateral agreements are still the more important instrument producing an impact of on immigrants’ integration. As we previously emphasise, the role played by the country of origin through the signature of bilateral agreements seems to be central in facilitating the integration of immigrants in some specific dimensions. In particular,

[email protected] 206 L. Gabrielli this was the case, for instance, of the bilateral agreements between Spain and Ecuador on dual nationality, signed by the two countries in 1964. This agreement permits Ecuadorians to ask for Spanish nationality after 2 years of legal residence in the country, while for Moroccans the required time of continued and legal residence is 10 years. As we have seen, the effects of this agreement are more clearly connected with access to citizenship. But it also has important consequences for Ecuadorians’ ability to enter the Spanish labour market. The agreement, besides establishing better conditions for access to Spanish citizenship, grants Ecuadorians the same access to the labour market as national workers. In the case of Moroccan workers, they are limited by the ‘national preference’ clause and can access labour contracts only if there is a shortage in national manpower in a specific field. Another interesting element that emerges from the analysis concerns the differences of the inactive populations in both communities. As we already mentioned, Moroccan women’s level of access to the labour market is lower than Ecuadorian women’s at origin, and this element probably also explains the divergence in the shares of the inactive population. Further analysis in this field may effectively confirm the aforementioned relationship, as well as evaluate whether the slight changes occurring in Morocco concerning diaspora policies and the perception of emigrants will also produce a policy evolution in the destination countries of Moroccan migration. At the same time, scholars may also develop a deeper understanding of the place and entry patterns of immigrant women in the destination countries’ labour markets. In the field of educational attainment, it’s difficult to assess the impact of bilateral agreements signed between Spain and Morocco on cultural issues. The comparison of Moroccans with an immigrant community such as the Ecuadorians who speak Spanish as a mother tongue, does not allow us to evaluate the impact of the actions implemented. In the future, it will be particularly interesting to examine the implementation and the results of the school support programme announced by the Association Ibn Batuta in the case of Catalonia.27 The mechanism of recognition of foreign diplomas has also to being studies more in depth in order to understand his possible role in labour market and education integration patterns. From the point of view of the role of civil society actors and immigrant organisations, both in the countries of origin and in the country of destination, their activities towards immigrant integration have a less structural character, and can at first appear to be less relevant. In any case, their impact is more difficult to quantify and evaluate, due to the fragmentation and the small extent of the initiatives carried out, and also to the large number of organisations involved. Further research on this specific issue will be also very useful to allow a deeper knowledge of CSOs’ impact on immigrant integration patterns.

27 This association announced in January 2015 a new pilot project to establish tutoring and school support for “Moroccans students abroad”. This programme is financed directly by the Moroccan government, and represents an interesting development of the country’s external actions towards its citizens abroad. The objective of the initiative is to fight against young Moroccans failing and dropping out of school in six cities of the Catalonia region (Barcelona, Terrassa, Mataró, Tarragona, Lleida, and Salt). The programme targets about 400 students in order to help them in different school subjects (mathematics, Spanish language, Catalan language, etc.) twice a week for two hours.

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References

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Gabrielli, L. (2013). Eunomad report 2012. Migration, development and integration in Europe. EUNOMAD – European Network on Migration and Development. http://www.academia. edu/7098455/_Migration_development_and_integration_in_Europe_. Accessed 19 July 2016. García Ballesteros, A., Jiménez Blasco, B. C., & Mayoral Peñas, M. M. (2014). Scripta Nova, 18. Gómez Ciriano, E. J. (2001). Ecuatorianos en España: historia de una inmigración reciente. Ecuador Debate, 54, 175–187. Gómez Ciriano, E. J. (2007). Ecuatorianos en España: Claves de un proceso migratorio en cuatro tiempos. In E. J. Gómez Ciriano, A. Tornos Cubillo, & C. IOÉ (Eds.), Ecuatorianos en España: una aproximación sociológica (pp. 15–100). Madrid: Observatorio Permanente de Inmigración – Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Gsir, S. (2014). social interactions between immigrants and host country populations: A country of origin perspective, Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT research report 2014/02. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31243/INTERACT_RR_2014_02. pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 19 July 2016. Herrera, G., Carrillo, M., & Torres, A. (2005). La migración ecuatoriana. Transnacionalismo, redes e identidades. Quito: FLACSO. Larrea Maldonado, C. (2004). Pobreza, dolarización y crisis en el Ecuador. Quito: Abya-Yala/ ILDIS-FES/IE/FLACSO. López García, B. (1996). La evolución cronológica del asentamiento de los marroquíes en España. In B. López García (Ed.), Atlas de la inmigración maghrebí en España. Atlas 2004 (pp. 68–71). Madrid: OPI-UAM Ediciones. López García, B. (2004). La evolución de la inmigración marroquí en España (1991–2003). In B. López García (Ed.), Atlas de la inmigración maghrebí en España. Atlas 2004 (pp. 213–221). Madrid: OPI-UAM Ediciones. Pasetti, F. (2014). Country report: Integration policies in Spain. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT research report 2014/30. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33231/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-%2030.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Pedreño, A. (2001). Gitanos. Magrebíes, ecuatorianos: una segmentación étnica del Mercado del trabajo, Ecuador Debate, 54, 189–200. Perrin, D. (2011). Report on Morocco. EUI-RSCAS, EUDO citizenship observatory – Country Report. http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Morocco.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Rodríguez-Planas, N., & Vegas, R. (2012). Moroccans’ assimilation in Spain: Family-based versus labor-based migration. IZA. Discussion paper n° 6368. http://ftp.iza.org/dp6368.pdf. Accessed 19 July 2016. Sanchez-Bautista, C. (2014). Policy and institutional framework: Country report Ecuador. Migration Policy Centre. INTERACT research report 2014/24. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33137/INTERACT-RR-2014%20-%2024. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 19 July 2016. Sanchez-Montijano, E. (2008). La politización de la inmigración en España. In R. Zapata-Barrero, E. Gonzales, & E. Sanchez-Montijano (Eds.), El discurso político en torno a la inmigración en España y en la UE (pp. 81–113). Madrid: Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. Zapata-Barrero, R., & De Witte, N. (2010). Muslims in Spain: Blurring past and present Moors. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), Muslims in 21stcentury Europe: Structural and cultural perspectives (pp. 181–198). London: Routledge. Zapata-Barrero, R., & Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2012). Spain. In R. Zapata-Barrero & A. Triandafyllidou (Eds.), Addressing tolerance and diversity discourses in Europe. A comparative overview of 16 European countries (pp. 231–248). CIDOB: Barcelona. Zapata-Barrero, R., & Rubio Carbonero G. (2014). Monitoring xenophobic political discourses. A pilot study in Catalonia. GRITIM-UPF Policy Series n°. 2. https://portal.upf.edu/docu-

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[email protected] Chapter 12 A Comparative Analysis of the Migration and Integration of Indian and Chinese Immigrants in the United States

Kate Hooper and Susanna Groves

Introduction

The United States has the largest immigrant1 population of any country in the world, hosting 20% of the world’s immigrants despite having only 5% of the world’s population (Nwosu et al. 2014). The vast majority of people in the United States have immigrant roots; and the United States enjoys a reputation for successfully integrating immigrants and their descendants. But the U.S. immigrant integration model differs quite substantively from Europe, both in terms of its emphasis and approach. In the United States, immigrants are expected to quickly become economically self- sufficient, with limited assistance from the government; this is facilitated by factors like a flexible labour market, a robust economy, and strong anti-discrimination laws (Fargues et al. 2011: 8–9). Unlike most European countries, there is no separate U.S. government portfolio for integration (Desiderio and Weinar 2014:7),2 and no comprehensive immigrant integration policy at the federal level (exempting its refugee and asylee program),3 with limited funding for targeted integration programs. This chapter explores some of these contrasts through examining the integration outcomes of Indian and Chinese immigrants in the United States. Of the 41 million immigrants in the United States in 2013, 29% (or 12 million) were born in Asia—

1 This paper focuses on foreign-born (so-called first-generation) immigrants unless otherwise stated. 2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden all have dedicated national offices or ministries for immigrant integration. 3 The federal government funds and coordinates refugee and asylee programs, before they are then implemented by state, local, or civil society actors. K. Hooper (*) • S. Groves Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 211 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_12

[email protected] 212 K. Hooper and S. Groves compared to 5% in 1960. Indian and Chinese immigrants constitute a significant share of the relatively new, but fast-growing Asian immigrant community in the United States. In 2013, the Indian-born population was the second biggest U.S. foreign-born nationality group (after Mexico), at 2.03 million, with the Chinese- born population ranked third (after the Philippines), at 2.02 million.4 Despite being a relatively new immigrant population, the Indian- and Chinese- born populations in the United States stand out for their high degree of socioeconomic integration. This chapter compares the historical migration and integration patterns of the Indian- and Chinese-born populations in the United States, before offering a quantitative analysis of their current socioeconomic performance, using U.S. American Community Survey (ACS) and Census data. This project’s research into the socioeconomic performance of these immigrant groups suggest that despite this success, they may still face some integration challenges—for example, limited English proficiency and experiencing social isolation. This chapter maps out the types of integration support offered by the U.S. government, the Indian and Chinese governments, and U.S. civil society actors— including Indian and Chinese diaspora organisations. Interventions like U.S. federal and state-level English language tuition, and the provision of welfare services and cultural support by Chinese and Indian diaspora organisations, can all play an important role in mitigating these effects. This chapter then assesses the integration outcomes of these two immigrant populations through a socioeconomic lens.

Indian and Chinese Immigration to the United States5

Immigrants from India and China live in all parts of the United States; however, the Indian immigrant population is more widely dispersed across the country than the immigrant population from China. While there are large concentrations of Indian immigrants in the states of California, New Jersey, and Texas, the majority of Indian immigrants reside outside of those three states. In contrast, over half of all Chinese immigrants in the United States live in either California or New York.6

4 Approximately 2.03 million people of Indian birth and 2.02 million immigrants of Chinese birth resided in the United States, each constituting 4.9% of the United States’ foreign-born population, respectively. Estimates are based on MPI analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2013 ACS and the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses. Unless otherwise stated, estimates for the Chinese population include Hong Kong but exclude Taiwan. 5 Unless otherwise noted, data in this section come from MPI analysis of data obtained from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, (Washington, DC: DHS 2012). 6 California is home to 350,000 Indian immigrants, New Jersey is home to 210,000 Indian immigrants, and Texas is home to 165,000 Indian immigrants. In contrast, California is home to 700,000 Chinese immigrants, and New York is home to 435,000 Chinese immigrants.

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History of Indian and Chinese Immigration to the United States

Today Indian and Chinese immigrants make up a substantial share of the U.S. foreign-born population, but this was not always the case. Indian immigration to the United States only began in earnest in the 1970s, while Chinese immigrants started arriving in large numbers during the 1980s; but unlike India, this followed an earlier period of immigration to the United States during the nineteenth century (see Fig. 12.1). U.S. immigration policies (and in the case of China, home government emigration policies) significantly shaped historical inflows of Asian immigrants to the United States, both in terms of their absolute numbers and their socioeconomic profile. Chinese immigrants first came to the United States in substantial numbers in the 1850s and 1860s, principally settling in the country’s western regions. Most were low skilled, and took jobs in the gold mining, railroad, manufacturing, agricultural, and service industries, or started small businesses. By the 1870s, nearly 5% of immigrant arrivals to the United States were of Chinese origin. However, as the U.S. Chinese population grew, so did anti-Chinese sentiment, leading to ethnic discrimination and demands to restrict Chinese immigration (U.S. Department of State 2013). During the 1880s, the U.S. Congress passed a series of laws collectively

12,000,000 700,000 R LPR 10,000,000 600,000 Granted 500,000 Granted LP 8,000,000 400,000 6,000,000

Population 300,000 4,000,000 200,000

2,000,000 100,000

0 0 U.S. Foreign - Born Indian and Chinese Immigrants

U.S. Foreign-Born Population China India

Fig. 12.1 Indian and Chinese Nationals and All U.S. Foreign Born Granted Lawful Permanent Resident Status (LPR) in the United States by Decade, 1850–2009 (*) Notes: (*) From 1820 to 1867, figures represent alien passenger arrivals at seaports; from 1868 to 1891 and 1895 to 1897, immigrant alien arrivals; from 1892 to 1894 and 1898 to 2012, immigrant aliens admitted for permanent residence; from 1892 to 1903, aliens entering by cabin class were not counted as immigrants. Land arrivals were not completely enumerated until 1908. Here, Chinese immigrants refers to mainland China, and excludes Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Source: MPI analysis of data obtained from DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.

[email protected] 214 K. Hooper and S. Groves referred to as the Chinese Exclusion Acts, which severely curtailed the numbers of Chinese immigrants granted entry to the United States. Other federal and state legislation introduced in the 1920s and 1930s barred Chinese, Indian, and other Asian peoples from qualifying for U.S. citizenship, inter-marrying with U.S.-born whites, or owning land (Naujoks 2013: 26). In 1960, the Asian-born population in the United States totalled less than half a million and made up about 5% of the overall foreign-born population (Gibson and Lennon 1999). The United States finally repealed its national-origin quota immigration system with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, having a visible and immediate impact on the scale of Indian, Chinese and other non-Western European immigration.

Contemporary Emigration from India and China to the United States7

The Indian and Chinese immigrant communities have both grown rapidly since 1980, now ranking as the second largest and third largest foreign-born populations in the United States respectively (see Table 12.1). Despite being relatively new populations in the United States, socioeconomic data suggest Indian and Chinese immigrants are well integrated into American society. This is partly due to the migration channels that Indian and Chinese immigrants use to enter the United States, which are very conducive to integration due to their selection requirements. Most Indian and Chinese nationals enter the United States through temporary admissions programmes for skilled workers and students, which means that these groups are disproportionately highly skilled relative to India’s national population, the U.S. foreign-born population, and the U.S. general public. They are also more likely to be working age (between the ages of 18 and 64) than the U.S. general public: 84% of the Indian immigrant population and 76% of the Chinese immigrant population, compared with the U.S. general public at 63%.8 The majority of Indian nationals enter via an employer-sponsored temporary worker program for the highly skilled (the H-1B visa),9 meaning that these

7 Unless otherwise noted, data in this section come from MPI analysis of data obtained from DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, (Washington, DC: DHS 2013). 8 Of the remaining Indian immigrant population, 9% were aged 65 or older, and 7% were under the age of 18. Though a similar share of Chinese immigrants and the U.S. general public were aged 65 or older as of 2012 (16 versus 13 percent), far fewer Chinese immigrants were under the age of 18 (7 percent, compared with the U.S. national average of 24 percent). 9 The H-1B visa program—currently capped at 65,000, with up to 20,000 for workers with at least a master’s degree or equivalent, and exemptions for employees of universities, non-profit organisations, and research institutions—enables U.S. firms to hire foreign workers with at least a bachelor’s degree for specialty occupations that require technical or theoretical expertise (for example, scientists, engineers, and computer programmers). Definition from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services, “H-1B Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Cap Season,” last updated 15 April 2013, http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations- and-fashion-models/h-1b-fiscal-year-fy-2014-cap-season.

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Table 12.1 Total Foreign-, Indian- and Chinese-born populations in the United States, 1980 to 2013 Indian-born population Chinese-born population Share of Share of U.S. U.S. Foreign-born foreign- foreign- Year population Population born (%) Rank Population born (%) Rank 1980 14,079,906 206,087 1.46 16 366,500 2.6 12 1990 19,767,316 450,406 2.28 11 682,075 3.5 6 2000 31,107,889 1,022,552 3.3 4 1,192,437 3.8 3 2010 38,674,773 1,696,057 4.4 4 1,682,626 4.4 3 2013 40,341,744 1,896,642 4.7 2 1,874,608 4.6 3 Source: MPI analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2013 and 2010 ACS 5-year estimates, and the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses (see Campbell and Lennon 1999). Estimates for China include Hong Kong, and exclude Taiwan and Macau

immigrants have already secured a specialised position in the United States that makes use of their expertise and provides an income stream. In U.S. fiscal year (FY) 2013, 65% of all H-1B visas and 29% of all L-1 visas (a visa category open to foreign employees of international corporations with offices in the United States) were issued to Indian nationals (U.S Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs 2014). A significant number of Indian nationals also enter the United States as dependents of H-1B or L-1 visa holders. Indian nationals comprise the second largest group of international students enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities, after Chinese nationals, and many among them plan on settling in the United States permanently after completing their studies. Indian nationals received more PhDs in 2012 from U.S. universities than any other foreign national group, bar China; and 86% of surveyed Indian doctoral students intended to remain in the United States after graduating that year.10 Most Chinese immigrants enter on student visas, which suggests that they are highly educated or in the process of acquiring an advanced education. Significant expansion in the size of the Chinese international student population in the United States began during the 1980s, and since 2009, China has been the number one source country of international students in the United States, sending more than double the number of students as the second ranked country, India, in the 2012– 2013 academic year. Most Chinese students come to the United States for graduate studies, with 29% of all PhDs awarded by U.S. institutions to students on temporary visas going to Chinese nationals in 2012. The number of Chinese students enrolling

10 In 2012, there were 2230 Indian doctoral graduates (15% of all PhDs awarded by U.S. universities to students on a temporary visa). See “Table 25: Top 40 countries or economies of origin, ranked by number of doctorate recipients: 2012,” and “Table 53: Doctorate recipients with temporary visas intending to stay in the United States after doctorate receipt, by country of citizenship: 2006–2012,” in National Science Foundation, Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities: 2012 (Arlington, VA: NSF 2013), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sed/2012/data_table.cfm.

[email protected] 216 K. Hooper and S. Groves in undergraduate studies is growing rapidly too,11 fuelled by the enormous competition for admissions to undergraduate degree programs in China and the growing size of China’s wealthy middle classes who can afford the fees. Demand for higher education in China far outstrips Chinese universities’ enrolment capacity; though China is expanding its university system, only 3% of students who sat the gaokao (China’s national college entrance exam) in 2012 gained admission to a Chinese university and only 0.2% of examinees were accepted by one of the country’s top five universities (The Economist 2012). After India, China is the second largest beneficiary of temporary work visas in the United States. In FY 2013, Chinese nationals received 8% of all H-1B visas (some 13,000), and 6% of all L-1 visas issued (some 4000) that year (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs 2014). A significant number of Chinese nationals were also issued temporary work visas as dependents. A significant number of Chinese nationals also come to the United States as asylum seekers and as adopted children—but while they actually make up the greatest share of both of these migration channels in the United States, the absolute numbers are small relative to the number of Chinese-born students and skilled workers. These temporary admissions programmes serve high-achieving migrants and reward beneficiaries that form strong social and professional networks in the United States. The university environment, for instance, facilitates cultural immersion and the building of social and professional networks. And while both the employment and student visa programs provide temporary legal status in the United States, they can also be stepping-stones to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, and eventual naturalization, for individuals who succeed in these programs.12 Foreign nationals can apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status through employment-based, family-sponsored, or refugee/asylee channels. As Fig. 12.2 shows, Indian and Chinese nationals are more likely to apply for LPR status through employment-based channels, and less likely to apply through family-based channels, than the overall foreign-born population granted LPR status. While only a very small share of Indian nationals apply for LPR status through refugee/asylee channels, Chinese nationals are more likely to apply through this channel than the overall foreign-born population. As of 2012, 42% of Indian immigrants and 54% of Chinese immigrants had naturalized, compared with 44% of the overall foreign-born population.13 Usually to become a naturalized U.S. citizen a person must have held LPR status for 3 to 5

11 During the 2012–2013 academic year 40% of Chinese students in the United States were enrolled in an undergraduate program: a 9 percentage point increase from three years prior. Institute of International Education, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: China,” Open Doors Report on International Education Exchange, (New York: Institute of International Education, 2010 and 2013), http:// www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-Country/2010 and http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-Country/2013. 12 Commonly referred to as Green Card holders, people with LPR status have the authorization to live and work in the United States on a permanent basis and are on a path towards naturalization. 13 These figures are taken from the CPS data. In the 2010–2012 ACS data, 46% of Indian immigrants were naturalized U.S. citizens.

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70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

India China All foreign-born

Fig. 12.2 Chinese-, Indian-, and All U.S. foreign-born populations granted LPR status by broad class of admission, FY 2013 Source: MPI analysis of data obtained from DHS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Note that “family-based immigration” includes family-sponsored preferences and immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and “other” includes “other” and “diversity” categories. years, in addition to meeting other eligibility requirements (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2013). Given that most Indian and Chinese immigrants in the United States arrived during or after 2000, this would suggest that many applied for citizenship shortly after they became eligible to do so. However, India and China do not recognise dual citizenship; a national of either country automatically loses their citizenship upon naturalizing as a U.S. citizen.

Institutional Framework for Integration in the United States

Unlike many European destination countries, the United States lacks a coordinated immigrant integration policy at the federal level, with many integration services de facto provided through mainstream programs and by a variety of state and non-state actors. Consequently, integration policy in the United States is very decentralised, enabling a number of state, local, and civil society actors to play a role in providing services to new arrivals. Many traditional receiving states and destination cities have their own integration offices to coordinate integration services like naturalization assistance, English language tuition, and social services at the local level. In many cases, states and cities will fund civil society actors like non-profits to provide services in the community. This enables many diaspora-based organisations to be

[email protected] 218 K. Hooper and S. Groves actively involved in integrating new arrivals to their community. Therefore, while the Indian and Chinese governments are not heavily involved with integration of their nationals at arrival in the destination country, they try to build and maintain close ties with their overseas population through dedicated diaspora offices and outreach efforts, which might affect integration trajectories.

India and China’s Emigration and Diaspora Policies and Institutional Frameworks

In general, China and India’s emigration and diaspora policies do not have much overlap with U.S. integration policy, though organisations run by their diaspora play an important role in helping to successfully integrate Chinese and Indian immigrants and their descendants. Both China and India court their skilled overseas nationals and their descendants to encourage them to contribute to their country of heritage—whether through their temporary or permanent return, remittance flows, investments, or sharing their skills, knowledge and networks. These programs encourage immigrants to maintain close political and economic ties with their country of origin while overseas, viewing their success overseas as a way to facilitate development at home.

India

India’s Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) tries to build links with India’s diaspora, though its efforts often centre on encouraging diaspora members to invest in and contribute to the homeland, rather than promoting integration at destination. However, MOIA recently set up an Overseas Indian Centre (OIC) in India’s embassy in Washington DC—partly to attract diaspora investment in India, and partly to work with Indian diaspora organisations to gather information on the U.S. Indian diaspora and work towards providing integration services. Though the consulate already provides legal and medical assistance where necessary, the goal of the initiative is to set up an Overseas Workers Resource Centre (OWRC) and an Indian Community Welfare Fund for Indian nationals in the United States. (MOIA, Overseas Indian Centre n.d.-b). India does not recognize dual citizenship; but in 2005, in response to demand from the Indian diaspora in the United States and elsewhere, India’s government introduced the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme, which grants a lifelong visa to enter India and parity with non-resident Indians in terms of access to educational, financial, and economic services, and access to certain professions in India (MOIA, Overseas Citizenship of India Scheme n.d.-a). However, overseas nationals cannot vote, run for elected office, or take up government employment in India. Despite this lack of formal participation in Indian politics, diaspora members have set up “overseas branches” of Indian political parties like the Indian National

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Overseas Congress of America and the Friends of Bharatiya Janata Party (Migration Policy Institute 2014a, b). The INOC lobbies on behalf of non-resident Indians (NRIs) in India, promoting “secular, democratic” values, and conceptualises its role as “goodwill ambassadors” between the United States and India. (Indian National Overseas Congress USA 2014).

China

Shifts in China’s policy towards emigration have made it much easier for Chinese nationals to migrate, and to maintain ties with their country of origin after migrating. The Chinese government has set up a number of organisations overseas, designed to maintain close ties with its nationals studying or working overseas. For example, it authorised officials in embassies and consulates of 38 major destination countries for Chinese students to set up more than 2000 overseas students associations and 300 professional associations by 2006 (Zweig 2006: 194–5). There are chapters of the Chinese Students and Scholars Association in colleges across the United States.14 These provide newly arrived Chinese nationals with ties to home and opportunities to network with other Chinese nationals, while simultaneously building overseas networks for China and enabling Chinese cities and/or companies to recruit overseas Chinese talent for jobs, temporary placements, or business opportunities back home. Like India, Chinese nationals cannot hold dual citizenship, and children born to Chinese nationals overseas who have “settled” in another country (permanent residence or naturalization) do not qualify as Chinese nationals. Chinese nationals can only vote or stand for (below county-level) election if they physically return to China (Liu and Du 2014). However, Chinese Americans remain politically involved in their country of heritage, and have set up political advocacy organisations in the United States that promote improved relations with China. The U.S. government’s decision to grant China most favoured nation status in the mid-1990s followed some 250,000 actions taken by 28 U.S.-based Chinese associations to try and promote U.S.-Chinese relations. (Wang 1999, cited in Barabantseva 2005: 24).

U.S. Integration Services

The decentralised approach to immigrant integration in the United States means that in practice (a) many of the integration services that immigrants benefit from are mainstream programs that are open to the general public as well as to immigrants, and (b) integration services are provided by a wide array of state- and non-state actors, often in partnership with each other.

14 See, for example, Learn in USA, “Chinese Student Associations in US”, Accessed 25 September, 2014, http://www.learninusa.com/pub/LIT_14.asp.

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The U.S. federal government provides funding for English language learning— English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), for adults, and English Language for Learners (ELL) for children in schools, as part of the public education system. However, these services are underfunded, particularly in destination cities like New York and Los Angeles that struggle to meet demand for English language tuition (McHugh et al. 2007: 16). Social welfare policies introduced in 1996 limit the access of legal immigrants to safety net benefits related to health, nutrition, and cash support, which may undermine integration efforts. Some states—like California and New York—subsequently reinstated access to these benefits for legal immigrants, using state funding; others—like Florida—have not (Fix 2007: 17). Currently, 40 U.S. states (plus the District of Columbia) supplement these federal social welfare programs either by (a) using state funds to expand coverage, or (b) introducing state-only funded programs (Pew Charitable Trusts 2014). The latter option may include welfare for families (like New York’s Safety Net Assistance program), seniors and people with disabilities (like California’s Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants); health coverage (like Illinois’ reduced-cost health insurance coverage for all children from low-income families); and food stamps (like California’s CalFresh Food Assistance Program) (Pew Charitable Trusts 2014). State and local government generally take the lead when it comes to targeted immigrant integration efforts—albeit often with federal funds—along with civil society organisations. These include Indian and Chinese diaspora organisations, which play an important role in helping new arrivals integrate into local communities, connecting them with services, providing language training and social services, helping them find jobs and develop networks, and representing their interests at the state or federal level. A number of U.S. states and cities with large Chinese or Indian immigrant populations run offices dedicated to addressing the needs of immigrant communities, like New York City, Los Angeles, and California (which is considering establishing a state-wide immigrant affairs office).15 Newcomers to the United States can access a wide array of integration assistance; but must rely on a diffuse network of state- and non-state actors to meet their needs, as demonstrated by the types of assistance detailed below.

Language Access and Training

One form of U.S. government-provided integration assistance is language access. Under U.S. law, all programs that receive federal funding must make their services accessible to Limited English Proficiency LEP individuals by translating vital documents and employing speakers of these languages to assist with providing

15 Comments by California State Senator Ricardo Lara at the 11th Immigration Law and Policy Conference held at Georgetown Law, 21 October, 2014.

[email protected] 12 A Comparative Analysis of the Migration and Integration of Indian and Chinese… 221 information and services.16 Many states and municipalities have passed their own laws on language access, ensuring that all state or local agencies are similarly accessible. Immigrants’ access to government services and institutions thus is not contingent on host-country language proficiency in the United States: a factor that can inhibit engagement in most European countries (Fargues et al. 2011: 9). Another form of assistance is language training—building up the LEP population’s English language skills, which ultimately improves these populations’ long- term integration outcomes (Whatley and Batalova 2013). In the absence of targeted language instruction for new immigrant arrivals, adult education programs and public schools in the United States play a critical role in providing English language training to immigrant adults, immigrant children, and the children of immigrants. But English language learning for adults and children is currently underfunded by the federal government—particularly in cities with large Chinese populations like New York City (McHugh et al. 2007: 16). Many U.S. colleges offer remedial English language tuition (English as a Second Language) on campus—this is particularly pertinent for Chinese nationals, who tend to struggle more with fluency than other immigrant groups (World Education Services 2011). Diaspora lobbying groups like Chinese for Affirmative Action, based in San Francisco, campaign for improved language access and issues affecting LEP individuals in their community (CAA 2014).

Naturalization Assistance

Around half of all Chinese and Indian immigrants are U.S. citizens; and China and India are two of the leading source countries for naturalizations. Naturalization grants foreign-born nationals the same rights and access to benefits as the U.S.- born; but of some 8.8 million LPRs who were eligible in 2012, only 757,000 naturalized that year (Auclair and Batalova 2013). Similarly, despite having higher than average naturalization rates, there remains a substantial gap between the number of Indian and Chinese naturalization applications, and the number of LPRs eligible to naturalize.17 This partly reflects backlogs in the system—at the end of 2012, 390,000

16 The legal basis for this is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of nationality), and Executive Order 13166 of 2000, which affirmed the applicability of Title VI to language access requirements. Migration Policy Institute, “Frequently Asked Questions on Legal Requirements to Provide Language Access Services,” Accessed 21 March 2014, http://www. migrationpolicy.org/programs/language%C2%A0access-translation-and-interpretation-policies- and-practices/frequently-asked. 17 There were 240,000 Indian LPRs and 280,000 Chinese LPRs eligible to naturalize in 2012; but only 32,000 Indian LPRs and 43,000 Chinese LPRs did so that year. Nancy Rytina, “Estimates of the Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2012,” U.S. Office of Immigration Statistics, Population Estimates, July 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_lpr_ pe_2012.pdf and DHS, Table 21, “Persons Naturalized by Region and Country of Birth, Fiscal Years 2003 to 2012,” http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-naturalizations.

[email protected] 222 K. Hooper and S. Groves applications were awaiting a decision—but also reveals some of the challenges of the process, including the high cost of applying, and the stringent English language requirements of the test, which may also act as deterrents (Auclair and Batalova 2013). Hence, a number of states, municipalities, and non-profits offer naturalization assistance for the foreign-born population. These initiatives help immigrants through the administrative process, by offering services like citizenship classes, legal advice, and mentoring by staff, and providing information in multiple languages, including Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese). For example, Chinese LPRs in Maryland can access services in Chinese at the award-winning Citizenship Program of Montgomery College (Montgomery College n.d.). Chinese diaspora organisations like the Chinese Information and Service Center (CISC) in Seattle also provide services for LEP members of their community. CISC provides cultural navigation programs for LEPs, helping them sign up for services with the help of interpreters and translators, and providing ESL instruction at basic, conversational, vocational, and naturalization levels.

Labour Market Integration

Most Indian and Chinese immigrants enter on employer-sponsored work permits, or as students, which enable them to start building business and professional networks in the United States. However, numerous Indian and Chinese diaspora groups offer further networking opportunities, which can aid immigrants’ career advancement, and that connect U.S. and Chinese or Indian companies and business opportunities. One notable example that helps Indian diaspora entrepreneurs strengthen their business and professional networks is The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE). The organisation was founded in Silicon Valley in 1992 and now boasts some 11,000 members; it has chapters in the United States and India, as well as many other countries, and promotes entrepreneurship through education, mentoring, and networking. TiE claims to have helped create businesses collectively worth around $200 billion over the past 22 years (The Indus Entrepreneurs n.d.). By entering with a job, or obtaining a U.S.-issued credential, they also sidestep many of the credential recognition issues that affect skilled immigrants.18 Some Chinese diaspora organisations offer vocational training opportunities as part of their social services packages: this targets lower-skilled immigrants, including asylees. The Chinese American Service League and the Chinese American Planning Council both offer vocational training to their local communities. CISC runs an employment program for around 300 people each year, which offers pre-employment training and help with the job search; and it runs an International Community Technology Center that provides computer training for adults and young people at different levels.

18 While the U.S. labour market is much more deregulated than in Europe, about a quarter of jobs require certification or licensure; these professions are often regulated at a state, rather than federal, level, with different standards and procedures for getting credentials recognized and obtaining licenses to practise. Rabben 2013: 2.

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Political and Civic Integration

Unlike some European states, noncitizens are barred from all U.S. elections at the federal, state, and local levels. This leaves immigrants with limited opportunities to formally participate in political or civic issues before they naturalize as U.S. citizens. While some cities have sought to introduce noncitizen voting for municipal elections—New York City being a recent example—these efforts are often thwarted by state-level legislation explicitly prohibiting noncitizen participation (Gilbert 2014). Noncitizens are barred from school board elections in most parts of the United States—a significant exclusion, given that curricular and funding decisions can particularly affect first- and second-generation immigrant children, who often require additional assistance like English language tuition (Gilbert 2014: 243). Many Indian and Chinese diaspora organisations take the lead in promoting the political and civic integration of their communities, disseminating Indian and Chinese culture to diaspora members and the U.S. general public, and representing the diaspora’s interests in politics. In both cases, these diaspora groups take on a national identity, instead of representing a particular region or ethnic group. In recent years members of both the Indian and Chinese diaspora have become increasingly involved in U.S. politics. Some Chinese Americans lobby on behalf of improved U.S.-China relations; and there are number of U.S.-China business organisations and chambers like the manned by Chinese diaspora members that promote cooperation and provide information on conducting business in the two countries. Indian-descent community leaders have also established political action committees and advocacy groups to campaign on behalf of the Indian community (MPI 2014a, b). Examples include the U.S.-India Political Action Committee, the Indian American Forum for Political Education, South Asian Americans Leading Together, the Republican Indian Committee, and the Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund. There are now bipartisan caucuses in both houses of the U.S. Congress that are dedicated to India and Indian diaspora affairs.19 Many Indian and Chinese diaspora organisations focus their efforts on promoting and celebrating cultural traditions. Examples include the China Institute in New York and the South Coast Chinese Cultural Association in Irvine, California, which offer Chinese language and cultural programs; and the India Community Center, which runs cultural activities for the Indian community and publicises Indian culture among the general public (Indian Community Center n.d.). These types of cultural activities not only serve immigrant communities, but can also help foster their integration into local society.20

19 The Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans, and the Senate India Caucus. 20 See, for example, the India Association of Western Washington, whose mission statement reads: “To provide a common identity to the Indian community and facilitate cultural, social and educational services and opportunities for cultural integration from young to old of the community; as well as to foster those activities that enhance mutual understanding and appreciation between the Indo-American community and mainstream American community.” India Association of Western Washington, “About Us: Mission Statement,” Accessed 23 October 2014, https://www.iaww.org/ aboutus.

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Integration Trends of Indian and Chinese Migrants in the United States

During their first years in the United States, immigrants often face barriers to full social, economic, and civic participation. However, as time passes and immigrants and their children learn English and interact with members of their host communities, the gaps that exist between them and the rest of U.S. society narrow (Jiménez 2011). Generation after generation of immigrants to the United States has demonstrated remarkable aptitude at integrating, and U.S. society has by and large adjusted to newcomers. Progress among the United States’ different immigrant groups is uneven, but overall recent immigrants are integrating well across five indicators: English language proficiency, socioeconomic attainment, political participation, ethnic diversity of their place of residence, and social interaction with the host community. Full integration in the United States generally takes multiple generations, with the children of immigrants most often outperforming their parents in terms of educational attainment, occupational status, wealth, home ownership, and English proficiency. Further, residential segregation decreases across generations and rates of inter-ethnic and inter-racial marriage rise (Jiménez 2011). Indian and Chinese immigrants perform well across these different indicators—often outperforming the U.S.-born population—suggesting a high degree of socioeconomic integration. This section analyses American Community Survey data from 2010–2012 and Current Population Survey data from 2009 to 2013 to assess Chinese and Indian immigrants’ socioeconomic performance in the United States across a variety of indicators. First-generation Indian and Chinese immigrants are, generally speaking, extremely well integrated into the United States. Indian and Chinese immigrants predominantly enter the United States as highly skilled workers, or as students pursuing a tertiary-level degree, which is reflected in their higher levels of education, employment, and household income compared with the U.S.-born population and other foreign-born populations. Full proficiency in the host country language is a vital part of ensuring the successful integration of immigrants and their descendants with poor language ability linked to lower labour market outcomes (see OECD and European Commission 2014; Batalova and Fix 2008; McHugh and Challinor 2011). English is one of the most commonly spoken official languages in India, which puts Indian immigrants at a significant advantage compared with other large immigrant groups that often struggle to gain full English proficiency. In 2011, 72% of Indian immigrants in the United States reported either only speaking English (9%) or speaking English “very well” (63%), compared with 49% of all immigrants (Whatley and Batalova 2013). However, language serves as an important barrier to integration for Chinese immigrants. In 2010, approximately 63% of Chinese immigrants reported having limited English proficiency (LEP); of which, 66% of immigrants from mainland China were LEP, compared with 42% of immigrants from Hong Kong.21 In comparison, only 28% of Indian immigrants reported being LEP.

21 MPI calculations from 2010 ACS data, McCabe, “Chinese Immigrants in the United States.”

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Limited ability in the language of the host country can have serious consequences on immigrants’ integration outcomes. LEP immigrants have lower employment rates than other immigrant groups whose native language is English (OECD and European Commission 2014), and are twice as likely to work in unskilled occupations compared with their English proficient counterparts (Batalova and Fix 2008: 21). Limited host-language ability can also lead to social isolation from mainstream society (Hernandez and Charney 1998: 55). One survey found that over half (55%) of Chinese immigrants claimed all or most of their friends were Chinese American; this fell to just 14% among second-generation Chinese (Pew Research Center 2013: 98–99). Yet in spite of this disadvantage, Chinese immigrants still perform well across an array of socioeconomic indicators. Unlike many other immigrant populations in the United States, whose education levels lag behind those of the U.S. general public (Haskins, in Fix 2009: 62), Indian and Chinese immigrants’ high levels of academic achievement set them far above U.S. national averages. Close to half (48%) of the Chinese-born population age 25 or older and more than three quarters of the Indian-born population (79%) held at least a bachelor’s degree, compared with the U.S. national average of 31%. Forty- five per cent of Indian immigrants and 27% of Chinese immigrants age 25 or older held an advanced degree (master’s, advanced professional degree, or PhD) compared to 11% of the U.S. general public. However, a small but not insignificant share of the Chinese-born population is low-skilled: 16% had less than a high school diploma, compared with 13% of the U.S. general public and just 6% of the Indian- born population. Indian and Chinese immigrants outperform the U.S. general public in the labour market, boasting higher employment rates (94% and 95% respectively, versus 91% for the U.S. general public). Indian immigrants age 16 or older are also more likely to participate in the labour force (71%) than Chinese immigrants (62%) or the U.S. general public (64%). Thirty-five per cent of Indian immigrants age 16 or older worked in professional or managerial occupations, which include STEM fields and administrative or managerial jobs, compared to 31% of the U.S. general public and 27% of Chinese immigrants.22 As a result, Indian and Chinese immigrants also earn more than the U.S. general public. Households headed by Indian immigrants in the United States had a median annual income approximately $40,000 higher than U.S. national median ($90,000 versus $50,000), and they were also far more likely to be high income. More than half (53%) of all Indian immigrant households had annual incomes in the top 25% of the U.S. income distribution (above $90,000 per year), and more than a quarter (28%) had annual incomes in the top 10% (above $140,000 per year). This helps explain the considerable scale of remittances sent to India from the United States: in 2012, almost $12 billion in remittances were transferred to India from the United

22 This rate is calculated based on the share of all individuals reporting an occupation for their primary job at the time the CPS was administered, or for their most recent primary job.

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States, comprising about 18% of total remittances to India that year.23 These remittance flows have been aided by changes in India—such as commercial bank policies to facilitate sending remittances—the successful profile of recent emigrants, and the strength of the Indian economy (Chishti 2007). Similarly, U.S. households headed by a Chinese-born immigrant had a higher annual median income than the U.S. national population and were more likely to be higher income. Thirty-five per cent of households headed by a Chinese immigrant had annual incomes above $90,000, placing them in the top quartile of the U.S. income distribution. Similarly, 18% of all households headed by a Chinese immigrant had annual incomes above $140,000, placing them in the top decile of the U.S. income distribution.24 But while Indian immigrants were much less likely to live in poverty than other immigrant groups, or the general U.S. population, with only 7% having family incomes below the federal poverty threshold, nearly equivalent shares of Chinese immigrant and U.S. households had family incomes below the federal poverty threshold (16 versus 15%). The United States uses the poverty threshold to determine eligibility for several means-tested government aid programs—though many of these are restricted to immigrants with LPR status or U.S. citizenship (Fix 2009). In general, Asian Americans tend to live in racially mixed neighbourhoods—particularly when compared with other U.S. racial groups—though levels of residential integration for this group have remained steady since 1980 (Pew Research Center 2013: 14, 35). Indian immigrants are more dispersed across the United States than Chinese immigrants, though many new arrivals still choose to settle in California, New Jersey, or Texas. Over half of Chinese immigrants live in the traditional immigrant gateway states of California or New York; and many large U.S. cities like New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles have historic “Chinatown” districts. However, these settlement patterns have altered in recent years, with more Chinese immigrants either choosing to settle outside of these inner-city enclaves in suburbs; or eschewing traditional gateway cities like New York altogether in favour of non-gateway destinations elsewhere. One study of low-skilled Chinese immigrants in the United States found many were now opting to move to non-gateway destinations—including rural areas—in pursuit of work in the Chinese restaurant business (Liang and Li 2012: 7–9). This dispersion is attributed to skilled professionals being less dependent on the help of their ethnic community, and being more

23 MPI tabulations of data from the World Bank Prospects Group, “Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012”. 24 MPI analysis found a notable discrepancy here between immigrants from mainland China, whose median household income was $52,000, and Hong Kong, whose median household income was $75,000. Households headed Hong Kong immigrants were more likely to earn over $90,000 (42%, compared to 34%), and over $140,000 (25%, compared to 17%). However, significantly more of the Hong Kong population was working age (18–64) compared with the mainland China population: 89%, compared with 75%. (Of the mainland Chinese immigrants, 8% was under 18, and 17% was over the age of 65.) Additionally, the Hong Kong population had, on average, been living in the United States for longer (with more time to build up their U.S. earning power): 80% of immigrants from Hong Kong arrived before 2000, compared with 57% of immigrants from mainland China.

[email protected] 12 A Comparative Analysis of the Migration and Integration of Indian and Chinese… 227 scattered throughout the country than manual labourers, for example (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 41). Yet despite living in mixed neighbourhoods, the Indian community is bound by strong cultural bonds. Indian immigrants and their children are less supportive of interracial and intergroup marriage than many other immigrant groups, including Chinese immigrants. A recent study found only 14% of newlyweds of Indian ancestry (marrying between 2008 and 2010) had married someone outside their ethnic group; and nearly 40% of Indian Americans stated they would be uncomfortable with their child marrying outside their race or origin group (Pew Research Center 2013: 13, 107). However, rates of intermarriage among Chinese immigrants and their descendants are relatively high: 35% of Chinese American marriages between 2008 and 2010 were to non-Chinese (Pew Research Center 2013: 106), compared to 14% of Indian Americans, only 9% of whites, 17% of blacks, and 26% of Hispanics (Wang 2012).

Conclusions

A century ago, most Asian immigrants were low-skilled, low-wage labourers crowded into ethnic enclaves, but today Asian Americans are the country’s highest- income, best-educated, and fastest-growing minority group who are also most likely to live in mixed neighbourhoods and marry across racial lines (Pew Research Center 2013). The vast majority of first-generation Indian and Chinese migrants have legal immigration status, and most enter the United States as highly skilled students or workers, which sets them at a significant advantage for integration. Consequently, these immigrant groups do not face many of the integration challenges that affect lower-skilled immigrant groups, instead scoring consistently higher than other immigrant groups and even the U.S.-born population across a variety of socioeconomic indicators. Structural factors like a flexible labour market and strong anti-discrimination laws that require states to ensure access to services regardless of language proficiency, coupled with an emphasis on early economic self-sufficiency, help underpin the U.S. immigrant integration model and its reputation for success (Fargues et al. 2011: 8–9). Nevertheless, European examples of early, targeted interventions to facilitate language learning and labour market integration could in some cases be instructive for the United States. Though the data suggest Indian and Chinese immigrants have, by and large, integrated well into the United States, stereotyping these communities as a “model minority” can mask integration challenges they may face—for example, limited English language proficiency, or lapsing into unauthorised status. Simultaneously, a lack of data makes it difficult to assess Indian and Chinese immigrants’ social, cultural, and civic integration. Additional federal funding for English language classes for adults and children, and perhaps targeted language classes for new arrivals (drawing from European examples like Germany), could help immigrants gain flu-

[email protected] 228 K. Hooper and S. Groves ency in English more quickly. Similarly, while many Indian and Chinese immigrants enter the United States and gain permanent residency through economic channels, a significant share still enter through family-sponsored channels, and could thus potentially benefit from targeted programmes to facilitate access to the labour market (such as credentialing, or training and mentoring) as pioneered in several European countries. The United States’ decentralised approach means that U.S. states and cities continue to lead immigrant integration efforts; this enables Indian and Chinese diaspora organisations—set up by immigrants and their descendants and primarily catering to their ethnic communities—to play an important role in integrating new arrivals. India and China both run dedicated ministries to build links with their overseas nationals, which focus on encouraging diaspora contributions to economic development at home. This is a significant motivation behind outreach efforts in the United States. However, the establishment of an Overseas Indian Center in India’s Washington DC embassy, which will engage the U.S. Indian population and offer employment and welfare resources to its overseas nationals, indicates a diaspora policy that is starting to include integration outcomes at destination.

References

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[email protected] Chapter 13 Conclusions

Anna Di Bartolomeo, Sona Kalantaryan, and Justyna Salamońska

While integration is increasingly perceived as a major problem, it does not depend solely on destination societies and their approaches. As recognised at academic and political levels, origin states can potentially have a major impact on shaping the integration trajectories of their emigrants living abroad. This volume provides fac- tual evidence on the link between origin determinants and integration outcomes by using migrant corridors as units of analysis. Accordingly, different migrant corridors are systematically compared within and between states on a wide range of integration dimensions, namely labour market, education and access to citizenship. In some cases, other dimensions were considered, including residential integration, social inclusion, political participation, language, etc. In terms of origin determinants, we considered the role of diaspora and emigration policies, ties between migrants and origin states and non-state-actor engagement. All these were found to have a differentiated impact according to the dimension of integration. In the labour market, destination dynamics seem to play a major role, as highlighted by the studies on Belgium and Italy. In both cases, the labour market structure at destination seems to play a fundamental role. In the Belgian case, two specular patterns are observed: while Moroccan migrants seem to be better integrated than Turkish migrants in the education dimension, the opposite is observed in the labour market. The authors point out that the reasons behind this are structural, depending on the structure of the Belgian labour market; particularly in a context of highly segmented dynamics and high over-qualification outcomes, Turkish migrants, in contrast with Moroccan migrants, have often opted for self- employment and opening ethnic businesses, among other activities. Labour market characteristics are again found to be the main drivers of migrant performance in the

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 233 A. Di Bartolomeo et al. (eds.), Migrant Integration between Homeland and Host Society Volume 2, Global Migration Issues 8, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-56370-1_13

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Italian case. Here, Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants both perform well notwithstanding extremely different approaches at origin: a mix of diaspora and emigration policy tools in the Moroccan case and a relatively “unmanaged context” in the Ukrainian one. Their performances can largely be imputed, according to the authors, to the availability of a large spectrum of low-skilled jobs as well as to the possibility of being regularised only a few years after entry. Both Ukrainian and Moroccan migrants are indeed largely employed in specific labour market niches (e.g. agriculture and household activities) where there is no competition with the Italian population. In the meantime, living in Italy without being employed is challenging for foreigners due to the difficulties they encounter in accessing any kind of welfare or unemployment benefits. Though destination seems to play a major role, origin-destination cooperation tools seem to have a positive impact on the labour market integration of migrants as well. In particular, the role of bilateral agreements deserves attention. As exten- sively reported in the chapter on Spain, they appear to be central to facilitating the integration of immigrants in the labour market. According to the author, the extremely good performance of Ecuadorian migrants is indeed certainly related not only to the good job conditions guaranteed in the bilateral agreement between Ecuador and Spain but also to the fact that, contrary to the policies that apply to Moroccans, the agreement guarantees that Ecuadorians get access to the same conditions and working rights in the labour market as Spanish workers. A similar positive impact is found in the case of Moroccan and Turkish migrants working in Belgium, in particular with regard to pre-departure trainings and information circulation. This seems to confirm that when concrete opportunities exist abroad, bilateral agreements can be a major tool for migration management. The so-called country-fixed effect is another indirect way by which the origin may affect the integration dynamics of migrants abroad. This effect seems to apply to the labour market but also to other dimensions as well, for instance, education. In the case of Germany, the main factor responsible for affecting migrants’ integration is the human capital that migrants themselves bring to their destination: the better the conditions at home at a micro and macro level, the better the integration outcomes are upon arrival. This is also found in the Swedish case, in which Iranian migrants perform much better than Turkish migrants, who instead rely on a wide range of state and non-state associations as well as state policies that support their integration abroad. Similar conclusions can be drawn in the Italian case: by comparing Moroccan and Ukrainian migrants it emerges that the better they perform at home, the higher their integration in the education dimension at destination. In the meantime, bilateral agreements seem to also play a role in the “access to citizenship” dimension, with both origin and destination factors having a role in determining integration levels. What emerges from the studies is that when destination countries have restrictive legislation regulating citizenship acquisition, the destination effect seems to prevail. At least, this is what the Italian case seems to suggest, given the fact that migrants living there rank near the bottom of the citizenship index regardless of origin. On the other hand, in the presence of “softer” citizenship laws, the existence of either legislation at origin or bilateral agreements that facilitate dual citizenship procedures seems to help “citizenship performance”. This

[email protected] 13 Conclusions 235 is the case for example of the extremely good performance of Turkish migrants (vs. Iranian migrants) in Sweden which can be at least partially credited to the attitude of Turkish authorities who promote and support dual citizenship procedures. It is also – and especially – the case of the outstanding ranking of Ecuadorian migrants (vs. Moroccan migrants) living in Spain. Their performance can indeed to be attributed to the dual-nationality agreement, under which Ecuadorians may ask for Spanish nationality after ‘only’ two years of legal residence in Spain. An interesting finding of the study emerges when we look at how integration levels interplay between different dimensions. In particular, having high levels of integration in one (or two) dimensions does not necessarily result in having good integration performances in the other dimension(s). This is found in the Swedish case which demonstrated that processes in different areas of integration do not necessarily go hand in hand: for instance, a migrant group may have high naturalization rates, but low structural integration. Easing citizenship acquisition procedures is thus not necessarily a policy that facilitates structural integration. By contrast, the UK case explores the role played by education to facilitate or constrain integration dynamics. Even though contemporary Chinese and Indian migrants are primarily highly skilled migrants and – especially in the Chinese case – international students, they do not automatically integrate into other spheres of the British society. These migrants’ positions in UK society are largely explained by both origin and destination policies. On the one hand, education and international student mobility is largely encouraged at both ends of migration through visa facilitations, university incentives and facilitating structures at home. However, although Chinese migrants are better educated than Indian migrants, they face major constraints in both the labour market and the citizenship dimension. As regards the former, the high share of international students among the Chinese community does not seem to go hand in hand with a successful labour market entry. In particular, among recent graduate students, searching for or keeping a highly skilled, sponsored job is extremely hard, despite the strong support available from ethnic Chinese organisations based in loco. By contrast, the Indian community’s longer length of stay largely explains their more successful integration in these dimensions. The debate around the efficiency of diaspora vs. emigration policies is deepened in at least two countries: Germany and Sweden. In both cases, emigration policies seem to be much more efficient than diaspora policies in supporting integration trajectories, particularly in the labour market. The German chapter demonstrates that, in their current form, diaspora policies do not seem to support the integration of migrants abroad. On the contrary, they re-focus migrants’ attention back to the country of origin and distract from integration efforts in the new home country. The only positive impact of diaspora policies is found in the business sector; cross- border activities for Turkish migrants and the enhancement of Russian-language proficiency for Russian migrants increase the involvement of both groups in international business affairs. A similar conclusion is found in the Swedish chapter regarding Turkish diaspora policies, which include concrete state policy actions as well as policies implemented by a wide range of state and non-state associations but which nevertheless seem to fail to support integration abroad.

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Finally, the role played by non-state actors is much debated in all the studies in accordance with what was found in the INTERACT Survey. As a whole, NGOs seem to be working much better and adhering to the real needs of migrants when operating at destination rather than origin. In addition, the majority of these organisations do not perceive the efforts of origin state authorities as significant or relevant, as clearly demonstrated in the German chapter on Russian and Turkish organisations. On the contrary, they tend to operate on an autonomous basis. As a whole, NGO actions seem to be always directed at confirming – and trying to improve – the status quo. In the Italian case, for instance, non-state actors are clearly concentrating on the labour market dimension, with a clear, specific objective: helping migrants find employment – not good employment, not well-remunerated employment but just employment. Job conditions, salaries and job-skill matching are not a priority either for state or non-state organisations, which shows that the latter do not innovate but rather follow national assets. In addition, the Polish case showed that – in the absence of integration policies at destination and emigration/ diaspora policies at origin, and in a context of temporary labour migration schemes, the role of NGOs appears to be limited with regard to migrants’ integration. Specifically, organisations working with migrants have a limited role in all integration dimensions aside from supporting labour migrants’ initial adaptation in the labour market. In Spain, although non-state actors play an important role, the study did not find that they had a clear impact on integration outcomes. Overall, this volume provides a key contribution to the literature of migrant integration on a number of fronts. It proposes for the first time that the role played by origin determinants in the integration of immigrants is an empirical asset. This was possible thanks to the adoption of a rigorous methodology which combined both quantitative and qualitative methods. In particular, the level of integration of migrant corridors – our units of analysis – was measured through a quantitative analysis according to the integration dimension. These results were explained by a number of qualitative analyses, and especially by the INTERACT Exploratory Survey which collected data from civil society organisations on a number of topics, including their roles and opinions relating to integration. In addition to the latter, an expert survey carried out among 20 selected migration experts and a detailed survey on the diaspora and emigration policies of key origin states were discussed as well. A core added-value of this methodology is that it puts equal emphasis on both ends of the migration process, i.e. destination and origin. Cross-national surveys of civil society organisations are also systematically conducted at both origin and destination. This standardised methodology makes international comparability possible, which is another added value of the analysis that is often difficult to obtain in international migration studies. Though the volume is mainly targeted at an academic audience it also provides some important insights for policy makers. For instance, it reveals that successful migrant integration in one domain does not necessarily imply successful integration in another. In other terms, policy makers should attempt a balanced integration across domains. Also, the study identifies important differences in integration patterns among migrants coming from different origin countries, even within the same destination country. A “one-size-fits-all” approach, then, is not ideal: it would be better to tailor policies to migrant backgrounds.

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