Sovereign Wealth Funds Quarterly Newsletter
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Sovereign Wealth Funds Quarterly Newsletter From the collaboration between Bocconi’s Sovereign Investment Lab and The Boston Consulting Group The Leviathan Corner 03 Global outlook for SWF investments 05 Q4 2017 – Q1 2018 Deal Activity Summary 06 Key Trends 11 Sovereign Wealth Funds, Assets under management 13 with the scientific support of Foreword The global macroeconomic outlook has been favorable the increase domestic demand will generate inflationary for SWF over the period: Asian economies boomed with pressures and interest rate hikes, which have already the resumption of global trade, and the oil price rally taken place, curbing equity prices. Absent geopolitical relieved the hard-pressed public finances of producing events, the engines of SWF growth, oil prices, trade nations. FX reserves in EM grew in Asia, while in surplus, and strong equity markets will be a spent force MENA (Qatar apart) decreased at a slower pace. But in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, governments in we are most likely at a turning point, which will have emerging markets (especially energy producing nations) very deep implications in future SWF behavior. The will try to tap the SWF assets to equalize lost revenues protectionist tide is mounting under Trump policies and stabilize their domestic economies. The shut down of in USA, a country becoming this year the largest oil the Russian Reserve Fund and the change in strategy and producer and thus “energy independent”. A reduction in reornanization taking place in some GCC are the opening the US trade deficit will reduce foreign investments, and salvos of this big change. Key facts and figures 18 148 $32.6 BN USD active SWFs completing an completed total reported deal acquisition in Q4-Q1 2018 SWF deals value in Q4-Q1 2018 16.8% 60% $14 BN USD of total investments in Q4 2017 was CIC’s share of deal value in Q4-Q1 2018 were in acquisition of Logicor the digital space for a Europe total of 48 deals Sovereign Wealth Funds Quarterly Newsletter | 2 JV infrastructure fund between the Public Investment The Leviathan Corner Fund and Blackstone, or Panama $1.4 billion SWF’s The hidden cost of democracy: Norway decision to start investing in unlisted equities by end-2018, GPFG’s ban on private equity with a target allocation of 5-10% of assets. Second, the government’s decision came against recommendations Bernardo Bortolotti and Raphael Mimoun from both Norges Bank Investment Management and a government-appointed expert group that was set up last The Norwegian SWF (the Government Pension Fund August to discuss the opportunity to expand the scope of Global “GPFG”) is the largest fund by assets under the fund’s mandate beyond public assets and real estate. management around the world. Established in 1990, it received the first allocation in 1996, and then it steadily grew thanks to net cash flows contribution from all petroleum activities (including the dividends from the national oil company Statoil) to reach $1 trillion market Many experts told that it was value this year. GPFG is owned by the Ministry of naïve to believe that a democratic Finance, and professionally managed by a dedicated system could manage such a arm of the central bank, the Norges Bank Investment big cash flow in a sustainable Management. The MOF retains the decision-making “and responsible way, but the power, and determines the fund’s investment strategy, experience so far is that we have following advice from among others Norges Bank Investment Management and discussions in Parliament. been able to do exactly that. By law, the management mandate defines the investment universe and the fund’s strategic reference index. Jens Stoltenberg Former Prime Minister of Norway On April 11, 2018, the Government of Norway announced its decision not to expand the mandate to invest in unlisted equities on a general basis. Presented by Norway’s ” Minister of Finance Siv Jensen, the government’s white Beyond transparency and management fees, the MOF paper on the GPFG claimed that “unlisted equities would may have considered a “late entry” in an already crowded challenge key characteristics of the current management market translating into significant difficulties to source model [of the Fund], such as low asset management appropriate investment opportunities. Total amount of costs, closely tracking the benchmark and a high degree capital committed – but not yet invested – to private equity of transparency”1. has surpassed $1 trillion in 20172, reflecting a growing imbalance between demand and supply of PE investment This decision caught observers by surprise. First, because opportunities. Indeed, GPFG’s sheer size would make there has been increasing appetite of SWFs for PE it difficult to achieve even a small allocation target in investment and unlisted targets. Examples from various unlisted equities. Based on end-2017 assets, a target of geographies abound, including Saudi Arabia’s $ 40 billion 1 https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/569f03a08ee74350b3778f 2 http://docs.preqin.com/press/Fundraising-2017.pdf (page 2/6) dbb24dd406/en-gb/pdfs/stm201720180013000engpdfs.pdf (page 8/10) Sovereign Wealth Funds Quarterly Newsletter | 3 5% would require approximately $50bn of investment, i.e. 2.6% allocated to unlisted real estate.5 Even without a level on par with the biggest private equity firms in the the materialization of a “Black Swan” scenario, the world. This partially explains why the fund has so far failed fund’s overexposure to Europe and the U.S. makes it to achieve its allocation target for unlisted real estate, vulnerable to growing risks such as demographic decline since getting approval to invest in this asset class in 2010 or increasing sovereign debt levels. Besides, the decision (2.6% of the portfolio at end-2017, i.e. half of the target). of the government to increase its equity exposure to 70% will need to be carefully and gradually implemented in Nevertheless, the decision of a blanket ban on an entire order to avoid buying stocks at inflated prices, as previous asset class is puzzling. Mandates typically design a decisions of the GPFG to increase its equity exposure general framework for strategic asset allocation which were made close to market highs (2007 and 1997). should not be affected by current market outlook but to fundamental contribution a given asset can provide Further to the government’s decision, Per Stomberg, to the long-term risk-adjusted performance.Indeed, from the director of the expert group, declared that it would a financial economics standpoint, there are compelling likely “come at a considerable cost in lower returns in reasons for the GPFG to expand its portfolio towards PE the future”.6 A back-of-the-envelope calculation of the investment. opportunity cost of not investing in PE, assuming a 12% return and a gradual portfolio rebalancing to reach a 10% Broadly speaking, investments in unlisted equities are allocation in this asset class in five years time, yields a particularly suited to the characteristics of the GPFG, cost estimate in the ballpark of $70bn over a ten year a long-term investor without explicit liabilities and thus holding period. able to harvest illiquidity premia over long horizons. Investment in PE would also allow the fund to boost its This statement begs a question: Why a respected, sub-par return. Between January 1, 1998 and end-2017, sophisticated organization with access to state-of-the- the fund generated only a 6.1% annual return3, certainly a art knowledge and skills deliberately leaves so much modest performance given the large exposure to stocks. money on the table? Our answer lies in the legacy of In 2017, the Fund reached a return of 13.7% return up an overtly prudent, ultra-conventional investment style only 0.7% on its benchmark index4. Key peers of the fund, imposed in these last two decades by the political system. such as Swedish AP funds, Canadian pension funds or Seeking widespread political legitimacy in an established the Netherlands’ pension fund (ABP), have consistently democracy founded on accountability and transparency, outperformed the GPFG while having more stringent rules decision makers opted for the easiest investment model on capital allocation (pension funds have to maintain to explain to their electorate, the globally diversified liquidity buffers to ensure payments to policy holders). portfolio of liquid stocks and bonds. The last decision on PE just follows in this wake. To some extent, the PE investment would also participate in reducing the Norwegian democracy imposes an excessive risk Fund’s exposure to stocks, which makes it vulnerable to aversion in the design and implementation of investment market fluctuations. In March 2018, the Fund published mandates, another form of political interference. This estimates indicating that – owing to the strong exposure governance conundrum has led to a rather paradoxical of the fund to listed equities – it could lose over 40% of situation whereby instead of investing in transformative its portfolio value in a single year, should adverse stock projects that could shape tomorrow’s global economy, market price developments combine with a strengthening the world’s biggest sovereign wealth fund is sticking to a of the Norwegian Krone. As of end-2017, the GPFG’s passive index tracking approach that is neither generating portfolio consisted of 97.4% of listed investments (66.6% development impact, nor yielding a strong return. in equity investments – to be increased to 70% in the medium-term – and 30.8% in fixed income) and 3 https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/return-on-the-fund/ 5 https://www.nbim.no/contentassets/db0b28dc13934aa6a56596d81d- 4 https://www.nbim.no/contentassets/49715a01ed684b1686ff- 47a33a/return-and-risk-2017---government-pension-fund-global.pdf 3c017f1efa12/press-conference---annual-report-2017---gpfg.pdf 6 https://www.ft.com/content/2092083c-3cb5-11e8-b7e0-52972418fec4 Sovereign Wealth Funds Quarterly Newsletter | 4 Global outlook for SWF investments The global macroeconomic outlook has been favourable Chart 1.