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5 Figure I.1. Dubai Inc. Ruler of Dubai Government of Dubai 100% 100% 100% 100% Dubai International Investment Dubai Holding Financial Centre Dubai World Corporation of Dubai Authority 100% 100% 100% 70% 100% 100% Dubai Holding Dubai Holding DIFC Investments Drydocks World 20% Borse Dubai Emirates Group Commercial Investment Group Operations Group 10% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% Dubai Properties Dubai Financial Dubai Group Istithmar World Emirates Airline Group Market 100% 70% 100% 20% 56% Commercial Bank of Jumeirah Group Dubai Banking Group Nakheel Emirates NBD Dubai 30% 100% 100% 70% 12% 100% Emirates Islamic Tatweer Dubai Bank Limitless Dubai Investments Bank 100% 48% 100% 30% 48% Port and Free Zone TECOM Investments SHUAA Capital Dubai Islamic Bank Union Properties World 20% Emirates Integrated 100% 80% 43%Emirates 20% Deyaar Development Telecommunications Dubai Financial Group DP World Refreshements Company Company Company 100% 100% 57% 10% Dubai International National Bank of Dubai Maritime City Tamweel Capital Fujairah 100% 31% Economic Zones Emaar Properties World 48% Amlak Finance Source: Zawya. 6 3. Looking forward, GREs will likely continue to pose significant risks to the sovereign balance sheet and the financial system. Although little information is available on the financial situation of most GREs, with an estimated US$60 billion of debt due in 2011–12, the U.A.E. face rollover risk and would need to manage this carefully in light of continued turmoil in global markets. Moreover, with the restructuring of Dubai Inc., a significant amount of debt has been shifted to the medium term with potential bunching risks in 2014–15. The overhang in the real estate sector means that these risks can affect the sovereign balance sheet as contingent liabilities may materialize; they can affect local banks that hold GRE debt; and they can have broader implications for capital markets through higher cost of borrowing. 4. The objective of this paper is to identify the risks posed by financially underperforming GREs. The note will assess the impact of the Dubai debt restructuring on capital markets, the sovereign balance sheet, and the banking sector, and it will identify future potential risks, particularly in terms of contingent liabilities for the government. B. Which Types of Risks Emerged in the Context of Dubai’s Debt Restructuring? Market risk 5. Following the DW debt standstill announcement conditions in secondary markets deteriorated rapidly. Yields on both conventional and Sukuk bonds immediately shot up by several hundreds of basis points. The extension of a US$10 billion loan from the GD to DW had only a temporary impact and Dubai government bonds kept selling off through most of the first quarter of 2010 with yields peaking at over 10 percent. It was only with the submission of the restructuring plan in March 2010 and the subsequent agreement among a large number of creditors that yields entered a sustained downward trend, although they remain somewhat above pre-crisis levels (Figure I.2). 11 Figure I.2. Dubai Government Bonds 11/25/09: DW (Yield to maturity, in percent) DUBAI 4.25 04/13 announces SUKUK 6.396 11/14 standstill 11/16/10: GD 10 agreement 03/25/10: DW 12/14/09: GD submits injects $2 bn 05/20/10: 7 extends restructuring in DH, which largest banks $10 bn loan plan 09/09/10: 99% announces to DW agree on of creditors plan plan 9 agree on plan 8 7 6 5 11/2/2009 1/2/2010 3/2/2010 5/2/2010 7/2/2010 9/2/2010 11/2/2010 Source: Bloomberg. 7 6. Market access for the sovereign and the GREs themselves were significantly affected. Only, in September 2010, the GD regained market access, though at higher costs than its peers. In the post-DW issues, Dubai paid more than 120 basis points (over benchmark) compared to the same period a year earlier. Comparisons with peers indicate that Dubai issued at spreads comparable with sovereigns in the single B rating category, such as Ukraine (B+/B2/B), as highlighted in Table I.1. As for the GREs, in April 2010, the Dubai Electricity & Water Authority (DEWA) had been the first Dubai’s GRE to regain market access after the DW’s announcement, but it had funded at over 8.6 percent on a US$1 billion issue, to the tune of 300 basis points above similarly rated emerging market corporate issuers. Most Dubai’s GREs have not still re-entered capital markets. Table I.1. 2010 Select Sovereign Issues Spread to Value S&P Fitch Years to Yield to Currency Moodys USD Sovereign Date (US$ Issuer Issuer Maturity Maturity (%) Code Rating Benchmark million) Rating Rating (bps) Belarus (B+) 26-Jul-10 600 5 9.21 USD B+ B1 727 Dubai 29-Sep-10 500 5 6.81 USD 543 Ukraine (B+) 16-Sep-10 500 5 6.99 USD B+ B2 B 541 Dubai 29-Sep-10 750 10 7.90 USD 527 Ukraine (B+) 16-Sep-10 1,500 10 7.90 USD B+ B2 B 499 Barbados (BBB) 27-Jul-10 200 12 7.33 USD BBB Baa3 416 Lithuania (BBB) 4-Feb-10 2,000 10 7.77 USD BBB Baa1 BBB 402 Croatia (BBB) 6-Jul-10 1,250 10 6.87 USD BBB Baa3 BBB- 381 Dominican Republic (B) 29-Apr-10 750 11 7.64 USD B B1 B 377 Sri Lanka (B+) 27-Sep-10 1,000 10 6.35 USD B+ B+ 373 Vietnam (BB) 26-Jan-10 1,000 10 7.07 USD BB Ba3 BB- 333 Lithuania (BBB) 7-Sep-10 750 7 5.32 USD BBB Baa1 BBB 320 Jordan (BB) 8-Nov-10 750 5 4.17 USD BB Ba2 301 Source: Dealogic. Fiscal risk 7. The DW debt restructuring translated into higher sovereign debt. The Central Bank of the U.A.E. (CBU) extended a five year US$10 billion loan to the GD in March 2009; the GAD extended a further US$6.3 billion in December 2009 following the DW debt standstill. Our estimate of Dubai’s government and government guaranteed debt stands at US$36 billion at end-2010 (34 percent of 2010 Dubai and northern emirates GDP), up from US$12.2 billion at the end of 2008 (Figure I.3). 8 Figure I.3. Dubai: Total Debt Stock, 2007, 2010 Dubai Debt Stock, 2010 Dubai Debt Stock, 2007 GREs Govt. 92% 8% GREs 68% Govt. 32% Source: Dealogic. Financial risk via local banks 8. Dubai banks were affected by their exposure to GREs. The banking system’s overall lending to Dubai GREs is estimated at 9 percent of total loans, and 16 percent of loans for Dubai banks. For DW, local banks were owed 40 percent of the debt subject to restructuring (US$14.4 billion), of which 60 percent is concentrated in Dubai banks. Provisions on DW restructured loans have been completed and amount to US$500 million, implying an average haircut of 9 percent. For Dubai Holding, the limited information available suggests that local banks are owed over 50 percent of the debt to be restructured (i.e. US$5.2 billion), of which 90 percent is with Dubai banks. C. What Are the Main Risks Posed by the GREs Going Forward? 9. Sovereign debt is low both in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, but a large share of public debt stems from GREs. Dubai’s publicly-held debt stands at US$113 billion (102.5 percent of Dubai and northern emirates GDP). The bulk of this debt is from Dubai Inc. which accounts for US$89.4 billion (Figure I.4) or 81.2 percent of Dubai and northern emirates GDP. Abu Dhabi’s debt amounts to US$104 billion (54.8 percent of Abu Dhabi GDP), and although the expansion of GREs started more recently, most of it also stems from GRE debt (US$92.4 billion or 48.6 percent of Abu Dhabi GDP). 9 120.0 Figure I.4. Total Gross Debt, 2010 (General Government + GRE Debt) (in percent of GDP) 100.0 GRE Debt (in percent of GDP) Sovereign Debt (in percent of GDP) 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 Dubai UAE Abu Dhabi Sources: World Economic Outlook ; Dealogic. 10. GRE debt is large by international comparisons. The size of Abu Dhabi’s publicly-held sovereign debt is rather small (6.1 percent of Abu Dhabi GDP); Dubai faces a sovereign debt (excluding guarantees) of 21.4 percent of Dubai and northern emirates GDP, also far from large by international comparisons. It is only when the debt of the GREs is accounted for (Figure I.5) that the full scale of the problem becomes visible. On this metric, Abu Dhabi’s debt rises to 54.8 percent of Abu Dhabi’s GDP and Dubai’s climbs to as much as 102.5 percent of GDP (Figure I.6). 100.0 Figure I.5. GRE Gross Debt, 2010 (in percent of GDP) 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 Sources: World Economic Outlook; Dealogic. 10 250.0 Figure I.6. Total Gross Debt: Cross-Country Comparison, 2010 (General Government +GRE Debt) (in percent of GDP) 200.0 150.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 Italy UAE India Brazil Spain Dubai China Japan Turkey Ireland Russia Austria France Mexico Greece Canada Belgium Portugal Australia Germany Argentina Indonesia Abu Dhabi Abu South Africa Netherlands South Korea Saudi Arabia Saudi United States United United Kingdom United Sources: World Economic Outlook ; Dealogic. 11. With US$60 billion maturing in 2011-12, both Dubai and Abu Dhabi face short- term rollover risk.