SPORTING DEMOCRACY:

THE WESTERN ALLIES’ RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANY

THROUGH SPORT, 1944-1952

by

Heather L. Dichter

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

Graduate Department of History,

University of Toronto

© Copyright by Heather L. Dichter, 2008

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ABSTRACT

Sporting Democracy: The Western Allies’ Reconstruction of Germany Through Sport, 1944-1952

HEATHER L. DICHTER Doctor of Philosophy, 2008 Department of History, University of Toronto

This dissertation examines how the three western Allies used sport to rebuild western

Germany during the occupation and early years of the Federal Republic. The Allies believed that the sports in which Germans chose to participate before 1945, in particular fencing and gymnastics (Turnen), helped define one’s Germanness through demonstrations of militarism and hyper-masculinity. The development of Directive 23 on the Limitation and

Demilitarization of Sport within the quadripartite Allied Control Authority imposed on sport the goals of the Potsdam Declaration: denazification, demilitarisation, decentralisation, and democratisation. By using sport as a vehicle to examine the achievement of western Allied goals, this dissertation demonstrates the centrality of sport to occupation policy.

Sport became a highly effective instrument of public diplomacy because of its broad appeal and also because it allows for a public display of national capabilities. By encouraging competition with athletes from other countries, the western Allies fostered a transformation of German sport from defining individual characteristics to supporting broader, group-oriented ideas of democracy. The problems of creating national sport organisations mirrored the geo-political situation as the western occupation zones merged to form the Federal Republic. The debate over the structural organisation of sport provided the

Germans with an opportunity to demonstrate the democratic ideals learned from the western

ii Allies but also allowed them to use these same ideals to gain autonomy.

Germans used the internationalism of sport to regain a position within the international community because international sport federations lay outside official state control. Examining unofficial international football matches and West Germany’s reacceptance by the international federations illustrates how sport provided a place for

Germans to participate in the international system when no formal German state existed. The division of Germany forced the world’s sportsmen to address the political realities of

Germany even though they considered sport separate from politics. This dissertation demonstrates how the western Allied efforts to dissociate sport and politics instead created the environment which enabled sport to assume a place of primacy during the Cold War, making the use of sport to democratise West Germany an ironic continuation of the politicisation of sport within Germany.

iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project involved several research trips across North America and Europe to many archives and organisations. I could never have conducted the research for this project without the assistance of: Marty Mcgann of the National Archives and Records

Administration in College Park, Maryland; Kerstin Schenke of the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz; the entire staff of the Bureau des archives de l'Occupation française en Allemagne et en

Autriche in Colmar; the staff of the Archives diplomatiques at the Ministère des Affaires

Étrangères in Paris; Lena Ånimmer at the National Archives of Sweden (Riksarkivet);

Stephan Wassong and Michael Winter of the Carl und Liselott Diem Archiv; Michael Schirp of the Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund; the entire staff of the International Olympic

Committee Library and Archive, in particular Ruth Beck-Perrenoud and Marie-Hélène Guex;

Nathalie Rodriguez at the Federation Internationale d'Escrime; Christa Bühler at the

Federation Internationale de Football Association; Pierre Weiss at the International

Association of Athletics Federations; David Barber at the Football Association in London;

Ina Müller of the Deutscher Fussball-Bund; Simone Kratzer at the Deutsche Leichtathletik

Verband; and Jezael Fritsche at the Schweizer Fussball Verband.

In addition to all of the archives that I visited, I would also like to thank Anne Causey of Special Collections at the University of Virginia Library, David Klaassen of the Social

Welfare History Archives at the University of Minnesota, Linda Stahnke of the University

Archives at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, David Hays and Karen Gifford at the University of Colorado at Boulder Archives, and Erika Gorder of Special Collections and

iv University Archives at Rutgers University for their assistance in locating additional material.

I could not have completed the multi-country research for my dissertation without the financial assistance of several organisations and departments. The University of Toronto provided me with significant support coming from the Joint Initiative in German and

European Studies, the Centre for International Studies, the School of Graduate Studies, and the Department of History. I would also like to thank the Society for Historians of American

Foreign Relations for supporting both my language instruction and my dissertation research, and I also received additional funding from the International Society of Olympic Historians and the George C. Marshall Foundation.

I would also like to thank Bruce Kidd and Jennifer Jenkins for being supportive members of my dissertation committee. Most importantly, I would like to thank Modris

Eksteins for being a great supervisor and encouraging me to tackle this topic. Getting through graduate school and writing my dissertation was made easier with the help of many friends, especially Erin Hochman, Jen Polk, Katie Edwards, Wilson Bell, Anthony Cantor, and Erik Huneke. I always looked forward to conversations on German sport with Jan C.

Rode. I would also like to thank all of my friends that housed me for various lengths of time as I traveled across Europe during my research, especially Ray and Maureen Whitley in

England and Sandra Esser and Stefanie Seeh in Cologne. My parents have always provided me with much support during graduate school, which I have greatly appreciated. My grandfather had finished writing his dissertation but could not afford to have all of the copies made to complete his degree due to the birth of his second son, my father. To his memory I dedicate this dissertation.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... ii

Acknowledgments...... iv

Abbreviations...... vii

List of Figures ...... ix

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1 Washington, London, and Potsdam: Demilitarising German Sport ...... 31

Chapter 2 Game Plan for Democracy: Public Diplomacy and Sport ...... 80

Chapter 3 Kicking Around International Sport: The 1948 German-Swiss Football Games ...... 136

Chapter 4 Recentralisation and the Founding of National Sport Organisations: The German Efforts to Gain Control of Sport ...... 172

Chapter 5 Returning to the International Arena...... 236

Conclusion...... 310

Bibliography...... 326

vi ABBREVIATIONS

ACC Allied Control Council AGSEC Allied General Secretariat (Allied High Commission) AHC Allied High Commission CCG(BE) Control Commission for Germany (British Element) CONL Control Council (Allied Control Authority) CORC Co-Ordinating Committee (Allied Control Authority) DAT Deutscher Arbeitsausschuss Turnen (German Working Committee for Gymnastics) DFA Deutscher Fussball Ausschuss (German Football Committee) DFB Deutscher Fussball-Bund (German Football Federation) DIAC Internal Affairs and Communications Directorate (Allied Control Authority) DLA Deutscher Leichtathletik-Ausschuss (German Track and Field Committee) DLEG Legal Directorate (Allied Control Authority) DLV Deutsche Leichtathletik Verband (German Track and Field Federation) DMIL Military Directorate (Allied Control Authority) DRA Deutscher Reichsausschuß für Leibesübungen (National Reich Committee for Physical Exercise) DTB Deutscher Turner Bund (German Gymnastics Federation) EAC European Advisory Commission FIBT Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobaganning (International Federation of Bobsledding and Tobogganing) FIE Fédération Internationale d'Escrime (International Fencing Federation) FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association GMZFO Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone Française d’Occupation GYA German Youth Activities HICOG High Commission for Germany (United States) HICOM Allied High Commission IAAF International Amateur Athletic Federation (now the International Association of Athletics Federations) IOC International Olympic Committee JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff LAW Law Committee (Allied High Commission) MSB Military Security Board NOK Nationales Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland NSRL Nationalsozialistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen (National Socialist Reich Association for Physical Exercise) NSWA National Social Welfare Assembly OMGUS Office of Military Government for Germany (United States) POL Political Affairs Committee (Allied High Commission) SFVA Schweizerische Fussball- und Athletikverband (Swiss Football and Athletics

vii Association) SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party) SWNCC State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

viii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Allied Control Authority Structure ...... 58

Figure 2 Munich-St. Gallen Program drawing by Ernst Maria Lang ...... 157

Figure 3 Military Security Board Structure ...... 208

ix ‘Introduction

...the past history of sports associations warrants a stricter control. –Youth Activities Report, British Zone1

It is the policy of the American Military Government to stress the reorientation of the Germans. Cultural relations, including sports, with other nations seem essential in order to reach that objective. –Major General Charles P. Gross, US Army2

As Germany prepared to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the country revisited in various media forms the first of its three World Cup victories: the 1954 title won in Berne,

Switzerland.3 The West German team won when the country last hosted the event (1974) and, most recently, in 1990 with a team representing the recently-reunified state. While both of these championships have come to symbolise the eras in which those victories occurred, it is the first title that scholars have utilised most often as a symbol of postwar German identity.4 Coming shortly before the end of the Allied High Commission, the 1954 title represents, as Erik Eggers has discussed in his examination of Germany’s football identity,

“the late birth of the Federal Republic Germany, the return of the outsider sweeping, albeit via football, onto the international political and social stage.”5 Yet, what happened after the

1Youth Activities, n.d., FO 1050/1120, National Archives, London, England. Hereafter cited NA. 2Draft, Charles P. Gross, Major General, US Army, to M. Julies Rimet, President de la FIFA, n.d. [March/April 1949], Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. Hereafter cited NARA. 3Das Wunder von Bern, directed by Sönke Wortmann (Little Shark Entertainment GmbH, 2003); Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, Zurück auf dem Platz: Deutschland und die Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft 1954 (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004); Peter Kasza, 1954 – Fußball spielt Geschichte: Das Wunder von Bern (Berlin: Bebra, 2004). 4Wilhelm Pyta, “German Football: A Cultural History,” and Erik Eggers, “All Around the Globus: A Foretaste of the German Football Imagination, c. 2006,” in German Football: History, Culture, Society, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (London: Routledge, 2006). 5Eggers, 226.

1 founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 that enabled the victory on the football pitch in 1954 to become this symbol? More importantly, what happened during the years of the occupation that enabled an area that had been thoroughly Nazified, and consequently had had its organisational structure decimated by the Allied denazification and decentralisation policies, to reemerge in this fashion onto the international stage?

The devastation of World War II and National Socialism demanded a reconstruction of both Germany and its citizens. The four Allies recognised the need for punishment of those individuals responsible for the war and the crimes perpetrated in the name of the Third

Reich, but they also understood that Germany could not continue to exist in a state of rubble.

Some elements within the Allied powers would have preferred a harsher treatment of

Germany, such as United States Secretary of Treasury Henry Morganthau, who wanted to keep Germany as an agricultural state without industry, or the Soviet Union’s attempt to extract severe reparations through the dismantling of Germany’s industrial infrastructure.6

Ultimately the western Allies concluded that reconstruction was necessary for Germany to become a functional society. The longer Germans remained in a state of poverty with a large population of disgruntled, unemployed, and homeless people and without the necessary means to support themselves or the state, the more likely they were to turn to another form of extremism. As the Cold War deepened, the western Allies believed that reconstruction in their zones also helped to minimise the allure of communism and the Soviet zone.

Thus, Germany needed a physical reconstruction and its citizens required a moral

6Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, 2d ed., vol. 1, From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1993), 23-6, 129.

2 restoration – both of which sport could provide. This dissertation therefore examines the western Allied actions to provide this moral rebuilding – at the individual and national level – within West Germany through sport. Although clearing the rubble in the bombed-out

German cities would not have been considered a sport, the rubble itself was, at times, transformed into places of sport. In February 1951 the city of Hannover began construction on a new football stadium, the second largest in the country, using one million cubic metres of rubble from the Second World War which remained in the city centre.7 Sport helped bring the Germans out of the rubble physically. Part of this moral reconstruction, in the eyes of the

Allies, was a removal of Nazi and militaristic elements of society, with democracy taking their place. Once athletes could participate in sport freely and without political or ideological motivations, they could participate in larger sport contests which would help provide a broader rejuvenation of spirits among the Germans. Cities are deeply proud of their teams when they win, and states often develop a healthy nationalism when athletes or teams are victorious at Olympic Games or world championships. Germany also wanted to participate at the international sport level again, and the western Allies generally supported these actions, recognising the benefit of helping Germany rejoin the community of nations. As three of the most powerful states within the international sport community whose own sport experiences shaped the development of the modern Olympic Games, the United States, Great Britain, and

France understood the importance of sport for the reconstruction of Germany.

7Jan C. Rode, “Fußball in Hannover - gestern, heute und morgen. Die Einweihungsfeierlichkeiten der städtischen Stadien,” in Weltspiel: Station Hannover, Lorenz Peiffer and Gunter A. Pilz, ed. (Hannover: Nordmedia, 2006), 26.

3 The negotiated return of German sport followed a similar trajectory as the creation of the West German state. In 1948 the three western powers began to relinquish control incrementally at the Germans’ behest. By placing its athletes, flag, and national anthem on display at the 1952 Olympic Games in Oslo and Helsinki, West Germany publicly announced its return to the world stage. As a result, examining how the Germans worked to regain authority over their sporting affairs demonstrates effective German agency during the later part of the occupation and in the early years of the Federal Republic when the Allies still retained some oversight via the Allied High Commission. This study therefore provides a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between the Germans and the three western

Allies, particularly as the Military Governments of occupation transformed into the Allied

High Commission.

It is this relationship between sport and politics – inside Germany, between Germany and the occupation powers (particularly the three western Allies), and with Germany and the larger international community – that this dissertation seeks to explain. Sport was important enough to warrant significant attention from the Allies, which the time and manpower devoted to the control of sport demonstrates. In particular, my dissertation will explore two key issues regarding sport in western Germany from 1944 to 1952: (1) why the Allies promoted the reorganisation of sport organisations at an early stage in the occupation; and (2) how their belief that sport would contribute to the reconstruction of a new German state and society was translated into policy and practise at the local, national, and international levels.

Regional and national organisations provided direction for local clubs, but at the same time, the leaders at the national level attempted to negotiate (West) Germany’s return to the

4 international sport community based on how sport now existed at the local level.

This dissertation concludes neither in 1949, when the Federal Republic officially

became a state and control transferred from the Military Governments to the Allied High

Commission, nor in 1955, when the Allied High Commission ceased and West Germany

gained complete sovereignty. Many works on the occupation of Germany cover the four-year

period from the conclusion of hostilities through the end of the military occupation.8 The

following six years for Germany, while different from the period of Military Government

control, still did not grant the Federal Republic total control over its own affairs. Only in

1955 did the Paris Treaties take effect, which dissolved the Allied High Commission and

established formal ambassadorial relations between the western Allies and West Germany.9

As a result, other studies address the ten year period (1945-1955) before Germans again had

full power over all of their own affairs.10

Although the complete control of their own sporting affairs did not return to the

Germans in 1949, it also did not wait until 1955. I have instead chosen to conclude with

1952, when three major events marked Germany’s return to the international community: the

first revision of the Occupation Statute, the signing of the European Defence Community

treaty, and participation in the Olympics, first in Oslo for the Winter Games and more

8John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); James Tent, Mission On the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); Wolfgang Buss, ed., Die Entwicklung des Sports in Nordwestdeutschland 1945-1949 (Duderstadt: Mecke Druck und Verlag, 1984). 9Bark and Gress, 349-50. 10Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1957); Ian D. Turner, ed., Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55 (Oxford: Berg, 1989).

5 significantly in Helsinki for the larger Summer Olympics. The acceptance of West German

membership in the European Defence Community demonstrates the effort on the part of the

United States, Great Britain, France, and the international community to readmit Germany.

Although the European Defence Community collapsed within two years, its acceptance of

West Germany enabled the Federal Republic to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The revision of the Occupation Statute represents the increasing transfer of control from the

western Allies to the Germans, and with it the Occupation Statute “ceased to exist as a

practical legal instrument by the summer of 1952.”11 In addition, the signing of the

Convention on Relations Between the Three Western Powers and the Federal Republic

(Deutschland-Vertrag) in May 1952 led to the formal return of sovereignty and eventual repeal of the Occupation Statute in 1955.12 Both the accession to international defence organisations and revision of the Occupation Statute coincided with the participation of West

Germany in the 1952 Olympic Games, which marked the culmination of the full return of sport to German control.

* * *

Sport and Society

All four of the victorious powers recognised the relationship between sport and militarism in Germany, viewing German sport as being both politically and ideologically motivated. The Allies believed that sport had served direct political goals in Prussia and

Germany over the previous 150 years, even preceding the Third Reich. Friedrich Ludwig

11David Aaron Meier, “Managing the West Germans: The Occupation Statute of 1949 from Gestation to Burial, 1945-1955” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1990), 10. 12Ibid., 438.

6 Jahn created a form of German gymnastics (Turnen) as a result of what he believed was the

physical and moral failure of Prussian men at the Battle of Jena in 1806.13 The Turner also

supported the 1848 Revolution and unification of the German states.14 Although the attempt

to create one German state had failed in 1848, Bismarck’s Prussian-led wars two decades

later brought the German states together into one country and fostered a more widely

accepted German nationalism. The Turner “put themselves wholly at the service of their

fatherland,” supporting the imperialist and military ambitions of the state.15 Turnen clubs

thus became a club of choice for patriotic Germans in both Imperial Germany and the

Weimar Republic. In addition to the nationalistic Turnen, fencing maintained close ties to

the military as duelling with swords was ingrained within German military custom to

preserve honour. Sport clubs proliferated in Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic, but

they usually formed along political or confessional lines, with Communist, Socialist,

Catholic, and Jewish or Zionist sport clubs comprising much of the athletic landscape. Once

the Nazis took power and implemented their policies of Gleichschaltung or coordination,

sport clubs as well came under these provisions. Jewish and communist sport clubs closed,

but the remaining clubs implemented anti-Semitic clauses and centralised within the structure

established by the Reichsportführer, Hans von Tschammer und Osten, in 1933. In addition, the Nazis excluded from participating in sport clubs those Germans denied membership in

13Horst Ueberhorst, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and His Time, 1778-1852, trans. Timothy Nevill (Munich: Heinz Moos Verlag, 1978), 35-37, 62. 14Annette R. Hoffman and Gertrud Pfister, “Turnen – A Forgotten Movement Culture: Its Beginnings in Germany and Diffusion in the United States,” in Turnen and Sport: Transatlantic Transfers, ed. Annette R. Hoffman (Münster: Waxmann, 2004), 13. 15Ibid., 16.

7 the Nazi party.16 Sport during the Third Reich supported Nazi racial policies, particularly the

creation of strong Aryans ready to serve the state as soldiers. Germans themselves have not

viewed their sport history as a continuous line from Jahn to Hitler.17 Nonetheless, the Allies

considered the close ties between sport and politics linked athletic institutions directly to the

state, with sport serving the interest of the state.

The occupation powers believed that German sport was thoroughly entrenched with

militarism and nationalism, while domestically they recognised the benefit of physical

education to help prepare men for army duty. In fact, the exclamation that “the Battle of

Waterloo was won on the playing-field of Eton” is often attributed to the Duke of

Wellington. While the Duke of Wellington likely never made such a claim,18 it nonetheless

has become one of the most common remarks regarding the relationship between sport and

the military, one that was frequently invoked by the British during the First World War.

French politicians and nationalists as well supported physical exercise and sport clubs in the

wake of the French surrender at Sedan in 1870. Whereas gymnastics in France prior to the

Franco-Prussian War was largely acrobatic, with tendencies leaning toward vaudeville and

the circus, after 1870 French calls for revanche against the new German state led to the adoption of the type of gymnastics that had helped the Germans defeat France.19 The

16G.A. Carr, “The Synchronization of Sport and Physical Education Under National Socialism,” Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education 10, no. 2 (1979), 20, 29; David Imhoof, “Sharpshooting in Gottingen: A Case Study of Cultural Integration in Weimar and Nazi Germany,” German History 23, no. 4 (2005), 460-493. 17Christiane Eisenberg, „English Sports” und deutsche Bürger: Eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1800- 1939 (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1999). 18Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 16-7. 19Richard Holt, Sport and Society in Modern France (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1981), 43-7.

8 concerns during the Third Republic regarding the strength of the nation prompted Pierre de

Coubertin to examine British and American physical education. This combination of French

patriotism and the study of sport helped Coubertin develop the modern Olympic Games in

the 1890s.20 Yet in both Great Britain and France a plethora of sports filled the athletic

landscape; no one or two sports dominated the athletic consciousness of the British or French

in the way that Turnen or fencing defined Germanness by the twentieth century.

Sport also served purposes other than military preparation by the early twentieth

century, and the general ideas behind sport in each of the four occupation powers are

important to understand the attitudes underlying Allied actions. Sport in the United States

developed differently than its continental counterparts, particularly with respect to the

development of football (soccer), as Andrei Markovits and Steven Hellerman have argued.21

What matters in the context of this project, however, are not the actual sports played in the

United States, but instead the nature of and ideas behind sport. The basis of sport in Great

Britain – fair play, amateurism, and health – also provided the grounding principles for the

development of sport and physical education in North America. The large number and size

of secondary schools and universities in the United States contributed to the adoption and

regulation of sport within educational structures. This sport organisational structure

reinforced meritocracy, a key ingredient of the American bourgeois ethos, which in turn

helped maintain the democratic order.22

20John J. MacAloon, This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 21This dissertation will use the term “football” to refer to what North America calls soccer except in direct quotations which use “soccer”. Andrei S. Markovits and Steven L. Hellerman, Offside: Soccer & American Exceptionalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 22Ibid., 42-3.

9 The decision by the Allies to utilise sport within the reconstruction of Germany was

not a great departure from British and American experiences at home, in which both

countries used sport as a method of domestic social control. Within Britain, the public

schools – which produced a majority of the country’s leaders – developed a strong emphasis

on sport in the nineteenth century as a way to control rowdy and undisciplined pupils.

Headmasters could monitor the free time of the students through games as well as impart

their own ideals of what constituted a well-rounded or solid man of the British Empire.23 On

the other side of the Atlantic American football, a bastion of the upper- and middle-class

university education system, had its professional origins in the labour unrest of the early

twentieth century. Large factories beset with multiple strikes established company football

teams with employees as the players, essentially buying off or appeasing labour through the

provision of company teams.24 The playground movement also used sport as a method of

social control and moral improvement for urban youth. Arising in concert with the idea of

the settlement house as a response to the ills of inner-city slums at the end of the nineteenth

century, the construction of playgrounds and supervised play-time for children helped

alleviate social problems.25

American, British, and French notions of sport differed from the ideas espoused by

23J.A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1981; reprint, 2000), 34. Mangan’s book in general traces the increased importance of athleticism within the public school system by looking at six schools in particular. Though specific headmasters emphasised athletics to a much higher degree than those at other schools, the nature of the public school system ensured the conformity of culture across the country. 24The National Football League’s Green Bay Packers and Chicago (originally Decatur) Bears both began as company teams. Markovits and Hellerman, 80-1; Ted Vincent, The Rise & Fall of American Sport: Mudville’s Revenge (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 8-10. 25Allen Guttmann, A Whole New Ball Game: An Interpretation of American Sports (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 83-85.

10 the fourth occupation power, the Soviet Union. What is often thought of as “Soviet sport” –

the state-run sport system which devoted significant resources and, at times, illegal drugs to

the development of elite athletes – is in fact a postwar phenomenon. The Soviet Union

withdrew from the modern Olympic movement following the Russian Revolution, only

rejoining in time to participate in the 1952 Summer Olympic Games in Helsinki.26 As the

Cold War hardened, this Soviet system developed and spread to other communist states, most

notably to East Germany. Prior to the 1950s, however, Soviet or communist sport was vastly

different from its postwar structure. The Red Sport International (Sportintern) worked in

conjunction with the Communist International (Comintern) and attempted “to advance

revolutionary goals through political education directed at members of communist (and

socialist) sport clubs.”27 Although the Sportintern was never very successful in its worldwide

goals, it nonetheless attempted to negotiate the proper balance between collectivism and

competition for sport within physical culture in the Soviet Union.28

Sport, in and of itself, celebrates the ability and accomplishments of humanity. At the

ancient Olympic Games and since the advent of modern sport, spectators and common

citizens venerate the achievements of the athlete. Victors at Olympia received honours upon

their return home, often receiving a life annuity or exemption from taxes.29 Elite and

professional athletes today receive multimillion dollar commercial endorsements, and those

sportsmen and women of exceptional athletic ability are enshrined in sport halls of fame.

26Barbara J. Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 158-61. 27Ibid., 162. 28Ibid., 163. 29Pierre de Coubertin, Olympism: Selected Writings, ed. Norbert Müller (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2000), 252.

11 Hometown success or spectatorship of the very best athletes thus fosters a positive identity

from which a city – or even country – can draw. Yet, sport is not solely an activity for

spectating; practising sport is an important component in ensuring physical health. Two

strands dominated the rationale for participation in athletic activity, which Pierre de

Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic Games, articulated: “physical exercise as a mere

agent of organic compensation and physical exercise as a creator of moral force and national

force.”30 The former is for improving general health, the latter “to accomplish a task of

renewal, of restoration, of general rigor.”31 Although Coubertin’s ideas regarding sport were

not original, they nonetheless reflected the general sentiment of the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, the period in which the Allied leaders grew up and were socialised.

Sport, in the context of this dissertation, is organised physical activity following the

rules established by international sport federations, what can also be called “modern sport.”

Modern sport coalesced in the second half of the nineteenth century. The six characteristics

that Max Weber used to define the legal/rational authority upon which modern society is

based are the same traits that distinguish modern sport from pre-modern, local, or indigenous

games. Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the development

of modern sport adopted the characteristics of legal/rational institutions: clear rules and

boundaries, separation of public and private, bureaucratization, creation of “the office” for

continuity, professionalism, and impersonal loyalty.32 Pre-modern sport lacks some or all of

30de Coubertin, 221. 31Ibid. 32Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), 329-32.

12 these traits. Traditional recreation lacks virtually all of Weber’s characteristics of modern

society; nationalistic gymnastics contains no separation of public and private life nor

professionalism; and worker sport has neither professionalization nor, in theory,

bureaucratization. Historian Barbara Keys has called modern sport “a universalist

international system” in contrast to traditional recreation (local sport), gymnastics (nationalist

sport), and worker sport (class based).33 These distinctions are important because modern

sport had long been adopted by the three western Allies, whereas nationalist sport remained

dominant in Germany well into the twentieth century.

The legal/rational approach to society therefore demands the importance of the

institution over the individual; the same can be said of modern sport organisations as national

sport governing bodies and international sport federations gained prominence throughout the

twentieth century. As Andrei Markovits and Steven Hellerman have argued:

Modern sports everywhere became inextricably linked to the most fundamental aspects of modernization: discipline exacted by regulated industrial life, the strict separation of leisure and work, the necessity of organized and regularized recreation for the masses, cheap and efficient public transport by train, later airplane (intercity) and bus as well as trolley (intracity), prompt and widely available mass communication via the press (introduction of the sport pages in newspapers and the establishment of sport journalism) followed by telegrams (crucial for the development and proliferation of betting), radio and then television, and the development and rapid expansion of modern education.34

Late nineteenth-century advancements established an interconnectedness of society that

enabled modern sport to become universal, which was also facilitated by the development of

33Keys, 19. 34Markovits and Hellerman, 13. All quotations which use American spellings have been kept in their original, even though I have used Canadian/British English spellings throughout the dissertation.

13 national and international sport organisations. These structures regulated the actual playing of sport to ensure continuity and regularity, and they facilitated the ability to schedule events, particularly against distant clubs. While national and international sport organisations assisted with the practical details of sport participation, they also ensured the dissemination of underlying principles and enforcement of regulations. The centralised sport structure in the Third Reich guaranteed the upholding of Nazi policies within sport clubs. Similarly in occupied Germany the new regional or national sport organisations were entrusted with maintaining democratic structures and promoting democracy within member clubs. The

Allies used an international language of modern sport to promote universal ideas such as democracy in regional and national sport organisations and West Germany’s reentry into international sport federations as compared to the nationalism inherent in a sport such as

Turnen.

Based on their own sport histories and their understanding of German sport history, it should thus come as no surprise that all four of the Allies acknowledged sport could play an important role in the occupation of Germany. Germans faced what appeared to be insurmountable hurdles in the path of their athletic possibilities, particularly in the form of the quadripartite Allied Control Authority’s Directive 23 on the Limitation and

Demilitarization of Sport in Germany. With the destruction of the Third Reich and all forms of the Nazi state, the Allies also forced athletic organisations to disband. German sport had to reorganise clubs with leaders not tainted by Nazi affiliations. Decentralisation policies, combined with the quadripartite division of the country, prevented the creation of national organisations until, at least in the three western zones, the establishment of the Federal

14 Republic. Nonetheless, the western occupation powers saw in sport a way to introduce

democratic ideas and practises to the Germans, even when Allied opinions regarding sport

did not fully coincide with one another.

Despite their intentions to remove the hyper-masculine and militaristic self-definition

from German sport, the Allies in fact reinforced the politicization of sport in Germany

through their use of sport to democratise the country. Democracy, however, can take many

forms. The Allied powers, each composed of different democratic structures themselves,

decidedly did not have a specific form of democracy in mind for Germany.35 Negotiations

among the four powers to determine general occupation guidelines were already difficult, and

the Allied Control Council therefore left the policies to implement these agreements to each

Military Government. The actions of the western Allies in particular ensured a continued

(albeit modified) relationship between sport and politics within West Germany as sport

became a site where East German recognition could be prevented. With the division of

Germany and the onset of the Cold War, the occupation powers created the environment

which enabled sport to become one of the most politicised and highly contested arenas of the

German-German Cold War confrontation. The creation of a team to represent “Germany”

became a contentious battle, beginning in 1952, because of the public displays of national

flags, symbols, and anthems at the Olympic Games.

The politics of international sport influenced the ways in which German sport was

reorganised, but at the same time sport also contributed to the wider political processes of

35Although the three western Allies did not consider the Soviet Union a democracy, the Soviet leaders nonetheless considered their country democratic, as true communism was the ultimate form of democracy.

15 occupied Germany.36 International sport organisations expelled Germany from their memberships immediately after the war, making participation by the occupied country impossible. The desire of Germans to resume international competition was the primary driving force behind the creation of national sport organisations even before the formation of a postwar German state. Sport allowed West Germany to negotiate an early participation within the international community, demonstrating the ability of sport to influence western

Germany during the occupation and into the Cold War.37

* * *

Historiography

This study on the western Allies’ use of sport to reconstruct Germany after the Second

World War will, I hope, contribute to the histories of Germany, sport, and international relations. Instead of looking at the relationship between one power and occupied Germany regarding sport policy, this examination on the control of sport permits the four aims established at the Potsdam Conference to be considered together during the occupation and through the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Denazification and demilitarisation were largely intertwined, and particularly in the case of sport, decentralisation as well. The Gleichschaltung or coordination of sport organisations by the

Nazis occurred quite early within the Third Reich and remained throughout the duration of

36In his introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary History, Jeffrey Hill states that within sport history, “much of its emphasis has been on the politics of sport rather than the contribution of sport to wider political processes.” Jeffrey Hill, “Introduction: Sport and Politics,” Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 3 (2003), 355. 37While praising the contributions of the articles within the special journal issue, Hill also commented “what is lacking in this emphasis is any sense of sport being itself something capable of exerting social and cultural influence.” Hill, “Introduction: Sport and Politics,” 361.

16 the regime. Thus, the Allies supported the creation of new German sport organisations that

were not centralised. At the same time, the western Allies attempted to ensure that Germans

created new organisations with democratic structures. As the Germans tried to gain more

control over how their sport clubs affiliated into regional or national organisations, they

adopted the democratic language of the Allies.

Until recently the literature on occupied Germany concentrated mainly on the

traditional political aspects of Allied activities. Early postwar scholarship provided histories

of the occupation governments, assessing the success (or difficulty in achieving success) of

democratisation and denazification.38 Lately research has examined specific aspects of

occupation zone policy, such as democratisation via education or cinema,39 or has focussed

on different segments of society or localised regions.40 In the sixty years since the end of

World War II, scholarly research on the occupation of Germany has been heavily weighted

toward the American zone because of the early availability of sources. British sources, on the

other hand, remained inaccessible for thirty years, and only afterwards have scholars begun

addressing the British zone.41 Scholars have examined the French zone in much less detail

38Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955; Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949; Constantine FitzGibbon, Denazification (London: Michael Joseph, 1969). 39Tent, Mission On the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany; Heide Fehrenbach, Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 40Maria Höhn, Gis and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Timothy R. Vogt, Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945-1948 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Steven P. Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 41Alan Bance, “Introduction,” in The Cultural Legacy of the British Occupation in Germany: The London Symposium, ed. Alan Bance (Stuttgart: Heinz, 1997), 7; Arthur Hearnden, ed., The British in Germany: Educational Reconstruction after 1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Turner, ed., Reconstruction in Post- War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-55; Denise Tscharntke, Re-educating German Women: The Work of the Women’s Affairs Section of British Military Government, 1946-1951

17 because the French maintained a strict fifty-year closure on files and a lengthy vetting process to view documents.42

Much of the previous scholarship on the occupation has looked at one segment of

German society such as university students, industrialists, or women.43 Whereas education reforms only affected youth, and higher education an even smaller percentage of those youth, sport, in and of itself, is not limiting. It is for the young and old, men and women, elites and masses. Granted, men participated in sport during the occupation of Germany more often than women, but this imbalance was the norm throughout the world at the time. Occasionally the Allies held programs specifically for teaching female sport and youth club leaders how to be democratic. Western Allied sport policies did not distinguish between men and women, instead only differentiating between Germans who were not Nazis as compared to those

Germans who had been Nazis or still displayed militaristic tendencies. The sports used for these courses for women and girls may have been different than the courses for male leaders, but the ideas imparted to male and female students were the same. While students gained the opportunity to experience democracy through classroom exercises and the introduction of new programs such as student councils, sport allowed for the implementation of these guiding principles on an even greater level. Of the youth group statistics maintained by the

(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003). 42Although over forty years old, the standard work on the French zone remains Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949. 43Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University; S. Jonathan Wiesen, West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Michael R. Hayse, Recasting West German Elites: Higher Civil Servants, Business Leaders, and Physicians in Hesse Between Nazism and Democracy, 1945-1955 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003); Höhn, Gis and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany.

18 Military Governments, sport comprised the single largest type of club.44 Although sport

partially fell under the purview of physical education within the school system and was often

directed at youth as the leaders of tomorrow, the organisation of sport clubs outside of the

education system belonged to adults. As a result, sport provided the opportunity to inculcate

Germans with democratic principles through the running of local clubs, and, as the

occupation progressed, permitted them to form associations at regional, provincial (Land),

and ultimately, the national level. Sport therefore allows for a broader examination of both

the occupation and of the reconstruction of Germany as a whole.

Whereas many issues are themselves large and unwieldy topics within just one

occupation zone, sport provides a way of examining more than one zone but with a

manageable amount of material.45 Each occupation power created legislation to regulate its

zone, but these laws stemmed from quadripartite decisions taken in the Allied Control

Authority. When the three western powers joined their zones together in preparation for the

creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the amalgamation was not as simple as

removing the borders between the zones. Yet, these issues have rarely been addressed by

scholars of the occupation or early years of the Federal Republic. Political parties, for

example, could combine their Land-based organisations into larger, national parties because

44If Protestant and Catholic club numbers were combined, then sport clubs would place second. However, the Military Governments counted those two religious groups separately, thus making sport the largest type of youth group. By December 1947 over 2 million youth participated in over 11,000 youth groups in U.S. zone, with 38% in sport. Draft of Minutes, OMG Conference of Youth Activities Personnel, 13-14 November 1947, Box 321, Records of Office of Military Government, Bremen -- Records of the Education Division: Records Relating to German Youth & Sports Clubs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 45At the 2006 German Studies Association conference, Rebecca Boehling called for comparisons across the occupation zones. This project does just that – and was well underway by the time of Boehling’s exhortation made during the open question portion of the session entitled “Displacement and Denazification in the Western Zones of Occupation, 1945-1949”.

19 of their similar structures. Other aspects of German society such as sport organisations were not as easily merged together, particularly when each occupation power had supported different structures within its zone, leaving this national formation phase frequently overlooked.

Ultimately, the integration of the history of the three zones will help provide greater insight into the reconstruction of West Germany as a whole. Earlier international relations histories of the occupation of Germany followed the traditional examinations of high politics, strategy, and statecraft, emphasising the relationship among the victorious powers46 as well as biographical works on or memoirs from the major political actors.47 Studying sport under the three occupation powers in one respect reinforces the historical generalizations attributed to the three occupation powers that controlled the zones that became the Federal Republic: that

British and American policies were more in tune with one another and that the French were more harsh. Yet at the same time, the three powers had to work with one another as well as with the Germans in order to harmonise policies as the three zones became the Federal

Republic in 1949 and a large portion of control was returned to the Germans themselves.

In recent years the field of international relations history has begun to adopt more social and cultural history trends. The emergence of public diplomacy, particularly as a subfield of American diplomatic history, has led to recent works that seek to understand the

46Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Carolyn Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 47Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); David Williamson, A Most Diplomatic General: The Life of General Lord Robertson of Oakridge (London: Brassey’s, 1996); Clay, Decision in Germany; Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle (London: MacMillan, 1959); Lord William Strang, Home and Abroad (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1956; reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983).

20 ways in which governments have utilised culture and communications to achieve their

geopolitical aims.48 Historians have examined the propaganda-based diplomatic efforts of the early post-war period, often used as a tactic of the Cold War,49 and political scientists are also

studying this new public diplomacy.50 Public diplomacy, however, remains largely focussed on American policies. During the occupation of Germany, American and British policies were quite similar, which facilitated the creation of the Bizone. France, on the other hand, had taken a stricter approach to its occupation zone, frequently making agreement within the

Allied Control Authority difficult. Only when the rift with the Soviets had become complete and the lines had been drawn for the Cold War did the French began to change their attitude regarding the future of Germany.51 With similar programs enacted by the western Allies, the public diplomacy efforts of all three powers should be studied together.

This project attempts to bridge two areas of international relations history – public diplomacy and the role of non-governmental organisations – within the context of sport.

Petra Goedde’s recent work on the social interactions between American occupation soldiers and Germans examines the intersection of gender and culture with foreign relations, but she

48Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Brian Angus McKenzie, Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); Wilson P. Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). 49Nicholas J. Cull, “‘The Man Who Invented Truth’: The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency During the Kennedy Years,” in Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History, ed. Ran Mitter and Patrick Major (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 23-48; Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 50Political scientists have taken an ever greater interest in public diplomacy after 11 September 2001. Jan Melissen, ed. The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 51Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1950), 349.

21 only briefly discusses youth and sport.52 The use of sport and especially the Olympic Games

within politics has been studied, in particular as a way to assert nationalism or identity.53

However, sport and international relations has rarely gained significant attention, and public

diplomacy scholars have not yet included sport within their studies. In the introduction to the

first serious work to address sport and international relations, Roger Levermore and Adrian

Budd emphasise the growing importance of non-governmental organisations.54 The

victorious powers created the policies regarding sport within occupied Germany, but the

actions of the international sport federations and the International Olympic Committee

affected the decision-making process of the Military Governments and the Allied High

Commission and the development of sport within occupied Germany. The desire of Germans

to participate in international sport contributed to the development of western Allied public

diplomacy programs which helped with the process of returning Germany to the international

sport community.

While the study of German sport history is more developed in Germany than in the

English-speaking world, the immediate postwar period is often overlooked. Scholars have

focussed on the later period of the Cold War; indeed, most political histories of the modern

52Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 53Alan Tomlinson, National Identity and Global Sports Events: Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the Olympics and the Football World Cup (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); John Hargreaves, Freedom for Catalonia? Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Douglas Booth, The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1998); James Riordan and Arnd Krüger, ed. European Cultures in Sport: Examining the nations and regions (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2003); Matti Goksøyr, “The Popular Sounding Board: Nationalism, ‘the People’ and Sport in Norway in the Inter-war Years,” in The Nordic World: Sport in Society, ed. Henrik Meinander and J.A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 54Roger Levermore and Adrian Budd, ed. Sport and International Relations: An Emerging Relationship (London: Routledge, 2004), 9.

22 Olympic Games, as well as studies of communist sport, examine the use of sport as a Cold

War battleground.55 The most extensive English-language discussion of the occupation

period is in the work of Roland Naul and Ken Hardman, which examines the changes in

German physical education in the twentieth century.56 Their research, however, is focussed on pedagogical methods of sport instruction rather than the impact of sport on German society. The few German-language works on sport in the British and French occupation zones fail to follow these policies into the early years of the Federal Republic.57 The notable exception explores the Saarland’s unique postwar history, including its political separation from Germany that enabled it to field its own athletic teams for international competition

(including an Olympic team) until its reunification with West Germany on in 1957.58 There has been no major work on sport in the American zone, nor has anyone addressed sport across the zones before the creation of the Federal Republic or national sport organisations.

Yet, in order to understand how Germany reestablished itself in the world of athletics and to grasp the significance of sport in the reconstruction of West German society, a thorough investigation and comparison of early sport policies in all three of the western zones is necessary. This dissertation seeks to examine sport in occupied Germany as the control of

55David B. Kanin, The Political History of the Olympic Games, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1981); Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1999); Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); and James Riordan, Sport, Politics and Communism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). 56Roland Naul and Ken Hardman, Sport and Physical Education in Germany (London: Routledge, 2002). 57Eduard Strych, Der westdeutsche Sport in der Phase der Neugründung 1945-1950 (Schorndorf: Verlag Karl Hofmann, 1975); Buss, ed., Die Entwicklung des Sports in Nordwestdeutschland 1945-1949; Stefanie Woite-Wehle, Zwischen Kontrolle und Demokratisierung: die Sportpolitik der französischen Besatzungsmacht in Südwestdeutschland 1945-1950 (Schorndorf: Hofmann, 2001). 58Wolfgang Harres, Sportpolitik an der Saar, 1945-1957 (Saarbrücken: Saarbrücker Dr. und Verl., 1997).

23 sport transitioned from the Military Governments to the Germans themselves. By looking at

sport before and after the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 and at the issues that

confronted both the western Allies and the Germans, a more complete picture of early

postwar German sport – used for more than just sport’s sake – emerges.

* * *

Organisation

This project begins by examining the dismantling of a Nazified society through the

implementation of the three punitive D’s of denazification, decentralisation, and, most

importantly, demilitarisation. Because of the heavily politicised nature of German sport,

wartime planning for the occupation by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the tripartite

(later quadripartite) European Advisory Commission included provisions to address sport as

a vehicle for military training. Sport’s inclusion in Allied discussions in 1944-45

demonstrates its centrality to occupation policy. These policies helped shape the discussions

in the Allied Control Authority and its subdivisions that formulated Directive 23 on the

Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany.59 Although introduced by the Soviets,

the three western powers nonetheless supported the creation of a law that controlled sport in

Germany. If scholars mention Directive 23 it is usually as an example of excessive Allied

control or as the law that limited sport to the local level.60 However, Directive 23 played a

larger role both within Allied occupation policy and in postwar Germany. Once the

59CORC/P(45)180(Revise) – Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany, 10 December 1945, FO 1005/391, NA. 60Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 29; Franz Nitsch, “Die Situation im Sport in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit in Norddeutschland 1945-1947,” in Die Entwicklung des Sports in Nordwestdeutschland 1945- 1949, ed. Wolfgang Buss (Duderstadt: Mecke, 1984), 55.

24 structures of the Third Reich were removed, the occupation powers could then concentrate on rebuilding Germany.

The three western Allies also understood that they could use sport to teach the

Germans how to be democratic. Chapter two explores American, British, and French exchange programs to help Germans create and run new sport organisations without ideological foundations. These efforts of public diplomacy allowed the western Allies to reach a large portion of the population. In particular, these programs targeted youth and youth leaders so that sport was not taught as a method of military training or with a political and ideological end. Recognising the widespread interest and participation in football, the

American Military Government arranged three German-Swiss matches in October 1948 to raise money for a German youth and sport leadership school and an orphanage. However, the world governing body for football (FIFA) had expelled Germany in 1945, preventing

Germany from participating in international matches. Chapter three examines how these efforts on the part of an Allied Military Government and a non-governmental group (in this case Swiss football leaders) demonstrate the ways in which the actions of diplomats could directly raise the morale of the average Germans who attended these sold-out football games.

The creation of a viable sport structure for the country mirrored the larger geo- political situation as the western occupation zones merged to form the Federal Republic. The fourth chapter explores the debate over the organisation of sport, which provided the

Germans with an opportunity to demonstrate the democratic ideals learned from the western

Allies but, more importantly, allowed them to use these same ideals to gain autonomy.

Although Directive 23 initially restricted sport organisations to the local level, by 1947

25 Germans were allowed to form sport associations at the Land level. The beginnings of this

recentralization of German sport through all-encompassing sport organisations

(Landessportbünde) led to a divisive split among sport leaders with the creation of Land- level single-sport associations (Fachverbände). The efforts of the Germans to assume full control over sporting affairs helped push through the appeal of Directive 23 within the first year after the Allied High Commission succeeded the Military Governments. Through sport

Germans demonstrated their own agency in shaping life in the Federal Republic, although under the guidelines specified by the Potsdam Declaration.

Even with the increasing control of sport by the Germans, the western Allies remained involved in their affairs, particularly as the Germans attempted to rejoin the international sport community. Chapter five thus addresses the involvement by the Military

Governments, the Allied High Commission, and the foreign offices in Washington, London, and Paris in assisting German reentry to international sport federations and, most significantly, the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Although the international sport community viewed itself as separate from politics, the occupation of Germany – and ultimately its formal division – forced the world’s sportsmen to address the political realities of Germany. The creation of the new German Olympic Committee, in the days after the

Federal Republic came into existence, included two men who had been IOC members since the 1920s and other members on its executive committee with questionable pasts from the

Nazi period. Thus, in a time when denazification had largely subsided, its reappearance within sport became an international concern as Germany pressed for recognition by the most important international sport organisation.

26 Yet, Germany’s reentry into international sport federations was neither smooth nor

guaranteed. Some federations readily accepted Germany back into their membership while

others were sceptical of the Nazi pasts of German representatives. The Allies pushed for

international acceptance of Germany as it coincided with their general aims for Germany,61 but the Nazi pasts of many German sport leaders created problems for both the western powers and the International Olympic Committee. Germany overcame Norwegian opposition to its participation at the Winter Olympics in Oslo as a lingering sentiment from the Nazi occupation of Norway, as well as from IOC members from other occupied countries who also opposed German reentry.62 The preparations for the 1952 Olympic Games were also important as they demonstrated the first efforts by the International Olympic Committee to create an all-German Olympic team with athletes and officials from both West and East

Germany. The failure of these efforts marked the beginning of the Cold War in German sport history.63 Nonetheless, the Federal Republic gained full control over its sport organisations in order to finalise preparations for the 1952 Olympics. The eight years examined within this dissertation demonstrate the transition from complete control by the Allies over sport within

Germany to the full resumption of self-administration by the Germans.

Although this project addresses the ways in which the three western Allies – the

61R. Birley, Staff Memorandum, Policy Regarding the Participation of Germans in International Sporting Events Outside Germany, 24 January 1949, FO 1050/1095, NA. 62Heather L. Dichter, “International Sport and Divided Germany: The Problem of the All-German Olympic Team, 1952-1964,” (MA thesis, University of North Carolina, 2002), 17-19. 63Several letters in the files of the Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund (formerly the Nationales Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland) in Frankfurt, as well as in the International Olympic Committee’s archives in Lausanne demonstrate the efforts to create an all-German Olympic team for the 1952 Olympics, as well as the East German refusal to work with the West Germans. For one example, see Karl Ritter von Halt to Lord Burghley, 22 December 1951, Heft 729, Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund, Frankfurt, Germany. Hereafter cited DOSB.

27 United States, Great Britain, and France – used sport to rebuild West Germany after the

Second World War, the Soviet Union and its zone of occupation are not completely absent

from this dissertation. Joseph Stalin was a member of the Big Three that met during the war

to determine the postwar settlement, and the Soviet Union comprised one of the four powers

in the Allied Control Authority. The Soviet Union’s presence helped shape the early

legislation to govern Germany. Yet, it was the three western zones that consolidated to form

the Federal Republic, and it was in these three regions where policies were the most

coordinated. Particularly as the Allied Control Council failed to accomplish meaningful

work throughout much of 1947 and met for the final time on 20 March 1948,64 it was the

efforts of the three western Allies that helped the Germans (re)form national sport

organisations and reestablish their international sporting ties. The national sport

organisations created as the occupation of Germany ended not only were the associations that

dominated West German sports, but they have also remained the governing bodies in the

post-unification era.65

While I have tried to present a balanced view of all three of the western occupation

zones, the efforts of the Americans and British dominate the history of events and thus this

dissertation. The French were in some respects the junior partner; as an occupied country

during the war, France played no role in the early wartime negotiations for the occupation of

Germany. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 the United States, Great Britain, and the

Soviet Union formally granted France a role in the occupation and representation on the

64Clay, 142-162, 355-357. 65The national governing bodies in East Germany were state-run, and the extensive doping of East German athletes discredited many of the organisations after reunification.

28 Allied Control Authority.66 France then gained a zone of occupation in Germany, Austria, and their divided capitals, but did not participate in the Potsdam Conference (July-August

1945). Although the French zone in Germany consisted of regions that bordered France

(Rhine province, Palatinate, Saarland, south Baden, and south Wuerttemberg), these areas did not contain a significant portion of the population, nor any of the major urban centres. The lack of any major sport leaders residing within the French zone, combined with the strict

French policies and the close relationship of the British and American zones, resulted in the

French playing a much reduced role in the overall coordination of German sport, particularly in the early years of the occupation. Regardless, as the Germans worked with the western

Allies to form national sport organisations, the French participated equally with the British and Americans within the trizonal sport conferences and during the negotiations for the creation of national sport organisations.

By looking at sport, one can see the three levels on which the three western Allies worked to reconstruct German society: the individual, the national, and the international.

Even by looking primarily at the documents of the three western Allies and the international sport federations, the agency of the Germans is apparent. Gaining access to the national sport federations and Landessportbünde in Germany was difficult, and in certain cases it was impossible to obtain any primary materials. While additional sources would have demonstrated a greater level of German agency during the occupation and first few years of the Federal Republic, the lived experience of sport in Germany developed during the first decade after the Second World War. Sport policies were created at the highest governmental

66Sharp, 114-119.

29 levels, but they impacted both the leaders of German sport as well as the average German who joined a club to participate in athletic pursuits. As a result, the men who helped shape sport in West Germany were not only the American, British, and French policy-makers and

Military Government officers, but also the Germans themselves and the leaders of the international sport organisations. Frequent and consistent Allied consideration of sport demonstrated its importance to the reconstruction of Germany. The year 1945 represents neither a continuation nor a complete break with the past. Instead, Germans manipulated the changes implemented by the western Allies in order for the former sport leaders – some going back to Imperial Germany – to regain control. While the western Allies had specific objectives that they hoped the occupation of Germany would accomplish, the Germans were not solely the pawns of Washington, London, and Paris. Although they worked under the guidelines laid out in the Potsdam Declaration, Germans, through sport, demonstrated their own agency in shaping life during the occupation and in the Federal Republic.

30 Chapter 1

Washington, London, and Potsdam: Demilitarising German Sport

The history of sports clubs under the Nazi regime shows that they formed a powerful instrument for the spread of Nazi doctrines and for the inculcation of militarism. –British Military Government Instruction1

After two World Wars in thirty years, where Germany was the primary enemy of the

British, French, Russians, and Americans, the victorious powers in 1945 wanted to remove from German society the elements that enabled the Germans to begin long and destructive wars. Planning for the occupation began before the end of the war, amongst the three (and later, with the inclusion of France, four) Allies as well as by each individual power as the armies marched toward Berlin. Plans for Germany following its surrender needed to be more effective than the ones that followed the end of the previous war. The Treaty of Versailles had drastically reduced Germany’s military capabilities after World War I. Rather than be extinguished, the German military tradition after 1918 reasserted itself through venues other than the army, most frequently in sport. Article 177 of the Treaty of Versailles stated that

“educational establishments, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs and, generally speaking, associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters.”2 Even with this general inclusion of sport within the peace treaty, sport nonetheless provided the physical

1Mil Gov Instr No __ -- Sports Clubs and Gatherings, n.d. [September 1945], FO1050/12, National Archives, London, England. Hereafter cited NA. 2“The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, Signed at Versailles,” 28 June 1919, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference, (Washington, D.C.: 1947), v. XIII, 331-32.

31 training for the German masses that helped maintain a preparedness among the population

which a limited military could not.3

Wanting not to repeat the mistakes of 1918-19, the Allies would only accept an

unconditional surrender by the Germans in the Second World War. Recognising that the

troops would need a plan for the beginning of the occupation of Germany, the American Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) created a directive for this impending event.4 The policy itself, known

as JCS 1067, went through many revisions from its inception in September 1944. Franklin

D. Roosevelt knew of JCS 1067, but he did not want to commit to any policies until after the

end of the war. JCS 1067 only became official policy on 14 May 1945 when Harry Truman,

by then President for barely one month, signed the secret directive to guide American policy

in Germany. JCS 1067 was not made public until 2 August 1945, the final day of the

Potsdam Conference. The Americans maintained secrecy around JCS 1067 until the

victorious powers finalised coordinated plans for the occupation of Germany, which

reinforced many of the ideas contained within the American document.5 JCS 1067 stated that

“the principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to

the peace of the world.”6 Although officially only applying to the Americans, the principles

of JCS 1067 nonetheless formed the basis of the discussion at the Potsdam Conference. In

3Roland Naul, “History of Sport and Physical Education in Germany, 1800-1945,” in Roland Naul and Ken Hardman, Sport and Physical Education in Germany (London: Routledge, 2002), 22-23. 4The Joint Chiefs of Staff was the American wartime planning body composed of the heads of the three military branches and the president’s military advisor. 5“1945 Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067),” in U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 21; Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977), 40-2; Rebecca Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996), 27-9. 6“1945 Directive,” in U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949, 23.

32 order to achieve this aim Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin agreed at the

Potsdam Conference to the four D’s – denazification, demilitarisation, decentralisation, and democratisation – but not the methods with which these policies would be implemented.7

The guiding principles of the Allied occupation of Germany were first outlined in the political section of the Potsdam Declaration. The first priority of the Allied occupation was demilitarisation, which could only happen with unconditional surrender. The potential existed for a revived militarism similar to 1918 without a total military defeat of Germany in the Second World War. The destruction of the Nazi Party and the dissolution of its institutions and organisations comprised another component of the guiding principles.

Although the Potsdam Declaration did not use the word “denazification” specifically, the

Military Governments quickly adopted the term (as have historians).8 The Potsdam

Declaration also stated that “the administration of Germany should be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility.”9 It was this policy of decentralisation10 that guided not only the efforts at the political reconstruction of Germany but also the social reconstruction of the country. Organisations under the Nazis had, from the beginning of the Gleichschaltung policies in 1933, been under the control of the state. Participation in all aspects of German life – the judicial system, the

7Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, 2d ed., vol. 1, From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1993), 53. 8“Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference,” 1 August 1945, U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 56. 9Ibid., 57. 10Some scholars (such as Bark and Gress) use decartelization as the third punitive ‘D’ of the Allies’ occupation policies. While decartelization is primarily associated with business and the economy, the idea of decentralisation is a broader concept that, while stated under the Political Principles section of the Potsdam Declaration, can encompass social and economic elements of German society as a result of the Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung, as well as other long-standing centralised features of Germany, such as cartels in industry.

33 press, education, and sport, for example – demanded membership in the Nazi Party or its

affiliated organisations, all of which were directed by the state.11

Associated with the idea of the decentralisation of the German state, particularly the

nature of its government, was the concept of democratisation. Self-government based “on

democratic principles” would be introduced at the local level, and subsequently at the Land

and national levels as developments permitted.12 While the reestablishment of a political democracy in Germany was the goal of the Allies, they understood that democracy was not something that could just be imposed on a country and work, as the failure of the Weimar

Republic demonstrated to the creators of postwar policy. Germans needed to learn the values associated with ensuring a stable democracy, and the education system in Germany would, as stated in the Potsdam Declaration, “be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.”13

As the intersection of all of these principles, education thus became an important battlefield not only to the Allies, but also between the occupation powers (particularly the Americans) and the Germans regarding the introduction of different educational features and systems.

The restoration of the German education system entailed the denazification of the teaching profession, the demilitarisation of the curriculum and texts (particularly the heavy emphasis on physical training), the decentralisation of the system, and the implementation of democratic ideals within the curriculum. These processes have been examined by scholars

11Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kunst, Inside Hitler's Germany: A Documentary History of Life in the Third Reich (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Company, 1992), 125-30. 12“Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference,” U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, 57. 13Ibid.

34 for each of the four zones.14

Recognising the role that sport played in the remilitarisation of Germany after the

First World War, the Allies included sport and physical education in their plans for the occupation of Germany within some of the earliest legislation. The Allies believed that militarism, long entrenched in German society, had to be removed from society in general, but in particular from sport. Of the four goals articulated in the Potsdam Declaration, demilitarisation and decentralisation required legislation to address these immediate concerns. The Soviets introduced Directive 23 on the Limitation and Demilitarization of

Sport in Germany within the quadripartite Allied Control Authority as a result of Germany’s sport history. However, Directive 23 was a direct outgrowth of another occupation law on the Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, which itself originated with the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the American element of the European Advisory Commission. Yet,

Directive 23 was neither an American nor a Soviet creation for the occupation of Germany.

The final form of Directive 23 reflected the opinions and biases that each of the four powers held regarding sport, militarism, and Germany. All four occupation powers helped create

Directive 23, but as a directive it only provided guidelines to the individual Military

Governments. Each Military Government therefore chose how to implement Directive 23 within its zone, particularly with respect to the demilitarisation and decentralisation of sport.

14James Tent, Mission On the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Falk Pingel, “Attempts at University Reform in the British Zone,” in German Universities after the Surrender: British Occupation Policy and the Control of Higher Education, ed. David Phillips (Oxford: University of Oxford Department of Education Studies, 1983), 20-27; Arthur Hearnden, ed., The British in Germany: Educational Reconstruction after 1945 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978); F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 163- 179; Benita Blessing, The Antifascist Classroom: Denazification in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945-1949 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

35 * * *

The History of Sport in Germany

Modern sport, characterised largely by specialisation of roles, rationalization, bureaucratic organisation, and a quest for records, developed in the second half of the nineteenth century.15 In this same period Germany became a single state, albeit with the

Prussian-dominated small Germany (kleindeutsch) structure. Many Germans had desired unification since the beginning of the century and the Wars of Liberation from Napoleonic

France. Although Germans had to wait more than a half-century for this goal to be realised, nationalists used the dominant sports within the German lands to further their aims.

Participation in Turnen, the German form of gymnastics, and fencing thus became a form of demonstrating one’s Germanness both before and after the formation of a German nation- state. The intense politicization of German sport conflicted with notions of fair play and sport for sport’s sake, central ideas behind modern sport. Although the Allies also used sport domestically for social control or military preparation, the predominant notion regarding sport in all four states was moral improvement. The Allied understanding of sport in

Germany shaped the creation of the occupation laws on sport, and it is important to review briefly some of Germany’s sport history, in particular how the Allies viewed the relationship of sport with national identity, militarism, and politics.

Fencing had a long European tradition, but within the German lands it developed in conjunction with militarism and the desire for a unified German state. The origins of the duel

15Allen Guttmann, From Ritual to Record: The Nature of Modern Sports (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 16.

36 date back to the chivalry of French knighthood; the rules of fencing were then codified in early modern Italy, where German scholars travelled and learned the art of fencing.16 Kevin

McAleer has argued that in Germany the duel reinforced the military’s code of honour, even after the introduction of honour courts in Prussia in 1843. Men duelled following insults to their honour, and affronts to honour implied physical cowardice and a notion of effeminacy.17

Receiving satisfaction through the duel demonstrated an officer’s courage and masculinity for

having participated, particularly if he was victorious. The violent nature of the duel in

Germany became especially pronounced in the nineteenth century; by the fin-de-siècle the

German duel more often employed pistols as the weapon of choice to level the playing field.

However, the use of pistols demonstrated less courage because the outcome depended more

on weaponry chosen than on skill, and the likelihood of death became far more likely in the

German duel with pistols than elsewhere.18

The actions of the duel reinforced the ideal of physical excellence within Imperial

Germany, particularly as respect for the army furthered middle-class adoption of military

habits. Ute Frevert has argued that the duel and its accompanying forms of social norms and

etiquette helped transfer military values to the bourgeoisie. The expansion of university

education in the nineteenth century contributed to this socialization of the classes.19 For

16Kevin McAleer, Dueling: The Cult of Honor in Fin-de-Siècle Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 16-9. 17Ibid., 44-5, 88. 18Ibid., 59, 64. 19Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 72, 84. Robert Nye demonstrated a similar process in France, but in the Third Republic the duel more often helped reinforce the Revolutionary idea of equality. The French did not have strict rules like the Germans regarding who could and could not duel against each other. By using the épée, perceived as the more noble and chivalrous weapon, French duels became more of a publicity stunt to gain notoriety rather than a formal contest of honor. Robert Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 143.

37 many of the middle-class students, the act of duelling within the university fraternities enabled them to uphold the code of honour borrowed from the aristocracy and the military.

The university subculture of the national fraternities (Burschenschaften) helped construct national identity in the period before a unified German state existed. The Burschenschaften promoted “God, honour, freedom, fatherland,” using names such as Allemania and Teutonia to demonstrate their national aspirations in contrast to regional fraternities such as

Pomerania.20 Burschenschaften spread after the Wars of Liberation, and the increase in students, many of whom fought against Napoleon contributed to the strong martial component of the fraternities, including the promotion of sports and the duel for upholding honour for military preparation. The Burschenschaften also used the black-red-gold flag – and not the black and white Prussian flag – to unify the population, as the French had rallied behind their tricolour during the French Revolution. The Burschenschaften also claimed that this tricolour German flag recalled the strength and supposed unity of the Germans in the

Holy Roman Empire.21 The ability of students to transfer between universities across the

German states helped contribute to this shared mentality. Although a wave of persecution of

Burschenschaften followed the failure of the 1848 Revolution, once Germany unified, the student fraternities continued with their nationalism, which then supported the government.22

Membership in the Burschenschaften and participation in its activities, including the duel, helped develop German identity which in turn made men more loyal once they worked

20Karin H. Breuer, “Constructing Germanness: The Student Movement from the Burschenschaft to the Progressbewegung, 1814-49,” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 2002), 2, 55-6. 21Ibid., 2, 87, 98, 102-3. 22Ibid., 48, 217.

38 with the state in positions such as civil servants or lawyers. The increasing number of university students serving as reserve officers during Imperial Germany further contributed to the transfer of ideas regarding masculinity and honour. The student societies trained their members to be “human beings, strong, self-confident men who love their country.”23 As a member of the Reichstag argued in 1886, the duel “exercises manliness, it steels the character, it breeds able men [...] it is a school of strength, of manliness and of German fidelity.”24 Within the fraternities, the duel (Mensur) developed with sabers as a highly ritualized fencing bout characterised by immobility and bloody results.25 The fraternity duels reinforced military qualities, particularly “the combat-ready soldier, able to stand at ramrod- straight attention for extended periods, prepared to endure the hardship and privation of long campaigning, and equipped to absorb punishment and wounds incurred in battle.”26 The facial scar (Schmiss) became an almost certain souvenir of the event, representing one of the most outwardly visible signs of demonstrated masculinity. More importantly, the German duel helped assimilate the middle-classes to aristocratic values, including tying their loyalties to the state through a heightened sense of nationalism largely fostered through the

Burschenschaften.

These general impressions regarding masculinity, honour, and the duel were reinforced in popular literature, such as Heinrich Mann’s Der Untertan (1919) and Jerome K.

Jerome’s Three Men on the Bummel (1900). Mann’s “loyal subject” Diederich Hessling

23Pusch quoted in Frevert, 108. 24Freiherr Langwerth von Simmern quoted in McAleer, 141. 25Nye, 143; Frevert, 102-6; McAleer, 83-4, 122. 26McAleer, 144.

39 begins the story as “a dreamy, delicate child, frightened of everything,”27 but after he joins a student fraternity, Neo-Teutonia, he learns honour and manliness. Hessling in particular changed after he received his first Schmiss: “The first time he was pinked he felt weak, as the blood trickled down his cheek. Then when the cut was stitched he could have jumped for joy.”28 In Three Men on the Bummel, the main characters’ cycling trip through the Black

Forest includes a visit to a German university town where they observe the student duel. The narrator provides only his impression rather than a description of the German duel because

“the Mensur has been described so often and so thoroughly that I do not intend to bore my readers with any detailed account of it.” He continues: “Every third German gentleman you meet in the street still bears, and will bear to his grave, marks of the twenty to a hundred duels he has fought in his student days. The German children play at the Mensur in the nursery, rehearse it in the gymnasium.”29 Jerome’s commentary furthered the idea, particularly outside of Germany, that the duel pervaded all levels of German society.

Perhaps Germany’s greatest sporting legacy is Turnen, the German form of gymnastics developed at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn as a way to strengthen the German people through military-like exercises and to help overthrow

Napoleonic France. Jahn believed a loss of national strength led to Prussia’s collapse both morally before Jena and physically at the battle in 1806. Jahn cultivated physical fitness and a love of fatherland within paramilitary training, and Turnen therefore involved many

27Heinrich Mann, The Loyal Subject, ed. Helmut Peitsch (New York: Continuum, 1998), 2. 28Ibid., 20. 29Jerome K. Jerome, Three Men on the Bummel (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1966), 331.

40 military exercises.30 Jahn coined the word Volkstum, the thinking and feeling or inner existence which a people (Volk) have in common.31 Jahn and his disciples created the

Burschenschaften, national student fraternities, in contrast to the aristocratic fraternities

(Landmannsschaften), in order to foster a German national identity. Thus, the

Burschenschaften developed strong ties with Turnen, particularly as Jahn believed that the

student’s obligation was to thoroughly train his body to serve his fatherland.32 Jahn’s Turnen

furthered social integration by removing from dress the ornaments fashionable at the time

which otherwise distinguished class. By moving in unison and wearing a common uniform

that Jahn considered traditionally German, Turnen promoted a single German national

identity.33 The ruling royalties of Europe ultimately could not accept the ideas espoused by

Turner, in particular unification and liberalization, because adopting them would mean a

decrease in their own power. The Congress of Vienna not only concluded the Napoleonic

Wars and provided a return to stability with the kingdoms of Europe, but it also outlawed

clubs for Turnen (Turnvereine). Jahn, the man behind the movement, was arrested in 1818

by Prussian authorities after failing to stop the instruction of his gymnastics.34

The Turner movement expanded rapidly between 1842, when the Prussian authorities

permitted it again, and the 1848 Revolution, and the many Turner who participated in the

30Horst Ueberhorst, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and His Time, 1778-1852, trans. Timothy Nevill (Munich: Heinz Moos Verlag, 1978), 35-37, 62. 31Peter Viereck, Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler, exp. ed. (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 69. 32Ibid., 85; Ueberhorst, 41. 33Breuer, 100-1. 34Although Jahn was released from prison in 1824, his travel was restricted until the 1840s. Ueberhorst, 66-69; Arnd Krüger, “Germany,” in European Cultures in Sport: Examining the Nations and Regions , ed. James Riordan and Arnd Krüger (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2003), 68; Charles Henry Schaible, An Essay on the Systematic Training of the Body (London: Trübner & Co., 1878), xvi; Viereck, 86-7.

41 Revolution inextricably linked Turnen with politics. Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV lifted the ban on Turnen with the decision that physical exercise should be included in the educational curriculum for males. Students no longer comprised the majority of the members of the new Turnvereine established in the 1840s, as had been the case thirty years earlier.

Instead, members of the new clubs came from the middle and lower-middle classes.35 These

Turner not only supported republican ideas, they also worked to include them in the creation of a German Gymnastics Association (Deutsche Turnerschaft). Although the vote to include a political purpose within the Deutsche Turnerschaft was narrowly defeated, the plan called for “the moral and spiritual improvement of the German people, the attainment of the principles of free government, public debate, self-determination, freedom of the press, and in short a free Germany by way of popular education or other necessary means.”36 The failure of the 1848 Revolution resulted in the emigration of many Germans, including scores of

Turner who then established Turnvereine across the United States and Latin America.

Turnen again grew in the 1860s, and the Turner began holding national celebrations

(Turnfest) which strengthened ideas for a larger Germany with the inclusion of gymnastic clubs from all of the German lands, including German-speaking areas of the Habsburg

Empire.37

The unification of Germany in 1871 largely achieved the goals of the Turner, who in turn supported the Empire wholeheartedly through participation in Turnen and Turnvereine.38

35Roland Naul, “History of Sport and Physical Education in Germany, 1800-1945,” in Roland Naul and Ken Hardman, Sport and Physical Education in Germany (London: Routledge, 2002), 16; Ueberhorst, 70. 36“Plan for the formation of a General Association of German Gymnasts” quoted in Ueberhorst, 71. 37Arnd Krüger, “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles? National Integration Through Turnen and Sport in Germany 1870-1914,” Stadion 25 (1999), 114. 38Annette R. Hoffman and Gertrud Pfister, “Turnen – A Forgotten Movement Culture: Its Beginnings

42 The Prussian education ministry then adopted the type of Turnen advocated by Adolf Spiess.

Although similar to Jahn’s Turnen, Spiess’ variety placed a greater emphasis on drill as

physical education. Spiess promoted regimented discipline through monotonous and

repetitive exercises, which helped psychologically to subordinate the citizenry to the state.39

The introduction of a more militaristic Turnen within the education system was in part to

diminish the influence of the democratic middle-class Turnvereine.40 Turnen also became the

most important component of physical education taught within the military. The Prussian

Cadet Corps devoted more than half of its athletics manual to Turnen, noting that Turnen

would imbue cadets with “courage, determination, self-confidence, alertness, endurance,

strength, and agility,” all characteristics necessary for a strong military.41 The formal and

militaristic drill introduced by Spiess became the dominant form of physical education in

Imperial Germany, providing a unifying activity in motion and mentality within the military

and schools and gradually influencing the private Turnvereine as well.

As Turnen continued to grow at the end of the nineteenth century, the practise of other

sports developed concurrently and encroached upon the place of primacy held by Turnen

within Germany. The expansion of sport in general and the rise of international competition

led to the creation of the International Olympic Committee and other international sport

in Germany and Diffusion in the United States,” in Turnen and Sport: Transatlantic Transfers, ed. Annette R. Hoffman (Münster: Waxmann, 2004), 6. 39Orestis Kustrin and J.A. Mangan, “Lasting Legacy? Spartan Life as a Germanic Educational Ideal: Karl Otfried Müller and Die Dorier,” in Militarism, Sport, Europe: War without Weapons, ed. J.A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 41-2. 40Michael Krüger, “Body Culture and Nation Building: The History of Gymnastics in Germany in the Period of its Foundation as a Nation-State,” International Journal of the History of Sport 13, 3 (1996), 411. 41John Moncure, Forging the King's Sword: Military Education between Tradition and Modernization: The Case of the Royal Prussian Cadet Corps, 1871-1918 (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 227.

43 federations at the fin-de-siècle. The Turner viewed the practise of other sports, imported

from abroad, as un-German. Initially the Turner did not consent to participation in the

Olympic Games because a Frenchman, Pierre de Coubertin, founded them, and Jahn had

developed Turnen with an underlying anti-French basis. The Turner also felt slighted

because de Coubertin had not included any Turner to represent Germany within his new

International Olympic Committee.42 Furthermore, Turner continued to promote ideas of a

greater Germany even after unification, holding Turnfeste through 1913. International sport

organisations, however, relied largely on state boundaries which clearly contradicted the

Turner notion of Germany. In addition, sport organisations emphasised records (a

characteristic of modern sport) and recent sport stars, whereas Turner continued to praise

Jahn and past Turnen leaders.43 Eventually the animosity between the Turner and other

German sport leaders subsided, but Turner nonetheless continued their claims for the true

Germanness of Turnen.

After the German defeat in World War I and the military limitations imposed by the

Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to find alternative ways to rejuvenate the population.

Recollecting the strict provisions Napoleonic France imposed upon Prussia a century earlier,

Germans again turned to physical education and sport. A 1920 German school conference

reported that “the consequences of the war with its malnutrition and the effects of the peace

agreement, which we can not overlook, bring with it the danger that the physical capacity of

our youth and our entire nation are weakened and diminished in the long run. We must try to

42A. Krüger, “Germany,” 69-70; Christopher Mack, “The Idea of Sports in Germany, 1880-1936,” (Ph.D. diss, City University of New York, 2000), 273-75. 43Krüger, “Deutschland, Deutschland,” 116-7.

44 counteract systematically this danger.”44 The inclusion of Turnen within the Weimar physical education curriculum helped offset the loss of military service required of male citizens in

Imperial Germany. The French authorities again recognised this German strategy and dissolved any sport or Turnen club which threatened the security of their occupation of the

Rhineland after the First World War.45 Some Germans even supported a mandatory sport and

Turnen year to replace the loss of military service. A more successful proposal was the introduction of the national sport badge for youth in 1921.46

Once the occupation of Germany ended, German sport organisations no longer had foreign eyes observing their every move. Nonetheless, sport during the Weimar Republic enabled Germany to uphold a basic level of physical strength which could not be maintained through formal military training of its male citizens. In the later years of the Weimar

Republic, the “bourgeois” National Reich Committee for Physical Exercise (Deutscher

Reichsausschuß für Leibesübungen, DRA) had over seven million members. The leading worker sport association had grown from approximately 190,000 members before the First

World War to 1.2 million members by the late 1920s. The German Football Federation also had over one million dues-paying members.47 The fragmentation of the political landscape

44Reichschulkonferenz 1920 Amtlicher Bericht 1921quoted in R. Naul, L. Jonischeit, and U. Wick, Turnen, Spiel und Sport in Schule und Verein: Jugendsport zwischen 1870 und 1932 (Aachen: Meyer & Meyer Verlag, 2000), 86. 45Stefanie Woite-Wehle, Zwischen Kontrolle und Demokratisierung: die Sportpolitik der französischen Besatzungsmacht in Südwestdeutschland 1945-1950 (Schorndorf: Hofmann, 2001), 54. 46Roland Naul, “History of Sport and Physical Education in Germany, 1800-1945,” in Sport and Physical Education in Germany, ed. Roland Naul and Ken Hardman (London: Routledge, 2002), 23; Hermann Bach, “Sport in den Jugendverbänden im ersten Drittel unseres Jahrhunderts,” in Jugendsport im ersten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Hans-Georg John and Roland Naul (Clausthal-Zellerfeld: Oberharzer Druckerei H. Greinert OHG, 1988); Arnd Krüger, “The role of sport in German international politics, 1918-1945,” in Sport and International Politics: The Impact of Fascism and Communism on Sport, ed. Pierre Arnaud and James Riordan (London: E & FN Spon, 1998), 82. 47Erich Beyer, “Sport in der Weimarer Republik,” in Geschichte der Leibesübungen, Band 3/2, ed.

45 during the Weimar Republic was reinforced through the proliferation of sport clubs, with

Germans primarily joining sport organisations based upon their political and religious affiliation: social democratic, communist, Zionist, Catholic, or Protestant clubs.48

Once Hitler came to power in 1933, the Nazis consolidated sport organisations under their control and emphasised the militaristic characteristics of sport. Only one year into the

Third Reich Baldur von Schirach, the National Youth Leader, gained control of physical education from the DRA. The National Sport Leader (Reichsportführer), Hans von

Tschammer und Osten, became von Schirach’s deputy and was responsible for the integration of sport within the Hitler Youth (Hitler Jugend).49 The Deutsche Turnerschaft dissolved in

1935, and the individual Turner clubs that met Nazi membership requirements folded into the

DRA, now renamed the National Socialist Reich Association for Physical Exercise

(Nationalsozialistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen).50 The other sport organisations in the Third Reich followed suit under the policy of coordination (Gleichschaltung). German youth could then only participate in sport through the Hitler Youth, where all activities were designed to further Nazi aims. The Hitler Youth in particular favoured boxing, as well as team sports which furthered a sense of (Nazi) community; for girls, collective rhythmic

Horst Ueberhorst (Berlin: Bartels & Wernitz, 1982), 659; James Riordan, “The worker sports movement,” in The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century, ed. James Riordan and Arnd Krüger (London: E & FN Spon, 1999), 107; Hoffman and Pfister, “Turnen – A Forgotten Movement Culture,” 16-7; “The question of the league. – The unity of sport,” [n.d.], Box 964, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 48A. Krüger, “Germany,” 70; Beyer, 681-94. 49Under Tschammer und Osten, the Deutscher Reichsbund für Leibesübungen became simply Reichsbund für Leibesübungen, though often referred to as the Nationalsozialistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen. Gerhard Rempel, Hitler’s Children: The Hitler Youth and the SS (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 178. 50Ueberhorst, 79.

46 gymnastics emphasised the role of women as childbearers.51 As the Nazis continually increased the emphasis on sport and physical training in education and the Hitler Youth, sport became one of the prime activities which the Nazis used to develop service to the state, often drafting Hitler Youth members into the SS.

By 1937 the Guidelines for Physical Education in Boys’ Schools emphatically placed sport as a central component of National Socialist educational preparation for youth.

Physical education, as stated in the Guidelines, was “a fundamental and inseparable part of

National Socialist education” and “of the greatest importance” within the curriculum.52 The

Nazis saw physical education as more than the mere training of the body. Instead, “it is a training on the basis of the body, or through the body, that is to say, it reaches out to young people where they are most easily educable: in gymnastics, in play, in sport, in movement.”53

The racial ideology of the Nazis could be instilled in German youth through physical education because “it develops and forms body and soul, as the carriers of the racial heritage, through physical exercises rooted in Volkdom.”54 The Nazis usurped sport and imposed their own goals and teaching ideologies on physical education. Germans who wanted to participate in athletics accepted the presence of National Socialist ideology, some willingly and some reluctantly for the sake of competing. Youth, seen as the future of the movement and the Reich, learned sport and received their physical education only through the racial lens of National Socialism.

51Michael H. Kater, Hitler Youth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 30, 82. 52“Richtlinien für Leibeserziehung in Jungenschulen,” in George Mosse, Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich (New York: Schocken Books, 1966), 281. 53Ibid. 54Ibid.

47 Yet, for as much as sport was able to incorporate the racial ideology of National

Socialism, it provided a significant opportunity to prepare German boys for military training, particularly through the Hitler Youth and the attention given to marksmanship and terrain manoeuvres.55 The emphasis on physical training came directly from Hitler and was present from the early years of the Nazi Party. In Mein Kampf Hitler expounded on the importance of physical education over traditional academic education because the physically-fit German “is more valuable for the national community than a clever weakling.”56 Young men in the Third

Reich received at least two hours a day of physical training, sport, and gymnastics in the regular school system, and the youth at the elite Adolf Hitler Schools spent five hours a day on physical education and only two on other subjects.57 Hitler directly linked the physical training with the military, writing: “To what extent the conviction of physical ability promotes a man’s sense of courage, even arouses his spirit of attack, can best be judged by the example of the army.”58 Physical education and sport were thus emphasised by the Nazis specifically to strengthen the nation and prepare for war.

The National Socialists also used international sport in order to demonstrate the triumph of their state and political ideology. While this use of sport was not limited to Nazi

Germany during the interwar period or even the twentieth century as a whole, Hitler used whatever means necessary to demonstrate German superiority. Before 1930 Germany competed in less than twenty international sport events a year; the Nazis quickly increased

55Rempel, 179-82. 56Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralf Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 408. 57Ibid., 409; Rempel, 177; Kater, 50. 58Hitler, 411.

48 this participation to over thirty a year and 78 in 1935 alone.59 England and Germany had, since the end of the First World War, played only one football match, in Berlin in 1930. The return fixture in England did not take place until December 1935 in London. Although

England won the match 3-0, the British Foreign Office had believed in the lead-up to the game that a German victory would serve Nazi political propaganda, both at home and abroad, about a regime with the capabilities of beating England in any field.60 The following year

Hitler showcased his reinvigorated Germany to the world when Berlin hosted the Olympic

Games. Although at first reluctant to support the Games when he came to power, Hitler quickly realised the propaganda benefit to the Third Reich and provided the financial means to ensure the success of the 1936 Olympic Games when Germany still faced significant problems following the Great Depression.61 German support abroad was strong enough to avoid an Olympic boycott by any state, including a strong movement in the United States, although some individual athletes chose not to participate in the Games.62

After the success of the 1936 Olympic Games, the Nazi leadership desired that

Germany become the permanent Olympic host and also gain control over all international sport federations. Because of its war with China, Japan relinquished control of the 1940

Games, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) eventually awarded the Winter

59A. Krüger, “The role of sport in German international politics, 1918-1945,” 86. 60Peter J. Beck, Scoring for Britain: International Football and International Politics, 1900-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 180-1, 198. 61Arnd Krüger, “Germany: The Propaganda Machine,” in The Nazi Olympics: Sport, Politics, and Appeasement in the 1930s, ed. Arnd Krüger and William Murray (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 17-24. 62Stephen R. Wenn, “A House Divided: The U.S. Amateur Sport Establishment and the Issue of Participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympics,” Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 67, no. 3 (1996), 161- 171.

49 Games to Garmisch-Partenkirchen. These games as well were cancelled because of the

Second World War.63 Nonetheless, Germany’s invasion of Belgium in 1940 gave the Nazis an opportunity to gain control of international sport. International Olympic Committee

President Count Henri Baillet-Latour was Belgian, and Germany’s IOC members ensured his safety in occupied Belgium. The Olympic headquarters were in Switzerland, and the Swiss secretary and Swedish Vice President, J. Sigfrid Edström, hid the organisation’s files to ensure they did not fall into German hands.64 Not all international federations were as secure.

The Germans confiscated the records of the International Fencing Federation (Fédération

Internationale d’Escrime) from its Belgian President, Paul Anspach. German intelligence leader Reinhard Heydrich had gained control of fencing in Germany as the head of the fencing division (Reichsfachamtsleiter) within the National Socialist Reich Association for

Physical Exercise. The Gestapo imprisoned Anspach and took all of the fencing files to

Berlin in August 1940. Heydrich and the Italian member of the International Fencing

Federation resolved to run the organisation for the duration of the war.65

Some of the German ideas regarding the use of sport to build a strong population for eventual military service were not very different from Allied beliefs. One nineteenth-century

English public school headmaster stated that “games in which success depends on the united efforts of many, and which also foster courage and endurance, are the very life blood of the public school system.” These sporting endeavours helped with the main objective of the

63Swantje Scharenberg, “Sapporo/St. Moritz/Garmisch-Partenkirchen 1940,” in Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement, ed. John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 309-12. 64Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics and the Olympic Games (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1999), 76. 65Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXVIIme CONGRÉS, 8 November 1946, Fédération Internationale d’Escrime, Lausanne, Switzerland.

50 English public school: “the production of a grand breed of men for the service of the British

nation.”66 While these British ideas on sport appear to resemble the nineteenth and early

twentieth-century mentality regarding sport in Germany as well, here the two countries

differed in their choice of sport. The British games that fostered these qualities in men were

modern sports such as football, cricket, and other team sports in which one side wins and the

other loses. Although some Germans played these sports as well, the dominant role of

Turnen within German society and the education system instead emphasised collective action

without an immediate goal (victory through scoring more points, running the fastest, or

jumping the highest). Jean-Michel Faure has argued that the difference between gymnastics

and sport was that

gymnastics was for the masses, and was meant to encourage devotion to national causes. It aimed to create an autonomous individual who would freely employ his strength in the service of the state: a citizen who was at the same time a soldier. Sport was aimed at the ruling elites, for whom the pleasure of competition would legitimize the idea of confrontation.67

While Turnen might also invoke a united effort and instill endurance, it was not a game

between competitive sides but rather individual or mass exercises, often under the direction

of an instructor.

Thus, duelling, Turnen, and Nazism demonstrated to the Allies that the previous 150

years of sport in Germany were inextricably linked with politics and that their occupation

policies had to address these concerns to help build a new German state. Modern sports only

66Hely Hutchinson Almond quoted in J.A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology, 3d ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 56. 67Jean-Michel Faure, “Forging a French Fighting Spirit: The Nation, Sport, Violence and War,” trans. Peter Snowden, in Tribal Identities: Nationalism, Europe, Sport, ed. J.A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 78.

51 gained momentum after the unification of Germany, whereas fencing and Turnen contributed

to the unification movement and therefore were intertwined with national identity and ideas

of Germanness. Sport in Germany spanned the political system used by the left and right,

elites and masses, in order to achieve political aims. The close association of sport with the

military troubled the Allies, particularly as fencers and Turner had supported the unification

of Germany, which was ultimately achieved through a series of military victories. It was with

this reading of German sport history that the Allies assumed the power to reorganise sport in

Germany. This is not to say that a Sonderweg, or separate path, existed in German sport history which helped lead to the creation of the National Socialist state. However, these ideas regarding German sport prevailed among the Allied leadership fighting Hitler’s Germany, influencing their thinking as they prepared for the occupation of Germany. This relationship between sport and militarism had persisted in Germany even as the type of government changed. The Allies therefore had to include sport within their postwar plans for the occupation of Germany.

* * *

Wartime Planning and the Demilitarisation of Sport

Before the Allies made the final decisions on Germany at the Potsdam Conference, they had worked with each other throughout the course of the war to develop the policies regarding the treatment of Germany. Senior diplomats and other high-ranking Allied officials discussed sport as early as 1944 and throughout 1945. Policies developed within the wartime planning body of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) formed the basis of the earliest legislation passed by the quadripartite Allied Control Authority once its jurisdiction

52 over Germany was established. Although much of the wartime consideration of sport within the plans for occupied Germany came from the Americans, the resulting quadripartite policy,

Directive 23 on the Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany, reflected the concerns of all four Allies. Each Military Government developed separate policies to demilitarise, denazify, and decentralise German sport within the parameters specified in

Directive 23. The occupation powers, together within the Allied Control Authority and separately for each zone, established legislation on sport based on biases regarding their domestic sport programs as well as their assumptions about the militarism and nationalism contained within German sport.

At the 1943 Moscow Conference Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph

Stalin agreed to establish the European Advisory Commission to coordinate plans for the occupation of Germany. The EAC sat in London, with a senior member of the British

Foreign Office (William Strang) and the American and Soviet Ambassadors in London (John

Winant and Fedor Gousev, respectively) comprising its membership, along with their staffs.

The French ambassador (René Massigli) later joined the Commission. The EAC studied and recommended plans to their governments regarding the eventual surrender by and occupation of Germany.68 Both the British and Americans on the European Advisory Commission drafted approximately thirty directives which they submitted to their respective governments for approval before sharing with the other. The close relationship and similar policies throughout the occupation between the Americans and British developed from these

68Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 56; Alice Hills, Britain and the Occupation of Austria, 1943-45 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 45.

53 coordinated efforts in the European Advisory Commission. The Soviets, meanwhile, did not

prepare any such directives, or at least they did not share their plans with the other

members.69

By October 1944 the European Advisory Commission had already discussed

proposals on the unconditional surrender of Germany, the control of education within

Germany, and the elimination of Nazi organisations, but the American element felt an

additional proposal regarding the elimination of military training was necessary. The

proposed directive, written by the Americans on the European Advisory Commission,

demanded the closure of all organisations with “the open or secret conduct of military

training” as their purpose, “whether any of the mentioned organisations purport to be

political, educational, religious, fraternal, athletic or of any other nature.”70 When the Joint

Chiefs of Staff reviewed this EAC draft directive, they added the following clause to its text:

“No German parades, military or political, civilian or sports, shall be permitted anywhere in

Germany.”71 Hitler had utilised parades and sport to serve his political aims and generate

support, particularly in the early years of the Third Reich. Leni Riefenstahl’s movie of the

1934 Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg, Triumph of the Will, demonstrated the extent to

which parades glorified militarism in the Third Reich.72 Furthermore, the emphasis of sport

69Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for Information No. 318 – Draft Directive to the U.S. (U.K.) (U.S.S.R.) Commander-In-Chief, Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training in Germany, Note by the Secretaries, 2 October 1944, Box 76, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Geographic File, 1942-45, RG 218, NARA. 70Ibid. 71JCS 1124 – Joint Chiefs of Staff United States Draft Directive to Allied Commanders-In-Chief on “Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training in Germany”, 20 October 1944, Box 76, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Geographic File, 1942-45, RG 218, NARA. 72Triumph des Willens, directed by Leni Riefenstahl (Germany: Leni Riefenstahl Produktion, 1934).

54 and militarism within the Hitler Youth and its frequent participation in parades provided the

public displays of support of the regime.

This inclusion within the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s discussion of the elimination of

military training centred on the ideas contained with JCS 1067 that Germany should be

prevented from again posing a threat to the world. This American proposal became the basis

for the Potsdam Declaration and quadripartite legislation within the Allied Control Authority.

JCS 1067 also stipulated that all schools would remain closed until the conditions permitted

for their reopening, in particular the removal of Nazi features and personnel.73 This

educational component of JCS 1067 would play an important role as the Allies considered

sport a function of the school system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved their revised

version of their EAC counterparts’ draft directive, at which point it received the official

designation as JCS 1124. In fact, the inclusion of sport contained within JCS 1124 repeated

exactly what the still secret JCS 1067 stipulated within its political section, that “no German

parades, military or political, civilian or sports, shall be permitted.”74 While JCS 1067

prohibited military education and training, no European Advisory Commission draft laws

explicitly prevented these actions. In addressing concerns that existing legislation already

covered the prohibition of military training within Germany, the American military policy

planners countered that:

Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training is a fundamental and basic element of Allied long range policy. It is felt that it should be treated as a

73Tent, 41; “1945 Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067),” in U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), 26. 74“1945 Directive,” in U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949, 25.

55 separate and distinct matter and that a law regarding it should be presented to the Germans in a clear and unmistakable manner. It is further believed that if the pattern is set now, later conflicts and misunderstandings will be avoided.75

The Law for the Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training provided the immediate

policies with which to demilitarise Germany and actions to prevent German efforts “aimed at

keeping alive, receiving or promoting the military or Nazi spirit and institutions, or to glorify

war.”76 Thus, American personnel viewed JCS 1124, specifically on military training and

originally based on JCS 1067, as necessary for the occupation of Germany.77

Ultimately the European Advisory Commission was not able to finalise as many

postwar laws as initially intended, including making JCS 1124 an official policy of the

European Advisory Commission. The Americans attempted to coordinate with the British to

have a united front in the EAC regarding policy on Germany, including the Law for the

Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training. While the British agreed “to the general

desirability of such a law and the general scope of the proposed law,” the Americans

recognised that British views were “at variance with some points of detail in the draft and

they have not yet determined the exact proposals which they wish to make.”78 Nonetheless,

the basis for several of the earliest regulations approved by the Allied Control Council in the

fall of 1945 developed out of the work of the EAC.

75Carrier Sheet, F.M. Albrecht to US Group CC, 24 May 1945, Box 642, Records of the Executive Office – The Office of Adjutant General: Recs Relating to the Allied Control Council Laws, 1945-48, RG 260, NARA. 76Control Council Law No. 8, Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, 30 November 1945, Box 642, Records of the Executive Office – The Office of Adjutant General: Recs Relating to the Allied Control Council Laws, 1945-48, RG 260, NARA. 77Letter, J.E. Lewis to US Group CC, 1 March 1945, Box 642, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: Recs Relating to the Allied Control Council Laws, 1945-48, RG 260, NARA. 78Letter, James L. Williams to Chief of Staff, G-5 Division, 6 April 1945, Box 642, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: Recs Relating to the Allied Control Council Laws, 1945-48, RG 260, NARA.

56 The European Advisory Commission did, however, establish the quadripartite governing structure for the occupation of Germany: the Allied Control Authority (Figure 1).

The structure of the Military Governments that comprised the occupation of Germany, and the way in which the occupation functioned, consisted of several levels of organisation. The four military Generals, one from each zone, were the Military Governors. These four

Military Governors – General Joseph McNarney (United States), Field Marshal Bernard

Montgomery (Great Britain), Lt. Gen. Marie Pierre Koenig (France), and Marshal Georgi

Zhukov (USSR) – met three times a month in Berlin as the Allied Control Council. Their deputies – Generals Lucius Clay, Brian Robertson, Louis Koeltz, and Vassily Sokolovsky – comprised the Co-ordinating Committee, which met more often than the Control Council.

The Co-ordinating Committee, in addition to setting the agenda for Control Council meetings, settled points of disagreement so that the Control Council only needed to approve formally the legislation for the occupation. The Control Council debated the details of policies only when the Co-ordinating Committee was unable to achieve a consensus.79

Below the Control Council and Co-ordinating Committee sat several Directorates that addressed specific areas of administration. One of the directorates, the Military Directorate, developed laws and provided advice on issues dealing with the German military.80

One of the first laws passed by the Allied Control Authority was the Law for the

Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, originally proposed by the Americans

79Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1950), 35, 106. 80Ibid., 35. The specific sections of the Potsdam Declaration with which each Directive was to address within its functions was specified in CORC/P(45)2(Final) – Control Council Responsibilities Contained in the Report of the Tripartite Conference at Potsdam, 19 August 1945, Box 110, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Coordinating Committee (CORC): General Records, 1945-1948, RG 260, NARA.

57 Figure 1 – Allied Control Authority structure Guide to the Functions and Organisation of the Allied Control Authority and the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) Provisional, October 1945, FO 1050/157, NA.

58 within the European Advisory Commission and refined in the form of JCS 1124. The

Americans had already enacted a similar law (Law 154) in July 1945 within their zone based largely on a February 1945 meeting to transform JCS 1124 into a formal law for the military occupation of Germany.81 The American representative on the Allied Control Authority

Military Directorate introduced this law as a proposal for the entire Allied occupation of

Germany at the second meeting of the Military Directorate. Because the Americans understood that the Potsdam Declaration emphasised “the necessity of the complete demilitarization of Germany,” they introduced this law on military training as one element within the larger project of demilitarisation.82 The Law for the Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training called for the immediate removal of militarism from German life and included provisions to prevent a remilitarisation of society, but it contained no reference to sport.83 The original proposal drafted by the Military Directorate went to the Co-ordinating

Committee, which approved it in principle and then forwarded it to the Legal Directorate for

81Attending the meeting that drafted the Law for the Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training were members of the following branches: Legal Division; Demobilization Branch, Army (Ground) Division; Public Safety Branch, Internal Affairs Division; Education and Religious Affairs Branch, Internal Affairs Division; and Intelligence Branch, Army (Ground) Division. Minutes of Meeting, Draft Law, Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, 20 February 1945, Box 642, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: Recs Relating to the Allied Control Council Laws, 1945-48, RG 260, NARA. 82DMIL/P(45)3 – Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, 22 August 1945, Box 425, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Military Directorate (DMIL): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA; DMIL/M(45)2 – Minutes, Second Meeting, Military Directorate, 24 August 1945, Box 424, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Military Directorate (DMIL): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA. 83CONL/P(45)38 -- Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, 18 September 1945, Box 105, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Control Council (CONL): Master File, 1945-1956, RG 260, NARA; DLEG/P(45)23 – Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, 21 September 1945, Box 176, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority – Records of the Legal Directorate (DLEG): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA.

59 formal wording.84 Recognising the historical relationship between sport and militarism in

Germany, the Legal Directorate added sport to the law.85 Article V of the final version,

Control Council Law No. 8 signed on 30 November 1945, explicitly stated that “any evasion of the prohibitions of this law under the guise of sport or gymnastics is prohibited.”86 The

Allies fully grasped the connection between sport and militarism and ensured that their policies would not be undone through the field of sport.

Although the four powers approved the Law for the Elimination and Prohibition of

Military Training (Law No. 8) through the Allied Control Council and its subdivisions in the autumn of 1945, the Soviets did not feel that its inclusion of sport was strong enough to remove traces of militarism and Nazism from German sport. The Soviet representative to the

Military Directorate therefore introduced a law specifically concerning sport in November

1945, one week before Co-ordinating Committee sent law on the Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training to the Control Council.87 The Allied powers understood that Germans

84CORC/M(45)8 – Minutes, Eighth Meeting, Co-ordinating Committee, 17 September 1945, Box 138, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Coordinating Committee (CORC): Minutes of Meetings, 1945-1948, RG 260, NARA. 85DLEG/M(45)8 -- Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Legal Directorate, 14 October 1945, Box 173, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Legal Directorate (DLEG): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA. 86CORC/P(45)52 (Third Revise) -- Law on Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, 24 November 1945, Box 110, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Coordinating Committee (CORC): General Records, 1945- 1948, RG 260, NARA; CORC/M(45)23 -- Minutes, Twenty-Third Meeting, Co-ordinating Committee, 27 November 1945, Box 139, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Coordinating Committee (CORC): Minutes of Meetings, 1945-1948, RG 260, NARA; Control Council Law No. 8, Elimination and Prohibition of Military Training, 30 November 1945, Box 642, Records of the Executive Office – The Office of Adjutant General: Recs Relating to the Allied Control Council Laws, 1945-48, RG 260, NARA. 87DMIL/P(45)22 – Prohibition of Establishment and Functioning of Various Types of Sport Clubs, Associations, and any other Athletic Organizations in Germany, 17 November 1945, Box 425, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Military Directorate (DMIL): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA.

60 had used sport as a substitute for military training when the Treaty of Versailles imposed

restrictions on the German military and the ways in which the Nazis had utilised sport. The

Soviets claimed in their introduction of this law that

there have been in existence in Nazi Germany sport clubs, associations, and other athletic societies, which, in their organization, as well as in the aims of their activities, were clearly of a military and Nazi character and were actually organizations of a para-military type, whose purposes were not so much the improvement of the physical health of the population, as the preparation of Nazi-trained cadres for the German Army.88

The Soviets thus felt that this situation necessitated a general law prohibiting “the existence of sport clubs, sporting associations, and other athletic organizations of national or local scope.”89

Having recognised how the Germans utilised education and sport to further preparations for future military participation during both the Weimar Republic and Third

Reich, the quadripartite body adopted the Soviet proposal because its members understood that safeguards were necessary within education of the youth, the future of Germany.90

Believing, as did many of the officials who drafted wartime proposals for the occupation of

Germany, that the German nature was predisposed to militarism and aggression, the Military

Directorate thus advised: “It is natural that the continued existence or formation of such

sport organizations in any of the occupational zones of Germany will have a tendency to

88DMIL/P(45)22 – Prohibition of Establishment and Functioning of Various Types of Sport Clubs, Associations, and any other Athletic Organizations in Germany, 17 November 1945, Box 425, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Military Directorate (DMIL): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA. 89Ibid. 90DMIL/M(45)12-- Minutes, Twelfth Meeting, Military Directorate, 23-26 November 1945, Box 424, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Military Directorate (DMIL): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA.

61 revert to the previous methods of a military-athletic type of training of the German population

and will present considerable danger.”91 The Military Directorate strengthened the original

Soviet proposal by incorporating the prohibition within educational institutions “of sport

activities of military or assimilated military nature.”92 Although the Military Directorate

often addressed issues concerning how the Allies dealt with the former German military, they

also had an interest in preventing a renascent militarism among the population. Therefore,

the revised draft law also emphasised that the sports prohibited by this law for the German

population were in particular banned for the German youth.

The Co-ordinating Committee met on 6 December 1945 to discuss the revised Soviet

proposal, renamed the Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany, but they

believed the proposal needed additional clarification. Major General Echols, filling in for

American General Lucius Clay, believed that the original draft of the law was not clear

enough. Echols “was entirely in sympathy with the principles of this paper, but believed that

portions of it might be unduly restrictive; specifically, such games as football, which the

American Delegation believes could do much to promote the democratic way of life, might

come under the prohibition.” British General Brian Robertson supported the American

concerns, replying that “while all were agreed that strict measures must be taken to insure

that organized sports do not foster military training, all are equally agreed that it is necessary

to allow a healthy outlet for German youth.” The Coordinating Committee agreed that the

91DMIL/P(45)22, 2nd Revise – Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany, 26 November 1945, Box 425, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Records of the Military Directorate (DMIL): General Records, 1945-1946, RG 260, NARA. 92Ibid.

62 Internal Affairs and Communications Directorate (DIAC) should review and clarify the

directive “in order to insure that healthy, normal activities are not unduly restricted.”93

An ad hoc committee of the DIAC’s Public Safety and Education Branches submitted

a revised directive to the Internal Affairs and Communications Directorate, which then

finalised a copy for the Co-ordinating Committee to approve.94 The DIAC discussed only

one item at this extraordinary meeting: the draft law on the Limitation and Demilitarization

of Sport in Germany. The American representative, chairing the meeting, expressed that his

country’s philosophy regarding the control of German sport was “to encourage indulgence in

sports for reasons of health and reorientation of thinking among Germans.” Regarding the

content of the law, he stated that “a broad statement of desires strengthens, rather than

weakens prohibitions.” The Soviet representative, however, reminded the members of the

Directorate that “after the last war, although military sports were prohibited in Germany, no

document on this subject was given to the German people and that they had used military

sports in militarizing their nation.”95 Although the Americans and British supported the use

of sport as a positive aspect of the occupation, the Soviets and French ardently believed that

German sport was thoroughly militarised and Nazified, and thus strong controls were

necessary to prevent a future threat.

While the DIAC agreed to the general principles presented within the revised

93It is unclear if Echols meant American football or soccer. CORC/M(45)24 – Minutes, Twenty-fourth Meeting, Coordinating Committee, 6 December 1945, FO 1005/383, NA. 94CORC/P(45)180(Revise) – Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany, 10 December 1945, FO 1005/391, NA. 95DIAC/M(45)14 (Special Meeting) -- Minutes, Fourteenth Meeting (Special), Internal Affairs and Communications Directorate, 9 December 1945, Box 195, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Direct. Of Internal Affairs and Communication (DIAC): General Records, 1945-1948, RG 260, NARA.

63 directive, both the British and Russians argued for the inclusion of a list of prohibited sports.

The representatives easily agreed on certain sports to be included because of their obvious relationship to the military, such as shooting and parachuting. However, the British and

Soviets suggested additional sporting activities to ban based on each country’s military fears of past battles. The Soviet representative requested the prohibition of motoring, motorcycling, and skiing as organised sports or above local level. Germany twice invaded

Russia over land during the twentieth century and had used well-trained skiers in the invasion of Norway, and the Finnish army’s use of ski detachments caused difficulties for the Soviet military in 1939-40. Furthermore, the Nazis held a national drive in 1942 for Germans to donate skis for soldiers on the eastern front. Christel Cranz, the 1936 Olympic champion who won the first-ever women’s alpine gold medal, publicly gave her skis to start the campaign, which collected over 1.2 million pairs for the Germany army.96 With the DIAC unable to come to a consensus regarding these sports, their inclusion was left to the Co- ordinating Committee, who decided against this Soviet suggestion. The British, as an island state that historically feared an invasion across the Channel, requested that yachting and regattas be prevented for the Germans. Both the French and Americans wanted these sports removed from the Directive because only a small percentage of the population (and even smaller percentage of the population involved with sport) were able to participate in yachting and regattas as a result of the geographical and financial necessities required. The Allies removed yachting and regattas from the final version of Directive 23 but “with the

96Kater, 30; Reinhard Rürup, ed., 1936: Die Olympische Spiele und der Nazionalsozialismus, trans. Pamela E. Selwyn (Berlin: Arlon Verlag, 1996), 212; E. John B. Allen, The Culture and Sport of Skiing: From Antiquity to World War II (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), 179, 275-77.

64 understanding that the British and Soviet Zone Commanders would each prohibit these two

sports within their zones anyway”97 – the two zones which, incidentally, contained coastline.

In the final version Directive 23 prohibited “Aviation, Parachuting, Gliding, Fencing,

Military or Para-military drill or display, [and] shooting with firearms.”98 While five of the

six activities were actions used by modern militaries, the inclusion of fencing was the result

of the long tradition of duelling in Germany within the military and among university

students. The Allies, in particular the French and English who practised fencing as a sport

under the guidelines of the International Fencing Federation rather than as a form of military

preparation, recognised the importance of preventing an activity which reinforced the

militarism that pervaded German society. Although Directive 23 did not ban Turnen, the

Allies kept a close watch on the activities of the Turner clubs, especially the 1948 Turnfest at

the Paulskirche in Frankfurt to commemorate the one-hundredth anniversary of the 1848

Revolution.99

By the end of 1945, only a few months into the quadripartite occupation of Germany,

the four Allies had agreed that sport was important both to German society and to occupation

policy. The Allies recognised that sport contributed to military preparation, including within

their own countries, but that sport in Germany had helped foster a dangerous nationalism.

The Soviets introduced the proposal that became Directive 23, but the inclusion of sport

97CORC/P(45)(Revise) (DIAC/P(45)96) – Recommended Directive for the Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany, 10 December 1945, FO 1005/391, NA; CORC/M(45)26 – Minutes, Twenty-sixth Meeting, Coordinating Committee, 12 December 1945, FO 1005/383, NA. 98CORC/P(45)180 (Final) – Allied Control Authority Control Council Directive No. 23, 17 December 1945, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 99See chapter four for more on Turnen and the 1948 Turnfest. Letter, Harold C. Patrick to Austin Welch, 27 August 1948, Box 129, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA.

65 within demilitarisation first arose with the Americans. Regardless, all four powers agreed to the control of sport because the idea was already firmly ingrained with the policy makers in each zone by the time Directive 23 became formal policy.

* * *

Implementing Directive 23

As the quadripartite policy concerning sport only provided the guidelines, each

Military Government could implement Directive 23 as it saw fit. Within the Allied Control

Authority, a directive addressed procedural matters whereas laws contained penal clauses with punishment in Allied courts.100 The Allies therefore had to define what constituted military training and determine how to implement Directive 23 within their zones. Directive

23 solidified policies already introduced in the western zones and helped these three Military

Governments in formulating new policies. In addition, the Allies had to ensure that their existing zonal legislation supported Directive 23. Although the Americans, British, and

French each created their own laws to address sport, they nonetheless reinforced the goals of the occupation and the ideas established in Directive 23.

Even before Directive 23 provided a list of militaristic sports, the British had, by the summer of 1945, already established a list of sports not to be taught in their zone. If physical education within Great Britain helped develop the qualities necessary for the leaders of its country, then supporting sport in Germany could also help rebuild the occupied country. The

British Military Government instructed that physical training syllabi containing military

100Elmer Plischke, The Allied High Commission for Germany ([n.p.]: Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1953), 87.

66 training should not be approved. This July 1945 policy defined as militaristic, and thus prohibited, “shooting or weapon training of any kind, including practice with simulated weapons, but not including such generally accepted athletic pursuits as javelin, discus and hammer throwing and weight and shot putting.”101 The field events of athletics date to antiquity and the ancient forms of warfare, but by the twentieth century virtually anyone could participate in these pursuits. The British viewed these activities less as beneficial to modern military preparation than as events within the track and field program, largely because of women’s participation in discus and javelin (and shotput by 1948).

In early October the British added fencing to this list of prohibited sports because of the role of the duel in Burschenschaften and the military in Germany, and also because it could still be related to hand-to-hand combat during war.102 Although the British fenced according to the International Fencing Federation rules, the prohibition of fencing was justified because of its inclusion within the modern pentathlon, an Olympic event developed in 1912 to showcase the skills needed by a military courier: horseback riding, running, swimming, shooting, and fencing.103 With advances in technology, however, the skills of the modern pentathlon other than shooting became less important for the training of a modern soldier. Warfare moved away from man-to-man combat during the two World Wars, but the

101Memo, CWB to Oberpräsident, North Rhine Province, 25 July 1945, FO 1013/2179, NA. 102Memo, H. Walker for Director, Education Branch to Admin & Local Govt. Branch, 9 October 1945, FO 1050/12, NA. 103The modern pentathlon, created at the request of International Olympic Committee President Pierre de Coubertin, was first contested at the 1912 Olympic Games in Stockholm. The event “arose out of the romantic, rough adventures of a liaison officer whose horse is brought down in enemy territory; having defended himself with his pistol and sword he swims across a raging river and delivers the message on foot.” Union Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne et Biathlon release quoted in Bill Mallon and Ture Widlund, ed., The 1912 Olympic Games: Results for All Competitors in All Events, with Commentary (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2002), 230-1.

67 Nazis had continued to emphasise the importance of fencing. Heydrich’s interest in the sport,

and his efforts to draft all top fencers into the SS, reinforced the relationship between fencing

and militarism in Germany and, therefore, the need for its prohibition.

The British wanted to prevent a remilitarisation of Germany through sport and

implemented policies within their zone before Directive 23, but their early policies reflected

their belief that German sport organisations did not require strict control. The British drafted

a Military Government Instruction on Sports Clubs and Gatherings in September 1945 (two

months before the creation of Directive 23) that reminded Military Government officers that

they were “responsible for the supervision of all sports and physical culture [organisations]

within their area.”104 The British permitted sport clubs within their zone without requiring them to obtain a permit to hold meetings or competitions. They also did not classify sport club activities as public meetings, which were not allowed at the beginning of the occupation.

The British Military Government Instruction admitted that “the present relaxation of the restrictions upon their activity involved some risk that they may again be misused in this way; but it is considered that any attempt at continued repression or regimentation would defeat its own ends.”105 British concerns regarding German sport were thus not raised to the extent that

they were in the other zones, particularly at the beginning of the occupation.

The French were probably the most strict, implementing many controls on sport in

their zone based on previous uses of sport during occupation even before the introduction of

Directive 23. The Americans had included sport within their prohibition of political

104Mil Gov Instr No -- Sports Clubs and Gatherings, n.d. [September 1945], FO 1050/12, NA. 105Memo, Charles Bridge to DCA/Mil Gov, 22 August 1945, FO 1050/12, NA; Mil Gov Instr No __ -- Sports Clubs and Gatherings, n.d. [September 1945], FO 1050/12, NA.

68 activities in JCS 1067, JCS 1124, and the European Advisory Commission draft directive.

The Soviets introduced Directive 23 within the Allied Control Authority. These actions clearly demonstrated a concern by the Americans and Soviets with German sport. By the autumn of 1945, however, the French had already banned Turnen, fencing, gliding, paramilitary training (Geländesport), and shooting in their zone. The French recognised the physical preparation and patriotic nationalism that Turnen had promoted in rallying Germans to fight France in each of the wars of the previous 150 years, and they insisted on preventing

Turnen from again fomenting anti-French and nationalistic ideas. In addition, the French only allowed organisations that permitted several sports rather than clubs for just one sport.

They introduced this policy because, as the French youth and sport officers explained to the

British Military Government, “in France the small sports groups were the best cover for the

Resistance Movement, while a large group can be more easily supervised and the members do not get to know each other well enough to organise underground activities.”106 The

French considered the experience of sport clubs from the German occupation of France when developing their policies for Germany.

Once the Allied Control Authority passed Directive 23, the French, like the other three powers, had to bring their earlier zonal policies into agreement with the new quadripartite legislation, but they still maintained tight control over German sport. The

French passed two pieces of legislation on 4 February 1946 to implement Directive 23 in their zone of occupation. Ordonnance 33 authorised the constitution of sport associations in

106Visit of Representatives of Youth and Sport Section, Education Branch, French Occupational Control in Germany, 25 October 1945, FO 1050/1293, NA.

69 the French zone, stipulating that clubs practising sport or physical education must achieve only those ends and no others within their organisations.107 Arrêté 40 provided additional clarification for the creation of sport associations. The French continued to demand that sport organisations be omni-sport clubs, associations where people could participate in several different sports, even after the introduction of Directive 23.108 The sports comprising these clubs were: football, handball, basketball, and any two authorised, individual sports.109

The only exceptions were for sports which required specific locations or equipment that could not readily be accommodated with other sports, “such as winter sports, cycling, equestrian sports, tennis, golf, polo and cricket.”110 The French Military Government wanted

Germans to form multi-sport clubs “in order to avoid the proliferation of these clubs, thereby reducing the number of sites required for their existence and especially to facilitate their control.”111 The French thus viewed the control of sport associations from the practical considerations of space, which was at a premium following the physical destruction of the war. They also recognised the limitations as an occupation power of their own ability to govern the Germans while at the same time build the Fourth Republic in France. The

107General Koenig, Ordonnance No. 33 autorisant la constitution d'associations sportives dans la Zone Française d'Occupation, 4 February 1946, AC 78/2, Direction Generales des Affaires Culturelles, Bureau des archives de l'Occupation française en Allemagne et en Autriche, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Colmar, France. Hereafter cited AOFAA. 108In her discussion of omni-sport clubs and their codification with Arrêté 40, Stefanie Woite-Wehle states that, “it is unclear when the Military Government decided upon this type.” However, it is clear from the October 1945 visit of French officials to the British zone that this policy was already in place in the French zone. It was not, as Woite-Wehle believes, a decision made following the creation of Directive 23. Woite- Wehle, 87. 109E. Laffon to Messieurs les Délégués Supérieurs, 26 February 1946, AC 78/2, AOFAA. 110E. Laffon, Arrêté No 40 de l'Administrateur Général portant application de l'Ordonnance No 33 du 4. Février 1946 sur l’autorisation des associations sportives dans la Zone Française d'Occupation, 4 February 1946, AC 78/2, AOFAA. 111E. Laffon to Messieurs les Délégués Supérieurs, 26 February 1946, AC 78/2, AOFAA.

70 creation of omni-sport clubs automatically limited the number of sport organisations that would require registration and oversight, therefore enabling French Military Government officers to address other issues rather than focus solely on sport.

Because Directive 23 did not prohibit Turnen, the French had to remove their ban on

German gymnastics once Directive 23 came into effect, but the omni-sport club structure reassured the French that Turnen would not resume its militaristic tendencies. The French believed that “the introduction of the omni-sport club system makes it virtually impossible to reconstruct associations in the old, traditional form ([such as] Turnverein, the cradle of

Prussian nationalism, anti-democratic and anti-worker associations, the breeding ground of

National Socialism, Nazi racist and pan-German organisations).”112 The French, more than the other occupation powers, affirmed the nationalistic roots of German sport. The French recognised that the Germans considered Jahn “one of the heroes of the Prussian liberation...

[who] formed his organisations with the goal of military preparation and resistance to the

French.”113 To the French, then, this German attitude regarding Jahn showed that a great danger remained if former Nazis were entrusted with the training of youth.

The French were the only one of the three western occupation powers to create a new type of sport association, whereas the Americans and British approved sport clubs as they each submitted an application to the proper Military Government authorities detailing their democratic and non-Nazi nature. Directive 23 required all previous athletic organisations to dissolve by 1 January 1946. New sport associations then had to submit a democratic

112E. Laffon to Messieurs les Délégués Supérieurs, 26 February 1946, AC 78/2, AOFAA. 113Schmittlein, Note Explicative, 22 January 1946, AC 78/2, AOFAA.

71 constitution and list of members, including their denazification status, in order for the

Military Governments to approve the organisation. The British, who had not initially required the registration of sport clubs, therefore introduced the mandatory registration of sport associations in their zone after the Allied Control Council passed Directive 23. The

Military Governments required these lists to ensure that the leaders of these new sport clubs had not been active members of the Nazi Party, particularly as members of the SA, SS, or

Hitler Youth. The American Military Government informed its officers that athletic organisations “are to be considered as private, voluntary associations and as such will be subject to civil control only to the extent normally required by associations of a similar nature.”114 While sport clubs had to register with the Military Governments, the Allies did not want to control them, as the Nazis had done, but rather ensure the private, voluntary, and recreational aspects of sport.

The Allies avoided governmental, structural, or associational organisation reminiscent of the Third Reich, and Directive 23 therefore decentralised German sport by restricting organisations to the local district (Kreis) level. The French had already restricted sport organisations to the local level from early in the occupation, and Directive 23 maintained this limitation once passed in December 1945. Provincial (Land) associations were only allowed with the permission of the Military Governor as long as they were “strictly limited to those sports that could not possibly have any military significance,” but Germans could not form zone-wide or inter-zonal sport organisations.115 Although the Allies did not provide a list of

114Letter, Bryan L. Milbrun to Directors, OMG-Bavaria, OMG-Greater Hesse, OMG-Wurttemberg- Baden, 15 March 1946, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 115CORC/P(45)180 (Final) – Allied Control Authority Control Council Directive No. 23, 17 December

72 permissible sports, their exhaustive discussions regarding what sports to include on the list of prohibited sports contained within Directive 23 meant that all sports not listed were permitted because they were not militarily significant.

By emphasising the local character of youth and sport organisations and preventing their funding from public or private bodies outside of the Kreis, the Allies hoped to recreate a sense of community among Germans in marked contrast to the state-controlled organisations run by the Nazis. The Allies recognised that the Hitler Youth removed youth from the home and community and “turned the normal healthy pleasures of childhood and adolescence to the service of a wicked cause.” Instead, the new clubs “must have a healthy purpose. The purpose will not be healthy unless it takes account of the just claims of the individual child, his home, his school, the community in which he lives and the greater community which is the world.”116 With this message the British demonstrated their belief that the relevant relationships were the local community and the international community, not the provincial, zonal, or German community. The Americans supported a restriction on the zonal-level organisation of youth groups in order to avoid promoting state-run youth groups similar to the structure of the Hitler Youth.117 These two levels of community – local and international – fostered by the Allies were the only two permitted during the first years of the occupation.

The western Allies, in particular the Americans linked the certification of athletic

1945, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 116Commander-in-Chief’s Personal Notes on the Present Situation, Appendix A – Draft Message to the German People of the British Zone, August 1945, FO 1050/12, NA. 117Memorandum, Konrad Kellen to Acting Chief of Intelligence, 20 December 1945, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

73 organisations and their leaders to educational requirements, which reinforced the positive relationship between sport and general health of population and assisted with the demilitarisation of sport. The American Military Government actually developed an extensive list of permitted sports to promote health, hygiene and recreation: bicycling, golf, hiking, mountain-climbing, playground ball and baseball, rowing, canoeing, skiing, sledding, skating, ice hockey, soccer, rugby, football, basketball, handball, volleyball, badminton, tennis, hockey, swimming, track and field events, wrestling, and boxing. This instruction further stipulated that sport organisation leaders would be subject to the same denazification standards that existed for teachers.118 Leaders of athletic associations had an influential role over youth comparable to that of educators, and the American Military Government believed that the denazification of sport leaders should follow educational standards.

The French may have mandated stricter controls on German sport as compared to the

British and Americans, but all three western occupation powers shared the same goals of the demilitarisation and decentralisation of sport in Germany. Directive 23 provided a uniform policy regarding sport among the occupation powers. The British and French had already created legislation regarding sport in their zones prior to the creation of Directive 23, with one power lax (Great Britain) and the other much stricter (France). The passage of Directive

23 in December 1945 forced the occupation powers to harmonise their policies with the quadripartite decisions taken by the Allied Control Authority. Regardless of whether the

British, Americans, or French implemented their laws in the summer of 1945 or after the

118Letter, Bryan L. Milburn to Directors, OMG-Bavaria, OMG-Greater Hesse, OMG-Wurttemberg- Baden, 15 March 1946, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

74 creation of Directive 23, all of the western powers’ legislation concerning sport worked toward the demilitarisation, denazification, and decentralisation of German sport. Banning national associations of clubs minimised the transfer of ideas and the formation of a cohesive national identity. Preventing militaristic sports and limiting others (such as Turnen) enabled the Allies to promote sports they considered harmless or the best representatives of fair play and sportsmanship. By implementing the general aims of the Potsdam Conference within sport, the Allies hoped to break the historical relationship between sport, including Turnen and fencing, and a militaristic national identity in Germany.

* * *

Conclusion

The members of the Allied Control Authority were not the first people to expound the relationship between sport, militarism, youth, and democracy. By 1941 American author

John R. Tunis believed a natural relationship existed between sport and democracy, arguing that both sport and democracy combined law, equality, and justice.119 Tunis believed that “to learn these three principles when one is young, means that they will stick.”120 Sport allowed youth to take responsibility for organising and running their games and therefore reinforced democratic principles. By contrasting the democratic ideals of sport with the ways in which the totalitarian governments at the time utilised sport, Tunis argued that the purposes underlying sport in Nazi Germany had removed the positive benefits from the act of participating in sport. Totalitarian sport, often in the form of regimented athletics, kept youth

119John R. Tunis, Sport and Democracy (New York: A. S. Barnes & Co, 1941), 38. 120Ibid., 38, 43-44.

75 busy. It also prevented “insurgent and actively alert elements from thinking too hard about internal conditions.”121 Sport was a “weapon of propaganda” for those regimes, such as when

Italy claimed its football victory over England demonstrated the superiority of fascism. The athletic program in the Third Reich “developed unthinking submission to discipline, and produced a cadre of cannon fodder susceptible to the doctrines of the Nazi regime.”122 The primary goal of totalitarian sport was therefore to provide men capable of defending their homeland. The same year that Tunis’ work on sport and democracy appeared, historian Peter

Viereck published his critique of Germany, Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German

Romantics to Hitler. Viereck also recognised the importance of sport to Nazi Germany, in particular Turnen, calling Jahn “the First Storm Trooper.”123 Viereck argued that the institutions created by Jahn built the foundation upon which Hitler created the Third Reich.124

The Allies used these contemporary ideas regarding the history and nature of German sport as the basis of their occupation policies for Germany. They viewed fencing and Turnen within the long process of German unification in the nineteenth century and saw their legacy intertwined with national identity and Germanness. The Allies stressed the militarism of

German sport, in particular Turnen and fencing, while neglecting a similar relationship within their own sport history. Instead, they believed that the ideas of health, fair play, and sportsmanship, what they considered the basis of their domestic sports, could foster a positive and democratic role for sport in Germany following the removal of the most dangerous elements of sport associated with the Third Reich. These contrasting ideas on the use of

121Tunis, 15. 122Ibid., 11-12. 123Viereck titled chapter four, “Father Jahn, the First Storm Trooper”. Viereck, 63-89. 124Ibid., 88.

76 sport guided Allied actions during the occupation and the first few years of the Federal

Republic of Germany.

The Allies took measures to ensure Germany’s demilitarisation in order to prevent a recurrence of its remilitarisation; they also implemented policies to secure the general denazification of society after the establishment of four-power control in Germany. The relationship between sport and national identity within German history as well as the ways in which the Nazis had used sport necessitated, in the eyes of the occupation powers, the implementation of controls on sport activities in order to achieve the goals established at

Potsdam. Directive 23 imposed restrictions on sport to help achieve the removal of militarism, Nazism, and centralisation from German society, but it also provided the ability of sport to be used positively in the reconstruction of Germany. Germany’s sporting traditions demonstrated just how deeply militarisation was entrenched in German society.

Gymnastics in Great Britain was predominantly associated with female physical education in order to foster good posture, grace, and agility, whereas in Germany the sport developed in order to prepare men for military service.125 In addition, the Third Reich’s centralisation of youth organisations, co-optation of sport clubs and associations, and imposition of ideology on sport club members necessitated that the occupation powers address the control of sport within the context of the Potsdam Declaration. While the Allies did not want to prohibit all sporting activities, they believed that specific legislation was necessary to assist with demilitarisation, denazification, and decentralisation.

125Richard Holt, “Contrasting Nationalisms: Sport, Militarism and the Unitary State in Britain and France before 1914,” in Tribal Identities: Nationalism, Europe, Sport, ed. J.A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 44.

77 The Director of Public Education in the French zone, Raymond Schmittlein, expressed the Allied sentiment best when he wrote in a memorandum to the French Military

Government officers that “care must be taken to make sure that [sport] does not return to the

German tradition of pre-military training.”126 In order to achieve that aim, the Allied Control

Authority passed Directive 23, and each Military Government then harmonised its policies with the quadripartite legislation. The introduction of Directive 23 was not the only instance when individual Military Governments adjusted their sport policies to provide to a common stance regarding sport. Yet, Directive 23 did not separate politics and sport in Germany as the occupation powers had intended. Following the abrupt denazification, demilitarisation, and decentralisation of sport resulting from Directive 23, the Allies helped democratise the

Germans through sport – but with very different notions of democracy on both sides of the iron curtain. The western Military Governments directed much of these efforts of democratisation through sport toward the youth, believing they could successfully introduce hygiene, fair play, and democracy through physical education and sport.

The quadripartite debates regarding the necessity of and provisions contained within

Directive 23 reflected the national concerns of each Allied power, and this truly quadripartite piece of legislation influenced the postwar development of sport in all of postwar Germany.

The Soviets introduced the law that became Directive 23 within the Allied Control Authority, but the Americans had developed the underlying principles within the European Advisory

Commission and Joint Chiefs of Staff before the end of the Second World War. Jessica

Gienow-Hecht, in her examination of American cultural diplomacy through the life of the

126Schmittlein, Note Explicative, 22 January 1946, AC 78/2, AOFAA.

78 Military Government-sponsored newspaper, Neue Zeitung, argues that the cultural vision set by the State Department in Washington rarely, if ever, found its way to the Military

Government officers on the ground in Germany. Gienow-Hecht demonstrates that cultural transmission instead depended on mid-level officers in the Military Government.127 In the case of youth and sport programs, however, it was both the highest officials in the American government, through the European Advisory Commission and Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the regional Military Government officers in charge of the branches within education divisions that ensured sport held a place of importance within the occupation of Germany.

The American Military Government implemented demilitarisation and democratisation within sport and youth programs in Germany, and the British and French developed comparable policies across their zones as well. The development of Directive 23 allowed for all levels of Military Government to address sport, in particular as a way to teach the

Germans about democracy.

127Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 5, 182.

79 Chapter 2

Game Plan for Democracy: Public Diplomacy and Sport

The encouragement of youth activities will have as its purposes the constructive use of leisure time and the successful development of democracy in terms of ideas, initiative, responsibility and the practice of democratic procedures. –Brigadier General Bryan L. Milburn1

In 1946 the American Military Government’s promotional material on the German

Youth Activities (GYA) program described the actions of a single soldier who, in his free time, began teaching American sports to German youth. This literature about the GYA’s origins helped foster a positive image of the occupation, explaining how the program began and what it aimed to do.

For weeks they had watched GIs play softball. It seemed strange and yet fascinating, and with the eager kid-worship of anything physically skillful they had wanted to try. And now the GI, that smiling kid-lover, was standing behind each to show how to catch or hit or throw. [...] The same thing might have happened anywhere in Germany [....] But this was in the Bremen Enclave, and there was a definite policy behind it. In teaching soft-ball, American soldiers and officers had the idea that they might instill an understanding or fairplay, and with smiles and frowns they stuck by their young charges, by practice showed what sportsmanship and good-natured teamplay were.2

The success of the initiative of this one soldier in Bremen, with the support of his superior officers, led to the formal establishment in April 1946 of the German Youth Activities

1Letter, Bryan L. Milburn to Directors, OMG-Bavaria, OMG-Greater Hesse, OMG-Wuerttemberg- Baden, 1 April 1946, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of the Adjutant General: Recs Rel to Changes to Military Govt Regulations, 1945-49, Box 649, RG 260, NARA. 2“Experiment Bremen,” 19 May 1946, Box 149, Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division, RG 260, NARA; “Democracy in Khaki,” n.d., Box 140, Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division, RG 260, NARA.

80 program across the entire American zone. Although the GYA program implemented by the

American military encompassed a wide range of activities, it maintained sport as one of its central components.

While the German Youth Activities program presented a heartwarming story during the difficult first year of the occupation, it nonetheless helped address a growing concern for the occupation powers: the problem of juvenile delinquency. The Nazis had coopted all extra-curricular activities for German youth into the Hitler Youth and its sister organisation, the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher Mädel). Following the Allied victory and forced closure of all Nazi organisations, German youth were thus left with no organised activity groups nor an educational system, which had ceased functioning in the last year of the war. The collapse of the Third Reich and Nazi organisations, as the British noted,

“brought nothing to replace them but a spiritual vacuum and political confusion.”3 These problems, combined with the difficulty faced by Germans of obtaining basic necessities such as food and shelter for survival, meant that juvenile delinquency became increasingly problematic in Germany. In announcing the German Youth Activities program the

Americans stressed that “juvenile delinquency is in inverse proportion to the extent of sponsored youth activities.”4 The Military Government therefore actively promoted programs for youth. Youth Activities officers throughout the American zone consistently reported a high participation in the German Youth Activities program by young Germans, from 289,084

3Memo, German Political Branch, Political Division, CCG(BE), 28 March 1946, FO 1050/82, NA. 4Teletype Message, Ben H. Brown, Jr. to Adcock, 6 April 1946, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

81 in August 1946 to 1,072,322 by February 1947.5 The Americans believed that as more

German youth participated in the GYA and similar programs, the rate of juvenile delinquency would decrease.

The Allies realised that they needed to provide new opportunities for German youth to participate in positive physical activity after the state-controlled monopoly of these programs during the Third Reich. While the restrictions placed on sport via the Allied Control

Authority’s Directive 23 immediately addressed the punitive functions of the occupation, physical education tied sport to the reconstructive efforts of the Military Governments. Even in the summer of 1945 the western Allies realised that sport, particularly for the youth who had lived almost their entire lives under Nazi rule, could be utilised as a way to introduce democratic ideas to a wide segment of the German population. All three of the western occupation powers entrusted officers within their Military Governments with overseeing the youth programs for Germans. While the United States Army sponsored the German Youth

Activities program, the majority of the assistance provided for German youth was a combination of Military Government and German initiative. The three western Allies expanded their programs, which focussed primarily on exchanges of Germans from their own zone, to include exchanges with the other two western occupation powers and other western

European democracies. Knowing that they could not do all the work themselves, the occupation powers also cooperated with organisations at home to help develop and

5Participation was based on “Youth Days,” calculated as “One youth participating in GYA once during part or all of a day during the month equals one youth day for the month for statistical purposes. If an event is held ten times during the month and an average of 10 youths attended each time, the result would be 100 youth days for the month.” Youth Activities, Report on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation, 31 March 1947, Box 117, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA.

82 implement Military Government programs of public diplomacy to democratise and reeducate the Germans.

Public diplomacy, as defined by Hans Tuch, is “a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”6 While cultural relations – the exchange of art, culture, and people – between countries has generally been viewed separately from the traditional diplomatic exchanges of ambassadors and correspondence, the growth of public diplomacy has eroded much of the divide between the two, particularly as both variations of diplomacy aim to build trust and

“win the hearts and minds” of the foreign public over time.7 Dutch political scientist Jan

Melissen claims that the new public diplomacy will rely on collaboration with non- governmental agencies both at home and abroad in order to capitalise on both local and diplomatic expertise.8 However, this cooperation between the government representatives and non-governmental organisations was the basis of much of the public diplomacy programs developed by the three western occupation powers in Germany.

The programs for sport and physical education initiated by the western Allies during the occupation of Germany were exactly what Melissen and his colleagues are describing as the new public diplomacy of today. Following the introduction in 1947 in the American zone of JCS 1779, which emphasised “the physical, political, and cultural reconstruction of

6Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 3. 7Jan Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in Jan Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 21-2. 8Ibid., 22.

83 Germany as part of and prerequisite to European recovery,”9 the western Allies increased in scope and size the exchanges of experts and leaders within their public diplomacy efforts. As the Cold War took shape and the division of Germany appeared more permanent, the three western powers expanded their public diplomacy programs. The Americans took the lead in developing and funding these programs, particularly those which addressed sport, because the

United States came out of World War II with a renewed economy and, unlike its European

Allies, did not have to rebuild its infrastructure resulting from the destructiveness of war.

The occupation of France and the bombing of Britain during the war both demanded a greater allocation of finances for postwar domestic reconstruction than providing funds to rebuild

Germany.

Although the early tasks of the Youth Activities officers within the Military

Governments approved acceptable youth organisations and ensured that these clubs were not authoritarian, their work with the Germans assisted with the development of programs to foster democratic ideals among the youth. Falling under the guidelines of reeducation and democratisation, these programs primarily involved Germans meeting with citizens of the victorious powers, often through exchanges of youth, leaders, and experts. The simultaneous creation of comparable programs within each of the three western zones demonstrates the importance placed upon the inculcation of democratic ideas among German youth and the benefits of cultural interaction and learning through experience. The Americans, British, and

French actively used public diplomacy within physical education, sport programs, and the

9Henry J. Kellermann, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany, 1945-1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 20.

84 exchange of experts and youth leaders to help achieve the aims of the occupation, in

particular the democratisation of the German people.

* * *

Targeting German Physical Education

As the focus of the occupation powers shifted from the punitive measures of

denazification, demilitarisation, and decentralisation to the more positive and reconstructive

‘D’ – democratisation – the emphasis placed on reeducation increased. The Allies needed to

return the educational system to a functional capability as soon as possible by providing the

infrastructure for schools, but also for the well-being of the youth and the future of Germany.

The final months of the war ground the German education system to a halt from a practical

standpoint, but the twelve years of the Third Reich completely disrupted the educational

nature of the German school system in its ability to teach the youth of Germany the basics

(and advanced components) of any subject within the curriculum.10 Particularly troubling to

the Allies was the extensive time spent on physical education in the Nazi schools and the

militaristic activities contained therein; the occupation policies on German education

therefore addressed these concerns.

Prior to entering Germany, the Allies believed that youth, having only ever lived

under National Socialism, would constitute a “lost generation.” Once the American

Information Control Division had an opportunity to speak with Germans, both prisoners of

war and youth within Germany, interrogations “revealed that the Nazi system of

10James Tent, Mission On the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40-2.

85 indoctrination had been only partially successful, that the number of true fanatics was very

small and that particularly among the youngest a good share of the Nazi teachings were

rejected.”11 As the Allies worked with the Germans during the occupation, these interactions reinforced the weakness of Nazi ideas among German youth. The Allies thus granted a general amnesty to all Germans born after 1 January 1919, except for those Germans classed as major offenders or offenders, categories which implied ardent support of the Nazi Party.

In reflecting upon this policy change from the summer of 1946, General Lucius Clay stated that the Germans who had been fourteen years old or younger when Hitler came to power in

1933 “had had little chance to know anything but Nazi ideology and they could not be excluded from society if they were to be rehabilitated.”12 With the majority of youth able to

participate fully within German society, the Allies directed their efforts regarding the youth

toward reconstruction rather than concentrating their actions on denazification and

demilitarisation.

Because education in the Third Reich prepared German boys for military training, the

Allies agreed in the Potsdam Declaration that they would control education in Germany “to

eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of

11Letter, Konrad Kellen to Acting Chief of Intelligence, 20 December 1945, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File). 1945- 49, RG 260, NARA. 12Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1950), 260; Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, 2d ed., vol. 1, From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1993), 74-5; G.H. Garde to Directors, OMG-Bavaria, OMG-Greater Hesse, OMG-Wuerttemberg-Baden, OMG-Bremen Enclave, OMG-Berlin District, 8 July 1946, Box 966, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. The French did not implement the amnesty until 2 May 1947 with the promulgation of Ordonnance 92. “Ordonnance No. 92 portant amnistie de la Jeunesse,” Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne (5 May 1947), 700-01.

86 democratic ideas.”13 Although democratisation was included within the initial principles to

govern Germany, all three of the western Allies concentrated on removing Nazism and

militarism from education before addressing the actual benefits of education. As a result, the

policies guiding reeducation were not made official at the beginning of the occupation.14

Nonetheless, Military Government personnel responsible for education worked toward the

“cultural and moral re-education” that was necessary “to restore the stability of a peaceful

German economy and to hold out hope for the ultimate recovery of national unity and self-

respect.”15 Both physical education in the schools and sport in general could contribute to

this moral reeducation. Robert Birley, Educational Adviser in the British zone, noted a shift

in education policy in 1947 when the Americans and British transferred control of education

to German authorities. Military Government activities were then confined “to a general

supervision and the giving of advice and assistance.”16 Birley also commented that rigid

control in the French zone minimised the distinction of the two periods with respect to

actions by its Military Government.17

Although each occupation power established its own education policies for the

German Länder falling under its control, they ultimately worked toward the same goal. The

same branches of the Military Governments that controlled education also organised the

13“Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference [Extracts],” in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 1985), 57. 14For the American zone, see Tent, 29-39. 15Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-Education (SWNCC 269), 16 May 1946, Box 121, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 16Robert Birley, “Education in the British Zone of Germany,” International Affairs 26, no. 1 (Jan. 1950), 32. 17Ibid.

87 youth policies and programs: Education and Religious Affairs (and after reorganisation in

1948, Education and Cultural Relations) in the American zone, Education in the British zone, and Éducation Publique in the French zone. Youth and sport activities fell under the purview of education divisions because of the central component of democratisation. John G. Dixon was the Chief Sports Officer for the British zone, and G. Du Mesnil was Chef du Bureau des

Sports in the French zone. The primary officers who dealt with sport in the American zone were L.E. Norrie at the zonal level, Austin Welch (Hesse), Aksel Nielsen (Wuerttemberg-

Baden), Harold Patrick (Hesse and later Bavaria), and Edward Ladd (Bremen).18 These men implemented policies within their areas of jurisdiction and met together throughout the occupation to coordinate actions and share information across the zones.

The early policies that addressed physical training and education in the three western zones reinforced the demilitarisation expressed in the Potsdam Declaration. In November

1945 the British summarised all of their Education Control Instructions in one comprehensive directive on Education, Youth Activities and German Church Affairs. Again the British stressed the prohibition of physical training that included militaristic exercises within education, requiring the elimination from class syllabi of all “physical training features or exercises which you [the Military Government officer] consider are designed for or likely to lead to the preparation for, or participation in, any war-like activity.”19 In contrast to the heavy emphasis by the Nazis on physical and military training, the French limited physical

18Bremen and Bremerhaven, although located in the British zone, became part of the American zone after the United States demanded access to a port during the zonal negotiations from September 1944 to February 1945. Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 90-101. 19Directive on Education, Youth Activities and German Church Affairs, 22 November 1945, FO 1050/148, NA.

88 education in their zone to two or three hours a week in the schools.20 While the French

would have preferred a set course of instruction for the schools, the low number of qualified

instructors and lack of sufficient equipment as late as mid-1947 prevented more

standardisation.21 Within the American zone the guiding document on education was the

Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-Education, initially drafted in May 1945 by

education consultants for the State Department. Once the State-War-Navy Coordinating

Committee approved a revised version a year later, it became known as SWNCC 269.22 The

delay in making SWNCC 269 official policy perpetuated the more punitive and less

reconstructive JCS 1067 as the dominant educational policy within the American zone.23

Therefore American programs for physical education only began in earnest once the policy

changed. While many of the reform proposals introduced by the Military Governments in

Germany, including massive structural changes, were never adopted,24 some of the ideas were

successfully transformed into new German institutions.

A major problem that the Allies had to address immediately was the lack of qualified

teachers in Germany, particularly in the field of physical education. The foremost training in

Germany before 1945 was provided by the Physical Education Department at the University

of Berlin and the Deutsche Hochschule für Leibesübungen, both of which fell in the Soviet

20Rapport, de Monsieur le Leiutenant de Vaisseau De Mesnil-Adelee to de Monsieur le Lt-Colonel de Champvallier, 19 July 1946, AC 416/3, AOFAA. 21Situation Statistique, Secrétariat Général, Division Education Publique, 1 May 1947, AC 415/2, AOFAA. 22Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-Education (SWNCC 269), 16 May 1946, Box 121, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA; Tent, 33-9. 23Tent, 41. 24On reforms not fulfilled in the American zone, see Chapter five in Tent, 164-255. On the British zone, see Birley, “Education in the British Zone of Germany,” 32-44.

89 sector following the quadripartite division of the capital. The best physical education

instructors in the Third Reich, noted one British report, received leading positions in the

Hitler Youth or its affiliated group for girls. The report continued that many of these

instructors were killed at the front or held as prisoners of war, and those who remained were

not allowed to reenter the teaching profession because of their previous ties to the Nazi Party

and its affiliated organisations. The majority of the physical education teachers who

remained in German schools “are too old and tired to be interested, and their methods are out

of date and unsuited to the post-war condition of the children.”25 As a result of the dearth of

suitable physical education teachers and the relationship between physical education and

Nazi organisations, the Soviets did not readily reopen the Deutsche Hochschule für

Leibesübungen when the occupation powers began permitting schools to function.

The French, the first of the Allies to reopen German universities, struggled in their

efforts to provide a school solely for physical education instruction because of a lack of

materials and, more importantly, teachers. The French refounded the University of Mainz,

which had closed in 1817,26 and they also sought to create an institute to train physical education instructors. The French began studying this possibility in July 1946, attempting to establish a training school first at the University of Mainz and subsequently at Trier,

Tübingen, and Tailfingen. In each city the French authorities ran into practical and material

25K.A. Thomas, Report on Women’s Physical Education in Teacher Training Colleges, 10 March 1948, FO 1050/1188, NA. 26The University of Mainz had been open from 1477 to 1817. Although it had not existed for over 100 years, the tradition of a university of the city, plus the available air force barracks enabled the French to refound the University of Mainz. F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 174-5, 247-48; Richard Gilmore, France’s Postwar Cultural Policies and Activities in Germany: 1945-1956 (Ph.D. diss., University of Geneva, 1971), 119-21.

90 difficulties, but the biggest problem confronting the French Military Government in

implementing physical education programs was the lack of teachers.27 At the end of the year

the French again considered the creation of physical education and sport centres in their zone.

Dr. Otto Peltzer, a former world record-holding runner in the 1920s whom the Nazis later

interned, had recently arrived in the French zone and proposed the creation of a sport college

(Sportakademie) in Rhineland-Pfalz. Peltzer argued that a new generation of sport instructors (Sportlehrer) needed to be developed “as soon as possible to replace the majority of the ‘Turnlehrer’ still functioning in the German schools. These Turnlehrer, in particular the male teachers, received a militarist and nationalist training; they therefore should be pulled out of the schools.”28 The French Military Government agreed that this sport college or a physical education centre created along similar lines would be desirable. They believed that the establishment of such a school could begin in the spring of 1947 if the location of physical premises and instructors did not run into too many problems.29

The British also recognised the severe shortage of qualified physical education instructors as a result of the twelve years of Nazi rule, but unlike the French, the British were able to locate the resources to establish a physical education college in their zone. The

27Rapport, de Monsieur le Leiutenant de Vaisseau De Mesnil-Adelee to de Monsieur le Lt-Colonel de Champvallier, 19 July 1946, AC 416/3, AOFAA; Situation Statistique, Secrétariat Général, Division Education Publique1 August 1947, AC 415/2, AOFAA; Situation Statistique, Secrétariat Général, Division Education Publique, 1 November 1947, AC 415/2, AOFAA; Documentation générale concernant l’oeuvre accomplie en ZFO de 1945 à 1949 parla Division Education Publique, n.d., AC 845/1, AOFAA. Even the physical education training school that was to be established in the semi-detached Saar to “teach the French methods of sport” was delayed because of bad weather, the poor state of the facilities, and a lack of material and equipment. Rapport, de Monsieur le Leiutenant de Vaisseau De Mesnil-Adelee to de Monsieur le Lt-Colonel de Champvallier, 19 July 1946, AC 416/3, AOFAA; Situation Statistique, Secrétariat Général, Division Education Publique, 1 May 1947, AC 415/2, AOFAA. 28December 1946 Rapport Mensuel, Rhénanie-Hesse-Nassau, Jeunesse et Sport, 3 January 1947, RP 446/2, AOFAA. 29Ibid.

91 British believed that “the present generation of German children should not be denied a

liberal physical education because the minds, as well as the bodies of their fathers, were used

to further ignoble ends.”30 The idea for an interzonal sport university first arose at a Zone

Sports Council (Zonensportrat) meeting in the British zone. When the British Zonal

Education Advisory Committee took up the matter from the Zone Sport Council, they noted

the “serious shortage” of sport instructors in Germany. The British agreed to create a training

program to be implemented as soon as possible. “German circles” had already discussed this

problem and preferred a joint British-American training school, particularly as the prewar

academy in Berlin had provided physical education teachers for all of Germany.31

The British opened the Deutsche Sporthochschule as an interzonal institution in order

to provide the necessary theoretical and practical preparation for physical education

instruction. The Zonal Education Advisory Committee discussed Cologne and Frankfurt as

potential sites for this new sport university. When Brunswick was suggested as a possible

alternative, the representative from Hanover argued that the new sport college must be in a

university town so that the students also have the opportunity for academic study of subjects

other than sport. The British pointed out that American forces occupied the Frankfurt site

and would be unlikely to relinquish it. They therefore went ahead to secure the Cologne site

to begin planning immediately.32 Chief Sports Officer for the British zone J.G. Dixon

preferred Cologne for “the beauty of its woodland setting” and, naturally, because it would be

30J.G. Dixon, H.M.I’s Report on Physical Education in Germany, October 1948, FO 1050/1255, NA. 31Minutes, Third meeting, Zonal Education Advisory Committee, 26 August 1946, FO 1005/1576, NA. 32Minutes, Fourth meeting, Zonal Education Advisory Committee, 3 October 1946, FO 1005/1576, NA.

92 easier for him to monitor the new Sporthochschule if it were in the British zone.33

Following several levels of screening and a discussion with Dixon, the Education

Branch offered the position of rector of the new Deutsche Sporthochschule to Carl Diem, a long-standing leader within German sport organisations and physical education. Diem had been a member of the Organising Committee for the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin, which the International Olympic Committee awarded to Germany before Hitler rose to power.

Diem had held the position of head of the Physical Education Department in Berlin until the

Nazis informed him that his contract had lapsed and relieved him of his duties. Diem had also been the General Secretary of the German Association for Physical Exercise (Deutscher

Reichsbund für Leibesübungen) before Reichsportführer Tschammer und Osten gained its control in 1933. Diem had lost both positions because he was too heavily involved in the

Weimar system and its “Jewish environment,” whereas the Nazis placed importance on what they considered “German” and “Aryan” physical education.34 Although Diem was nearly 65 years old when hired as rector of the Sporthochschule, Dixon selected Diem because “the youth were inexperienced and the middle-aged often tainted. Only among the old could one find proven eminence combined with detachment from Nazism.”35

33John G. Dixon, “The Founding of the Cologne Sporthochschule,” Sports International 6 (1982), 16- 17. 34J.G. Dixon to Director of Education and Col. Walker, 9 December 1947, FO 1013/2213, NA; S.M. Armetage and W.J. Bracey-Gibbon, Cologne Intelligence Section, Vetting of University Professors: Dr. Karl Keim [sic], 21 July 1947, FO 1050/1188, NA; Carl Diem, “Bericht über meine Tättigkeit während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus,” 16 June 1946, Diem, Carl – Physical Educ. College, 1946-1947, Box 10, R.T. Alexander Papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, VA; Email correspondence, Dr. Frank Becker to author, 2 December 2006. Becker’s forthcoming biography on Carl Diem is being written to clarify Diem’s legacy, particularly his record during the Third Reich. Currently a debate is being waged, particularly in Cologne, regarding the acceptability of having the main road through the Deutsche Sporthochschule called Carl-Diem- Weg. As chapter five demonstrates, the Allies themselves had a difficult time with Diem’s denazification status. 35Dixon, 17.

93 After meeting with Dixon, Diem wrote an essay about the principles on which the

instruction at the new physical education college should be based, which coincided with the

idea which the occupation powers held regarding sport. From the beginning, Diem stated

that “sport in Germany must again serve the ideals of health, fair-play, democracy, culture

and international friendship.” He continued that “the Nazi emphasis upon a militaristic and

muscle-building gymnastics” should be replaced. “Instead of the Nazi mass-drill and striving

after ‘uniformity’, Physical Education must concern itself fundamentally with the individual,

and must lead him to harmony.”36 Diem thus saw physical education coinciding with the

aims of the Allies, both to remove the effects of Nazi control of the discipline and to help

create a positive image of Germans. In addition, the creation of the Sporthochschule would

address the numerical problem of available teachers. Diem stated that not only were formal

teachers needed, but also amateur sport instructors because “a higher proportion of these

teachers and instructors than of other professional men was both forced into the Party and

killed in the war (for similar reasons). The need for new teachers is therefore greater than it

ever has been before.”37

Opened as the Bi-Zonal Physical Education College of Cologne University in the

summer of 1947, the Deutsche Sporthochschule served as the primary physical training

institution for university students from across occupied Germany. The students came

primarily from the British zone, but students from the American, French, and Soviet zones

36Carl Diem, Principles upon which instruction at the Bi-Zonal Physical Education College at Cologne should be based, 25 March 1947, Mappe 212, Carl und Liselott Diem Archiv, Deutsche Sporthochschule, Cologne, Germany. Hereafter cited CULDA. 37Ibid.

94 attended from the outset. At the start of the second term, 117 of the 163 total students lived

in the British zone, ten were from the American zone, and another eight each from the French

and Soviet zones.38 The following semester saw an increase in percentage of pupils from the

American zone, although students from the British zone still comprised the highest number.39

Of the 68 students who entered the Sporthochschule in the second semester, all but two were

born after 1 January 1919 and thus granted amnesty from denazification. However, a

denazification committee still reviewed every student’s application and background.40 Sport

had been so thoroughly coopted by the Nazis that the Allies could not rely on the youth

amnesty to ensure only politically acceptable Germans received training at the new

Sporthochschule. The majority of the students matriculated with an Abitur. Some students

entered the Sporthochschule as Gasthörer, students on a one-year probationary period who

had not passed or taken the Abitur. This process provided an opportunity for students who

“showed high ability even if they lacked the academic qualification.”41 The nature of

education under the Nazis, combined with the difficulties of actually carrying out education

during the latter stages of the war and the beginning of the occupation, left many men and

women without the necessary university qualifications. By making the admission

requirements less strict, the Allies demonstrated a commitment to the reeducation of

Germans.

38The report does not state from where the other twenty students resided. J.G. Dixon to Mr. Birley, 15 December 1947 (received), FO 1050/1188, NA. 39Of a total of 280 students enrolled in the third term, 218 were from the British zone, 33 from the American zone, 16 from the French zone, and 10 from the Soviet zone. Another three students were non- Germans (one Greek, one Yugoslav, and one Hungarian). J.G. Dixon, Report on the Physical Education College of Cologne University, Summer Term 1948, 18 June 1948 (received), FO 1050/1188, NA. 40J.G. Dixon to Mr. Birley, 15 December 1947 (received), FO 1050/1188, NA. 41Ibid.

95 The tradition of university students, particularly within the fraternities, participating

in duelling and Turnen led to the extra vetting of Sporthochschule students, for both the full-

time and special courses. In addition to providing full university training in all aspects of

physical education and its related scientific fields, the Deutsche Sporthochschule also

provided shorter courses and certificates for teachers already in the schools who were not

trained in physical education. For the beginning of the third term, the Sporthochschule

instituted a one-year post-certificate course for elementary school teachers in which six

women and eight men enrolled. Also begun that semester was a one-year course for club

gymnastic teachers. Similarly to the regular students at the Sporthochschule, a special

denazification committee screened all participants enrolling in these special courses. Dixon

emphasised in a report that none of the students admitted to the course had been a regular

officer in the German army.42 While it was important to the Allies to train the physical

education leaders, the problems of the denazification process and the ability of some former

Nazis to slip through the cracks led Dixon and the admissions committee of the

Sporthochschule to provide an additional assurance that the new physical education

instructors fulfilled Military Government requirements on denazification status.

This new university incorporated a strong element of democratisation within its

structure and teaching content, which helped reinforce the goals of the occupation. Thus,

Diem wrote in the principles upon which the Sporthochschule should be based that “sport

teachers must educate youth to democracy, and develop its faculties of self-government, for

42J.G. Dixon, Report on the Physical Education College of Cologne University, Summer Term 1948, 18 June 1948 (received), FO 1050/1188, NA.

96 sport is based upon free-will, friendship, and fair-play, and the solution of the self-

governmental tasks implied thereby corresponds to the urges of youth.”43 These ideas carried

through the opening of the Sporthochschule. In a July 1947 letter to his American friend,

International Olympic Committee Vice President Avery Brundage, Diem wrote that “the

activity of this College has general sympathy. We don’t want anything else except to help the

recovery of the German nation, and the return of youth to democrady [sic], which is the

precondition and the mark of sport.”44 This desire for a student-run component of the

Sporthochschule coincided with other initiatives introduced in Germany at the time. The ability of youth to participate in democratic institutions either within one specific school or across an entire city, such as the Berlin Student Parliament, provided a much greater learning opportunity through actual experience rather than merely learning about democracy in a classroom.45 Dixon reported on the positive influence of self-government within the first year of the Sporthochschule’s activities, highlighting that “the experience which they [the students] are having of a self-regulated community life is the most valuable part of their education.”46 A disagreement over dormitory regulations was resolved through discussions to which the students, Dr. and Frau Diem, and J.G. Dixon all contributed their viewpoints.

Dixon wrote of this issue that “the shaping of the theory by practical experience is of first- rate importance,” thus reinforcing the Allied emphasis on learning democracy through first-

43Carl Diem, Principles upon which instruction at the Bi-Zonal Physical Education College at Cologne should be based, 25 March 1947, Mappe 212, CULDA. 44Carl Diem to Avery Brundage, 15 July 1947, Microfilm 2, CULDA. 45Brian M. Puaca, “‘We Learned What Democracy Really Meant’: The Berlin Student Parliament and Postwar School Reform in the 1950s,” History of Education Quarterly 45, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 616. 46J.G. Dixon, Report on Bi-Zonal Physical Education College of Cologne University, December 1947- January 1948, 16 February 1948 (received), FO 1050/1188, NA.

97 hand experience.47

While the Allies wanted to return the education system in Germany to one that

promoted democracy, the primary function of education was “to give the opportunity to each

individual to develop to the best of his ability.”48 The Allies wanted to utilise education to instill democratic values in pupils particularly because of the Nazi misuse of the education system and authoritarian control of German life. The occupation powers also wanted new

German physical education syllabi and courses to “encourage independence and initiative and allow for exploratory and creative activity.”49 Although the Allies sought to remove militarised sport from the German curriculum, they did not want to remove sport completely from German education. The Americans, British, and French all believed in the importance of physical education, demonstrated by the inclusion of sport within their domestic educational curriculums. The Military Governments needed teachers who were not fully indoctrinated in Nazi ideology or methods, a difficult requirement to fulfill in the immediate postwar period considering the heavy emphasis placed on physical training in the Third

Reich.

With the former institute for physical education residing in the Soviet sector of Berlin, the western Allies were forced to create new institutions in their zones to help relieve this problem of a lack of qualified non-Nazi German personnel in order to provide sport instruction with a democratic emphasis. Once the British established the Deutsche

47J.G. Dixon, Report on Bi-Zonal Physical Education College of Cologne University, December 1947- January 1948, 16 February 1948 (received), FO 1050/1188, NA. 48Military Government Regulation, Title 8, Change 3, 14 March 1947, Box 649, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of the Adjutant General: Recs Rel to Changes to Military Govt Regulations, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 49J.G. Dixon, H.M.I’s Report on Physical Education, October 1948, FO 1050/1255, NA.

98 Sporthochschule the other powers could send Germans from their zones there for physical

education training. The French could not locate the financial and physical resources to

develop a physical education school in their zone, and a year after the Deutsche

Sporthochschule opened Germans in the French zone believed that a separate sport university

in Rhineland-Palatinate would create a “lack of uniformity in training and diplomas that

would generate in the long run serious difficulties between different Länder and zones.”50 As

the three western zones moved toward consolidating into the Federal Republic of Germany,

Germans recognised the advantage of having one premier sport university for what would

soon become one state.

* * *

Targeting German Youth Leaders

In addition to developing policies regarding physical education, the Allies also

established general youth policies because what the German youth did in their time outside of

the four walls of the classroom was just as important for providing a democratic foundational

basis for Germans. The Allies not only addressed the educational needs of the Germans, but

they also assisted in the creation and democratisation of youth organisations. The emphasis

on education policies demonstrated the Allied commitment to youth, but the Allies also

developed broader policies to bring democratisation to youth programs not directly affiliated

with schools. Because sport had played a central role in Nazi youth organisations, the Allies

could not exclude sport from their instructions to their Military Government officials who

501948 Compte-rendu d’activité du Bureau de l’Education physiques et des sports en ZFOA, 25 November 1948, AC 415/1, AOFAA.

99 primarily worked on youth issues. All three western Military Governments wanted Germans

to have a “constructive use of leisure time and the successful development of democracy in

terms of ideas, initiative, responsibility and the practice of democratic procedures.”51 These

officers worked with Germans in their regions to implement these policies and expand Allied

efforts of democratisation through the creation of new youth leadership institutions.

The occupation powers believed the German population could learn the ideas of

democracy through recreation without feeling as though the Allies were forcing propaganda

on them, and they began addressing policies for youth immediately in the first two years of

the occupation. The British expressed their support of youth programs in the summer of

1945, emphasising that “as one of our main functions in Germany is to re-educate the

German nation on democratic lines we must devote our main attention to German youth.”52

They recognised that schools would reopen shortly, but the British also encouraged “Boys’

and Girls’ Clubs and any similar youth organisations which can be a vehicle for instilling

sound ideas.”53 The British emphasised the voluntary nature of new German youth groups in

contrast to the Hitler Youth. Requirements for leaders over the age of eighteen of youth

organisations were as stringent as the denazification procedures for teachers,54 demonstrating

that the British assigned equal importance to extracurricular activities as they did to education

for young Germans.

51Military Government Regulation, Title 8, Change 3, 14 March 1947, Box 649, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of the Adjutant General: Recs Rel to Changes to Military Govt Regulations, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 52Draft, Directive from Chief of Staff, 21 July 1945, FO 1050/157, NA. 53Ibid. 54Education Control Instruction No. 10 – Plan for the Resumption of German Youth Activities, n.d., FO 1013/13, NA; Plan for the Resumption of German Youth Activities, 4 August 1945, FO 1050/12, NA.

100 The French emphasised cultural activities, particularly the promotion of their own

culture, within their zone as a way to overcome the long-standing animosity between the two

countries. Scholars have noted the emphasis on the instruction of the French language and

culture in the schools and universities across the French zone in order to foster this change of

German opinion.55 Non-French observers visiting the French zone during the occupation

even noted that “the French program is marked by a sincere belief that learning and culture

can produce civilized men.”56 Believing that younger Germans had a greater ability to change

their attitudes, the French thus directed much of their efforts toward youth.57 Sport and

physical education, once free of militarism and Nazism, could be used in conjunction with

the French language and culture courses. Wanting to instill in “German sport a new spirit,

which can contribute strongly to the democratic education of German youth,” the French

promoted sport as “physical relaxation” and prevented specialization within the youth

sections of sport clubs in their zone.58 The French believed that “National Socialism gave priority in youth athletic activities to combat sports, particularly boxing, because they were viewed as contributing to character development, military spirit, and the moral and physical hardening of young Germans.”59 The French Military Government supported programs for

German youth, believing these Germans to be the future of the country and the persons most capable of altering their outlook and mentality.

These ideas regarding the importance of youth activities, both within the education

55Willis, 170-79; Gilmore, 92-101. 56Percy W. Bidwell, “‘Reëducation’ in Germany: Emphasis on Culture in the French Zone,” Foreign Affairs 27 (October 1948), 78. 57Bidwell, 80; Willis, 177. 58E. Laffon to Messieurs les Délégués Supérieurs, 26 February 1946, AC 78/2, AOFAA. 59Ibid.

101 system and outside of it, were reinforced in the report compiled by the United States

Education Mission to Germany, commonly referred to as the Zook Report.60 Participating in

the Mission was Paul M. Limbert, a YMCA official who, in 1946 as the Mission prepared to

leave for Germany, also became President of Springfield College in Massachusetts.

Limbert’s primary area of concern in Germany was the youth groups that lay outside formal

education channels.61 The section Limbert prepared for the Zook Report, Youth Groups and

Activities, supported many of the claims previously made by policy planners in Washington

and the Military Government officials on the ground in Germany.62 The Education Mission

addressed youth activities because approximately one-fourth of the two million boys and girls

between the ages of ten and eighteen in the American zone participated in extra-curricular

activities. Even with all the difficulties of postwar Germany, Limbert wrote, youth work

should provide hope that Germans can be reeducated democratically when their social and

ideological environments have drastically changed.63

For the youth programs to be most effective in achieving Allied aims, the Zook

Report supported initiatives which fostered youth leadership. However, the report also

60The Education Mission’s report is called the Zook Report after the Mission’s chair, George Zook. Zook had been a history professor, a university president, and, since 1934, president of the American Council on Education. Zook had first worked for the government during World War I by serving on the Committee on Public Information. Fred W. Buddy, “George Frederick Zook: An Analysis of Selected Contributions of an American Educator” (Ph.D. diss, University of Akron, 1990), 41-6. 61Paul M. Limbert, Reliving a Century (Asheville, N.C.: Biltmore Press, 1997), 140-1. 62Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, 20 September 1946, Box 7, International Information Administration (IIA) -- European Field Program (IFI/E) -- Subject Files 1949-52, RG 59, NARA. Also published as Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946). The section on Youth Groups and Activities is on pages 33-6 of the published version. 63Paul M. Limbert, “Youth Activities in Germany, Prepared for Educational Record,” n.d., Box 138, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. This appears to be a more detailed version of Limbert’s section on youth activities contained in the Zook Report.

102 acknowledged that the same problems which confronted education also affected youth

activities: the shortage of facilities and a lack of denazified instructors with democratic

leadership experience. The Zook Report recommended an increase in personnel to assist

with the youth programs, noting the understaffing of the Education and Religious Affairs

Division. The Education Mission was optimistic in the outlook for securing the necessary

assistance for supporting the youth programs. The report stated that “because of the deep

interest of Americans in sports and recreation, it is easier to secure popular support among

American soldiers and civilians for the reconstruction of youth activities in Germany than for

any other phase of reeducation.”64 Noting the Military Government’s decrease of personnel

in Germany by the end of 1946, the Zook Report suggested the use of short-term specialists,

which then became an important component in the reeducation policies for youth.65 To

address the dearth of qualified youth leaders, the Allies established schools to train the

instructors of Germany’s future leaders. Both the British and Americans developed youth

and sport leadership schools across their zones, with the main schools at Vlotho in the British

zone (northeast of Bielefeld) and Ruit in the American zone (near Stuttgart). These

institutions trained pupils in sport and organisational matters and also in democracy and

incorporating democratic ideals within sport and youth clubs.

The primary British leadership training school at Jugendhof Vlotho began as a

German initiative. The original idea to transform a former Nazi school for adult leaders of

64Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, 20 September 1946, Box 7, International Information Administration (IIA) -- European Field Program (IFI/E) -- Subject Files 1949-52, RG 59, NARA. 65On the timing of the decrease of personnel order with the Zook Report, see Tent, 121-2. On the Zook Report recommendation, see Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, 20 September 1946, Box 7, International Information Administration (IIA) -- European Field Program (IFI/E) -- Subject Files 1949- 52, RG 59, NARA.

103 the Hitler Youth (Bannführerschule) into a centre for youth leadership was developed by a

group of Germans that met in Hanover in 1946, led by the local youth administrator

(Kreisjugendpfleger) Klaus von Bismarck.66 The British Military Government approved the

proposal, and following a tour of the youth work in the other three zones by a British officer,

the British agreed to open Vlotho for German youth to discuss and exchange ideas with one

another, as well as with leaders from across Europe.67 In May 1946 Vlotho began holding eight-day courses under German direction with the participation of foreign instructors.

Vlotho provided instruction in basic subjects, such as Experiences and Methods of Youth

Services Abroad or Education for Citizenship, and practical topics, including Youth in Sports

Groups or Amateur Drama.68 A monthly report of the Education Branch evaluated Vlotho’s activities positively: “German Youth leaders have not only been enabled to clarify and revise their own viewpoints through contact with one another and with the latest ideas from other

European countries but a welcome spirit of understanding and tolerance has been fostered between the different German authorities controlling all aspects of Youth Activities and

Youth Welfare.”69

Similarly to Vlotho, the origins of the American institution, Ruit, also began as a

German initiative. The Chairman and the Business Manager of the Wuerttemburg Land

Youth Committee approached the Youth Activities Section of the American Military

Government to address the need for a leadership school. Not only were the leaders trained

66Klaus von Bismarck, “Aufbruch aus Pommern,” in Bildung – Entfaltung des ganzen Menschen: Jugendhof Vlotho, 1946-1996 (Münster: Ardey Verlag, 1996), 29. 67Nigel R. Spicer, “Erinnerungen an die Zeit vor 50 Jahren,” in Bildung – Entfaltung des ganzen Menschen: Jugendhof Vlotho, 1946-1996 (Münster: Ardey Verlag, 1996), 48-9. 68Arrangements for 8-day courses for youth leaders in Vlotho, 10 May 1946, FO 1050/1299, NA. 69Monthly Report [Education Branch], June 1949, 15 July 1949, FO 1050/1103, NA.

104 during the Third Reich unacceptable on account of their Nazi training and their potential to

“cling to the Nazi ideals,” but the leaders trained prior to 1933 “are getting old and with a few

exceptions do not have close contact with the youth any more.”70 Initially funded by

Reorientation Funds from the Military Government, the Ruit Youth and Sports Leadership

School opened in May 1948 at a former air force (Luftwaffe) research centre for

aerodynamics.71 In its first three months Ruit held courses training leaders working in camps

in Wuerttemberg-Baden during the summer of 1948, Girl Scout leaders from across the entire

American zone, youth leaders from Ludwigsburg as part of world youth week, and sport

leaders, both men and women.72

All three of the western Allies understood the importance of German youth to the

future of the country as well as Europe and the world at large. Once the Allies could move

past the punitive acts of denazification and demilitarisation, they could develop positive

educational policies designed to teach Germans how to be democratic. Although Germany

faced a severe lack of appropriately denazified youth club leaders, the Allies supported

German initiatives to develop democratic leaders. German youth and leaders of youth

organisations benefited from the courses at schools such as Ruit, Vlotho, and the Deutsche

70Aksel G. Nielsen, History and Development of Ruit Youth Leadership School, 6 July 1948, Box 148, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 71Aksel G. Nielsen to Director, Dr. E.P. Lam, 4 November 1948, Box 152, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the German Youth Activities Program (GYA), RG 260, NARA; Aksel G. Nielsen, History and Development of Ruit Youth Leadership School, 6 July 1948, Box 148, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA; Letter, Margaret Berry to Friends, 16 October [1951], Folder 6, Box 7, Margaret Berry Papers, Social Welfare History Archives, Elmer Anderson Library, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. Hereafter cited SWHA. 72Appendix, Topical Report, Youth Leadership School in Ruit, 10 June 1948, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

105 Sporthochschule. These new institutions offered short courses in order to maximise the

number of Germans – whom the Allies had already approved as leaders of youth and sport

organisations – incorporating democratic practises within their clubs and classes. The three

western occupation powers wanted to broaden their democratisation efforts within Germany,

and to complement the work of these new schools the Americans, British, and French

implemented exchange programs for sport and youth leaders.

* * *

Experts to Germany

The Military Governments worked to democratise the German citizens, but

reeducating Germans was more than just a policy regarding the youth. Reeducation was

necessary for all Germans, regardless of age, across many professions and cross sections of

society. Following an experimental contact between German and French youth in 1946 and

its “fruitful” results,73 the French proposed to establish additional relations of German youth

with the youth of other nations at a quadripartite Allied Education Committee meeting in

1946. The quadripartite committee ultimately resolved, “as a positive contribution to the re-

education of Germany to democratic ideals, [that] active steps be taken to bring the youth of

Germany into contact with the youth of the United Nations.”74 The Allies viewed the transfer

of ideas as a cross-cultural benefit. The western Allies brought experts to Germany to survey

the situation, make recommendations, and instruct the Germans directly in democratic

73DIAC/AEC/P(46)30, 13 November 1946, Box 232, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Direct. Of Internal Affairs and Communication (DIAC): General Records, 1945-1948, RG 260, NARA. 74DIAC/AEC/M(46)14 – Minutes, Nineteenth Meeting, Directorate of Internal Affairs and Communications Allied Education Committee, 18 December 1946, FO 1005/620, NA.

106 methods. These reeducation policies carried over into the period of the Allied High

Commission (1949-1955). Other scholars who have argued that Allied youth work ended

with the occupation in 1949, but in fact the Allies increased funding and support for youth

programs and reeducation.75 Particularly as the Cold War heated up and the division of

Germany began to appear more permanent, the western Allies – in particular the Americans – increased their programs aimed at instilling democratic practises. Once the three western zones merged and the Federal Republic of Germany came into existence in 1949, the western

Allies expanded their programs outside of their original zone of occupation to include all

West Germans.

While special commissions such as the U.S. Education Mission, which resulted in the

Zook Report, helped formulate policy for the occupation powers, the Americans began sending experts to Germany for the purpose of reeducation as early as 1946. For two weeks in May, at the initial request of General Lucius Clay, civilian athletic consultants held weekday evening courses for German children and their parents in Stuttgart. These classes, rotating among softball, swimming, volleyball, tennis, track, and golf, were arranged by the

Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden and led by instructors visiting from the United

States. Included among the instructors were Mercer Beasley, the former Tulane and

Princeton tennis coach, and Matt Mann, the swimming and diving coach at the University of

Michigan.76 Reporting on the progress of the program to Clay, the Military Government

75Karl-Heinz Fuessl and Gregory Paul Wegner argue that, though achieving “notable success,” Allied interest in “youth work ended shortly before the transfer of almost every legal initiative to German responsibility at the termination of the occupation period.” Karl-Heinz Fuessl and Gregory Paul Wegner, “Education under Radical Change: Education Policy and the Youth Program of the United States in Postwar Germany,” in History of Education Quarterly 36, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 1, 14. 76Letter, A.R. Bolling to Lucius Clay, 14 May 1946, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The

107 officer wrote that the civilian athletic consultants “believe that through the field of athletics it

is possible to instill into the German people the true meaning of sportsmanship for the boys

and girls who will be the future citizens of Germany.”77

Although this program was only for the Stuttgart region, the interest aroused among

the Germans and the support from the officers running the program and its instructors led to

requests for an expansion of the program. Upon his return to the United States and of his

own initiative, Matt Mann wrote to Clay about his experiences leading classes for German

youth. Convinced of the benefit of his work, Mann informed Clay that sport instruction “is

going to be the place where we can really teach democracy to the German people. As you

know, democracy is not in books. It can’t be taught. It must be really lived. Our system of

athletics is such that we teach fair play, the obeying of rules and the individual effort at all

times.”78 Mann then proposed an expansion of the program held in Stuttgart so that students

and teachers from across Germany could attend a camp for a month at a time and then return

to their hometowns with their increased knowledge, similar to the sports camps run at

American universities. Clay’s reply highlighted the work of the German Youth Activities

program, particularly its efforts to teach the same ideas through a slightly different method.79

Nonetheless, Mann’s suggestion is similar to the approach later adopted with the creation of

the Ruit Youth and Sports Leadership School.

Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File). 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 77Letter, A.R. Bolling to Lucius Clay, 14 May 1946, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office -- The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File). 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 78Letter, Matt Mann to Lucius D. Clay, 14 June 1946, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office – The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49,RG 260, NARA. 79Letter, Lucius D. Clay to Matt Mann, 16 August 1946, Box 87, Records of the Executive Office – The Office of Adjutant General: General Correspondence & otr recs (Decimal File), 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

108 Once the occupation powers established the youth leadership schools, they required

instructors to help the Germans in teaching the various courses, and the Military

Governments established programs that brought experts to Germany to assist with the

development of youth and sport. Although the Allies had permitted the formation of sport

associations with Directive 23, the American Military Government in 1947 began reporting

that problems remained in the field of sport. Most troubling was “the danger of nationalistic

elements again exerting too much control in large sports organizations. The tendency for a

few at the top to set the policy and pass it down the line is contrary to the democratic

objectives of our reorientation program.”80 The American Military Government requested

that experts visit Germany to analyse the local recreation and sport situation and “assist in

outlining an adequate local community recreation program.”81 George E. Little and Harry G.

Carlson, the athletic directors from Rutgers and Colorado respectively, visited Hesse in May

1947 to pay special attention to sport activities and consult with the leaders of German sport

organisations.82 Little and Carlson’s first two recommendations involved exchanges of

German and American physical educators. They urged the American Military Government to

send more knowledgeable experts (comparable to themselves) to Germany to continue their

own work. Little and Carlson’s second recommendation was the creation of a large-scale

exchange to enable German physical education teachers and students to come to the United

80Community Recreation and Sports, 20 April 1947, Box 137, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 81Ibid. 82Weekly Report, Hesse, May 27, 1947, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA.

109 States to bring Germans up to date on healthy trends in the field. They also emphasised the

importance of teacher training and youth leadership schools to increase the number of

qualified physical education instructors in Germany.83

Little and Carlson had recommended short-term courses for sport and physical education leaders, and these activities could be run either by the teacher training schools such as the Deutsche Sporthochschule or by visiting experts. The American Military Government

(and later the High Commission) established several programs to bring sport experts from the

United States or Europe to the American zone. Most of the early expert programs addressed policy to help the American Military Government officers or leading Germans, particularly members of local government. Many of these programs involved the development of programs for youth leaders, such as bringing experts to the American zone in drama, trade union work, and publications.84 Little and Carlson’s report, in addition to supporting the teacher training schools, focussed primarily on sport within the educational system and suggested the promotion of school sport along the lines of the American sport structure.

They argued that through participation in interscholastic competitions and “by representing their school and their town they [Germans] are made to feel that they belong to society.”85

Yet, bringing a completely new structure to German education was extremely difficult, which

83Harry G. Carlson and George E. Little to Chief, Education and Religious Affairs Branch, Report on Physical Education, n.d. [1947], Folder 6, Box 178, Series I, Central Administration President’s Office, University of Colorado at Boulder Archives, Boulder, Colorado. Hereafter cited UCBA. 84Memorandum, Mr. Welch to Dr. Oxley, 22 September 1948, Box 724, Records of Official of Military Government, Hesse -- The Education and Cultural Relations Division: Group Activities Branch: Recs of Dr. Howard W. Oxley, 1946-50, RG 260, NARA. 85Harry G. Carlson and George E. Little to Chief, Education and Religious Affairs Branch, Report on Physical Education, n.d. [1947], Folder 6, Box 178, Series I, Central Administration President’s Office, UCBA.

110 many Military Government personnel ultimately realised.86 Introducing significant changes to the nature of German physical education without the necessary infrastructure for holding these classes would be even more challenging.

German sport had long been organised through clubs, and ensuring that the reconstituted clubs functioned along democratic lines was of the utmost importance to the

Allies. At the same time, however, the Americans believed that this organisational structure hindered the development of more general recreation programs.87 Particularly as a result of the limited physical facilities available for sport in the aftermath of the war, combined with the dire financial situation of much of the German population, the Americans believed that

Germans would benefit from municipal recreation programs. Broad recreation programs, or at least public facilities, could provide youth with activities in their free time, prevent juvenile delinquency, and promote general health. In addition, the Americans hoped broad recreation programs would prevent the re-fragmentation of sport along pre-1933 confessional and political lines.88 By 1946 the Soviets had created in their zone a centralised yet communist youth movement, Free German Youth (Frei Deutsche Jugend), which encompassed sport as well.89 With the formal division of Germany into two states the

86See Tent for the problems of reforming the German education system more broadly. 87Community Education Branch, Community Organization Section, n.d. [1949], Box 121, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 88OMGUS sponsored project, “Study of Sports and recreation in Germany”, n.d., Box 137, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA; Community Recreation and Sports -- Objectives/Planned Activities, n.d., Box 724, Records of Official of Military Government, Hesse -- The Education and Cultural Relations Division: Group Activities Branch: Recs of Dr. Howard W. Oxley, 1946-50, RG 260, NARA. 89Alan L. Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 13-14; Beryl R. McClaskey and Elisabeth Erdmann, The Free German Youth and the Deutschlandtreffen: A Case Study of

111 western Allies recognised that the reorganisation of sport in the Soviet zone into a mass sport movement forced the disbanding of all private clubs and left worker sport under strict control of the Free German Youth.90 The Americans in particular viewed the creation of municipal recreation programs as a way to help avert the communist threat and the expansion of the

Free German Youth in sport and youth activities in western Germany.

The American Military Government thus created programs to bring experts with knowledge of recreation and city planning to Germany to develop broader initiatives. The

Youth Activities Section in Hesse requested experts though a 1948 program on City Planning for Recreation in Large Cities because “cities the size of Frankfurt, Darmstadt, [and] Kassel need now in their rebuilding program to [plan] for playground, sports and recreation centres for all youth organized and unorganized. Their public officials need help not only in land and building planning but in taxation systems to support these ventures.”91 Broader recreation programs would provide all German youth, not just members of organised sport clubs, with an opportunity to participate in physical activity. The Americans developed the Community

Recreation and Sports project of 1949 because they believed that German sport was still “in a chaotic state.” This program intended to “assist German communities to replace their traditionally highly selective and centrally controlled sports programs by community recreation programs with an educational content for all the people.”92 The Americans

Soviet Tactics ([n.p.]: Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1951), v. 90April 1950 Monthly Report, Youth Section, British Troops Berlin, 28 April 1 950, FO 1050/1091, NA. 91Memorandum, Mr. Welch to Dr. Oxley, 22 September 1948, Box 724, Records of Official of Military Government, Hesse -- The Education and Cultural Relations Division: Group Activities Branch: Recs of Dr. Howard W. Oxley, 1946-50, RG 260, NARA. 92Education and Cultural Relations Division, “Community Recreation and Sports,” 1 November 1949,

112 continued this program by including a 1951 exchange on Community Recreation, Sport,

Youth and Community Centres for 35 Germans who visited the United States for either 90 or

180 days.93

The American Military Government also created expert programs with a broader focus to reach German youth directly in addition to the programs which brought experts to help formulate policy. The Military Government in Bavaria justified its 1948 request for sport experts because “organized sports play a big role in the lives of German Youth. It has been noted, however, that German sports have been developed in a manner which tend to sublimate the person to the masses.” Therefore “experts in recreation and physical education can assist in reshaping the thinking of German sports leaders.”94 One of the projects for

Wuerttemberg-Baden – Experts, Consultants, and Teachers for the Ruit Youth and Sports

Leadership School – entailed bringing three British experts to Germany for ninety days. Ruit gained one specialist each in the fields of youth activities and organisations, sports and recreation, and youth work. Magda Kelber of the British Quaker Organisation and David

Davison, a football coach, filled two of these positions.95 Kelber, a naturalised British citizen

Box 113, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 93The Project for 1951, from German Leadership Project, Education-Recreation Division, National Social Welfare Assembly, 26 February 1951, Box 2, U.S. Land Commissioner for Hesse - Public Affairs Division - Records Relating to Youth and Community Activities, 1949-1951, RG 466, NARA. 94Group Activities Branch, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, “Request for Recreation and Sports Experts,” 25 October 1948, Box 125, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 95L.E. Norrie, Project 11, 21 January 1949, Box 113, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA; L.E. Norrie to Miss May, Invitations to Mr. Davidson [sic] and Miss Magda Kelber on the European Consultants Program, 18 February 1949, Box 114, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA; Community Activities Branch Report, 1 July - 31 December 1949, Box 2, U.S. Land Commissioner for Hesse - Public Affairs Division/Education and Cultural Relations Branch - Records Relating to Rural Youth Education

113 of German birth, provided both pedagogical and technical instruction at Ruit. Kelber later

helped run Haus Schwalbach, near Wiesbaden, another one of the four leadership schools in

the American zone.96

Davison was perhaps the most widely-used expert in Wuerttemberg-Baden, if not all

of the American zone because of his work teaching democracy through football instruction

for players, coaches, and referees. Davison’s duties were “to give expert guidance among

sports organizations in matters of organization programs, coaching, Youth Leadership

Training methods and standards.”97 The Americans requested Davison teach football

techniques as well as more general courses on the purpose of sport and physical education,

the place of sport within general education, and fair play in order to develop a higher standard

of soccer competition.98 Davison’s short courses were designed to foster democracy through

sport, and his work was well-received by the Germans. However, Davison caused a public

uproar when his comments on the militaristic tradition of German football training received

widespread publicity. Davison had remarked that all German players received the same

training, resulting in the older players tiring too easily while the younger players had hardly

been worked, which was reminiscent of the old German army sergeant. This mass training

therefore left no initiative for self-development, Davison claimed, which reinforced the

and Recreation, 1949-1951, RG 466, NARA. 96Margaret Berry, Notes, 1954-55, Folder 4, Box 7, Margaret Berry Papers, SWHA. 97L.E. Norrie to Miss May, Invitations to Mr. Davidson [sic] and Miss Magda Kelber on the European Consultants Program, 18 February 1949, Box 114, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 98Letter, Aksel G. Nielsen to Mr. Lester Davison, 21 March 1949, Box 970, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA; Youth Activities Monthly Report, August 1949, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

114 necessity of bringing western sport methods to Germany.99 At the conclusion of his work,

Davison nonetheless reported to the American Military Government that sport in general but football in particular “is a great contributary [sic] factor to the future of good relationship between nations.”100 Davison’s comments echoed the sentiments of Directive 23 that sport needed to be demilitarised, but also that sport could provide a venue for helping to teach the ideas associated with democracy.

The Americans continued the expert program into the period of the Allied High

Commission to further German democratic developments in sport and recreation. By the end of 1948 a struggle for the organisation of sport in Germany had developed (addressed in chapter four), leaving German sport “in a chaotic state.”101 The American Military

Government believed that “present and potential sports leaders must gain a new and enlarged vision of the true value of sports in helping the participants grow and develop [...] to educate them in more democratic methods of organization.”102 To accomplish these goals the

Military Government brought American experts to Germany to hold conferences and training courses with German sport leaders. Jay M. Ver Lee, the Superintendent of Recreation in

99Quarterly History, Part VI – Community Education Branch, 1 April - 30 June 1949, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA; Leon Shelnutt to L.E. Norrie, May 1949 Monthly Report, 3 June 1949, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 100Report on the Activities of Mr. David D. Davison, Physical Education and Sports Consultant from 4 April to 31 July 1949, 12 August 1949, Box 961, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 101Community Education Branch Cultural Exchange and Reorientation Projects 1949/50, n.d., Box 4, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Division Headquarters -- Miscellaneous Document Issued by the E & CR Division, RG 260, NARA. 102Ibid.

115 Colorado Springs, went to Germany as one of these experts in 1950-51. While in Germany he participated in a week-long conference attended by over 60 German recreation leaders and administrators, municipal officials, and American regional officers. Ver Lee was impressed with the “progressive attitude of many of the German participants” regarding community recreation programs and planning as well as the level of discussion.103 The community and recreation leaders at this conference demonstrated that they had learned and implemented many of the attitudes and practices from the earlier public diplomacy programs.

Programs to bring sport experts to Germany were primarily an American project, although the British also arranged for specialists to visit their zone in Germany to assist with democratisation efforts. Little and Carlson stopped in Cologne during their 1947 consultant trip to meet with Carl Diem as the Deutsche Sporthochschule prepared to open.104 The

British also sent two physical education specialists to spend a week in each of the four Länder within the British zone in 1947, followed by visits from two female physical education specialists.105 The British were more concerned with the instruction of physical education within the school system, as many visitors gave lectures across the zone.106 David Munrow,

Head of the Physical Education Department at Birmingham University, visited the Deutsche

Sporthochschule for two weeks in 1948 under the auspices of the British Military

103Report of Visiting Consultant in Youth Activities, Jay M. Ver Lee, Superintendent of Recreation, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 13 January 1951, Box 2, U.S. Land Commissioner for Hesse - Public Affairs Division - Records Relating to Youth and Community Activities, 1949-1951, RG 466, NARA. 104Monthly Report for May 1947, E/RA Regierungsbezirk Cologne, 28 May 1947, FO 1013/2201, NA. 105All four specialists were His Majesty’s Inspectors. Education Summary No. 72 Berlin, K.J. W. Melvin for Educational Adviser, 16 April 1947, FO 1050/1256, NA; Dixon, 19. 106Minutes, 157th Conference, Directors, Education Branch, 8 April 1949, FO 1050/1110, NA; Minutes, 148th Conference, Directors, Education Branch, 1 November 1948, FO 1050/1110, NA; Minutes, 161st Conference, Directors, Education Branch, 17 June 1949, FO 1050/1110, NA.

116 Government. While his report stressed the content of the material taught at the new German

university for sport and criticised its deficiencies, he nonetheless praised the new sport

university for its great potential. Munrow commented that “the linking of Physical Education

with such a wide variety of subjects is ultimately for the good of the student products which

the Sporthochschule turns out.”107 The Deutsche Sporthochschule and Birmingham

University established a long-running faculty and student exchange as a result of Munrow’s

visit.108 Additionally, the British Youth officer in Berlin reported that visits from full-time

workers in the field of youth activities “proved most fruitful, not only in the individual’s own

narrow sphere of work, but even more so in the broader fields of democracy in practice.”109

British experts travelled widely across the zone in addition to participating in specific

programs aimed at teaching democratic practices. Six British physical education lecturers

spent a week in April 1949 leading a Zonal Physical Education Course for German teachers

at the Deutsche Sporthochschule.110 By July of that year, the Physical Education section

reported that the work of the secondary school teachers who had participated in that course

“now definitely showed the influence of the course, although naturally in varying degrees.”111

Although the British experts often focussed their discussions and reports on the methods of

German physical education and instruction and often do not address democracy directly, they frequently compared the work they observed in their zone to English methods or courses at

107Report by Mr. Munrow, Head of Birmingham University Dept. of Physical Education, 1-14 August, 1948, FO 1023/2213, NA. 108Dixon, 19. 109M.S. Berenson, Evaluation of the Work of Youth Section Berlin in its Relation to Further Policy, 17 February 1950, FO 1050/1076, NA. 110Minutes, 25th Conference, Chief Education Control Officers, 20-21 January 1949, FO 1050/1255, NA. 111Minutes, 162nd Conference, Directors, Education Branch, 1 July 1949, FO 1050/1110, NA.

117 British universities. Without explicitly stating so within their reports, the British experts’

commentary on the advances made within German physical education noted the contrast to

the stereotypical German methods of military drill or authoritarian teacher and subservient

students.

The Allies not only sent experts to Germany, but the British and French also sent

groups of sportsmen to Germany to help further German sport. From the early days of the

occupation the British believed that Anglo-German football matches could promote Allied

aims. Concerning games between British troops and German civilians, the British Foreign

Office and Military Government believed that “the playing of matches between British and

German civilian teams can contribute to the democratic re-education of the German

people.”112 Field Marshal Montgomery informed the British Cabinet in January 1946 that “he

had arranged for the Army to play football matches against German boys’ clubs in the interest

of the re-education of German youth.”113 The British principally sent football teams to

Germany, although the Oxford track and field team – including an eighteen-year old Roger

Bannister – also participated in a meet against German university students in 1948 after

competing against the British Army of the Rhine.114 In the spring of 1949, a British select football team played in Berlin against BSV 92. The game, according to the monthly report,

“was, if not a triumph for British sport, a move in the right direction in Anglo-German relations.”115

112Letter, Philip Noel-Baker to Sir Stanley Rous, 18 February 1946, FO 371/55626, NA. 113Letter, A.C.W. Drew to H. Godfrey, 15 January 1946, FO 371/55626, NA. 114Dixon, 20; Minuets, 95th Conference, Director, Education Branch, 19 July 1947, FO1050/1254, NA; Minuets, 96th Conference, Director, Education Branch, 26 July 1947, FO1050/1254, NA. 115Monthly Report - May 1949, Youth Section, British Troops Berlin, 1 June 1949, FO 1050/1089, NA.

118 Whereas both the British and Americans began participating in some form of athletic

competition fairly early in the occupation, the French remained adamant in their non-

fraternization in sport. Not until 31 March 1948 did General Koenig declare that while the

prohibition of sporting events between French and Germans remained, specific exemptions

could be granted by the head of youth and sport for the zone or by the local officer.116 Only

after this change in policy could the French begin initiating exchanges with the Germans. As

a result, the exchanges arranged by the French were broader than American or British

programs. The first French exchange sent skiers to Germany in the winter of 1949-50 for the

Germans and French “to become acquainted with each other and live together in a friendly

manner.”117 The following winter the French sent 124 skiers to Germany and began planning

for an exchange in the summer of 1951 for mountaineering and water sports.118 The French

authorities stated that “sport is an excellent base of bringing people together, particularly for

young people of different nationalities.”119 Although the initial impetus for Allied-German exchanges came from the French in 1946, the late development of the Franco-German sport exchanges was a combination of the continued ban on Franco-German sport competitions and the financial difficulties faced by the French domestically. Nonetheless, French sport exchanges increased after the transition from the occupation to the Federal Republic of

Germany, demonstrating a continued commitment to the fostering of a cross-cultural transfer

116Letter, Le Général d’Armée Koenig to MM. Le Délégué Supérieur pour le G.M. de Bade, Délégué Supérieur pour le G.M. du Wurtemberg, Délégué Supérieur pour le Land Rhéno-Palatin, 31 March 1948, AC 421/2, AOFAA. 117Letter from H. Schmelzer, Leiter des Instituts für Internationale Begegningen, 5 October 1950, AC 423/1, AOFAA. 118Echanges UNCM - Institut für International Begegnungen, n.d. [1950], AC 423/1, AOFAA. 119Ibid.

119 between the two countries and their citizens.

The occupation powers recognised the necessity of bringing to Germany experts in a variety of fields in order to help develop German programs and train German leaders. The western Allies brought athletes, coaches, and recreation professionals to occupied Germany to share both practical knowledge regarding sport, physical education, and recreation as well as organisation methods to instill democratic practices among the participants. The benefits perceived by the Allies of the visits from experts led the occupation powers to expand these programs and broaden their scope. In addition to reinforcing the Allied policy of democratisation, the visits by experts to Germany helped lessen the tensions between Allied and German citizens through the emphasis on the cross-cultural benefits for the individuals involved and, ultimately, the countries at large as the participants shared their knowledge.

* * *

German Leaders Abroad

In addition to sending their own citizens to Germany, the three powers also promoted exchanges that sent Germans abroad. By helping Germans resume contacts with other countries through visiting them, the Allies enabled the Germans to observe a variety of democratic practises. With the assistance of private organisations within the western Allied home countries, the Military Governments could develop and fund extensive programs for specially selected Germans to visit the United States, Great Britain, and France to further their study of democracy and its practises through first-hand experience. German youth and sport leaders who participated in these programs abroad had the opportunity to return home and impart this new knowledge to other Germans through their leadership positions and

120 further advance the Allied occupation goals for Germany.

All three western Allies brought German athletes from their zones to Great Britain,

France, or elsewhere in western Europe to participate in athletic competition. In conjunction with the program to send French skiers to Germany, the French also brought several Germans to France for ski instruction, mountaineering, and water sports.120 England’s Football

Association invited a representative from the Bavarian Football Association to London “to confer on [the] latest methods of training” and receive “instruction and aid in modern British training procedures.”121 The BSV 92 football team, after hosting a British team, went to

Denmark and Sweden in 1950 to play a series of friendly matches.122 American education or community activity programs sent Germans to the other two western occupation powers,

Great Britain and France, as well as to Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, and the

Netherlands.123 These actions supported the ideas of the quadripartite Allied Education

Committee, which believed that these contacts “could not but have the best effects towards the task of reeducating German youth. The purpose of these contacts is to widen the horizon of German youth and to show them the democratic way of life of which they had no knowledge during the Hitler period.”124

The Americans in particular found it beneficial to bring some of the most promising

120Echanges UNCM - Institut für International Begegnungen, n.d. [1950], AC 423/1, AOFAA. 121OMG-Bavaria Monthly Report for Period Ending 31 August 1948, 31 August 1948, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 122Monthly Report - January 1950, Youth Section, British Troops Berlin, 28 January 1950, FO 1050/1090, NA. 123Kellermann, 163. 124DIAC/AEC/P(46)30 Addendum, 12 December 1946, Box 232, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Direct. Of Internal Affairs and Communication (DIAC): General Records, 1945-1948, RG 260, NARA.

121 Germans to the United States for both short-term and extended visits to assist with reeducation and further their understanding of democracy. The Americans developed a program in 1949 to send Germans to the United States because “German administrators, supervisors and organizers need to observe our youth leaders, recreation superintendants [sic] and board members of councils of social agencies, welfare departments and similar bodies to observe first hand how cooperative, democratic planning and administration in Recreation and Sports is carried on.”125 The 1946 Education Mission had called for private sector aid to relieve the governmental financial and manpower burden regarding exchanges and education.126 Private organisations in the United States increasingly assisted with the German cultural exchange programs following the introduction of JCS 1779 in 1947 and also after the

Allied transition from military to civilian control in 1949. The National Recreation

Association provided assistance on exchanges in both directions between the United States and Germany for programs dealing with recreation and sport. In addition, the National Social

Welfare Assembly (NSWA) played a prominent role in helping arrange for the visits of several German leaders or potential future leaders. The chair of the NSWA’s German

Leadership Training Project Advisory Committee was Dr. Paul Limbert – the member of the

1946 Education Mission responsible for youth groups. Also participating as a member of this

Advisory Committee was Edward Ladd, the Youth Activities Officer for Bremen from 1946 to 1948 who had returned to Yale to complete his doctorate in education.127

125Education and Cultural Relations Division, “Community Recreation and Sports,” 1 November 1949, Box 113, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 126Kellermann, 24. 127Minutes, National Social Welfare Assembly Youth Division Advisory Committee German Leadership Training Project, 11 March 1949, Box 28, International Information Administration (IIA) --

122 Working in conjunction with civilian organisations, the American Military

Government (and later the High Commission) developed programs for German leaders to visit the United States to learn about democratic procedures within their fields which they could use in Germany. The Military Government for Bremen wanted to send four leaders to designated American cities to

study and observe how American youth is provided the opportunities of varied recreational activities and how they respond to a free choice of activities. They will observe that recreation in America means opportunity for all to express a democratic attitude or spirit which finds expression in varied forms of activity. This attitude can be transplanted to Germany only by German leaders studying this recreation movement in action.128

The participants in the Bremen recreation project participated in some of the programming developed by the National Recreation Association while they were in the United States.

When the city architect from Bremerhaven returned from this visit, he built a new playground in the city with “distinctive American features.”129 The Bremerhaven architect, along with many other German leaders who visited the United States, accomplished what the Allies hoped these exchanges would: the implementation in Germany of democratic ideas learned and observed abroad. In comparison to the limited access granted only to members by the sport clubs traditionally found in Germany, the new Bremerhaven playground enabled recreation for all residents of the city.

The American Military Government and High Commission often worked with the

European Field Program (IFI/E) -- Subject Files 1949-52, RG 59, NARA; E-mail correspondence, Diane Kaplan, Yale University Library, to author, 11 July 2008. 128Project for Land Bremen -- “Study of Municipal Recreation Activities”, Box 141, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 129Kellermann, 220.

123 National Social Welfare Assembly in the United States to organise several of the projects for youth and sport. The first project on which the National Social Welfare Assembly assisted brought seven German youth leaders (aged 21 to 35) to the United States in 1948 for an extended period of six to ten months. The seven Germans studied at colleges or schools of social work and were funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. The participants knew that upon their return to Germany, some of them would be selected as staff for the youth leadership schools in the American zone.130 Melitta Dressel, the youngest of the group, had already worked as a sport and folk dancing instructor at the Ruit Youth and Sports

Leadership School. She returned to the leadership school following two terms at Springfield

College in Massachusetts. While at Springfield Dressel enrolled in classes on “group work, youth serving agencies, gymnastics, dancing, music, and American History, the last because she felt that she could better understand the American people if she were to have insight into their past.”131 Dressel not only lived with three other boarders on the top floor of Dr.

Limbert’s house in Springfield, but her advisor at Springfield College was David DeMarche, who had previously visited Bavaria as an expert to study youth issues.132 Even with her prior

130Letter from Youth Division, National Social Welfare Assembly, 13 September 1948, Box 129, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. While the NSWA does not mention which private foundation provided the financial support for these seven students, Aksel Nielsen referred to Dressel as a Rockefeller student upon her return to Ruit. Aksel Nielsen, Daily Report, 24 March 1949, Box 960, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 131Minutes, National Social Welfare Assembly Youth Division Advisory Committee German Leadership Training Project, 11 March 1949, Box 28, International Information Administration (IIA) -- European Field Program (IFI/E) -- Subject Files 1949-52, RG 59, NARA. 132Final Report of Melitta Dressel, student at Springfield College, March 1949, Box 129, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA; Letter, Charles D. Winning to L.E. Norrie, 27 October 1948, Box 126, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -

124 experience as a Military Government-approved youth leader instructor, Dressel’s frequent contact with experts who had visited the American zone on government-sponsored trips could still provide a fruitful experience.

The National Social Welfare Assembly, State Department, and American Military

Government no doubt were pleased with Dressel’s final report on her exchange experience, in which she described positively the democratic practices she observed in the United States.

She began her eight-page report:

I was so glad that I have had the opportunity as one of the very few to leave behind me needs, ruins, and narrowness of Germany, and to look forward to learn to know people of another country, their customs and different ways of life; to take to heart and to learn as much as possible without any prejudice, and to put into action these experiences after my return to Germany. Thus I can contribute so that the German youth may find a better way of life.133

Dressel noticed differences between Germany and the United States in higher education as well as in extra-curricular activities. Although she did not believe that every aspect of

American life was better than German traditions, she nonetheless reported that “I am anxious to put into action these ideas.”134 The Americans organising these exchanges could only hope that all of the German visits to the United States were as successful as Dressel’s.

In 1949 the National Social Welfare Assembly expanded its efforts by arranging for

Germans to visit the United States and, also with working with other organisations and local communities on the daily programming for the German visitors. The Military Government and the NSWA established four simultaneous projects on youth, sport, and recreation:

- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 133Final Report of Melitta Dressel, student at Springfield College from September 24 to March 15, 1949, Box 129, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 134Ibid.

125 Development of Community Programs and Inter-Organizational Planning for Youth,

Curriculum and Methods of Leadership Training, Improvement of Program Content and

Planning Methods of Youth Organizations, and Development of Standards for Physical

Education and Community Recreation. The seven Germans selected for the latter program came from all four Länder in the American zone, as well as the American sector of Berlin.

The purpose of these projects, as stated by the NSWA in a memorandum to the host organisations and individuals in the United States, was not “to propagandize the German leaders, nor to ‘sell’ them a pattern of work for importation to Germany.” Rather, “the

American way of doing things needs to be seen, felt, talked out, and experienced to be understood.”135 By cooperating with these non-governmental organisations, the Military

Government and State Department utilised sport and recreation in its programs of public diplomacy toward occupied Germany.

Similar to the Americans, the British also believed in the benefits of reeducation and democratisation through exchanges which brought Germans to Great Britain. The best known British program for Germans in England was the Wilton Park reeducation courses for prisoners of war. The British at first designed Wilton Park courses for those German prisoners of war most in need of political reeducation as a result of their ardent Nazism. In

1947 German civilians began attending Wilton Park courses focussed on citizenship and politics.136 The director of Wilton Park believed that the ideas discussed and taught there

135Dr. Paul Limbert, Bernice Bridges, and Mabel Shannon, Memorandum regarding German Leadership Project of the Youth Division National Social Welfare Assembly, 4 February 1949, Box 119, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 136David Welch, “Citizenship and Politics: Legacy of Wilton Park for Post-War Reconstruction,” Contemporary European History 6, no. 2 (1997), 209-214; Richard Mayne, In Victory, Magnanimity in Peace,

126 helped achieve British foreign policy aims, in particular the contribution of Germany to a

stable and prosperous Europe.137 By expanding courses to include lecturers from other

countries such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, Wilton Park became more international in

its efforts. Wilton Park’s director believed that having instructors from a variety of countries

would “help make Germany a good European.”138 The British expanded the Wilton Park program concurrently with the American implementation of the exchange programs and for the same reason: to bring Germans in contact with a broad range of democratic leaders and organisations. Although Wilton Park began as a reeducation program for prisoners of war, the British opened participation to a larger segment of the German population when Soviet

“democracy” in eastern Europe and its zone of Germany increasingly appeared to take only the Soviet form.

In addition to Wilton Park, which held a program in 1951 specifically for Youth

Specialists,139 the British Military Government also arranged for German youth and sport leaders to visit Great Britain to observe and learn democratic practices. The £5,000 assigned for youth visits in 1947-48 had already been spent by November 1947, although the

Education Branch requested another £2,000 to permit an additional 60-75 visits in the last quarter of the fiscal year. Private organisations within Great Britain, in particular the

Friends’ Educational Council, funded additional German youth visits. The Youth Advisor within the Education Branch therefore requested two-and-a-half times more money for youth

Goodwill: A History of Wilton Park (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 62-64. 137Welch, 216. 138Heinz Koeppler quoted in Mayne, 132. 139Ibid., 177.

127 visits the following year.140 The proposed expansion would include leading German physical educationalists and sportsmen for youth in order for them to study English games and methods of sport. The Youth Officer felt that “the sports organisations undoubtedly constituted a potential political force in Germany; their members must not be forgotten or overlooked in our efforts to widen the German horizon through closer contacts abroad.”141

The British Military Government, largely through the effort of its Chief Sports

Officer, J.G. Dixon, expanded the exchanges to include physical education instructors. In conjunction with the Central Council for Physical Recreation in London, Dixon arranged for six men and six women, two each from North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony and one each from Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, to visit Great Britain for a few weeks at the beginning of the new fiscal year (April 1948).142 Funding for these programs was a consistent problem for the British, but Dixon forged ahead on the planning with the Central Council for

Physical Recreation for a second exchange in 1948 for Germans “to gain insight into the role played by sport in our English Youth Work.”143 The lack of funding, however, resulted in the program’s cancellation, a great disappointment to Dixon.144 A report on physical education in

Germany by His Majesty’s Inspectors recommended further expanding these exchanges, but at the same time they recognised the difficulty with funding these exchanges.145 Eventually the British located the financial resources for German physical education lecturers to

140Minutes, Fifth Conference, Youth Control Officers, 18 November 1947, FO 1050/1174, NA. 141Ibid. 142Minutes, Conference, Senior Youth Officers, 2 February 1948, FO 1050/1087, NA. 143Minutes, Eighth Conference, Youth Officers, 29 September 1948, FO 1050/1544, NA. 144Ibid. 145J.G. Dixon, H.M.I’s Report on Physical Education, October 1948, FO 1050/1255, NA.

128 participate in courses in the West Riding of Yorkshire in the fall of 1949.146

Because Great Britain received Marshall Plan assistance to facilitate its domestic

recovery, the British could then direct more resources to implement the exchange programs

developed by Dixon to bring German physical education instructors to Great Britain. In

February 1949 sixteen German physical education lecturers visited Great Britain for two

weeks. The eight men visited London schools and teacher training colleges while the eight

women spent the duration in residency at teacher training colleges. The aim of these visits,

noted the Education Advisor of the British zone, was “to give the German lecturers some idea

of the organisation of the English Colleges and, in particular, the place of Physical Education

in their curricula.”147 The British Education Branch also developed separate plans to send female physical education instructors to England for professional development, permitted that

Contingencies Fund monies were available.148 Although not able to execute all of the plans for German visits to Great Britain, the British Military Government nonetheless worked with non-governmental organisations to send Germans abroad to help in the democratisation efforts.

While the Americans established more exchange programs than the British and

French for German youth and youth leaders, all three of the western Allies understood the importance of international contacts and supported them as much as was feasible. The financial position of the United States after the war – compared to Great Britain and especially France – enabled the occupation power geographically farthest from Germany to

146Minutes, 170th Conference, Directors, Education Branch, 4 November 1949, FO 1050/1110, NA. 147Monthly Report, Office of the Educational Adviser, February 1949, FO 1050/1103, NA. 148Minutes, 148th Conference, Directors, Education Branch, 1 November 1948, FO 1050/1110, NA.

129 develop and implement more exchange programs. Through the visits of some of the most promising German leaders to Great Britain and the United States, including future chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, Germans could observe democracy in action across a number of relevant organisations.149 Sport and youth leaders could, while interacting with citizens of other democratic western countries, learn a multitude of skills and organisational structures which they could implement in their own clubs and associations to ensure that they differed from the centralised and authoritarian structures which had previously dominated in Germany. By working with non-governmental organisations, the western Allies hoped that the Germans would more readily accept and use the democratic ideas because average citizens and not representatives of the occupation governments espoused and demonstrated these ideas.

* * *

Conclusion

The increased emphasis on public diplomacy on the part of the British, Americans, and French involved a larger number of Germans in the positive and reconstructive aims of the occupation. The western Allies further expanded these programs with the formal division of Germany and the hardening of the ideological Cold War. Almost 75 per cent of the participants from 1947 to 1954 in the German exchange programs participated between 1950 and 1952, after the creation of two separate German states and at the beginning of the crisis over Korea. Cultural programs, which included education and youth, dominated the exchanges organised by the State Department with 64 per cent of the total sent during those

149Kellermann, 240.

130 eight years.150 Youth and sport exchange programs were not only central to Allied plans for

the reconstruction of Germany but were included in some of the earliest exchanges.

While the occupation powers wanted Germans to learn and adopt democratic

practises, the experience of the Third Reich largely prevented the use of outright propaganda.

Whereas cultural diplomacy promotes a country’s beliefs and achievements abroad, public

diplomacy also seeks to create an understanding for that state’s goals and policies.151 By

introducing democracy within youth and sport organisations and selective exchange

programs, public diplomacy enabled the aims of the occupation to influence German society

to a greater extent. Of course, determining the success of these programs is difficult. Is

success measured in short-term goals being met, such as the building of a playground in

Bremerhaven? Or can success only be considered after a number of years, after the initial

group of Germans who learned coaching skills from David Davison had trained more

Germans who had, in turn, imparted this knowledge to an even larger number of pupils?

At the time the Americans attempted to gauge the success of these programs through

public opinion surveys conducted by the Reactions Analysis Branch. A March 1950 report

stated that almost eight out of every ten Germans in the American zone believed that

individual students and experts as well as Germany as a whole benefit from their exchanges

to the United States.152 Henry Kellermann, who coordinated many of these projects as a member of the State Department, wrote in his history of the German-American exchange

150Kellermann, 276. 151Tuch, 3. 152Germans View the U.S. Reorientation Program, III. Opinions on the Cultural Exchange Program, Report No. 12, Series No. 2, 30 March 1950, Box 1, Research Reports on German Public Opinion, RG 306, NARA.

131 programs that “the exchange experience, after all, was no more than a means to an end; its purpose was to help assist Germans in creating a new society modeled on western democratic concepts.”153 The American practitioners of public diplomacy have, upon retirement from the

State Department, written books attesting to the success of these programs.154 Kellermann, reflecting on his work with the expert program, stated that “in time the German leader- specialist exchange became not only the largest but, as regards impact on the German populace, the most significant and effective program. The secret of its success lay in the careful and calculated selection of the best participants, but, perhaps even more so, in its project-oriented nature.”155

While Kellermann’s assessments of projects he organised must be weighed accordingly, the fact that all three western Allies expanded their exchange programs signifies some level of success, or at least perceived success at the time. In a period with a high demand from competing directions domestically, in Germany, and abroad for financial resources, programs had to fulfill a need to continue receiving funding. The United States in particular devoted over five billion dollars through the Marshall Plan to ease the European financial crisis, over $400 million in aid to China, and additional money to Greece and

Turkey.156 The British and French both received Marshall Plan aid and, in fact, were in dire need of American money in order to stave off crises domestically and in their empires.157

153Kellermann, 163. 154Kellermann, Cultural Relations As an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy; Yale Richmond, Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008). 155Kellermann, 40. 156Forrest Pogue, “George C. Marshall and the Marshall Plan,” in The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program, ed. Charles S. Maier and Günter Bischof (New York: Berg, 1991), 67. 157Charles S. Maier, “Introduction: ‘Issue then is Germany and with it Future of Europe’,” in The

132 Yet, the British and French continued their programs of public diplomacy in Germany. Even when the Political Branch of Great Britain’s Military Government thought in 1948 that

Wilton Park would soon outlive its purpose and that the thousands of British pounds needed to run the courses could be better spent on an Anglo-German Centre in London, the

Education Branch’s belief in its reeducation efforts won Wilton Park the ability to continue in its mission.158

The interconnectedness of sport and education of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries across Europe and North America, and particularly within Germany, provided the foundations for the Allied policies regarding sport. The three western Allies understood the importance of German youth to the future of the country as well as Europe and the world at large. Once the occupation powers set the basic regulations for the refounding of athletic organisations, each Military Government instituted programs that helped foster democratic ideas through sport. The early policies at introducing democracy to the youth of Germany focussed on training youth leaders and physical education instructors, primarily through the establishment of zonal leadership schools and the exchanging of instructors and leaders between countries. All of these actions helped to “remove the tradition of regimentation and mass drill under one leader” and to introduce “games and sports that develop individual leadership, team play and stress the concept of fair play.”159 By providing physical education without militarism, the Allies hoped that a new generation of Germans would mature with a

Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program, ed. Charles S. Maier and Günter Bischof (New York: Berg, 1991), 12-14. 158Mayne, 122-3. 159Liaison Conference on German Youth Assistance, 21-24 October 1946, Box 136, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA.

133 solid foundation of democratic principles. In his speech at the opening of the second year of the Deutsche Sporthochschule, J.G. Dixon told the students that “here you should learn and learn to teach.”160 German youth clubs, in an Allied sentiment expressed by the British,

“must have more positive ends so as to create clean living, clean thinking and constructive citizens of the world.”161 The Allies recognised the importance of youth activities outside of the schoolhouse, often involving sport, and their development of programs in conjunction with the occupation aims helped spread the ideas and practises of democracy to a wider segment of the population.

In one of the earliest examinations of the American occupation of Germany, Harold

Zink briefly discussed the main program for German youth in the zone but claimed that “the youth program is another which, considering the dire condition of the German youth following the Nazi debacle, might very well have received greater emphasis.”162 Yet, the

Americans, British, and French Military Governments all devoted significant support to the formation and implementation of policies which addressed youth and sport activities.

Because the state-run Hitler Youth controlled all sport activities for German youth during the

Third Reich, the western Allies believed that voluntary and local organisations providing extracurricular activities would assist with democratisation. Even the Soviets, who publicly protested that the American army violated Directive 23 and was remilitarising Germany

160J.G. Dixon, Ansprache aus Anlass der Eroeffnung des 4. Semesters der Sporthochschule Koeln, 4 November 1948, FO 1023/2213, NA. 161Education Control Instruction No. 56, “Youth Activities. – The Purpose of Youth Clubs in Germany – the Choosing and Training of Club Organisers and Helpers,” n.d., Box 311, Records of Office of Military Government, Bremen -- Records of the Education Division: Gen. Corresp & Rel Recs of Youth Activities Branch, 1945-47, RG 260, NARA. 162Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), 358.

134 through its support of the German Youth Activities program,163 recognised the benefits of a positive sport program. By late 1947 the Soviets admitted (to themselves) that sport could be useful to gain the sympathy of the German youth and that the Soviet Military Government should ease sport restrictions and promote sport within German organisations.164 The western

Allies worked with their own domestic organisations as well as with the Germans to create programs to help with democratisation. In addition to implementing ideas learned from visiting experts or on exchanges abroad, German sport leaders took their own initiatives such as the initial actions to create the Ruit and Vlotho youth leadership schools. These joint

Allied-German ventures often received initial funding from the Military Governments, but as

Germans increasingly regained control of their country, they also had to secure domestic funding to continue these voluntary and democratic programs.

163The Soviets claimed that the Americans disregarded the demilitarisation component of Directive 23 by having military personnel teach German youth sport through the Army’s GYA program. Letter, FL Howley to Commanding General, US HQ, Berlin District, 12 September 1946, Box 2, U. S. Mission Berlin -- Cultural Affairs Committee, 1945-1949, RG 84, NARA. 164V. Zakharov, Deiatelnost Sovetskoi voennoi administratsii v Germanii (SVAG) po demilitarizatsii Sovetskoi zony okkupatsii Germanii, 1945-1949: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: ROSSPAEN: 2004), 635. Thanks to Auri Berg for the translation.

135 Chapter 3

Kicking Around International Sport: The 1948 German-Swiss Football Games

In planning for cultural interchange among nations we do not want to forget the importance of sports. The promotion of understanding and good fellowship through sports is one of the worthwhile aims of sports. We believe no youth should be barred from the good influences in the world. At the same time we hold to the motto: “Sports for sports’ sake”! –Aksel Nielsen, Youth Activities Officer, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden1

When the Allies created plans for the occupation of Germany, perhaps the governmental official from any of the powers with the most vested interest in sport was

Philip Noel-Baker, who held many positions within the British Government during his long life. When Clement Atlee became Prime Minister in 1945, Noel-Baker moved from working in the Ministry of War Transport to the Foreign Office. After fourteen months Noel-Baker then became the Secretary of State for Air.2 Noel-Baker in particular understood the international goodwill fostered by international sport, having competed as an athlete at the

1912 Olympics in Stockholm and the 1920 Antwerp Games. Noel-Baker wrote of his first

Olympic experience that he “left the sunlit Swedish capital with a deep conviction that international sport and the Olympic movement could become a mighty instrument for making all the nations understand that they belong to one Society with common interests, common

1Aksel Nielsen, “Background on Today’s Two Important Football Games,” 27 September 1948, Box 973, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 2David J. Whittaker, Fighter for Peace: Philip Noel-Baker, 1889-1982 (York: William Sessions Limited, 1989), 184-86; Peter J. Beck, “Confronting George Orwell: Philip Noel-Baker on International Sport, Particularly the Olympic Movement, As Peacemaker,” in Militarism, Sport, Europe: War Without Weapons, ed. J.A. Mangan (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 189.

136 hopes and common aims!”3 During the fourteen months in 1945-46 when Philip-Noel Baker worked as a member of the Foreign Office, he helped set the attitude toward sport ultimately adopted by the Allies in Germany. Noel-Baker championed the international and peaceful benefits of sport his entire life which, combined with his efforts with the United Nations and on disarmament, earned him the Nobel Peace Price in 1959.4

The leadership and exchange programs worked on the democratisation component of

Directive 23 at the individual level, teaching small groups of Germans how to instill democratic practises within their organisations and youth groups. At the same time the Allies recognised the potential for sport to reach an even larger portion of the German population.

Spectatorship, particularly the ability to rally around a city or national team, could assist with the moral reconstruction of the German population. Abraham Brill, American psychiatrist and translator of many of Sigmund Freud’s works, espoused the prevailing attitude across

Europe and America by the late 1920s that sport spectatorship was a “necessary catharsis, indispensable to civilized man – a salutary purgation of the combative instincts which, if damned up within him, would break out in disastrous ways.”5 Brill argued that the average man should “identify himself with his favorite fighter, player or team. He will purge himself of impulses which too much dammed up would lead to private broils and public disorders.

He will achieve exaltation, vicarious but real. He will be a better individual, a better citizen, a better husband and father.”6 Interwar commentators on fandom such as Brill believed that

3Philip Noel-Baker quoted in Whittaker, 14. 4Ibid., 263-4. 5A.A. Brill, “The Why of the Fan,” North American Review 228 (1929), 432. 6Ibid., 434; Allen Guttmann, Sports Spectators (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 180.

137 sport, even in the form of spectatorship, provided an outlet for an otherwise dangerous aggression which could have manifested in the form of an anti-capitalist revolt.7 With the devastation of the Second World War and the difficulties of the occupation, the Allies needed to prevent German uprisings, renascent Nazism, or other anti-Allied actions. Participation in as well as spectatorship of sport could provide this outlet in occupied Germany, they believed.

The financial and material position of individual Germans remained tenuous during the first half of the occupation, and the Allies understood the need for a source of positive pride for the Germans. Sport, especially football, could fill that need. Jules Rimet, the

French president of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) from 1921-

54, believed that “sport and football could bring people and nations together in a healthy competitiveness,” and that “sport could be a powerful means of both physical and moral progress, providing healthy pleasure and fun, and promoting friendship between races.”8

Furthermore, as Andrei Markovits and Steven Hellerman argue, team sports “exercise much greater emotional power and collective cohesion than individual sports” because the

“collective in the form of the country, city, or region most definitely supercedes any identity with the individual.”9

Recognising the potential for football, the American Military Government therefore attempted to utilise this sport within its broader reconstruction efforts. Football had been

7Guttmann, Sport Spectators,148-9. 8Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, “Culture, Politics, and Spectacle in the Global Sports Event - - An Introduction,” in German Football: History, Culture, Society, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (London: Routledge, 2006), 5. 9Andrei S. Markovits and Steven L. Hellerman, Offside: Soccer & American Exceptionalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 13, 37.

138 popular in Germany before 1945, but it did not dominate the German athletic landscape and influence society in the way that Turnen did. By the outbreak of the First World War, only

200,000 Germans had joined the national football association (Deutscher Fußball-Bund), whereas the Deutscher Turnerschaft had over one million members.10 With the limitations placed on Turnen and a greater emphasis on team sports in order to demonstrate teamwork, democracy, and fair play, the popularity of football grew during the occupation. The simple nature of football and its minimal equipment requirements facilitated its growth during the dire circumstances of the immediate postwar years, much in the way that football has become the dominant global game, especially in less developed states. If the Germans could participate in international football matches, Germans could, at least for ninety minutes, forget about their personal difficulties and begin to think positively about their country.

Thus, the American Military Government worked with Swiss football officials to organise international matches for Germany. The Americans did not help with these arrangements solely to assist German sportsmen and sports fans; instead, they viewed these games as a component of their public diplomacy program. The American Military

Government worked with nongovernmental organisations in both Switzerland and Germany in order for the games to happen. The matches raised money for the Ruit Youth and Sports

Leadership School and for an orphanage in Munich because American financial support for these projects was ending by late 1948. The currency reform also hindered the German ability to provide funding for these programs. Finally, the matches gave Germans a positive

10Christiane Eisenberg, “Football in Germany: Beginnings, 1890-1914,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 8, no. 2 (1991), 205.

139 identity only a few years after the end of the war for which they could cheer.

* * *

German Sport: Isolated and Underfunded

The first German postwar sporting activities consisted solely of Germans participating

with other Germans, not only as a result of all international federations excluding Germany

from their memberships, but also as a result of the non-fraternization policies instituted by

the occupation powers. The non-fraternization policy encompassed all aspects of Allied-

German relations, including the playing of sports or games.11 As Allied troops moved across

Germany in the spring of 1945, the British Foreign Office, with Philip Noel-Baker,

established a policy whereby “the children of occupied countries should be encouraged to

play games in accordance with British traditions, [but] adults should not be given

opportunities to take part in sports, although they would be permitted to attend sports

functions arranged by the occupying forces in order that they might observe the spirit in

which such matches were played.”12 Once the war officially ended all three western powers

established extensive sport competitions for their armies of occupation.13 The Americans

established the Theater Athletic Programs with four goals: maintaining troop morale and

discipline, maintaining physical fitness, providing vocational training, and providing

11Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 50-1. 12Sir Stanley Rous, Secretary of the (English) Football Association, was referring to a meeting he had in March 1945 “with Foreign Office officials, which was attended by Mr. Noel Baker, at present Minister of State, a representative of the Amateur Athletic Association and others concerned.” The above policy was, according to Rous, that of Foreign Office and U.N.R.R.A. Letter, S.F. Rous to Field-Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, 8 December 1945, FO 371/55626, NA. 13For example, H.H. Newman to Commanding Generals, 20 August 1945, Box 20, U.S. Group Control Council – Adjutant General – General Correspondence, 1944-1945, RG 260, NARA. See also FO 1068/61 and FO 1068/62 at the National Archives regarding the organisation of British military sport.

140 “opportunities for developing spectator interest.”14 It was these types of events, with

Germans present only in the stands and not on the fields, which the Allies believed at the outset of the occupation would demonstrate the positive benefits of sport to the Germans.

Even once the Allies relaxed their non-fraternisation policies and actively helped rebuild

German sport, financing for sport organisations and programs remained tenuous during the difficult early years of the occupation.

The prohibition of Allied-German sporting events in conjunction with non- fraternization was in line with the sentiments of the wider international athletic community.

In its first postwar Executive Committee meeting in 1945 in Switzerland, the Fédération

International de Football Association agreed with the early British mentality regarding sport relations with Germany. FIFA’s Executive Committee decided that it “cannot have any more relationship with the practice of football in Germany and Japan.”15 FIFA upheld the

Executive Committee’s decision at its full Congress in Luxembourg in 1946.16 The governing body for football maintained Germany’s exclusion through the end of the 1940s.

Thus, any attempt by the western Allies to schedule international games against German teams would run into difficulties with FIFA.17 However, the British and Americans placed

14R.B. Lovett to Commanding Generals, 2 June 1945, Box 20, U.S. Group Control Council – Adjutant General – General Correspondence, 1944-1945, RG 260, NARA. 15FIFA Proces-Verbal de la Reunion du Comite Executif, 10-12 November 1945, Executive Committee Meeting Agenda Minutes, 1940-1946, Fédération Internationale de Football Association, Zurich, Switzerland. Hereafter cited FIFA. 16Minutes of the XXVth Congress, 25-26 July 1946, 25th - 27th Ordinary Congress, 1946-1952 Activity Report Minutes, FIFA; “Ousts Japan and Germany,” New York Times, 13 November 1945, 17. FIFA formally expelled Germany and Japan “until the two former Axis-partners have re-established normal relations with other countries.” “Japan, Germany Dropped,” New York Times 27 July 1946, 25. 17Following the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union withdrew from all international sport federations and the International Olympic Committee. Thus, any attempt that the Soviet Union might have made in arranging an international sporting event with its zone of occupation in Germany would not have been recognised by the international governing bodies of sport. For more on the Soviet Union’s relationship with

141 greater importance on the democratisation of Germany than a non-governmental

organisation’s rules. At the same time they recognised that for Germany to rejoin the

community of nations – in this case the football community – FIFA’s regulations could not

be disregarded completely.

Following its 1945 Executive Committee decision, FIFA informed the four British

football associations of Germany’s expulsion and requested they uphold a comparable policy

as well. International sport federations such as FIFA, the organisations to which the national

governing bodies of that sport within each country are affiliated, control international

matches within their sport. Sir Stanley Rous, Secretary of the (English) Football Association,

received FIFA’s request because none of the four British football associations were, at the

time, members of FIFA.18 FIFA wanted, “after hearing the views of the liberated countries,

in particular those of Holland and Norway, to ask the British Associations, so far as it lay

within their power, to forbid services' or civilian teams to play against German, Japanese and

Italian teams.”19 The authority of international federations did not, however, officially extend

to the Allied soldiers or, once it had been expelled, Germany. Had the non-fraternization ban

worked in practise as the military commanders had intended, then FIFA would not have had

to make such a request of the British.

Rous concurred with the FIFA decision and had, in fact, participated in the Foreign

international sport, see chapter seven in Barbara J. Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 18Unlike in the Olympic Games where Great Britain competes as one country, in football each of the four home countries controls the sport within its borders. Of the four organisations, however, England’s Football Association is the dominant. The four British Football Associations joined and left FIFA several times during the twentieth century as a result of conflicts over rules governing the sport. Peter J. Beck, Scoring for Britain: International Football and International Politics, 1900-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1999). 19Letter, S.F. Rous to Mr. Alexander, n.d. [December 1945], FO 371/55626, NA.

142 Office discussions with Philip Noel-Baker in late 1944 and early 1945 regarding the decision not to allow German adults to participate in sport as part of the non-fraternisation policy.

Rous therefore wrote to both Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and First Lord of the

Admiralty A.V. Alexander, urging them not to allow their troops to engage in football matches with Germans. Montgomery, however, replied: “I am afraid that I do not agree with the Football Association. My troops are forbidden to play matches with German ex-military teams. But it is part of my policy to play games with civilian teams, such as miners, boys clubs, and so on.”20 The soldiers found it difficult to enforce an all-encompassing non- fraternization policy with the Germans because instead of encountering German soldiers as the military had anticipated, the Allies were primarily met by women and children.21

Now convinced that Anglo-German interactions on the football pitch could help promote the government’s aims, Philip Noel-Baker supported Montgomery’s decisions.

Noel-Baker therefore informed Rous “when the British troops originally entered Germany the non-fraternisation order made any such matches quite impossible. You are, however, no doubt aware that the policy has been carefully reviewed and, as a result, considerably modified.”22 He added that “the playing of matches between British and German civilian teams can contribute to the democratic re-education of the German people, and we do not agree that such games should be discouraged.”23 As a former Olympian Noel-Baker could personally attest to the benefits of international athletic competitions, and he fully supported

20Letter, Field-Marshal B.L. Montgomery to Sir Stanley Rous, 16 December 1945, FO 371/55626, NA. 21Goedde, 50-9. 22Letter, A.C.W. Drew to S.F. Rous, 2 January 1946, FO 371/55626, NA. 23Letter, Philip Noel-Baker to Sir Stanley Rous, 18 February 1946, FO 371/55626, NA.

143 the changed stance of the British government regarding sport with and for Germans.

Although the western Allies did not clamor for the immediate return of Germany to

international sport, they nonetheless recognised the potential for sporting contacts between

themselves and German civilians to assist with the aims of the occupation. The Admiralty

agreed with Montgomery that, once the military had relaxed non-fraternization, nothing could

really prevent games between Germans and the British troops.24 The same ideas supporting

the benefits of Allied troops participating in sport with German civilians – particularly the

youth – drove the expansion of the German Youth Activities program in the American zone,

as well as the later exchange of English and German youth football teams, as demonstrated in

chapter two. While the occupation powers readily supported these youth programs, they

could not provide all of the financial backing to these projects. The continued presence of

troops in Germany was a drain on Allied coffers, and the British, American, and French

wanted to decrease their occupation costs.25 The Military Governments, with the Germans, had to devise plans for Germans to assume a greater financial responsibility for many of the programs initiated by the Allies.

Securing alternative funding for German programs was a major concern of the Allies, particularly of the elected officials concerned with their constituents at home. For these reasons United States Secretary of State George Marshall announced, in a speech at Harvard

University in June 1947, the beginnings of a European assistance program. The European

Recovery Program, informally known as the Marshall Plan, was designed to help reconstruct

24Letter, A.C.W. Drew to H. Godfrey, 15 January 1946, FO 371/55626, NA. 25John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 120.

144 the continent through the rebuilding of its economy. The Marshall Plan paid significant

attention to the situation in Germany, which received over $1400 million in aid, the fourth-

highest sum of money of the seventeen recipient states.26 Although the United States

financed the Marshall Plan, the European states receiving funds were required to rebuild their

economies with these monies rather than merely accept them as loans.27 The introduction of

the European Recovery Program thus provided a continued financial support of Europe and

Germany. Coinciding with the creation of the Marshall Plan was the release of JCS 1779,

which emphasised economic and political reconstruction and replaced the much stricter JCS

1067 as the guiding American policy in Germany. These changes in policy led to an

expansion in the Education and Cultural Relations programs, especially for community

activities, youth, and health.28 Although the American Military Government increased its

support of these programs (including for sport) after 1947, the domestic pressure in the

United States nonetheless demanded the return of American military personnel from

Germany and a renewed focus on the American economy.29

Germany received a significant portion of Marshall Plan money, but by early 1948 the

Allies realised that for the German economy to recover fully, greater assistance was

necessary. The Americans in particular believed that Germany needed to be drawn into the

26The United Kingdom received 3,442.8 million dollars, France 2,806.3 million dollars, and Italy (excluding Trieste) 1,515.0 million dollars, whereas the western zones of Germany received 1,412.8 million dollars. Alan Kramer, The West German Economy, 1945-1955 (New York: Berg, 1991), 155. 27Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 50. 28Henry J. Kellermann, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany, 1945-1954 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 20, 33; Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1957), 97. 29John Bledsoe Bonds, Bipartisan Strategy: Selling the Marshall Plan (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 27.

145 western European economy, but Germany needed a drastic currency reform to accomplish

these goals.30 In addition to making German currency more valuable by implementing a high

exchange rate between the old Reichmark (RM) and the new Deutschmark (DM), the

German Länder also gained legislative power over financial matters following the currency

reform.31 The currency reform, although initially a major shock to Germans, nonetheless

helped return to them a sense of responsibility, both real and psychological, as stores were

suddenly stocked with goods the day after the introduction of the Deutschmark. An

American Military Government report noted the currency reform “has introduced the hope of

better times and of improved conditions.”32

However, securing German financing for non-essential programs such as athletic

clubs became more difficult after the 1948 currency reform because the revaluation of the

Deutschmark meant that Germans had less money available for non-necessity items. Rail

travel prices made games between sport clubs – even within the same Land – a financial

burden, including for the large football clubs of the south German Oberliga. Many

organisations had averaged 5000 RM a month on travel costs for all of their teams – top

level, youth, and female.33 Germans also anticipated a sharp decline in professional sports

with clubs fearing they would no longer be able to pay players at a full-time rate as a result of

30Hogan, 59-60; Michael L. Hughes, “Hard Heads, Soft Money? West German Ambivalence about Currency Reform, 1944-1948,” German Studies Review 21, no. 2 (May 1998), 317. 31Ian Turner, “Great Britain and the Post-War German Currency Reform,” Historical Journal 30, no. 3 (Sep. 1987), 706. 32OMGUS Monthly Report quoted in Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, 2d ed., vol. 1, From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1993), 203; Kramer, 136- 7. 33Kurt Schaffner, “Does the currency reform affect sports?,” 21 June 1948, Box 968, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

146 the anticipated combination of decreased gate receipts and increased travel costs.34 Yet, by the end of July 1948, less than two months after the implementation of the currency reform, the American Military Government reported: “Judging from late experiences, sports life has not suffered as badly from the currency reform as has been generally expected beforehand.”35

The financial changes resulting from by the currency reform did not affect the

popularity of football as much as predicted. The large football clubs remained largely

resilient, although the medium and small clubs faced financial hardships from their inability

to field better teams during a period of extremely limited disposable income.36 Even with the

currency reform significantly decreasing their savings, thousands of Germans traveled to and

bought tickets for a German football playoff game in Mannheim.37 While the maximum face-

value ticket price for the championship game was 7.5 DM, scalped tickets on the black

market ranged from 50 DM for the stands to 200 DM for seats.38 The organisers received

over 100,000 ticket requests for the game between Nuremberg and Hamburg. The stadium,

which had been badly damaged during the war, was able to accommodate 42,000 spectators

34Translation of an article from Der Sport-Kurier (Ulm) for Aksel G. Nielsen, 21 June 1948, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 35Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 29 July 1948, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 36Ibid. 37The German football championships comprised teams from the American, British, and French zones. Although the Germans, with the help and approval of the occupation powers, attempted to make the championships for the entire German territory, the Soviet authorities ultimately refused to allow participation by German teams within their zone. Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 7 July 1948, Box 960, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 38Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 12 August 1948, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA.

147 for the game. A Mannheim sport paper called the match a “non-political national event,” and

the American Military Government concurred, stating that “nothing in public life or politics

can bring together the Zones and all Germans more easily than sports.”39 After FC

Nuremberg won the championship in August in front of 76,000 fans in Cologne, the team

received a “tremendous reception” upon its return in Nuremberg. The Military Government

reported that “a large crowd packed the square in front of the station, bands played in the

parade through the town, and city dignities made speeches of congratulations.”40 The

Military Government noted that the attendance of the game and this reception of the team in

Nuremberg demonstrated the power of sport as a medium to gain German attention.

Although attendance at the championship game and at the matches of the larger

football clubs remained strong in light of the currency reform, many youth organisations

faced serious economic difficulties. The currency reform affected organisations similarly to

its effect on individual Germans, hurting those with cash savings the most (with a 100:6.5

conversation rate from Reichsmark to the new Deutschmark) as compared to holders of other

types of assets, such as mortgages (with a 10:1 exchange rate).41 As a result of the income

lost from dropped membership and lost assets, youth organisations often released their paid

leaders and many youth centres closed because they were unable to pay rent.42 The currency

39Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 29 July 1948, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 40Group Activities Branch Bi-Monthly Report on Youth Activities, 11 August 1948, Box 123, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 41Hughes, 320. 42Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden Quarterly Report, Second Quarter 1948, Box 146, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch - - Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA.

148 reform greatly hampered the ability for youth to travel to conferences or other meetings as

railway fees increased. Only when sport participants and the press campaigned for reduced

rates were railway fares lowered by fifty percent for youth or sport groups of ten or more

persons. This reduction “caused a considerable increase in the activity of the financially

weaker branches of sports.”43

In addition to the consequences of the currency reform, the Ruit Youth and Sports

Leadership School also received decreasing financial support from the Military Government

in 1948, further compounding the situation. One course at Ruit was cancelled and several

more (including a sport course) were in jeopardy with a sharp drop in enrollment after the

currency reform. Individual participants typically came from all over Germany and therefore

could not take advantage of the lower railway fares for groups. A course at Ruit for German

Girl Scout leaders only proceeded after securing funding from the National Girl Scout

Organization in New York.44 The problems that resulted from the currency reform, combined

with the cancellation of the American Military Government’s Reorientation Fund that had

provided much of the initial funding for the Ruit Youth and Sports Leadership School, forced

the school to locate a new source of funding. In a setting where the population had an

extremely limited disposable income, Ruit’s leaders had to devise a creative source of income

to maintain the programs which supported the Allied occupation aims and moral

43Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 29 July 1948, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 44Aksel G. Nielsen, Semi-monthly report [Group Activities Branch, Youth Activities Section] for the period ending June 30, 1948, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

149 reconstruction of the German people.

* * *

“A Symbolic Day of German Sport”

The American Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden believed that it could combine its plans for German exchanges with the youth of other democratic countries with the German desire to reestablish international sport competitions, and at the same time raise funds for an endowment to continue the running of the Ruit Youth and Sports Leadership

School. If a foreign country other than the occupation powers were to send its national football team to Germany, the Germans would welcome the external competition and clamour for tickets to the match. Even with the loss of savings as a result of the currency reform, Germans still flocked to the football championship games and paid well over face value for the tickets. From a financial standpoint, Ruit could raise substantial funds through a charity football match against an international side. This type of game could also help repair Germany’s status within the international sport community and begin the process of reacceptance. While the American Military Government supported these goals, this practice also coincided with other public diplomacy programs which brought athletes to Germany.

The American Military Government, German football leaders, and the general population all hoped that a match between a German team and an international team would accomplish these three goals.

The Olympic Games generally increase the feeling of international goodwill, and the

Military Government wanted to take advantage of those sentiments from the upcoming

Olympics for the financial and moral benefit of Germany. On 29 July 1948 the Youth

150 Activities Officer for Wuerttemberg-Baden, Aksel Nielsen, sent a letter to the president of the

governing body for football in Switzerland, the Swiss Football and Athletics Association

(Schweizerische Fussball- und Athletikverband, SFAV), requesting that the Swiss Olympic

team stop in Stuttgart on its return from the London Olympics. The profits from this game

between the Swiss and an “All-Star” German team from the American zone would be used

“for the training and reorientation of German youth and sport leaders.”45 Nielsen invited the

Swiss because the American Military Government did

not want to forget the educational and cultural value in bringing sports teams together. The German sports people have had little or no contact with outsiders for many years and they are eager to meet competition from the outside. Switzerland is not only the closest neighbour of Wuerttemberg- Baden but it is also a country which we in the Military Government feel could contribute a great deal to the reorientation of German youth.46

Not only would these sport exchanges benefit the Germans, but they would also arouse

sympathy for Germany within the countries that sent athletic teams to Germany.47

The Swiss football leaders had already expressed an interest in reestablishing

competitions with Germany, but other states had blocked these efforts within FIFA. The

Swiss introduced a motion to renew relations with Germany at FIFA’s meeting in London

before the Olympics began, ostensibly to enable the Swiss to participate in the football match

in Stuttgart. The 1948 request for permission to compete against German teams was not the

first time Switzerland had posed this question to FIFA. At the Executive Committee

meetings in October 1946, September 1947, and April 1948 the Swiss had asked FIFA if

45Letter, Aksel Nielsen to Director E. Thommen, 28 July 1948, Box 973, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 46Ibid. 47Ibid.

151 matches for charity purposes could be played against German teams. The Executive

Committee rejected the first two requests outright, but in 1948 the Executive Committee

agreed to leave the decision to the full Congress in London.48 However, FIFA again rejected

the motion, with the affront led by the members from the countries which Germany had

occupied during World War II. The Belgian member and Vice President of FIFA, Rodolphe

W. Seeldrayers, in particular reminded the Congress that after the First World War FIFA did

not permit matches against German teams until Germany was a member of the League of

Nations.49 With Germany still divided and occupied by four powers, it was not yet in a

position to return officially to the international organisation.

Even though Switzerland did not send a football team to the 1948 Olympic Games50

and Germany remained a football pariah, the Swiss nonetheless agreed to three charity home-

and-home series which created difficulties within Switzerland among the organisers. Rather

than send a national squad, three intra-city games would be held: between Zurich and

Stuttgart, Basel and Karlsruhe, and St. Gallen and Munich.51 However, the President (Ernst

Thommen) and the General Secretary (Helmut Käser) of the Football Committee of the Swiss

48Minutes, FIFA Executive Committee Meeting, 23 October 1946, Executive Committee Meeting Agenda Minutes, 1940-1946, FIFA; Minutes, FIFA Executive Committee Meeting, 23 September 1947, Executive Committee Circular to Members, 1946-1957, FIFA; Minutes, FIFA Executive Committee Meeting, 15-16 April 1948, Executive Committee Meeting Agenda Minutes, 1947-1950, FIFA. 49Extrait du PV du Congrès de Londres, 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938- 1950, FIFA. 50The amateur-professional debate has long plagued the Olympic movement, in particular within football. OMGUS learned that “Switzerland did not send a team to London because the best players cannot qualify under the amateur rules.” Aksel G. Nielsen, Semi-monthly report [Group Activities Branch, Youth Activities Section] for the period ending July 31, 1948, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 51Semi-monthly report [Group Activities Branch, Youth Activities Section] for the period ending July 31, 1948, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

152 Football and Athletics Association were also two of Switzerland’s representatives to FIFA.

As members of the international federation, Thommen and Käser had to uphold the decisions

taken by FIFA and its Executive Committee. At the same time, however, the Swiss

association’s Vice President, Gustav Wiederkehr, was one of the organisers of the Zurich-

Stuttgart match.

The confusion over the organisational jurisdiction of these games led to conflicting

decisions regarding whether Swiss and German teams could play one another. At first the

Swiss Football and Athletics Association granted permission to the Swiss clubs to participate

in these games “only if they are organised by the Military Government.”52 Because the

German-Swiss games would not be between SFAV member clubs and German clubs but

rather between “city teams” composed of players from two club teams per city, the Swiss

Football and Athletics Association would therefore not be officially concerned with the

organisation of the games. Following this decision by the Swiss Football and Athletics

Association, Thommen then asked FIFA whether the international federation, based in

Zurich, was officially involved with the Zurich city team or the game against Stuttgart.53 The

FIFA President, Jules Rimet of France, replied with a stern reminder to the Swiss Football

and Athletics Association about the Luxembourg decision and the failure in London of the

Swiss proposal regarding Germany earlier in the year. Rimet believed that “it would be very

distressing if the Swiss Association were to engage in this venture without the consent of

52Note, Betr. F.C. München in St.Gallen, 10 September 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, Schweizer Fussball Verband, Bern, Switzerland. Hereafter cited SFV. 53Letter, E. Thommen to Mitglieder des Fussball-Comité des SFAV, 24 September 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV; Letter, Dr. I. Schricker to Jules Rimet, 27 September 1948, Membres du Comité Exécutif -- Dossiers individuels -- M. Jules Rimet Correspondance 1.1.1950, FIFA.

153 FIFA.”54 Rimet concluded a second letter on the issue to Thommen,“urgently and amicably

request[ing] that [he] do nothing that might indicate any disagreement between your

Association and FIFA.”55 Thus, two weeks before the German-Swiss matches were to take place, Thommen reiterated in a letter to Wiederkehr, the vice president of the Swiss Football and Athletics Association and member of the organising committee of the Zurich-Stuttgart game, that the organising committee did not have the approval of the SFAV for these games following FIFA regulations.56

Yet even with the stern warnings from FIFA and the Swiss Football and Athletics

Association, the Swiss organisers continued with the preparations for the football matches for both humanitarian and financial reasons. The American Military Government in

Wuerttemberg-Baden remarked: “It is astonishing to see that the Swiss responsible soccer leaders are willing to play with German teams in spite of the London decision by the FIFA for not re-opening the doors.”57 The Military Government realised that the decision was not solely based on goodwill. The average attendance at a top-league Swiss football match was

6,500 people, whereas German matches routinely attracted thousands more spectators. The three games in Switzerland would therefore provide a financial windfall for the Swiss, as none of the gate receipts from the three return games in Switzerland would go to the German

54Letter, Julies Rimet to Dr. I. Schricker, 28 September 1948, Membres du Comité Exécutif -- Dossiers individuels -- M. Jules Rimet Correspondance 1.1.1950, FIFA. 55Letter, Jules Rimet to Ernst Thommen, 28 September 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV. 56Letter, E. Thommen to Gustav Wiederkehr, 29 September 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV. 57Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 2 September 1948, Box 960, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

154 teams.58 On a personal level, Gustav Wiederkehr also owned a travel business which organised all of the travel arrangements for the Swiss who attended the Stuttgart-Zurich match.59 Nonetheless, the Swiss organisers in each city couched their efforts in terms of the positive benefits for the Germans, particularly in their arguments to the Swiss Football and

Athletics Association.

Although many people both inside and outside of Germany did not believe that the games would actually come to fruition because of FIFA’s exclusion of Germany, the three football matches took place as scheduled on 10 October 1948. While in Germany the Swiss officials emphasised that their willingness to participate in the matches was because individuals or private clubs would not profit, but rather the Ruit Youth and Sports Leadership

School and a Munich children’s relief fund would be the beneficiaries.60 The city of Stuttgart loaned the Neckar Stadium free of charge for the Stuttgart-Zurich game, and both Karlsruhe and Stuttgart “agreed to donate a large share of the usual amusement tax to the Ruit School.

All income from these historical games will go into a permanent endowment fund for the

Ruit School.”61 The Süddeutsche Zeitung even called 10 October “a symbolic day of German

58Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 2 September 1948, Box 960, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. When the games in Germany were played, none of the financial benefit derived by the Swiss were mentioned in reports, only the humanitarian reasons. In addition, Gustav Wiederkehr was the manager of the Zurich team that participated in the football games. The financial benefits most likely influenced his decision as part of the presidium to accept the Military Government invitation. Youth Activities Monthly Report [OMG-Wuerttemberg-Baden], October 1948, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 59“Nicht nur um des Sportes willen,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 11 October 1948, 3. 60Letter, Dr. Anderegg to E. Thommen, 16 September 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV; Letter, A. Moser to E. Thommen, 16 September 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV. 61Aksel Nielsen, Background on Today’s Two Important Football Games, 27 September 1948, Box 973, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations

155 sport.”62 In addition, the Swiss downplayed a possible fine from FIFA, stating that the FIFA regulations affected only members organisations and the teams representing Zurich, Basel, and St. Gallen “did not play in Germany as a club but as all-star representatives of their respective cities.”63

The program for the Munich-St. Gallen match included messages from the Bavarian

Football Association and the mayor regarding the kindness of their Swiss guests and the significance of their actions. The mayor of Munich called 10 October 1948 a milestone for the sport history of the city, as the Swiss were extending a “conciliatory hand in friendly competition again to our sportsmen after the genocidal war. From emotional hearts we say to you the deepest thanks for these noble, sport-friendship actions.” He continued that the city of St. Gallen “as godmother of our capital city has already assisted us in a different way with energetic help in these difficult times.”64 The Bavarian Football Association’s first chairman welcomed the Swiss footballers by thanking them for forgetting “the bitter war incidents and want[ing] to help us again achieve the respect of the sports world. Munich's football community will with your arrival show our deepest gratitude for the great sport-friendship placed in us.”65 The program as well contained a drawing by Süddeutsche Zeitung cartoonist

Ernst Maria Lang of a strong Swiss footballer in triumphant stance holding in one hand a

Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 62“München grüßt St. Gallen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung 9 October 1948, 6. 63Youth Activities Monthly Report [OMG-Wuerttemberg-Baden], October 1948, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 64Oberbürgermeister Wimmer quoted in Sport Programm, Munich, 9-10 October 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA. 65Hans Huber quoted in Sport Programm, Munich, 9-10 October 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA.

156 crossbow, symbolising the freedom-loving national hero William Tell, and in the other hand

holding up a football with wings of a dove (Figure 2). Next to him was a happy, but

noticeably thinner, German footballer holding a lion, a symbol of the city of Munich and of

TSV 1860, one of the two teams which provided the Munich players. In the background is

the Munich skyline, with the two towers of the Frauenkirche. The caption in Swiss German

reads: “Here comes the Swiss dove of peace.”66 Germans thus viewed their Swiss guests in heroic terms, bringing them joy for the day through the game and for the long duration by helping raise funds for the construction of buildings for Munich charities.

Nearly 150,000 spectators watched the three matches, but almost 300,000 ticket requests had been made for the two games in Wuerttemberg-Baden, justifying the desire to hold football matches to raise funds. 65,000 fans packed the stadium in Stuttgart, one thousand of whom had travelled from Switzerland. Approximately 40,000 people watched the Munich-St. Gallen game, and a city-record 35,000 fans in Karlsruhe. The games clearly helped raise German spirits among the large crowds as all three German teams beat their

Swiss guests: Stuttgart 6, Zurich 1; Karlsruhe 1, Basel 0; and Munich 5, St. Gallen 1.67

Profits from the Stuttgart-Zurich game alone totalled over 49,000 DM; all but 3,000 DM went to the Ruit endowment, with the reserve held to cover the costs for the return match in

Switzerland. The Karlsruhe-Basel match, although attended by fewer people, nonetheless

66Sport Programm, Munich, 9-10 October 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA.Thanks to Urs Obrist for recognising the picture as the work of Ernst Maria Lang. 67Youth Activities Monthly Report [OMG-Wuerttemberg-Baden], October 1948, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA; “Städtespiel Stuttgart-Zürich 6:1 (3:0),” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 October 1948, 4; “Ueber allem stand die Freundschaft,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 October 1948, 6.

157 Figure 2 – Munich-St. Gallen Program drawing, Ernst Maria Lang Sport Programm, Munich, 9-10 October 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA.

158 earned a profit as well.68 Even though the American Military Government had initiated these football matches, the funds raised from these games represented a significant step toward financing the orphanage construction and making Ruit financially independent from the

Military Government.

The newspapers in all six participating cities gave extensive coverage to the German-

Swiss matches and their symbolism, both leading up to and following the games. An article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung following the German-Swiss games stated that “the Swiss sport community are familiar with the work building bridges,” reiterating that the Swiss were

upholding the tradition they established after the First World War.69 When the mayor of

Munich stated that 10 October 1948 would be remembered in the annals of the city’s sport

history, he hoped that the date would be considered similarly to 8 June 1919. Twenty-nine

years earlier FC St. Gallen also crossed the German-Swiss border and participated in

Germany’s first international friendly match after the First World War against FC Bayern in

front of 5,000 fans in the old Bavarian square on Leopoldstraße.70 Furthermore, the Neue

Zürcher Zeitung article asked: “is it not completely natural there that the sport people of

neutral countries take the first step?”71 Clearly the states which still harbored animosity

68A later OMGUS report stated that, contrary to newspaper reports of an attendance of 35,000, the Karlsruhe-Basel match had an attendance of only 18,000 people and yielded a profit of just 600 DM. The inefficient handling of the arrangements for the game by the committee in charge of this game was the reason for the “meager profits” which would not cover the costs of sending the Karlsruhe team to Basel for the return game. Youth Activities Monthly Report [OMG-Wuerttemberg-Baden], November 1948, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 69Emphasis in original. “Politische Spekulationen um ein Fußballspiel,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 October 1948, 2. 70Sport Programm, Munich, 9-10 October 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA. 71Emphasis in original. “Politische Spekulationen um ein Fußballspiel,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 October 1948, 2.

159 toward Germany, such as the Netherlands or Belgium, were not going to be the first countries

to resume international sport relations with Germany. In the case of football, a match against

any of the three western occupation powers could only be minimally symbolic and would not

help change Germany’s position with respect to the international federations. The United

States was not a serious participant on the international football scene, and none of the four

British Football Associations were current members of FIFA. Under no circumstances would

France have flouted the past president of the French Football Federation (Fédération

Française de Football) and current FIFA president, Jules Rimet, by playing a match against

Germany. Although the Swiss also reiterated that the scheduling of these three matches “did

not indicate a readiness to resume [a] full and unconditional sports relationship with

Germany,”72 their participation in the first German international sporting event (excluding

any games against occupation forces) helped support the aims of the western Allies.

The goodwill expressed by the Swiss was experienced personally by German players

in the three games, witnessed by thousands of other Germans firsthand, and reported widely

in German papers and the foreign press. The Genova Sportivo wrote that “the games turned

out to become a wonderful demonstration of international soccer.”73 The article continued

that “even being anarchical, the American - Swiss gesture is beautiful.”74 The day before the

match the Stuttgarter Nachrichten considered the game “proof of friendship” that “no

72Youth Activities Monthly Report [OMG-Wuerttemberg-Baden], October 1948, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 73Letter, Kurt A. Schaffner, to Aksel Nielsen, Chief, 3 November 1949, Box 129, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 74Ibid.

160 question of prestige” existed between the Zurich and Stuttgart sides; it was not important which team was victorious, but rather how individuals and the teams performed. One

Stuttgart business even provided a gift for the fairest player.75 Stuttgart mayor Hirn welcomed to his city over 1,000 Swiss guests whom the newspaper called “would-be mayors” because of their efforts at fostering German-Swiss relations. Hirn “thanked the

Swiss that they again have made the beginning of the breakthrough of German isolation and commemorated the traditional friendship between Zurich and Stuttgart.”76 The Zurich-

Stuttgart match, as the best attended of the three games, even appeared in the news reels shown before films at the cinema in Zurich.77

While from a purely athletic point of view the German-Swiss football matches helped the cause of Germany’s reentry into the world of international sport, these games had a wider implication which the American Military Government anticipated. The American Military

Government reiterated the importance of sport within the cultural interchange among nations as the inspiration for organising these matches. To the Americans, “the promotion of understanding and good fellowship through sports is one of the worthwhile aims of sports.

We believe no youth should be barred from the good influences in the world.”78 The

American Military Government recognised the powerful effect that large-scale sporting events, with players and spectators from abroad interacting with Germans, could have on the

75“Ein Freundschaftsbeweis -- keine Prestigefrage,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 9 October 1948, 5. 76“Nicht nur um des Sportes willen,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 11 October 1948, 3. 77Letter, [?], SFAV to H. Käser, 18 November 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV. 78Aksel Nielsen, Background on Today’s Two Important Football Games, 27 September 1948, Box 973, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA.

161 German population. Nearly 150,000 south Germans directly participated as spectators at the three German-Swiss games. Other Germans participated in related events, such as the

Stuttgart-Zurich youth football games held during the three hours before the main event.79

For those Germans unable to secure tickets to the football matches, the media coverage of the events in all three German cities hosting the Swiss teams featured the games prominently throughout the entire week. The day after the game the Stuttgarter Nachrichten even ran a picture of one of the Stuttgart goals under the paper’s masthead. The photograph of the goal was placed next to the main headline of the Monday morning edition about U.S. Secretary of

State Marshall returning to Washington from Paris to discuss the American position regarding the Soviet Union with President Harry Truman, an issue clearly important to the occupation of Germany.80

While the games themselves may have buoyed German spirits for ninety minutes or even the day, the long-term benefits were the financial rewards provided to the organisations supported by the profits from the gate receipts. In Munich the funds helped build an orphanage, a necessary component of the physical reconstruction efforts in a country destroyed after six years of war. In Wuerttemberg-Baden the monies raised went to fund the

Ruit Youth and Sports Leadership School, which struggled to maintain its programming following the currency reform earlier in the year. The three matches on 10 October 1948 were so successful that within days other organisations in Germany, including several from the British zone, wrote to the Swiss Football and Athletics Association to request additional

79“Schweizer Sportler sind wieder die Ersten,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 9 October 1948, 5. 80Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 11 October 1948, 1.

162 German-Swiss football games to raise money for other charities.81 The British Military

Government even informed the Swiss Football and Athletics Association that it would

support these requests in any way possible to ensure a successful visit.82 The positive press

contributed to the desire for the scheduling of additional games in Germany. FIFA’s reaction

to the games in the American zone forced the Swiss Football and Athletics Association to

decline the additional invitations.83 The extensive media coverage also ensured that FIFA

could not avoid learning about these games, nor could the international federation avoid

taking action.

* * *

International Sanctions

Unlike the Swiss and German journalists and sportsmen, FIFA did not think as highly

of the three German-Swiss games. As a result of the widespread media coverage, particularly

in the city of FIFA’s headquarters (Zurich), the international federation could not ignore that

these matches took place. FIFA expressed its “deep astonishment” to have learned that the

three matches proceeded, especially after FIFA rejected the (fourth) Swiss proposal at its

London Congress in July 1948. The FIFA Secretary therefore wrote to the Swiss Football

and Athletics Association: “Considering the grave nature of these infringements of FIFA

statutes and regulations the emergency Committee has instructed me to ask you to forward

your explanations to me as soon as possible so that they can be submitted to all members of

81Letter, Europa Union to Ernst Thommen, 15 October 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV. 82Letter, F.E. Winmill to Ernst Thommen, 8 November 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV. 83Letter, Ernst Thommen and H. Käser to Europa Union, 9 December 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV.

163 the Executive Committee.”84 While the Americans, Germans, and some Swiss had hoped

that these matches would facilitate German reacceptance by FIFA, this goal was not achieved

as easily as raising funds for the beneficiary organisations.

Two months after the German-Swiss games took place, the Swiss Football and

Athletics Association submitted an irregular report to FIFA regarding the games and

penalties. The Swiss authorities informed FIFA that “the responsibility lies less with the

individual players, who responded to a received request, than with the organisers of the three

games.”85 The Swiss Football and Athletics Association fined the organisers of the three

games 500 Swiss francs and merely warned the players that a second violation would result

in a more severe penalty. However, the second half of the report from the Swiss Football and

Athletics Association addressed the long historical relationship between Switzerland and

Germany, especially northeastern Switzerland and southern Germany. The Swiss understood

that Germany needed to be brought back into contact with the democratic world, which was

already happening in other areas such as religion, art, and science, and sport should not be

exempt from introducing these elements to the Germans. How can the largest sport

organisation in the world, the Swiss Football and Athletics Association asked, continue to

exclude games with Germans when the Allies – who know best what Germany needs –

desired these international sport contacts? The Swiss therefore requested that the FIFA ban

on unofficial friendly games against German teams be lifted.86 The report to FIFA should

84Letter, Dr. I. Schricker to SFAV, 22 October 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA. 85Letter, Thommen and Käser to FIFA, 20 December 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA. The French version of this letter is dated 17 December 1948. 86Ibid.

164 have stated the rationale for sanctions that reinforced the international federation’s rules.

Instead, the Swiss Football and Athletics Association demonstrated that while it absolved

itself of any responsibility for the 10 October matches, it nonetheless agreed with the

organisers as to why they violated the FIFA ban on games against Germany. Although the

German-Swiss clubs desired the return games scheduled between Christmas and New Year’s

Day, the Swiss investigation and subsequent penalties thus necessitated the postponement of

the matches until a time when they would not incur further sanctions.87

Backlash over the fine imposed on the Swiss teams arose from the public as well as

the American Military Government. The American Military Government even sent a letter to

Jules Rimet, the French president of FIFA, to request the removal of the fine imposed on the

Swiss. A representative of the Wuerttemberg-Baden Military Government wrote:

It is the policy of the American Military Government to stress the reorientation of the Germans. Cultural relations, including sports, with other nations seem essential in order to reach that objective. Military Government does not wish to do anything which in the slightest way interferes with the fine work and purpose of FIFA. We are ready to give your organization our full support. However, we are concerned if the rules of FIFA should work in such a way as to restrict and hamper the goals of the occupation powers.”88

In addition, the German-American Soccer League, although not the governing body in the

United States, submitted a protest to FIFA regarding the fines. The Swiss papers not only

reported the details of the punishment, but the Zurich-based paper, Sport, called upon “the

Swiss sports people to raise through a collection the fine of Fr. 500 which the ‘responsible

87Letter, Aksel Nielsen to Ernst Thommen, 10 November 1948, F.I.F.A. Spiele Gegen Deutsche Mannschaften 1948-1949, SFV. 88Draft, Charles P. Gross to M. Julies Rimet, n.d. [March/April 1949], Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA.

165 persons’ of the city-games have to pay as a fine, showing solidarity and real democracy.”89

Within a week the 500 Swiss franc fine had been paid from a few large donations and several

contributions under two francs. The paper donated the extra money raised (after paying the

fine) to the Swiss Red Cross charity program to help German youth.90 Even mainstream

papers entered the fray, with the Neue Zürcher Zeitung writing that the general Swiss

population did not support a continued sport boycott against Germany.91

With the general sentiment shifting away from the complete exclusion that prevailed

in 1945, FIFA addressed the issue at its May 1949 Executive Committee meeting as a result

of these German-Swiss matches. By this time the agitation from German sportsmen to form

national organisations, which chapter four addresses, had grown vociferous. However, the

three western Allies still prevented interzonal sport organisations from forming, fearing the

Soviet Union would use the creation of “national” sport organisations in the three western

zones as proof that the western Allies were forcing the permanent division of Germany. Yet,

as a result of the changing situation in Germany, the Executive Committee of FIFA agreed

that games can be “played between clubs in membership with Associations of F.I.F.A. and

German clubs, on the condition that such matches shall be authorised on the one hand by the

commandants of the occupation zone and on the other hand by the interested affiliated

Associations.”92 FIFA could not formally accept Germany in the spring of 1949 because a

89“Gleiches recht für Alle!” Sport, 17 December 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA. 90“,,Solidaritätsaktion” der Schweizer Sportler,” Sport, 22 December 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA; “Die Buße ist bezahlt!” Sport, 24 December 1948, Correspondence with National Associations SUI 1938-1950, FIFA. 91“Zum Sport-Boykott gegen Deutschland,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 22 December 1948, 10. 92Minutes, FIFA Executive Committee Meeting, 6 May 1949, Executive Committee Meeting Agenda Minutes, 1947-1950, FIFA.

166 true national organisation did not exist, but FIFA allowed this half-measure as a way of upholding its rules. At the same time this change in FIFA’s position granted a concession to the occupation powers and Swiss advocates for the rehabilitation of Germany through sport.

With this revision to FIFA’s stance on Germany, the English Football Association, with the assistance of the British Military Government, quickly worked to bring a German team to England as a component of their democratisation and moral reconstruction programs.

Members of the Education Branch agreed that a German under-18 youth team should make the trip because they “would be accepted by the British public although an adult professional team would not.”93 By both playing against and watching good teams in England, the

German youth would benefit not only athletically, but also in fostering improved relations between the British and Germans. Furthermore, half of the money raised from the German team’s games would be returned to Germany to help with youth work.94 The Football

Association planned the visit with the assistance of the National Association of Boys’ Clubs for a German youth football team visit in the spring of 1950.95 The German team played games against English teams in London, Birmingham, Nottingham, and Sunderland, where

“the German boys were warmly welcomed everywhere and the visit was favourably received in the press.”96

Although the relaxation of FIFA’s ban permitted games between club teams from

Germany and other countries, official international matches had to wait until full recognition.

93Minutes, 162nd Conference, Directors, Education Branch, 1 July 1949, FO 1050/1110, NA. 94Ibid. 95Football Association International Committee Minutes, 12 December 1949, FA Minutes 1949-50, The Football Association, London. 96High Commissioner's Conference Brief from Office of the Educational Adviser, 20 April 1950, FO 1050/1342, NA.

167 The three German-Swiss matches on 10 October 1948 nonetheless represented a major step in bringing Germany out of athletic isolation. FIFA considered these games to have contravened their rules, and they supported the fine levied by the Swiss Football and

Athletics Association on the participating Swiss clubs. Before these October 1948 games

FIFA had consistently rejected Swiss efforts to gain formal approval to hold matches against

German teams. The success of these three games in raising money for charity, supporting democratic activity, and fostering international goodwill demonstrated to FIFA the need to relax the ban on matches with German teams. The public support for the three matches and the outrage over the fines imposed on the Swiss teams prompted a reevaluation of FIFA’s position regarding Germany. Although FIFA could not fully recognise Germany because no national governing body formally existed, the support from the Americans in particular and

British facilitated the granting of games against German teams.

* * *

Conclusion

In their recent work on German football, Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young address the importance of the sport to the remaking of the country’s past. Germany’s three

World Cup victories symbolise the path the country has taken in the postwar era: 1954 represented the return of Germany to the international community, 1974 the success of West

Germany, and 1990 the strength of a unified country.97 These identifications also coincide with Cornel Sandvoss’ work on spectatorship, in which he argues that football fandom is

97Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, German Football: History, Culture, Society (London: Routledge, 2006), xiii-xiv.

168 “based on the duality of identity and identification/self-reflection.”98 Football fans appropriate clubs “as spaces of projection for their values and Weltanschauungen and, hence, as spaces of self-reflection.”99 Fans identify with a team because they perceive the club as promoting characteristics and values similar to those possessed by themselves. Thus, a club with a predominantly working-class fan base winning a game against a deep-pocketed, upper- class team provides the workers with a sense of triumph for the average citizen over his privileged boss. The German-Swiss charity matches of October 1948 provided a common identity to thousands of south Germans simultaneously. By competing as city teams rather than as club teams, Germans from the greater Munich, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe regions could all rally around and identify with the teams. These city teams transcended the class or other divisions which club teams often present within a city. The Germans not only played against

Swiss competitors but also, in the case of Stuttgart and Munich, overwhelmingly defeated the

Swiss, who represented a neutral state which did not face the devastation and reconstruction of the war-ravaged states.

Before these October games the Germans had not participated in any international football matches since a 5-2 victory over Slovakia on 22 November 1942; after this game the war finally took precedence over any perceived benefit of international football and prevented any additional matches.100 The German-Swiss games therefore represented the early stages of

Germany’s reacceptance into the international community. The victories by all three German

98Emphasis in original. Cornel Sandvoss, A Game of Two Halves: Football, Television and Globalization (London: Routledge, 2003), 31. 99Ibid., 44. 100Joel Holger, Chronik des deutschen Fußballs: die Spiele der Nationalmannschaft von 1908 bis heute (Munich: Chronik, 2005), 375.

169 city teams demonstrated that the Germans were able to compete with the rest of the world – and not just in football. The concurrent inclusion of the three western zones of Germany within the Marshall Plan disbursement of aid meant a growing acceptance outside of

Germany for greater levels of production across virtually every German industry. The smaller states neighboring Germany traditionally relied heavily upon trade relations with

Germany, and the continued restraint placed upon German production prevented full recovery within the rest of the western Europe states (other than France).101 Similarly in sport, a state such as Switzerland, which had long valued international competitions with its larger and stronger northern neighbor, wanted to facilitate German reentry onto the international stage.

The ability of the three 1948 German-Swiss football matches to proceed as scheduled in light of the ban on German participation in international football demonstrated the importance of sport to the physical and moral reconstruction efforts within Germany. The

Swiss affronted the threats of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association to gain their own benefits but also to help the Germans. By working with the American Military

Government to organise Germany’s first international sport competition, the Swiss also demonstrated their willingness to support the western Allies with the democratisation of

Germany. Swiss citizens had participated as lecturers at Wilton Park and the other leadership schools in Germany, and Switzerland was one of the European countries included in the exchange programs for Germans organised by the western occupation powers. The American

Military Government even considered that FC Nuremberg’s victory at the 1948 German football championship was “credited to the great number of excellent sports activities

101Hogan, 63-4.

170 developed in the US Zone since 1945”102 – the same sport programs in which the Americans also taught the Germans how to be democratic.

Histories of German football, either of international matches or of the national federation, fail to include these three German-Swiss matches from October 1948 because of the German expulsion from FIFA. These games, however, facilitated German reentry by demonstrating the growing European acceptance of Germany by both sportsmen and average citizens through media coverage of the three games and the fines subsequently imposed on the Swiss. Yet before Germany could take on the world in its most popular game, the country first had to be recognised. The sanctions upheld by FIFA reinforced to the Germans the necessity of forming national sport organisations in order for them formally to rejoin the international community. For German sport and its leaders, the creation of national organisations was the next step toward the ultimate aim of full international participation.

The limitations of Directive 23 and the growing Cold War, particularly the solidifying of the division of Germany, prevented these actions from happening either immediately or smoothly.

102Letter, Kurt Schaffner to Leon Shelnutt, 12 August 1948, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA.

171 Chapter 4

Recentralisation and the Founding of National Sport Organisations: The German Efforts to Gain Control of Sport

...sport in Germany was of particular importance, as in the past, time and again, sport organisations grew into powerful aggressive nationalistic bodies. –Colonel R. Corlieu, French Representative Military Security Board, Military Directorate1

The Allies incorporated decentralisation within the Potsdam Declaration to place limitations on the national government and prevent a concentration of power in one individual. By delegating to the Land or local administrators many of the responsibilities previously held by the highest state authority (the Kaiser, President, or Führer), the Allies hoped that democratic ideas would become more ingrained within the German population. In addition, the Allies believed that by practising democracy within local organisations and gaining the experience of local responsibility through practise, Germans would no longer accept an authoritarian or dictatorial ruler within an association or for the country. Against these ongoing Allied efforts at demilitarisation and decentralisation, German sport leaders developed two opposing structures for the formation of national organisations. While the western occupation powers maintained their role as the guardians of democracy, the rapid move toward political autonomy in 1949 revealed the difficulty of the three Allies to maintain strict control. The impending creation of the Federal Republic of Germany resulted in a transitional period for sport groups, which found expression in closely-supervised public sporting events, frequent meetings between the Allies and German sport leaders, and an

1MSB/MIL/M(49)14 – Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Military Security Board Military Division, 31 August 1949, FO 1005/1261, NA.

172 interzonal but unresolved debate played out among sport leaders and in the media.

A major controversy erupted in 1947 among the leadership of German sport clubs regarding how sport should be organised at the Land level: within an all-sport organisation

(Landessportbund) or a single-sport organisation (Fachverband). Landessportbund

Württemberg had recently formed, but in June the Wuerttemberg Tennis Association

(Württembergischer Tennisbund) requested permission from the American Military

Government to form as a separate and independent organisation.2 The Military Government responded that the Württembergischer Tennisbund met the requirements for forming an independent organisation: non-Nazi leadership, non-militaristic activities, and a democratic constitution approved by its membership. Thus, the Tennisbund was “entitled to the same right as all other organizations. This includes the right to exist as an independant [sic] Land organization and it must now be regarded as such.”3 Shortly thereafter the rowers, skiers, and

Turner in Wuerttemberg all seceded from the Landessportbund and formed their own

Fachverbände, initiating a scenario that replayed across the American and British zones.4

(The French and Soviets still restricted sport organisations to the local or Kreis level at the end of 1947.5 ) To further stoke the debate, many radio addresses and newspaper articles

2Within the Military Government documents, the Landessportbund in Württemberg is mentioned in several forms, some of which are not grammatically correct in German. For clarity I have used Landessportbund Württemberg as most German Landessportbünde use that naming structure. For the Fachverbände I have used the location followed by the sport, such as Württembergischer Tennisbund or Deutscher Fechter Bund. In addition, I have maintained German spellings of organisational names, such as Landessportbund Württemberg, but retained the English spelling of places, such as Wuerttemberg. 3Letter to Württemberg Land Youth Committee, Württemberg Ministry of Culture, 5 June 1947, Box 973, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 4Meeting of Sports Representatives, Youth Activities Office, 22 October 1947, Box 973, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 5Minutes, Twelfth Military Government Youth Activities Conference, 11-12 December 1947, Box 120,

173 appeared, most of which, the Fachverbände claimed, were part of a propagandistic media campaign organised by the Landessportbünde.6

Military Government officials in both the British and American zones believed that this debate should be left to the Germans to resolve on their own. At a Youth Officer conference that British Education director “thought it unnecessary for us to bother about the different Verbande [sic], and considered that the Germans should work out the problem. He said that our only worry would be the political aspect.”7 However, the occupation powers had no choice but to become involved in the quarrel once the Fachverbände levied claims of authoritarian control against the Landessportbund. The Fachverbände accused the

Landessportbund of assuming that the license to exist (granted by the Military Government) bestowed upon the Landessportbund exclusive control over sport within Wuerttemberg.8 Yet the importance of this debate is not limited to German sport. The Landessportbund-

Fachverband debate provided Germans with an opportunity to create new organisational structures, in contrast to pre-1933 or Nazi associations, without initial Military Government demands.

The debate over the structure of German sport at the Land level influenced the discussions on the structure of national sport organisations in Germany even though Directive

Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 6“Pivotal Verbands Questions in the US Zone,” Translation of an article printed in Sportwelt, Stuttgart, 5 November 1947, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, Box 972, RG 260, NARA. The OMGUS files contain several of these newspaper articles and radio addresses on the issue. 7Minutes, Second Conference, Youth Conference Officers, 11 March 1947, FO 1050/1087, NA. 8“German Youth Between Yesterday and Tomorrow,” 30 April 1948, Box 145, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA.

174 23 on the Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport prevented organisations from existing as inter-Land or interzonal. To circumvent the prohibition of inter-Land or interzonal organisations mandated by Directive 23, the Germans created a working group

(Arbeitsgemeinschaft) for each sport to assist with the formation of national organisations once they would be permitted. German Land and regional sport leaders wanted Directive 23 repealed to facilitate the reentry of Germany into the international sport community. In 1946 and 1947 the Germans had unilaterally attempted to create national sport organisations, in particular a National Olympic Committee, only to be prevented by the Military Governments.

However, by working with the occupation powers in 1948-49 their efforts proved more fruitful. The creation of a viable sport structure for the country mirrored the larger geo- political situation, essentially the creation of the Bizone, the subsequent Trizone, and then, ultimately, the promulgation of the Occupation Statute and the creation of the Federal

Republic as drafted by Germans but receiving the approval of the High Commissioners. Yet, decisions taken by the three western powers regarding sport were often prompted by German actions, demonstrating the importance of Germans in effecting changes in occupation policies to benefit themselves.

The Germans attempted, through the working groups for sport and the trizonal sport conferences, to reclaim control over their own sporting affairs before they received full control via the law. As the rift between single-sport and umbrella sport organisations deepened and required more involvement by the Military Governments, the debate ultimately drove the creation of national organisations and the repeal of Directive 23 by the Allied High

Commission. The debate over the organisation of sport thus provided Germans with a

175 chance to demonstrate the democratic ideals required by the western Allies while, more importantly, allowing them to use these same ideals to gain autonomy from the occupation powers. These actions were most evident in the attempts to create separate national organisations for fencing and Turnen. The British, Americans, and French made the ultimate decisions which allowed national sport organisations to form, but these changes happened as a result of German pressure. The three Allies permitted national organisations after the creation of the Federal Republic, but they did so only after ensuring that their forms would not entail a recentralization of German society, which would have demonstrated a failure of the occupation policies. Most of the leading sport officials resided in the British and

American zones, and the Military Governments in the Bizone dealt most often with these issues. The French, however, took the lead in initiating trizonal conferences on sport and ensuring that German sport would not remilitarise. Thus, the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate and the formation of national sport organisations provided the Germans with an opportunity to use the rhetoric of democracy against the Allies in order to achieve their own aims.

* * *

Sport Organisation Debates

The decision by the tennis leaders in Wuerttemberg in 1947 to secede from the

Landessportbund was only the beginning of a problem for German sport. As the dispute grew and claims of authoritarianism and lack of democracy became more numerous, the secession debate transformed from an issue affecting only German sportsmen to one that encompassed the Military Governments. The quarrel among sport leaders arose over whether

176 an overarching organisation should oversee the sport associations in each Land or if the clubs

for a specific sport should have control over their own affairs. The Landessportbünde

claimed that their members were organised along sport lines through the internal associations

(Fachgruppen) representing each sport within the structure of the Landessportbünde, thus making secession unnecessary. Both sides used the language of democracy in the debate over

German sport in their attempts to curry favour from the Military Governments and earn the right to direct the future structure of German sport. Once the sport organisation quarrel gained widespread publicity and Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union could be affected by the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate, the occupation powers realised they could not remain passive observers.

When the Americans and British permitted Land-level organisations to form in 1947,

Landessportbund Württemberg mistakenly viewed this permission as the desire of the

Military Government to centralise sport organisations. Only with the third draft of its constitution did the Landessportbund demonstrate that it “would function on a democratic basis,” finally earning the Military Government’s approval.9 The earlier versions of the

constitution provided too large a concentration of power at the top of the organisation. Once

approved, however, the Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden reported that the

leaders of Landessportbund Württemberg “took the approval of their constitution as a license

for monopoly on sports organization.”10 The growing dissatisfaction with the “totalitarian

methods” of the Landessportbund prompted the Youth Activities Branch of the American

9Topical Report for Wuerttemberg-Baden, 10 December 1947, Box 146, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 10Ibid.

177 Military Government to broadcast a message over Radio Stuttgart in June 1947 with a clarification of the official position: that Germans had the freedom of assembly and the ability to create organisations, provided that such associations were not fascist, militaristic, or overly nationalistic. Furthermore, constitutional approval of one organisation did not grant, as Landessportbund Württemberg had asserted, special favour or protection from the

American Military Government. Lastly, the radio speech reminded Germans of the dangers that the centralization of sport, as the Nazis had carried out, could bring.11

The Radio Stuttgart address proved to be the spark that touched off the debate which raged in the press, on the radio, and within sport organisations as sportsmen took actions to form new organisations separate from the Landessportbund. Believing, as a result of the

Radio Stuttgart broadcast, that the Military Government would support sport organisations in additional to the Landessportbünde, tennis club leaders in Wuerttemberg became the first group to secede. They submitted their application for the creation of their own organisation, as was policy, to the German-run Land Youth Committee. There the application sat, without action, for weeks as the Youth Committee “feared to commit itself.”12 Eventually the Land

Youth Committee requested the presence of the tennis association representatives to answer questions regarding their reasons for wanting to leave the Landessportbund. Members of

Landessportbund Württemberg also attended this discussion, where the Land Youth

Committee informed the tennis clubs that the creation of a new sport organisation was

11Radio address, Aksel G. Nielsen on Radio Stuttgart, 4 June 1947, Box 149, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 12Topical Report for Wuerttemberg-Baden, 10 December 1947, Box 146, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA.

178 unnecessary because it would merely cause social and political division among sport groups.13 This attitude alluded to the fragmentation that beset sport in Imperial and Weimar

Germany. By wanting to avert a refragmentation, the Landessportbund hoped to avoid the bitterness and divisiveness among sportsmen which the proliferation of political and religious sport clubs had previously created.

Following this setback, the tennis clubs then appealed to the Military Government because they established the laws which governed German associational life during the occupation. The American Military Government informed the Land Youth Committee that it must take action on the application of the tennis organisation. Should the Land Youth

Committee refuse to permit the formation of this new association, the rejection must be based on Military Government or German law and explained as such. The Land Youth Committee forwarded the application of the Württembergischer Tennisbund to the Military

Government’s Youth Activities Branch in the Land, but without any recommendations. As the application fulfilled all requirements specified in the Military Government directives, the

Youth Activities Branch immediately approved the Wuerttemberg Tennis Association’s application.14 The permission granted by the Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden to the tennis association to exist as an organisation independent from the Landessportbund opened the door for the rest of the individual sports to organise their own Fachverbände. The skiers, rowers, and Turner in Wuerttemberg-Baden followed the lead of the tennis clubs, and

13Topical Report for Wuerttemberg-Baden, 10 December 1947, Box 146, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 14Ibid.

179 movements were underway for more sports to secede.15

After the creation of multiple Fachverbände, the debate’s publicity proliferated as each side took its views to the press. Sport papers aligned themselves with one faction and printed articles supporting the position of either the Landessportbünde or Fachverbände. In

Stuttgart, for example, Sportwelt published articles in support of the Fachverbände whereas the city’s other sport paper, Sportbericht, favoured the Landessportbünde.16 The debate also entered the airwaves as sport personalities spoke publicly regarding their organisation’s position. Herr Bernhardt of the Swabian Ski Association gave a speech on the radio explaining why ski organisations had either left Landessportbund Württemberg or refused to join in the first place. He said that many clubs feared Landessportbund Württemberg would be “a parallel of the former NSRL [National Socialist Reich Association for Physical

Exercise].”17 The Allies could not ignore these claims regarding Nazi tendencies, particularly as they appeared so publicly.

15By the end of 1947, the following sports had received recognition of their Fachverbände: Basketball (September 1947), Handball (August 1947), Turnen (October 1947), Ice Hockey (November 1947), Rowing (November 1947), Swimming (November 1947), Wrestling and Weight Lifting (November 1947), and Cycling (December 1947). Kurt Schaffner, Nation-wide sports committees, 20 January 1948, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA; Radio Stuttgart Broadcast “Schwaebische Turnerschaft”, spoken by Kurt Vollmer, 29 October 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 16“Pivotal Verbands Questions in the US Zone,” Translation of an article printed in Sportwelt, Stuttgart, 5 November 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA; “Debates about the Question ‘Centralized or Branch Organization?’,” Translation of an article in Sportbericht, Stuttgart, 21 September 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 17Radio Stuttgart Broadcast by Herr Bernhardt, Schwaebische Schneelaufbund, 15 October 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA.

180 The American Military Government reiterated that the organisation of sport within

Germany should not be an either/or decision between the Landessportbund and the

Fachverbände, which was demonstrative of totalitarian thinking; rather, the needs of all sports people should develop freely. With all of the accusations within Wuerttemberg-

Baden, the Military Government in the Land organised a meeting to achieve a resolution with representatives from the licensed sport organisations in Wuerttemberg-Baden: the four

Fachverbände and Landessportbund Württemberg. At the 22 October 1947 meeting each association reported on its state of affairs, and the groups agreed to create a committee to address the common problems affecting each organisation. Each organisation would be represented equally on this committee, which held no executive power but instead worked to resolve common issues such as equipment and transportation. Although initially agreeing to this idea, the Landessportbund Württemberg later claimed that each of its internal sport associations (Fachgruppen) was independent and should be represented on this council as well – in essence a stacking of the committee that would ensure that the opinions of the

Landessportbund would always win out over the preferences of the separate Fachverbände.

The Military Government objected to this assertion because the branches within

Landessportbund Wuerttemberg were neither self-sufficient nor independent.18

Rather than resolve the issue, the October meeting instead resulted in an increase of distrust as Landessportbund Württemberg felt that the Military Government supported more

18Meeting of Sports Representatives, Youth Activities Office, 22 October 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 206 (OMGUS), NARA; Radio Stuttgart broadcast by Herr Kraemer, 24 October 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 206 (OMGUS), NARA.

181 strongly the organisations for the individual sports (Fachverbände). As a counter-measure the four Landessportbünde of the American zone (Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg) met in Munich in early November.19 While the purpose of the conference was to discuss the all-encompassing versus single-sport organisation question, as the article in the Stuttgarter

Nachrichten reported, no representatives of the Fachverbände were present. Thus, the meeting only really discussed the reform movements within the Landessportbünde and passed a resolution that these associations “are not undesirable central organizations provided that the branches are fully independent” within the Landessportbund.20 Nuremberg’s newspaper

Sport reported more positively on the Munich meeting, writing that “anything such

Fachverbaende might give has long existed in the Landessportverbaende and their Sparten

[internal single-sport associations or Fachgruppen]: freedom of action and independence of each kind of sports under the name of ‘Sparte’ (which, by the way, is also common in

Switzerland).”21 Thus, the Landessportbünde attempted to defend their actions against claims of being undemocratic by comparing their structure to that of sport organisations in longtime democratic Switzerland. In addition, a member of Landessportbund Württemberg reportedly said that the Munich conference had been called because the working committee was “a

Military Government committee, but I want a committee of my own to deal with the German

19Although the Land in the American zone was Wuerttemberg-Baden, consisting of North Wuerttemberg and North Baden, each half of the Land had its own Landessportbund. 20“Meeting of the Landessportverbaende in Munich,” Translation of an article printed in Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 4 November 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 21“Separatism Rejected,” Translation of an article printed in Sport, Nuernberg, 5 November 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA.

182 Government.”22 His wish was fulfilled, as the organisations present at the Munich meeting agreed to create their own working group for sport in the American zone to coordinate the actions of the Landessportbünde.23

The press campaign waged by both sides prompted the Youth Activities Officers to agree at one of their zonal meetings to organise a German-American conference on sport in

Stuttgart in December 1947 to attempt once more to resolve the debate.24 Although not privileging either the Landessportbund or the Fachverband structure, the Military

Government tended to support the Fachverbände based on their claims of democracy and fears of centralization by the Landessportbünde. The American Military Government, in preparation for the December meeting, concluded that:

The direction of the development of sports seems to be well pointed out in Wuerttemberg-Baden. However, the democratic elements among sport enthusiasts in Wuerttemberg-Baden are looking with apprehension toward the time when zone-wide or nation-wide sport organizations will be permitted in Germany. They fear that if any form of zone-wide organization is permitted, the Landessportverbaende in the states where no competing sports organizations are permitted to appear, will swallow up or suppress the smaller independent and democratically founded sports organizations in other states.25

22This member of Landessportbund Württemberg had recently resigned his position as the Chairman. However, he was also the Ministerialrat for Youth Welfare and Adult Education in the Wuerttemberg-Baden Ministry of Culture. Topical Report for Wuerttemberg-Baden, 10 December 1947, Box 146, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 23“Separatism Rejected,” Translation of an article printed in Sport, Nuernberg, 5 November 1947, Box 972, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA; Topical Report for Wuerttemberg-Baden, 10 December 1947, Box 146, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division - - Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA. 24Draft of Minutes, OMG Conference of Youth Activities Personnel in Bremen, 13-14 November 1947, Box 321, Records of Office of Military Government, Bremen -- Records of the Education Division: Records Relating to German Youth & Sports Clubs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 25Topical Report for Wuerttemberg-Baden, 10 December 1947, Box 146, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA.

183 With these organisational fears in mind, the representatives gathering in Stuttgart were to speak as individuals with an interest in German sport rather than as spokespersons for the organisations that they represented.26

Ultimately, however, the Stuttgart meeting settled nothing and only reinforced the

American Military Government’s position against a fully centralised sport system. The

Military Government officers directed the meeting and posed several questions to the

Germans from across the American zone. Max Stahl, the chairman of the Wuerttemberg

Tennis Association, framed his arguments for the existence of the Fachverbände around decentralisation and democratisation. Stahl, who returned to Germany after spending most of the Third Reich years abroad, said:

It is a great thing for us Germans to be free at last. Why shall we be joined again to a unity? I personally am glad when there exist many ideas. Only by this we can train our youth to think for themselves. If we guide them, not much can happen. On the other side, tradition in German sports calls for Fachverbaende and not a unity Verband. If we learn from the bad that has been done before 1933, and if we do it better now, we can establish good organizations which we all will like.27

As the various delegates spoke at the conference, their arguments clearly reflected the organisations of which they were members. Even the issue of a zone-wide organisation was barely addressed, except to reiterate the prohibition of zonal youth organisations and, as stipulated by Directive 23, sport organisations as well.

26Minutes, Twelfth Military Government Youth Activities Conference, 11-12 December 1947, Box 120, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch - - Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 27Ibid. The history of the Deutscher Tennis Bund, while mentioning Stahl’s role in the creation of the Württemberg Tennis Bund and as President of the Deutscher Tennis Bund in 1951-52, it provides no information regarding Stahl’s activities during the Third Reich. Ulrich Kaiser, Hans-Jürgen Jaufhold, and Dieter Koditek, Tennis in Deutschland: von den Anfängen bis 2002: zum 100-jährigen Bestehen des Deutschen Tennis Bundes (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 289-90.

184 While ostensibly about sport, this quarrel actually drew upon American Military

Government concerns over the strength of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany.

The American Military Government’s Youth Activities Branch report on the first quarter of

1948 paid particular attention to the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate. The leaders of the Landessportbünde in both Wuerttemberg and Baden each held a government position, potentially causing a conflict of interest. The officer noted that “as both private and public officials they are in a position to give full approval to their own private decisions!!”28 The report questioned whether officials should be allowed to serve in both capacities and if the

Military Government needed more direct action to prevent Land-level associations in order to reinforce decentralisation and the prohibition of zonal organisations. The report warned that:

if the present setup is left alone until such time as the Germans have full control of the sports development the people now in charge of the landessportverbaende will see to it without fail that any organization above a land level will be within their sphere and under their control of the landessportverbaende. This in reality will mean the establishment of a German sports union in the pattern of the Hitler system.29

In addition, the report stated that should this recentralization occur, German sport would fall under the current Landessportbünde leadership, 95 percent of whom the Youth Activities

Branch believed were Social Democratic or Communist Party leaders.30 The Americans conflated the desire by the political left for a leading role in society with fears of a centralised authoritarianism because of the ideological basis of communism and the structures of the

Soviet Union. The Americans had dismissed German government officials as early as 1945

28Youth Activities Quarterly Report, January-March 1948, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 29Ibid. 30Ibid.

185 because of Military Government distrust of the Social Democrats, continuing this process

through much of the occupation.31

The Americans believed that the leftist threat in sport (including in the

Landessportbund-Fachverband debate) had ties to the Soviet Union, and the Military

Government wanted to prevent those Germans from gaining control of sport in the western

zones. The worker sport movement was at its height in the 1920s when both socialist and

communist sport groups flourished. Germans played leading roles in both the communist and

socialist international sport movements. Just as the division of the political left in the

Weimar Republic contributed to the instability of politics, the communist-socialist divide

also fuelled the pre-1933 fragmentation of German sport.32 In addition, the Americans feared

that greater control by the Social Democrats would bring more contact with and influence

from the Soviet zone, where the socialist and communist parties had already combined into

the Socialist Unity Party. Interwar attempts by the Soviet Union to control international

worker sport through the Sportintern had been largely unsuccessful. However, in 1948 the

USSR sent a team of observers to the London Olympics in preparation to rejoin the Olympic

movement, helping set the stage for sport to become a primary Cold War battleground.33

While the Fachverbände fought against the centralised control of the

Landessportbünde, they also began to push for organisation at a level greater than Land so

31Rebecca Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996). 32Arnd Krüger, “Germany,” in European Cultures in Sport: Examining the Nations and Regions, ed. James Riordan and Arnd Krüger (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2003), 71. 33Barbara Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 162; James Riordan, Sport, Politics and Communism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 141; Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1999), 84-96.

186 that they could rejoin the international federations. The football leaders in the American zone wanted to create a south German football association, which had existed until the Nazis forced its dissolution in 1933, in order to promote a more democratic levying of fees based on club size.34 They argued that German football “will be excluded from international connections for long years to come if we do not soon create the greater Fachverband.”35

National sport associations provided a clearinghouse for and made easier the scheduling of international sporting events with other teams affiliated with the same international body.

The leading sportsmen across the American and British zones felt similarly to the football leaders regarding international competition. By January 1948 eleven other nation-wide working committees for sport (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) had formed; these committees could exist because they were merely coordinating committees and not executive bodies for legal organisations.36 Although the Americans established the precedent of the working committee in Wuerttemberg-Baden the previous autumn, the Military Governments nonetheless kept a close watch on these Arbeitsgemeinschaften to ensure that they did not call themselves actual associations, thus violating Directive 23.

Aside from upholding the quadripartite legislation, the Americans and British in particular wanted to avoid the creation of sport associations that claimed jurisdiction over all of Germany but which only contained representatives from the Bizone and possibly the

34Translation, Committee of the South German Soccer Association, Circular No. 2, 3 May 1948, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 35Ibid. 36Letter, Leon A. Schelnutt to L.E. Norrie, 23 January 1948, Box 970, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA.

187 French zone. Preventing these actions would forestall Soviet claims that the western Allies

were forcing the division of Germany. Although Cold War divisions were increasingly

developing, the Americans and British tried as best they could to minimise actions which

would prompt the Soviets to renew their claims that the western Allies were not committed to

a unification of the German territories. As the German sport associations pushed to form

national organisations, concurrent actions by the three western Allies contributed to the

Soviet accusations. At the London Six-Power Conference (February-June 1948) between the

three western Allies and the Benelux states, the British, French, and Americans

recommended that Germany should be authorised to form a provisional government. This

recommendation prompted the Soviets to walk out of the Allied Control Council in Berlin,

formally ending the already tenuous quadripartite control of Germany, and to restrict travel to

the western sectors of Berlin. With the introduction in June 1948 of the Deutschmark as the

new currency in the three western zones, the Soviets completely closed all land and sea routes

into West Berlin, initiating the Berlin Blockade.37 Although these actions set in motion the formal division of Germany, the three western occupation powers continued to enforce the quadripartite Directive 23, in particular the prohibition of formal organisations above the

Land level until Germany was officially two separate states.

While Cold War tensions over Germany grew more heated in 1948, so, too, did the

Landessportbund-Fachverband debate in the American zone as well as the British zone. The centralization issue did not disappear with the creation of the sport-specific working

37Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, 2d ed., vol. 1, From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1993), 198-214; Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1950), 355-367.

188 committees. Instead, they brought the British and Americans together to address the debate

over the formation of German sport organisations. A similar Landessportbund-Fachverband

quarrel had erupted in the British zone. J.G. Dixon, the Chief Sports Officer in the British

zone, organised a survey of the sport organisational structures in the spring of 1948 to prepare

for a zonal conference to address the question of sport associations. Delays in receiving

responses made planning for a meeting of sport officials from the British zone superfluous;

by the time Dixon compiled the necessary information in September 1948, the situation had

progressed to the point where bizonal meetings were necessary – and already happening.38

The Landessportbünde in the American zone had organised another meeting for February

1948 in Munich with representatives of the Fachverbände, as well as the Landessportbünde and Fachverbände representatives from the British zone. While both types of associations were present, the Landessportbünde dominated the meeting. Dixon and a representative from the Military Government in Bavaria also attended this German-run meeting. They reminded the Germans that Directive 23 still prohibited the creation of interzonal organisations but that the two Military Governments “had no objection to their discussing future plans in view of the fact that eventually it might be possible to organize on a broader basis.”39

With Military Government permission to discuss future sport organisational plans the

German Landessportbünde and Fachverbände leaders held three additional meetings in 1948, but again they agreed on few concrete solutions. Following the Munich conference there was

38Minutes, Sixth Conference, Youth Control Officers, 24 February 1948, FO 1050/1174, NA; Minutes, Eighth Conference, Youth Officers, 29 September 1948, FO 1050/1544, NA. 39OMG-Bavaria Monthly Report for the Period ending 30 April 1948, 4 May 1948, Box 143, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA.

189 another meeting in Cologne in May 1948, although this time the Fachverbände dominated the

discussions. The two groups met again in Frankfurt in August, only to agree “largely by

ignoring differences of opinion, to form an ‘Ausschuss für Leibesübungen’ [Committee for

Physical Exercise].”40 This new committee convened a meeting in October 1948 in Bad

Homburg in the American zone attended by all eight Landessportbünde and 21 Fachverbände of the Bizone. Representatives from Berlin and the French zone observed but held no voting privileges. The meeting resolved nothing but merely provided a larger forum for the quarrel.

Almost the entire two-day conference was spent electing an executive committee, which ultimately comprised three Landessportbünde representatives (including the chairman) and four members of Fachverbände (including the vice-chairman). The discord among the attendees prompted the representative from the French zone to comment that “he had never seen such an exhibition in his life.”41 At the conclusion of the Bad Homburg meeting, the

Ausschuss für Leibesübungen had discussed only three of eleven agenda items.

By the end of 1948 the issue of how German sport should be organised above the

Land level had not been resolved. Even though the Americans and British had attempted to provide forums for the German sportsmen to resolve their organisational dispute, the problem had become more contentious. The German sport leaders could barely agree to form a committee to discuss the problem, let alone achieve a consensus regarding the organisational structure for sport. As much as the western Allies had hoped that the Germans could develop on their own a solution acceptable to all, they realized that the Military Governments would

40K.R. Walsh, German Sports Organisation and the Erste Arbeitstagung des "Ausschuss für Leibesübungen", n.d. [October 1948], FO 1050/1096, NA. 41Ibid.

190 have to take a more active role in achieving a resolution.

* * *

Trizonal Sport Conferences

As the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate grew more intense, larger political

factors began to alter the position of the western Military Governments with respect to the

creation of interzonal organisations. When the blockade of Berlin began in the summer of

1948 and the division of Germany started to appear more permanent, the French agreed more

readily to trizonal fusion.42 Discussions among the three occupation powers increased regarding all facets of life in Germany after the London Six-Power Conference (February-

June 1948), and sport was not an exception. As the debate between all-sport or sport-specific organisations continued and the Germans could not resolve the issue of the overarching structure of German sport on their own, the three western Military Governments realised they needed to take a more active role in the issue. The transition from occupation to self- government further complicated the matter for the three Military Governments, which then held trizonal sport conferences to provide a united front when dealing with the leading

German sport officials. A series of trizonal sport conferences, primarily among the French,

British, and Americans, began in February 1949 to coordinate the future of German sport organisational structure.

The trizonal sport conferences of 1949-50 were not, however, the first meetings of the occupation powers to discuss issues surrounding German sport. As early as March 1947 the

French had organised a quadripartite meeting of youth officers, with one of the three days

42Clay, 212.

191 devoted entirely to the problems pertaining to sport. The 1947 conference did not attempt to coordinate policies among the four occupation powers but instead presented an opportunity for a more general discussion and understanding of the sport situation within each zone. The

French and the Soviets in particular enforced stricter provisions within their zones regarding the organisation of German sport. The four powers reaffirmed the prohibition of interzonal sport organisations and supported Germany’s exclusion from the 1948 Olympics, but they encouraged interzonal competition.43 This meeting came just three months after the quadripartite Allied Education Committee had recommended that German youth be brought into contact with the youth of other countries.44 It was therefore natural that Germans from the four zones should also have more opportunities to interact with one another. As a result, plans began for an exhibition day of German sport teams from all four zones as well as some bizonal or German championships (ideally with teams from all four zones).45 However, increasing tensions between the Soviets and the three western powers, which culminated with

Soviet General Sokolovsky walking out of what ultimately became the final meeting of the

43While the Soviets initially participated in the planning of German Championships, they not surprisingly withdrew and did not permit German teams or individuals from their zone to participate. Compte rendu de la Réunion interalliée des Officers des Sports et de la Jeunesse à Honau-Traifelberg, 4-6 March 1947, AC 415/5, AOFAA; Notes Taken at French Youth Conference at Honau, 5 March 1947, Box 969, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA; Chief of Military Division, Military Security Board to Hon. P.E. Ramsbotham, 17 April 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 44The Allied Education Committee recommended “as a positive contribution to the re-education of Germany to democratic ideals, active steps be taken to bring the youth of Germany into contact with the youth of the United Nations.” DIAC/AEC/Memo(46)49 – Relations Between German Youth and the Youth of Allied Countries, 19 December 1946, Box 232, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations -- Records of U.S. Element, Allied Control Authority -- Direct. Of Internal Affairs and Communication (DIAC): General Records, 1945-1948, RG 260, NARA. 45Compte rendu de la Réunion interalliée des Officers des Sports et de la Jeunesse à Honau-Traifelberg, 4-6 March 1947, AC 415/5, AOFAA; Notes Taken at French Youth Conference at Honau, 5 March 1947, Box 969, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA; Chief of Military Division, Military Security Board to Hon.P.E. Ramsbotham, 17 April 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA.

192 Allied Control Council in March 1948,46 meant the February 1947 conference was the only quadripartite meeting outside of the formal Allied Control Authority structure to discuss

German sport.

Between the 1947 quadripartite meeting which addressed sport and the inauguration of the trizonal sport conferences, the three western occupation powers did not act unilaterally on sport issues. Youth officers from the British and American zones regularly conferred with their counterparts or attended youth officer meetings in the other zone, and on occasion a

French officer was present. As chapter two demonstrated, the creation of the Deutsche

Sporthochschule in Cologne was a bizonal venture (though largely supported by the British), and the British and Americans also shared visiting experts, such as the athletic directors Little and Carlson. With the western powers working more closely with their economic and political occupation policies, the British, French, and Americans thus initiated formal tripartite discussions to help coordinate their stance on German sport and how national organisations should be structured.

Directive 23 had prevented the centralization of sport in the immediate aftermath of the war, but as the Germans developed democratic practises, they were increasingly permitted to form regional or Land-level organisations. Modern sports, with international federations overseeing their governance across the world, are not restricted to a small local area; instead, games are contested between people or teams with the smallest of distances between them as well as between countries oceans apart from one another. Understanding the German desire to resume participation in sport contests against other countries, the occupation powers

46Clay, 155-57, 355.

193 recognised that the some form of national organisation would ultimately be necessary.

Particularly after the International Olympic Committee barred Germany from participating in the 1948 Olympic Games, the western Allies agreed that German sport could not be kept from international competition indefinitely.47 Nonetheless, the actions of the

Landessportbünde demonstrated to the Military Governments that the potential for a recentralization of German sport, reminiscent of sport under the Nazis, was great without

Allied oversight.

The western Allies held a series of trizonal conferences held during 1949-50 to address issues in sport as Germany moved from areas under the control of the occupation powers to the self-governing Federal Republic of Germany with only limited Allied control through the Occupation Statute. To deal with the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate and ensure that German sport did not recentralise, the French invited the British and Americans to the first trizonal sport conference in Mainz on 10-11 February 1949. All but one of the conferences consisted solely of Military Government officials from the three western zones; only the fourth meeting, in July 1949, included leaders of the regional sport associations. At these conferences the Allies addressed German attempts to create national organisations while ensuring that German sport officials did not contravene Military Government laws.

Meanwhile, through the various working committees on sport, Germans held an increasing number of meetings in preparation for when official organisations could be formed at the national level. As the legislation introduced in the trizone reflected this transition, so, too, did

47Chapter five addresses Germany’s inability to participate in the 1948 Olympic Games and the country’s return to international sport federations and the Olympic movement.

194 the laws governing German sport.

While Landessportbünde and Fachverbände representatives held successive meetings

in 1948 without arriving at any solutions for the structure of German sport, German

politicians began working in earnest toward the creation of a federal constitution and

government. By 1948 the French could not run their zone without incurring costs unless they

consented to trizonal fusion and the currency reform implemented by the British and

Americans in June 1948. Once the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Authority,

effectively ending quadripartite control, France could no longer fight Anglo-American

programs for Germany, particularly as occupation costs remained high and domestic postwar

recover in the French Fourth Republic could not progress rapidly enough on its own without

Marshall Plan assistance. France reluctantly agreed to join its zone of occupation with the

Bizone, which paved the way for the formal creation of the Federal Republic of Germany.48

The three Military Governments informed the Länder minister-presidents on 1 July 1948 of

the Allied recommendations for Germans to establish a federal republic. A committee of

German political, legal, and constitutional experts worked on a constitutional draft in August

1948, and the Parliamentary Council began meeting in September 1948 to finalise the new

constitution.49

While the Parliamentary Council drafted the Basic Law (the constitution of the

Federal Republic of Germany), the three western Allies developed the Occupation Statute, which transformed the presence of the three western powers from direct occupation via

48The French had run their zone with a profit so that it could pay for occupation costs. Once the Saar merged economically with France in 1948, however, the French zone lost much of its ability to pay for itself. F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 141-6. 49Bark and Gress, 210-12, 217-20.

195 Military Governments to an oversight body through the Allied High Commission. The

Occupation Statute recognised the creation of a (West) German government and the broad powers granted to the Germans. However, the Occupation Statute reserved for the Allies certain areas of control in such areas as foreign affairs and demilitarisation. Most importantly the Occupation Statute permitted the three western Allies the right to exercise “full authority if they consider that to do so is essential to security or to preserve democratic government in

Germany.”50 The Occupation Statute thus delegated many powers to the German government, established the relationship between the German government and the Allied

High Commission, and specified the powers reserved by the three Allies.51

As the Basic Law and Occupation Statute neared completion, the trizonal sport conferences began to address three central yet intertwined issues: the Landessportbund-

Fachverband debate, the creation of national sport organisations, and Germany’s participation in international competitions. The French called the first trizonal sport conference for

February 1949 “with the purpose of discussing the possibility of developing a unified sports policy.”52 While the western Allies worked out “the principles according to which their powers and responsibilities will be exercised after the establishment of a German Federal

Republic” through the Occupation Statute,53 the three powers had to coordinate their varied

50Occupation Statute, 10 April 1949, Box 121, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 51“Occupation Statute Defining the Powers To Be Retained by the Occupation Authorities, Signed by the Three Western Foreign Ministers,” 8 April 1949, U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944- 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), 213-14. 52OMG-WB Interim Report, 1-15 February 1949, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 53Press Release, OMGUS Public Information Office, 26 April 1949, Box 65, Office of the Executive Secretary - General Records, 1947-1952, RG 466, NARA.

196 policies regarding sport as well. The Military Governments recognised that sport was not

going to be included in the Occupation Statute. However, the attention that they had all

devoted to sport since 1945 led the French to call this meeting to ensure that the new Allied

High Commission would not overlook sport policy. Sport organisations increased their

membership faster than other adult or youth associations, and the Military Governments

“viewed with alarm the continuance of certain nationalistic, political, commercial and power

concentrative influences in German sport, many of which were characteristic of Nazi times

and Hitlerjugend [Hitler Youth] programs.”54 In particular, the French, who had imposed the strictest regulations for sport of the three western powers, wished to ensure that the Germans could not easily return to a centralised structure.

The Germans needed to resolve the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate in order to determine the nature of their future national sport organisation(s) and thus have the opportunity to reenter the international sport community. Without a national governing body for sport, Germany could not participate in international sporting events. At the Mainz conference both the British and French preferred to grant control of German sport to the

Landessportbünde, but the Americans desired neither organisational type to hold sole control, instead believing the two organisational structures could coexist.55 The Americans were the first to permit – and were far more accepting of – the Fachverbände than the other two powers. Both of these perspectives thus reflected the positions already taken by each

54Memorandum, L.E. Norrie to A.G. Grace, 14 July 1949, Box 115, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 55Letter, L.E. Norrie to Alonzo Grace, 28 February 1949, Box 113, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA.

197 occupation power. The Military Government representatives talked about this issue nearly as much as the Germans did in their own meetings without arriving at any significant conclusions either. Yet, for the occupation powers the discussion centred not on which type of organisation was better, but rather on what the future organisation of German sport above

Land level should be. The early discussions did not lead to clear resolutions, but the three powers were nonetheless in agreement that they should retain some oversight of German sport. By using the justification of education and security for the continued control of

German sport, as well as the fact that Directive 23 remained in effect, the three powers agreed in Mainz that they needed additional meetings to continue these discussions.56

By the time the French called the first trizonal sport conference, the Americans had already initiated international sport competitions for their zone and recognised the benefit of the Fachverband structure. The Americans understood the difficulties because of Germany’s lack of national sport organisations, as evidenced by the German-Swiss charity football matches in October 1948. Moreover, they recognised the necessity for national sport organisations in order to enable Germany to participate in international sport on its own without involvement of the Military Government to arrange competitions. In particular, they saw that when organised on a national level for each sport, the Fachverbände would fulfill

“the need for effective organization in order that German sports groups can be contacted by sports groups of other nations, and in order to make necessary arrangements and regulate such sports activities.”57 However, the American support of the Fachverbände did not lead to

56Letter, L.E. Norrie to Alonzo Grace, 28 February 1949, Box 113, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 57Ibid.

198 the endorsement of the single-sport structure over the Landessportbünde by all three of the occupation powers.

At their second meeting, held 16-17 March 1949 in Bad Rothenfelde (Lower Saxony) in the British zone, the Military Government representatives worked out more detailed criteria for continued Allied control of sport. The Allies agreed that control included punitive measures such as demilitarisation and decentralisation as well as assistance for the Germans.

The positive measures included “inviting experts from other countries to Germany to discuss methods of sport-education, actively assisting clubs and organisations whose spirit seems sound, and encouraging the Sportdezernenten in the Kultusministerien [Heads of the Sport

Department in the Ministries of Culture] to promote permissive legislation facilitating the development of sport as a social service.”58 By including the benefits of sport, the occupation powers reinforced the importance of the exchange programs and sport in general in the overall rebuilding of Germany.

In the meantime, the Parliamentary Council’s completion of the Basic Law in May

1949 and the implementation of the Occupation Statue made the Military Governments realise that “the days of controls were numbered.”59 Released on 10 April 1949, the

Occupation Statute prepared for the transition from the Military Government to the Allied

High Commission throughout the summer of 1949. Generals Lucius Clay, Brian Robertson, and Pierre Koenig resigned their positions as Military Governors. John J. McCloy and André

58Report, Inter-Allied Working Committee on Sport and Physical Education, 28 March 1949, FO1050/1074, NA. 59Letter, L.E. Norrie to A.G. Grace, 14 July 1949, Box 115, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA.

199 François-Poncet became the new High Commissioners for the American and French zones while Robertson remained as the British High Commissioner. The Allied High Commission formally handed the Occupation Statute to Konrad Adenauer on 21 September 1949 after the

Chancellor presented his cabinet.60 During the five months between the announcement of the

Occupation Statute and its formal implementation, the occupation powers were in a state of transition in preparation for German control of federal affairs. Occupation laws, including

Directive 23, remained in place until German laws superceded them or the Allied High

Commission reviewed and rescinded them.

At the same time the Military Government officers in charge of sport within each zone recognised that the Allied position on sport needed to be modified in light of the

Occupation Statute. The representatives from the three western zones, in particular the

French, still desired some form of control over German sport. One of the areas in which the

Occupation Statute permitted a retention of Allied control was demilitarisation. Directive 23, and thus the actions taken by Military Government officials with respect to sport, dealt indirectly with security only as far as ensuring that sport was not militaristic. Allied sport officials were far more concerned with ensuring the democratisation of sport because of their place within the Education branches of each Military Government.

Following the announcement of the Occupation Statute and Basic Law, the Allied sport officers called the third trizonal sport conference to take place in Bad Nauheim (Hesse) on 29-30 June 1949 in order to coordinate policies on sport with these changes to the governance of Germany. Directive 23 had been a quadripartite law; however, the three

60Bark and Gress, 230-2, 253-4.

200 western powers did not have the authority to change it themselves – even though quadripartite cooperation by this time had long-since ended. The Allied representatives could at least make recommendations as to how the tripartite authorities should interpret the directive with respect to the new Occupation Statute. The Americans called this third conference “to re-align the agreements reached at earlier conferences with the spirit and intent of the Occupation Statute.”61 The Military Government representatives at Bad

Nauheim thus agreed that Directive 23 should be liberalised.

With the impending resumption of German control over their own affairs, the Allied representatives at the trizonal sport conference understood that they alone could not dictate the form of German sport. One of the French representatives argued that modification of

Directive 23 could not “take place until the German leaders have been given a chance to make known their opinions on that subject, [and] until allied authorities have received sufficient assurance that democratic development of sports in Germany is safeguarded.”62

Although the French supported a change to Directive 23, they nonetheless wanted to ensure that some controls on Germany remained to prevent a resurgence of extremely politically- motivated sport. In addition, one of the British representatives pointed out that after the

Occupation Statute took full effect, the three occupation powers would “meet the Germans more or less on the basis of equality. We should treat them not as defeated enemies but as members of the common nations.”63

61Letter, L.E. Norrie to A.G. Grace, 14 July 1949, Box 115, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 62Minutes, Inter-Allied Sports Conference, 29-30 June 1949, FO 1050/1096, NA. 63Ibid.

201 With these ideas the three Allies agreed that they should meet with some of the leading German sport officials from the three zones to ensure a common view of the future of a democratised German sport. Previous meetings between the occupation powers and sport leaders had only included American and British Military Government personnel and

Landessportbünde and Fachverbände officials from those two zones, with the occasional

German observer from sport organisations in the French zone who held no voting privileges.64 For this conference between the Allied sport officials and German sport leaders from all three zones, the Military Government officers posed the invitation as fulfilling repeated German requests to meet with the Allies to discuss sport. At this proposed Allied-

German conference the three Allied powers would therefore meet the German sport officials

“on the basis of equality looking forward to their being received in the sports family of nations.”65 The representatives of all three occupation powers worked out a common platform regarding Directive 23 and interzonal German sport organisations in order to present a united front to the Germans, but they also recognised the changing nature of Germany within the international system and its affect on their own positions. The Allies opened the two-day conference with the German sport representatives in Bad Schwalbach (Hesse) in the

American zone on 16 July 1949 with a prepared statement regarding their position on

German sport and Allied control of it. British Chief Sport Officer J.G. Dixon gave the opening statement, informing the Germans that Directive 23 was still “legally operative” even though it was currently being modified.66 Dixon assured the German sport leaders that

64For example, the November 1947 Munich meeting, the December 1947 meeting in Stuttgart, or the October 1948 meeting in Bad Homburg all discussed in this chapter. 65Minutes, Inter-Allied Sports Conference, 29-30 June 1949, FO 1050/1096, NA. 66Ibid.; Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA.

202 the three powers did “not intend to take any action under it [Directive 23] which we would

have to withdraw when the tripartite ordinance is published.”67 This statement primarily

addressed the creation of the working committees (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) that had formed

for almost every sport, linking the Fachverbände from each Land without contravening

occupation law. The legality of the loose associations had frequently arisen during the three

previous Allied trizonal sport conferences, but as long as they had remained working

committees and not official organisations the three powers permitted their continued

existence.

With the Allied representatives, the German sport leaders worked out a “federal form

of structure” to guarantee the unity of German sport among the Landessportbünde and the

Fachverbände.68 The Germans agreed to create yet another working committee to help with the formation of this federal – but not centralised – organisational structure for sport. The

Allies reassured the sport officials that as soon as a tripartite ordinance was finalised, national

(West) German sport organisations could be established, provided that they receive approval from the Allied High Commission.69 Yet when the Germans asked about the creation of a

National Olympic Committee, Dixon replied that “the German Olympic Committee should

be the last step in the development.”70 The French representative reiterated that the Allies

“agree to have first the trizonal organization and later the olympic committee. There is no

67Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 68Official Press Release, German Allied Sports Conference in Bad Schwalbach, 19 July 1949, Box 969, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 69Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 70Ibid.

203 hurry about it.”71 The Bad Schwalbach conference concluded with the decision that this new

German working committee would meet in September 1949 and then meet with the Allied sport officials.72

The trizonal sport conferences and concurrent German actions demonstrate the difficulties encountered with the amalgamation of the three zones into one state. Unlike for associations which affiliated into a loose national organisation with Allied permission, the control of sport faced two main problems in the creation of national organisations: the fear of a highly centralised structure reminiscent of the Third Reich and the combination of different policies across the three zones. The majority of the leading figures within the national sport governing bodies and the German Olympic Committee resided in the American and British zones, but they nonetheless had to include the sport officials from the French zone. The

Allies and Germans also needed to address the more stringent French policies regarding the formation of sport associations such as the mandatory omni-sport club structure or the fact that Land-level sport organisations still did not exist in the French zone. Although the senior

Allied officials entrusted with the control of sport ultimately coordinated policies from across the three zones, they could not ignore the actions and desires of the German sport leaders.

The inability of the Germans to settle the Landessportbund-Fachverband issue themselves drew the Allies into the debate. Yet, the Allied sport officials could not unilaterally make decisions regarding German sport, particularly after the drafting of the Basic Law and

Occupation Statute was underway. With frequent communication and meetings between the

71Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 72Chapter 5 will return to the creation of the German National Olympic Committee, including the events following the Bad Schwalbach conference.

204 Germans and occupation powers, the Germans demonstrated agency of their own in ensuring that their opinions on sport were not only heard but also accepted. Germans gained greater political autonomy in 1949 with the acceptance of the Basic Law and the election of Konrad

Adenauer as the first postwar Chancellor. Within sport as well Germans increasingly gained more control over their affairs that year, even though these actions ultimately required Allied approval. This dual process was most evident with the formation of national sport organisations, especially for the two sports which had played a dominant role in Germany’s sport history.

* * *

Fighting to Fence

The first four trizonal sport conferences continually addressed the status of Directive

23, which controlled sport and prohibited sport organisations above Land level, and its state of limbo as a result of the promulgation of the Occupation Statute. Allied sport officers could not take as much decisive action as they wanted because sport fell primarily within the areas of German control once the Basic Law went into effect and Germans had their own national government. Were the Allies to continue enforcing Directive 23 to its fullest extent, immediately upon its revocation they would have to backtrack on their own actions which would weaken their appearance in the eyes of the Germans. Because the Allies promoted the educational function of sport, its control fell under the purview of the new Federal

Government. Yet, the threat of militarism in sport based on the historical relationship between sport, the military, and national identity in Germany enabled the Allies to retain some control over German sport once the Occupation Statute went into effect in 1949.

205 Through this caveat the three western Allies could justify their continued interest in the two militaristic sports which had troubled the occupation since the creation of Directive 23: fencing and Turnen. Although Military Governments themselves changed Allied policies, the three western occupation powers listened to and worked with the Germans to lessen

Allied controls on sport as the Germans assumed more political power in general.

The Landessportbund-Fachverband debate brought the issue of national sport organisations to the fore, and the creation of the working committees forced the occupation powers to reconsider their own control of sport. Directive 23 permitted Turnen and prohibited fencing, but once Germans could form national organisations these two sports faced a similar fate. Allied fears over the militaristic and political nature of these two sports persisted among the highest levels of the Allied High Commission, largely through the

Military Security Board, which acted to prevent the founding of national associations for

Turnen and fencing. The fencers and Turner enlisted the support of Deutsche

Sporthochschule rector Carl Diem, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and Herbert Blankenhorn, one of Adenauer’s closest government advisors. They also used the rhetoric of democracy, which the Allies had attempted to teach the Germans through sport, in order to gain permission from the Allies to create national federations. The sportsmen affected most by

Directive 23 became the primary groups responsible for achieving the repeal of the directive.

As Directive 23 addressed the demilitarisation of sport, the responsibility for its review fell to the Military Division of the Military Security Board. The three western

Military Governments established the Military Security Board, first suggested at the London

206 Six-Power Conference, to address broadly the maintenance of security in Germany.73 The

Military Security Board consisted of three divisions: Industrial, Military, and Scientific

Research, all of which reported to the Committee of Deputies and, ultimately, the Military

Security Board itself. The structure of the Military Security Board (although tripartite) mirrored the structure of the quadripartite Allied Control Authority (Figure 3). The Military

Security Board’s subdivisions discussed a specific area of control and made decisions which the Military Security Board approved and, when necessary, the Allied High Commissioners sanctioned as well. The Military Security Board continued to function throughout the period of the Allied High Commission, providing the legal and security basis for the retention or modification of occupation legislation.

The Military Division considered Directive 23 in detail in May 1949, two months after the second trizonal sport conference (Bad Rothenfelde, 16-17 March 1949) as part of the reevaluation of Allied policies in preparation for the transition to German self-government.

The Military Division removed much of the restrictive components from Directive 23, in particular the restrictions on sport organisations to remain of a local character, but retained the elements that prevented militarism from permeating sport.74 The Military Security Board would therefore deal with sport only when ground-level officers brought violations to its attention. The Military Security Board Committee of Deputies agreed that it was “not our intention to prohibit innocuous sporting activities, that all we wish to do is to deny sporting activities which have a military character.”75 Instead, the revised Directive reflected this new

73Clay, 340-41. 74MSB/MIL/P(49)6 – Review of legislation of the Second priority by the Military Division, 30 April 1949, FO 1005/1265, NA. 75MSB/DEP/M(49)8 -- Verbatim Minutes, Eighth Meeting, Military Security Board Committee of

207 Figure 3 – Military Security Board Structure TRIB/P(48)17 (Final) – Directive on the Organization of the Military Security Board, 17 January 1949, FO 371/77209, NA.

Deputies, 10 May 1949, Box 6, Records of the U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations - U.S. Element of the Tripartite Control OFC (TRICO) - Records of the Military Security Board - Minutes of Meetings of the Committee of Deputies, RG 260, NARA.

208 Allied stance regarding sport. Before the Military Security Board released a revision of

Directive 23 in 1949, the Allied sport officials met in June in Bad Nauheim. As they planned

their invitations to the Germans for the joint Allied-German conference, the Military

Government representatives agreed not to inform the Germans that Directive 23 had officially

been modified, only that it needed to be changed in light of the impending implementation of

the Occupation Statute.76

In preparation for the July 1949 trizonal sport conference between the Allied sport officers and the German sport leaders, the British convened representatives from all of the relevant occupation offices within their zone to advise the Chief Sports Officer, J.G. Dixon.

British members of the Military Security Board, Intelligence Division, Political Division, and

Office of the Legal Advisor attended the meeting, chaired by R.T. Percival, head of the

Education Branch and Dixon’s superior. The representative from the Military Security Board stated that its involvement in sport affairs, with the revisions of Directive 23, would be needed “only so far as it was necessary to eliminate militaristic and extreme nationalistic tendencies.”77 The British representatives agreed, based on their interpretation of the

Occupation Statute, that interzonal or national organisations would have their “tacit approval so long as their activities remained unobjectionable.”78 The information provided by the aforementioned divisions which retained an interest in the direction of German sport helped

Dixon as well as the American and French representatives prepare for the meeting with the

German representatives. Since the Military Security Board reaffirmed that Allied control of

76Minutes, Inter-Allied Sports Conference, 29-30 June 1949, FO 1050/1096, NA. 77Report on Meeting to Discuss the Control of Sport, 12 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 78Ibid.

209 sport would only be necessary when specific incidents arose, the Education Branch would retain a more advisory capacity regarding sport. Dixon supported this position, stating that

“since the educative function was much the more important of the two, the loss of the control function under the Occupation statute should not seriously affect their work.”79 The German sport representatives themselves supported this point in their resolution taken at the July Bad

Schwalbach conference. They reiterated that “educational and social values of German sports will be given special attention” by the Germans responsible for sport.80 Thus, a revision of

Directive 23 that removed many of the Allied controls of German sport would not much alter the work on sport which the three Military Governments had already completed.

The Military Security Board recognised that the promulgation of the Occupation

Statute, the creation of the Federal Republic, and the election of a German government taken together rendered strict control over sport impossible. These events, combined with the

German-Allied discussions at Bad Schwalbach, prompted the Military Security Board to address Directive 23 again. Three days before the federal election the Military Security

Board raised Directive 23 but postponed any discussion until the following meeting.81 The

British and American members reiterated the view from earlier in the summer that Allied control of sport would only be necessary when militaristic tendencies arose. The emphasis on the educational value of athletics meant that the Military Security Board did not need to address Directive 23 and that other laws already revised with respect to the Occupation

Statute adequately addressed the issues that beset sport. The French member disagreed,

79Report on Meeting to Discuss the Control of Sport, 12 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 80Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 81Bark and Gress, 236; MSB/MIL/M(49)12 – Minutes, Twelfth Meeting, Military Security Board Military Division, 11 August 1949, FO 1005/1261, NA.

210 countering that “sport in Germany was of particular importance, as in the past, time and

again, sport organisations grew into powerful aggressive nationalistic bodies.”82 Although

the other two members concurred with the French sentiment, the three ultimately agreed that

“it was more important to maintain efficient means of action with regard to persons who will

be destined to control sport, than to engage in a control covering the whole sporting

organizations which control would, at the same time, be difficult to carry out and not very

conclusive.”83 The Military Security Board there agreed that the continuation of the

Elimination and Prohibition of Militarism and Nationalism in conjunction with the revisions of Directive 23 initially made in April 1949 would sufficiently enable the Allies to maintain some oversight of German sport.84

Thus, as the Federal Republic came into being as a self-governing state, the

occupation powers returned much of the control of sport to the Germans themselves.

German sport officials rarely appealed directly to the Military Government for the revocation

of Directive 23, but their frequent discussions with the Military Government officers

responsible for sport and the creation of working committees, with the ultimate aim of

creating national sport organisations, helped push the Allied authorities to revise the law.

The three western powers were primarily concerned with the positive functions of sport with

respect to health and democratisation after 1949. Their programs to promote these activities

increased during the period of the Allied High Commission as Cold War tensions escalated.

82MSB/MIL/M(49)14 – Minutes, Fourteenth Meeting, Military Security Board Military Division, 31 August 1949, FO 1005/1261, NA. 83MSB/MIL/M(49)16 – Minutes, Sixteenth Meeting, Military Security Board Military Division, 9 September 1949, FO 1005/1261, NA. 84Ibid.; MSB/MIL/P(49)25 – Directive 23 Limitation and Demilitarisation of Sport in Germany, 16 September 1949, FO 1005/1265, NA.

211 The Military Division of the Military Security Board stated, with the revision of Directive 23, that only when “sport activities begin to show signs of renascent militarism and aggressive nationalism [would] they become a matter of concern to the Military Division.”85 This relaxation in the control of sport thus provided the space in which national associations could legally form in West Germany, and very quickly the working committees for each sport transformed into official organisations. Although the Military Security Board hoped it would not have to address sport further, two sport organisations with the potential for militarism and aggressive nationalism forced the issue once again within the Allied High Commission.

Particularly after West Germany became its own state with a democratically elected government, the leaders of fencing and Turnen involved the Federal Government in order to force the Allied High Commission to permit their existence and revoke the last remnants of

Directive 23 still in effect. Directive 23 explicitly forbade fencing, but with the creation of the Federal Republic and, subsequently, national sport organisations, fencers desired the same rights as other sportsmen. Yet, the earlier concern expressed by the occupation powers regarding fencing meant that their leaders had to overcome additional hurdles in order to establish a national organisation. The attempts to create interzonal organisations and, ultimately, the German Fencing Federation (Deutscher Fechter Bund) raised the issue of demilitarisation with the three western powers.

Less than a month after Adenauer formed his government, his ministers addressed the issue of sport because fencers in the Federal Republic wanted to form a national association.

85MSB/MIL/P(49)25 – Directive 23 Limitation and Demilitarisation of Sport in Germany, 16 September 1949, FO 1005/1265, NA.

212 Deutsche Sporthochschule rector Carl Diem had also been appointed as sport consultant

(Sportreferent) in the Ministry of the Interior in 1949 and kept the new government apprised of the difficulties of Germany’s sportsmen.86 On 12 November 1949 the Ministry of the

Interior informed the Chancellor’s office that at the end of the month the fencers would found

a national federation and, on that same afternoon, showcase the 1936 Olympic fencers in

action. Fencing, however, was still illegal in Germany while the Military Security Board

reviewed Directive 23. The fencers, through Carl Diem and Herbert Blankenhorn in the

Ministry of the Interior, therefore asked the Chancellor or his office to request a tacit

acquiescence of fencing competitions from the Allied High Commission.87

Although Directive 23 had explicitly prohibited fencing since 1945, many Germans

had continued to participate in the sport. In September 1947 the Military Government in

Wuerttemberg-Baden had requested clarification on the status of the ban on fencing.

Germans and the Military Government in the American zone heard rumours that the British

and French permitted fencing in their zones.88 Only when whispers of fencing being

practised or requests to participate in the sport arose did the Military Governments send

letters reiterating the prohibition. Rarely did the Military Governments actively seek out

Germans participating in the sport and punish them, even when the general rumours included

the activity occurring within their own zone.89 The American Military Government

86Achim Laude and Wolfgang Bausch, Der Sport-Führer: Die Legende um Carl Diem (Göttingen: Verlag die Werkstatt, 2000), 195. 87Bundesminister des Innern to Bundeskanzleramt, 12 November 1949, B 136/5562, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Hereafter cited BAK. 88Letter, Aksel G. Nielsen to L.E. Norrie, 3 September 1947, Box 970, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 89An Education Report from Dortmund (in the British zone) in 1947 stated its office had been approached by a fencing instructor who requested permission to give lessons. Following Directive 23, the

213 “reprimanded” a German in April 1949 for having taught fencing (foil, rapier, sword, and light and heavy saber) to one of the revived fraternities at the university in Munich.90 Hans

Hubert, who became a prominent figure in postwar German fencing organisations, as a man in his early twenties even practised fencing with the wife of one of the local Military

Government officers in Offenbach (Hesse).91 At one point the British actually prosecuted two men, who later played leading roles in the German Fencing Federation, for fencing. The

British military court judge convicted the two men of the crime of fencing and fined them 20

DM each.92

Germans had clearly been practising the sport of fencing in contravention of Directive

23 with few repercussions, but fencers became more open with their activity after the Bad

Schwalbach conference between the Allies and Germans. Many German sportsmen took

Dixon’s opening statement at the July 1949 conference describing the drafted – but not yet finalised or approved – changes to the control of sport as fact. The Allied sport officers had discussed at their March 1949 meeting in Bad Rothenfelde that valid reasons no longer existed for continuing to prohibit sports such as jiu-jitsu, fencing, or archery.93 Thus, when

Military Government in Dortmund denied his request but stated that “it seems that the applicant was given permission last year by another HQ of Mil. Gov. He states also that fencing is being allowed in certain other parts of the Land.” Rather than follow up with this information, the Education officers in Dortmund instead requested clarification because “this much-debated sport should either be permitted in all areas or none.” J.M. Paddon and F.J. Brand, Education Report East Ruhr Group Dortmund, 15 October 1947, FO 1013/2202, NA. 90Weekly Intelligence Report, No. 161 (Fencing), 11 June 1949, Box 2, Military Security Board -- Military Division -- Classified General Records, 1949-52, RG 466, NARA. 91Hubert is an honorary member of the Deutscher Fechter-Bund and honorary president of Fechtclub Offenbach von 1863, which has produced many national team members, including Helene Mayer, the half- Jewish woman permitted to compete on Germany’s 1936 Olympic team. Mayer won a gold medal at the 1928 Olympics and a silver medal in Berlin. Mandell, 63, 182; Milly Mogulof, Foiled! Hitler’s Jewish Olympian: The Helene Mayer Story (Oakland: RDR Books, 2002); Private collection of Hans H. Hubert, viewed 14 June 2006. 92Deutsche Fechter-Bund, 50 Jahre Deutsche Fechter-Bund (n.p., 1961), 17. 93Report, Inter-Allied Working Committee on Sport and Physical Education, 28 March 1949, FO1050/1074, NA.

214 meeting with the Germans in July of that year, Dixon summarised the future controls on

sport. He stated that “fencing will be permitted provided that it is conducted in a human

manner with the customary safeguards.”94 In October the Allies realised that Dixon had been misquoted; several lower Military Government officials, in addition to the Germans, had taken Dixon’s statement as fact even though Directive 23 still prohibited fencing. The Youth

Activities officer in Wuerttemberg-Baden reported in January 1950 that “scores of fencing organizations are springing up all over Germany openly.”95

At the beginning of 1950 national sport organisations had already begun to form, and the fencers solicited the assistance of the Federal Government to be allowed to create a national federation. Although technically still prohibited by Directive 23, the Allies were not punishing fencers. The new Federal Government knew of the fencers’ plan to create a national organisation, but only after the German Fencing Federation’s formation did the government send a request to the Allied High Commission to permit this new organisation.

Chancellor Adenauer himself signed the letter to the Allied High Commission, recognising the Allied Control Authority’s rationale that fencing had been military or para-military training as the justification behind its inclusion in Directive 23. Yet, Adenauer countered:

German sporting circles have repeatedly pointed out that this assumption was not correct, since the foil used for Fencing cannot be regarded as a weapon. Besides, the sport of Fencing is pursued both by women as well as men; it is a popular sport in Latin countries, and has long ago been included in the programme of the Olympic Games.96

94Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 95Aksel Nielsen, Youth Activities and Sports, 27 October 1949, Box 1, U.S. Land Commissioner for Wuerttemberg-Baden - Public Affairs Division - Daily, Weekly, and Monthly, RG 466, NARA; Aksel Nielsen, Youth Activities and Sports, 19 January 1950, Box 1, U.S. Land Commissioner for Wuerttemberg-Baden - Public Affairs Division - Daily, Weekly, and Monthly, RG 466, NARA. 96Letter, Konrad Adenauer to General Sir Brian H. Robertson, 23 January 1950, FO 1005/10, NA. The

215 By emphasising the popularity of and women’s participation in the sport, Adenauer distanced fencing from the more traditional view of fencing as a demonstration of masculinity in

Germany. Rather than a staple of the men’s student fraternities, Adenauer instead focussed on fencing’s inclusion for both sexes in the peaceful Olympic movement, which the

Chancellor knew all three of the western powers supported and had been helping the

Germans reenter.

Adenauer’s arguments forced the Military Security Board to reconsider the prohibition on fencing in Germany because they recognised the sport the fencers were practising differed from the duels of the student fraternities. The Allied High Commissioners and the Military Security Board had recently received a letter from the Allied sport officers following their fifth meeting (5-6 June 1950), in which they recommended permitting fencing

“with masks and protective clothing.”97 In essence, the Allied sport officers agreed that fencing as a sport following international guidelines should be permitted. The use of masks and protective clothing therefore excluded the bloody and violent fraternity duels. All three representatives of the Military Division concurred that Germans should legally be allowed to participate in the sport of fencing, but they disagreed as to whether any limitations within

Directive 23 should remain in place. The Americans supported a complete revocation of

Directive 23 in order to prevent confusion among Germans as to the intention of the Allied

High Commission with respect to sport. On the other hand, the British and French argued that duelling “must remain firmly prohibited” and that no fencing organisation should be

German original can also be found in B 136/5562, BAK. 97Verbatim Minutes, Tri-Zone Sport Conference, 5-6 January 1950, AC 422/2, AOFAA.

216 permitted above Land level.98

The Military Security Board agreed with both viewpoints but ultimately abolished the limitation on the level of organisational structure. The Allied High Commission finally legalised fencing as a sport that followed the rules of the International Fencing Federation

(Fédération Internationale d'Escrime), arguing that fencing was no longer included in the modern soldier’s instruction on the art of war. The Military Security Board further commented in its statement to the Allied High Commission that “it is doubted if any group of fencers could develop into a security threat solely from their knowledge of fencing.”99 These actions further removed the sport from the realm of military or para-military activities. On 21

March 1950, just under two months after Adenauer’s initial request to the Commission,

French High Commissioner André François-Poncet informed Adenauer that Germans now had full permission to participate in the sport of fencing.100 François-Poncet noted, however, that student duels remained a violation of Allied High Commission Law No. 16 on the

Elimination of Militarism. If any fencing organisation demonstrated militaristic or para- militaristic characteristics, the Military Security Board could dissolve it through this more general law.101 Thus, the actions taken by the German fencers to create a national organisation, combined with the Federal Government’s request, removed the final restriction against the sport of fencing in Germany. The fencers, whose sport Directive 23 explicitly

98MSB/MIL/P(50)5 – Fencing in Germany, 21 February 1950, FO 1005/1266, NA. 99MSB/DEP/P(50)3 – Fencing in Germany, 2 March 1950, US Element, Military Security Board -- Reports on Activities of US Element, Military Security Board, RG 466, NARA. 100AGSEC(50)517 – A. Francois-Poncet to Chancellor Adenauer, 21 March 1950, AC 374/2, AOFAA. 101MSB/DEP/P(50)3 – Fencing in Germany, 2 March 1950, US Element, Military Security Board -- Reports on Activities of US Element, Military Security Board, RG 466, NARA; MSB/MIL/P(50)5 – Fencing in Germany, 21 February 1950, FO 1005/1266, NA

217 prohibited, could finally form a national organisation with Allied approval in early 1950.

* * *

Troublesome Turner

Unlike the fencers, the Turner had legally been allowed to participate in their sport throughout the occupation, but their attempts to create a national organisation faced even more difficulties. The French had banned Turnen within their zone because of the sport’s political origins as a method of physical training to prepare Germans to fight against French domination until Directive 23 came into effect. Following the creation of Directive 23 in late

1945 the Allies had paid close attention to Turnen even though the sport was not prohibited by the Directive. The Allies had agreed to permit gymnastics within Germany, particularly when it conformed to the standards of the International Gymnastics Federation (Fédération

Internationale Gymnastique) as compared to the methods of Jahn and Spiess. As long as gymnastics remained organised at the local or regional level, it could not provide a nationalising influence within the new German state. The western Allies believed the historical and current actions of the Turner were a potential threat to the demilitarisation and democratisation of the Federal Republic, and the Allied High Commission prevented the formation of a national federation for gymnastics until the Turner demonstrated a significant change in their practises and principles.

Turnen leaders had been one of the first sport groups to try (unsuccessfully) to create a national organisation in conjunction with a large celebration held in Frankfurt in August

1948. The political and military connotations implied by the 1948 Turnfest justified these renewed Allied fears over the creation of a national gymnastics organisation. The Allies

218 permitted a Turnfest to mark the centennial of the 1848 Revolution, but the occupation powers kept a close watch over the activities and speeches comprising the event. Shortly before it began, the French Military Government prevented Germans from its zone from travelling to the festival, but some people still attended the event. Because of previous warnings from the American Military Government, the mayor of Frankfurt, Dr. Walter Kolb, shortened his speech and made no reference to the working committee for Turnen or the creation of a national organisation.102 The American Military Government officer who observed the event in Frankfurt reported that he had never “met a large group of sports people with so much serious idealism and [emotionalism] in their activities and work.”103 Although the actions and words of the Turner in Frankfurt did not violate Military Government regulations, they came close. The five days of festivities held at the Paulskirche – the site of the 1848 Revolution which the Turner had ardently supported – frequently invoked Jahn’s memory. When the Allied Control Authority Political Directorate had reviewed the program from the 1948 Turnfest in Frankfurt, it considered the program “a disturbing document and in places reads more like a military manual than a guide book.”104 Dixon attended the Turnfest and reported that the program, more than a centimetre thick with an eagle on the cover, demonstrated that “the main sentiment behind the Movement is that of nationalism.”105 This politicization of sport had concerned the Allies and reaffirmed to them the necessity of

102Letter, Harold C. Patrick to Austin Welch, 27 August 1948, Box 129, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 103Ibid. 104Letter, I.P. Garran to Military Division, Military Security Board, CCG(BE), 31 August 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 105Minutes, Eighth Conference, Youth Officers, 29 September 1948, FO 1050/1544, NA.

219 Directive 23 and the continued prohibition on national sport organisations.

The changes in Germany during the summer of 1949 enabled the trizonal working committees for sport to transform themselves into official national organisations. By the end of August 1949 the Political Directorate also informed the Military Security Board’s Military

Division that “under the terms of the Occupation Statute, however, we have no further right to impose any restrictions on the detailed organisation of any German body of this kind and we accordingly have no grounds for objecting to the formation of sports organisations on a federal, zonal, Land or any other basis.”106 When the German Working Committee for

Gymnastics (Deutscher Arbeitsausschuss Turnen) applied to the International Gymnastics

Federation for recognition, the international governing body requested proof, as per its bylaws, of unity of all gymnasts within the country under one organisation.107 Just as he assisted the fencers, Carl Diem informed the Federal Government of the intention of the

German Working Committee for Gymnastics to hold a celebration on Whitsuntide 1950 and officially become the German Gymnastics Federation (Deutscher Turner Bund) to fulfill this requirement.108

When the Chancellor’s office asked the Allied High Commission if these actions were permissible, the Allied High Commission, through the Military Security Board and Political

Affairs Committee (the successor of the Political Directorate), used the caveat of renascent militarism to intervene.109 Similar to the stances taken during the reconsideration of the ban

106Letter, I.P. Garran to Military Division, Military Security Board, CCG(BE), 31 August 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA. 107Letter from Dr. Kolb, 5 July 1950, contained in HICOM/P(50)111 – German Gymnastics Federation, 8 July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA. 108Letter, Carl Diem to Bundeskanzler, 10 February 1950, B 106/1732, BAK. 109The Political Advisors of the High Commissioners comprised the Political Affairs Committee and

220 on fencing, the British and French members of the Military Security Board again supported preventing the creation of the national sport organisation. They not only argued that

“German national federations for gymnastics have a long history of political and para-military activity,” but also that “gymnastic clubs lend themselves to the covert inculcation of basic military discipline.” Furthermore, the Military Security Board expressed concern that “large gymnastic displays, which would inevitably follow the formation of a large Federation of clubs, would tend to ‘foster the resurgence of militarism’.”110 Although the British and

French did not wish to hinder the development of sport within Germany, they nonetheless still believed that “gymnastic clubs are in a different category from other sporting activities and require special treatment.”111 However, the American representative of the Military

Security Board argued that Directive 23 was, with the promulgation of the Occupation Statute and Law No. 16, no longer effective and that legislation forbidding the creation of a national gymnastics federation was not essential to military security. Since this request from the

Federal Chancellory regarding gymnastics was a mere two and a half months after the fencing inquiry, the American proposal also reiterated the necessity of a clarification on Directive

23.112 The Americans argued that “it was not within the philosophy of the occupation as expressed in the Occupation Statute, to prohibit activities out of which a threat to security might eventually develop, but that it was the philosophy of the occupation to act against

were concerned with “all political and foreign affairs of the German Federal and Land Governments coming within the competence of the Council.” The Political Affairs Committee carried out similar functions as the Political Directorate from the Allied Control Authority. HICOM/P(49)12 – Establishment of the Main Committees of the Allied High Commission, 19 September 1949, FO 371/76797, NA; Letter, Herbert Blankenhorn to L. Handley-Derry, 5 April 1950, contained in AGSEC(50)704 -- German Gymnastics Federation, 15 April 1950, FO 1005/12, NA. 110MSB/MIL/P(50)13 – German Gymnastics Federation, 25 April 1950, FO 1005/1266, NA. 111Ibid. 112Ibid.

221 actual threats when they did occur.”113 The British and French members countered that the

Military Security Board must consider the problem with issues relevant to the Military

Security Board and not give too much weight to political or other factors.114

The Military Division could not, therefore, come to a consensus regarding Turnen question and sent the problem to the Military Security Board Committee of Deputies, who determined that the Chancellory’s letter in fact constituted two separate requests that required additional examination. The Military Security Board did not object to a “festive gymnastic display at Frankfurt, [but] the permanent formation and subsequent development of a federal organisation was a different matter.”115 The Military Security Board transferred the latter issue to the Political Affairs Committee because of the highly politicised history of German

Turner. The Military Security Board reminded the Political Affairs Committee of Turnen’s

“unfortunate history,” which “has often been inspired by political ideals, and used as a means of inculcating a strident and flag waving nationalism; their activities land themselves to the training of military discipline and drill, and it is in that that they differ from other sports such as swimming and sailing.”116 The Military Security Board felt that “gymnastic drills or displays are innocuous if carried out by local clubs,” but it objected to a national organisation

“because such a centralized organization offers an effective means of fostering a resurgence of militarism.”117 The Political Affairs Committee concurred with the initial decision taken

113MSB/MIL/M(50)9 – Minutes, Thirty-fifth Meeting, Military Security Board Military Division, 25 April 1950, FO 1005/1262, NA. 114Ibid. 115MSB/COM/M(50)12 – Minutes, Thirty-sixth Meeting, Military Security Board Commission, 28 April 1950, FO 1005/1233, NA. 116MSB/SEC(50)41 – German Gymnastics Federation, 29 April 1950, Box 5, US Element, Military Security Board -- Reports on Activities of US Element, Military Security Board, RG 466, NARA. 117Ibid.

222 by the Military Security Board and agreed that while the Whitsuntide festival could proceed, the Turner could not form a national organisation. The French, who had voiced the most vociferous concerns over Turnen since 1945, agreed to examine the issue further for the

Political Affairs Committee.118

Immediately upon receiving this decision, the Federal Government reiterated to the

Allied High Commission its support for the creation of a national association for gymnastics because of its democratic and non-militaristic basis. The Germans argued that the creation of the Deutscher Turner Bund was “merely the transformation and renaming of the existing

‘Deutsche Arbeitsausschuss Turnen’ which has been approved by the Allied occupying powers since 1948.”119 In addition, this federation would follow international and Olympic rules for gymnastics, and its membership would consist of democratically organised associations. Furthermore, countering the claim that the Germans were returning to undemocratic organisations by reintroducing the previously-used name of Deutscher Turner

Bund, the Federal Government reiterated that “the Gymnastics Federation is a new creation and not a continuation of the National-Socialist Reich Athletic League which was an association compulsory for all forms of athletics and which suppressed the independent organization of gymnastics.”120 The Nazis dissolved the previous Deutscher Turner Bund in

1935 precisely because it had been democratic, they argued.

Some international sport representatives and the general public from the countries

118POL/M(50)15 – Minutes, Twenty-fifth Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 12 May 1950, FO 1005/1304, NA. 119Translated letter, Dittmann to Joseph Slater, 16 May 1950, contained in AGSEC(50)1039 – Foundation of the German Gymnastics Federation (Deutscher Turnerbund), 19 May 1950, FO 1005/13, NA. The German original can also be found in B 106/1732, BAK. 120Ibid.

223 occupied by Germany during the war were not as anxious to resume international competition with Germans, prompting the Allied High Commission to disagree with some of the Turner’s claims. The American High Commissioner, John J. McCloy, communicated to Chancellor

Adenauer that the Allied High Commission “has no desire to prevent the formation of an athletic federation for the Federal Republic under some other name,” which would coordinate

German athletic associations and participation in international meets.121 In addition, the

Allied High Commission wanted to review the statutes of this proposed German Gymnastics

Federation. The High Commissioners agreed to follow this formal letter with informal conversations with Adenauer, President Theodor Heuss (scheduled to speak at the

Whitsuntide Turnfest), and Dr. Walter Kolb, mayor of Frankfurt and chairman of the German

Working Committee for Gymnastics. McCloy emphasised in his personal conversations that

“the actions of the Federal Government and of the German people must for some time to come be taken with a view to their possible effect on public opinion abroad.”122

At the 1950 Whitsuntide festival the Turner elected three men to negotiate with the

Allied High Commission regarding the future formation of a national gymnastics association and differentiate the postwar organisation from the politically-motivated gymnastics associations of Prussia and Germany’s past.123 The High Commissioners instructed the

Political Affairs Committee to meet with the three Turnen representatives. Louis de

Guiringaud, who later became the French Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1976 to 1978,

121AGSEC(50)1080 – John J. McCloy to Konrad Adenauer, 23 May 1950, FO 1005/13, NA. 122HICOM/M(50)19 – Minutes, Twenty-Ninth Meeting, Council of High Commissioners, 31 May 1950, FO 1203/206, NA. 123Letter, Herbert Blankenhorn to Col. Glain, 9 June 1950, contained in AGSEC(50)1247 – Central Organisation for the Co-ordination of German Gymnastics Associations, 15 June 1950, FO 1005/13, NA.

224 had the responsibility as the French member of the Political Affairs Committee for carrying

out these negotiations with the Turner.124 The German Turner emphasised during the meeting with de Guiringaud the democratic nature of the new organisation. They insisted that even though the association used an old name, it “was prompted by an entirely new spirit and that participation in international competitions was one of its principal aims.”125 To reflect this

“new spirit” the group agreed to change the word “Turnerbund” in its statutes to

“Turnergemeinde” and also to remove any reference to “Volkstum” within the organisation’s

aims.126

Although the Turner had agreed in the meeting with de Guiringaud to change the

name of the organisation, one week later they submitted revised statutes to the Allied High

Commission which defended the decision to continue using the name Deutscher Turner

Bund. Passing over all imperial and Weimar German organisations, the Turner argued that

the specific name Deutscher Turner Bund had been used in 1848 by gymnasts who

“disavowed any political activity on the part of their DTB.”127 While the Turner of 1950

acknowledged that their predecessors a century earlier had put forth a national objective, it

had been “to work against despotic bondage and for participation in government, in order that

‘the democratic republic should be recognized as the sole rational form of government’.”128

124Like in the Allied Control Authority, the Allied High Commission rotated the chairmanship of the main body and its subcommittees every month, which the French held in June 1950. Minutes, Thirtieth Meeting, Council of the Allied High Commission, 15 June 1950, FO 371/85157, NA; POL/M(50)21 – Minutes, Thirty-first Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 23 June 1950, FO 1005/1304, NA. 125HICOM/P(50)111 – German Gymnastics Federation, 8 July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA. 126Ibid; POL/M(50)22 – Minutes, Thirty-second Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 30 June 1950, FO 1005/1304, NA. 127Letter from Dr. Kolb, 5 July 1950, contained in HICOM/P(50)111 – German Gymnastics Federation, 8 July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA. 128Ibid.

225 Thus, Dr. Kolb and the Turner leadership hoped that associating with the liberal and progressive Turnen movement of the nineteenth century, and not the form of Turnen used in

Prussian education which that emphasised ordered exercises along strict lines to promote automatic obedience,129 would help transform the working committee into an official organisation with Allied High Commission approval. The new Deutscher Turner Bund purposely invoked the memory of 1848ers who believed in democracy through the use of this organisational name and the specific location at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt for the Turnfest of 1948 and 1950.

The German Gymnastics Federation appealed to three Allies, in particular to calm the persistent fears of the French representatives, by emphasising the positive desires of the organisation and ways in which it would not violate the Occupation Statute nor return to the mentality that had prompted the creation of Directive 23. Dr. Kolb argued that the German

Gymnastics Federation wanted to be “an educational and ideological community which would impart to this movement, embracing millions of Germans, ethical values by sensible and popular gymnastic exercises, and by consciously cultivating the national traditions, protect its members from drifting into nationalism, militarism or nihilism.”130 With this statement the Turner acknowledged the potential for dangerous militarism, but they instead argued that their organisation would help prevent, similar to other sport organisations, a return of militarism in sport and would ensure the promotion of democratic ideas.

Emphasising that the German Gymnastics Federation was a new association, Dr. Kolb

129J.G. Dixon, “Prussia, Politics and Physical Education,” in Landmarks in the History of Physical Education, ed. P.C. McIntosh, 3d ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 133. 130Letter from Dr. Kolb, 5 July 1950, contained in HICOM/P(50)111 – German Gymnastics Federation, 8 July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA.

226 concluded the lengthy document by reiterating that the organisation “must not be held responsible for the past mistakes of gymnastic organisations, mistakes which are inherent in any human community and which must be understood in the spirit of their time.”131 This last point coincided with the British position that restricting Turnen, similarly to the decision taken regarding fencing, should occur only when undemocratic actions warranted intervention.132

Not surprisingly, the majority of the hesitation to approve the German Gymnastics

Federation came from the French representatives within the Allied High Commission, but de

Guiringaud’s meetings with the Turner leadership assuaged the doubts held by the French regarding the aims of the organisation. The Political Affairs Committee accepted all but one statute from the revised version, requiring an additional meeting between the Turner and the

French representatives. The purpose of the organisation which retained the Deutscher Turner

Bund name still sounded too political in its ideas and carried the potential to foster a dangerous nationalism. The organisation’s constitution stated:

The DTB is an ideological and educational community, with freedom and the dignity of man as its supreme precepts. Its aim is to educate its members to be upright citizens and to uphold freedom, brotherly love, and social justice. It stands for the ideals of native land, fellow countrymen, and fatherland, and at the same time of sincere cosmopolitan ideas imbued with the spirit of the Olympics. The DTB wishes to be the guardian and furtherer of national and cultural traditions of the German people. Endeavors of partisan, religious or racial nature are barred.

With these aims, the DTB considers its task to be the promotion of German gymnastics on a non-profit basis as a means for the physical, mental, and

131Letter from Dr. Kolb, 5 July 1950, contained in HICOM/P(50)111 – German Gymnastics Federation, 8 July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA. 132Brief for the British Member on Item 4 of Agenda, German Gymnastics Federation, Prepared by Chancery, July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA.

227 moral up-building of the people, especially of youth.133

The German Gymnastics Federation ultimately agreed to remove the nationalism contained within its charter, replacing it with a general statement regarding the educational nature of the sport to help its members “become upright men and women and good citizens of their country and of the world in the spirit of freedom and of dignity of man.”134 The purpose of the organisation accepted by the Allied High Commission contained no reference to

Germany, Germans, or Volk, thus removing references to the organisation’s founding principles which might have been construed as renascent nationalism. Instead, democracy and internationalism formed the foundations of the Deutscher Turner Bund, reinforcing the positive measures underlying the occupation.

Although the High Commissioners took their role seriously, they nonetheless recognised the humour in the highest British, French, and American political officials in

Germany making a decision as to whether or not a national sport association could exist.

When they met in July 1950 to approve the recommendation of the Political Affairs

Committee regarding the revisions to the German Gymnastics Federation statutes, the

American High Commissioner John McCloy remarked that “just as a matter of humorous interest, I have got a chart of the Deutsche Turnerbund and the proposal of the new organization, and if that isn’t the, as I was about to say, damnedest collection of lines in order to do physical jerks, I give up.” Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Robertson’s successor as British High

Commissioner, responded that “this structure looks to me so complicated as to give evidence

133Letter from Dr. Kolb, 5 July 1950, contained in HICOM/P(50)111 – German Gymnastics Federation, 8 July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA. 134POL/Memo(50)22 – German Gymnastics Federation, 14 August 1950, FO 1005/1314, NA.

228 that it must be very, very democratic.” French High Commissioner André François-Poncet concurred, adding that he “always will adhere to the artist’s drawing.”135 McCloy,

Kirkpatrick, and François-Poncet approved the general changes and, once the Deutscher

Turner Bund submitted a final draft of its statutes to de Guiringaud and the Political Affairs

Committee, the German Turner finally established a national federation.136

When the fencers and Turner began pushing for the creation of national federations in early 1950, the tripartite powers realised that Directive 23 should be officially rescinded.137

The forced decentralisation of German sport contained within Directive 23 was no longer necessary, particularly after the creation of the Federal Republic and the new legal standing of national organisations. The Occupation Statute addressed any future concerns regarding militarism which, after the protracted discussions regarding fencing and Turnen in Germany, the Allies considered a broad enough piece of legislation to cover any possible appearance of dangerous militarism or nationalism that might arise within a sport organisation. In fact, the

Military Security Board acknowledged in the autumn of 1949 that when they initially reviewed Military Government laws for the new period of the Allied High Commission, the law eliminating militarism (HICOM Law No. 16) would be sufficient to cover sport.138

Because the new draft laws had not yet been finalised, the Law Committee tabled the

135Verbatim Minutes, Thirty-third Meeting, Council of the Allied High Commission, 13 July 1950, FO 1023/315, NA. 136HICOM/M(50)23 – Minutes, Thirty-third Meeting, Council of the Allied High Commission, 13 July 1950, FO 1023/2, NA; POL/M(50)26 – Minutes, Thirty-sixth Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 9 August 1950, FO 1005/1305, NA. 137MSB/MIL/P(50)14 – Directive No. 23 Limitation and Demilitarisation of Sport in Germany, 28 April 1950, FO 1005/1266, NA; MSB/MIL/M(50)17 – Minutes, Forty-first Meeting, Military Security Board Committee of Deputies, 14 September 1950, FO 1005/1247, NA. 138MSB/MIL/M(49)16 – Minutes, Sixteenth Meeting, Military Security Board Military Division, 9 September 1949, FO 1005/1261, NA.

229 discussion on the repeal of Directive 23.139 When the Allied sport officials met at the final

two trizonal sport conferences (5-6 January 1950 in Bad Nauheim and 13-14 March 1950 in

Mainz), they agreed that some level of oversight to continue, but they recognised that the

Occupation Statute virtually nullified Directive 23.140 The Military Division of the Military

Security Board concluded that “it is obviously in the interests of the Occupation Authorities

that the utmost freedom to develop sport, and even to encourage it, should be permitted.”141

Yet, they continued, gymnastics was the only sport “which lends itself to covert basic military

training, and to large displays of a para-military nature.”142 Although the High Commission

and Political Affairs Committee overturned the Military Security Board’s recommendation

that the ban on a national organisation for Turner continue under the provisions of HICOM

Law No. 16, the Military Security Board nonetheless considered “that there would be little

danger in permitting a Federal organisation for sports and games such as swimming, football,

cross-country running, hockey, etc., and it therefore recommends that Directive No.23 should

be declared no longer operative in Federal Germany.”143

While the actions of the Turner took precedence within the Allied High Commission and its subdivisions, German sport leaders continued to take the necessary steps to transform the working committees into official national organisations. Once the Turner finally gained the same organisational rights as the rest of their fellow German sportsmen, the Military

139LAW/M(49)12 – Minutes, Twelfth Meeting, Law Committee, 28 November 1949, FO 1005/1200, NA. 140Verbatim Minutes, Tri-Zone Sport Conference, 5-6 January 1950, AC 422/2, AOFAA; Rapport sur la Conference Interalliee consacree aux questions de Sport (Mainz), 13-14 March 1950, AC 374/2, AOFAA. 141MSB/MIL/P(50)14 – Directive No. 23 Limitation and Demilitarisation of Sport in Germany, 28 April 1950, FO 1005/1266, NA. 142Ibid. 143Ibid.; MSB/MIL/M(50)10 – Minutes, Thirty-sixth Meeting, Military Security Board Military Division, 28 April 1950, FO 1005/1262, NA.

230 Security Board returned, for the third time, to the issue of Directive 23. In late September

1950 the Military Security Board approved, and in October the Law Committee concurred, that Directive 23 could finally be revoked in full.144 On 25 October 1950 the Allied High

Commission sent a letter to Herbert Blankenhorn which simply stated: “I am directed to inform you that Allied Control Authority Directive No. 23 is no longer in force in the Federal

Territory.”145 With this succinct note the formal control of German sport, initiated five years earlier by the quadripartite powers, ended in the Federal Republic of Germany.

* * *

Conclusion

The repeal of Directive 23 concluded a three-year discussion of the structure of

German sport which began with the creation of a sport-specific association in one Land in the

American zone. What the Americans and British had hoped would remain an issue for

German sport officials to decide using their new democratic skills quickly involved all three western occupation powers. The leaders of the Fachverbände argued that the authoritarian and centralised structure of the Landessportbünde prevented the implementation of democracy within sport, playing to the fears of the western Allies. The Landessportbund-

Fachverband debate also led to the eventual rescinding of Directive 23 once Germans could create national sport organisations. The potentially militaristic sports of fencing and Turnen

144MSB/DEP/M(50)18 – Minutes, Forty-second Meeting, Military Security Board Committee of Deputies, 26 September 1950, FO 1005/1247, NA; MSB/COM/M(50)27 – Minutes, Fifty-First Meeting, Military Security Board Commission, 28 September 1950, Box 1, Military Security Board Commissioner -- Minutes of Meetings of the Commissioners, 1948-55, RG 466, NARA; LAW/M(50)45 – Minutes, Fifty-third Meeting, Law Committee, 18 October 1950, FO 1005/1202, NA. 145AGSEC(50)2378 – L. Handley-Derry to Herrn Ministerialdirektor Blankenhorn, 25 October 1950, FO 1005/17, NA.

231 continually factored into Allied discussions on the Landessportbund-Fachverband issue and

Directive 23. Once the Allied High Commission permitted the national federations for fencing and gymnastics to exist, however, it could no longer justify a need for Directive 23.

The Landessportbund-Fachverband debate appeared first and was most contentious in the American zone because the American Military Government did not initially state a preference between the Landessportbünde or Fachverbände, instead encouraging the Germans to resolve the issue democratically and on their own. The plurality of sport organisations provided Germans with an opportunity for implementing democracy outside the realm of politics. While the Landessportbund-Fachverband quarrel intensified in both the American and British zones, those two occupation powers were in the process of joining their zones to form the Bizone. Whereas the Americans and British worked together in forming this new, bizonal structure to solve problems that had affected both Military Governments, such as the struggling economy, the Americans and British prevented the amalgamation of sport organisations. In fact, the two powers maintained the ban on zonal and interzonal sport organisations. Even when the French joined Anglo-American efforts and consented for the

Bizone to become the Trizone (and then the Federal Republic), all three powers continued the prohibition on interzonal or national sport federations.

The three western Allies recognised the difficulties of fusing their zones together into a federal German state after four years of different policies. While the British and Americans had more similar practises and had worked together on projects even before the creation of the Bizone, the alignment of French policies was more difficult. The trizonal sport conferences helped worked through these differences to create a unified Allied policy to

232 present to the Germans, and local Military Government officers could begin to adjust their actions accordingly to conform to these changes. This coordination proved most difficult, not surprisingly, in the same Land where the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate first developed. With the amalgamation of the three zones the Land of Baden-Wuerttemberg was created from the American Land of Wuerttemberg-Baden and the French Länder of South

Baden and South Wuerttemberg (Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern).146 Coordinating policies from both occupation powers in all areas, including sport, proved difficult, and the

Americans feared that compromises on control policies would lose the gains which resulted from the few years of occupation.147 The French, having imposed some of the tightest controls on German sport, felt similarly about the combination of their zone with the other two and therefore took the initiative in calling the trizonal sport conferences to ensure that oversight of sport continued. French apprehension, in particular regarding the centralisation of German organisations, played an integral role in preventing the creation of national sport associations. In addition, the Soviets simultaneously increased their accusations that the western Allies were driving the formal division of Germany following the currency reform in

June 1948 and the end of quadripartite control. The western occupation powers did not want to provide merit to these claims in early 1949 by permitting “national” sport organisations which represented sportsmen only from the three western zones of Germany.

However, once the new Federal Republic of Germany elected its own national

146Willis, 238. 147For an example on the proposed integration of the U.S. and French administration of Education and Cultural Affairs see Memorandum to Dr. Mead, n.d., Box 968, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg- Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

233 government and, by the end of the summer, the division of Germany into two separate states was official, the western Allies found it increasingly difficult to claim legal justification to control sport and prevent national organisations from forming. The concurrent development of the Occupation Statute by the Allied powers and the Basic Law written by the Germans themselves provided the space in which Military Government officers felt hesitant to enforce laws that, although still valid, would soon be rescinded. The German sport leaders in particular took this opportunity to gain for themselves the ability to form national sport organisations immediately following the founding of the new state. Thus, the National

Olympic Committee, national sport federations, and the Deutscher Sport Bund (a national organisation for all of the Landessportbünde) formed in 1949 and 1950. Fencers and Turner, although specifically restricted by the occupation powers, nonetheless seized these opportunities to join together to promote their sport and also to counter the restrictions placed upon their activities. The Turner and fencers’ fights to form national organisations made the western Allies realise that they could no longer control German sport, and they therefore rescinded Directive 23 in full.

The occupation powers possessed the final decision-making ability regarding the organisational structure of German sport, but they also provided the forums in which the

Germans could democratically develop a solution to the problem of sport organisation. In fact, each time that the Allied High Commission and its subcommittees debated retaining or repealing Directive 23 was a direct result of the actions of the German sport officials. By the time the Allied High Commission fully rescinded Directive 23, the Germans had developed extensive national sport organisations. With these new national governing bodies for each

234 sport (West) Germany could apply for recognition by the international federations, which the three western Allies supported because these actions coincided with their occupation aims.

Germany’s reentry into the world of international sport, however, was not a smooth transition following the creation of national sport organisations.

235 Chapter 5

Returning to the International Arena

...international competitive sports could be a valuable asset in breaking down the isolation of Germany and the re-establishment of friendly international contests... –L.E. Norrie, Community Education Branch Chief1

When the Olympic Games and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association

(FIFA) World Cup, the two largest international sport competitions, resumed after the conclusion of World War II, Germany was not invited to either event. After having been prevented from entering either the 1948 Olympic Games in St. Moritz (Winter) and London

(Summer) or the 1950 World Cup in Brazil, Germany’s successes in the 1952 Olympics and the 1954 World Cup made its return to the international sport scene even more impressive.

Following much debate whether Germany should be invited to the 1952 Winter Games as a result of lingering Norwegian animosity from the German occupation of the country during the war,2 the West Germans nonetheless marched in the Opening Ceremony in Oslo behind the German flag and to much applause.3 In addition to having one of the largest delegations behind the Americans and Swedes, West Germany won seven medals at Oslo, including three gold.4 The Federal Republic of Germany bettered its medal tally at the Summer Games in

1Letter, L.E. Norrie to Alonzo G. Grace, 28 February 1949, Box 113, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 2Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Otto Mayer, 15 November 1950, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edstrom / Correspondence: (Oct. - Dec.) 1950, International Olympic Committee Historical Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland; J. Sigfrid Edström to Otto Mayer, 15 November 1950, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edstrom / Correspondence: (Oct. - Dec.) 1950, International Olympic Committee Historical Archives, Lausanne, Switzerland. Hereafter cited IOC. 3“Winter Classic Officially Opened by Princess Ragnhild of Norway,” New York Times, 16 February 1952, 16. 4Germany won gold medals in the 2-man bobsled, 4-man bobsled, and figure skating pairs; silver medals in women’s slalom and downhill skiing; and bronze medals in women’s slalom and giant slalom skiing.

236 Helsinki, winning 22 medals.5 The country’s greatest postwar sporting achievement in the first decade after the fall of the Third Reich was winning the 1954 World Cup in Berne, which has often been portrayed as Germany’s symbolic return to the international stage, both politically and socially.6

Germany’s victories on the playing fields, although impressive from an athletic standpoint, are even more astounding considering the devastation of the war. Almost all of the cities which were more than 50 percent destroyed, and all but two of the cities more than

75 percent destroyed, lay in the three western zones.7 Large buildings which remained intact were either requisitioned for the Allies or used to house refugees. Even after buildings such as schools began to return to their intended function, the likelihood remained that the Allies continued to control athletic grounds to maintain their own military fitness.8 As late as June

1949 the American army still occupied the stadium in Mannheim, which led to a public controversy when the army initially denied Germans the use of the stadium for an important

Deutsche Olympische Gesellschaft, Die Olympischen Spiele 1952 Oslo und Helsinki: das Offizielle Standardwerk des Nationalen Olympischen Komitees (Frankfurt am Main: Olympischer Sport-Verlag, 1952), 427-502. 5Germany won seven silver medals and seventeen bronze medals. Walter Borgers, Jürgen Buschmann, Karl Lennartz, ed. Olympischer Neubeginn: Gründung des Nationalen Olympischen Komitees, 24. September 1949 in Bonn (Cologne: Carl und Liselott Diem-Archiv, 1999), 99. 6Wilhelm Pyta, “German Football: A Cultural History,” and Erik Eggers, “All Around the Globus: A Foretaste of the German Football Imagination, c. 2006,” in Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, ed., German Football: History, Culture, Society (London: Routledge, 2006). 7Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A History of West Germany, 2d ed., vol. 1, From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1993), 30-2. 8For example, the Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden reported that “all small craft belonging to the Heidelberg and Mannheim rowing clubs have been placed under lock and key for exclusive troop use even the four and six man shells which the soldiers never take out.” In October 1950 the Youth Activities officer in Hesse noted that playgrounds and recreational fields were still being derequisitioned. Officer of Military Government Wuerttemburg-Baden Report, 19 July 1946, Box 142, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA; Monthly Report, Education and Cultural Relations Branch, Land Hesse, October 1950, Box 5, U.S. Land Commissioner for Hesse - Public Affairs Division/Education and Cultural Relations Branch, RG 466, NARA.

237 sectional football match.9 Athletic facilities, although beneficial for promoting general health, were not as high a priority for reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the war as housing and schools, which were necessary to begin returning German society to normalcy.

Germany’s victories at the 1952 Olympic Games and 1954 World Cup are also noteworthy because of the years of the country’s absence from international sport during the occupation and into the early years of the Federal Republic. International sport established a precedent of excluding war aggressors following the First World War and implemented a similar policy after 1945 as well. Germany, Austria, and Hungary did not receive invitations to the 1920 Olympic Games in Antwerp because of the lingering ill-will toward those states for purportedly having started the First World War. Germany again failed to receive an invitation to the 1924 Paris Olympics and only began to resume membership in international sport federations in September 1925. The athletic readmission happened just one month before the signing of the Locarno treaties, which provided Germany with more acceptable revisions of the stipulations imposed by the World War I treaties and paved the way for

German entry to the League of Nations the following year.10 After the Second World War the rationale for Germany and Japan’s exclusion from sport was partially based on animosity from the victors. The international sport community also justified the absence on legal grounds. These two countries lacked national Olympic committees, national sport governing bodies, and most importantly, sovereignty as a result of their occupations. International sport

9Leon Shelnutt to L.E. Norrie, May 1949 Monthly Report, 3 June 1949, Box 959, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 10David B. Kanin, A Political History of the Olympic Games (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 51-52; Stephanie Salzmann, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union: Rapallo and After, 1922-1934 (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2003), 75.

238 federations excluded Germany and Japan from participating in any sanctioned sporting event or against other member organisations.11 Germans were therefore barred from participating in athletic competitions against anyone except other Germans.

Yet, Germany’s reacceptance in the world of international sport did not automatically resume with the end of the military occupation and the creation of the Federal Republic of

Germany in 1949. Instead, the tensions between the western Allies, the German sport leaders, and international sport organisations led to protracted discussions before the Federal

Republic of Germany could participate fully in international sport. Sport scholars have addressed Germany’s difficult return to the Olympic movement within the larger context of the Cold War, but they have not examined the situation thoroughly from all three sides.

Combining these differing perspectives provides a more complex understanding of West

Germany’s position within the postwar international system. German sport officials worked to cultivate their contacts in the international athletic community while simultaneously working within the confines of the occupation laws, in particular during the period when

Directive 23 prevented inter-Land or interzonal organisations. The Military Governments monitored sport associations to ensure that the Germans did not prematurely create interzonal or national organisations. In addition, the western Allied foreign ministries involved themselves directly in the affairs of the international federations and the International

Olympic Committee regarding Germany’s resumption of membership. While the Germans,

11Alfred E. Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1999), 80; Barbara J. Keys, Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 38; Per Olof Homäng, “International Sports Organizations 1919-25: Sweden and the German Question,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 9, no. 3 (Dec. 1992), 455.

239 as demonstrated in the previous chapter, took the initiative in creating new national sport governing bodies, the efforts of the Military Governments and the Allied foreign ministries helped Germany rejoin the world of international sport, but not simply for sporting purposes.

The occupation powers wanted to ensure the denazification, demilitarisation, and decentralisation of German sport, but their belief in the benefits of sport as a way to help democratise the population led to their promotion of sporting events and activities between

Germany and other countries.

While a common exclusionary attitude regarding Germany prevailed in 1945-46 across all of the international federations, each organisation nonetheless made its own decisions regarding when and how Germany could resume membership based upon the sport and, largely, the personalities comprising the executive committees of each international federation. As much as the three western Allies promoted the benefits of democratisation, psychological morale, and goodwill fostered by sport from the beginning of the occupation, the international sport community acted in direct contrast to its own foundations by excluding

Germany immediately after World War II. The international sport movement liked to consider itself above politics, but the quadripartite occupation and subsequent division of

Germany into two states forced the international federations to address the political realities of postwar Germany. As a result, the international federations and their executive committee members concerned themselves with the actions of the Military Governments and the Allied

High Commission in conjunction with the German efforts to organise national sport associations which the occupation powers recognised.

The emergence of the Cold War and the deepening rift among the Allies over

240 Germany contributed to the shifting of opinion within the international sport community over

German membership. The international federations and the International Olympic

Committee largely prevented rather than encouraged a return of Germany until a change in international politics forced sport organisations to adopt the position of the three western

Allies, in particular that of the United States and Great Britain. Only when the Cold War was on the verge of exploding into a multitude of problems within international sport did the

International Olympic Committee, international sport federations, and the Allied High

Commission consent to German reentry with the individuals, put forward by the Germans themselves, who had ties to Imperial German and Third Reich sport. Germany’s exclusion after the Second World War from the traditional realm of international relations via politics and governments did not remove all relations between Germany and other states. Instead,

Germans had to look to alternative areas to reestablish relationships with other countries, and national sentiments among the Allies and across Europe played a significant role in the return of the Federal Republic of Germany into international sport.

* * *

The Dominant Sports: Football and Athletics

All of the international sport federations excluded Germany after 1945, but each federation set its own terms for Germany’s return. Nonetheless, a general pattern emerged as a result of the interconnectedness of the international sport officials. The men who constituted each country’s national Olympic committee in general led the national sport federations, and they also represented the country within the international federations. These same men also comprised the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This small group of

241 sportsmen therefore confronted the German issue in more than one organisation through their multiple leadership positions. The representatives of international sport federations worked in the interest of each of their own country’s sportsmen, and they recognised their governments’ positions with respect to Germany and international sport, often acting in conjunction with those wishes. As the international enemy of the western democracies shifted from Germany to the Soviet Union, the international sport community viewed the return of (West) Germany to its membership as a bulwark to the communist influences and proposals raised by the members of the communist European states. Even though the international sport officials continued to espouse the rhetoric that politics and sport were wholly separate from one another, similar decisions in the two biggest international federations, for football and track and field, demonstrate that these political issues directly influenced the decisions taken within the international sport federations.

While not unique in its involvement in German sport, Military Government influence on German football was greater than in other sports. The ease with which football could be played in the difficult immediate postwar period, the prominent role of the sport within

German society, and its importance in Great Britain all combined to make football the logical choice for Germany’s first international sporting contacts, either officially or via youth exchanges. To further the democratising benefits of international contacts, the occupation powers assisted Germany in participating in other international sporting events and, ultimately, with regaining membership in the international federations. After the fallout from the October 1948 German-Swiss football matches organised by the American Military

Government, FIFA returned to the issue of German recognition in the spring of 1949.

242 Although only a working committee for football existed in Germany and Directive 23

still prevented national organisations from forming, the Germans nonetheless attempted to

return to international competition. In February 1949 Peter J. “Peco” Bauwens, a former

player and international referee and the chairman of the new German Football Committee

(Deutscher Fussball Ausschuss, DFA), requested that FIFA permit German club teams to

play against teams from other countries. Bauwens argued that the International Ice Hockey

Federation had recently passed a similar resolution, which allowed each national federation to

decide whether it wanted to permit games between its member clubs and German teams.12

Introduced by the Swedish member of the ice hockey federation, this proposal reinforced the

former neutral state’s commitment to helping Germany return to the international community.

Similarly to the Swiss football federation’s interest in resuming relations with Germany, the

Swedes also viewed Germany as a natural athletic rival due to the close proximity of the two

countries to one another. Furthermore, Sweden and Germany continued to compete in

sporting contests through the first half of the Second World War, with their last football

match on 20 September 1942 in the Olympic Stadium in Berlin.13 After receiving Bauwens’

request, the FIFA Executive Committee passed a comparable resolution to the International

Ice Hockey Federation.14 This change in international football policy enabled the games

arranged by the British Military Government between BSV 92 and British, Danish, and

12Letter, P.J. Bauwens to Dr. Ivo A. Schricker, 18 February 1949, Correspondence with National Associations GER 1938-1950, FIFA; Proces-Verbal du XXXIIIe Congres de la Ligue Internationale de Hockey sur Glace, 11-20 February 1949, IIHF Minutes, 1949-1951, International Ice Hockey Federation, Zurich, Switzerland. 13Tomas Glanell, 100 år : Svenska fotbollförbundets jubileumsbok 1904-2004 (Vällingby, Sweden: Stroemberg Media Group, 2004), 142. 14FIFA Minutes, Meeting of the Executive Committee, 6 May 1949, Executive Committee Meeting Agenda Minutes, 1947-1950, FIFA.

243 Swedish teams to take place in late 1949 and early 1950.15

During the summer of 1949, as the plans for the election of the Bundestag and the

establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany were underway, Bauwens and the rest of

the German Football Committee executive prepared to transform the working committee into

an official national federation. The committee planned the founding festivities for the

German Football Federation (Deutscher Fussball Bund) in conjunction with the German

football championship game in July 1949. The American Military Government in

Wuerttemberg-Baden had already offered its full cooperation in helping the working

committee become a member of FIFA. Military Government officer Leon Shelnutt wrote to

the German Football Committee that “inasmuch as these efforts are directly in line with our

efforts to re-establish competition between German sports men and those of other countries,

we would like to offer our full cooperation to your organization in this matter.”16 In fact, the

football committee had just obtained a significant advantage in its quest for full recognition

by both FIFA and the Allies when it convinced Kurt Schaffner to resign his position as

Technical Advisor for sport to the American Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden

and become the General Secretary of the German Football Committee.17 Schaffner had

worked as a German civilian for the Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden for over

two years and played an integral role in organising the October 1948 German-Swiss

15Monthly Report - May 1949, Youth Section, British Troops Berlin, 1 June 1949, FO 1050/1089, NA; Monthly Report - January 1950, Youth Section, British Troops Berlin, 28 January 1950, FO 1050/1090, NA. 16Letter, Leon Shelnutt to Kurt Schaffner, 26 May 1949, Box 964, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 17Leon A. Shelnutt, Group Activities Branch Report, 10 May 1949, Box 961, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

244 matches.18 Schaffner’s intimate knowledge of how the American Military Government

functioned enabled him to navigate the football committee through its transformation into the

German Football Federation concurrently in the summer of 1949 with the new Federal

Government and state.

The German football leaders appreciated the support that the Swiss had provided

during the occupation, both directly to the Germans and within FIFA, and included the Swiss

Football and Athletics Federation (Schweizerischer Fussball- und Athletikverband) to

participate in the celebrations. SFAV President Ernst Thommen, Vice President Gustav

Wiederkehr, and General Secretary Dr. Helmut Käser travelled to Stuttgart to attend the

founding festivities of the new football federation on 9-10 July, one month before the

Bundestag elections. The events included the German championship game, several banquets

and receptions, and the official proclamation by the committee to become the German

Football Federation.19 Thommen and Käser thanked Bauwens for the invitation to participate

in the founding of the German Football Federation, writing afterwards that “it made us

extraordinarily happy that we can resume contact with the old friends of the DFB and to have

new colleagues to get to know in your association.”20

The western Allies largely believed that the football federation’s proclamation was

18Letter, Leon A. Shelnutt to Dr. Norrie, 29 April 1947, Box 149, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records re the Work of the Youth Activities Section, RG 260, NARA; Letter, Aksel Nielsen to Kurt Schaffner, 26 November 1948, Box 973, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Youth Activities Section: Corresp & Related Recs, 1947-49, RG 260, NARA. 19Letter, Ernst Thommen and Helmut Käser to Stuttgart Oberbürgermeister Dr. Klett,19 July 1949, F.I.F.A. Wiederaufnahme Deutschland, SFV. 20Letter, Ernst Thommen and Helmut Käser to P. Bauwens, 19 July 1949, F.I.F.A. Wiederaufnahme Deutschland, SFV.

245 premature and that these changes should wait until after the formation of the Federal

Republic. Shelnutt, who had worked with many of the sport organisations in the

Wuerttemberg-Baden, attended the event celebrating the founding of the German Football

Federation and believed that the Military Government “should recognize the organization and

help them while they are forming. It is only a matter of weeks, or perhaps a few months,

before we will be working with them as an organization anyway.”21 Shelnutt’s superiors,

however, were not as receptive regarding this proposition, or even with the change from a

working committee to an official association. The British, French, and the Americans (albeit

somewhat reluctantly on the latter’s part) issued an order preventing the committee from

using the Deutscher Fussball Bund name until after the formation of the Federal Republic of

Germany, reminding the football leaders that Directive 23 still remained in effect. The

occupation powers also reiterated the Bad Schwalbach agreement, in particular that any

national sport organisation which ultimately is permitted to form must adhere to democratic

principles.22

The circumstances which had justified exclusion from FIFA in 1946 no longer existed

by the end of 1949, and the Germans, with the assistance of the Swiss, argued for FIFA to

change its position regarding Germany. After the establishment of the West German state,

the German Football Federation received a license to exist from the three occupation powers

21Leon A. Shelnutt, Community Education Branch Report, 9-10 July 1949, Box 960, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 22Leon A. Shelnutt, Community Education Branch Report, 2 August 1949, Box 960, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA; Letter, J. Pixley to C. Jones, 19 August 1949, Box 115, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA.

246 on 22 October 1949 and recognition as a corporate body on 21 January 1950.23 The Swiss

Football and Athletics Federation again requested that FIFA normalise relations with

Germany and readmit the Federal Republic of Germany. The Swiss acknowledged that since

the October 1948 games their member clubs had abided by the prohibition of matches against

Germany. They argued that a year later there had been profound changes in the status of the

occupation of Germany, with the Allies conferring on Germany “an official character”

through the election of a German government and the resumption of foreign governmental

representation in Bonn.24

The German Football Federation itself had informed FIFA of its formal reconstitution from the working party and hoped for recognition at the 1950 FIFA Congress in Rio de

Janeiro.25 Prior to the full Congress Bauwens informed the FIFA Executive Committee at its

March 1950 meeting of the status of football in Germany, providing assurances that the occupation powers recognised the new German football association.26 At the Rio de Janeiro

Congress in June the Swiss again introduced a proposal for the readmission of Germany,

citing the democratic reorganisation of the German federation and its licensing as a corporate

body.27 Furthermore, the Swiss proposal emphasised that the rationale for excluding

Germany after the war – in particular on grounds that no governing organisation existed –

23FIFA Minutes of the XXVIIth Congress, 22-23 June 1950, 25th - 27th Ordinary Congress, 1946- 1952 Activity Report Minutes, FIFA. 24Letter, Ernst Thommen and Helmut Käser to Comité exécutif de la FIFA, 19 November 1949, F.I.F.A. Wiederaufnahme Deutschland, SFV. 25Letter, Deutsche Fussball Bund to FIFA, 16 November 1949, Correspondence with National Associations GER 1938-1950, FIFA. 26Minutes, FIFA Executive Committee Meeting, 18 March 1950, Executive Committee Meeting Agenda Minutes, 1947-1950, FIFA. 27Minutes of the Twenty-Seventh FIFA Congress, Rio de Janeiro, 22-23 June 1950, FA Minutes 1950- 51, FA.

247 was no longer applicable since the reconstitution of the German Football Federation.28 The

Israeli member still expressed reservations regarding West Germany’s membership by

pointing to the continued division of the country, but the pro-Germany members reminded

the full Congress that they had already agreed in London in 1948 to grant the Executive

Committee the full power to make a decision in the interest of the federation.29 Once the full

Congress empowered the Executive Committee to make the decision, Germany’s acceptance

was practically guaranteed because members from the three western Allies and Switzerland

usually comprised a majority of the Executive Committee when it met. The German

federation made a formal request on 31 August 1950 for reaffiliation based on the FIFA

statutes, and the Executive Committee finally approved (West) Germany as a full member of

FIFA at its meeting the following month.30

As was the case within FIFA, backlash at German participation pervaded other international sport organisations when they held their first postwar meetings. The

International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), the other most powerful international federation along with the football federation, was particularly strict in its exclusion of

28Appendix to the Agenda of the XXVII Congress of the F.I.F.A., 22-23 June 1950, 25th - 27th Ordinary Congress, 1946-1952 Activity Report Minutes, FIFA. 29FIFA Minutes of the XXVIIth Congress, 22-23 June 1950, 25th - 27th Ordinary Congress, 1946- 1952 Activity Report Minutes, FIFA. 30The Executive Committee first approved West Germany’s return during its 28 June 1950 meeting following the full FIFA Congress. A misunderstanding regarding Germany’s reaffiliation between FIFA President Jules Rimet and Swiss Executive Committee member (and Swiss Football and Athletics Federation President) Ernst Thommen arose because the proposal in Rio de Janeiro came from the Swiss and not the Germans themselves. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association General Secretary then asked Bauwens to submit a formal request from the Deutscher Fussball Bund to FIFA, which the Executive Committee approved in September 1950. Letter, Dr. I. Schricker to Jules Rimet, 16 August 1950, Membres du Comité Exécutif -- Dossiers individuels -- M. Jules Rimet Correspondance 1.1.1950, FIFA; Letter, Deutscher Fussball- Bund to Dr. I. Schricker, 31 August 1950, Correspondence with National Associations GER 1938-1950, FIFA; Minutes, FIFA Executive Committee Meeting, 23 September 1950, Executive Committee Meeting Agenda Minutes, 1947-1950, FIFA.

248 Germany. When the question of Germany and Japan’s status arose in 1946 at its first postwar

Congress, IAAF President J. Sigfrid Edström reminded the Congress that it should refrain

from political discussions but that Germany and Japan were not included on the membership

list.31 The former (Nazi) German federation, the Track and Field Division of the National

Socialist Reich Association for Physical Exercise (Nationalsozialistischer Reichsbund für

Leibesübungen Fachamt Leichtathletik) no longer existed; thus, Germany was not a current

member of the IAAF.32 With the creation in 1947 of the German Track and Field Committee

(Deutscher Leichtathletik-Ausschuss, DLA), its leaders attempted to gain Germany’s

reaffiliation with the international federation.

Lord David Burghley, the British member who succeeded Edström as President of the

International Amateur Athletic Federation, shared his government’s (and Philip Noel-

Baker’s) sentiment of wanting to bring Germany back into the community of nations.

However, with Lord Burghley’s position as IAAF President and as a member of the

International Olympic Committee, he also recognised that not every country felt similarly

regarding Germany. Lord Burghley informed Walther von Adelson, First Chairman of the

German Track and Field Committee, of his interest in the committee’s efforts to resume

athletics in Germany “on a reformed basis.”33 Lord Burghley also wrote that he would

express the organisation’s desire to reaffiliate to the rest of the International Amateur Athletic

31Minutes, Fifteenth Congress, the International Amateur Athletic Federation, 21 and 26 August 1946, International Amateur Athletic Federation 1940-47, Box 207, Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois Archives, Champaign, IL. Hereafter cited ABC. 32Letter, E.J.H. Holt to Max Danz, 19 April 1950, Germany, International Association of Athletics Federations, Monaco. Hereafter cited IAAF. In 2001 the IAAF changed its name from the International Amateur Athletic Federation to the International Association of Athletics Federations. 33Letter, Lord Burghley to Walther von Adleson [sic], 8 June 1947, Germany, IAAF.

249 Federation Council.

Although Lord Burghley supported the German efforts to return to the International

Amateur Athletic Federation, international support was not as forthcoming. In response,

Avery Brundage, the American Vice President of both the IAAF and the International

Olympic Committee, wrote to von Adelson that “unfortunately, some individuals and perhaps

some countries are not educated to the point where they can appreciate Olympic ideals. It is

therefore possible to do harm to the cause by untimely application of our principles in a world

seemingly ruled by force.”34 Although Brundage’s support of German participation in

international sport never waned, he recognised in 1947 that the potential backlash with

German membership might provide more harm than goodwill so soon after the war.

Undeterred, von Adelson continued his correspondence with Lord Burghley and the IAAF’s

British Secretary-Treasurer, E. J. Holt. Von Adelson provided the necessary materials

leading to a formal membership application for the International Amateur Athletic Federation

to consider at its Congress following the London Olympics.35 Shortly before the London

Olympic Games and IAAF Congress, Lord Burghley informed von Adelson that “it is

doubtful if we will get a definite decision on the re-entry of German athletes into the

International Committee at the meeting of the International Amateur Athletic Federation on

this occasion.”36 Lord Burghley was primarily concerned that the division of Germany and

the inability of the German associations to organise across the zones would prompt the

34Letter, Avery Brundage to Walther von Adelson, 26 July 1947, Binder 1, Deutsche Leichtathletik Verband, Darmstadt, Germany. Hereafter cited DLV. 35Letter, Walther von Adelson to E.J.H. Holt, 7 May 1948, Germany, IAAF. 36Letter, Lord Burghley to Walther von Adelson, 18 June 1948, Germany, IAAF.

250 Congress to vote down German membership.37

On the same day that Lord Burghley sent this letter to von Adelson, the western Allies announced the currency reform; within a week the Berlin Blockade began, and the escalating tensions between the three western Allies and the Soviets began to pervade the international federations. With the division of Germany beginning to appear more permanent, the

International Amateur Athletic Federation was concerned that Germans in the eastern zone might be excluded from participation with the (western) German Track and Field Committee.

The prevailing sentiment among the International Olympic Committee (discussed later in this chapter) likely influenced Lord Burghley’s change of opinion, as did the prominence of the

Landessportbund-Fachverband debate among German sportsmen. By mid-1948 the debate surrounding the structural organisation of German sport dominated the sport discussions, and it was unclear which structure would ultimately prevail within Germany. The Military

Governments, although attempting to remain uninvolved, nonetheless reiterated that

Directive 23 prevented the creation of all-German organisations – a point Lord Burghley’s contacts in the British government and Foreign Office surely impressed upon him.

Unlike Swiss efforts within FIFA, no national federation pressed for German reacceptance into the International Amateur Athletic Federation. Because of the nature of track and field as a competition among individuals rather than as between two teams,

Germany’s return was less pressing to the other states in the international track and field community as compared to the natural rivalry between neighbouring areas or states created by a team sport such as football. The German Track and Field Committee therefore only

37Letter, Lord Burghley to Walther von Adelson, 18 June 1948, Germany, IAAF.

251 became the German Track and Field Federation (Deutscher Leichtathletik-Verband) after the

founding of the Federal Republic, on 12-13 November 1949 in Munich with Max Danz as

President.38 The IAAF Council met later that month in Paris, but the new national track and field body had not officially contacted the international federation. Instead, the International

Amateur Athletic Federation had received a letter from the International Olympic Committee

“recommending to International Federations of Sport that the respective national associations of Germany and Japan should be re-elected to membership.” The IAAF, however, merely laid the International Olympic Committee’s letter on the table as it had not yet received a formal application from the German federation.39

West Germany ultimately resumed its membership as a result of its own efforts and

not the actions of another member federation. The International Amateur Athletic Federation

only considered Germany’s membership after the German federation submitted a formal

request for affiliation with the appropriate forms in July 1950.40 When the Council met on 21

August 1950, it recommended that the entire Congress approve the German federation.41 The

International Amateur Athletic Federation approved Germany with a vote of 39 members in

favour and 10 opposed; the only countries which voted against Germany’s reaffiliation with

the IAAF were Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Israel, Rumania, and the Soviet Union.42 The

European communist states, all following Moscow’s lead, voted against (West) Germany’s

38Gründungsversammlung des Deutschen Leichtathletikverbandes, 12 November 1949, Binder 4, DLV. 39Minutes, IAAF Council, 27 November 1949, Council 1945-1955, IAAF. 40Letter, E.J.H. Holt to Max Danz, 21 July 1950, Germany, IAAF. 41Minutes, IAAF Council, 14 August 1950, International Amateur Athletic Federation 1950, Box 208, ABC; Minutes, Seventeenth Congress, IAAF, 23-27 August 1950, International Amateur Athletic Federation 1950, Box 208, ABC. 42Yugoslavia was the one communist country that voted for Germany’s acceptance. IAAF Memorandum, 18 October 1950, International Amateur Athletic Federation 1950, Box 208, ABC.

252 acceptance because of their support of East Germany, which was not yet a member of any international sport federation. Although the German Track and Field Federation returned to the IAAF through its own efforts, the Anglo-American leadership of the International

Amateur Athletic Federation ensured that the organisation’s actions implicitly supported the position of the western occupation powers.

The new West German national federations for football and track and field received differing levels of support from members of friendly states within those international federations. The endorsement of the Swiss in FIFA and Lord Burghley in the IAAF facilitated the recognition of West Germany. Particularly in the case of football, Germany resumed international competition through the direct intervention of the occupation powers and a third party (Switzerland) interested in the rehabilitation of Germany. While the western

Allied concern with sport officials fell under the larger goal of ensuring that the youth leaders within Germany developed democratic ideas and instituted them within their organisations, the Military Governments recognised the importance of Germany’s participation in international sporting events. This support, from the western Allies and Switzerland as well as within the international sport federations, helped the German football and track and field leaders achieve their goal of international recognition.

* * *

Belgian Backlash

These debates over German recognition were replicated in all of the international federations, not just the two dominant federations within the international sport community.

All international sport federations, for team and individual sports, and winter and summer

253 sports, addressed the issue of German participation and recognition in the years immediately after the war and again following the creation of the Federal Republic. Within some of the federations where smaller states played a more influential role, particularly in those sports where the western Allies were not as dominant, the attitudes of countries with a different wartime and postwar relationship with Germany could play a greater role in influencing the

Federal Republic’s path to recognition. Belgian delegates held several leadership positions within international federations in disproportion to the size of their country, and they were some of the most vocal opponents to German recognition. While delegates from Belgium and other states occupied by Nazi Germany could hinder the Federal Republic’s attempts for reacceptance within international federations, the growing Cold War ultimately overrode these objections and enabled West Germany to participate fully in international sport.

As the Alpine region of Germany fell largely within the American zone of occupation, the American Military Government and American representatives in international sport supported a return of German athletes to winter sport. Hanns Kilian, a German bobsled medal-winner in St. Moritz (1928) and Lake Placid (1932) and top-five finisher in Garmisch-

Partenkirchen (1936), received an invitation to lead a German team in the bobsled events at the 1949 North American and World Championships in Lake Placid. The American organisers fully approved of German participation in these events.43 The American Military

Government granted the travel permit to Kilian and his bobsled team because German participation would help improve relations among Germans, Americans, and the wider international community with the sense of sportsmanship that international sport

43Letter, Daniel J. Ferris to Hanns Kilian, 17 November 1948, Film 13, CULDA.

254 competitions generate among both participants and fans.

Although the Americans supported German participation, the International Federation of Bobsledding and Tobogganing (Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobaganning) had not discussed Germany’s readmission, and they forced the Germany’s invitation to be rescinded. The President of the international federation, Count Renaud de la Frégeolière of

France, requested that the American organisers of the World Championships withdraw the

German team because of protests from the Belgian and Swiss representatives.44 The Swiss member of the federation, Albert Mayer, was also a member of the International Olympic

Committee, and he supported the official position taken by the International Olympic

Committee that Germany could only participate once a formal state existed with legally recognised national organisations.45 Furthermore, Mayer would have known about the penalties imposed one week earlier by the Swiss Football and Athletics Federation and FIFA on the Swiss organisers of the October 1948 football matches.

The American organisers maintained their support of the German invitation for both the athletic and personal developmental benefit of the Germans. The organisers stated that even if Germany could not participate in the World Championships, its bobsled teams could still compete in the North American Championships. They hoped “to bring the athletes of all countries together in this and other world championships, irrespective of what has occured

[sic] in the past, in the hope that the youth of the world, through the comradeship of sports,

44“Bob Races Face Tough Sledding as Rift Occurs Over Germans,” Lake Placid News, 31 December 1948, 1. 45Letter, Otto Mayer to R.W. Seeldrayers, 14 March 1949, Seeldrayers, Rodolphe William / Correspondance, 1946-1946, IOC.

255 will see to it that the world can live and play together, in peace.”46 Kilian ultimately chose not to bring his bobsled team to the United States, fearing a cold reception and the possible inability to compete after travelling at great cost. Kilian publicly announced: “I did not wish to create any more difficulties for my American sports friends. With the money they would have contributed to our trip I suggest that my American friends buy CARE parcels for needy

Germans here.”47 Nonetheless, the support from American sportsmen and other German-

Americans in raising funds to pay the costs of German participation demonstrated the possible benefit of the German sport exchanges.

For a sport such as bobsled in which the number of countries capable of competing at the highest level is small, its international federation could not afford to continue the exclusion of one of its traditionally strongest member countries. In addition, only a handful of bobsled tracks existed in the world, and the inability to use one of them for international competitions also hurt the sport. After the difficulties with German participation at the 1949

Lake Placid events, the International Federation of Bobsledding and Tobogganing recognised the necessity of having Germany return as an official member. One month after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the leading members of the German bobsled community founded the German Bobsled and Toboggan Federation (Deutscher Bob- und Schlittensport

Verband) on 25 October 1949.48 With a short competitive season because of the sport’s

46“Bob Races Face Tough Sledding as Rift Occurs Over Germans,” Lake Placid News, 31 December 1948, 1. 47Kilian’s decision was reported as a result of the problems associated with the visits of the German muscicians Walter Gieseking and Wilhelm Fuertwengler. “Kilian of Germany Rejects Race Here,” New York Times, 31 January 1949, 24. 48Karl Zobel, 75 Jahre Deutscher Bob- und Schlittensport Verband (Berchtesgaden: Deutscher Bob- und Schlittenverband, 1986), 5.

256 dependence on cold weather, it was imperative that the Germans create the bobsled

federation immediately and not lose another year of international competition. The

international federation approved Germany’s application at its 1950 Congress at Cortina

d’Ampezzo in Italy. Of the nine member states present, only Belgium voted against

Germany’s reaffiliation. Count de la Frégeolière replied to the Belgian member’s opposition

of Germany’s affiliation that only he, the Belgian member, supported that view and that the

motion had passed.49

In fact, Belgian members of international federations and the International Olympic

Committee were some of the most ardent protestors of German reentry into the international

sport community. Belgium had tried to overcome its own bilingual differences through

national organisations and government policies which preferenced neither Flemings nor

Walloons. Once Germany occupied Belgium, however, the Flemish sport associations

bolstered their claims of being “Aryan” in contrast to the older national sport organisations

which they claimed were Belgian and Jewish.50 Because of the German support of Flemish

nationalism during the occupation of Belgium, the leaders of Belgian national sport

federations resented the German attempts to divide and suppress their organisations. After

the war the national, unitarian federations could claim a patriotic reputation as having

attempted to protect Belgian sport.51 In addition to espousing the general Belgian opinion in

sport regarding Germany, the Belgian member of the International Federation of Bobsledding

49The countries voting in favor of Germany’s return were England, Austria, Argentina, the United States, France, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland. Proces-Verbal, 1950 FIBT Congress, 4 February 1950, Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobaganning, Milan, Italy. 50Roland Renson and Pascal Delheye, “War Games: Sport During the German Occupation of Belgium (1940-1944),” Stadion 26, no. 2 (2000), 253. 51Ibid., 263.

257 and Tobogganing had been a second Lieutenant and the first Belgian volunteer of the war to

obtain certification as a paratrooper in England, which also contributed to his position on

German recognition.52

Several of Belgium’s leading sport figures held prominent positions within the

International Olympic Committee and many international federations, and these men

transferred their national sentiments to the international sport world. Rodolphe W.

Seeldrayers was the former president of the Belgian Football Association and a current vice

president of FIFA, the Belgian Olympic Committee, and the IOC. Paul Loicq was vice

president of the Belgian Olympic Committee and president of the International Hockey

Federation. Paul Anspach was president of the International Fencing Federation, René de

Raeve was president of the International Swimming Federation, and Alban Collignon

finished his term as president of the International Cycling Federation in 1947.53 Although

International Olympic Committee and FIFA Executive Committee member Seeldrayers may

have been sympathetic toward his German colleagues from before the war in the international

organisations, he recognised the difficulty that German participation in sporting events in

states occupied during the war would arise.54

Whereas Belgian and Dutch members of international federations often supported the

continued exclusion of Germany, the International Fencing Federation (Fédération

Internationale d’Escrime, FIE), led by the Belgian Anspach, did not face as many problems as

52Roland Renson, Enflammé par l’Olympisme... Cent ans de Comité Olympique et Interfédéral Belge 1906 -2006 (Roeselare, Belgium: Roularta Books, 2006), 104. 53Renson and Delheye, 249-50. 54Letter, R.W. Seeldrayers to J. Sigfrid Edström, 12 May 1949, D1 IOC vol 63, J. Sigfrid Edström papers, Riksarkivet, Stockholm, Sweden.

258 some of the other federations because of the ban on fencing in Germany. Nonetheless, at its

first postwar Congress in November 1946, the International Fencing Federation unanimously

voted to exclude Germany and Japan “for reasons of humanity above the statutes.”55 Paul

Anspach had been president of the international federation since 1932; however, in August

1940 the Gestapo removed all of the files of the organisation from Belgium and transferred

them to Berlin. After the success of the 1936 Olympic Games, the Nazi leadership wanted

the control of all international federations and Germany to be the permanent host of the

Olympic Games. With the occupation of Belgium and German intelligence leader Reinhard

Heydrich’s interest in fencing, Nazi Germany came closest in this quest with fencing.

Heydrich gained control of the German Fencing Federation and attempted to draft all of the

best German fencing into the SS.56 The International Fencing Federation, however,

considered itself suspended as of September 1939 until the end of the war and was therefore

in no hurry to consider Germany’s return.

Whereas other international federations supported the practise of their sport within

Germany (but not the participation of Germany in international competition), the fencing

federation believed its own organisational expulsion of Germany meant that it could not

interfere with the Allied decision to include a ban of fencing within Directive 23. The

International Fencing Federation noted at its 1946 Congress that the Allies prohibited fencing

because they considered it a form of military preparation. The International Fencing

55Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXVIIme CONGRÉS, 8 November 1946, Fédération Internationale d’Escrime, Lausanne, Switzerland. Hereafter cited FIE. 56Letter, Dernell Every to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 18 July 1949, Box 6757, 1945- 1949/862.406, RG 59, NARA; Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXVIIme CONGRÉS, 8 November 1946, FIE.

259 Federation therefore agreed that it “should not intervene in this question.”57 While the status of the German Fencing Federation was in limbo in 1949-50, the international federation permitted a gentlemen’s agreement regarding competitions with Germans. Competitions with German fencers could be of “a private character,” but Germans could not participate in official tournaments.58 By the time that the Allied High Commission approved the German

Fencing Federation in March 1950, the German request for reaffiliation could not occur until the international federation’s 1951 Congress.

The International Fencing Federation voted to recognise West Germany provisionally, but with two countries protesting for very different reasons. The Belgian member objected to the admission of Germany because of the Nazi wartime occupation of Belgium. Paul

Anspach was no longer in charge of the International Fencing Federation, as the Frenchman

Jacques Coutrot had assumed the presidency in 1949. One of Belgium’s other members, however, raised the issue of Heydrich’s control of fencing in Nazi Germany and the continued presence in German sport of leaders tainted by their affiliations during the Third

Reich. He also argued that it would cause moral anguish, particularly for the victims of

German atrocities, to have to maintain sport relations with those people who might be the perpetrators responsible for those atrocities.59 The Polish representative concurred, questioning if these former SS and fascists really had changed. The Polish member further

57Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXVIIme CONGRÉS, 8 November 1946, FIE Procès-Verbal 1946, FIE. 58Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXXIIe CONGRÉS, 6-7 April 1951, FIE Procès-Verbal 1951, FIE; Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXXIIIe CONGRÉS, 28 March 1952, FIE Procès-Verbal 1952, FIE. 59Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXXIIe CONGRÉS, 6-7 April 1951, FIE Procès-Verbal 1951, FIE.

260 argued that only under the pretext of procedure was the international federation not

discussing the request of the East German fencing federation, claiming that because the letter

requesting East German recognition arrived only two weeks and not two months before the

Congress was it not being addressed. If the International Fencing Federation did not want to

engage in politics, he considered it unacceptable for them “to discuss the issue of the

admission of West Germany without discussing the request for the admission of the German

Democratic Republic.”60 Without the Soviet Union as a member of the International Fencing

Federation, Poland assumed the role normally taken by the Soviets, who had only recently begun to join the international sport federations.61

The International Fencing Federation voted to maintain the provisional status of West

Germany, permitting Germany to participate in club matches but not international

tournaments. The international federation also agreed to revisit the issue in full at its 1952

Congress in order to consider the decision taken by the International Olympic Committee

regarding Germany at its 1951 meeting.62 One year later, after the International Olympic

Committee had accepted (West) Germany, the International Fencing Federation voted

overwhelmingly in favour of the affiliation of the (West) German federation. Poland’s

representative again pushed for East German recognition, but the international federation

60Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXXIIe CONGRÉS, 6-7 April 1951, FIE Procès-Verbal 1951, FIE. 61Following the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union withdrew from all international federations and the International Olympic Committee. While some sport federations made overtures to the Soviet Union in the interwar period, the country did not join the international sport movement until the late 1940s and early 1950s. The USSR sent observers to the London Olympic Games, but the Soviet Union’s first participation came in 1952 at the Summer Games in Helsinki. Keys, 158-80; Senn, 84-95. 62 Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXXIIe CONGRÉS, 6-7 April 1951, FIE Procès-Verbal 1951, FIE.

261 voted down his proposal with a similar result as the vote for recognising West Germany.63

The longer that international federations waited to reaccept Germany into their membership, such as the case of the fencing federation, the more that the Cold War intruded into the discussion. A few representatives, often Belgian, continued to argue that German wartime aggression remained too bitter and recent of an experience within their countries to welcome Germany back into the international community. By the creation of the Federal

Republic of Germany in 1949, however, the sentiment which international sport accepted unanimously in 1945-46 no longer prevailed as the majority opinion. Although these sportsmen believed sport remained above politics, delays in readmitting (West) Germany provided greater opportunities for the European communist states to introduce the Cold War into sport.

By the summer of 1950 many international federations had reaccepted Germany back into their membership, and the other federations were on the verge of following suit.

Germany achieved full recognition from international federations as a result of the positive sporting contacts established with the help of the Military Governments. When the Allied sport officers met with the German sport officials at Bad Schwalbach in July 1949, they agreed that the Allied High Commission would still approve all national sport federations.64

As the previous chapter demonstrated, the highest tripartite officials were primarily

concerned with fencing and Turnen when Germans formed national sport governing bodies.

Aside from concerns over the formation of national sport federations before the creation of

63Procès-Verbal extrait du Compte-rendu Sténographique du XXXIIIe CONGRÉS, 28 March 1952, FIE Procès-Verbal 1952, FIE. 64Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA.

262 the Federal Republic of Germany, this aloofness regarding the other sports was evident within the international federations. On the whole, they acknowledged the lack of a German government in the immediate aftermath of the war but did not have any significant discussions of Allied policies. Fencing was the noticeable exception, not only regarding

Allied involvement but also with the international federation’s discussion of the quadripartite ban on fencing less than a year after Directive 23 went into effect. It was ultimately the

German national sport federations and the efforts of their leaders that achieved recognition by the international federations. Nonetheless, the support of the three western occupation powers, whose representatives often dominated the international federations, facilitated the work for the majority of sports within Germany. The leading positions within the international federations held by the Americans, British, and French ensured that Germany’s return to international sport after 1949 overrode other international concerns, such as the memory of the brutal German occupation. The increasing tensions of the Cold War solidified the western Allied support, among both the politicians and sports leaders, of German reentry into international sport.

* * *

Founding a National Olympic Committee

In addition to national federations forming for individual sport, Germans also worked to form a National Olympic Committee (Nationales Olympisches Komitee, NOK) in order to join the International Olympic Committee and participate in the Olympic Games. The

Landessportbund-Fachverband debate not only affected the regional structure of sport organisations, but the same sport leaders also fought over the structure and control of sport at

263 the national level. The leaders of the new postwar Landessportbund structure fought for control over German sport with the denazified German sport leaders who had maintained earlier connections with international federation members. In addition to the infighting amongst German sport leaders, the attempts to form a National Olympic Committee had to contend with the Military Governments (and Directive 23) as well as the International

Olympic Committee. Although the choice for the structure and leadership of a national sport organisation to arrange German participation in the Olympic Games was left to the Germans, the international sport community ultimately favoured those leaders with whom it had previous, prewar relationships. These international connections provided the means necessary for a select group of Germans to secure control of the new National Olympic

Committee.

The Nazis had attempted to gain as much control over the National Olympic

Committee as possible during the Third Reich. The International Olympic Committee awarded the 1936 Olympic Games to Germany in 1931, and control of the preparations remained with the National Olympic Committee and the organising committees in Berlin and

Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Theodor Lewald, one of Germany’s three International Olympic

Committee members and president of the National Olympic Committee since 1919, also became the president of the organising committee for the Olympics once Germany won the right to host the Games in 1931.65 Initially the Nazi press derided the Olympics as “Jewish international enterprises,” and when Hitler assumed power in 1933 he did not approve of

65“Germany and Olympism: From its Origin to 1945,” Olympic Review no. 93-94 (July-August 1975), 288.

264 hosting the Olympics in Germany. Only after he realised the propaganda opportunities that the Olympics would provide Germany did the Third Reich provide its full support.66

The Nazis gained more influence within the German Olympic Committee as

Reichsportführer Hans von Tschammer und Osten became more heavily involved in the

Olympic preparations. The Nazis attempted to replace Lewald as the leader of the organising committee with Tschammer und Osten because one of Lewald’s grandparents had been

Jewish. However, international threats that the Games would be transferred from Germany if

Lewald was removed enabled him to remain in control of the preparations.67 The Nazis were successful at replacing Lewald as President of the National Olympic Committee with the

Reichsportführer in 1934, a position Tschammer und Osten maintained until his death in

1943. The Nazis could achieve this personnel change without raising international ire because the composition of a National Olympic Committee was a purely domestic affair.

After Tschammer und Osten’s death Arno Breitmeyer held the position until 1944, when Karl

Ritter von Halt, another of Germany’s International Olympic Committee members, assumed the presidency from 1944 until the end of the war. In addition, after the furor of the Olympic

Games had faded, Lewald resigned his position on the International Olympic Committee in

1938. With a seat open for a third German member, the vacancy was filled by General (later

Field Marshall) Walter von Reichenau.68 What was left of the German National Olympic

66Keys, 136-7. 67Richard D. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics (New York: MacMillan, 1971), 61. 68Lewald resigned his position on the IOC Executive Committee in 1937, even though Carl Diem in particular attempted to persuade him to retain his seat in order to make it more difficult for the Nazis to force his resignation. Von Halt then replaced Lewald on the Executive Committee in 1937. Keys, 131; Karl Lennartz, “Walter von Reichenau: Officer, Sportsman, IOC Member, War Criminal,” Journal of Olympic History 14, no. 1 (March 2006), 34.

265 Committee at the end of the war ceased to exist with the forced decentralisation of Germany and the prohibition of national sport organisations.

As the occupation of Germany progressed and the new sport organisations began to press for greater control, the desire among regional German sport officials and within the general population for participation in international sport grew. The organisers of the 1948

Olympic Games in both St. Moritz and London did not invite Germany, although in the lead- up to the Games many Germans had hoped the country would be able to participate. Several

German sport officials even requested Military Government assistance in securing German participation, in particular from the British as the hosts of the Summer Games. Former

German International Olympic Committee member Theodor Lewald had survived the Second

World War and resumed his correspondence with his Olympic friends. In the spring of 1946

Lewald informed International Olympic Committee Executive Committee member and organiser of the 1948 London Olympics Lord David Burghley that Carl Diem wanted to summon the German Olympic Committee and reconstitute it as soon as the conditions in

Germany would allow it. Lewald admitted that Germany might not be able to undertake the necessary preparations to compete in London; nonetheless, he believed it important that

London invite the Germans on principle to reaffirm the International Olympic Committee’s separation from politics and provide Germany with the right to participate. Lewald continued that “the Olympic movement could do much here for the spreading of peace in the world if it were to show the nations that without exception youth must reconcile itself again and that a holy spot exists here where reconciliation really takes place. Such a step would be

266 guaranteed world-wide applause.”69

Carl Diem called a conference of sport officials across the zones in November 1946 to

develop a basis of sport which would appeal to the western Allies so that they would consent

to the creation of a National Olympic Committee. Recognising the limitations placed by

Directive 23, Diem admitted before the meeting that the Germans needed “to think of a form

which can be used for the time until cultural German associations are again permitted.”70

Representatives from recognised sport associations in Germany attended this meeting,

organised by Diem in Frankfurt on 27-28 November 1946, and they agreed to six resolutions

on the future of German sport. The first and, what Diem believed, the most important, was

that German sport would again exude the Olympic spirit and consider the establishment of an

Olympic Committee. Secondly, German sport declared itself to be democratic, part of the

national community (Volksgemeinschaft), and also part of the international community

(Weltgemeinschaft). Until a unitary organisation could be formed to fulfill these goals, a working committee with advisory capabilities but without executive power would be formed from the representatives of the recently permitted Landessportbünde and individual personalities across the zones. The conference also affirmed that the ideals of amateurism would prevail in German sport, that sport constituted the basis for a healthy life in the schools, that sport was particularly important for youth but in a form that progressed with age, and that German sport wanted the merger of sport and Turnen methods for women’s physical exercise.71

69Letter, Theodor Lewald to Lord Burghley, 9 March 1946, Film 3, CULDA. 70Letter, Carl Diem to Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 18 October 1946, Film 18, CULDA. 71Erste Interzonen-Konferenz im Sport, Frankfurt am Main, 27-28 November 1946, Mappe 41,

267 As a result of the interest in the Frankfurt conference, Diem intended to move forward with the plans to form a National Olympic Committee for Germany and informed his international contacts on the IOC. In a letter to Avery Brundage, the American member of the International Olympic Committee’s Executive Committee, Diem wrote that since the acceptance of his proposal in Frankfurt regarding Germany’s commitment to the ideals of the

Olympic movement, preparations for the creation of a National Olympic Committee had begun. Diem believed this National Olympic Committee “will presumably be founded in

March of next year so that we can report it to the I.O.C. at its June Session.”72 Diem believed that his actions would facilitate Germany’s participation in the 1948 Games, particularly after he had read a newspaper article in which Brundage stated that Germany would not be able to participate in the Olympics until it had an National Olympic Committee. J. Sigfrid Edström,

President of the International Olympic Committee, informed Diem that he was pleased to hear of the actions of the Frankfurt conference and that the first step toward participation in the Olympics was the formation of a National Olympic Committee. However, Edström warned Diem not to get his “hopes up that these things will already be resolved in June.

Regrettably the English and Americans cannot forget the atrocities carried out by the Nazi administration, and the whole German people must bear the consequences.”73 Edström’s sentiments were more realistic than the high expectations Diem held for Germany’s immediate future in international sport.

When Diem applied to the Military Government to hold a meeting in the spring to

CULDA. 72Letter, Carl Diem to Avery Brundage, 15 December 1946, Film 2, CULDA. 73Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Carl Diem, 8 January 1947, Film 7, CULDA.

268 establish the German Olympic Committee formally, the American Military Government

rejected his request because this meeting violated Allied law and also did not have the

support of the International Olympic Committee. The Education and Religious Affairs Chief,

John W. Taylor, informed Diem that even though the American Military Government

recognised the importance of international goodwill,

it is, however, pointed out that the International Council for the Olympic Games has declared that Germany will not be invited to participate in the Olympic Games to be held in 1948 in London. It is further pointed out that there is as yet no authorization for the establishment of any voluntary organization within Germany on a national level. Therefore, this office cannot give concurrence to the formation of the proposed organization of a Council for the Olympic Games for Germany at this time. Further, participation by an all-Germany team in such an event would of necessity have to be approved by action of the Allied Control Authority rather than by a single Occupying Power.74

Taylor recognised the simple fact that Germany received no invitation to the 1948 Olympic

Games, but more importantly, he reiterated the decentralisation and prevention of interzonal

or national organisations which provided the basis of occupation policies. When leaders of

Landessportbund North Baden requested permission to attend a preliminary Olympic

Committee meeting in Frankfurt from 17-20 April 1947, the Military Government in

Wuerttemberg-Baden denied this request not because of the lack of support from the

International Olympic Committee but rather because of the prohibition of inter-Land

organisations.75

However, when phrased differently the Military Government permitted sport

74Letter, John W. Taylor to Carl Diem, 5 February 1947, Film 28, CULDA. 75Letter, OMG-WB to Landessportverband North Baden, n.d., Box 962, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

269 representatives from more than one zone to meet as long as the meeting remained “of an

informal character.”76 Although unable to hold the meeting in April as initially planned,

sport officials held an interzonal conference on 8-9 June 1947. With the International

Olympic Committee meeting scheduled for later that same month, the Germans believed they

could still receive recognition by the International Olympic Committee and an invitation to

the 1948 Games.77 Heinz Lindner, the Chairman of Landessportbund Hessen, invited several

sport leaders from the British and American zones to Frankfurt; one representative from the

French zone attended as well, with approximately 100 people present at the meeting.78 In

Frankfurt the discussion centred primarily around the formation of a preliminary Olympic

committee “to maintain connection with foreign countries with regard to sports activities.”79

Diem suggested that this preliminary Olympic committee should consist only of

members from the British zone. Although several members expressed their displeasure with

this proposal, the conference attendees nonetheless accepted it, voting Peco Bauwens to lead

the preliminary Olympic committee with two associates in North Rhine-Westphalia. The

American Military Government report on this conference presumed that Diem suggested

76Harry A. Wenn to Heinz Lindner, 14 March 1947 reproduced within Heinz Lindner to Carl Diem, 18 March 1947, Film 16, CULDA. 77Invitation to Sportkonferenz from Heinz Lindner, 1. Vorsitzender Landessportverband Hessen, 16 May 1947, Film 16, CULDA. 78The final paragraph of the report mentions a Soviet zone representative “whose name is not known, did hardly play an active part in the discussions” although no representatives from the Soviet zone are listed among the attendees at this beginning of his report. Kurt Schaffner, Interzonal Sportconference at Frankfurt, 8-9 June 1947, Box 969, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA; Carl Diem, Aktennotiz: Teilnahme an der Tagung der Sportkonferenz vom 7. u.8.Juni 1947 in Frankfurt a./M., 11 June 1947, Mappe 41, CULDA. 79Kurt Schaffner, Interzonal Sportconference at Frankfurt, 8-9 June 1947, Box 969, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA.

270 leadership by British zone representatives in order to exclude Heinrich Sorg, the Social

Democratic Party sport leader who believed Diem to be a representative of militarist sport

and openly accused Diem of such ideas.80 Prior to the Frankfurt conference, however, seven of the leading sport figures, including Carl Diem, Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg, one of the two surviving German members of the International Olympic Committee, and football leader Peco Bauwens, met to coordinate their ideas on the formation of a German Olympic

Committee.81 This pre-conference meeting agreed that the provisional Olympic committee should only contain a few members from the British zone – before they even arrived at the meeting and heard Sorg’s diatribes against Diem. This decision likely reflected the difficulties in arranging a meeting of sport officials across the zones. Having all members on a provisional committee residing in the same zone – or even Land – would therefore alleviate some of the problems creating a National Olympic Committee.

In addition, the men who met in Cologne for the pre-conference meeting agreed on the composition of the founders of the German Olympic Committee and contacted the

International Olympic Committee to facilitate recognition and participation in the 1948

Games. They agreed that the committee should have only a few members, all of whom resided in one zone (the British zone), including the German members of the International

Olympic Committee and representatives from the five most important sports (track and field, football, Turnen, rowing, and hockey). Of the seven men at this meeting, six fit these

80Other than the three members who abstained from voting, this measure passed unanimously. Kurt Schaffner, Interzonal Sportconference at Frankfurt, 8-9 June 1947, Box 969, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 81Walter von Adelson (track and field) called the meeting, which was also attended by H. Lüer (Turnen), Dr. Walter Wülfung (rowing), and Paul Reinberg (hockey). Note, 28 May 1947, Mappe 41, CULDA.

271 requirements and the seventh, Diem, hoped to fill von Reichenau’s open seat on the

International Olympic Committee. The Duke of Mecklenburg sent a letter to International

Olympic Committee President Edström following the pre-conference meeting in Cologne, announcing the formation of the German Olympic Committee and that final establishment from the other zones would occur at the Frankfurt meeting. Furthermore, the Duke of

Mecklenburg informed Edström that “should no further message have reached you by the

IOC meeting, then these lines are considered as final registration to our Olympic Committee, which will stand under my presidency.”82 The International Olympic Committee’s Executive

Committee and full membership, however, agreed to take no decision on Germany and Japan at their 1947 meeting in Stockholm. After the Stockholm meeting Edström informed the

Duke of Mecklenburg that “the Olympic Committee is of the opinion that the recognition of a

German Olympic Committee can take place only after a new Germany is formed by the western states. German participation in London 1948 is therefore unlikely to happen.”83

Although the 1947 German actions did not result in recognition by the International

Olympic Committee, those German sport officials who had maintained their prewar international contacts continued correspondence and developed a structure in place for when both the International Olympic Committee and the western Allies would permit the formation of a German National Olympic Committee and its reentry into international sport. The Duke of Mecklenburg replied to Edström on a personal level and not as the president of the provisional German Olympic Committee, writing that Germany, although occupied, in fact

82Letter, Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg to Sigfrid Edström, 28 May 1947, Film 28, CULDA. 83Letter, Sigfrid Edström to Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 7 July 1947, Film 18, CULDA.

272 exists.84 However, the International Olympic Committee’s refusal to recognise Germany in

1947 closed the subject of Germany’s participation in the 1948 Olympic Games and laid to

rest for the time being the creation of a formal Olympic Committee. By the end of 1947

many of the German sport leaders were involved in the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate

and the efforts to achieve recognition by the Military Government authorities for sport

organisational structures above Land level. The 1948 Olympic Games thus took place

without German participation and, at the St. Moritz Winter Olympics, without the Duke of

Mecklenburg’s name on the official program.85

As the Landessportbund-Fachverband debate grew and the calls to create national sport associations became more frequent, these issues encompassed the question of

Germany’s membership in the International Olympic Committee as well. On 27 December

1948 Heinz Lindner, President of Landessportbund Hessen, wrote a letter informing

International Olympic Committee President Edström about the founding of the Working

Committee for German Sport (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Sport). Edström informed

Lindner that while he wished this new organisation success, the International Olympic

Committee could only work with an Olympic committee which, as far as he knew, had already been started under the direction of the Duke of Mecklenburg and Carl Diem.86 This short exchange between Lindner and Edström set off a flurry of action both in letter writing

84Letter, Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg to Sigfrid Edström, 4 August 1947, Film 18, CULDA. 85Although IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer said that it was not official policy but rather a well-meaning yet incorrect decision made on the part of the St. Moritz Organising Committee, he did write to Sigfrid Edström that “after all they are our members, never mind what we can think about them, as long as they figure on our list.” Letter, Otto Mayer to J. Sigfrid Edström, 2 March 1948, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edström / Correspondance: 1946-1948, IOC. 86Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Heinz Lindner, 5 January 1949, Film 7, CULDA.

273 and meetings among the German sport leaders. The Duke of Mecklenburg and Diem

defended their position as the protectors of the German National Olympic Committee, hoping

only to see Germany’s return to the international sport community. As a result of the tepid

response from the International Olympic Committee in 1947 and the ban on forming national

associations, Diem hoped that German agitation for reentry into the Olympic movement

would remain minimal until the International Olympic Committee itself made overtures to

Germany, an order of events which could facilitate immediate recognition.87

Lindner, as a leader and advocate of the Landessportbund movement, hoped to gain

the upper hand in the preparations for creating a National Olympic Committee in order to

help the efforts of Landessportbünde in their battle against the Fachverbände. Lindner

initially welcomed Diem, the Duke of Mecklenburg, and their associates to participate in the

working committee hoping that all of the leaders of German sport could work together to

achieve German reentry into the Olympic movement.88 However, Lindner became more

defensive as Diem and the Duke of Mecklenburg continued to rebuff his efforts. Lindner sent

to Diem a list of his personal opinions regarding the formation of a National Olympic

Committee, asserting that “individual persons do not have the right to establish and fill

objectively and subjectively a National Olympic Committee. This right is entitled solely to

the elected representatives of German sport organizations.”89 Lindner further argued that

only provisionally would the working committee and later the umbrella organisation

87Letter, Carl Diem to Herzog Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, Peco Bauwens, Heinz Lindner, and Willi Daume, 10 January 1949, Film 18, CULDA. 88Letter, Heinz Lindner to Carl Diem, 14 January 1949, Film 16, CULDA; Letter, Heinz Lindner to Herzog Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 14 January 1949, Film 18, CULDA. 89Letter, Heinz Lindner to Carl Diem, 23 January 1949, Mappe 41, CULDA.

274 (Dachorganisation) for German sport, via elected representatives from the sport organisations, determine the function and structure of the National Olympic Committee.90

The Landessportbünde and Fachverbände were in the thick of their battle to influence the structure of German sport at a national level, and the western Allies had not yet held any trizonal sport conferences or established a preference for one form over the other.

Countering Lindner’s claims, the Duke of Mecklenburg argued that in his old age he just wanted to accomplish the return of Germany to the Olympic movement, which could only occur with the guarantee that the National Olympic Committee is built upon IOC principles. In order to achieve that goal he participated in the June 1947 meeting which

Lindner had organised. The Duke of Mecklenburg reminded Lindner that this meeting selected him (the Duke of Mecklenburg) as the chairman of the National Olympic

Committee, which the International Olympic Committee had said it would recognise once the political situation within Germany permitted it. Furthermore, the Duke of Mecklenburg demonstrated his support of the Fachverbände because one of the International Olympic

Committee’s foundations was that the representatives of the national sport governing bodies

(in other words, national Fachverbände) comprise the National Olympic Committee.91 Many of the sport officials who supported the Duke of Mecklenburg and Diem regarding the formation of the National Olympic Committee were themselves leading the creation of the national Fachverbände for their sports and facilitating reentry into the international federations. For example, Peco Bauwens had been a member of FIFA (1925-45) and its

90Letter, Heinz Lindner to Carl Diem, 23 January 1949, Mappe 41, CULDA. 91Letter, Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg to Heinz Lindner, 19 February 1949, Film 18, CULDA.

275 Executive Committee (1932-45), and he was the Chairman of the new German Football

Committee (and later the German Football Federation). Max Danz was Chairman of the

German Track and Field Committee (and later the German Track and Field Federation), and

Willi Daume led the handball efforts, becoming the first president of the German Handball

Federation (Deutscher Handball Band).92

The Duke of Mecklenburg’s letter convinced Linder to abstain from further action

that might hinder Germany’s chances of recognition at the International Olympic

Committee’s April 1949 meeting in Rome, which the Duke of Mecklenburg planned on

attending. The Duke wanted to be at this meeting to promote in person the reacceptance of

Germany, which International Olympic Committee President Edström supported.93 However,

rumours that the Duke was a close friend of Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels

raised the ire of the members from countries that had been occupied by Germany during the

war. Although these notions proved false, Edström nonetheless asked the Duke to refrain

from attending the meeting and “wait for another time.”94 The Finnish member of the

International Olympic Committee and 1952 Summer Olympic Games organiser, Erik von

Frenckell, stopped in Cologne on his return from the Rome meeting to meet with Carl Diem.

The two discussed preparations for the Helsinki Olympic Games because Diem had played a

large role in the 1936 Organising Committee, and they also talked about Germany’s position

92Friedrich Mevert, “Persönlichkeiten, die den DSB in den Gründerjahren prägten,” in 50 Jahre Deutscher Sportbund der Sport, ein Kulturgut unserer Zeit, ed. Deutscher Sportbund (Frankfurt am Main: Der Bund Buchhandelsvertrieb durch Umschau Braus, 2000), 31-36. 93Letter, Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg to Carl Diem, 19 January 1949, Film 18, CULDA; Abschrift, J. Sigfrid Edström to Graf Alberto Bonacossa, 24 January 1949, Film 18, CULDA. 94Letter, Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 16 March 1949, Film 18, CULDA; Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Carl Diem, 23 February 1949, Film 7, CULDA.

276 with respect to the Olympic movement. Von Frenckell’s meeting was unofficial and not on behalf of the International Olympic Committee, but he nonetheless informed Diem that the

Duke of Mecklenburg’s presence was expected at the next meeting in 1950. Von Frenckell told Diem that not only would Germany be recognised, but that the International Olympic

Committee would also select a successor for von Reichenau’s still vacant position, which

Diem coveted. Even though Diem and the Duke of Mecklenburg had been discouraged by the lack of German representation at the meeting, the discussion with von Frenckell buoyed

Diem’s spirit regarding Germany’s prospects. Following von Frenckell’s visit, Diem informed the Duke of Mecklenburg that the time was right for the formal reconstitution of the

German National Olympic Committee.95

In addition to the discussion with von Frenckell, Diem also received word that once a

West German state existed, the International Olympic Committee agreed it would then recognise Germany’s membership within the Olympic movement.96 This request followed shortly after the announcement of the Occupation Statute (April 1949) and just days before the Parliamentary Council approved the Basic Law (8 May 1949), the political developments which set in motion the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, the request that

Germany’s reacceptance take place following the establishment of a German state signified that the International Olympic Committee would approve Germany at its 1950 meeting.

Diem, however, disagreed with the rationale that a federal government needed to exist for the

International Olympic Committee to recognise Germany, writing to the Duke of

95Letter, Carl Diem to Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 4 May 1949, Film 18, CULDA. 96Letter, Carl Diem to Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 2 May 1949, Film 18, CULDA.

277 Mecklenburg:

I would like to take the point of view that German sport exists in its own right and is completely independent of the political configuration. The question whether a German government is present or not is, in my opinion, only used as a pretext by the Olympic Committee in order to continue avoiding the decision. I cannot see the connection which should exist between a sprint and the convening of the government in Bonn.97

Diem believed the organisational structure, following either Diem and the Duke of

Mecklenburg’s lead or the course promoted by Lindner, was more important for the

International Olympic Committee to make a decision regarding German membership than the status of the new government. Although the International Olympic Committee wanted to wait to recognise Germany until a formal state existed again, Diem and the Duke of

Mecklenburg pressed forward in June 1949 to form a National Olympic Committee.

Willi Daume, one of the leaders of German handball but also a member of the

Lindner’s working committee, attempted to reconcile the two sides in the debate over the structure of a national sport organisation in order for IOC recognition to happen. Daume invited to his Dortmund home Carl Diem, the Duke of Mecklenburg, Heinz Lindner, and

Heinrich Hünecke (a founding member of the working committee and in Lindner’s camp).

At this meeting Lindner agreed to forego any further attempts by the working committee to form a National Olympic Committee.98 Lindner realised that Diem and the Duke of

Mecklenburg, as well as the sport officials allied on their side, had maintained their international sport contacts, whereas Lindner did not possess any of the connections that

97Letter, Carl Diem to Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 13 May 1949, Film 18, CULDA. 98Franz Nitsch, “Auf konfliktträchtigem Weg – Initiativen 1945 bis 1949,” in Rückkehr nach Olympia, ed. Nationales Olympisches Komitee (Munich: Copress, 1989), 41.

278 would have assisted Germany’s reentry into the world of international sport. This point in

particular had been demonstrated to Lindner from his attempts to achieve FIFA recognition

of German football via his Working Committee for German Sport. Instead, FIFA had

maintained its relationship with Peco Bauwens, the German member who had sat on its

Executive Committee from 1932 to 1945 and was leading the working committee for German

football.99

In addition, all of the men at the Dortmund meeting began preparations for the

creation of the official National Olympic Committee, but the cooperation between the two

sides did not last long. They planned for the National Olympic Committee founding to take

place in Dusseldorf on 21 August 1949 in conjunction with a large sport festival for athletics,

Turnen, football, and handball.100 Diem took charge in these preparations but worked with

the other four men that met in Dortmund, including Lindner. Although Diem did not agree

with the International Olympic Committee’s insistence that a German Olympic Committee

could gain recognition until after the creation of a formal political state, the Dusseldorf

celebration was scheduled to occur one week after the first Bundestag elections (14 August

1950).101 As the five-member committee planned for both the Dusseldorf sporting events and

the founding of the National Olympic Committee, the discord between Diem and Lindner

resurfaced. Following the Dortmund meeting Lindner coordinated with the Military

Governments to achieve German participation in the fourth trizonal sport conference at Bad

99Letter, Peco Bauwens to Carl Diem, 2 May 1949, Mappe 612, CULDA. 100Letter, Willi Daume to S.H. Herzog Adolf-Friedrich zu Mecklenburg, Carl Diem, Heinz Lindner, Heinrich Hünecke, 23 June 1949, Mappe 86, CULDA. 101Bark and Gress, 236.

279 Schwalbach in July 1949. Although Lindner argued that the western Allies had invited eight members from the Working Committee for German Sport (composed of representatives from the British and American zones) and four sport leaders from the French zone, Diem nonetheless believed Lindner manipulated the invitations to specifically exclude himself and the Duke of Mecklenburg.102 When the western Allies reiterated at Bad Schwalbach that no national sport organisation could exist before the Federal Republic formally existed, Diem foreswore any additional work with Lindner regarding German sport.103

The conditions dictated by the occupation powers at Bad Schwalbach regarding the creation of national sport organisations meant that the plans to celebrate a new National

Olympic Committee in Düsseldorf in August had to be delayed. The Allied sport officers in particular believed that an Olympic committee was the last step and least important of all the issues confronting German sport.104 The leading representatives from every sport not only had to wait until after the federal elections to form a National Olympic Committee, but they could not form any national organisation until after a federal government existed. The

Bundestag elected Theodor Heuss as the Federal President on 12 September and Konrad

102Of the twelve Germans invited to the meeting with the trizonal sport officials, Peco Bauwens (British zone) and Dr. Robert Lingnau (American zone) were fully allied with Diem. Karl Gewers (British zone) and Robert Henle (American zone) were both representatives of Fachverbände on the National Olympic Committee once it formed, although Henle had initially been the leader of the ski section (Fachgruppe) of the Landessportbund in Bavaria. Willi Daume (British zone) attempted to bridge the two camps but ultimately aligned with Diem and the Duke of Mecklenburg. Heinrich Hünecke (British zone) supported Lindner. Nothing is known about the fourth representative of the American zone, Fritz Kutschke, nor the four representatives from the French zone. Bad Schwalbach Trizone Sport Conference Invitation List, 9 July 1949, Box 115, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA; Translation of article printed in Sportwelt, Stuttgart, 17 December 1947, Box 968, Office of Military Government, Wuerttemberg-Baden -- Records of the Education & Cultural Relations Div -- Community Activ Branch Chief: Corresp & Rel Recs, 1945-49, RG 260, NARA. 103Letter, Heinz Lindner to Willi Daume, 3 July 1949, Mappe 86, CULDA; Letter, Carl Diem to Adolf Friedrich von Mecklenburg, 8 August 1949, Film 18, CULDA. 104Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1049/1849, NA.

280 Adenauer as Chancellor on 15 September. The Occupation Statute, which granted the

Federal Republic of Germany greater autonomy from the three western Allies, went into effect on 21 September 1949 when Adenauer officially received it from the High

Commissioners.105 As the German government took shape, the invitations, under the aegis of the Duke of Mecklenburg, went out to all of the Fachverbände that represented sports on the

Olympic program for the refounding (Neugründung) of the German National Olympic

Committee on 24-25 September.106

The Germans finally recreated their National Olympic Committee with this two-day celebration in September 1949 with much fanfare and support in the new capital of Bonn.

President Heuss spoke on the second day, expressing his satisfaction that Germany again had an Olympic Committee.107 The Federal President also praised the French founder of the modern Olympics, Pierre de Coubertin, for creating a movement whereby nations could recognise each other chivalrously through the free competition of sport rather than through war.108 In addition Herbert Blankenhorn, Adenauer’s personal aide, sent a message on behalf of the Chancellor, welcoming the preparations undertaken for Germany’s participation in the next Olympic Games.109 This governmental support was for a newly-formed National

Olympic Committee whose president was the Duke of Mecklenburg and the rest of whose

105Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-53, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 183; Elmer Plischke, The Allied High Commission for Germany (n.p.: Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1953), 16. 106Letter, Willi Daume to Herren Vorsitzenden der Fachverbände, deren Sportarten zum olympischen Programm gehören, 14 September 1949, Mappe 86, CULDA. 107Ansprache des Buindspräsidenten Professor Dr. Theodor Heuss bei der Feier der Sportjugend in Bonn, 25 September 1949, Mappe 87, CULDA. 108Ibid. 109Nationales Olympisches Komitee, Gründungsfeier in der Bundeshauptstadt Bonn am Rhein, 24 September 1949, Mappe 87, CULDA.

281 members were all born before World War I.110

All of the Olympic Committee members had therefore matured in Imperial Germany or during the Weimar Republic, before the Nazis assumed power. The socialization of almost all of the National Olympic Committee members happened at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, when the ideas of internationalism prevailed and several of the international sport federations were created. These sport officials used these older ties to claim that, rather than permit the complete Nazi cooption of German sport, they instead worked to protect German sport from being fully politicised during the

Third Reich. In additional, all 21 members, including the eighteen representatives of the

Fachverbände, lived in either the American or British zones.111 Although the majority of the urban centres and location-specific sports such as sailing or skiing resided in the American and British zones, this unequal geographical distribution of members also reflected the greater willingness from the early years of the occupation of the American and British in permitting Land-level sport organisations, particularly the Fachverbände, as compared to the

French Military Government. The continued connections of prewar German sport leaders with the Executive Committee of the IOC proved to be the greatest factor in deciding the form and leadership of a national sport organisation to direct German participation in the

Olympic Games. Within this debate among German sport leaders, the western occupation powers only became involved when German actions violated Allied policies, such as the

110Sixteen of the 29 members were born before 1900, and only three were born between 1910 and the outbreak of World War I. Geburtstagsliste der NOK-Mitglieder, n.d., Heft 728, Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund (formerly Nationales Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland), Frankfurt, Germany. Hereafter cited DOSB. 111Carl Diem, Nationales Olympiscen Komitee Rundschriben Nr. 1, 30 September 1949, Mappe 90, CULDA.

282 formation of a national organisation before the creation of the Federal Republic.

* * *

Returning to the Olympic Family

Rather than welcoming Germany back into the world of international sport

immediately after World War II or immediately after the formation of the Federal Republic,

the International Olympic Committee did not reaccept Germany until May 1951.112 The two-

year delay in formal recognition after the refounding of the German National Olympic

Committee came as a result of the intimate involvement by the U.S. State Department, the

British Foreign Office, and the American and British High Commissioners regarding the

composition of the German Olympic Committee. The French, while present at tripartite

meetings and expressing their opinions in the matter of German Olympic participation, did

not work as strenuously behind the scenes because two of their members were compromised

by their own actions during the war.113 The Allies pushed for international acceptance of

Germany, but the Nazi pasts of many prominent German sport officials created problems for both the western powers and the International Olympic Committee. Nonetheless, American and British dissatisfaction with the Nazi ties of German sport officials and the German struggle to gain recognition by the International Olympic Committee demonstrate the problems the Allies faced in implementing denazification, as well as the shift in priorities

112Borgers, Buschmann, and Lennartz, 93. 113The two French members were Marquis Melchior de Polignac and François Piétri. Piétri “remained in Madrid ever since Pétain sent him there as Ambassador and has never dared return to France for trial. Melchior de Polignac, on the other hand, after being in prison with his wife, who is a poisonous American, Nina de Polignac, somehow got himself white-washed to the extent that he is not at present suffering imprisonment or national indignity; although no decent French person will meet either him or his wife.” Letter, Sir O. Harvey to Sir Orme Sargent, 30 June 1948, FO 371/73009, NA.

283 with a changing international situation. Although denazification and democratisation were two primary goals of the Military Governments in Germany, the politics of the Cold War ultimately suppressed these moral aims as the western Allied foreign ministries heavily involved themselves in Germany’s reentry into the Olympic movement. The acceptance of the National Olympic Committee that Germany put forward represented a victory for

Germans, demonstrating their ability to reassert their own policies and that they were not pawns of the western powers.

The occupation governments had understood the importance within Germany of its reacceptance in the world of international sport even before the founding of the Federal

Republic and the new National Olympic Committee. British Chief Sports Officer J.G. Dixon wrote in 1948 that recognition by the International Olympic Committee and the other international sport federations “would in fact involve a recognition that Germany had taken her place again amongst the commity of nations, and there is no doubt that Germans themselves would attach considerable political significance to it.”114 Even at the beginning of

1949, as the plans to form the Federal Government were underway, the British Educational

Adviser sent out a staff memo in which he stated that “present policy excludes Germany from participation in International Championships and this policy was endorsed by the

International Olympic Committee.”115 With the British members of the International

Olympic Committee (Lords Aberdare and Burghley) in close communication with their government, the Military Government recognised the political implications of German

114Letter, J.G. Dixon, to Mr. Percival, 27 July 1948, FO 1050/1095, NA. 115Robert Birley, Staff Memorandum, “Policy Regarding the Participation of Germans in International Sporting Events Outside Germany,” 24 January 1949, FO 1050/1095, NA.

284 participation in international sport and took measures to ensure that German or Allied actions did not create additional problems.

However, the primary objections raised by the American and British governments

(and some IOC members) concerned the two German members of the International Olympic

Committee. Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg and Karl Ritter von Halt had been members of the International Olympic Committee since 1926 and 1929 respectively.116 Ritter von Halt, who was from Bavaria, assisted with the 1936 Berlin Olympic bid and became

President of the Garmisch-Partenkirchen Winter Games. Ritter von Halt had risen rapidly in the 1930s to higher positions in both international sport as well as in the SA

(Sturmabteilung). As a director of the Deutsche Bank, he had provided funds to Himmler and had been part of his inner circle. By 1938 when Ritter von Halt resigned from a four- year term as president of the International Amateur Handball Federation, he still held positions as a member of the International Olympic Committee, a member of the

International Amateur Athletic Federation Executive Council, the president of the German

Bobsleigh Association, and the vice-president of International Federation of Bobsledding and

Tobogganing. Ritter von Halt was also head of track and field (NSRL Fachamt

Leichtathletik) under the centralised Nazi sport system by 1938, and for the last year of the

Third Reich he was also the final Reichssportführer. This last position contributed to his imprisonment in Buchenwald by the Soviets, who only released him in February 1950 as a precondition of joining the International Olympic Committee themselves.117

116Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 267. 117Minutes, 5th Congress, International Amateur Handball Federation, 9 July 1938, International

285 The Duke of Mecklenburg’s actions during the Third Reich are not as well- documented. He had been the Governor of the Togo Colony from 1912-14, and during the

First World War he had earned an Iron Cross from the Austro-Hungarian army and had participated in a mission to Turkey in 1916. In April 1918 some leading Baltic Germans,

Estonians, and Latvians had requested that the Duke of Mecklenburg become the head of state of a United Baltic Duchy, but the proposal did not come to fruition. The Duke of

Mecklenburg also had played a leading role in the Colonial Society (Kolonial-Gesellschaft), which had aimed to reclaim German colonies lost with the Treaty of Versailles. During the

Weimar Republic and Third Reich, the Duke of Mecklenburg had travelled across the world, particularly to Africa and South America, to help improve trade relations with Germany and speak with communities of emigrant Germans, but not in an official governmental capacity.118 The Duke of Mecklenburg’s participation in sport was more typical of the aristocrat with many sporting interested as compared to the involvement of Ritter von Halt.

The Duke of Mecklenburg had participated in equestrian sport, automobile sport, and the famous Blau-Weiß tennis club in Berlin. As the brother-in-law to Queen Wilhelmina of the

Netherlands, his connections to exiled European royalty had led to his dismissal from any posts under the Nazis.119

Amateur Athletic Federation 1938-39, Box 207, ABC; Horst Ueberhorst, “The Importance of the Historians’ Quarrel and the Problem of Continuity for the German History of Sport,” Journal of Sport History 17, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 241-2. 118Georg von Rauch, The Baltic States: The Years of Independence: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 1917- 1940, trans. Gerald Onn (London: C. Hurst, 1974), 48; Werner Pade, “Zwitschen Wissenschaft, Abenteurertum und Kolonialpolitik Adolf Friedrich Herog zu Mecklenburg,” in Mecklenburger im Ausland: Historische Skizzen zum Leben und Wirken von Mecklenburgern in ihrer Heimat und in der Ferne, ed. Martin Guntau (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2001), 201-12; Rudolf Junack, Adolf Friedrich Herzog zu Mecklenburg: Leben und Werken (Hamburg: Verlag Krüger & Nienstedt, 1963), 21-34. 119The initial claims in POL(50)39 regarding Mecklenburg’s positions under the Nazis were later cleared, but any dismissals regarding his close connections to royalty are, presumably, valid. Borgers,

286 The Allies believed democratisation could only happen after denazification and

demilitarisation, and the selection of these individuals to the German Olympic Committee

troubled the Allies greatly. One month after the formation of the new German Olympic

Committee the representatives of the American High Commission expressed concerns about

the National Olympic Committee having a Nazi and anti-democratic character. In his report

to the Education and Cultural Division Director, the Community Activities Branch Chief L.E.

Norrie wrote that the occupation powers and German sport leaders had previously reached an

agreement whereby a new organisation to prepare German reentry into the Olympic

movement would be democratically elected. Instead, “German officials at Bonn have

recently appointed a committee of the former 1936 Olympic Committee members for this

purpose.” Norrie continued: “This move has incenced [sic] not only the Occupation officials concerned, but the democratic element among German sports leaders who have worked on this agreement.”120 These sport leaders were therefore chosen without respecting the democratising aims of the occupation. Not only were sport organisations flouting the democracy they claimed to promote, the failure of the policy of denazification among the core of leaders enabled them to resume control.

In preparation for the 1950 International Olympic Committee meeting in Copenhagen, the Germans used all of their political connections to secure recognition. German Olympic

Committee Vice President and Football Federation President Peco Bauwens, along with the

Buschmann, and Lennartz, 62; POL/P(50)39 – German Participation in International Olympic Committee, 29 June 1950, FO 1005/1309, NA. 120L.E. Norrie, Report [Community Activities Branch] to Division Director, OMGUS Education and Cultural Division, 31 October 1949, Box 113, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA.

287 Football Federation’s General Secretary, Kurt Schaffner, met with Aksel Nielsen, the Youth

Activities officer for whom Schaffner had worked when he was a Technical Advisor to the

American Military Government. Bauwens asked if the American High Commission would suggest to the American Olympic Committee that its members attend the International

Olympic Committee meeting in Copenhagen. Nielsen reported that Bauwens’ motivation was obvious, as “he was trying to make sure that the country friendly to Germany will be present at that meeting.”121 The Germans even involved their own high-ranking government officials in their attempt to secure Olympic acceptance. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer asked the American High Commissioner, John J. McCloy, to garner the support of American member Avery Brundage for Germany’s readmission. Adenauer believed that the support of

Brundage, as a Vice President of the International Olympic Committee, would facilitate

Germany’s request for recognition. More importantly, though, the Chancellor understood the influence of the American government’s aims for Germany – even if they entered the realm of sport – and thus was “convinced that Mr. Brundage will agree to do this when he finds out that you [McCloy] are in favor of readmittance of Germany to International sport relations and particularly to [the] International Olympic Committee.”122

As the Allies had utilised local sport to further their own political aims such as democratisation since 1945, Adenauer’s request enabled the Allied High Commission to take a more active role in helping Germany return to international sport. McCloy informed the

121Aksel Nielsen, Youth Activities Section Report, 27 January 1950, Box 1, U.S. Land Commissioner for Wuerttemberg-Baden - Public Affairs Division - Daily, Weekly, and Monthly, RG 466, NARA. 122Letter, Konrad Adenauer to John J. McCloy contained in Telegram, John J. McCloy to Secretary of State, 29 April 1950, Box 5252, 1950-54 / 862A.453, RG 59, NARA.

288 State Department that he supported the request because he “agree[d] in principle to German membership,” suggesting that the Embassy in Copenhagen should assist with the matter.

McCloy ended his telegram with a less positive tone regarding German sport, opining that the composition of Germany’s Olympic Committee was “unsatisfactory, but [the] matter of its membership will be taken up separately.”123 Whereas McCloy’s support for recognition of

Germany by the International Olympic Committee was in line with the tripartite recommendation to press for membership in international organisations,124 he stressed that

Germany’s National Olympic Committee had to be comprised of acceptable members, as this body would be a representative of the new Germany. Nonetheless, the State Department clearly supported McCloy’s suggestion regarding the involvement of the American Embassy in Copenhagen, which informed Brundage of “the interest of the Allied High Commission in having the Federal Republic of Germany accepted into membership by the International

Amateur Sport Governing bodies so that German athletes can take part in the Games of the

XV Olympiad in Helsinki in 1952.”125

In addition to the endorsement of the State Department, the British Military

Government also expressed its desire for Germany’s return to the Olympic movement in language reminiscent of the founding Olympic ideals. A friend of the British High

Commissioner, General Brian Robertson, also approached Brundage while he was in London

123Letter, Konrad Adenauer to John J. McCloy contained in Telegram, John J. McCloy to Secretary of State, 29 April 1950, Box 5252, 1950-54 / 862A.453, RG 59, NARA. 124“German International Relations,” 11 October 1949, Box 5, Bureau of European Affairs – Office of German Affairs – Subject Files of the Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, 1949-1956 – Miscellaneous, RG 59, NARA. 125Letter, Avery Brundage to John McCloy, 14 October 1950, Box 5252, 1950-54/862A.453, RG 59, NARA.

289 en route to Copenhagen. The British ensured that the Allied intentions regarding Germany reached all of the International Olympic Committee members by providing Lord Burghley with a letter to read at the Copenhagen meeting that expressed his hope for Germany to be invited to the 1952 Olympics. Robertson implored the International Olympic Committee to welcome Germany back into international sport because “it is the best means that we can provide to show the German youth that their cooperation is required for the re-attainment of peace and the contact with the youth of other nations.”126 The occupation governments granted amnesty from denazification to Germans born after 1919 and attempted to inculcate the leaders of tomorrow with democratic ideals. The Olympic Games, created by Pierre de

Coubertin in the 1890s to bring together the youth of the world on the athletic fields as compared to against each other on the battle field,127 fit perfectly with the democratising aim of the Allies. The International Olympic Committee debated the position of Germany at length at its meeting, even forming its own subcommittee to examine the issue further before it reached a decision. Ultimately the International Olympic Committee decided to recognise provisionally the German Olympic Committee, with the understanding that a separate meeting of International Olympic Committee members and the German Olympic Committee would address any remaining concerns.128

Just days before the Copenhagen meeting, however, the issue of Germany’s National

Olympic Committee, in particular its structure and personnel, arose for the first time within

126Auszüge aus dem Protokoll der Sitzung des IOC, Copenhagen, 15 May 1950, trans. Frau Haunit and Carl Diem, 3 July 1950, Heft 709, DOSB. 127Karl Lennartz and Stephen Wassong, “Athens 1896,” in John E. Findling and Kimberly D. Pelle, ed. Encyclopedia of the Modern Olympic Movement (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 18-19. 128Auszüge aus dem Protokoll der Sitzung des IOC, Copenhagen, 15 May 1950, trans. Frau Haunit and Carl Diem, 3 July 1950, Heft 709, DOSB.

290 the Allied High Commission’s subcommittees. The Political Affairs Committee agreed to

inform the American International Olympic Committee member (Brundage) “that German

participation in the 1952 games was favored, but that it was understood that the Germans

who were members of the Committee were politically undesirable and that it was hoped they

could be prevailed upon to resign.”129 The High Commission understood that the new

Germany, and the Olympic Committee as the face of German sport, could not resemble

Germany’s authoritarian and Nazi past. This appearance was critical in order to alleviate the

concerns of the smaller European countries. In addition, the western Allies wanted to prevent

additional criticism from the communist states, which claimed that former Nazis were

running West Germany.130 Two days before the Copenhagen meeting, the French Foreign

Ministry telegraphed its embassy in the Danish capital to request a consultation with the

French delegates of the International Olympic Committee. The Quai d’Orsay wanted the

French members to know that while the general French political policy could not deny

German participation, they hoped that “seriously compromised” individuals could be persuaded to resign from the German Olympic Committee.131

These discussions concerning the need for a democratic and non-Nazi organisation,

including the recommendation that the Duke of Mecklenburg and Ritter von Halt resign their

positions, frequently reappeared in the Political Affairs Committee of the Allied High

129POL/M(50)15 – Minutes, Twenty-fifth Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 12 May 1950, FO 371/85207, NA. 130Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 181-82. 131Telegram, Affaires Étrangères, Déchiffrement, GL/JD, Direction d'Europe, Sous-Direction d'Europe Centrale to Copenhagen, 13 May 1950, Box 83, Relations culturelles, 1945-1970, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris.

291 Commission over the next year as the International Olympic Committee considered the

recognition of Germany. The British member of the committee drafted a paper that was

highly influenced by discussions with one of the British International Olympic Committee

members, most likely Lord Burghley. The paper stated that “the choice of members of the

German Committee is entirely a German matter and that it would, therefore, be undesirable

for the Allied High Commission to intervene officially.”132 The Political Affairs Committee

understood that meddling in a completely domestic organisation would be viewed negatively

both within Germany and abroad. Yet in order to facilitate German reentry into international

sport, the British member recommended that “the Chairman of the Political Affairs

Committee should be authorised to advise Herr Blankenhorn of the Federal Chancellor’s

office personally and informally” to suggest the Duke of Mecklenburg resign his position on

the International Olympic Committee.133

While the first draft of the paper was concerned primarily with the role of the Duke of

Mecklenburg, the revised version delved further into the Nazi pasts of the entire executive

committee of the German Olympic Committee to demonstrate the organisation was neither

democratic nor denazified. In this version the Duke of Mecklenburg’s “political record

appears to be untarnished by Nazism,” while several other members instead “had played a

considerable role in Nazi organizations.”134 The Political Affairs Committee objected to the individuals who had held posts in the 1936 Olympic organising committee or had been a

132POL/P(50)39 – German Participation in International Olympic Committee, 29 June 1950, FO 1005/1309, NA. 133Ibid. 134POL/P(50)39/2 – German Participation in International Olympic Committee, 7 August 1950, FO 1005/1309, NA.

292 member of the Nazi Party or its affiliated organisations: Ritter von Halt (new NOK president), Peco Bauwens and Max Danz (NOK vice presidents), Carl Diem (NOK secretary), Willi Daume (NOK treasurer), and Guido “Guy” Schmidt (the ski representative).

In addition, the Political Affairs Committee believed allegations that the new National

Olympic Committee was self-appointed and “does not enjoy the confidence of the majority of democratic German sportsmen.”135 In essence, the Political Affairs Committee saw Nazism, at least in sport, as having been accepted by the leaders who thus led the general population astray. While these men may have been sufficiently denazified for their everyday lives, as representatives of German sport to the international community, their continued presence in these roles was unacceptable. The Political Affairs Committee thus recommended that all members of the National Olympic Committee who held positions in the 1936 organising committee resign, the two German IOC representatives resign, and that all vacated positions be filled via elections of “uncompromised representatives of German sport.”136

The Allied High Commission agreed with the recommendations of the Political

Affairs Committee regarding Germany’s Olympic Committee and the need for the removal of members who had been in charge of the 1936 Olympic Games, as well as the two members of the International Olympic Committee. McCloy, France’s André François-Poncet, and Sir

Ivone Kirkpatrick, Robertson’s successor, worked unofficially behind the scenes to obtain favourable outcomes by the International Olympic Committee that were in line with the aims

135POL/P(50)39/2 – German Participation in International Olympic Committee, 7 August 1950, FO 1005/1309, NA. 136Ibid. The provision that the IOC members should resign was added to the paper during the meeting which approved POL/P(50)39/2. POL/M(50)26 – Minutes, Thirty-sixth Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 9 August 1950, FO 1005/1305, NA.

293 of the Allied role in Germany. The High Commissioners addressed this issue of Germany’s

National Olympic Committee leadership less than two weeks before German Olympic

Committee officials travelled to Lausanne to meet with the International Olympic

Committee, as per the stipulations of the Copenhagen decision. As American intelligence discovered that Diem, Ritter von Halt, Bauwens, and Daume had all falsified travel documents and charges against them were pending, the matter was urgent. The High

Commissioners met on the morning of 17 August 1950, with the recommendations of the

Political Affairs Committee listed as the fourth item on the agenda. As chair of the meeting,

McCloy asked if all were agreed to the recommendations that the High Commission suggest to Adenauer that Germany’s chances at recognition would greatly improve if the organisers of the 1936 Olympics were not members of the new German Olympic Committee.137 The brief prepared for Kirkpatrick, which supported the informal communication to Adenauer, raised the point that National Olympic Committee membership is “presumably revocable” whereas International Olympic Committee membership is for life, presenting “difficulties in securing the withdrawal of the Duke of Mecklenburg and of von Halt if they cannot be persuaded to retire voluntarily.”138 Kirkpatrick preferred that the suggestion to the Chancellor take the form of a statement of fact from which Adenauer could draw his own conclusions, reminding the High Commissioners that their concern was foreign affairs and not the role of the sporting ministry as well. With François-Poncet also in concurrence, the three agreed that

137Verbatim Minutes, Thirty-seventh Meeting, Council of the Allied High Commission, 17 August 1950, FO 1023/319, NA. 138Brief for British Member on Item 4 of Agenda, German Participation in International Olympic Committee, prepared by Chancery, 17 August 1950, FO 1023/319, NA.

294 McCloy would present the suggestion to Adenauer in their meeting with the Chancellor later in the day.139

That afternoon Adenauer and the Allied High Commissioners discussed several issues regarding Germany’s position within the international system, including the European

Defence Community, German rearmament, the possibility of an East German-Soviet invasion of West Germany, and the German Olympic Committee. During the occupation all four

Allies had emphasised demilitarisation, but after the beginning of the Korean War the nature of the Cold War led the western Allies to desire some form of West German rearmament to provide defensive capabilities. Rearming Germany, however, did not gain widespread support in Germany, including with Adenauer himself. Because the new Federal Republic of

Germany was only eleven months old and had been “created out of nothing,” Adenauer argued, controversial plans such as rearmament could not be rushed.140 Yet, this same uncertainty about the Federal Republic of Germany’s place in the international community could be removed with additional West German presence in a positive setting, such as in international sport. Upon being informed of the High Commission’s efforts to secure

German participation in the Olympic movement and the suggestions of the Allied High

Commisioners regarding the membership of the German Olympic Committee, Adenauer expressed concern and promised to cooperate.141

Adenauer recognised the importance of the Olympic Games as an international stage

139Verbatim Minutes, Thirty-seventh Meeting, Council of the Allied High Commission, 17 August 1950, FO 1023/319, NA; HICOM/M(50)27 – Minutes, Thirty-seventh Meeting, Council of the Allied High Commission, 17 August 1950, FO 1023/19, NA. 140Adenauer, 274-78. 141HICOM/FED/M(50)10 – Minutes, Nineteenth Meeting, Council of the Allied High Commission with the Chancellor of the German Federal Government, 17 August 1950, FO 1023/3, NA.

295 to demonstrate a country’s strength and success, as the Berlin Games had done for Nazi

Germany, and the Federal Republic could not afford to be excluded from yet another

Olympiad. Four days before the German delegation (of unsatisfactory individuals) met with the International Olympic Committee in Lausanne, Adenauer reported back to the Allied

High Commission that he had contacted the National Olympic Committee and “taken steps that the composition of the delegation be changed to conform to your wishes.”142 Removed from the trip to Lausanne were Carl Diem, Karl Ritter von Halt, Willi Daume, and Max

Danz.143 Adenauer requested that the new delegation be immediately granted travel documents for Switzerland, as none of these men had been members of the Nazi Party.

Walter Kolb, Peco Bauwens, and a third official were the acceptable members of the new delegation. Bauwens, the only member from the initial delegation, was cleared as he was able to prove that his membership in the Nazi Party from 1933-34 was unbeknownst to him but also impossible.144 The German Olympic Committee bowed to the pressure from both the

Federal Government and the American authorities in order for Germany to gain unconditional recognition from the IOC.145

The delegation pleaded its case in Lausanne for full recognition by the International

142Letter, Konrad Adenauer to John J. McCloy, 24 August 1950, Box 47, Office of the Executive Secretary – General Records, 1947-1952, RG 466, NARA. 143Telegram, John J. McCloy to Secretary of State [Dean Acheson], 25 August 1950, Box 5252, 1950- 54/862A.453, RG 59, NARA. 144Whereas Adenauer’s letter to the Allied High Commission stated that Bauwens, Kolb, and Lingnau would comprise the German delegation, in the minutes Georg Dietrich, another member of the NOK, was listed in place of Lingnau. Letter, Konrad Adenauer to John J. McCloy, 24 August 1950, Box 47, Office of the Executive Secretary – General Records, 1947-1952, RG 466, NARA; Protokoll der Sitzung des Exekutiv- Komitees des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees mit der Delegation des Deutschen Olympischen Komitees, 29 August 1950, Heft 709, DOSB. 145Telegram, John J. McCloy to Secretary of State [Dean Acheson], 25 August 1950, Box 5252, 1950- 54/862A.453, RG 59, NARA.

296 Olympic Committee by emphasising the changed nature of sport in Germany and the importance of sport, including participation in the Olympic Games, to German youth. After apologising for the horrors (Grausamkeiten) perpetuated by the criminal Nazis and their tarnishing of the name of Germany, the delegates provided information on the status of

German sport and expressed the desire of German youth to participate in the Olympic movement again. They also detailed the measures taken by the Allied High Commission

(although not the Federal Chancellor) in preventing the original German delegation – including its two IOC representatives – from appearing in Lausanne. The International

Olympic Committee members in Lausanne recommended full recognition of Germany at its

1951 meeting in Vienna, as well as Germany’s participation in the 1952 Olympic Games in

Helsinki. Only once did an IOC member raise the issue of compromised individuals continuing in their roles on Germany’s National Olympic Committee.146 The Dutch and

Belgians in particular, as well as members from other countries which Nazi Germany had overrun, had consistently voiced their opinions in their home countries, within the international sport federations, and at International Olympic Committee meetings that the return of Germany with its compromised individuals to the Olympic movement was unacceptable. These members threatened that if Germany participated in the Olympics, their own countries would boycott the Games.147 Col. P.W. Scharroo, the Dutch member who had also led the Defence of Rotterdam and, with a heavy heart, surrendered the city to the

146The IOC delegation included: President J. Sigfrid Edström (Sweden), Vice President Avery Brundage (U.S.), Lord Aberdare (Great Britain), Comte Bonacossa (Italy), Col. P.W. Scharroo (Netherlands), Armand Massard (France), Angelo Bolanaki (Greece), and Albert Mayer (Switzerland). Protokoll der Sitzung des Exekutiv-Komitees des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees mit der Delegation des Deutschen Olympischen Komitees, 29 August 1950, Heft 709, DOSB. 147Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Carl Diem, 13 June 1950, Heft 709, DOSB.

297 Germans in 1940,148 questioned the actions of Ritter von Halt and the Duke of Mecklenburg.

Yet when Scharroo raised his objection at the Lausanne meeting it was basically ignored, with the next speaker (Swiss representative Albert Mayer) replying that if these German sport representatives have the trust of the German youth, then the International Olympic

Committee should not interfere with the affairs of a National Olympic Committee.149

Thus, Germany’s return to the Olympic movement only needed formal approval by the entire International Olympic Committee in Vienna, but again Germany’s IOC members faced anti-German sentiments as some International Olympic Committee members still wanted the German members excluded from the meeting. Knowing that the Lausanne meeting had recommended Germany’s reentry, the Duke of Mecklenburg and Karl Ritter von

Halt intended to travel to Vienna for the meeting. President Edström asked Otto Mayer,

Chancellor of the International Olympic Committee and brother of Swiss member Albert

Mayer, whether any objections to Ritter von Halt and the Duke of Mecklenburg’s participation might arise, although he personally felt their participation would be “quite natural” because of the impending recognition.150 Otto Mayer replied that while earlier he would have said Ritter von Halt and the Duke of Mecklenburg should attend, “I think that

Western Germany will be recognized if our German members do not come, but there will be more difficulties if they are present. This press campaign is coming especially from Norway

148Anthony Th. Bijkerk, “Pieter Wilhelmus SCHARROO”, unpublished biography sent by Bijkerk to author. 149Protokoll der Sitzung des Exekutiv-Komitees des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees mit der Delegation des Deutschen Olympischen Komitees, 29 August 1950, Heft 709, DOSB. 150Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Otto Mayer, 16 March 1951, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edström / Correspondance: 1951, IOC.

298 and Sweden and is reproduced by certain German Press also.”151 With Oslo the site of the

1952 Winter Games and East Germany pushing for its own recognition, the International

Olympic Committee could not afford the negative publicity, particularly from the communist

East German press, on allowing former Nazis to resume their membership. In addition,

Mayer raised the point that some members still harbored animosity towards Germany and its

International Olympic Committee members and thus believed that “their absence is more suitable for the sake of everything.”152 When the Belgian member, Rodolphe W. Seeldrayers, insisted on the continued exclusion of the Germans from the Vienna meeting, Edström replied that “our rules say that no discrimination is allowed against anyone on grounds of politics. We must stick to that. We cannot any longer preclude German sport from the

Olympic games.”153 The International Olympic Committee was able to exclude Germany before the founding of the Federal Republic because there was no German state, but now that one existed, the IOC had to act according to its supposedly democratic rules.

Although the Duke of Mecklenburg and Ritter von Halt were permitted by the

International Olympic Committee to attend the meeting, political problems appeared to prevent their participation in Vienna. The Russians had control of Vienna during the month of May because Austria and its capital were still under quadripartite control, and both men were concerned for their safety should they travel to Vienna under those circumstances.154

151Letter, Otto Mayer to J. Sigfrid Edström, 19 March 1951, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edström / Correspondance: 1951, IOC. 152Ibid. 153Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to R.W. Seeldrayers, 13 April 1951, Rodolphe William Seeldrayers / Correspondance: 1946, IOC. 154Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Lord Burghley, 9 April 1951, David George Burghley / Correspondance: 1933-1969, IOC.

299 The same week that Edström replied to Seeldrayers, Otto Mayer spoke with Bauwens, informing him that Edström had “decided that Ritter von Halt must come to Vienna.”155 The problem remained that Ritter von Halt was on the Allied Combined Travel Board’s travel restriction list. Between the relaying of the message imploring Ritter von Halt to go to

Vienna and the meeting itself, the Political Affairs Committee agreed to submit urgently to the Federal Minister of the Interior, as well as to the Combined Travel Board, that Ritter von

Halt’s name should be removed from the travel restriction list.156 Even though Ritter von

Halt and the Duke of Mecklenburg had been denied travel visas, they were determined to be in Vienna, crossing the border into Salzburg, from where they called Edström, claiming they had to be at the meeting to discuss the East German issue. Edström, with the help of

Brundage and the American Embassy, obtained entry visas for Ritter von Halt and the Duke of Mecklenburg.157 The two German members participated in the International Olympic

Committee meeting, where Germany resumed its position within the Olympic Movement, but only as a result of the direct intervention of the State Department. Yet what had prompted this change of opinion regarding the acceptability of Ritter von Halt and the Duke of

Mecklenburg?

Leading up to Vienna Brundage had written a letter to McCloy in October 1950 reporting on his previous actions and providing testimony on the non-Nazi character of Ritter

155Letter, Otto Mayer to J. Sigfrid Edström, 16 April 1951, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edström / Correspondance: 1951, IOC. 156POL/M(51)12 – Minutes, Sixty-fifth Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 27 April 1951, FO 1005/1306, NA; POL/M(51)13 – Minutes, Sixty-sixth Meeting, Political Affairs Committee, 25 May 1951, FO 1005/1306, NA. 157Protokoll der Sitzung des Präsidiums, Nationales Olympisches Komitee, 16 May 1951, Mappe 89, CULDA.

300 von Halt and Diem in particular, hoping to facilitate the ability of his German colleagues to remain in leadership positions.158 When Brundage failed to receive a reply from McCloy, he contacted the State Department directly, forwarding a copy of his unanswered letter. Various

State Department and American High Commission divisions communicated with each other

– although not Brundage – over several months regarding the progress of German Olympic

Committee and the Nazi associations of its leaders. Only in July 1951 was the issue concluded when the American High Commission informed the State Department that

from August 1950 to April 1951, the West German Sports Union was split into two camps and was unable to agree on a West German Olympic Committee to succeed the one in question. […] when the stalemate was resolved and the Olympic Committee modified by expanding it, the situation had taken on a confidential and political phase, the factors of which could not be divulged to Mr. Brundage.159

That “confidential and political phase,” however, was a need to brush aside the problematic nature of denazification in order to address a more pressing concern: the developing Cold

War, or at least the prevention of East Germany’s recognition.

With the beginning of the Korean War the Cold War had become more global by moving beyond Europe’s borders, and with the admission of the Soviet Union into the

International Olympic Committee the Cold War spread from the political realm into the world of sport. The Soviet Union began joining international sport federations in 1946

(FIFA, weight-lifting, basketball, and skiing) and only joined the International Olympic

Committee in 1951 at the Vienna meeting.160 The Soviet Union quickly assumed a position

158Letter, Avery Brundage to John J. McCloy, October 14, 1950, Box 5252, 1950-54/862A.453, RG 59, NARA. 159Letter, George A. Selke to Department of State, 3 July 1951, Box 5252, 1950-54/862A.453, RG 59, NARA. 160Senn, 86-92.

301 as an influential member, just as it saw itself on the international political stage. Eastern

European states which had remained members of the international sport community between the World Wars now offered communists acceptable to Moscow as their delegates to the

International Olympic Committee and international federations. The western Allies recognised it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union and its communist satellite states championed the cause of East Germany in sport as well. Shortly before the

International Olympic Committee meeting in Vienna, East Germany established its own

National Olympic Committee.161 Once the European communist states began pushing for

East German recognition, the International Olympic Committee and international federations had to make a decision regarding (West) Germany if they had not done so already.

West Germany claimed its National Olympic Committee represented all of Germany because it represented the democratically elected German state, and the International Olympic

Committee could therefore continue its “apolitical” stance by conferring recognition to the

National Olympic Committee of Germany, even though it only represented the West German state. By recognising the German Olympic Committee of the Duke of Mecklenburg and

Ritter von Halt, which called itself the National Olympic Committee of Germany (Nationales

Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland), the International Olympic Committee attempted to thwart the very political Cold War from entering the Olympic movement by preventing the representation of two separate Germanies in the Olympic movement. Instead, the

International Olympic Committee forced both German states to work together under the

161Senn, 99; Letter, J. Sigfrid Edström to Otto Mayer, 12 March 1951, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edström / Correspondance: 1951, IOC.

302 rubric of the National Olympic Committee of Germany (situated in the Federal Republic) to produce an all-German Olympic team to compete at the Games.162 The International Olympic

Committee’s recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951 ended the Allied High

Commission’s demands for further denazification of German sport, as the deepening of the

Cold War led to a change in the American, British, and even French aims for Germany. Yet the creation of the (West) German National Olympic Committee and its fight to be recognised by the International Olympic Committee, a seemingly internal affair for Germans or the international sporting community, had to contend with the aims of the U.S. State

Department and Britain’s Foreign Office for a new Germany. Only when the political aim of the West German government and western Allies (preventing East German recognition) coincided with the goal of West German sport officials (the resumption of West German membership in international federations) were the organisers of West German sport able to gain full autonomy without any further Allied interference. The strict allegiance by the rest of the European communist states to Moscow’s line within meetings made the International

Olympic Committee believe that East German recognition was just another plan which would provide the Soviet bloc with additional votes and more leverage to control international sport.

* * *

Conclusion

The State Department achieved an athletic coup in 1950 when J. Brooks B. Parker, a loyal American with several ties to the United States government, became a member of the

International Olympic Committee and could help influence international sport to coincide

162Agreement on German Participation in 1952 Olympic Games, 22 May 1951, Mappe 96, CULDA.

303 with American political aims for Germany. Parker, a fencer on the 1920 and 1924 American

Olympic team and an active member of the Philadelphia sport community, also had a long involvement with the United States government. From 1914-16 he served as assistant director in the Bureau of War Risk Insurance (Treasury Department), was the assistant secretary for the American-Mexican Joint Commission on Arbitration (State Department) in

1916, and served as the technical advisor to the American Delegation at the Fourth

Diplomatic Conference on Air Law in 1938 in Brussels.163 Parker’s accession to the

International Olympic Committee, particularly with the difficulties surrounding Germany’s membership, surely pleased the State Department. In fact, it was Parker who met with the

American High Commission in Vienna to report on the discussions at the International

Olympic Committee meeting.164

The British Foreign Office as well had learned the usefulness of international sport from its occasional forays into sport before 1939. As Peter Beck has argued, British governmental involvement occurred when necessary, but the British Foreign Office did not have an official or regular stance regarding international sport. The England-Germany home- and-home football matches in 1935 and 1938 in particular demonstrated to the British government the political value that other states placed on victories. The British continued to emphasise in the 1930s that a sporting display and simply taking part were more important than the outcome on the scoreboard. British politicians and sport officials returned to these

163“Parker, J. Brooks B.,” Who’s Who in Pennsylvania, v. 1 (Chicago: The A.N. Marquis Co., 1939), 670; “J. Brooks Parker, Olympic Official,” New York Times 1 December 1951, 9; “J. Brooks B. Parker,” Bulletin du Comité International Olympique, no. 31 (January 1952), 24. 164Telegram, Donnelly to Bonn, London, Berlin, Geneva, Paris, 18 May 1951, Box 26, Berlin Element, Administration Division - Security Segregated General Records, 1949-55, RG 466, NARA; Letter, Avery Brundage to Secretary of State, 1 August 1951, Box 509, 120.1/8-151/1950-1954, RG 59, NARA.

304 same ideals after 1945 when the possibility of a renewed German participation in international sport arose. The British may not have had a consistent government policy regarding international sport before 1939, but after 1945 they maintained a clear policy with respect to Germany, supporting international sport in order to foster positive relations between states. Their initial reticence, along with American concerns, regarding the continued participation of former German sport officials was because they believed the involvement of these men would prolong sentiments of ill-will within sport.

The western Allies viewed sport, which had been completely coopted by the Nazis to further their militaristic and authoritarian aims, as a way to teach the youth how to be democratic. Just as in certain areas of technology and business, former German sport leaders such as Karl Ritter von Halt and Peco Bauwens resumed their positions because of their expertise and contacts with the international community. Particularly if sport officials could demonstrate that their work began before the Nazi assumption of power, and that they tried to protect sporting ideals from Nazi corruption, they could be considered reliable enough. With men such as Parker and Lord Burghley on the International Olympic Committee, international sport remained a bastion of the self-selecting “old boys’ network.” Even if the

Military Governments had attempted to replace the old German sport officials, these new

(and often younger) leaders did not have the international connections of the older leaders.

These experienced sport leaders were the very same men who maintained international sport contacts during the war and occupation and were thus favored by their international friends to resume control of German sport.

When international backlash to German reentry or recognition developed, it arose

305 from Germany’s smaller neighbours which the Third Reich had invaded and occupied during

World War II. The fears were more readily accepted in the immediate aftermath of the

Second World War and continued during the quadripartite occupation of Germany because international federations could claim that no geopolitical entity yet existed. Once the Federal

Republic of Germany became a legitimate state with its own government, however, the anti-

German sentiment no longer held sway over international sport. The American and British

Military Governments had implemented from an early stage in the occupation the use of sport to help bridge the hostilities which developed during the war, and the French eventually established similar programs. The Swiss, in particular with football, worked in tandem with the western Allies to help bring Germany back into the international community. These four countries largely dominated the International Olympic Committee, the international federations, and their executive committees by having more members per country than most of the rest of the world. Being members of the executive committees enabled a smaller group of men approving decisions – such as the acceptance of a state to membership – which only required formal approval by the full organisation and rarely went against executive committee recommendations.

Historians of the modern Olympic Games have demonstrated that the movement, although claiming that sport is above politics, has from its inception been greatly influenced by politics.165 The International Olympic Committee’s requirement that its members remain separate from politics was seriously challenged by the delegates nominated by communist states after World War II. Yet, at the same time the British, American, and French

165Senn, Power, Politics, and the Olympic Games; Kanin, A Political History of the Olympic Games.

306 governments became intimately involved in the affairs of international sport federations and the International Olympic Committee. Sport representatives contacted their governments in order to advance the cause of German sportsmen, while the High Commissioners, the State

Department, and Foreign Office concurrently attempted to influence their countries’ international sport representatives to support the governmental stance regarding Germany.

Allied interest in Germany’s position (or lack thereof) stemmed from their role as the occupation powers and the control of sport invested in them by Directive 23. As the Cold

War deepened both within Europe and throughout the world, it altered the way that the three western Allies viewed Germany and how the former Axis power could become an ally in international organisations to confront the new global enemy. As a result, the American,

British, and on occasion French foreign ministries and their representatives in Germany worked to ensure that international sport federations followed the political agenda set by the western democracies.

National sport officials in Germany simply wanted to secure German reentry in international sport, but they could not accomplish this goal without the assistance of the three western Allies and their international sport representatives – who often conferred with their governments. The occupation powers supported German reentry into international sport because it coincided with the general western Allied policy to help bring Germany back into the community of nations. Ultimately, however, German initiatives had to conform to the occupation laws still in effect. When German actions contravened Allied policies, the three powers became involved. Comparable to other decisions made by the western Allies, the

State Department and Foreign Office reversed their earlier decisions on German sport and its

307 leaders from policies following the aims of the occupation, such as denazification and decentralisation, to actions that supported newer Cold War policies, such as the isolation and nonrecognition of East Germany. In the process the western Allies ceded full control of sport back to the Germans themselves. If the western Allies did not permit the West German sport officials to function independently and democratically on their own, they could be accused of propping up West German sport similar to Soviet actions in East Germany.

Although denazification and democratisation had taken precedence during the occupation of Germany, the changing geopolitical situation, including the Korean War and the intensification of the Cold War, led to a reordering of western Allied priorities in

Germany. While the Duke of Mecklenburg and Karl Ritter von Halt were not the Allies’ first choice to direct sport in the new Germany, these two men were more acceptable members of the International Olympic Committee than whomever the Soviets nominated to represent East

Germany. Once the International Olympic Committee accepted the National Olympic

Committee of Germany and welcomed the Duke of Mecklenburg and Ritter von Halt back into their membership, the Allied High Commission no longer became involved, officially or behind the scenes, in the affairs of German sport. The two German IOC members, although perhaps tainted by some of their connections to the Nazis, would nonetheless uphold within the International Olympic Committee the western Allied and West German governments’ position of nonrecognition regarding East Germany. The Cold War, which had previously prompted changes in the western Allied policies regarding sport in Germany, again led to this important step in returning autonomous control to West German sport.

These histories of West Germany’s fight to rejoin the International Olympic

308 Committee and international sport federations present a general pattern, although not a set model, of the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Germany into international sport.

Taken together, they demonstrate that the national sentiments which influenced international organisations were the positions held by the three western Allies, especially the Americans and British. Just as the national will from these three states overrode the sentiments of the smaller European states such as Belgium and the Netherlands in other political debates, the sport organisations reflected these same relations between states. Sport provided a venue for

West Germany to participate in international relations with other countries while Germany itself remained excluded from the traditional international relations of diplomats.

309 Conclusion

The [German sport leaders] give their assurance that they will do everything in their power to prevent any misuse of German sports for other than sports purposes. –Allied-German Conference on Sport1

As this dissertation has shown, sport can be a highly effective instrument of public diplomacy. This usefulness of sport results from its broad appeal across multiple segments of the population, but also because sport allows for a public display of national capabilities. In the case of the occupation of Germany, the Americans, British, and French used sport to achieve the immediate occupation goals of democratisation and reconstruction. In doing so, the western Allies used the internationalism of sport to transform what they considered a militaristic and nationalistic activity within Germany. Before 1945 and especially before

1918, the sports in which Germans chose to participate, in particular fencing and gymnastics, helped define one’s Germanness through demonstrations of militarism and masculinity.

Participation in these sports was a conscious decision in opposition to the more international modern sport, largely viewed by Germans as imported from abroad. By encouraging competitions with athletes from other countries, the western Allies fostered a transformation of German sport from defining individual characteristics to supporting broader, group- oriented ideas of democracy. The Allies sought to rebuild German sport but remained wary of German efforts to form national sport organisations.

In return, Germans used the internationalism of sport to regain their position within the international community. Because the fragile relationship of the quadripartite powers

1Minutes, Allied-German Conference on Sport, 16-17 July 1949, FO 1050/1849, NA.

310 unravelled in 1948, the three western Allies granted concessions more willingly, paving the

way for the creation of national organisations. The lack of recognition for the 1948 German-

Swiss matches demonstrates Germany’s position as neither a part of the international system

nor an entity wholly separate from it. For all of the attention that FIFA paid to these three

games, the records of these games are not included in the international records for either

Germany or Switzerland.2 The leadership of international sport federations lay outside

official state control, and the occupation powers as well as the (West) Germans recognised

the significance attached to German resumption of membership within these organisations.

Although West Germans struggled with national and international recognition before 1949,

international sport federations became a bridge between a non-state with international pariah

status and the community of nations. International federations and non-governmental

organisations rely on this national-international tension, yet in the case of sport and occupied

Germany, the international sport federations played a different role in helping West Germany

negotiate this terrain. In this regard, international sport provided a place for Germans to

participate (at least unofficially) within the international system during a period when

Germans had no formal state.

The history of sport in occupied Germany reveals a set of fundamental tensions

between nationalism and internationalism and between sport and politics. Examining sport

allows for a reconceptualisation of international relations history, particularly when new or

unofficial states attempt to enter the international system. The actions of governments and

2Schweizerische Fussball und Athletik Verband, Das goldene Buch des Schweizer Fussbals (Basel: Verlag Domprobstei, 1953), 250; Deutscher Fußball-Bund, 100 Jahre DFB: Die Geschichte des Deutschen Fußball-Bundes (Berlin: Sportverlag Berlin, 1999), 40.

311 non-governmental organisations within the international system can have a direct impact on individuals within a state as well as the cognisant shaping of a national identity as states attempt to negotiate a place within the international community. In addition, the modern international sport movement was founded with the underlying premise that sport and politics were separate, and its leaders today continue to espouse this rhetoric. Yet, this politicisation of sport has existed from the first modern Olympic Games, and the basis of international sport on national or state boundaries contributes to this problem. The western Allies’ own sport traditions relied upon this ideal of national identity within the international system. In addition, sport and physical education in the United States, Great Britain, and France helped provide a general fitness among their male citizens in preparation for military service.

However, the Allies believed that sport in Germany, particularly fencing and gymnastics, had contributed to a militarised national identity which exalted a hyper-masculine ideal. The

Allies attempted to remove this self-definition from German sport by banning fencing, a staple of the university fraternities which perpetuated violence and militarism, and restricting the German form of gymnastics whose own history was inextricably linked with German politics and state formation. The use of sport to democratise West Germany, and the use of these new national organisations to prevent East German recognition in the international arena, were nonetheless ironic continuations of the politicization of sport.

When the International Olympic Committee recognised the National Olympic

Committee of Germany (situated in the Federal Republic) at its 1951 meeting in Vienna, the

IOC still pretended that sport remained separate from politics. Believing that “there can only be one Olympic Committee in each nation,” the International Olympic Committee considered

312 Germany one country even though it was separated into two parts.3 Eastern European

communist support of East Germany forced the International Olympic Committee to address

the issue of the composition of the German team for the upcoming 1952 Olympic Games.

The International Olympic Committee brokered a compromise, a combined team, that

provided any qualified German athlete – from either German state – with the opportunity to

participate in the Olympic Games in Helsinki. The selection of athletes was a technical

question left to the German authorities, but any difficulties would be solved by the National

Olympic Committee of Germany under the direction of Karl Ritter von Halt.4 The

International Olympic Committee had, in essence, accepted the political stance on Germany

that both West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the National Olympic Committee

in West Germany took, namely that their authority to govern – be it over the German people

or German sports – encompassed the entirety of the country, including the land that fell under

Soviet occupation.

East German Socialist Unity Party leader Walter Ulbricht, a sports enthusiast who

took a great interest in his country’s athletic endeavours, voided this agreement for the

combined team because the West Germans had complete control over the all-German team.5

The refusal of the East Germans to cooperate with the West German Olympic Committee

3J. Sigfrid Edstrom and Otto Mayer, “Executive Committee Decision on German Participation in 1952 Games,” 11 February 1952, Executive Commission, Oslo, February 11, 1952, Box 90, ABC. 4Letter, Otto Mayer to J. Sigfrid Edström, 31 May 1951, Presidents / J. Sigfrid Edström / Correspondance 1951, IOC. 5Martin Barry Vinokur, More Than a Game: Sports and Politics, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 105; G.A. Carr,“The Involvement of Politics in the Sporting Relationships of East and West Germany, 1945- 1972,” Journal of Sport History 7, no. 1 (1980), 43-4; Rede Herrn von Halts vor dem IOC, Helsinki, Sitzung, July 1952, Heft 713, DOSB; “Die Sowjetzone verzichtet auf Helsinki,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 March 1952, 6; Kurt Edel, “Declaration du Comité National Olympique de la République Démocratique Allemande au sujet de sa proposition d’être reconnu par le Comité International Olympique,” 10 February 1952, Heft 729, DOSB.

313 meant that only West Germans competed for “Germany” at the 1952 Summer Olympic

Games in Helsinki. It also marked the official introduction of the Cold War into the Olympic movement, and the “German Question” became an Olympic problem for nearly twenty years.

East Germany waited until the 1972 Olympic Games in Sapporo and Munich to compete with a completely separate team and its own flag. In fact, the first time the East German flag was officially recognised on West German soil was at the Munich Olympics.6 Athletic competitions during the Cold War, particularly between the two German states after 1952, enabled the two politically-divided camps to fight for which ideology was superior without having to engage in an actual war. East Germany viewed West Germany as its chief rival on the sport fields as a result of the nearly two decades of the all-German Olympic team imposed by the International Olympic Committee. From the division of Germany into two separate states in 1949 until its reunification, sport was one of the most visible and hostile fields in which West and East Germany competed against one another, viewing the athletic contests as being fought for democracy or for communism.

The preparations for an all-German Olympic team in Helsinki marked the beginning of the Cold War as the defining feature of postwar German sport, while at the same time the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in both the Summer and Winter Olympic

Games in 1952 signified the end of direct control by the western Allies within German sport.

The recognition of the Federal Republic within the International Olympic Committee and international sport federations and the state’s ability to compete at the Winter Olympics in

6Mexico City 1968, October 7-11, International Olympic Committee General Session Minutes, v. IV (1955-1988), International Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario; Lord Killanin, My Olympic Years (London: Secker & Warburg, 1983), 110.

314 Oslo demonstrated the acceptance of West Germany within the international community, which was reinforced with West German participation in the European Defence Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The diminution of western Allied political power came on the heels of the International Olympic Committee meeting in Vienna, after which the Americans, British, and French no longer attempted to influence directly the composition of West German sport. The events of 1951-52 concluded a period that began with the wartime planning for occupied Germany and the agreement on the creation of

Directive 23 on the Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport in Germany in December 1945 by all four Allies.

The demilitarisation of Germany involved more than the dismantling of the military, as the Allies wanted to remove the institutions within German society that fostered militarism. Here sport played a central role in Allied policies because they believed the

Prussian and German states used sport, particularly Turnen and fencing, to help develop a militaristic and centralised state. While these two sports continued in postwar Germany, their nature changed from forms which reinforced the militaristic national identity to the versions supported by the international sport federations. The Allied emphasis on modern sport led to the de-emphasis of Turnen and fencing within Germany. By limiting fencing and gymnastics to the forms espoused by their respective international federations, the Allies removed much of the politics and nationalism within German sport. The promotion of international sport rules for fencing and gymnastics further removed the Germanness reinforced by the duel and traditional Turnen. Western Allied support of modern sport has contributed to the changing of the athletic landscape of Germany, as fencing and Turnen are no longer the dominant

315 sports within German society. In the postwar period football has become the largest sport

within Germany, with nearly 6.5 million members of the German Football Federation.7

Looking at the intersection between Allied policy and German sport organisations

provides a different way of conceptualising the lived experience of sport. Although the

archival sources did not speak to how Germans personally experienced sport during the

occupation, the sport organisations mediated and directed the experiences of individual

Germans. As a result, the sport organisations at the local, regional, and national level helped

foster a new identity for West Germans. These sport organisations regulated the actual

playing of sport, but they did so within the parameters specified by the western Allies and the

international federations. The tensions among the interests of the Germans, the western

Allies, and the international community as a whole limited the agency of all three groups and

forced them to negotiate not only the return of German athletes to international athletic

competition, but also West Germany’s position within the international community. German

sport organisations had to contend with the aspirations of their leaders in forging a new

national identity as well as the competing goals of those people and organisations outside of

Germany who wanted the Germans to return as a “team player,” happy to participate in but

not intent on controlling international sport.

Sport, like other aspects of German society, built its postwar structure out of a

combination of older German traditions and new ideas and did not provide a radical departure

from pre-1945 German sport. Germans created new sport organisations during the

7The Deutscher Fussball Bund had almost 6.5 million members as of March 2007, making it the largest national sport governing body under the Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund. Deutscher Fussball Bund, http://www.dfb.de/index.php?id=311003, accessed 2 April 2008.

316 occupation in addition to reviving older, pre-Nazi sport organisations. Some of the former leading German sport institutions were completely tainted by their Third Reich affiliations, whereas other institutions fell under Soviet control and could not be used by the western

Allies. In addition, several of the leading sport personalities, some of whose involvement in

German and international sport stretched back to Imperial Germany, were the driving force behind the revival of previous sport organisations. In a few cases they supported the new sport institutions, such as Carl Diem’s appointment as rector of the Deutsche

Sporthochschule, but on the whole the leading sport figures in Germany used their international connections to ensure that the traditional Fachverbände returned as the dominant organisational structure in western Germany. These same individuals created difficulties for West Germany as it attempted to rejoin the international sport federations, just as tainted individuals who remained within German government and business created a public international outcry. The western democracies ultimately accepted the continued participation of individuals such as Carl Diem and Karl Ritter von Halt in order to demonstrate support of West Germany against the increasing calls for recognition of East

Germany, both within the sport community and the international system in general.

Thus, 1945 was not a Stunde Null or zero hour for German sport. German sport could not be a wholly new creation led by a young generation inexperienced and untrusted by the conservative and self-selecting international sport community which survived the Second

World War largely intact. The continued involvement of Imperial and Third Reich sport leaders also permitted the renewed relationship between sport and politics because these men viewed the political support of the western Allies as necessary to achieving their own sport

317 aims. Although the relatively high degree of continuity with sport organisations and people was at times problematic, the international scrutiny limited the autonomy of the German sport leaders and prevented them from returning completely to earlier practises.

The western Allies’ policies to oversee the reeducation and democratisation of

Germany unsurprisingly encountered criticism that forcing democracy on a country essentially conflicts with how democracy operates. How can and does a victorious power transform a vanquished state into a democracy when the defeated citizens did not demand those rights themselves? Petra Goedde, in her study of the interaction between American occupation soldiers and Germans in the American zone, noted the inherent contradiction in the imposition of democracy. She states that “the focus on the democratization of Germany's youth furthermore allowed the military government to reconcile one of the most profound paradoxes of its mission: how to impose democracy on another people through essentially undemocratic means.”8 The policies instituted for youth organisations were the same as for sport organisations, with each group submitting its bylaws to the local Military Government office for approval. Until the rules governing each association were sufficiently democratic with all traces of authoritarianism removed, the organisation could not officially exist. The

Allies believed that the act of writing these new statutes and selecting leaders for these organisations were themselves democratising practises. While this policy may itself appear authoritarian on the part of the occupation powers, it nonetheless enabled a large segment of the population to participate in democratic activities, particularly before Germans achieved

8Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 128.

318 full political democracy.

The use of public diplomacy programs helped the Allies inculcate Germans with

democratic practises without imposing democracy by decree. Allied policies emphasised

increasing the “use of those native resources of German civilization which offer promise of

the peaceful development of new ideals and institutions.”9 The western Allies believed their

policies were successful, demonstrated by the expansion of these programs as the Cold War

deepened. In addition, sport leaders used the language of democracy in their fight for the

repeal of Directive 23 and the formation of national sport organisations, including for

gymnastics and fencing. By providing arguments which demonstrated the attainment of the

occupation aim of democratisation, the western Allies had a difficult time continuing to place

restrictions on German sport by late 1948. The western Allies hoped the plurality of

organisational structures would foster democratic decision-making among German

sportsmen. The ability of other German sport leaders to overcome authoritarian tendencies

and develop sport structures which reinforced democratic practises and procedures,

particularly as a result of participation in the Allied programs, indicates that the western

Allies were largely successful in their democratisation efforts. One of the most lasting

achievements was the decentralisation of sport, as no single organisation governed sport in

Germany until 2006 when the National Olympic Committee and the Deutscher Sportbund

merged into the Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund.10

9Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-Education (SWNCC 269), 16 May 1946, Box 121, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division -- Records of the Community Education Branch -- Records of Mr. E.L. Norrie, Branch Chief, RG 260, NARA. 10On 10 December 2005 the National Olympic Committee and the Deutscher Sportbund announced their agreement to merge into one organisation, the Deutscher Olympischer Sportbund, effective 20 May 2006. “Fusion zwischen NOK und DSB beschlossene Sache – DSB-Bundestag stimmte zu,” Deutscher Olympischer

319 Whereas previous histories have assessed the goals of the occupation, this dissertation has examined sport as a vehicle for achieving these goals. The western Allies could not work with every single German, but they recognised the usefulness of sport and increased those programs. Jessica Gienow-Hecht’s examination of the Military Government-led newspaper,

Neue Zeitung, demonstrates that the Americans did not abandon democratisation once the

Cold War deepened. Instead, they intensified their efforts by expanding anti-fascist programs by including an anti-Soviet stance. This dissertation on sport demonstrates that these same actions which Gienow-Hecht observed were replicated across the three western zones of

Germany. The Americans, British, and French noted the achievements of their public diplomacy programs and expanded them at the same time as they began to discontinue denazification and decentralisation efforts. The western Allies recognised that they could not dictate new democratic structures for the Germans, but if carefully selected Germans participated in Allied programs and spread ideas of democracy and democratic structures themselves, Germans would more readily adopt these practises. Even when Germans were not the best choice to portray the new Germany, such as the executive of the National

Olympic Committee, enough overlap existed between their ideas and the anti-Soviet position of the Allies that enabled these Germans to remain in their positions.

Sport went beyond the physical reconstruction of Germany and its citizens by also rehabilitating Germans morally. Attending matches between clubs or cities provided a temporary reprieve from the difficulties of the early years of the occupation. One American

Sportbund, 10 December 2005, http://www.dosb.de/de/start/details/news/fusion_zwischen_nok_und_dsb_beschlossene_sache_dsb_bundestag_s timmte_zu/8279/na/2005//cHash/baa266512a, accessed 15 April 2008.

320 physical education expert who visited Germany believed the main physical education problems facing the Germans, in order of importance, were food, shelter, equipment, and teachers. He noted that it was difficult “to participate in physical education activities on an empty stomach.”11 Once basic necessities were met, Germans could sustain the physical rigours of sport participation. The western Allies could then provide financial support for rebuilding athletic venues and helping construct new sport spaces, as well as the organisational support for Germany to rejoin international federations. The western Allies were successful in promoting sport for sport’s sake in Germany instead of participating in sport solely to foster a national identity among the masses. During the Cold War elite sport at the international level supported West or East German “nationalism” or, more appropriately, statism, but since reunification the militarised and nationalistic undertones which Turnen and fencing held within Germany before 1945 are largely absent from sport for the general population.

The Allied attempts to remove politics from sport directly led to sport becoming one of the key Cold War battlegrounds, particularly between the two German states. Both

German states, with the support of their occupation powers, used the space created by

Directive 23 to transform sport into one of the defining characteristics of the German-German confrontation until the end of the Cold War and reunification of Germany. The creation of national sport organisations, which in fact only represented the three western zones of the

Federal Republic, and their attempts to join international federations deepened the rift

11“George E. Little Describes Post-War Progress in Germany,” Daily Home News [New Brunswick, N.J.], 18 July 1947, Rutgers University Archives, New Brunswick, N.J.

321 between the two German states following the growing Cold War divide among the four

Allies. Although the politics of sport influenced West Germany’s formal resumption of membership, sport within Germany and the international community affected the Cold War, with the emergence of sport as one of its central battlegrounds. Particularly as the western

Allies shifted their opinion with respect to German membership in international sport federations, politics became one of the most important factors in achieving West German recognition. Although the Americans, British, and French did not go as far as the communist

European states, which interfered all the way to the personal level through the state- sponsored doping programs in order to win more medals, the three western Allies nonetheless viewed sport as key component in the front line against communism in Germany. The interactions between political and sport leaders reveals a heavier manipulation of international sport by the western democracies. These archival discoveries necessitate a reevaluation of Cold War sport which combines materials from sport organisations as well as political leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

While it is important to examine how events during the occupation of Germany contributed to the Cold War, it is also necessary to understand how the western Allies addressed their different policies as they consolidated the three zones to form the Federal

Republic of Germany. Previous studies of sport during the occupation, and almost all of the literature on the occupation of Germany, have only addressed policies within one zone.

Examining the policies of the occupation, such as when the decisions both to create and repeal Directive 23 were taken at a quadripartite or tripartite level, called for a different perspective. The policies of the American, British, and French zones must be considered

322 together because the creation of West Germany involved the amalgamation of the three western zones. Sport policies in occupied Germany all developed out of the quadripartite

Directive 23 on the Limitation and Demilitarization of Sport. However, each power created separate laws to implement Directive 23 within its own zone. As in other areas of the occupation, the three western Allies had to coordinate their policies with the merging of their zones and the formal creation of the Federal Republic.

This dissertation has not only demonstrated the interaction of the three occupation powers, but also the role that other European states played in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Germany. The occupation of western Germany may have been tripartite, but its return to the international community was a multinational project undertaken by the victorious, the rescued, and the neutrals alike. The Federal Republic had to contend with popular opinions and government positions, particularly from the states which Nazi Germany had occupied during the Second World War. The three western Allies as well as the

Germans had to contend with these sentiments and address the broader implications within the international community. Actions within sport federations reflected the international situation, especially once the division of Germany was complete. Even with the initial hesitation from smaller, neighbouring states, West Germany’s resumption of international sport also helped heal the wounds of war in other states, as the Federal Republic’s participation in the 1952 Winter Olympics in Oslo demonstrates. Allied officials recognised the potential for international sport in raising German spirits, stating that the resumption of

German membership within international sport federations “would involve a recognition that

Germany had taken her place again among the nations of the World and the Germans would

323 undoubtedly attach considerable political significance to this.”12 Rejoining international sport

federations assisted with the moral rebuilding of West Germany, but the western Allies did

not want this return to international sport to foster a premature German nationalism.

Perhaps the fear of an unhealthy German nationalism has prompted the German

Olympic Committee to continue providing uniforms for its Olympic team that do not include

the colours of its flag, as most states do.13 The issue of German nationalism and sport

returned to the fore in the summer of 2006 when Germany hosted the FIFA World Cup, the

first sport mega-event held in Germany since reunification. West Germany had previously

hosted the World Cup in 1974, and the two Olympic Games on German soil are remembered

more for their politics: the “Nazi Games” of 1936 and the terrorist massacre of Israeli athletes

in 1972. In 2006, however, German periodicals and scholars of Germany widely discussed

the “new nationalism” displayed across the country, as Germans waved flags, painted their

faces with the black-red-gold, and wore shirts emblazoned with “Deutschland”. Some people

considered these actions as harmless and the same as fans in the rest of the world; others

viewed this patriotism as a dangerous precedent to encourage extremists within Germany.14

International sport, formalised in the late 1800s and early 1900s with the creation of

the International Olympic Committee and international sport federations and designed to

promote internationalism, in fact creates the intense nationalism demonstrated by the

competitors and fans. This paradox of international sport is what prompted the western

12R. Birley, Staff Memorandum, Policy Regarding the Participation of Germans in International Sporting Events Outside Germany, 24 January 1949, FO 1050/1095, NA. 13At the 2006 Winter Olympics in Torino, Italy, the German team marched in the opening ceremony in uniforms that were bright orange, lime green, and white. 14See the discussion on H-GERMAN from 22 June - 18 July 2006, http://www.h-net.org/~german/. Accessed 16 March 2008.

324 Allies to support competition between Germans and athletes from other countries, but it also contributed to their hesitation in permitting the formation of national sport organisations.

The balance attempted between promoting moral reconstruction while not fomenting nationalism was waged by the western Allies during the occupation of Germany and into the first few years of the Federal Republic. Germany’s achievements in the 2006 World Cup as both a participant, only losing in the semifinals to eventual champion Italy, and as host, with the cultural and economic success of the month-long event, have brought a return of these issues and concerns sixty years later. Sport helped West Germany return to the international community after World War II, and perhaps it is sport that will allow Germany and its citizens finally to be just like everyone else with respect to patriotism and flag-waving without always raising its negative historical connections.

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