THE PE0BLES4 OF INDOCTRINATION: AS VimED IROM SOCIOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BASES
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By MiOhio Nagai, B.A., A,M. The Ohio State University 1952
Approvi
Adviser H. Gordon flullfish AClSilOWLEDGMiiMT
It would be diriicult to express adequately my appreciation of
the contributions made by many persons to this study. I first wish
to express my gratitude to Dr. H. Gordon Hullfish, my adviser, wnose
sincere guidance, generosity, and patience have led me from the
first stage of learning in English in July, 194-9, up to the very last
minute of completing this dissertation in May, 1952. I am very much
indebted to Dr. Aurt H. Wolff whose wisdom and painstaking guidance
have been of invaluable help in the writing of this dissertation.
Likewise my indebtedness is due Dr. Alan E. Griffin and Dr. Lloyd
Williams who read the complete manuscript and made numerous valuable
corrections and suggestions.
I also wish to express my appreciation for the intellectual
stimulation gained for contacts with Dr. John W. Dennett and
Mr. Iwao Ishino. Acknowledgment of a less specific, but not
necessarily of less important value, is due Dr. Ervin E. Lewis
whose kindness guided my first steps in this new land, finally, I wish to thank my wife, Mieko Nagai, without whose help this dissertation might not have been completed.
MIGHIO NAGAI
909454 XI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I INTRODUCTION...... 1
I Dictionary Definition...... 3
II The Indoctrination Controversy...... 5
(a) The Position oi George Counts...... 7 ( b) The Position of The Educational Frontier...... 9 (c) The Concept of "Defensible Partiality"...... 11
III The Sociological and the Philosophical Approaches to the Problem...... 13
(a) The Sociological Approach...... 14 (b) The Philosophical Approach...... 21
II SCHOOL e d u c a t i o n AND INDOCTRINATION:A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.. 29
I The Ethos of Science...... 30
(a) Universalisa...... 31 (b) Communism ...... 33 (c) Disinterestedness...... 33 (d) Organized Scepticism...... 34-
II Education in Institutions ofHigher Learning...... 35
(a) Functional Specificity...... 36 ( b) Universalisa...... 38 (c) Achievement Orientation...... 38 ( d) Affective Neutralily...... 39 (e) Collectivity Orientation...... 4-0
III School Education and Indoctrination...... 41
(a) School Education...... 42 (b) Indoctrination and School Education: The content and the Method...... $1
17 School and Society at Large...... 56 XXX
uüAPTiiR Pa g e
III OBJECTIVITY m TEACHING: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS...... 62
IM.annh.exm.’s Theory of knowledge...... 64
(a) Geaeral character of Mannheim's Sociology of knowledge...... 64 (,b) "Substantive” Sociology of knowledge...... 67 ^.c) Sociological Theory of knowledge...... 71
II Weber on the Problem of Objectivity in the Social Sciences ...... 77
(,a) Relative Aspects of Knowledge. .... 78 (b) Objectivity in the Social Sciences: The Problem of Origin and Validity...... SO
IIIMorris’ Theory of Signs...... 82
(a.) The Importance of Semiotic...... 82 (b) Three Dimensions of Semiosis...... 83 (c) Implications of Semiotic for the Sociology of Knowledge...... 86 (d) The Implications of the Theories of Weberand Morris for the Problem of Indoctrination...... 88
IV The Teaching of Subjective Knowledge...... 90
IV THE PRAGÎÂATIST THEORY OF KiTOWLEDGE...... 95
I The Pragmatist Theory ol Knowledge...... 97
(a) Experience...... 100 Cb} Scientific Inquiry...... 102 ( c) Logic of Inquiry...... 104 (d) Truth...... 107
II Criticisms of Pragmatism...... 110
(a) Criticisms of Pragmatist Logic...... 110 (b) criticisms of Pragmatist Theory of Truth...... 115
V CONCLUSIONS...... 123
I Dimensions of Indoctrination...... 123
^Uy The Soc^o^v^xvcLjL i^Xiuen>dXon...... i,2/y XV
uhaptjër Page
(d) The Philosophical Dimension...... 124.
II The Meaning of the Present Stuc^; InRespect to the Indoctrination Controversy...... 125
Ca) In Respect to the Position of The Educational If'rontier...... 125 (h) In Respect to the Position of George Counts...... 127 L c) In Respect to the Concept "Defensible Partiality"...... 128
BIhLlOGRAPtiY...... 130
AUTOBIOGRAPHY...... 136 THE HROBLiTiH OE IiNDOCTEH^a ÏION ;
AS VIETiED ËROM SOCIOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL EASES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is with this clashing of nodes of thought, each of which has the same claims to representational validity, that for the first time there is rendered possible the emergence of the question which is so fateful, but also so fundamental in the history of thought, namely, how it is possible that identical human thought-processes concerned with the same world produce divergent conceptions of the world.1
This statement is found in the introduction, especially written by
Earl Mannheim himself, for the English edition of his Ideology and
Utooia. It was written in 1936. Sixteen years later, however, it
still expresses the general feeling of our time. It probably does
so more today than it did at the time it was written.
Day after day at international and national political gatherings,
we see the same event interpreted and explained differently by differing
people. The fear arises that there may not be a common ground between
people, especially at the international level, in terms of which the
ideas of differing parties can be freely exchanged and objectively
examined. Also at the national level, differences in ideas which might
have been conceived, during the prosperous period of laisez-faire. as
^ Mannheim, Earl, Ideology and Utopia, trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, New Yorij Harcourt, brace and Uompany, 1936, p.S. 2
the source of diversity in ttie so-called free culture, are, at present,
so often a source of tension, conl'lict, and fear.
Fear, unfortunately, is not confined to the realm of politics.
A common ground for the exchange of ideas is scarce in virtually T
aspects of our contemporary life. Eaucation is not an exception.
To mention only a few, the issue of academic freedom at the level of
higher learning has been raised time and again— most recently, for
instance, at the University of California and the Ohio State
University— and the question of ideologies in teaching at the level
of elementary and secondary education was raised by those involved 2 in the famous Pasadena incident.
The term “indoctrination,” which is to be under examination in the present study, is one of the concepts most commonly and
conveniently used by either or both parties to characterize "the evils" of the other, whenever such issues of power, academic freedom, and objectivity in education are in question. Whatever the one party does is branded by the other as sheer indoctrination. Thus in the eyes of the radicals "the reactionary indoctrinate," and according to the reactionary, "radical education is indoctrination." In some cases, both the radicals and the reactionary even agree with each other, and say, "the so-called middle road is another type of
^ Of. Radin, Max, "The Loyalty Oath at the University of California," ■bulletin of the American association of University Professors. Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1950, pp.237-24.5. Fine, Benjamin, "Issue of Academic Freedom is Raised Again; This Time at Ohio State University," The New Y one Times. Sunday, October 28, 1951, Section, 4-. Hulburd, David, This Happened in Pasadena. New YorJc, The Macmillan Company, 1951. 3 indoctrination." Those who are concerned with this common use and abuse of the
term "indoctrination" in the field of education thus are compelled
to raise the question, "What is indoctrination?" Otherwise, we
cannot Know what is to be protected, if anything is to be, from
indoctrination. It _is precisely the aim of this study to find.
if not a clear and satisfactory solution to the problem of
indoctrination as it is practiced in the elementary and secondary
schools, at least ways in which such solution may be sought.
We may Know, then, in which direction our educational efforts
are to be made.
before indicating the major directions of this study
(Section 3) > a dictionary definition of the term "indoctrination"
will be introduced (Section 1), and an attempt will be made to
describe in what sense indoctrination has been a subject of
controversy among educational thinKers (Section 2).
I. DICTIOMABl DEFINITION
It may be convenient to start our study with a dictionary
definition of the term "indoctrination." According to Webster* s
New International Dictionary:
Indoctrinate (ML. in-infdoctrinare to teach, fr. doctrina teaching.. See Doctidne,) 1. To instruct in the rudiments or principles of learning, or of a branch of learning; to instruct (in), or to imbue (with), as principles or doctrines; teach. A master that...tooJc much delight in. indoctrinating his young, unexperienced favorite, clarendon. 2. Sometimes, in a aerogatory sense, to imbue with an opinion or with a partisan or sectarian point of view.3
As this definition suggests, the term is used in two ways. The first
use, however, may be subdivided into two parts: 1) indoctrination
is a special Kind of teaching, instruction in doctrines; 2) indoctri
nation, in another sense, is synonymous with teaching. If the second use of the dictionary definition is added to these, we obtain three meanings of the term; the third being: indoctrination, in a deroga tory sense, is partisan teaching.
Popular vie7«s of indoctrination seen to correspond roughly to these three meanings suggested by the dictionary definition, (a) most commonly, the term "indoctrination" is used, in a derogatory sense, to mean something which should not be confused with teaching; e.g.,
"what he does is indoctrination, but it is not teaching." In this case, indoctrination is taicen to mean an expression of a partisan point of view, while teaching seems to be considered as instruction in objective and impartial Knowledge. The term is used here in the third meaning of the dictionary definition. (,b) Quite contrary to the first use, we often encounter statements in which indoctrination is used as synonymous with teaching; e.g., "After all, teaching is indoctrination." This use evidently corresponds to the second meaning in the dictionary definition. Indoctrinaxion in this use, accordingly, does not have any derogatory implication. (,c) Indoctri nation also seems to mean a kind of teaching. It is teaching of
^ Webster's New International Dictionary. 2nd ed. 5 doctrines as against teaching of objective imovfledge. In this case,
it is used merely as a classii'icatory concept without any derogatory
implication, f or example, we say "the objective of education is to
indoctrinate democratic ideals in children and to inform them, at
the same time, of objective Knowledge about our society and culture."
This use corresponds to the first meaning in the dictionary definition.
In this last use, there is a recognition that teaching involves
indoctrination, but it also involves a Kind of teaching which may
be contrasted to indoctrinationj viz., teaching of objective Knowledge.
Thus even a glance at the dictionary definition, as well as
at what we understand about the common use of the term "indoctrination,"
indicates how much confusion is involved in its use. In what sense
indoctrination is a problem in contemporary American education will
be made clear when we introduce, in the following pages, various
conflicting views about indoctrination as conceived by educational thinKers.
II. THE IîjDüCTRINATIQj>i CQàTROVERSY
Although indoctrination has long been one of the most important problems of education, it is only since the depression that it has become a central subject of controversy among thinKers in education.
Discussions about indoctrination since the depression may be called, for convenience, "the indoctrination controversy."
Even before the depression, of course, the problem of indoctri nation was not absent in the thinking of American educators. Among 6
other things, the problem of whether religion should be taught in
the public school had already become a serious problem in the late
eighteenth century. After a long controversy in New Hampshire, it
was decided to separate the public school from the influence of the
church. The prohibition of sectarian instruction in the public
school was written into the constitution of New Hampshire in 1793.^
Following this constitutional prohibition of religious instruction,
the principle of the separation of church and state was put into
practice during the nineteenth century in every state in the union.
In spite of this Keai interest in the problem of religious instruction
in the public schools, the problem of indoctrination was not so
seriously involved in other spheres of educational activity. On
the contrary, diversities in political, economic, and cultural
ideas were welcomed as a source of enrichment for a pluralistic
culture.
The depression changed this tradition. Various plans to meet the
social crisis and to. regulate the American system, which might have been regarded as a source of freedom and diversity in culture, now constituted a source of political tension and economic conflict.
Teachers were anxious to restore order within society and to bring prosperity again to American society. Various plans were thus introduced to classrooms. Since many of those plans represented interests and powers so far apart from each other that it was not
^ üeyer, A, E., The Development of Education in the Twentieth Century. New form, frentice Hall inc., 1949, p.377. 7 easy to find common standards in terms of which agreement was to be
found. In this atmosphere, it was only natural that the problem arose
as to whether the school v/as a place for the examination of « n
ideas, or whether it was a place for the diffusion of specific plans.
"Are we to present various views impartially or to show our points of
view with regard to the crisis?" became a question in the minds of
many teachers.
(a) In answer to this question, a group of educators held the
view that the school should take a positive stand with regard to social
reforms. Among these, George Counts was most explicit in his advocacy
of the use of the school as a means for social reform. P/ith regard to indoctrination, he stated that any school education, be it
conservative or progressive, contains after all a large element of indoctrination. Indoctrination is inevitable; and furthermore, it is desirable if it is directed to the "right" ends. Counts elaborated this position explicitly in 1932, in the pamphlet. Dare the School
Build a New Social Order? In answer to the orthodox view that indoctrination in the school is undesirable, counts stated that;
all education contains a large element of imposition, that in the very nature of the case this is inevitable, that the existence and evolution of society depend upon it, that it is consequently eminently desirable, and that the frank acceptance of this fact by the educators is a major professional obligation.5
Even a position that claims neutrality in teaching. Counts argues, turns out to be an unconscious indoctrination for the liberal-minded
%ounts, George, S., Dare the School Build a New Social Order? New York, John Day Co., 1932, p.6. 8
upper-middle class point of view. The Progressive Education group,
who claimed liberality in education, were also, in the eyes of Counts,
actually "in the grip of conservative forces... serving the cause
of perpetuating ideas and institutions suited to an age that is gone."^
Consequently, according to the argument of Counts, the major
conflicts between various educational theories are not those between
impartiality and partiality but betvfeen dii'fering partial points of view. The important thing for the teacher to do is not to seeic for
objectivity in teaching, but to choose a better position to indoctri nate. The socially oriented philosophy of education was elaborated by Counts as the guiding principle for an educative practice that would represent the most desirable Kind of indoctrination.
Although not so explicity as Counts, a large number of booKs and articles which appeared during the thirties developed educational theories along the line of social reform.*^ Many of them justified indoctrination on the ground that it is inevitably involved in any teaching. As teaching is desirable, so is indoctrination, which is merely another name for teaching.
^ Ibid., p.5. There are a large number of booKs and articles in which similar emphases are placed on the theory described here. To mention only a few; 1) George Counts wrote, in addition to the pamphlet already mentioned. The Social Foundations of Education. New ïorK, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934; "The Place of the School in the Social Order," N.E.A., Proceedings, 19 2 6 , pp.308-315; and others; 2) beale, H. A . , Are American Teachers Free? New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936; 3) Ailpatrick, li. H., Education and the Social Crisis. New York, Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1932; 4) Pittenger, h. F., Indoctrination For American Democracy, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1941. For information about the reformist trend in education during the thirties,_ see Curti, Merle, The Social Ideas of American Educators. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935> Chap. 16; also Meyer, op. cit.. pp.83-93. 9 (b) The position of George (Jounts, although it aroused the
interest of students in education, was also criticised by many scholars.
Many thinKers in the field of education went along with Counts in their
admission of the fact that indoctrination is involved, in some sense,
in teaching. However, their admission was qualified. Some scholars
maintained that indoctrination, though it may not be avoidable, is not
desirable. Others maintained that some Kind of indoctrination is
desirable, while another Kind is not. Still others showed the way
in which indoctrination may be converted to proper teaching.
Among many contributions made in these respects, the one which
is to be mentioned first is The Educational Frontier which was written
by leading educators and published in 1953, a year after the publication
of the controversial pamphlet by counts.® The authors recognize unanimously that, in current practices of education, a large element of indoctrination is present. In contrast to Counts, however, they do not thinK that indoctrination is desirable. For example, Dewey says;
Instead of recommending an imposed indoctrination, we are striving to challenge all the indoctrination of conscious dogma and of the unconscious bias of tradition and vested interest which already exist.9
This demand for the abolition of indoctrination does not mean, according to another writer, that they are advocating the position of neutrality, for he stàtes:
® Ailpatrick, W. H. (editor), Dewey, J., Bode, B. fi., Childs, J. L., Raup, R: B, ; Thayer- ?, T =, and Hullfish, H, G=, The Educational Frontier. New YorK, D. Appleton Century Co., 1933- 9 Dewey, ibid., p.72. 10 iJeutrality, in the sense oi avoidance oi this responsibility, becomes thus, as we see it, a cowardly refusal to face inherent duty. It is a M d this shift of thinking that many are now confused... .As conscious education, whether of young or old, faces then such a situation as our hang-over economic system, it cannot be neutral. To do nothing is in so far to perpetuate outworn and now hurtful doctrines.
They well recognize that, in the educative experience of children,
teachers cannot completely avoid determining the character end the
quality of many influences. Their avoidance of indoctrination,
therefore, does not lead them to the position of neutrality. Instead
it leads them to take their stand upon a particular position. Vv’hat,
then, is the basis on which they stand? A clear and concise answer
is set forth by Dewey:
If to prepare individuals to take part intelligently in the management of conditions under which they will live, to bring them to an understanding of the forces which are moving, to equip them with the intellectual and practical tools by which they can themselves enter into direction of these forces, is indoctrination, then the philosophy of education which we have in mind may be adjudged to be an instrument of indoctrination. Otherwise not. ^
"Reliance upon intelligence" ^ is a final ground of this philosophy of education. The important thing, however, is that we rely upon intelligence not for the sake of intelligence, but "to prepare individuals to take part intelligently in the management of conditions under which they will live."^^ More correctly, therefore, not sheer reliance upon intelligence, but reliance upon
Ailpatrick, ibid., p.lA7. ^ Dewey, ibid., p.71. ^ Hullfish.-±b£a^. p.211. 13 DewQT, ibid., p.71 11
intelligence for the saie of preparing individuals to meet the problems
of iii'e, is the premise of the philosophy. This premise, according
to Dewey, is at the same time the premise of the democratic tradition.
The final position of their philosophy of education, accordingly,
may be stated also in the following manner:
Upon one thing we take our stand, ae frankly accept the democratic tra.dition in its moral and human import. That is our premise and we are concerned to find out and state its implications for present conditions, in order that we may know what it entails for theory and practice of public education.!^
Indoctrination is rejected by the authors. The full use of
intelligence for a better life— which means, according to tnem, also the premise of the democratic tradition— is set forth as the basis of their position. Proper teaching which should be differ entiated from indoctrination, is based on the premise of the democratic tradition; viz., reliance on intelligence for a better life.
(c) Brameld’s theory of "defensible partiality," though not very different from the position of The Educational frontier, presents another approach to the problem of indoctrination.
According to Brameld, teaching does not become indoctrination simply because it contains an element of "partiality," Whether teaching becomes indoctrination or not is not determined as much by the points of view a teacher wants to stress, as by the ways in which his views are expressed. If partiality is defended reasonably,
^ Dewey, ibid,, p,72, 15 Brameld, Theoaore, Ends and Means in Education; A Midcentorv A-ppraisal, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950, 12
therefore, it ceases to be indoctrination.. Defining his position,
Brameld says:
In short, our position supports that kind of "partiality" which is at the same time "defensible." Here indeed is the ultimate test of whether learning is woven into the warp and the woof of individual and group behavior— whether patterns of belief not only are professed but consistently and fully practised,
In another statement in v;hich the meaning of the concept "defensible"
is explained more clearly, he says:
What we learn is defensible simply insofar as the ends we support and the means we utilize are able to stand up against exposure to open, unrestricted criticism and comparison. What we l e a m is partial insofar as these ends and means st-m remain definite and positive to their majority advocates after the defense occurs.*^
A delicate line is drawn between teaching and indoctrination by the use of the concept "defensible." Both teaching and indoctrination utilize partial ends and means, while the former is defensible, the latter is not defensible.
Of course, Brameld’s theory needs to be examined more carefully.
VThat Brameld means by partial ideas is:
Some one doctrine or systematic body of beliefs— a doctrine assumed in advance to be ao supremely true, so good, or so beautiful as to justify no need for critical, scrupulous, thoroughgoing comparison with alternative doctrines.
It is not clear in what v/ays partial ideas are defended by exposure to open, unrestricted criticism and comparison.19 Nevertheless,
Brameld* s attempt to characterize indoctrination is a definite
16 Ibid.. p.87. 17 Ibid.. pp.92-93. (italics in original) 18 Ibid.. p.88. 19 Cf. Ibid., pp.93-91. 13 coatribution to the problem of indoctrination. Just as the authors
of The Educational f rontier rely upon intelligence as a basis of
proper teaching, Brameld suggests that exposure of ideas to open,
unrestricted criticism, and comparison is an indespensable procedure
of teaching.
III. BüüIOiiQGlGAL THE PHILObOBrxICAL
APPRQAUHES ^ THE PEOBBm
The foregoing description shows that there are various uses of,
and conflicting interpretations of, indoctrination. To some people,
indoctrination is synonymous with teaching, while to others,
indoctrination takes place only under abnormal situation. Another disagreement may be seen between one position, which holds that any teaching of partial views is indoctrination, ana another position which holds that even the teaching of partial views is not indoctri nation if it is presented in a defensible manner.
In order to answer our original question, "What is indoctrination as itis practised at the level of elementary and secondary education?", we haveto makeclear what aspects of the problem should be studied in what ways. That is to say, the problem must be broken down into sub-problems, and the approaches to these sub-problems should be accurately stated.
We shall deal with the problem first by way of the sociological approach, then by way of une philosophical approach, in the sociological lÀ study, our major problem will be, "In what way is indoctrination
involved in school education?" And in the philosophical study, we
shall be mainly concerned with such problems as, "Is all teaching
indoctrination? ", and "What is the relationship between teaching and
indoctrination?" As virill be clarified later, however, neither or these
approaches is complete by itself. And the full meaning of each v;ill '
become clear only when both studies have been completed and the
interrelations between them have been analyzed. Also, the problems
allocated to each of the two approaches, in fact, cut across one another.
The problems are allocated to respective approaches merely as foci.
( a) The Sociological Approach
It is necessary to point out, at the outset, two aspects which are
considered, only hypothetically, to be tne major differences between
teaching and indoctrination in this sociological study.
1. In regard to content, teaching is primarily concerned with
objective, valid knowledge, such as the sciences, mathematics, and
l o gic.In doctri nation is concerned, on the other hand, primarily
with subjective, unverifiable knowledge, such as national ideals, class
ideologies, family norms, mores, moral convictions, religious creeds, and
the like.
Classification of types of knowledge itself constitutes an important and difficult philosophical problem which needs to be examined separately. I'or example, there are those scholars who include philosophy and religion in objective knowledge, in addition to the sciences- mathematics, and logic- Uf. Felix üaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York, Oxford University Press, 1941, Ghap, IX. "Value Judgments"; also Vivas, Eliseo, The Moral Life and the Ethical Life, Chicago, Universily of Chicago Press, 1950. The writer's tentative position in this study is to exclude religion and philosophy from objective, valid knowledge. Jl5 2. In regard to method, indoctrination utilizes non-rational
means^ while, on the other hand, teaching utilizes open examination,
disinterested exchange of ideas and unrestricted critical analysis.
Since these two terms (teaching, indoctrination) will be used
hereafter to mean different activities, the activity which includes
both indoctrination and teaching, or which cannot be defined clearly
in terms of the above definition of two terms, will be referred to by
the use of the term ”instimetion” or "education."
These two differences between teaching and indoctrination, again,
are nj'pothetical and whether they are sound is to be examined in the
philosophical study which follows. I'or example, such a problem as
Whether all knowledge is relative and contains an element of subjectivity,
or, whether some knowledge is objective, is a problem for philosophy, not for sociology.
Accepting the above-mentioned differences in method and content as tentatively useful, it is then possible to ask in what kind of society or social structure the one type of knowledge and method prevails, and under what conditions, the other. This question obviously belongs in the sociology of knowledge. Thus the socio logical attempt will be made to study the institutional structure of instruction at the elementary and secondary school to see to what extent it is suitable for indoctrination.
The importance of such a study can be easily realized if one only
What is meant by non-rational means will oe explained in Chapter I, Section II, (b), {2), and in chapter II, Section III, (d), (2). 16
recalls several names which, we use in characterizing the nature of the
elementary and secondary school teacher. Teachers' are often called
"parent-substitute s. Some philosophers require teachers to be
lihe "statesmen."23 Teachers are also asiced to be "community leaders"
by those who are interested in the community-school movement.^4 The
aim of the guidance movement has been, to produce teachers who may
be called "guides" in life.25 Although teachers are not called
"propagandists," Hie nature of the teacher and that of the propagandist
are sometimes discussed in parallel.
h'hen this is contrasted with names used for the university
professor, the existence of difference in the common concept of the role
of the university professor and of the school teacher^? is immediately
realized. While the university professor is called a "scholar,"
"scientist," "researcher," "learned man," and the lime, he is seldom
22 uf. bossard, James, H., The Sociology of uhild Development. New Yorx, Harper and brothers, 1948, p.467. 23 uf. Counts, OP. cit.. Introduction, "Education as Statesmanship" pp.1-6. brameld, _op. cit., pp.57-72. 2 4 uf. Everett, S., The Community School. New York, D Appleton Century uo., 1938, p.430. ^5 cf. Progressive Education Association, Progressive Education Advances. New York, Appleton Century Croft, Inc., 1938, pp.5-6. The third principle of the PEA. states "The teacher as a guide, not a taskmaster." 26 Cf. Merton, Robert, A., Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Illinois, The free Press, 1949, p.284. "In passing, it might be remarked that the logic of the propaganda of facts is not far removed from the logic of progressive education." 27 Hereafter, the term "school teacher" will be used to mean the teacher in elementary and secondary education. 17 called a “parent— substitute," "statesman," "cominunity leader," and
" guide.This suggests that the school teacher is expected to play
roles which are not expected of the university processor. It may be,
or so it seems, that such differences in the institutional roles of
school teacher and university professor are related to differences in
the content and method of university teaching as against school
teaching.
Very often the problem of indoctrination is discussed abstractly,
apart from the study of the institutional structure of teaching. Such discussion, however, does not seem to oe fruitful, when one is interested in the problem of indoctrination as it is actually practised in institutions of higher learning and in the elementary and secondary school. Uomparative studies of the role of the university professor and that of the school teacher may reveal which environing structure is more conducive to the practise of indoctrination. Znaniecici suggests that, while the pursuit and teaching of scientific knowledge is the primary role of the institution of higher learning, the imposition of certain social norms is the primary role of school education:
...the school of higher learning performs the specifically social function of an educational institution only because its main activities are not social but scientific, do not aim to contribute to the maintenance of the social order but to the maintenance of Knowledge as a supersocial domain of culture supremely valuable in itself,,..The school of general education, on the contrary, as an institution of the
The university professor is also called a " propagandist}' "spokesman," and the like. In so far as he is called by these names, his role is expected to be somewhat different from the role of a pure scholar. Although the writer hopes to deal with such problematic aspects of the university professor in some future paper, an emphasis is placed in this study on the contrast between the role of the university professor and that of the school teacher. 18
modem s o c i e l y serves directly the maintenance of social order— whether it be a traditional static order or a more or less dynamic new o r d e r . '^9
The difference, however, may not be so clear-cut as this simplified
comparison suggests. There may be overlapping elements between these
two institutional structures. In order to maice more careful comparisons
it is necessary to analyze each of them more closely. In this connection,
the sociological studies by Parsons and Merton provide us with useful
knowledge.
According to Merton, "The persistent development of science
occurs only in societies of a certain order, subject to a peculiar
complex of tacit presuppositions and institutional constraints."^^
In his sociological studies of science, he shows in whs.t ways "fee
social order is related to the development of s c i e n c e . 32 Norms of
science are expressed in the form of proscriptions, prescriptions and
permissions, and are legitimatized in terms of institutional values.
While Merton pays attention mainly to the analysis of the cultural
ethos, and demonstrates in what way the cultural ethos is related to
the development of science, Parsons illuminates the manner in which
Znaniecici, Pierian, The Social Role of the Man of knowledge. New York, djolumbia'Universiiy Press, 1940, p.155. 30 Mannheim's analysis of intelligentia should be considered another important sociological study of the social structure of science. According to him, the "classless position" of the "socially unattached intellectuals" makes it possible for intellectuals to obtain objective knowledge. (Mannheim, op. cit.. p.139) 31 Merton, _op. cit., p.295. 32 Ibid., Part 17, "Studies in the Sociology of Science" pp.289-363,. ohaps. XI, "Science and the Social Order," XII, "Science and Democratic Social Structure," and XIII, "The Machine, the Worker and the Engineer," discuss this relationship in contemporary society. 19
the pursuit of scientific Knowledge is institutionalized as part
of the role structure of the social system. To put it another way,
while Merton's studies show the cultural ethos of science in a large
sociei^. Parsons' studies show the analysis of the occupational role
of the scientist, such as the university professor, physician, and
engineer.
To introduce only conclusions, Merton points out that there are
four sets of institutional imperatives— universalism, coiiiiunism,
disinterestedness, and organized scepticism— which comprise the
ethos of science. Parsons* studies snow five common elements in
the role structure of the scientist— functional specificity, universalism, achievement orientation, collectivity orientation,
and affective neutrality.54
The writings of these two authors-, especially Parsons' analysis of the role structure of' the scientist (and, more broadly, of the modern profession) ,give us an excellent background for the comparison between university teaching and school teaching. The fact that
33 There are numerous papers written by Talcott Parsons on this subject. Several which are familiar to the v/riter are: (1) Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Aoolied, Glencoe, Illinois, The free Press, 1 9 4 9 , Chaps. VIII, "The Professions and Social Structure," pp.1 8 5 - 1 9 9 , and XIII, "Propaganda and Social Control" pp.2 7 5 - 3 0 9 ; (2) "Education and the Professions," Ethics « Vol, 17, No. 3, Apr. 1937, pp.265-269; (3) The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1951, Chaps. VIII, "Belief Systems and The Social System; The Problem of The Role of Ideas" pp.326—383, and X, "Social Structure and Dynamic Process: The Case of M o d e m Medical Practice," pp.429-479. 34 These concepts will be explained in Chap II. 20 objective, valid xnowledge is taught through the process of open,
disinterested, and free examination at institutions of higher
learning is obviously interrelated with the particular institutional
role structure of the university professor as analyzed by Parsons.
It is now possible to state the way in which we shall naxe the
sociological study of the problem of indoctrination in school education.
Our major problem, once more, is "In what ways is indoctrination
involved in school education?" It seems to be appropriate, in order
to answer this question, to examine to what extent the institutional
structure of school education shares common elements with that of university education in science, in the humanities, and in applied
science. We may expect that to the extent in which school education and university education share common elements in their institutional
structures, to that extent there is a tendency for the teacher to practise teaching, not indoctrination. If the institutional structure of the school teacher deviates from the ideal-typical institutional structure of university education, on the other hand, the danger of indoctrination arises.
Interestingly enough, however, in spite of the fact that the roles of the school teacher are expected to be like those of a parent-substitute, a community leader, a statesman, a guide in life, and even of a propagandist, teaching is also called one of the modem professions— even P a r s o n s . 35 Obviously, the school teacher shares
35 Parsons, "The Professions and Social Structure" p.lS5» "...There was scarcely a close analogy to modem engineering, medicine or education in quantitative importance, though all of them were developed to a considerable degree." 21 many common elements in the institutional structure of the modem
profession. It is at the same time quite evident, however, that
the function of the school teacher as "parent-sub statute," "statesman,"
and " community-leader" is functionally much diffused, instead of
being specific. The "parent—substitute" often develops particularism
in .place of universalism.^^ Thus we may expect that the role of the
school teacher is in fact a mixture of various roles. It cgnnot
be contrasted, therefore, so sharply with the role of the university
professor. Nevertheless, it may be expected that the closer analysis
of the institutional structure of school education will reveal the
existence of elements within it which are conducive to the practice
of non-rational instruction of subjective and unverifiable Knowledge,
that is, indoctrination. This analysis is the objective of Chapter II.
( b) The Philo sonhical Approach
1) Of the t?fo problems with which we shall deal, the first is,
"Is «11 teaching indoctrination?" As we have seen, one of the
dictionary definitions of "indoctrination" is "teaching." V/e have also
seen that this interpretation of the term is approved by Counts.
His position is more fully explained as follows:
^ An example of the specif icity of function is seen in the function of the researcher in chemistry which is limited to stuc^ in his specialized field. On the other hand, the diffuseness of the function of the mother is seen in her function with regard to her child which includes whole aspect of the life of the child. An example of universalj.sm is found in the evaluation of the quality of students in terms of universalis tic standards— such as tests, number of credit hours, and other scholastic achievements. On the other hand, the mother evaluates the quafity of her child in terms of standards particularly applicable to that child only. These concepts will be more fully explained in Chap. II. 22
The historical record shows that education is always a function of time, place, and circumstance. In its basic philosophy, its social objectives, and its program of instruction, it inevitably reflects in varying proportion the experiences, the condition, and the hopes, fears, and aspirations of a particular people or cultural group at a particular point in history. In actuality it is never organized and conducted with sole reference to absolute and universal t e r m s . 37
This position obviously is in conflict with our hypothetical distinction
between teaching and indoctrination, which was stated in the previous
section. If the position of Counts is right, the sociological approach,
which is planned on the basis of the hypothetical distinction, is
meaningless.
how is it possible to maintain that all teaching is indoctrination?
Although Counts himself' does not develop clearly the theoretical basis
of his contention,38 there are two contemporary theories of jsnowledge which may be used for the support of this position— the sociological
epistemology of harl Mannheim and the theories of certain pragmatists.
Both theories deny the absolute objectivity of any Kind of knowledge.
According to Mannheim, his sociology of knowledge has discovered that all thought whatsoever is "perspectivistic," i.e., all knowledge is deteimined by "the social and cultural setting in which it arises.39
37 Counts, The Social Foundations of Education, loc. cit.. p.l. 38 The position of Counts is not clear. Although he recognizes that scientific knowledge is objective and universal, he seems to think that it loses its objectivity once it is used in teaching where it is modified so as to be useful for practical pxirposesw - "Facts must be selected, interpreted ^ d woven_into patterns of utility and purpose. Also this task /^educatio^ should not be confused with scientific neutrality,..." (ibid., p.2.) 39 Of. Mannheim, pp. cit.. pp.238-239» 23 And some pragmatists have likewise claimed that all knowledge, and
truth itself, is relative to the experience in which it emerges and
that it plays, further, the role of an instrument for the solution of
practical problems.
It is easy to see how these relativistic theories may be used for
the support of Counts' position. If all knowledge is "perspectivistic,"
the content of teaching can never and nowhere be objectively valid.
Whatever is taught or learned is determined by time, place and circum
stance. The content of any teaching is relative and subjective;
hence, indoctrination is inevitable.
The extreme relativistic position has been refuted, however, by
many philosophers and scientists. All of these critics are well aware
of the merits of Mannheim and the pragmatists in their sociological and psychological discovery of the "genesis of thought." They point out, however, that the genesis of knowledge and the validity of knowledge are two separate problems. F elix haufmann, one of these critics of epistemological relativism, expresses his position in the following statement;
Logically prior to the question of the origin of knowledge (the causal conditions of scientific progress) is the question of the meaning 'knowledge*, in other words, of the distinction between warranted and unwarranted beliefs, and this distinction is logical!y dependent upon (defined exclusively in terms of) theoretical factors. 'Scientific truth' is defined in terms of rules of procedure that determine the grounds for the acceptance and for the elimination of propositions, and these grounds are propositions accepted at the time of the decision, i.e., theoretical factors.^
^ üaufmann, on. cit., p. 1 8 8 . kA To put it another way, science is related to social and cultural
settings in so far as its formulation of problem and choice of materials
are concerned, but the validity of the content of science is inde
pendent of extra-theoretical factors.-^ The sociological approach
discovers the social and cultural genesis of Knowledge, but the validity
of Knowledge is established only in terms of canons, or rules, or
scientific procedure.
Ahile the extreme relativist position endangers the validity
of our hypothetical distinction between the content of teaching and that
of indoctrination, the soundness of this distinction is assured by the
latter view. The criterion of scientific procedure (laufmann*s "rules
of procedure") allows us to distinguish scientifically warranted
Knowledge from scientifically unwarranted Knowledge. Teaching is
concerned with the former; indoctrination, with the latter.
The theoretical claim of the autonomy- of the validity of Knowledge,
however, raises another problem with reference to our sociological
study of the relationship between types of instruction and types of
social structure. One may say that, if science is autonomous, the
assumption of the relationship between science and a certain social
structure is untenable. One may prove this statement by illustrating
the fact that science is produced under various social structures."^
^ This position also describes fairly well the famous RicKert— Weber conception of Wertbeziehung. See, Aeber, Max, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. by h. A. Shils and d. A. Finch, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 194-9» p.84. 4^ uf. Merton, op. cit., pp.308-309. Merton shows various social structures in which science have developed. 25 To be sure, the validity of scientific Knowledge is determined only
in terms of canons of scientific procedure, but not in terms of certain social structure, i'i evertheless, it is also true that there is a certain relationship between science and a certain ethos and a particular role
structure. That is to say, the development of science is related to a great extent to social settings in which it takes place. Whether a specific content of science is valid or not cannot be determined, however, in terms of its origin. It is determined by canons of scientific procedure which operate independently of social settings.
To put it more concretely, a specific content of science cannot be validated for the reason that it is produced in the university which is supposed to be the most suitable social setting for the development of science. It is validated in terms of canons of scientific procedure independently of w’hether or not it is produced in the university. A certain cultural ethos or a particular role structure thus does not necessarily produce science, a or does it validate scientific Knowledge.
What the sociology of science does is to discover only some probable, but not necessary, relations between the two. lor example, Merton says that "science develops in various social structures, to be sure.“43 but he further states that it is possible to ffnd. ihose "which provide an institutional context for the fullest measure of development 44
His study merely intends to see if there is any -probable, not necessary.
43 Ibid.. p.309. 44 Ibid.. 26 relationship between the development ox science and the cnltnral struc
ture in which the former taices place.-^5 v»hat our sociological study
intends to discover is likewise probable relationships between types
of instruction and types of social structure.
Consequently, whether the content of instruction is objectively
valid or not is a question wnich itself must be determined in terms of
canons of scientiiic procedure. Tne sociological study merely tells
us in what kind of situation indoctrination is likely to take place.
Whether a particular content of instruction is that of teaching or
indoctrination is not to be determined, therefore, in terms of the
social setting in which it tak.es place, but in terms of canons of
scientific procedure. The importance of this point must be strongly
emphasized.'
2) The second problem which we shall deal with is, "What is the relationship betv/een teaching and indoctrination?" fte have said that, while teaching is concerned with objective, valid knowledge, indoctri nation is concerned with subjective unwarranted knowledge. This suggests the problem as to whether all instruction of unwarranted knowledge is indoctrination, without regard to the method by wnich it is presented.
Vi’ith regard to the method we have stated previously that non- rational means are characteristic of indoctrination. Then, what does
"non-rational" mean? The best answer to these questions seems to have
■45 The distinction between necessary and probable relationships between knowledge and existential bases is theoretically formulated by uhild. • Cf. Child, Arthur, "The Problem of Truth in the Sociology of knowledge," Ethics, 47: July, 1947, pp.16-17. 27 been given by Max Weoer in nis analysis of the scientific criticism
of ethical values, lb point out only his conclusions, iveber holds
that science, although it can never tell us in what ethical values we
should believe, can analyze (a) the means by which ends may or may not
be attained, and (b) the consequences in which the achievement of ends
terminates. Science thus provides us with the critical ability to
judge ethical values in the sense of indicating to us, given certain
ends, what we can do or what we may wish to do under various circum
stances.^^
The teaching of scientific, objective Knowledge consequently
helps children to judge whether certain subjective values may be
realized under certain circumstances, hut once the teacher,
dissatisfied with the criticism of subjective values, asKS children
to believe in them, he is indoctrinating. Merely to present subjective
unwarranted Knowledge, accordingly, is not in itself indoctrination.
When the related means and consequences of such Knowledge are taught
carefully at the same ti#e, the introduction of such Knowledge to the
classroom is extremely useful, fauch presentation may be called
"rational."
On the other hand, whatever method is used by the teacher, for the purpose of having children believe in certain unwarranted Knowledge. is "non-rational"— be it physical punishment, display of affection, or display of anger.
After an analysis in Chapter ll to discover whether there is some probable relationship between indoctrination and certain aspects
46 Weber, op. cit., pp.52-53, 28 of the institutional structure of school education, we shall develop, in Chapter III, the philosophical approach to the content and method of teaching and indoctrination. The discussion of pragmatism in
Chapter IV is added because pragmatism is the most influential philosophy in American education, and because the examination of this theory has certain relevance to the problems discussed in
Chapter III. 29
CHAPTER II
SCHOOL e d u c a t i o n AND IHDOGTRIfiATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
The problem which we shall deal with in this chapter is, "In
what way is indoctrination involved in school education?" In order to
deal with this problem, we intend to analyze the institutional
structure of school education, and see in what ways it may or may not
be conducive to the practice of indoctrination. There is no intention,
nowever, to establish a necessary relationship between a certain social
structure and the practice of indoctrination, a s has been emphasized
previously, sociological analysis is satisfied if some probable
relationship can be discovered. The final criteria to judge whether
a certain instruction is indoctrination or not is based on canons of
scientific procedure.
For the purpose of comparison, we shall first analyze the
institutional structure which is considered to be suitable for the practice of teaching as against the practice of indoctrination.^
Then we shall see in what ways the institutional structure of school
education is different from it, and may be a more appropriate setting for indoctrination.
For a general background, we shall expound Merton's analysis of the ethos of science. Using Parsons’ conceptual schema, we shall
1 Differences in the content and method between the two have been defined previously. G f . Chap. 1, Sec. 3, (a). 30 then, analyze the inst? tutional structure of university education,
which will be compared, in the following section with the institutional
structure of school education, with particular reference to the
practice of indoctrination. Finally, we shall discuss some relation
ships between the school and the larger social system as they bear upon the problem of indoctrination.
I. THE ETHOS OF SCIMCE
The content of teaching which is differentiated from indoctri nation is empirically confirmed and logically consistent knowledge; and the method of teaching should be conducive to the learning and production of such knowledge.
In his sociology of science, Merton has set forth the analysis of the cultural structure which seems to provide support for the fullest development of science. 7fnat he has analyzed, therefore, is neither
“(1) a set of characteristic methods by means of which knowledge is certified," nor "(2) a stocK of accumulated Knowledge stemming from the application of these methods." It is, rather, "(3) a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific."*^
The method of science is a subject-matter for methodology, and the content of science is accumulated scientific Knowledge. While the methodological canons are used not only for the clarification of
^ Merton, op. cit.. p.308. Ezpiosition of Mertons* analysis of ethos of science in this section is mainly from Chapter XII, "Science and Democratic Social Order," pp.307-316. 31 scientific procedure but are also considered institutional imperatives
of scientific activities, it is solely the latter with which the
sociology of science is concerned. In brief, Merton is interested
in"tiie cultural structure of sciaice, that is,..,/3u/ one limited
aspect of science as an institution.
The norms and values of scientific activities are expressed in
the form of prescriptions, proscriptions, and permissions, and they
are internalized in varying degrees by the sciaatist, thus fashioning
his "scientific conscience." ihe scientific method of inquiry is
carried on with ■Uiis conscience, and the fruit of scientific pursuit
can be obtained when the scientist conducts his activities according to these norms and values. Likewise, we may expect that the teaching
of scientific knowledge in the university lecture hall or in the research laboratory is practiced in accordance with them,
Merton means by the "ethos of science" the institutional imperatives which are binding in the pursuit of science because they are believed to be right and good, four sets of these institutional imperatives of science are universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized scepticism,
(a) U niver sali sm ,
Universalism finds immediate expression in the canon that truth claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to preestablished inq)ersonal criteria; consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge,^
The imperative of universalism is rooted in the objective nature
2 Ibid., p,308, 4 Ibid,. p,309. 32
of science. Whether a certain discovery or invention should be accepted
or rejected is detennined only in tenas of preestablished impersonal
criteria of science. The discover's or inventor's race, nationality,
religion, class, and personal qualities are irrelevant. Objectivity
precludes all such particularistic considerations. Thus ideally,
even in time of war, the merit of scientific achievement in the
enemy country should be evaluated not in terms of political antagonisms,
but solely in terms of scholastic standards. Universalism further
demands that scientific .careers be open to talents, irrespective of
personal backgrounds.
Although universalism has been maintained as theory, it has often
been impaired and suppressed in practice. In totalitarian nations
especially, e.g., Oermany and Japan, the primary criterion for
scientific achievement was placed on the loyalty of the scientist
to the political goal of the state, rather then on the impersonal
standards of science. Religious persecution, such as that of Galileo, is another example of the interference of particularistic standards.^
Merton claims that in spite of these disturbances in practice, universalism has been upheld as an important imperative of scientific activity, as well as one of social ideals, especially in democratic societies. "Democratization is tantamount to the progressive elimination of restraints upon the exercise and developmait of socially valued
5 Merton illustrates such interference with universalistic standards of science by the state, the church, and the racial group at length ibide - Chapter XI; "Science and the Social Order." pp.295-305: also on pp.310-311• 33 capacities.'*^ In fact, impersonal criteria of accomplishment,
rather than fixation of status are, at one and the same time, the
values of science and of the democratic society.
(D) uomimini sm
The term "communism” is used here to mean "the non-technical
and extended sense of common ownership of goods."7 "Communism" denotes
the fact that
the substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community. They constitute a common heritage in which the equity of ihe individual producer is severely limited.8
The institutional imperative of communism can be seen in the fact that every new finding is communicated to all experts in the field.
Secrecy is the antithesis of this imperative. Even the scientist who does not report his finding because of modesty is condemned as a violator of "communism." Open and free communication between experts is necessary so that every new idea may be shared and a stocK of ever increasing imowledge oe accumulated. Only by Keeping all scientific knowledge " communistic" is every scientist given opportunity to share the common heritage, and the privilege to contribute to the further accumulation of new Knowledge.
(c) Disinterestedness
"Disinterestedness," Merton says, should not be equated "with altruism nor interested action with egoism...It is rather a distinctive
7 Ibid.. p.312. 8 Ibid.. p.312. pattern of institutional control of a wide range of motives wnicJa
characterizes behavior ol‘ scientists.”9
The reason why disinterestedness is demanded in the pursuit of
science is that the character of scieice is public and testable.
Scientific research is always to be verified by empirical evidence
and is to be submitted to the exacting scrutiny of fellow experts.
Thus, for science to be objective and to oe warranted by evidence, it
is necessary for the scientist to be disinterested in his activities
in the field, furthermore, he should be disinterested not only in
his attitude toward his worx, but also in his relationship with his
fellow experts in so far as the relationship is concerned with the worJc. It is only the demand for disinterestedness which maxes it
possible for scientists to examine mutually the worxs of fellow
experts in terms of rigorous scientific standards.
(dj Organized scepticism
This last institutional norm is interrelated with the other elements of the scientific ethos. Merton states that it is related to a méthodologie: mandate: i.e.,
the suspension of judgment until "the facts are at hand" and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria.10
It is a violation of the norm for the scientist to give up scepticism and stop examining every aspect of nature and society in
9 Ibid., PP.313-3U. 10 Ibid. . p.31$ 35 terms of evidence. The scientist investigates every aspect of empirical
reality whether it oe the sacred sphere of religious creeds, political
ideologies, or economic claims. Often this sceptical attitude of the
scientist is the source of conflict between the institution of
science and other social institutions in which loyalty, adherence, and respect are demanded for certain institutional symbols and values.
In spite of the conl'lict, however, organized scepticism has been
maintained by those scientists who have wished to be the discoverers
of reality.
II. lîDUüATlON jj INSTITUTIONS OF hIGHiE LilABNING
This ethos of science, says Parsons, has "above all become
embodied in the university as its principal institutionalized frame."H
Parsons analyzes the institutional structure of the modem university:
Not least important of the facts about the modem university is that it combines the highest levels of devel opment of the functions of pure scientific investigation in the same basic organized complex with the humanistic branches of learning which have formed the primary core of the most highly rationalized part of the great expressive cultural tradition of the West.12
The cultural tradition of the West, according to Parsons, has been typically institutionalized in the university, where not only pure scientific investigation, but also humanistic studies and applied
11 Parsons, The Social System, p.342. 12 Ibid,c p=342. 3b sciences, such as medicine and engineering, have developed, The
modem university thus is so institutionally stmctured as to oe
conducive to the development of all three major branches of learning,
pure science, applied science, and the humanities.^3
Related to this is Parsons’ analysis of the role of modem
professions which the scientist and the applied scientist occupy.
In his several writings on modem professions, be has contended that
there are five elements common to the institutional pattem of modem
professions. They are, as has been stated in Chapter I, functional
specificity, universalism, ai'fective neutrality, achievement
orientation, and collectivity orientation. Although Parsons has
not specifically analyzed university education, we may attempt to
collect the elements of such an analysis from his various, relevant
writings.
(aj functional Specificity. The specificity of the function of the universiiy professor is
indicated by the fact that it is
1 3 parsons’ claim that both liberal learning and professional learning are integral parts of the same institutional stmcture is significant in view of the fact that some scholars consider that the goal of liberal learning is quite different from that of professional learning. The most vigorous proponent of the latter view is Robert M. Hutchins, who claims that professional learning is oriented to secular goals, while liberal learning is oriented to the tmth for truth’s saice. "We see, then, that we may have order in the higher leamihg by removing from it the elements which disorder it today, and these are vocationalization and unqualified empiricism." (Hutchins, R. M., Higher Learning in America, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936, p.1161) Although Hutchins’ view represents a remaricable insight into the problems of the contemporary university, it fails to taice due cognizance of the fact that both liberal and professional learnings are going on in the same institutional stmcture. 37
only in matters touching his academic speciality that the proi'essor is superior by virtue of his status, to his stud«at. Professional authority, like other elements of the professional pattem, is characterized oy “specificity of lUnction." The technical competence which is one of the principal defining characteristics of the professional status and role is always limited to a particular “field" of knowledge and skill. 14-
The professor is not required to be a generalized "wise man" in
all human affairs. He does not have to have better judgment about
international affairs— except in the case when he happens to be a
professor of international affairs— than any other comparably
intelligent and well-educated citizen, üot only is the function of
the university professor specified in terms of its dii'ference from
oldaer social institutions, there are also elaborate subdivisions of
specialization within higher learning. The student, likewise, is
considered to be good or bad on the basis of his academic performance
in a given course.
Specificity of the function of the roles of the university professor and the student in the teaching-leaming situation has an important bearing upon the problem of the autonomy of science, a s
Merton has demonstrated, 15 in a society such as Nazi Uermany, where the spread of domination by one segment of the social structure— the
State— involves a demand for primary loyalty to it, specificity of the function of the university professor tends to be lost. Vshether a ceitain professor is superior or not is judged, in this situation,
14 Parsons, hssays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied. p.189. 15 Merton, o p . cit., pp.297-299. 38 not in terms of nis abilities or experiences in nis specialized
field, but in terms of nis loyalty to tne state. It is abvious that
wnen the roles of the university professor and tne student are so
diffused, the autonomy of science is lost and its development
hampered. Science, in order to develop fully, must not lose functional
specificity in the institutional structure of the university; and it
must not suffer itself to become the handmaiden of theology or economy or state, _The function of this sentiment. 2the purity of science/ is likewise to preserve the autonomy of science.
(bj Universalism
Since this point was already stressed by Merton, it is only
necessary to show its significance in teaching; universalism maxes
it possible for students to compete in fair play and to strive
toward the attainment of high goals. If the variation of particular
human relations comes into the picture, an a-bnosphere of "fair" learning is lost and the motivation for success is obstructed,
(c) Achievement Orientation
Achievement orientation is necessitated in the teaching-leaming
situation of the university, because of the present stage of the development of science;
Because of the complexity and subtlety of the knowledge and sxill required and the consequent length and intensity of training, it is difficult to see how the functions could, under modem conditions, be ascribed to people occupying a prior status,,.17
——TA ,1. ^ 900 / * 17 Parsons, The Social System, p,434. 39 It is obvious that if the success or failure of both the professor
and the student is ascribed to such factors as birth, nationality,
sex, the place of birth and the iiiie, it is impossible to recruit
enough capable people to grasp and advance a complex stocK of
scientific Knowledge. It is widely Known that the purge of Jewish
scholars the Nazi regime turned out to be a great loss to German
“I O learning."^ Exclusion of particular groups— racial, national, sex,
age, or any other— on the basis of ascriptive qualities, whether of
professor or student, is Inimical to the development of science.
On the other hand, when the professor and the student are
treated on the basis of universalistic norms and evaluated in terms
of their achievement, they can be oriented toward the goal of
successful accomplishment in a fair way. it is also possible under
such an institutional structure that men of high competence will be
produced more and more frequently.
(d) Affective N eutrality
This point was also stressed by Merton as "disinterestedness" and
"organized scepticism." It is necessary here only to point out that this institutional norm is applicable to the attitude of the professor and of the student in the teaching-leaming situation. They are expected to treat their subject-matter in objective, scientifically justifiable terms, not in emotional, subjective, and affective manners.
^ flartshome, E. 1., The German universities and National Socialism. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1937. See Chapter III. AO
They are expected to oe mutually objective aad rational in their
attitudes toward each other in the classroom situation. The attitude
of the professor and of the student in such interactive relationships
is characterized by Parsons as approval or esteem.^9 Th.e student
admires the professor's competence and performance in the field; on
the other hand, the professor respects the student* s ability and
promise in the course of training. Seldom are they emotionally
involved in what Parsons calls by the technical term, of "love-
r elation ship. **
(e) collectivity Orientation
Collectivity Orientation corresponds roughly to Merton* s
''communism*' as an institutional imperative of science. The scientist
should not be self—centered; he is obliged to regard the welfare
of the group prior to his own interests. This is what is meant by
**collectivily orientation." Such devotion to the profession is
necessary, as we have seen, first for the development of scientific
knowledge, and secondly -— a point made by Parsons to abolish the
danger to public welfare stemming from the monopolization of Knowledge— ;
It is indeed true that in a sufficiently large number and strategically important type of cases the discoveries of the sciaitist would, if uncontrolled, put him in a position to interfere with the interests and sentiments of other s. 20
Thus the scientist is regulated by the norms of his group.
He is institutionally endowed with authority only in his particular field. The self-oriented motivation of the scientist is minimized
19 cf. Parsons, The Social System, p.391. 20 Ibid.. p.3 4 4 . 4 1 in order to protect the public from inimical uses of science.
In the teaching-leaming situation, both the professor and the
student are liicewise supposed to be collectivity-oriented. Their
devotion to institutionalized obligations maices it possible for them
to participate in the advancement of science. It also prevents the
exploitation of the student tfj the professor for his own interests.
We have no means exhausted the analysis of the institutional
structure of university education. The above consideration maxes it clear, however, that the modem university is so institutionalized as to open channels for the teaching and learning of objective Knowledge.
III. SCHOOL EDUCATION AMD INDOCTRINATION
The institutional structure of university education, as analyzed in the foregoing pages, is an ideal-lype construction. Its concrete actualization, therefore, may not be found in any existent university.
On the other hand, school education, although it is commonly contrasted to university education, shares common elements in the institutional pattem with the ideal-typical university education, t or example, the teaching of so-called academic subjects in elementary and secondary schools, although the level of content is comparatively low, follows the pattem of teaching in higher leaming institutions. The teaching of academic subjects or pure Knowledge in elementary and secondary schools is thus university education in minuature, and as such it plays the role of helping children to prepare for further university 4 2
leaming. Derining the role of the teacher or academic suojects,
Znaniecici says;
isy implanting in young minds seeds of the true Knowledge as understood in scholarly circles and. maKing them see its an solute validily, he spreads far oeyond the precincts or learned schools respect i'or truth and respect for its bearers. He is one of those to whom pure disinterested Knowledge mainly owes whatever support it gets in democratic societies.
In spite of the similarity between the university professor and
the teacher of academic subjects, however, the role of the school
teacher in general is quite different from that of the university professor. The lower the grade, the less teaching of academic subjects. Instead, more attention is paid to such activities of children as play, music, home-life, coimîiunity-iil'e, and the liKe. tie may ezcpect that the role of the school child is correspondingly different from that of the university student.
We shall now proceed to show contrasts between the institutional structures of school education and of university education; and an effort will oe made to analyze the relations between the structure of school education and the practice of indoctrination.
( a) School Education
In order to contrast school education to university education, we shall examine whether school education shares the five elements in the institutional pattem of university education or whether it displays contrasting elements in its institutional structure— which
21 Znaniecici, op. cit., p.157. 43 would De runctional difl'useuess, ai'fectivity, selx'-orien.'bation,
particularism, and ascription orientation.
(1) functional Specificity vs. . Dil'fuseness
The role of the school is functionally specil'ic when considered
in the broad context of the division of labor in modem society. It
is functionally diffused, however, when the content of the function
is closely examined.
The school is not necessary in a primitive society where the
function of teaching is not differentiated from such other functions
as religion, production, or politics. The school is necessary in a
complex modem society where family and intimate community can no
long span the gap between the original capacities of the immature
child and the complex standards and customs needed even for bare
necessities of subsistence. The school, litce other modem institutions,
takes its part in the complex mechanism of division of labor in modem society. As other institutions play functionally specific roles, so does the schoolj i.e., to educate the youth of our society.
In comparison with other specific functions— for example, research in chemistry, or medical practice— the specific function of the school
changes into a diffused function. Dewey* s definitions of education clearly show this diffuseness. Education
is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience wnich adds to the meaning of experience., and which increases abiliiy to direct the course of subsequent experience.22
22 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education. New ïorx, Tne Macmillan uo., 1916, pp.90-91. kk or: Discipline, culture, social eri’iciency, personal refinement, improvement of character are but phases of the growth of capacity nobly to share in such a balanced experience. And education is not a mere means to such a life. Education is such a life.^3
It is important to note that, according to these two definitions,
education is synonymous with reorganization of experience or with
life itself. Accordingly, "the criterion of the value of school
education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued
growth.. What school education is thus concerned with is not
certain aspects of the children’s lives, namely their scientific
knowledge, but with their lives themselves.
The diffuseness of the function of school education is obviously
related to the fact that the school is an institution for children,
that is, persons whose activities are not yet differentiated. The
school helps children to prepare specifically for later life in a
complex society. In this sense, the school may be called a tran
sitional institution between the family and complex society. It may thus be expected that the lower the grade, the more diffuse the function; and the higher the grade, the more specific the function.
Hence the role of the teacher. Especially in the lowest grades, the teacher acts liKe a parent— cf. the notion of "parent-substitute"— and takes care of all aspects of the child’s life. In line with this is the m o d e m trend of the guidance movement to emphasize "whole child"
2 3 Ibid-. p-417; italics are mine. 2 4 Ibid., p.62. U5
guidance by teachers.^5 a s we have previously noted, such dii'fused
functions of the role of the school teacher are also expressed in
many other terms such as "statesman," "spoicesman," "community-leader,"
and so on. Note the following two statements which advocate such
diffused functions of the teacher:
Education is one of the highest forms of statesmanship. The educator worxing in the public schools is a servant of the state. As distinguished from the educational jobholder, he is under obligation to foster the most complete development of the capacities of the citizens, upon whose powers the state depends for its existence, its security, and the fulfillment of its ideals.
...such objectives are now subordinated, even while indispensable to, the more encompassing objectives impelled by a world in crisis, jf'aced by the alternatives of economic chaos and atomic war, on the one hand, of world wide plenty and enforceable international order, on the other hand, the teaching profession should become the clearest, most purposeful educational spokesman for the second of these alternatives.
consequently, ihe content of school education is composed of
all Kinds of Knowledge. In such subject matters as arithmetic, natural science, geography, history, English, and social studies, not only scientific Knowledge, but also all Kinds of values— national ideals, family norms, moral convictions, etiquette, and the lixe— are taught. In courses such as industrial arts and home economics.
uf. hell, H. M., Youth Tell Their Story. American Council on Education, 1938; brewer, J. M., Education as Guidance, New YorK, The Macmillan company, 1932; Johes, A. J., Principles of Guidance New Yorx, McGraw-rHill hooK company, 1930; and many others. 2^ counts. The Social Foundations of Education, p.l; italics added. 27 hrameld, op. cit., pp.193-191; italics added. 46
technical Knowledge is taught together with scientific Knowledge.
According to the advocates of the core—curriculum movement, even the
division of courses should be abolished and all Kinds of Knowledge
should be taught through the life—activities of children.
consequently, no one can necessarily be regarded a superior
teacher just because he is an expert in a subject-matter. Nor is
he a superior teacher, even if he is an expert in chila psycnology.
To be an expert in school education, one has to have Knowledge not
only about virtually ail subject matter, but also about education.
It means, in brief, that to be an expert in school education one has to
be an expert in life. Such, of course, is a contradiction in terms,
since " ezpertness" means the mastery of Knowledge or sKill in a certain
restricted area of human life. The reason why it is difficult to
establish professional standards for teachers may be found in the
diffuseness of the function of the teacher, especially in the lower
grades.28
In an analogous manner, the role of the child cannot be
functionally specific. Although his function is more and more
strictly specified as the child is promoted to the higher grades,
his function is extremely diffused in the lower graoes. vihether
28 Xn many educational writings, it has been debated whether teaching is a modem profession, or a non—technical vocation, for example, Reeder says, "Some persons believe that only a meager amount of preparation is necessary for any teacher; they affirm that teachers are ’bom, not trained', that almost anyone can teach school...At the other extreme are many persons who affirm that teaching is one of the most technical, difficult, and important vocations.(Reeder, «ard, G., The fundamentals of School Administration, New lorK, The Macmillan uo., 1 9 4 1 , p.1 5 2 .) 4 .7 the child is a good pupil or uot is determined not only in terms of
what he does in school, but often in terms of whether he behaves at
home, whether he is nice to his neighbors, whether he helps mother,
or tgr similar' criteria. Although children share other segments of
life with parents, brothers and sisters, relatives, and neighbors,
none of the roles they play in these relationships or in school is
functionally specific. Their school role, like that of the school,
itself, is transitional between a diffused role-orientation to a
specific role-orientation. With regard to this point. Parsons says:
There is, then, a sense in which the school system is a ■ microcosm of the adult occupational world, and experience in it is a main field of operation of the second stage mechanisms of socialization, the specification of role- orientation. There are, of course, a whole series of stages within this before full adult status is achieved.29
{2) Affective eutrality vs. Affactivity
With regard to the "pattern variables" of affectivity neutrality
and affectiviiy, too, the role of the teacher seems to be transitional.
The woman teacher in particular, by having a kindly, womanly, protective attitude toward children, plays a role of a mother-substitute. Since she is responsible, however, for a class of some twenty or more children, she cannot show each child the affection that would normally be shown by a mother.30
The children, too, are often motivationally oriented by affectivity.
To be affectively neutral requires a certain degree of independence.
Parsons, The Social System; p=240= 30 uf. Ibid., p.241. 48 Unless one’s emotion is disciplined., one cannot De neutral in
al'fectivity. Although the child becomes more and more independent as he grows up, a large elemait of helplessness is still present
during his school age. Thus children in school liice to love teachers
as they liice to be loved by them. It is pointed out often that the
child’s admiration of a teacher is likely to be emotional.31
C3) uollectivitv Orientation .vs... Self Orientation
With regard to this pattern variable, the roles of the teacher
and children seem to be in sharp contrast. Vifhile teachers, on the
whole, are devoted to their task, children generally are Interested
only negatively in their task at school. They are usually more
concerned about their own desires and interests. The reason why
institutional systems of dominance and subordination— often discussed
in the name of "discipline”— are so important in schools may be
explained in part by the existence of this conflict. Various techniques
such as commands, punishment, management or the manipulation of personal and group relationships, temper, and appeal are thus used in school as a means of turning children’s interest from their self-centered desires to their task of l e a r n i n g . 32 in addition to formal means of discipline, informal mechanisms of social control are developed in schools for the purpose of fostering solidarity in school life. What a sociologist calls the unique culture of the school— athletic activities, social
31 of, ibid., pp.212 -2 4 3 , also dossard, op. cit., pp.466-469. 3 2 ijf- Waller, Willard, The Sociology of Teaching. New fork. John w-iilty and Sons Inc., 1932, pp.198-210. 4 9 clu&s, games, school I'oUclore, opening exercises, assemblies, pep-
meetings, organized cheering, commencement preparations, school songs
£md the liKe— may be considered to function as inl'ormal mechanisms
of control in school.33 The children, ty participating in these formal
activities, begin to realize more and more clearly that they are part
of the school to which they belong, and that they have particular roles
as pupils.
14) Universalism vs. ~ Particularism
Here both the teacher and the children seem to be in a transitional
stage. As it is hard to evaluate performances of children in the
elementary grades in terms of universalistic standards, so it is hard to judge whether the teacher is good or bad, especially when the content of instruction is diffused, by universalistic standards. Individual differences in children are seriously considered in the process of evaluation, particularly at lower levels. With regard to the evaluation process in the core-curriculum, one author states:
The amount of_progress which an individual maxes toward those goals /the goals of the life of each chiljÿ’ varies with each individual and can be ascertained more objectively for some goals than for others. The data collected through measurements should be used individually and in terms of individual needs.
As the children enter junior high school, however,
there is another big step toward the acquisition of univer salistic orientations, in that the focus is on competence in the subject matter rather than the more diffuse, general.
33 Cf. ibid.. p.121. 34 Aloertgr, Harold, Reorganizing The High School curriculum. New Yorx, The Macmillan company, 1949, pp.283-285. 50 and hence parent-like superior knowledge and standing of the teacher.35
Universalistic standards thus are more frequently utilized for the
evaluation of both the teacher and the child as they go up to the
higher grades.
It might also be remarked that the existense of particularism
in the school is often seen in the special attention paid by the
teacher to the children of a particular race, social class, nationality, or sex.36
[, 5) Achievement vs., Ascription Orientation
In this regard also, the mixture of both pattern variables characterizes the institutional structure of school education, in the lower grades, as teachers arè often liked and respected because of such ascriptive qualities as age, sex, and race, age is likewise considered as an important factor in determining of status of the children. Such phenomena gradually disappear, however, as children f go up to the higher grades.
( b) Indoctrination and School Education
We have presented, in the foregoing pages, an analysis of the ways in which the institutional structure of school education deviates from that of the ideal—typical university education. Although the con'fcrast betweei these two types of education has been drawn sharply
35 Parsons, i‘ne Social System, p.2^2. 3“ Cf. Waller, op. cit.. pp.144—US; Warner, W. Licyd, V;'ho Shall be Educated? New fork. Harper and brothers, 1944> uhap. VI. 51 for the purpose of comparison, we have also repeatedly stressed the
point that school education approaches the pattern of university
education at the level of the higher grades.
The significance of the contrast for the study of indoctrination
can De found in the fact that most philosophical treatments of the
pro Diem of indoctrination nave paid very scant attention to the
difference in the institutional structure between the two types of
education. The philosophers often claim that as indoctrination should
De eliminated from university education, so it should be eliminated
from school education. In the light of our analysis, such a claim
appears somewhat unrealistic. It will appear more so when we focus upon two particular aspects of school education, its content and its
method.
( 1) The Content of Instruction
The content of school education is aoove all diffused. While the content of teaching in the university is restricted to a
specialized field, the content of school education is composed of all
Kinds of Knowledge because of the diffuseness of the educational function. Children are educated in schools not only to be future university students, but also to be members of a family, community, and the world. Although the training in the pursuit of scientific
Knowledge is important, it is liKewise important for teachers to build certain attitudes in children, and to foster certain ideals in them. Some technical Knowledge also has to be taught in such courses as industrial arts and home-economics. 52
Con.sequOT.tly, the content of instruction in school cannot be
restricted, alone to empirically verified and logically consistent
knowledge. It also contains family norms, national ideals, customary
beliefs, and etiquette. As we have emphasized previously, instruction
in such subjective knowledge itself is not indoctrination. Whether
it is indoctrination or not depends upon the ways in which the
content is taught.
(2) The Method of Instruction
1. The diffuseness of the authority of the teacher is one of the most important factors in the practice of indoctrination. While the university professor has authority over the student only in a restricted
area of human activity, the school teacher, especially in the lower grades, has au-fchority over children in many aspects of their lives.
When the authority is so diffused, it is impossible for the teacher always to utilize the rational and critical method for the examination of all ideas which are presented and to avoid indoctrination completely.
The areas of study with which the teacher has to deal are too broad.
No single individual can have enough objective knowledge in such a wide variety of learning. Moral convictions, national ideals, and other unwarranted knowledge are thus often presented in the classroom without critical examination. Secondly, teachers are asmed constantly in the teaching situation to make decisions about the actions of children. The task of the teacher, unlike that of the professor, is not only to teach how to learn science, but also how to live. 53 From the practical standpoint, the teacher is at times compelled
to direct children what to do.
The diffused authority thus may tend to develop despotism.
In the university, authority is divided among the administrative
staff, the research staff, and the teaching staff, and within each
it is again subdivided. Jflirthermore, these restricted authorities
stand side side on equal footing. In the school, by contrast, the principal has usually a fairly diffuse authority over the teachers; and the teacher, in turn, over the children. There is a hierachical order. Thus the lives of children are litcely to be controlled directly by tneir class-room teachers, and indirectly tsy the principal.
Such relationships are described oy Waller as follows:
The generalization that the schools have a despotic political structure seems to hold true for nearly all types of schools, and for all about equally, without very much difference in fact to correspond to radical differences in theory. Self- government is really rare. Usually it is but a masjc for the rule of a student oligarchy carefully selected and supervised by the faculty. The ezperimaital school which wishes to do away with authority continuously finds that in order to maintain requisite standards of achievement in imparting certain basic stcills it has to introduce some variant of the authority principle, or it finds that it must select and employ teachers who can be in fact despotic without seeming to be s o . 37
2, The so-called mother—liice attitude of the woman teacher is found when diffused functions in her dealing with the child are combined with her affective attitude. She loves the child in his totality, and the child in turn gets involved in the love-relationship.
37 Waller, op. cit. « p.9. 5U This is a situation favorable to indoctrination. The child’s rejection
or acceptance of what the teacher says depends very much on such an
emotional relationship with her. indoctrination thus is not necessarily
an "imposition" of certain ideas upon the child, because the child may be persuaded and willingly believe in them, without any feeling of being imposed upon, when he loves his teacher as he does his mother.38
The means of indoctrination seems to oe also broader than what the term "inculcation" designates.39
3 . The child is generally not so devoted to his tasJc in school as is the university student. Informal and formal mechanisms of discipline are necessary to convert children's attention from their self-interest to the woric in school. Various forms of severe punishment
Which have often been used in the traditional school may be considered as combinations between such mechanisms of discipline and the diffused authoriiy of the teacher and his or her anger. Waller mames the point thus:
It should be noted that the technique of control by anger is often mingled with punishment, or confused with it. Strictly speajcing, anger destroys punishment as punishment, but the machinery of punishment may be used as a part of the technique of control by anger, and it is probably so employed more than it is administered without passion.AO
In such a situation, the method of indoctrination may properly be called " inq)osition." The term "non—rational means" used in the present
38 The term "imposition" is used oy uounts to characterize the methocTof indoctrination. See p.7 above. 39&ccord±ng to brameld, "inculcation" is the method of indoctrination. See op. cit., p.SS. 4 0 Waller,_gp. cit.. p.205. 55 study to designate the method of indoctrination is .broader than both
’’inculcation” and ”imposition.”
hr» Positive and negative affection of teachers is intensified
when t h ^ judge human relations by particularistic standards. A
teacher may consider whatever the daughter of the most influential
family thinks to be right, while judging wrong that which the son
of a laborer thinks. Warner demonstrates that in the school he
studied, upper-class children tended to be graded higher than
lower-class children.^
Certain aspects of the institutional structure have been analyzed
to show in what ways they are conducive to the practice of indoctrination.
Non-rational methods of indoctrination are especially related to the
teacher's diffused authorily, to his emotional attitude, and to his
particularistic orientations to human relations. The avoidance of
the practice of such methods is extremely dii’ficult, though perhaps not impossible. Of course, many schools make efforts to require
teachers to intensify their knowledge in specialized subject matters;
to require them to be disinterested in their attitudes toward children; to emphasize their devotion to the task of teaching; and to stress universal 1 sm and fairness in the treatment of their charges. Neverthe less, in so far as the institutional structure of school education does not change profoundly, the danger of indoctrination is serious.
41 Warner, op. cit., p.74. 56
IV. SCüOOL AND SOüim ^ LAÎU^E
”To the extent that the scientist— layman relation does become
paramount, there develop incentives for evading the mores of science."^
If this generalization by Merton is correct, incentives for evading
the mores of science are always present in scnool education, because
the teacher himself is both an expert and a layman. It is only
natural that the teacher, as a layman, is lihely to be criticised,
ini'luenced, and attached by the lay-public outside the school. The
autonomy of education, though often upheld simultaneously with the
autonoiqy of science, is hardly comparable to the latter. Historically,
the school has beei weaK under outside attacxj the problem of indoctri
nation is deeply rooted in this weakness.
In what ways does the school suffer from outside pressures?
And in what ways is the tendenQr toward indoctrination intensified
by them? Merton*s analysis of the relations between the "ethos of
science" and a democratic order suggests that the tendency to practise
indoctrination is intensified in an undemocratic society, while
the pursuit of scientific Knowledge is fostered in a democratic
society.
As has be«a noted previously, Merton first points out that universalistic criteria of scientific validity can be integrated with
12 Merton, op. cit., p.314. 57 the values of a free society in which "it is men's capacities and achievements which matter, not their status or origins. "^3 The value
of Merton's "communism" can also oe integrated with another aspect
of a democratic society in which the ideas of any individual can be
freely expressed and shared. Thirdly, specificity of function is
congruent with the restricted autnority of the modem liberal state.44
In addition to these conclusion^ as set forth by Merton, Parsons
suggests that, in the,' structural patterns of both the modem liberal state and the occupational system the element of "rationalism" is present.45 In a democratic society, therefore, the development of science is fostered, rather than hindered, and the practice of indoctrination is not intensified. In fact, very little pressure on school education seems to come from the university, from other occupational systeig, and from the modem liberal state, all of which are stractually and functionally suitable to the practice of proper teaching.
it may be expected, on the other hand, that pressures on school education come from institutions that are stmcturally and functionally less suitable and different from the university. Such institutions are, according to Parsons, family and xinship, friendship, and the social class system. These constitute
.43 Ibid., p.292. 44 uf. ibid., chapters 2 1 , 211. 45 uf. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory. Pure and Applied, p.197. 58 quite different institutional patterns. Among these notably are family and Kinship, friendship, class .identifications so far as they are bound up with birth and the dil'fuse "community" of common styles of life, and loyalty to particular leaders and organizations as such, independently of what they "stand for," In all these cases, though in different ways and degrees, particularism tends to replace universalism, and functional diffuseness, specificity. To a lesser degree they have tendencies to traditionalism.^
To the three institutions mentioned, the modem totalitarian state
should be added. All of them, being diffused in their functions, taxe much interest in the education of children and frequently put pressures on the school. They are interested, however, not in the education of all children, but in the education of children of a particular class, a family, or a nation. Under such pressures, teachers are often compelled to be emotionally involved in their relations with particular groups of children, and the children* s devotion to their tasK in school is litcely to be very much modified or even lost.
Not only children, but also teachers, school administrators, and school boards are bound up with these social systems. Proper teaching is thus attactced, criticised, and suppressed by pressures coming into the classroom from various directions. As a result, the practice of indoctrination is intensified.
To analyze closely these con^lex relations between school education and outside pressure, however, is beyong. the scope of the present study.
Several statements will be quoted to point out merely that the existence
46 iDid., p.197. 59 or such pressures is evident even in the United States, where the
school is supposed to have developed most freely. With regard to
the inl'luences of the social class system and the family upon the
attitudes of children in the classroom, hoil-ingshead reports a conclusion of his research as follows:
we can conclude with confidence that adolescents who have been reared in families that possess different class cultures may be expected to follow different behavior patterns in their responses to situations they encounter in their participation in the community’s social life. Jî*urtheraore, tdiis study, if it has done'nothing else, has demonstrated clearly that, for a complete cross section of a relatively homogeneous age and sex group in one community in contemporary America, the home an adolescent comes from conditions in a very definite manner the way he behaves in his relations with the school, the church, the job, recreation, his peers, and his f a m i l y .47
With regard to teachers, Warner states that "teachers represent
middle-class attitudes and enforce middle-class values and m a n n e r s . "48
And again, in defining the social role of the teacher, he writes:
It is difficult to conceive the teachers’ social role in America being anything but an expression of middle-class values.49
The same consideration can be applied to school boards:
A number of studies of the social composition of boards of education agree in finding that school board members are predominantly business and professional men. In towns and cities, about 75 percent of school board members belong to these two categories, f armers maxe up the bulx of rural school boards.50
47 Hollingshead, August B ., Blmtown’ s louth; The Impact of Social Class on Adolescents. New loria, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1949, p.441. 43 Warner, op. cit., p.107. 49 Ibid.. p.109. 50 Ibid.. p.118. See also counts, U. S., The Social composition of Boards of Education: A Study in the Social control of Public Education. The Universily of Chicago Press, 1927. 60
Of course, the meaning of each of these statements has to oe carefully
examined. They seem to be enough to show, however, that the impact
of social class is present in the school. In addition, as the first
statement indicates, what are considered to be pressures of social
classes are at the same time those of families, uo—operation as well
as conflict between the family and the school cover almost all aspects
of the lives of children, because both institutions are concerned with
the fundamental patterns of child training and with philosophies of
life. Describing the conflict between the immigrant family and the
school, for instance, hossard. states:
The differences that exist may cover the range of language, mores, family life, political traditions, conceptions of the universe, philosophy of man's role and many other social values.51
As we have seen, previously, Itmctional diffuseness, particularism, ascription orientation, and affectivity are those elements in the institutional structure of the school which open channels for the practice of indoctrination. And it is ea^ to see that this practice becomes more intense yriien. such elements of the institutional structure are strengthaied by outside pressures of a social class, a family, or the modem totaritarian state. The reason wigr the problem of indoctri nation has been considered in America very seriously since the depression may partly be the fact that the social class system nas occupied a more and more important place in contemporary society.
51 Dossard, op. cit., p.4^7. 61 The practices of indoctrination in totalitarian nations, such as
Japan and Germany, were clearly related, on the other hana, to strong
pressures of the state. Thus in the contemporary world in both
democratic and totalitarian societies, there is indoctrination and
the danger of more of it. In order to see the magnitude of the problem of indoctrination, the structure and function of contemporary
society must be analyzed. 62
CHAPTER III
OBJECTIVITY IE TEACHING: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
In the previous chapter, a sociological attempt was made to find
relationships Between types of social structure and types of instruction.
We concluded that the peculiar structure of school education maices it
almost, if not wholly, impossible for teacaers to avoid indoctrination.
We suggested also that such a tendency to practise indoctrination is
intensified in a society in which families, social classes, and
modem totalitarian states occupy important places. There are,
however, three vitally important problems with which our sociological
study has been unable to deal. It is the purpose of this chapter to malce an attempt to solve these problems,
1, As has been already stated, our sociological analysis is based on the hypothetical distinctions between the content and method of teaching and those of indoctrination. If our hypothetical distinctions are not valid, the whole sociological study is indeed meaningless.
It is necessary, therefore, to examine whether we may justifiably distinguish objective, valid Knowledge from subjective, unverifiable
Knowledge, i.e., idie content of teaching from that of indoctrination.
If Knowledge is subjective, all teaching, as Counts has said,! has to be indoctrination. Whether there is objective, valid
1 See Chap. I, p.7, 63 Knowledge or not thus is our lirst problem. 2. Our sociological study Has another limitation. Although it
has attempted to find cut in what Kind of situation teaching is liKely
to taice place and in what other Kind of situation indoctrination tends
to De practised, it has not made any attempt to indicate the ways in
which the content of instruction is to be characterized, as that of
teaching or indoctrination. To determine whether a specific content
of instruction is that of teaching or indoctrination, it is necessary
to Jcnow canons of scientific procedure in terms of which objective, valid Knowledge is to be differentiated from subjective, unverifiable
Knowledge. The second problem thus is related to the first problem.
3. The foregoing sociological study also has not revealed in what ways the method of teaching is to be used to minimize indoctri nation. The presentation of certain subjective Knowledge is almost unavoidable in the classroom situation. Then, in what ways can we treat such Knowledge? In the previous chapter we discussed the Kind of institutional structure that is suitable for the objective treatment of the content of indoctrination. In other words, we have made clear what Kind of norms, values, and attitudes are required for the objective treatment of Knowledge. The present concern is not with such a sociological analysis of the problem, but with the methodological analysis of the ways in which the content of indoctrination is to be treated. This is the third and the last problem of the present chapter.
To consider these three problems, this chapter will be developed 64 in the following order: 1) The sociological epistemology of harl
Mannheim will be taicen up for examination, because it is considered
as one of the most influential positions which claim the relativity
of Knowledge.2 2) In order to show the possibility of objectivity in
science, Max Weber's methodology of social sciences, and oaarles Morris’ theory of signs will be developed, though there are many tneories.
By introducing these two contrasting theories— the theory of
Mannheim and the theories of Weber and Morris— we intend to show
solutions to the first two problems of this chapter. 3) The last
problem will again be dealt with by recourse to Max Weber.
I. MMNHV.TM»S THEORY OF AMOffLEDGE
I a) General character of Mannheim* s Sociology of Knowledge
Although our major aim here is to introduce Mannheim's theory of
Knowledge, it is first necessary to describe briefly the general propositions contained in this sociology of Knowledge. In this section, the general character, and in the following section, the major propositions, of this sociology will be described.
The fundamental discovery of the sociology of Knowledge, according to Mannheim, is that all human Knowledge is "perspectivistic."
"Perspective," Mannheim writes,
signifies the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in M s own thinKing. Perspective, therefore, is something more than a merely formal determination of thinKing. It refers also to qualitative elements in the structure of thought,
^ The pragmatist theory of Knowledge, which is another important relativistism, is introduced for consideration in Chap. IV. b5 elements which must necessarily be overlooked by a purely formal logic. It is precisely these factors which are responsible for the fact that two persons, even if they apply the same formal-logical rules, e.g., the law of contradiction or the formula of the syllogism, in an identical manner, may judge the same object veiy differently.3
That knowledge entertained by the people of the ruling class is not only colored but also determined by social and cultural backgrounds from which it is derived was earlier pointed out by Marx.4 Mannheim goes a step further and develops the thesis that not only some thoughts are ideological, but that all thought is. While the traditional theory of ideology developed merely a concept of "partial ideology," the sociology of knowledge, according to Mannheim, thus discovered "total ideology"— the concept that all knowledge is ideological and perspectivistic: ^
With the emergence of the general formulation of the total conception of ideology, the simple theory of ideology develops into the sociology of knowledge. What was once the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history generally.^
3 Mannheim, harl. Ideology and Utopia, trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, New fork; Harcourt, hrace and uompany, 1936, p.244. 4 for example,. Marx states that criticism g£ bourgeois economy can only be made by the proletariat, criticism by the bourgeois themselves is not scientific, but ideological. "So far as such criticism represents a class, it can only represent the class whose vocation in history is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes— the proletariat." (Marx, harl. Capital. revised and aaç)lified according to the 4th German edition by E. Untermann, New York, The Modem Library, h. d., "The author's preface to the second edition," p.20j 5 cf. Mannheim, op. cit.. pp.238-239. ^ IDid.. p.6 9 . 66
A concise definition of Mannheim*s concept of ideology is given by
bchelting;
Ideology is a form of thought which, in spite of a subjective ly honest cognitive desire, cannot claim objective validity, or cannot claim it wholly, or cannot claim it in the sense which it ascribes to itself. The peculiarity of its ** deviation" from the logico-normative ideal is conditioned tsy elements in the social structure. It is precisely this deviation which regularly causes this form of thought— with its questionable or theoretically entirely absent cognitive value— to have a "function" in social life which must be appraised from the standpoint of values other than cognitive ones.?
further, Mannheim divides ideologies into two categories, i.e.,
ideology and utopia. While the Knowledge entertained by ruling groups
is called ideology, the thinKing of oppressed groups is called utopian.
Mannheim contrasts ideology and utopia as follows:
It is clear that those social strata which represent the prevailing social and intellectual order will experience as reality that structure of relationships of which they are bearers, while the groups driven into opposition to the present order will be oriented towards the first stirrings of the social order for which i^ey are striving and which is being realized through them.®
The sociology of Knowledge attempts to find a relationship
between thought and its social and cultural genesis. Epistemological
implications of this proposition are significant. If all Knowledge
is perspectivistic and its validity can only be revealed in relation
to its genesis, the possibility of objective Knowledge has to be
? SShelting, Max Webers Wissenscfaaftslehre« p. 172, translated and quoted by Wolff, hurt H., The Sociology of Intellectual behavior: A survey and Appraisal of The Sociology of Knowledge. (mimeographed) 1947, pp.7>74-. o Mannheim, o p . cit., p.176 67 denied. The theoretical implication of this relativistic proposition
for onr problem of indoctrination is also evident, if’rom Mannheim* s
"perspectivism," it logically follows that the content of all teaching
is subjective; hence, all teaching is indoctrination. Though not
directly related to Mannheim* s theory, this point is made by J?‘. J. Sheed
in a short article on education. Starting with the proposition
that all Knowledge achieved by human procedures is “probable,” not
absolute, Sheed asserts that such Knowledge is nothing more than a
mere individual guess. Thus, having reduced Knowledge to the status
of subjective guess, he concludes that any "educator who proceeds to
shape human lives according to his own guess is exercising a tyranny."'^
If all Knowledge is relativistic, however, the proposition that
all Knowledge is relativistic itself loses objective validity.
Mannheim suggests several solutions to overcome this dilemma, jjefore
going forward to introduce these solutions, the major propositions
of his sociological system need to be described.
( b) "Substantive” Sociology of Knowledge
Mannheim distinguishes two branches of the sociology of Knowledge: a historical-sociological method of research, and a theory. The latter, again, is suodivided into two branches. The one is the substantive theory of sociology of Knowledge, and the other is a sociological
9 jj*. J. Sheed, "Education for the Realization of Qod*s Purposes,” The Educational frontier. Vol. I, No. 4 (January 1935)» pp.10-11, This criticism of relativism is made from the point of view of a religious leader. Without regard to his religious position, nowever, the point he is maKing is relevant here. 68
theory of Knowledge.^® The former is explained by Mannheim as the
purely empirical investigation through description and structural analysis of the ways in which social relationships, in fact, influence thought*
On the other hand, the sociological theory of icnowledge is the
epistemological inquiry concerned with the oearing of this interrelationship upon the problem of validity.^
Since the former virtually influences the theoretical construction
of the latter, it is necessary at first clearly to grasp the major
propositions contained in the substantive sociology of Knowledge. A
concise summary of these propositions is presented and classified into
five categories by Wolff as follows; "(1) The locus of the social
determination of thought; (.2) The influaice of social processes upon
the process of Knowledge; (3) "Perspectivism"; (,4) Imputation; and
(5) "Relationism" and "particularization."^ bince this summary,
though short, provides us with a general picture of the substantive
sociology of Knowledge, it is worthwhile to introduce it briefly.
(1) What Mannheim suggests about the three points where the social
determination of thought enters in is very similar to what
pragmatists say about the experiential process of inquiry. These
points by Mannheim are "the selection of a problem of thought
as a whole, the selection of data held to be relevant to it.
11 Ibid.. p.239. 1^ Woll'f, op* cit., p.78. The five categories are listed alphabetically in Wolff s original statement. Arabic numbers are used here for convenience. 69 and tüe solution of the problem."^3
(2) Rather than maicing a systematic study of social processes in
their bearing upon thought, Mannheim is particularly concerned with
two social processes: differently situated generations and com
petition. Mannheim’s statements on intellectual competition are
briefly summarized by Wolff to show the nature of Mannheim’s analysis.
Four typical constellations of social forces which influaice a
"public” interpretation of life in all societies are "1. consensus
or cooperation, 2, monopoly of an interpreting group, 3. com
petition of different groups for imposing the official interpretation
of the world, and I. ’concentration,’ i.e., agreement among com
petitors on certain points."^
(3) As already pointed out earlier, the sociology of knowledge
reveals that all knowledge is perspectivistic in "the manner
in which one views an object, what one perceives in it and how
one construes it in his thinking."^5 inis is done by analyzing
thought in terms of the following criteria:
ihe meaning of the concepts being used; the phenomenon of the counter-concept; the absence of certain concepts; the structure of the categorical apparatus; dominant models of thought; level of abstraction; and the ontology that is presupposed.^^
13 IDid.. p.78. Five phases of thought, according to Dewey, are perplexed situation, intellectualization of a problem, formulation of hypothesis (selection of data), reasoning, experimentation (the solution of the problem). See Dewey, John, How we think. Mew lork, D. u. Heath and Uo., 1933, pp.106-11$. 14 Wolff. 5 2 .. cit., p.79, based on liannhsir^ cp. cit., pp.242 end 4-7-58, 13~xbid., p.80, based on Mannheim, op. cit.. p.244. ^ Ibid. 70
{A} Imputation is a central technique of research in the sociology
of Knowledge. It proceeds in three steps: (a) individual thought
is imputed to an ideal-typical world view; (hj the extent to
which these ideal-typical world views are realized in the thought
of each individual is examined; and {c) thoughts and world-views
are imputed to group structures and to social-historical
situations. Imputation is complete when these three steps of the study have been taKen.^7
(5) As pointed out earlier, in the process of finding
relationships between thoughts and their origins, the sociologist
of Knowledge " relationalizes" and " particularizes" intellectual
phenomena. That is to say, relations between social structure and intellectual phenomena are sought.
All of these sociological propositions presented by Mannheim, and as outlined by ?»olff, lead to epistemological problems. The last proposition, in particular, regarding relationism and particular ization, leads Mannheim to doubt the validily of Knowledge, however, he does not majce his position clear. The following two statements show ambiguity and contradiction in Mannheim’s thinKing. In the first statement he seems to deny the validity of Knowledge:
If we followed this trend of thought ^/Einstein’s theor;^, which in its unformulated relationism is surprisingly similar to our own, idaen the setting-up of the logical postulate that a sphere of "truth in itself" exists and
A7 Ibid.. p.SO, based on Mannheim, op. cit., pp.76, 277-278. IS Ibid., p.81, based on Mannheim, op. cit.. pp.K52-253. 71 has validity seems as dilTicalt to justify as «n of the other emp1y existoitial dualisms just meutioned. isecause, as long as we see only relational determinaoilities in the whole realm of empirical icnowledge, the formulation of an "as such" sphere has no consequences whatsoever for the process of Joiowiiigi-^9
uut in another statement he says:
Relating individual ideas to the total structure of a given historical-social object should not be coni'used with a philosophical relativism which denies the validity of any standards and of the existence of order in the w o r l d . 2 0 and it is the major objective of mannheim's sociological theory of
.Knowledge to find a solution to the problem thus posed.
{c) Sociological Theory of knowledge
Criteria of truth, according to Mannheim, grow out of the conditions of social-historical life and do not need to be legitimatized by an epistemology. The common assumption that epistemology logically precedes the development of empirical icnowledge is contrary to the real situation. Since even epistemology emerges out of human experience, it is determined by situations, because Knowledge grows out of the conditions of social-historical life, Mannheim further argues that
Knowledge is not a passive perception of objects. On the contrary, to Know is to act in a dynamic situation. Thus, the idealistic conception of Knowledge is criticised by Mannheim:
The dogmatic eu^nents of classical logic and philosophy are accustomed to maintain that the genesis of an idea has nothing to say concerning its validity or meaning.. .1 believe
^9 Mannheim, op. cit., p.275. 2 U "T * X U X U . » * 72
that from, the stanapoint or strict interpretation, we are ini'inlteiy enriched, when we attempt to understand the Diblical sentence, "The last shall he first," as the psychic expression of the revolt of oppressed strata.
AS has already heen pointed out, however, Mannheim does not seem
to deny completely the possibility of objective Knowledge. His
vagueness with regard to the problem of objectivity and relativity of
Knowledge may be seen, according to Merton, in the confusion and
indefiniteness of his discussions of the types of Knowledge,and the
connectiveness of Knowledge and society.
(1) Types of Knowledge. Merton raises a series of question:
Which spheres of thought are included in Mannheim’s theses concerning the existential determination ( 8 einsverbundenheit) of thought? Precisely what is embraced by the term "Knowledge" to the analysis of which the discipline of Wissenssoziologie is nominally devoted? for the purposes of this discipline, are there significant differences in types of Knowledge?24
Mannheim* s answers to these questions are not clear-cut. At times,
the term "Knowledge" is used so broadly as to include practically all
types of Knowledge— from folKloristic beliefs to rigorous positive
science. Merton points out, however, that the content of "formal
Knowledge" is considered by Mannheim not to be affected by the social
or historical situation.25 %hat is meant by formal Knowledge, however.
Ibid.. p.22. 22 Merton, Robert, Social Theory and Social Structure. Chap. IX, "Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge," Glencoe, Illinois, The free Press, 1949, pp.253-254* 23 Ibid.. pp.254-258. ^ Ibid.. p.253. 25 Ibid.. p.253, Merton refers to Ideology and Utopia, p.150. 73 is not clear (is it analytic statements, logic, mathematics, and even
formal sociology, or all of it?). Merton, pointing out the vagueness
of Mannheim in differentiating the formal structures of thought from
the contents or materials of thought, states;
Had he /mannhei^ attended to the familiar distinction between the referential and emotive functions of language, such a miscellany would scarcely have remained undifferen tiated.'^'/
(,2} connectives of knowledge and Hociety» Another limitation
of ^annneim’s analysis is seen by Merton in his failure to specify the
type or mode of relations between social structure and Knowledge.
Merton mentions the many different terms used by Mannheim to designate
relations between thoughts and social and cultural bases, and points
out that these different relations are not sharply defined. The
numerous expressions used by Mannheim to describe social determination are classified by Merton under five headings:
(.1 ) "direct causation of forms of thought by social forces"} (.2 ) "idea’s and forms of thought are in accord with, that is, gratifying to, the interests of the subjects"} (3 ) "thought is directed by the very formulation of the problem, awareness of which may in turn be attributed to the social position of the subject"} C4-) "certain types of groups /_faciiitatJ7 certain forms of thought"} (5) "An ’emanationist’ or ’quasi-aesthetic' assumption." "Such terms as ’compatibility,* ’congruity,’ ’harmony,' 'consistency,’ and ’contrariety’ of A eltans cnauungen usually signalize the emergence of this assumption."*^
Ibid., p.253. Wolff makes the same point I op. cit., p.85). As Wolff points out, Mannheim seems to mean by "formal Knowledge" the formal structure of Knowledge, let this point, indeed, is not made clear by Mannheim, o£. cit.. pp.272-273. *7 Merton, ou. cit., no.272-273* ^ Ibid.,'p.25A. lu Since the types of Knowledge and the connectiveness between
thought and social-cultural bases are not sharply deiined, it is not
clear, in, Mannheim* s theory, in what sense Knowledge is perspectivistic,
on ■üie one hand, and in what sense it is valid, on the other. Mannheim
maKes several attempts to solve this problem, of which Merton discusses three.29
1. "Dynamic criteria of Validity." This is a notion that an
idea is valid if it helps man to adjust himself to a given practical
situation or a historical stage. This notion, however, is not tenable, according to Merton, for the following reasons: (a) the criterion of "adjustment” or "adaptation" begs the question unless the type of adjusianent is specil’ied; (,b) "Social adjustment" is a normative rather than an existential concept; therefore, the adaptation itseli" presupposes the criteria of validity, (c) Mannheim suggests that if the adaptation is based on a broad historical perspective (utopian) , then it is right;
Dut this historical perspective presupposes the very criteria of validity. 3 0
2, Relationism. Merton identifies Idle notion of relationism with EicKer-Weber* s conception of "value relatedness" (Wertbeziehung).
This theory holds that "values are relevant to formulation of scientific problems and choice of materials but are not relevant to the validity of the results" 3 1 As Wolff points out, however, Merton’s interpretation
29 Ibid.. 1DD.2 59-2 6 3 . ^ Ibid.. pp.259-2 6 0 . Merton, on. cit., p.262, Uf. Chap. I, footnote 34. 75 of Mannùeim’ s relationist position does not seen to be tenable^^; as was indicated earlier, Merton bas pointed out Mannheim's failure to
differentiate the referential from the emotive functions of language,
Merton should have made a similar criticism with regard to Mannneim* s
relationist position. Uontrary to RicJfcceri>4Yeïiex's conception of
"value relatedness," Mannheim does not clearly differentiate the
problem of the origin of knowledge from that of the validity of
icnowledge,
3* Structural Warranties of Validity,
"And Mannheim finds a structural warranty of the validity of social thought in the classless position of the socially unattached intellectuals,"
"The intellectuals are the observers of the social universe who regard it, if not with detachment, at least with reliable insight, with a synthesizing eye."33
Mannheim says;
Mothing would be more incorrect than to base one* s judgment of the function of a social stratum on the apostatic behavior of some of its members and to fail to see that the frequent "lack of conviction" of the intellectuals is merely the reverse side of the fact that they alone are in a position to have intellectual convictions. 34
Thus Mannheim contends that various particularistic views are synthesized and validated by intellectuals. This third attempt is a sociological approach, and may be suggestive in these terms. It hardly presents however, an epistemological solution to the problem of the validity
32 Woli'f, op. .cit., p.87. 33 Merton, pp. cit., p.263» see Mannheim, op. cit.. pp. 141-142. 34 Mannheim, pp. pit., pp.141-142. 76
of Knowledge Decause no social structure can validate the content of
Knowledge.
In addition to Mannheim’s three attempts to solve the dilemma
of relativism, as pointed out Dy Merton, Wolff mentions further
efforts tjy Mannheim with reference to this problem.^5 Objectivity is
"either (a) an. unan imity of thinKers on the basis of their common
perspective...or it is (d ^ a translation of different unanimities into
one another and, thus, the elimination of arbitrarily conceived and
mistaKen elements as errors." This is a psychological explanation of
objectivity. It, too, is not an epistemological solution.
in spite of the four attempts so far described, Mannheim evidently
failed to ground the objectivity of Knowledge logically or epistemologi-
cally. It is his merit to have shown sociologically that Knowledge
is situationally determined. He goes too far, however, in his
insistence that the sociological investigation of Knowledge can taKe the place of the philosophical study of Knowledge. As will be shown later, this weaKness of Mannheim has been pointed out not only by Merton and Wolff, but also by others, especially haufmann and Hinshaw. And further, because of his extreme relationist position, Mannheim has failed to validate his own theory.
The problans of validity and objectivity of Knowledge have not beai answered adequately by Mannheim. We have merely learned from him that some Knowledge is perspectivistic.
35 Wolff, on. cit.. p.S3, based on Mannjieim, op. cit.. pp.39, 270. 7 7 Let us come DacJc to our proDlem of indoctrination. If Mannüeim's
theory is applied to this problem, we have to say that all teaching is
perspectivistic since the content of all instruction is situationally
determined. Then how can any teacher be sure that what he is teaching is
more than perspectivistic Jznowledge? How can a teacher be sure that his
teaching is valid and objective— something other than indoctrination of
perspectivistic icnowledge? Even in the case when the institution of
school education is so structured as to maice it possible for teachers
to engage in teaching, instead of in indoctrination, such a structural
warraniy cannot validate the content of instruction, any more than the
classless position of intellectuals can validate the content of their
icnowledge. Thus, the following discussion of the validity and
objectivity of-icnowledge is of crucial importance to our problem of
inoictrination .
II. WEHER ON THE P E O H L m OE GJBJECTIYITY IN THE SGOIAL SUIENUES
In the following pages, some aspects of Weber's methodology of the
social sciences and of Morris' theory of signs will be introduced as forceful, clear expressions of theories of icnowledge and as criticisms of Mannheim.^
3w jiaufmann criticizes Mannheim in his booic. Methodology of the Social~Sciences« New ioric, Oxford University Press, 1944., unap. iVI, "The Objectivity of Social Sciences,"; he expresses general agreement with Weber in regard to the problem of value in the social sciences in Chap. IV, "Value Problems in the Social Sciences." Merton also shows a theoretical affinity to Weber in his criticism of Mannheim. (Merton, op. cit.. p.261-262.) ohsrles Morris' theory of signs is used by Hinshaw as a basis for his criticism of Mannheim. (Hinshaw, Virgil, Jr., "The Epistemological Relevance of Mannheim's Sociology of knowledge," The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 40, No. 3. Eeb. 4» 1943, pp.62-58.) 78 (a) Relative Aspects of Aaowledge.
Weber is willing to admit, as Manndeim does, that a~l 1 ioiowleage
is "perspectivistic." weber himself says:
All imowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always icnowledge from particular points of view. When we require from the historian and social research worker as an elementary presupposition that they distinguish the important from the trivial and that he J_ sic_/ should have the necessary "point of view" for this distinction, we mean that they must understand how to relate the events of the real world consciously or unconsciously to universal "cultural values" and to select out those relationships which are significant for US.37
All Knowledge of cultural realiiy is from a particular point of view, i.e., is perspectivistic, for several reasons. It always emerges from a problematic situation. \Z) A given situation is not merely a reality but a problem, because it has a specific cultural significance for us. (.3) Some events are considered to be culturally significant because of a certain value-orientation. These points are emphasized by Weber as we shall see in the following quotations:
(1) We all Know that our science, as is the case with every science treating the institutions and events of human culture (^with the possible exception of political historyJ, first arose in connection with practical considerations.38
Science arises first, then, when a certain situation necessitates a practical solution of a problem.
37 Weber, Max, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and edited by Jü. A. Sixils and H. A. finch, Ulencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1949, "Objectivity in Social Sciences," pp.31-82. 3^ iDid.. p.51. 79 (2) Ttie transcendental presupposition of every cultural science lies not in our finding a certain culture or any "culture" in general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to taKe a deliberate attitude toward the world and to l«id it significance. Whatever this significance may be, it will lead us to judge certain phenomena of human existence in its light and to respond to them as being ^positively or negatively) meaningful, Whatever may be the content of this attitude— these phenomena have cultural significance for us and on this significance alone rests its scientific interest.^
Science thus is not sheer fact-finding. It is rather a deliberate
effort to grasp reality, trying to judge it and respond to it as being meaningful. It may be worthwhile, at this point, to Know that
Weber does not consider the establishment of laws as the end of the social sciences. The end of the social sciences is to lend significance to realiiy. The establishment of laws is merely the means.
(3) The reason why objects become meaningful to us is that they become related to values. We cannot discover anything meaningful if we investigate data without any presuppositions.
The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intellegible by a ^stem of analytical laws IGesetzesbegriffen), however perfect it may be, since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation toward these events. The concept of culture is a value— concept, itoplrical reality becomes "culture" to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes only those segments of realiiy which have become significant to us because of this value—relevance.41
39 Ibid.. p.Sl. 40 of,, ibid., p.80. Ibid.. p.76. 80
According to ?feOer, as well as Mannheim, the problem of concept-
constmction in the social sciences depends upon the setting of the
problem, and the latter varies with the content of culture. All
Knowledge of society and culture is from some particular point of
view.
(.d) Cb.jectivity in the Social Sciences (The Problem of Origin
and Validity) .
In contrast to Mannheim, however, Weber claims that scientific
truth is not relativistic but is valid for all who seek: it. This
assertion is based on nis clear distinction between the construction
and the use of concepts.
in the method of investigation, the guiding "point of view" is of great importance for the construction of the conceptual schema which will be used in the investigation. In the mode of their /.sic/ use, however, the investigator is obviously bound by the norms of our thought just as much here as else where. for scientific truth is precisely what is valid for all who seek the truth.^
The validity of scientific truth should be distinguished from the
value-relatedness of scientific knowledge. Social science involves
"subjective presuppositions insofar as it concerns itself only with
those components of realiiy which have some relationship, however
indirect, to events to which we attach cultural significance."^-^
Nevertheless, social sciences gain objective knowledge in so far
42 Ibid.. p.Si; italics added. 43 ibid., p.82. 81
as they achieve analytical Knowledge oi empirical data.^
The social and cultural genesis or origin ol‘ Knowledge and
validity of knowledge are clearly differentiated by Keber, in contrast
to iiannheim. Mannheim undoubtedly was right in rejecting traditional
idealistic epistenologies which hold that passive experiences are the
basis of-all Knowledge, dis is the great merit to have overcome the
absolute dualism between existence and validity, as it is found in
traditional idealistic epistemologies. Objective validity of Knowledge,
however, is established, as Weber has demonstrated, quite independently
from its social and cultural origins.
This difference between validity and origin of knowledge is
more explicitly pointed out by Jiaui'mann. According to him, "the
sociology of Knowledge is concerned with conditions for the existence of b e l i e f ."^5 Whereas methodology^ is concerned with the criteria of the correctness of beliefs, üaufmann says:
There cannot be differences irreconcilable in principle between the views of social scientists who agree about the rules of procedure of empirical inquiry. Disagreement concerning the rules, on the other hand, is disagreement with respect to the meaning of scientific Knowledge.***^
^ Ibid., p.106. It is necessary, at this point, to note that the epistemological position of Weber is hantian. His claim of the possibility of objectivity of Knowledge is not based on the position of the historical school, according to which "The function of concepts was assumed to be the reproduction of 'objective' reality in the analyst’s imagination." For Weber, "concepts are primarily analytical instruments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data." See ibid.. p.106. 6.aufmann, op. cit., p.190. Ibid.. p.192. 82
It often happens that the same facts are seen differently by
different scientists, and different interpretations are made of them.
This does not mean, however, that there are only perspectivistic truths
concerning the one object, from the methodological point of view, it
simply means that the different interpretations or approaches concern
different problems from the Deginning. These different approaches, at
the same time, share common elements, namely, the rules of prodedure of
scientific inquiry.^?
The relationsnip between origin and validity, therefore, is merely that of probability, but not that of necessity. "Always,
therefore, the validity of an idea as well as its origin— is a matter for concrete and specific investigation; and the mere social derivation of an idea proves nothing whatsoever, one way or another, about its factual validity.”AS There is only a relationship between Kinds of
social setting and Kinds of Knowledge,
III. m OREIIS' TfiEOBI Of SIÜMS
(a) The Importance of Semiotic
Max Weber presents a clear methodological discussion of objectivity in the social sciences, yet Charles Morris’ analysis of signs provides another important approach to the same problem. According to Morris, the stu<^ of signs— semiotic— has two important relations to the
A7 Uf. ibid.. p.l?l. 48 Child, Aittoir, "The Problem of Truth in the Sociology of Knowledge," Ethics, 47: pp.16-17, July, 1947. 83 sciaaces; "it is Doth a science among the sciences and an instrument
of the sciences."^9 bince every science mames use of and expresses
its results in terms of signs, semiotic is vital for the further ad vancement of all sciences.
The relevance of semiotic to the sociology of Knowledge is
evident. The sociology of Knowledge is interested, among other things, in ideas, all of which are expressed in signs. A clarification of the nature of signs, therefore, should throw much light on the sociological analysis of ideas.
Although the full detail of Morris’ position will not oe introduced here, some maj or points relevant to the present interest will be briefly described.
(bj Three Dimensions of bemiosis
According to Morris, "the process in which something functions as a sign may be called semiosis."50 And this process involves three factors; "that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers to, and that effect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter. These three components in semiosis may be called, respectively, the sign vehicle, the designatum, and the interprétant."51
Three Kinds of study of semiosis develop to investigate respectively each of these three dimensions. They are syntactics. semantics. and
^9 Morris, Uharles, foundations of the Theory of Signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, uhicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938, p.2. 50 Ibid.. p.3 . Ibid., p.3. 84- pragmatics »
11) Syntactics
Syntactics is "the study of the syntactical relations of signs
to one another in abstraction from the relations of signs to objects or to interpreters."52 Syntactics studies the sign vehicles, that is, the formal structure of language. It is not concerned with
"meanings" and "truth" in the usual sense, for example, the object of study for logicians, although overlaid with many other complicated considerations, has been the relations within a language; and mathematicians have been interested in the clarification of a deductive or axiomatic system, both logic and mathematics are certain icnowledge, not because they correspond with some extra-logico ma thematical state of affairs, but because they are analytical or tautological icnowledge. Roughly speaicing, syntactics stuaies such relations of signs to one another as determined by rule.53
(2) Semantics
"Semantics deals with the relation of signs to their designate and so to the objects which they may or do denote."54- While mathematics and formal logic have developed to exhibit syntactical structure, empirical science has developed to describe and predict natural processes, i.e., to exhibit semantical structure. To put it another way, the study of semantical structure has always involved the
52 Ibid., p.ll. 53 Uf. ioia.. pp.1 1 -1 3 . 54- Ibid., p.2 1 . 85 question of truth, the relation of signs to things. Semantics thus
malces clear under what conditions a sign is applicable to an object
or situation. It studies the rules under which a sign denotes an object.55
(3) Pragmatics
"By ’pragmatics* is designated -tiie science of the relations of
signs to their interpreters."5^ Morris says that the term "pragmatics" has obviously been coined with reference to the term * pragmatism*."57
The signil'icance of the achievements of pragmatists, Peirce, James,
Dewey, and Mead, lies in the fact that they have made clear the functioning of linguistic signs in a behavioristic context. What Dewey has meant by instrumentalism— a product of pragmatism— is that a concept is not an entity but an instrumental functioning of signs or ideas by which the organism gets directions as to how to act with rei'erence to the environment, however, the term "pragmatics" is not synonymous with "pragmatism," nor with "pragmatic," nor with "pragmatical."58
It is an abstracted feature of pragmatism which deals with the behavioristic aspect of semiosis. Morris says;
If from pragmatism is abstracted the feature of particular interest to pragmatics, the result may be formulated somewhat as follows; The interpreter of a sign is an organism; the interprétant is the habit of the organism to respond, because of the sign vehicle, to absent objects which are relevant to a present problematic situation as if they were present. In virtue of semiosis an organism taxes account of relevant properties of absent objects, or unobserved properties of objects which are present, and in this lies
55cf. ibid.. pp.21-28. 56 Ibid., p.30. 57 Ibid., p.30. 58 Ibid., p.30. 86 general instrumental signil’icance of ideas. 59
Or, more simply;
Since most, if not all, signs have as their interpreters living organisms, it is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmatics to say that it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psycho logical, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs.60
( c) Implications of Semiotic for the Sociology of jinowledge
As Weber has made clear, social science is related to cultural and social settings in so far as it is formulated from a particular point of view. He has made clear at the same time, however, that although values are relevant to the formulation of a given problem in the social sciences, they do not impinge upon the validity of the content of scientific Knowledge. Weber thus does not suffer from the vagueness of Mannheim* s sociological epistemology. Uharles Morris’ analysis of signs indicates clearly which Kind of signs can be studied sociologically and which Kinds of signs must be studied epistemologically.
Though this approach is different from Weber* s, it is equally helpful in solving the problem of the validity of Knowledge, which Mannheim failed to solve.
As the foregoing sKetch of the three Kinds of inquiries into signs has shown, only pragmatics is concerned with the psychological, biological, and sociological aspects of semiosis. To put it the other way around, p^chology, biology and sociology do not study
59 Ibid.. pp.32-33- 60 IDid., p.3 0 . 87
all dimensions. Tneir studies are restricted to pragmatics, that is,
the relation of signs to their users:
The psycnoanalyist is interested in dreams for the light they throw upon the dreamer; the sociologist of Knowledge is interested in the social conditions under which doctrines and systems of doctrine are current. In neither case is the interest in question whether the dreams or doctrines are true in the semantical sense of the term, i.e., whether there are situations which the dreams and the doctrines may be said to denote. Such studies, together with many others, have confirmed over a wide range the general thesis of pragmatism as to the instrumental character of ideas.
This distinction of the three dimensions of semiosis is lacKing in Mannheim's theory. According to him, not only the pragmatic
Knowledge of a given time and place is in part a function of the social emd historical perspective, but also the semantical truth of
Knowledge is determined by perspective or context.
Hinshaw* s criticism of Mannheim is based on this theory of signs. He gives his conclusion as follows;
Of these three dimensions of language analysis pragmatics— coupled with the inquiry concerning its interrelationship with and influence upon semantics and syntactics— is the sole legitimate discipline of Wissenssoziologie.62
Of course, as Woli'f points out, "the almost inextricable union of the cognitive with the emotive in the "typical ideology or utopia" would maxe it difficult to distinguish between these three dimensions of language. Nevertheless, the fruitfulness of this distinction for the clarification of the problem of the validity of Knowledge can
61 Ibid., pp.38-39. 62 Hinshaw, pp. cit., p.67. 63 Wolff, pp. cit.. p.1 3 3 . 8 8
hardly be denied. Although the sociologist of imowledge should
have some understanding of epistemological problems in order to
differentiate his field from epistemology, he is primarily an
empirical scientist whose interest should be in the study of the pragmatic -dimension of signs.
( d) The Implications of the Theories of Weber and Morris for the Problem of Indoctrination
The first two of the problem of this chapter now may be solved.
1) Our hypothetical distinctions between the content of teaching and "üiat of indoctrination cannot be validated by Mannheim's theory of Knowledge. If all thought whatsoever is perspectivistic, as
Mannheim suggests, there is no way of differentiating the content of teaching from that of indoctrination. The logical conclusion of
Mannneims' perspectivism in reference to the problem of indoctrination is thus the thesis developed by counts, i.e., that "all teaching is indoctrination." If, on the other hand, the validity of Knowledge can be distinguished from the genesis of Knowledge, we have a good reason for claiming that the content of teaching is objective, while that of indoctrination is subjective.
This distinction between the valiaity and the genesis of Knowledge has been explained in the exposition of Weber’s methodological discussion of the problem of objectivity in the social sciences. In an analogous manner, Morris’ theory of signs suggests that, of the three dimensions of semiosis, indoctrination can operate only in reference to the pragmatic dimension, whereas the syntactical and 8 9 the semantic dimensions may De validly cultivated, to do which means
to teach. Indeed, even the teaching of science may be colored by
the teacher's particular experience in so far as the formulation of a problem and the selection of data are concerned. Nevertheless, whether a specific content of instruction is a matter of teaching or indoctrination can be determined in terms of scientific procedure.
2) The foregoing expositions of the theories of Weber and Morris also mates clear a limitation of our sociological analysis of the institutional structures of teaching and indoctrination. To apply the theoretical distinction between the validity and genesis of knowledge to the characterization of our sociological approach, the study of the institutional structures of teaching and indoctrination has attempted to clarify only the genesis of teaching and indoctri nation. Both Merton's and Parsons' studies of the institution of the scientific pursuit have made clear in what xind of institution this pursuit is lUcely to taxe place. They oy no means claim, however, that all Knowledge which originates in such an institutional structure is of necessity scientifically valid. In an analogous manner, the institutional structure of school education which has been discussed has some elements conducive to the practice of indoctrination, let again such elements do not necessarily produce the content of indoctri nation. And analogously for the canons of scientific procedure which are liicely to operate in a particular social structure: once they operate, they are independent cf that structure. The validity of 90 canons of scientific procedure must be distinguished from tneir
origin,
IV. THE TüAUHING Of SDBJEoTIVE a Ü^GVvLEDGE
The foregoing discussion grounds the distinction between objective and subjective icnowledge. It entails no prohibition to teach subjective icnowledge in the classroom. In fact, it is impossible to exclude all subjective icnowledge from tdie content of instruction. The important thing to be considered is the way in which such icnowledge is presented.
If the teacher utilizes emotional means to have children believe in such knowledge, he is indoctrinating. On the other hand, when he utilizes rational methods, he can avoid indoctrination even while presenting moral convictions, political ideals, or national ide ologies. Again Max Weber, this time in his discussion of the scientific treatment of ethical beliefs, is helpful for the clarification of the procedures to be utilized in the rational method of teaching.
According to Weber, the science of culture can provide us with three Kinds of objective Knowledge:
it may be asserted without the possibility of a douot that as soon as one seeKS to derive concrete directives from practical political particularly economic and social political) evaluations, (1) the indispensable means, and {2) the inevitable repercussions, and C5) "üie thus conditioned competition of numerous possible evaluations in their practical consequences, are all that an empirical discipline can demonstrate with the means at its disposal.
Weber, op. cit.. "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality* in Sociology and Economics,” loc. cit., pp.18-19. 91 That is, given an end, social science can show us the means to
attain it, and it can indicate the consequences of schieving the end, furthermore, it can provide us with the ability to compare and weigh
the undesirable as over against the desirable consequences of a
given action, and it can analyze, in a logically consistent manner,
the ideas which underlie the concrete end;
it is self-evident that one of the most important tasJcs of every science of cultural life is to arrive at a rational understanding of these ideas for which men either really or allegedly struggle.^5
Although such, a formal logical understanding of historically given value—judgments and ideas is often considered as belonging in the realm of social philosophy, Weber does not thinx that it exceeds
"the boundaries of a science which strives for an analytical ordering of empirical reality, although the methods which are used in this interpretation of cultural (geistiger) values are not inductions in the usual sense.Science cannot tell us, however, whether a person should adhere to ultimate ethical standards or not. Whether he should or not is a matter of his personal choice, will, and conscieice, not of scientific Knowledge,
The social sciences thus are able to tell us what one can do or what one may wish to do under given circumstances, but it never can tell us what one ought to do. One decides what he ought to do on the basis of his personal choice; "...to judge the validity of such
Weber, op. cit., "Objectivity in Social Sciences," og. cit.. p.51. ^ Ibid.. 92 values is a matter of faith."^7
Weber further discusses the problem of teaching in the university
on the basis of the foregoing argument.
(1) In the first place, the problem of whether a lecturer may,
must, or should champion certain practical values in teaching, snould
not be confused with the purely logical discussion of value-judgments
in empirical disciplines. Tne most important thing for any lecturer
to do is to maice the distinction between his assertion of practical
values and empirical discipline. Even when some practical values are
asserted by a lecturer, they are acceptable only when
he sets as his unconditional duty, in eveiy single case, even to the point where it involves the danger of making his lectures less lively or attractive, to maice relentlessly clear to his audience, and especially to himself, which of his statements are statements of logically deduced or empirically observed facts and which are statements of practical evaluations.
The danger which any lecturer is licely to fall into is to maKe his
lectures stimulating by the insertion of personal evaluation, and
thereby to weaicen the students’ interest in sober empirical analysis.
Evidently, Weber thinics that one of the most important roles of the lecture-hall of a university is to advance specialized training by specially qualified persons,
67 Ibid., p.55. This quotation shows that 7teber's voluntaristic position with regard to ultimate values which is criticised by Kaufmann (op. cit., pp.204-205). According to Aaufmann, even ultimate values can be justified in terms of presupposed rules of higher order, haufmann things that these presupposed rules of jjigher order are o-owoT»p't 1-0- T»<»croTTior< B R T v i Tn'nrvr'hBnt. f o r TtiBT iyind - 68 "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality," op. cit.. p.2. 93 In. an analogous manner, Weber indicates three major duties of the student. They are:
(1) to fulfill a given tasK in a worJonanliJie fashion; 12) definitely to recognize facts, even those which may be personally uncomi'ortable, and to distinguish them from his own evaluations; (3) to subordinate himself to his tasJc and to repress the impulse to exhibit his personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily,
(2) Ethical Neutrality. The foregoing discussion, however, should
not be taicen to mean that Weber taxes the position of "ethical neutrality.” It should not be understood that Weber is invoxing the postulate of ethical neutrality by differentiating empirical discipline from value-judgment. Weber does not thinx that the postulate of
ethical neutrality is tenable. He says:
The indubitable existence of tnis spuriously "ethical neutral" tendentiousness, wnich (,in our discipline) is manifiested in the obstinate and deliberate partisanship of powerful interest groups, explains why a significant number of intellectually honest scholars still continue to assert their personal evaluations from their chair,70
Instead of asserting ethical neutrality, what Weber seems to be recommending is the education of judgment about practical problems.
The teacher estimates the chances of attaining a certain end by examining which means are appropriate or inappropriate for its achievement. The teacher also teaches students how to assess the many possible consequences of pursuing different ends. For example, the teacher can examine whether the attainment of a certain end involves the
6 9 Ibid.. p.$. 70 Ibid., p.6. 9U loss of certain (other) values, furthermore, the teacher can teach
\ students how to analyze the logical consistency of a given historical end. In all this instruction, what the teacher is doing is not postulated on ethical neutrality, since he critically examines the setting of the end itself, its meaningfulness or otherwise in a given situation, etc.
WeOer’s conception of the method of teaching is applicable to teaching in elementary and secondary schools. The teacher entertains a world-view, national ideals, class-ideologies, fami ly-norms, and certain points of view with regard to social and cultural problems.
If these values are simply asserted and imposed by teachers upon children, he undoubtedly indoctrinates tnem. If, on the other hand, the teacher teaches the children how to analyze means, consequences, and logical structure, in order the better to appraise values, he is not indoctrinating them. 95
uHAPrm IV
THE ERACMATIST THEOEÏ OF jü'iOM.EDGE
Although significant aspects of the problem of indoctrination
have been treated in the two preceding chapters, the pragmatist
theory of Knowledge will now be dealt with for two reasons; (1) its
importance in contemporary American education and {2) its similarities
with Mannheim^ s theory of Knowledge.
The similarities between the sociological theory of Knowledge
and the pragmatist theory of Knowledge have often been noted.
Accordingly, both theories have been criticised on the same ground.
For example, with regard to their similar approach to Knowledge,
Morris says:
When a sign produced or used Dy an interpreter is employed as a means of gaining information about the interpreter, the point of view taKen is that of a higher process of semiosis, namely, that of descriptive pragmatics. Psycho analysis among the psychologies, pragmatism among the philosophies, and now the sociology of Knowledge among the social sciences have made this way of looKing at signs a common possession of educated persons. Newspaper statements, political creeds, and philosophical systems are increasingly being looKed at in terms of the interests which are expressed and served by the production and use of signs in question.^
Another scholar points out that not only in the study of
Knowledge in general, but, more specifically, in the study of
science, the pragmatist* s interest is primarily that of the sociologist and psychologist of science. Instead of developing a philosophy of
1 Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, op. cit., p.33. 96 science, he argues, the pragmatist
has contributed to what might be termed the science of science. In place of more aostract logical and episte- mological analysis of the methods and results of science he has made a valuable study of the processes, or as he calls it, the * logic’ of i n q u i r y . ^
AS Knowledge is perspectivistic for the sociologist of Knowledge,
it is, according to the pragmatist, relative to the experiential process
in which it emerges. All Knowledge is seen in the context of behavior
as an "instrument” which emerges from the dynamic interaction of the
organism with the environment and which controls this dynamic
experience in favor of a more desirable adaptation of the organism
to the environment, because of this instrumental nature of Knowledge,
some pragmatists have claimed that new truth may arise from changes in experience, and the new truth may be in conflict with the old. They have said, in effect, that it is within conflict that the quest arises.
The question of how objectivity can be established in spite of the experiential relativity of Knowledge thus naturally arises with regard to pragmatism as it does with reference to the sociological theory of Knowledge. The question becomes all the more urgent when one realizes the fact that pragmatism is the veiry theory which advocates the necessity as well as the possibility of bringing about more objectivity in teaching. The focal point of the problem is well stated by &.aufmann;
What Dewey calls "inquiry in the complete sense" is, in view, the ideal of Inquiry as implied in the fundamental
^ Hinshaw, V. G., Jr., "The Pragmatist Theory of Truth," Philosophy of Science. Vol. 11, No. 2, April, 1914> p.34. 97 postulate of scientific objectivity. It would oe inconsistent to emphasize the objectivity of science, and to state at the same time that the establishment of unambiguous standards of warranted assertihility is impossible in any given situation,3 now can one expect that education will help people to gain objective
Knowledge about nature and society when Knowledge is relative to each
individual's experience?
In order to tacKle these questions raised above, we shall discuss
(1) the pragmatic theory of Knowledge, and (,2) criticisms, and the
pragmatist's answers,
I. PR&ÜMa TIü THjiDRY o f rüviOT??LEDGE
The pragmatist theory of Knowledge may be characterized from two sides, negatively, its merit lies in the criticism of traditional theories of Knowledge, Positively, it is a theory developed on the basis of scientific findings about biological processes occuring betweai the organism and his environment.
The pragmatist criticism of theories of Knowledge is directed against major views, rationalism and realism,^ According to the
3 jiaufmann, Felix, "Dewey's Theory of Inquiry," in John Dewey; Philosopher of Science and Freedom, ed, by S, hooK, New lorK, Tne Dial Press, 1950, p.224. 4 The Pragmatist criticisms of the traditional theories of Knowledge, as described here, may be found in many of John Dewey's writings. One of the most concise and clear statements of the position is nis "Tne Development of American Pragmatism," Twentieth uentury Pailosopay. ed, by D, D Runes, New iorx: Philosophical Library. 1947, pp.449-468. See, also, the essay under the same title in Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, New YorK, Minton, Dalch and uompany, 1931. pp.36-3$. 98 rationalist position, empirical knowledge is only prooaole, in contrast
to the absolutely certain knowledge provided by logic. against this,
pragmatism argues that no knowledge, whether revealed by liod or
postulated by reason, is reliable unless verii'ied in an experiential
context. Man's quest for certainty in the natural world is incompatible
with the acknowledgment of the autonomy of the self-correctiveness
of knowledge.
The realist assumes that our experiences of objects resemble
the things as they are in themselves. The canons of logic are not
derived from somewhere outside the physical world. They are aerived
from ontological principles. According to pragmatism, however, it is
illegitimate to assume that our perceptions of objects are caused
by things-in-themselves. It is even illegitimate to think that the
category of causality (or any other category) is inherent in tnings-in- themselves. Thus the realist conception of truth as correspondence of propositions with things-in-themselves is rejected.
In addition to these two traditional philosophical views, the empiricist theory of knowleage, too, is criticised by the pragmatist on the ground that the data of immediate experience, which the empiaricist regards as the sole foundation of knowledge, are no more ■than unrelated and isolated sense data, hence cannot provide a basis for knowledge, which is essentially contextual.
The pragmatist criticisms of these three philosophical views are stated clearly and briefly by John Uewey in the following three cuotations. 99 1, The criticism of rationalism
Its formal and empty nature, due to conceiving reason as something complete in itself apart from subject matter, its hostile attitude toward historical institutions, its disregard of the influence of habit, instinct, and emotions, as operative factors in life, left it impotent in the suggestion of specific aims and methods, bare logic, however important in arranging and, criticising existing subject matter, cannot spin new subject matter out of itself.5
2. The criticism of realism
A merely mental coherence without experimental verification does not enable us to get beyond the realm of nypothesis. If a notion or a theory makes pretense of corresponding to reality or to the facts, this pretense cannot be put to the test and confirmed or refuted except by causing it to pass over into the realm of action and by noting the results which it yields in the form of the concrete observable facts to which this notion or theory leads.&
3. The criticism of empiricism
An empiricism which is content with repeating facts already past has no place for possibility and for liberty, it cannot find room for general conceptions or ideas, at least no more than to consider them as summaries or records, but when we take the point of view of pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very different role to play than that of reporting and registering past experience. They are the bases for organizing future observations and experiences.^
When any substance, be it mind, matter, or immediate sense experience, is used as a foundation of the theory of knowledge, it leads inevitably to an untenable dualism which holds that there is a cleavage between mind and matter. The pragmatist theory of Knowledge,
^ Dewey, John, Democracy and Education. New fork. The üacmillan ÜO., 1916, p.349. 6 Dewey, "The Development of American bragmatism," op. cit., p.461. 7 Ibid., p.461. 100 thus criticising these defects of traditional philosopnies, seeks to
establish a new basis on which its theory may be built.
According to Dewey, 8 the reason why the traditional epistemologies
could not avoid an untenable dualism is that they drew a dividing
line between inquiry, conceived as a purely mental phenomenon, and
overt experience, which involves interaction of the organism with the
environment and brings about changes in the world, in order to
establish a new theory of knowledge, this artificial division between theory and practice must be abandoned. An inquiry, like any other
action, proceeds within experience, hence it should be analyzed, not
in separation from experience, but in close interrelation with it.
The starting point of any process of thinking is something going on, something, which just as it stands, is incomplete or unfulfilled. Its point, its meaning, lies literally in what is going to be, in how it is going to turn out. 9
(a) Experience
It is therefore necessary for this theory of inquiry to analyze
first the human experience in its biological, sociological, psychological,
and other aspects. It is important to note that the influences of
scientific findings, such as Darwinian biology and YJatsonian behaviorism, upon the pragmatist theory of knowledge are mentioned by Dewey else where in his many writings.^® Dewey himself should be regarded not only
^ Since there are slight differences in thinking between leading pragmatists like Peirce, James, and Dewey, to avoid unnecessary complica tion, only the philosophy of Dewey will be introduced here. V Dewey, Democracy and Education, op. cit., p.315. 10 Cf, Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," op. cit.. : The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in uontemporary ■Thought. New fork, Henry Holt and uo., 1910. 101
as a philosopher, hut also as a scientist of human behavior.^
The specii'ic traits of inquiry then are determined on the basis of
scientific analyses of human experience, Tne nature of experience
is characterised and summarised by levcey as follows:^
1) first of all, experience is neither a subjective stream of
consciousness nor an objectively separated substance. Rather, it is an affair of the interaction of a living organism with its natural and social environment.
2) The fact that experience is not an objectively separated substance does not mean that experience is subjective. Pragmatic thought does not admit that there is a separated objective world. The pragmatist thinxs, rather, that this dynamic interaction of a living being with its natural and social world is itself a genuinely objective world* Therefore, an objective world is not static. Un the contrary, it is dynamic, acting upon men and undergoing modifications through their responses.
3) Consequently, experiencing means trying. Experience in its vital form is experimental. Trying is acting upon something, or trying to change the given. In trying to change the given, the organism is at the same time acted upon. When we try to change the given, we
ïiLfor example, the subtitle of Human Nature and uonduct is An Introduction to Social Psychology, but not a philosophy. Dewey, John, Human Nature and conduct. New Yorx, The Modem Library, 1930. ^Jf. Dewey, John, "The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy^ Creative Intelligence, ed. by Dewey, Henry Holt and Co., 1917, pp.7-14. 102
forecast future consequences. ïïe tüen experiment with our ideas,
testing them in the process of trying. Present experience, therefore,
is deeply connected with a future. To put it more correctly, every
experience is pregnant with a future,
4) Since experience is a process of experimenting, it is not
aisconnected. Through the dynamic process of interaction, experience
is being connected and controlled. Every experience has its own
connected configuration.
5) In regard to the relation of experience to reflection, Dewey
does not believe that reflective thinxing comes from some a priori
order to actual experience. Since experience is pregnant with connections,
reflection arises within experience. Experience, having its own logic,
reconstructs itself through ref lection, ^3 jjjot only the organism
in experience, but experience itself is reconstructed and adjusted.
Of course, Dewey does not mean that every experience develops through
reflection. Some experiences are mere blind activities or crude movements. However, as soon as efforts become, conscious, experience
on the part of men is involved. It is this level of activity which
is pregnant with inference,
(b) Scientific Inquiry
In the foregoing outline of the major characteristics of experience, it has been shown that inquiry originates in experience, or to put it
1 3 Of. Especially Dewey, John, Experience and Education, New Yorx, The Macmillan and uo., 1938, Uhap, III, "Criteria of Experience," pp.23-52. X03 the other way around, experience itseli' is pregnant with ini'ereace.
More specifically, it is the undesirable quality of an experiential
situation which necessitates the emergence of inquiry to eliminate
the doubtfulness, or indeterminâtedness, of the situation. The
organism in a problematic situation cannot adjust itself through
immediate action. Immediate action is diverted and it taxes the
form of ideas. Thus recognition of the inde terminât edne s s of a
given situation is the starting point of any inquiry.
This first Indeterminate phase of perplexity and disturbance,
when exactly located and well delimited, is called a "problem."
Inversely, when the problem is not exactly located, it is impossible
to seem for a solution.
As the saying truly goes, a question well put is hall' answered. In fact, we Know what the problem exactly is simultaneously with finding a way out and getting it resolved. Problem and solution stand out completely at the same time.
When a problem is located and delimited, a plan of action for
dealing with it can be outlined. This plan of action is then carried
out by creating conditions that are required for the solution of the
problem. An idea which is first merely an emotional suggestion in
a perplexed situation becomes, through the intellectual location of
the problem, a more refined and defined supposition. More technically
14- Dewey, John, how We ThinK, A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective ThinKing to the Educative Process. New form, D. u. heath and Company, 1933. p.luS. The process of scientific inquiry is described on pp.106-118. 104 speaicing, it becomes an hypothesis or a guiding idea. The hypothesis is
refined more and more to the degree in which it is tested and regulated
by observations of facts and its bearings are carefully reasoned.
The inquiry comes to a successful end when the problem is solved.
That is to say, the end of inquiry is to transform the indeterminate
situation into a determinate one in which there is no longer need
for doubt. The termination of inquiry, at the same time, is a test
of the adequacy of the hypothesis. The experimental test of ideas, and the transformation of the indeterminate situation to a determinate one, therefore, are one and the same action. Thus experimentation is defined by Dewey as follows;
üonditions are deliberately arranged in accord with the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see whether the results toeoretically indicated by the idea actually occur 3-5
îïhen an inquiry is successfully terminated, therefore, Knowledge . is acquired. "That which satisfactorily terminates inquiry is, by definition. Knowledge; it is Knowledge because it is the appropriate close of i n q u i r y . "16 To use another phrase of Dewey's, "warranted assertihility" is " Knowledge . " 17
( c) Logic of Inquiry
The canons of inquiry with which logic is concerned, do not exist prior to inquiry, but emerge from the process of inquiry,
^ Ibid.. p.l4. 16 Dewey, John. Logic; The Theory of Inquiry. New YorK, Macmillan Co., 1938, p.S. 17 Ibid., p.8. 105 They are never absolutely established, therel'ore, but are always
open to modifications. Lice other technological rules, they are
merely instruments, hence need to be revised whenever they fall
short of the expected success. Neither the rules of deductive
logic nor those of inductive logic should be severed from methodology.
It is illegitimate, therefore, to contrast logic and scientific
method. Scientific method itself both constitutes and discloses
the nature of logical forms.
According to Dewey, traditional theories of logic have two
defects in commonly, (i) they regard logic as a discipline which can
provide us with aosolutely certain relationships in separation from
man, and prior to human inquiry; (2; they do not rnaxe clear why
logical-thinxing should maxe a difference in actual objective situations
when it is employed. On the other hand, logic as conceived by Dewey
controls the transformation of the indeterminate situation into a
determinate one by the use of symbols, such as propositions, terms, and relations. Hooic, pointing out that logic is conceived by Dewey as part of the theory of inquiry, says:
This states rather neatly a challenge which Dewey is prepared to meet by arguing that the theory of proof is part of the theory of inquiry, that forms of implication and inference acquire validity by functioning as "leading principles" of inquiry, and that the separation of the theory of logic as proof from sciartific inquiry (sometimes called applied logic) not only is inadequate but leads to obvious inconsistencies.^9
üf. Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy, New YorK, The
1 9 hooK, Sidney, John Dewey: ^ Intellectual Portrait. New YorK: The John Day uompany, 1939, p.98. 106
Thus logical theory is established, by scientii'ic practice.
As iiooic notes in the above quotation, however, Dewey is fully aware
of the fact that logic is concerned with leading principles of
scientific criticism. In this sense, it provides norms or standards.
Therefore, as Dewey himself says, logic may be used as if it were
absolutely true. But it is not absolute. Other rules may be formulated
for other habits of inference.
Every proposition concerning truths is really in the last analysis hypothetical and provisional, although a large number of these propositions have been so frequently verified witnout fail that we are justified in using them as if they were absolutely true. But logical ly absolute truth is an ideal which cannot be reali zed, at least not until all the facts have oeen registered, or as James says "bagged," and until it is no longer possible to maice other observations and other experiences.^0
Logical propositions, therefore, should be called postulations
rather than postulates. Postulations mean merely conditions required for further operations, while postulates mean something " tamen for
granted as the true oasis for reasoning or belief."21
What we have said is equivalent to holding that postulations arise out of the field of inquiry, and maintain themselves strictly subject to the needs of that field. They are always open to re—examination. The one thing they most emphatically never are is unexaminable.^2
To summarize the preceding descriptions of Dewey’s logic, three basic points seem to stand out;
^0 DewQT, "The Development of American Pragmatism," op, cit.. p.462. (italics in original) ^ Dewey, John and Bentley, Arthur f., knowing and the nnown, Boston, The Beacon Press, 194-9» p.SI. 2^ Ibid., pp.80-81. (italics in original) 107 (1) Logic grows out of the natural experience of man.
Logic is a naturalistic theory,...rational operations grow out of organic activities.
(2) Logic, although it is the outcome of inquiry, controls
inquiry as a guiding pricniple.
To engage in an inquiry is like entering into a contract. It commits the inquirer to observance of certain conditions. A Stipulation is a statement of conditions that are agreed to in the conduct of some aiTair. The stipulations involved are first implicit in the undertaking of inquiry. As they are formally acknowledged they become logical forms of various degrees of generality. They make definite that which is involved in a demand.^
(3) Logic, although it may be used as if it dealt with absolutes,
is merely postulational, and the severance of logic from subject
mattei- is provisional.
Logical forms are postulational.^^
Mathematical forms, and logical forms generally, are properly to be studied in severance from their subjectmatters only when it is recognized that the severance is provisional, and that their full setting in determinate human action is to be taken into account in the final construction.
(d)~ T m t h
According to pragmatism, to speak of ideas as if they had an
existence separate and apart from experience, is meaningless. Whether ideas are true of false can never be foretold; they must be verified by
^3 Dewey, Logic., on. cit., pp.18-19. ^ Ibid., pp.16^17. , Ibid., p.16.. De w ^ and Bentley, op. cit.. pp.209-210. 108
facts in. an experiential process. Pragmatism locates ideas in the
process of inquiry, and finds the validity of ideas only when the ideas
are warranted by facts. What then is a definition of truth by an empirical philosopher '
who wishes to state the nature of truth oy means of an empirical
method? "He must," answers Dewey,
if he wants to apply this method, and without bringing in for the present the pragmatic formula, first find particular cases from which he then generalizes. It is therefore in submitting conceptions to the control of experience, in the process of verifying them, that one finds examples of what is called truth. Therefore the philosopher who applies this empirical method, without the least prejudice in favor of pragmatic doctrine, can be Drought to conclude that tiuth "means" verification, or if one prefers, that verification, either actual or possible, is the definition of truth.27
In other words, a proposition is true if it is verii'ied successfully by consequences, or more crudely, if it worxs well in practice. This statement, however, has to be explained further, since it is often misunderstood as a utilitarian theory of truth. It does not mean that any proposition, if it proves to give personal satisfaction or happiness, is true. I'or example, a religious creed may prove to be very satisfactory to a person, as a consequaice of entertaining it, because it enables him to meet the crises of life with serenity and courage. In this sense it worts well. This is not what is meant by the pragmatist by the phrasing, "it woncs well in practicei" Dewey points to the misunders'tanding and corrects it;
27 Dswey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," o£. cit ., p.461. 109 Too often, for example, when truth has been thought of as satisfaction, it has been thought of as merely emotional satisfaction, a private comfort, a meeting of purely personal need, but the satisfaction in question means a satisfaction of the needs and conditions of the problem out of which the idea, the purpose and method of action, arises. It includes public and objective conditions,,,As a matter of fact, truth as utility means service in maxing just that contribution to reorganization in experience that the idea or theory claims to be able to m a x e , 2 8
There are many false beliefs that have worxed well for a long
time for many people, and there are many true propositions that bring
dissatisfaction and even paralysis of action to those who believe them.
Thus what is inçortant for the verification of ideas are not conse quences which may give us personal satisfaction or pleasure, but
"consequences that are anticipated in virtue of the specific plan to be followed and which in certain situations may be far from pleasant,”^9 a proposition worics well when anticipation of it as a specific proposition is fulfilled by consequences. Only in this sense is a proposition true. Another important feature of the pragmatist theory of truth is, as already suggested, its rejection of the realist theory of xnowledge.
According to pragmatism, there is not any "real” -world in separation from experience,
"Objects" as determined through inquiry are not determined as existences antecedent to all inquiry, nor as detached products; instead they enter xnowledge as condition eu by the process of their determination. 30
Ideas do not passively reflect things as they are. Things come
hew^. Reconstruction in ihilosopny, p,129, fiooK, OP, cit,, p,76, ^ Dewey, Logic, o p , cit,, p,119. 1 1 0
to be Jmown in a experiential process in which they are always in
interaction with the organism. Whether this dil'ference between
pragmatism and realism makes a dil'ference in their respective views of
truth presents an important problem. Since this problem will be
discussed later, it is only pointed out here.
II. CRITIÜISaHS OF p r a g m a t i s m
Pragmatism has been an object of criticisms by scholars of
various schools. Since it has many aspects, psychological theory,
logic, theory of truth, theory of value, educational philosophy, political theory, and others, the criticisms are of various kinds.
Our limited interest in the pragmatist theory of knowledge, especially
in the problem of how pragmatism establishes the validity of knowledge, allows us to deal with only those criticisms which are relevant to our interest, that is, with only two concerns of pragmatism; logic and theory of truth.
Criticisms of Pragmatist Logic
As we have seen, Dewey holds logic not to be something given outside experience but to emerge within experience. Logic is analyzed, accordingly, in connection with a biological study of habits. According to Dewey's theory, these two analyses should never be severed from each other, haufmann, who stands for numerous other writers, has criticized this interpretation of logical principles as habits of thinking or I l l
acting. The following quotation suggests A.aufinann' s general position in
the criticism of hewey^ s logic:
...a process of explication^clarification) is not adequately characterized Oy calling it a formulation of habits of inquiry. To oe logically implied in an ideal, or a postulate, is one thing; to oe included in haoits of observable behavior is something dii'ferent.^^
Thus Jiaufmann severs the problem of logical principles from that
of the description of the pattern of inquiry. And logical principles
are set up by him as postulates while in Dewey’s theory they are merely
postulations. Most people thinic inconsistently and " even the haoits
of the most eminent scientists are bound to fall short of the ideal
of perfect-clarity in i n q u i r y . ” 32 ^.aufmann thinjcs, however, that this actual state of habit does not affect logical principles. Logic is an explication of the implicitly presupposed standards of scientific criticism, but not a formulation of habits of Inquiry. haafmann further says that because Dewey’s analysis of logic is dependent upon that of the process of inquiry, some teleological and causal terms are confusingly contained in Dewey’s logic, grhereas logic should be an analysis of the formal structure of i n q u i r y . 33
When the process of inquiry is described as a purposive human activity,
Jiaufmann argues, the temporal sequence of the steps in inquiry should
■> be analyzed. It is important, in this case, to Jcnow which step should be followed by which for the solution of the given problem, but
31 Jiaufmann, op. cit., p.224-. 32 Ibid.. p.224. 33 Of. ibid.. p.226. 1 1 2
the logician, is not concerned with the temporal sequence of the steps, oua temporal, but only with the formal structure of the sequence. The "dependence" of suosequent steps upon preceding steps is from his point of view not causal depoidence, but logical dependence.34-
jiaui’mann elucidates tnis point by showing an analogy vith the process
of counting in its relation to arithmetic. When we count objects,
our assihgment of nunriser two to an object occurs previous to that of
number five. There is a temporal sequence. This temporal sequence,
according to haufmaan, has nothing to do with the corresponding
mathematical proposition ”5 implies 2."35
Thus what is emphasized by h.au±'mann in his criticism of uewey is the independence of the formal structure of logic from the process of inquiry. This position seems to resemble the position of traditional rationalistic theories of logic. It should not be understood, however, that laufmann is merely repeating the view of the latter, Ee clearly rejects the demand for the logical determination of ontological certainty in the form of traditional rationalism. For he says;
Most contemporary philosophical doctrines are agreed that philosophical reflection should not introduce elements transcending possible human experience. Philosophy, it is now realized, is analysis of experience. 36
Logical standards are not identical in different fields of inquiry, and they are liable to b@_ altered at different stages of scientific progress. Moreover, one of the important principles governing the scientific acceptance or elimination of logical propositions is the practice of observational tests. One finds
34 Ibid., p.226. 3i; Gf. ibid., pp.226. 36 üaufmann. Methodology of the Social Sciences, op. cit., p.14. 113 thus the close relationship between üaul'nann and Dewey, but, as
Bentley points out, &.aul'mann does not entirely dispense with the
ontological study of logic.
...although he can content himself without the ontological speciaiizea search, he cannot content himself without the ontological searcher. He retains the non-natural "mental"— the "ego," "person," "decider," or "basic Knower"— if not as existential possessor, then at least as substantial vehicle or conveyor, of meanings.
Logical rules that are subject to changes are called the rules of lower order. And they are to be judged by rules of higher order.
Although Aaufmann shows affinity with Dewey in his recognition of the fact that even logical rules change according to situations, he is far from Dewey in his insistence upon the existence of invariant rules of higher order, behind all changes of the rules of lower order, the presupposed meanings and invariant properties are required. Higher rules of scientific procedure are thus postulated.
Propositions may be used sometimes, even in Dewey’s theory, as ±£ they were absolute, but after all they are instruments, for Jiaufmann, who things that propositions are based on the presupposed logical rules, Dewey's theory is wrong in failing to differentiate between the analysis of logical rules and the analysis of the process of inquiry.
Science, according to Dewey, is a corpus of propositions made in accordance with presupposed rules. He asserts that science is merely the actual observable on-going process of human inquiry in the natural
3/ Dewey and bentley, op. cit., p.216. 114 world in which it takes place, what happens merely happens. iMo
need is found by Dewey to insert "tne presupposed rules" behind the
natural world to make it happen. Even matnematical formulae are
regarded as outgrowths of inquiry. But Dewey does not say, as many
people suppose he does, that logic and mathematics should not oe
studied in separation from subject matters. Analyses of the formal
structure of logic and mathematics should be made independently. In
regard to this point, there seems to be no disagreement between Dewey
and jiaufmann, as many suppose. Disagreement arises when Dewey says that logical rules, although they may be used "as if they were absolutely true,"38 are in the last analysis hypothetical and provisional.
If however, as Dewey asserts, the estaolishment of logical rules is only provisional, there remains the problem of how he can consistently insist upon the objectivity of science. Dewey’s answer probably is that objectivity is progressively achieved through the constant revision of the rules in experience. This answer is suggested in the following quotation: ...there is a valid distinction between Knowledge which is objective and impersonal, and thinking which is subjective and personal. In one sense, knowledge is that which we take for granted. It is that which is settled, aisposed of, established, under control.. .everj'thing which is assumed without question, which is taken for granted in our intercourse with one another and nature
38 Dewey, "The Development of American Pragmatism," op. cit., p.462. 115 is what, at the given time, is called Knowledge. ThinKing W the contrary, starts, as we nave seen, from ctouDt or uncertainty. It marxs an inquiring, hunting, searching attitude, instead of one of mastery and possession. Through its critical process true Knowledge is revised. and our convictions as to the state of things reorganized.39
AS may oe seen in this quotation, the philosophical validation
of the objectivity of science is eliminated in Dewey's theory.
Instead, he states that, at a given time, there is a valid distinc
tion between objective and subjective Knowledge. That is to say,
although the fact of the existence of objective Knowledge is recog
nized, objectivity of Knowledge is not validated on philosophical
grounds. To put it another way, the philosophical ground for his
assertion of the objectivity of science is not clearly shown.
In order to clarify an implication of Dewey's theory of logic for
the sociology of Knowledge, one caution should be added, a s we have
seen, even Dewey’s theory admits the fact that logical and mathematical
forms should be studied separately from subject matters. It means that,
when we are engaged in the sociological study of Knowledge, it is
absurd to seeK for the relationships between correctness or incor
rectness of one’s logical or mathematical propositions and his
social and cultural bacKground, Such qualifications of relativism will further be strengthened in the discussion of the pragmatist theory of truth,
(b) Criticisms of the Pragmatist Theory of Truth
Aaui'mann’s criticism is directed toward Dewey’s logic. With
39 Dewey, Democracy and Education. op. cit., p.345. italics added. 116 regard to the problem of truth, it is confined to "Uiat of logical
or syntactical truth. Another criticism is made, by the aanerents
of the “coherence" theory of truth, of the pragmatist notion of
truth as "verified hypotheses."
They, like naufmann, point out in the first place that pragmatism
does not clearly differentiate between the epistemological analysis of
the methods and results of science and the scientific analysis of the
actual context of inquiry, “a s a consequence," says one critic,
"the pragmatist"
has tended to blur the distinction between the actual historical context of inquiry and the epistemologist* s context of analysis, in his many praise-worthy attempts at ridding science of unnecessary and confusing metaphysical foundations and elements.4-0
The pragmatist’s analysis of the actual process of inquiry is highly praised by the positivist, however, the positivist argues that to analyze the process of inquiry is one thing, and to analyze the epistemological ground of truth is another thing. The criticism runs as follows.
if, as the pragmatist says, the object of xnowledge is always in the on-going process of experience, and if it is constantly influencing the organism and being influenced cy it, how is it possible to xnow the object as it is? To put it another way, if knowing maxes a difference to experience, and thus also to that which is known, how can we ever xnow what the object is? The positivist
4-0 hinshaw, op. cit.. pp.o2-S3. 117 wonders wùetner Dewey is opening the door to idealism, subjectivism,
and all the other seli’-defeating " isms" which he himseli" has so effective
ly exposed. "To assume that truth itself consists in the process by
which it is verified," says one critic,
maices truth a psychological affair and, as such, an affair of individual experience and relative to each individual who has the experience. I may experience successful consequences from believing that the proposition "A is b" is true; you may experience consequences that are equally successful, and successful in the same sense, from believing that it is false. Shall we, then, say that the same proposition is at once both true and false? True for me and false for you V ^
According to Montague, "the truth (or falsity) of a proposition
antedates the process by which it is verified (or refuted) ."42 Of
course, it may taice a long time until we discover whether a
proposition, ”S is P," is true or false. Positivists agree with
pragmatists on the point that to verify even a statement so simple
that common sense would never doubt it requires an infinite number
of tests, but once it is discovered that the proposition is true, it will remain true— and it was true, in fact, before the condition of its truth was reached. And some positivists, in order to validate their position, tend to identify their metaphysics with that of realism, saying that facts will be as they have been end as they were prior to the evaits of their discovery or verification.^3
^ Montaigue, W. p., "The Story of American Realism," in Twentieth Century Philosophy, op. cit., p.430. Â2 Ibid.. p.430. ^3 Positivism and Realism differ from one another, out their differences are not discussed here. 118
The positivist argues, however, that such an analysis oi‘
verification is often used hy some pragmatists as substantiation for
a pragmatic theory of truth. In other words, pragmatists, capitalizing
on a finite process of testing ideas, assert that no ideas or concepts
can be absolutely assured to be true, and that they will constantly be
revised under the results of further investigation. Thus, some
pragmatists assert that a truth of yesterday is not that of today
and that truth of today will not be that of tomorrow.
Two decisive differences between the pragmatic position and the positivist position may be pointed cut from the foregoing discussion.
They are stated by Hinshaw as follows:
first, an important distinction is to be drawn between verification conceived oy these pragmatists as the successfilL wcrJcing of a nypo thesis and verification conceived by the positivist as the exhibition of a certain type of correspondence or agreement between sentences and their designate, becond, whereas various pragmatists have urged as evidence for abandoning a correspondence theoiy the fact that we must actually deal in inquiiy with verified hypotheses rather than with some more abstract concept of truth, in the fact of such " evidence" the positivist insists on acknowledging the semantical as well as the pragmatical aspects of the notion. inihat .are: the pragmatists. answers to these criticisms? In the first place, most critics, including Hinshaw, are aware of the fact that their criticisms are relevant only to some pragmatists, but not to all. As we shall see, some careful pragmatists are as aware as certain positivists of the distinction between the pragmatical and the
44 Hinshaw, "Fragmatist Theory of Truth," p.88. 119 semantical aspects of truth. For example, according to Hoox’s
interpretation of Dewey, while Dewey asserts the need for changing
or rearranging the situation, it is important to note that the aim
of the rearrangement of the situation is to provoxe the inquiiy in
order to determine "What is the case% What is the case (or ’object
of imowledge') is always something to be discovered."45 In order to
discover what is the case, nowever, we cannot Just stand outside
the object. We may have to touch, smell, or push it. Even in the
case where almost no overt action is tajcen, we are at least changing
our perspective of looxmg at the object. Thus changes taxe place
in things that are in the situation and they are modified by the
behavior of the organism or by wnatever instrument he may use in
testing his ideas, but it should be clearly understood that changes
do not taxe place in the outcome of inquiry. Dev^ey has never said
that the outcome of inquiiy— the object of xnowledge— changes. If
doing changes what we discover, "that would be m a d n e s s . "46
The same point is emphasized in hofstadter’ s analysis of Dewey’s
metaphysics.^- Hof stadter says that Dewey* s xnowing is not the art
of maxing the world, as it has been often maintained by critics, but
the art of existentially fixing the significance of things validly.
That is, inquiry settles the significances of items involved in the
problematic situation with regard to this situation. Of course, in
hooX, op. cit.. p.71. 46 Ibid.. p.70. 47 Hof stadter, Albert, " ^ n c e m i n g certain Deweyan üonception of Metaphysics," John 'Danger. Philosophy of Science and .U’reedom. op. citi, pp.249-270. 1 2 0 an actual process of experimental operation, a process of doing and
majdng is involved. This does not mean, however, that ia maming
a thing or in doing an act we create the characters of existence as
we wish. Actions are necessary in order to ascertain the significance
of things in terms of existential facts, in short:
There is no contradiction between hevt’ey* s view that the obi ect of inquiry is produced or constructed in the course ofinquiry and the view that the purpose of inquiry is to ascertain those involvements oy virtue of which the problematic situation may be settled in its significance. Dewey does not abandon his "connective realism" when he asserts that inquiry is not concerned with ascertaining fixed traits of antecedent existence but with ordering and settling a problematic situation.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that relativity of all kinds of truth is not asserted by all pragmatists, in fact, it is one of pragmatists, C. Morris, who has established a theory of three dimensions of truth.49 he says:
Those who like to believe that "truth" is a strictly pragmatical teim. often refer to the pragmatists in support of their view and naturally fail to note (or state) that pragmatism as a continuation of empiricism is a general ization of scientific method for philosophical purposes and could not hold that factors in the common usage of the term " truth" to which attention was being drawn rendered nonexistent previously recognized factors. Certain of James's statements taken in isolation might seem to justify this perversion of pragmatism, but no one can seriously study James without seeing that his doctrine of truth was in principle semiotical,. .Dewey has specifically denied the imputed identification of truth and utility.50
4 8 Ibid.. p.262. 49 The outline of his theory is given in Chapter III. 50 Morris, op. cit.. p.41. 1 2 1
Pragmatism does not assert the possibility of new truth in the
sense in which new truth can contradict old truth. Thus "the truth
remains unaltered and new truth and old truth do not contracict."51
As the foregoing statement suggests, the pragmatist concept
of truth should not be confused with a strictly pragmatical term.
Indeed, the three dimensions of truth, as set forth by Morris, are
not recognized by some pragmatists, furthermore, pragmatists
are almost exclusively interested in tne study of the pragmatical
aspects of icnowledge— Knowledge related to the on-going experience
of the organism. (Jonsecuently, the pragmatist theory of Knowledge
is explained by these pragmatists only as a philosophy of relativism.
If all Knowledge is relativistic, however, the single conclusion with
regard to the problem of indoctrination is, as has been repeatedly
pointed out, that all teaching is indoctrination.
Yet John Dewey, in nis many worxs, has repeatedly expressed his
conviction that a society in which freedom and order are happily
blended cannot be established and developed unless discussion of a'l i
important issues is publicly xept alive and objectively examined.
Thus in many writings on ethics, politics, and education, John Dewey has attempted to show how ethical beliefs, political ideologies, and educational ideals can be objectively analyzed through the use of the scientific method. This can be done, as caxr analysis of the pragmatist theory of Knowledge suggests, by clearly recognizing common standards
“ • I 1 l.a .2 ^ — -1^ M ' ■■ I II». U» ^ ^ ^ ^ I ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ ^ A World-0rder. New ïoric, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929, p.268. 1 2 2
for the appraisal of beliefs and actions. And in order to establish
common standards confusions pften attached to the pragmatist theory
of knowledge must be clarii'ied. Dintinctions between the three
dimensions of truth seems to be most useful in clarifying these
contusions. Only by doing this may the content of teaching be
clearly distinguished from that of indoctrination.
^ Although the implication of Dewey's analysis of the thinming process for education has not been discussed in this study, its importance should not be overlooked. It shows the process through which unreflective habit is transofrmed to reflective thinking in relation to changes in human ea^erience. When this theory is related to our sociological analysis of the structure of school education, this theory may be used in clarifying some aspects of the process through which the structure of indoctrination is transformed to the structure of teaching. The clarification of this relationship between Dewey's theory of the thinking process and our sociological study of school education is a problem which is left for the writer +.<-> l O - h n / ^ 'O ' ' 123
GHAPTilŒi V
üONgLUSIONS
Tais study has been specifically directed toward the problem
of gainirig insight into the educational issue raised by the play of
charge and counter-charge as individuals and groups accuse each other
today of using the schools in order to indoctrinate young people. In
the opening pages the purpose of the study was stated as follows: "It
is precisely the aim of this study to find, if not a clear and satis
factory solution to the problem of indoctrination as it is practiced
in the elementary and secondary schools, at least ways in which such
solution may be sought. In this chapter, we shall first briefly summa
rize our answers and then point out the meaning of those answers in
reference to conflicting views about indoctrination which have been
set forth in the introductory chapter.
I. DIMENSIONS OF INDOCTRINATION
Indoctrination, as a type of instruction, is contrasted to
teaching in both content and method. With regard to content, teaching
deals with valid, objective Knowledge, whereas indoctrination deals with subjective, unverifiable Knowledge. With regard to method, teaching 124 utilizes ratioaal means, whereas indoctrination utilizes non-rational
means- The nature of indoctrination is further illuminated by discussing
its two dimensions.
(a) from the sociological point of view, there are certain
relationships between the peculiar institutional structure of school
education and the practice of indoctrination. The fact that the practice of indoctrination is lively to taxe place more in the
school than in the university is related to the institutional structure of school education wnich, in comparison with that of university education, is more functionally, diffused, particularistic, oriented to ascriptive values, and affective. In such a system, the content of instruction includes that of Doth teaching and indoctri nation, and in it various forms of non—rational means tend to be utilized by the teacher for methods of instruction.
The practice of indoctrination is further related, through the peculiar structure of the school, to pressures coming from outside institutions. These pressures, which come especially from family and Kinship, the social class system, and the modem totalitarian state, are institutionalized structurally and functionajLly in a manner that is similar to what may oe called the structure of indoctrination itself.
(b) Whether a specific content of instruction is that of teaching or indoctrination, cannot be determined in terms of a type of structure in which ihe instruction taxes place, but in terms of canons of scientific procedure. Such determination belongs in the 125 püilosopJiical dimension of the pro Diem of indoctrination, rather than in its sociological dimension. That is, the question of whether
the content of instruction is objective, valid jcnowledge or not is
determined philosophically, apart from the problem of the genesis of
that icnowledge. The distinction between three dimensions of semiosis
is helpful in the differentiation between the content of teaching and
that of indoctrination.
There is no objection to the acceptance into teaching of subjective
unver if iable icnowledge provided the scientific method is utilized in
dealing with such Knowledge. Critical examinations of subjective
Knowledge in terms of scientific procedure thus is not indoctrination,
but teaching.
II. TEh MEANING OF THE PRESENT STUDY
With regard to three meanings of the term "indoctrination" given in the dictionary definition,^ our definition corresponds roughly to the first; indoctrination as a special Kind of teaching, or instruction.
Let us now see what our study of indoctrination means in respect to the "indoctrination controversy."
( a) According to the authors of The Educational frontier, in order to eliminate indoctrination from school education, teachers
1 Webster* s New International Dictionary. 2nd ed. "To instruct in the rudiments or principles of learning, or of a branch of learning; to instruct (inj , or to imbue (with), as principles or doctrines." 1 2 b
have to taice their stand upon two bases; reliance on intelligence and
on the democratic tradition.2 This view is tenable from our point of
view. Reliance on intelligence is indispensable in teaching which
utilizes rational means in dealing with objective knowledge. It is
also necessary to maintain a democratic social order within and outside
the school, since a democratic social order is the very structure
which, as has been seen, facilitates the practice of teaching.
Although the view expressed in The educational Frontier is thus
tenable as a statement of the nature of teaching and indoctrination, we can not accept its insistence on the elimination of all indoctri nation from school education. Although we have discussed at length the reasons why it is simply impossible for the teacher to deal with all problems of life in a scientific manner, the case shown in the following quotation, though extreme, may further strengthen our position. The case indicates now surprisingly weak a teacher can become under outside pressures. (The statements quoted are the demands written in the contract in one rural school.)
I promise to take a vital interest in all phases of bunday- school work, donating ny time, service, and money without stint for the uplift and the benefit of the cozmnmity.
I promise to abstain from all dancing, immodest dressing, and any other conduct unbecoming a teacher and a lady.
I promise not to go out with any young men except in so far as it may be necessary to stimulate Sunday school—work. I promise not to fall in love, to become engaged or secretly married.
2 hilpatrick, 'A'. h., sd.. The Educational Frontier, op. cit.. pp.70-71, 211. 127
I promise not to encourage or tolerate the least familiarity on the part of any of my boy pupils.
I promise to sleep at least eight hours a night, to eat carefully, and to tahe every precaution to keep in the best of health and spirits, in order that i may be better able to render efficient service to my pupils.3
It is natwçal under such circumstances to think thai^ in order to
teach, ideologies of a particular class must be upheld, buch a teacher
cannot eliminate all elements of indoctrination from instruction, as
Merton has suggested, even in the case of the progressive educationists
who claim that all elements of indoctrination are avoided in their
practice of instruction, imposition of certain subjective icnowledge
is present.^
(.b) The view held by counts, i.e., that all teaching is
indoctrination, is based upon his recognition of these facts, for
him teachers must indoctrinate in the name of labor and socialism,
counts thus publicly attacxed progressive education for its apparent
lack in social policy. He felt that progressive education brought
" into the picture only one—half of the educational landscape.” hut
"it has elaoorated no theory of social well'are, unless it be that of
anarchy.. ."5
This view undoubtedly has some deep insight into the practice of
^ Sluoted in Minehan, T., "The Teacher (joes Job-Eunting," The Nation, 19 nation from that of teaching. Furthermore, in the actual practice of instruction, the teachers, although they are put in situations in which, indoctrination is almost unavoidable, srs still able, at least to a certain degree, to teach objective icnowledge about society and nature. If all teaching is indoctrination, teaching can no more oe considered as a mode m profession. Thus in concrete situations elements of both indoctrination and teaching are involved. Looicing at these situations from another angle, the teacher, as half professional and hall" layman, is standing always on a delicate balance between teaching and indoctrination. Whether teaching or indoctrination should be practiced, therefore, is decided by the judgment of each teacher in a given situation. (c) The foregoing appraisals of the two contemporary views about indoctrination should not be taicen to mean that the importance of teaching is underrated. For, once more, instruction in subjective knowledge is not necessarily indoctrination if rational means are utilized by the teacher to appraise such knowledge critically. Although the meaning of the concept " defensible partiality” is not clearly explained by Brameld,^ it does not seem to be too far from what we mean by a rational scioitific treatment of subjective knowledge. It is extremely important for the teacher who is standing on a delicate balance between teaching and indoctrination, to understand clearly the 129 canons o±‘ scientific procedure and to criticise the content and method of his own instruction. School education can be improved by the teacher* s understanding of the common standards in terms of which objectivity in the content of teaching is to be determined. 130 BIBLIOGRAPHT BOOJiS Alberty, Harold. Reorganiaing The High School Uurriculum. New YoTK: The Macmillan Co., 194-9 Beale, fl. JL. Are American Teachers Free? New Yoric: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. Bell, H. M. Youth Tell Their Story, American council on Education, 1938. Bossard, James, fl. The Sociology of Child Development. New York: Harper and Brothers, 194-8. Brameld, Theodore. Ends and Means in Education: A Midcentury Appraisal. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. Brewer, J. M. Education as Guidance. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932. Counts, George, S. Dare the School Build a New Social Order? New York: John Day Co., 1932. Counts, G. S. The Social composition of Boardsof Education; A Study in the Social Control of Public Education. Chicago^ The University of Chicago Press, 1927. Counts, G. S. The Social f oundations of Education. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934-. curti. Merle. The Social Ideas of American Educators. New YorK: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935. Dewey, John (editor). Creative Intelligence. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917. Dewey, John. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan CO., 1916, Dewey, John. Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan and Co., 1938. 131 Dewey, John. How We ‘Jnlnjc; A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Tninicing to the Educative Process. New YorK: D. C, Heath and Company, 1933. Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct; An Introduction to Social Psychology. New Yorjc; The Modern Library, 1930. Dewey, John and uentley, Arthur, f . Jlnowing and the hnown; Boston; The iseacon Press, 194-9. Dewey, John. Logic; The Theory of Inquiry. New Yoric: The Macmillan Co., 1938. Dewey, John. Philosophy and Civilization. New York; Minton, Balch and Company, 1931. Dewey, John. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New Yorh: The New American Library, 1950. Dewey, John. The Influence of Darwin and other Essays in Contemporary Thought, New foric; Henry Holt and Co., 1910. Everett, S. The Community School. New Yorh: D. Appleton Century Co., 1938. flartshome, E. Y. The German Universities and National Socialism. Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1937. fiooJc, Sidney. John Dewey; An Intellectual Portrait. New Yoric; The John Day Company, 1939. Hook, Sidn%r (editor) . John Dewey; Philosopher of Science and Freedom. New York: The Dial Press, 1950. Hulburd, David. This Happened in Pasadena. New Yoric; The Macmillan Company, 1951. Hutchins, R. M. Higher Learning in America. New Yore; Yale University Press, 1936. Jones, A. J. Principles of Guidance. New Yoric: Mafiraw-tiill Book Company, 1930. jLaufmann, Felix. Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York; Oxford University Press, 1944-. Ailpatrick, W. fl. (editor). Dew^r, J., Bode, B. H., Childs, J . L., Raup, R. B., Thayer, V. T., and flullfish, H. G., The Educational Frontier. New York: D. Appleton Century Co., 1935. 132 Jiilpatricic, W, H. Education and the Social (Jrisis. New Yoric: Liveright PuDlisfaing Corporation, 1932. Mannheim, û.arl. Ideology and Utopia, trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward 8nils, New Yorj&c: Harcourt, nrace and company, 1936. Marx, üarl. Capital, revised and amplified according to the 4th German edition by E.. Dntermann, New Yorx: The Modem Library, n.d. Merton, Robert, h. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Illinois: The Eree Press, 1949. Meyer, A. B. The Development of Education in the Twentieth Century. New Yorx; Prentice Hall Inc., 1949. Morris, Charles, foundations of the Theory of Signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 2, cnicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1938. Parsons, Talcott. Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied. Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, 1949- Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. Glencoe, Illinois: The free Press, 1 9 5 1 . Pittenger, h. F. Indoctrination For American Democracy. New Yorx: The Macmillan Co., 1941. Progressive Education Association. Progressive EducationoAdvances. New Yorx: Appleton century uroft. Inc., 1938. Reeder, Ward, G. The Fundamentals of School Administration. New Yorx: The Macmillan Co., 1941. Runes, D. J L 5 . ( editor) Twentieth century Philosophy. New Yorx: Philosophical Library, 1942. Vi^as, Eliseo. The Moral Life and the Ethical Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950. Waller, Willard. The Sociology of Teaching. John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1 9 3 2 . Warner, W. Lloyd. Who Shall be Educated? New Yorx: Harper and Brothers, 1944- Weber, Max. The Methodology of the Social Sciaices. trans. and ed. by Shils, E. A. and Finch, H. A., Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, 1 9 4 9 . 133 WoIlT, Jiiirt, H. THe Sociology or Intellectual tsehavior; A Survey and Appraisal of The Sociology of knowledge. ImimeograpnedJ , 1947. Znaniecici, Florian. Tne Social Role of the Man of nnowleage. New Yorjc; uolumbia University Press, 1940. ARTIULhS Uhild, Arthur. “The Problem of Truth in the Sociology of Knowledge,” Ethics, 47, July, 1947, pp.16-17. Counts, Oeorge, S. "The Place of the School in the Social Order,” E. A , , Proceedings « 19^6, pp.308-315. line, JOenjamin. "Issue of Academic freedom is Raised Again; This Time at Ohio State University," The New Yoric Times, Sunday ed. Section 4, October 28, 1951. Hinshaw, Virgil, Jr., "The Epistemological Relevance of Mannheim's Sociology ofKnowledge," The Journalof Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Feb. 4, 1942), pp.62-68. Hinshaw, V. U. Jr., "Tne Pragmatist Theory of Truth," Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, No. 2 (Apr. 1944), p.83, f. Mineham, T. “The Teacher does Job-Hunting," The Nation, Vol. 124, 1927, p.603. Parsons, Talcott, "Education and Professions," Ethics. Vol. 47, No. 3, April, 1937, pp.365-369. Radin, Max, "The Loyally Oath at the University of ualifomia," H"11 etia of the American Association of University Professors, Vol. 3 6 , No. 2, Summer 1950, pp.237-245. Sheed, P. J. "Education for the Realization of God's Purposes," The Educational frontier. Vol. 1, No. 4 (January 1935), pp. 10-11. fURTfiER REfERMCES Beard, Charles. A Charter for the Social Sciences in the Schools, New xoric; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934. 134 üeard., uharles. A, Tiie Nature of the Social Sciences in Relation to Objectives of Instruction. New YorJc; Oûicago: Scrioner, 1934. Comts, George, ü. Scnool and the Society ia Chicago» New YorK; Harcourt, brace, 1928. Counts, George, S. The American Road to Culture; A Social Interpretation of Education in the United States. New Yoric; Jonn Day company, 1930. Dewey, John, The Child and the Curriculum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902. Dewey, John, The School and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago,Press, 1921. Dewey, John and Evelyn. Schools of Tomorrow. New Yorjc: Dutton, 1915. Pine, benjamin. Our children Are cheated: The crisis in American Education. Henry Holt and company, 1947. Plexner, Abraham. Universities; American, English. German. New YorK: Oxford University Press, 1930. Gee, Wilson. Social Science Research Organization in American Universities and Golleges. New YorK: Appleton century, 1934. Harvard committee. General Education in a Eree Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. Lynd, Robert S. and Helen m. Middletown in Transition. New YorK: Harcourt brace, 1937. Lynd, Robert S. and Helen M. Middletown. New YorK: Harcourt brace, 1929. Melby Ernest 0. American Education Under Fire. Anti-Defamation League of b ’NAI b'RITfl, 1951. Merriam, Charles E. Glvid Education in the United States. New YorK: t>cribner, 1934. Ortega Y Gasset, Jose. Mission of the University, trans. Howard Lee Nostran, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Sinclair, Upton. The Goose-Step: A Study of American Education. Pasadena: California: The author, 1923. 135 Sinclair, Upton. The Goslings: A i^tudy of the American Schools. Pasadena, California: The Author, I924.. Veblen, Thor stein. The Higher Learning in America: AMemorandum on the Uonduct of Universities by business Men. New YorK: Huebsch, 1918. 13à AUTOBIOGRAPHY I, M i cMo Nagai, was born in ToKyo, Japan, March A, 1923. My secondary school education was received at ToKyo Education University High School. My undergraduate training was obtained at The Musashi Uollege and at iiyoto University. Prom the latter I received the degree Bachelor of Arts in 1944-» if'rom 19^4 up to the present date, I have been a member of the faculty of hyoto University. Since 1949, I have been on leave from this position, and have been studying at the Ohio State Universiiy. At the latter institution, I received appointments as University Scholar for the first two years, and as University fellow during the third year. I received the degree Master of Arts at the Ohio State University in 1950. Since 1950 I have continued my specialization in the fields of philosophy and sociology in the Department of Education while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.