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UniversiV M icr^tlms International SOON.Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

8513653

Zoubir, Yahia Hamdallah

WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES: KAUTSKYISM AND/OR DEREVOLUTIONIZATION?

The American University Ph.D. 1985

University Microfilms internâtions!300 N.Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml48106

Copyright 1985

by

Zoubir, Yahia Hamdallah

All Rights Reserved

WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES:

KAUTSKYISM AND/OR DEREVOLUTIONIZATION?

by

Yahia H. Zoubir

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Relations

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: Steven I . Levine

Gert H. Mueller

Richard Breitman

Dean of the College

Date

1985 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

TEE AkERICM UNIVERSITY LIBRARY © COPYRIGHT

BY

YAHIA H. ZOUBIR

1985

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES:

KAUTSKYISM AND/OR DEREVOLUTIONIZATION?

by

Yahia H. Zoubir

ABSTRACT

In the 1970s, the Euroconununist phenomenon dominated

the political scene. The West European communist parties

declared that their strategy would be constitutional and

that the deep transformation which they intended to under­

take in their nations would be accomplished within the

parliamentary democratic framework. Their strategy con­

sists of involving and obtaining the consensus of the majority of the population in this peaceful process of

transformation. To achieve their goal, they have pro­

claimed their independence from their previous center of

domination, Moscow, and emphasized their national charac­

ters. More importantly, they have abandoned many of the

fundamental concepts of Leninist doctrine. The basic

thesis of this dissertation is that Eurocommunism has

rejected "insurrectionary politics" as a means of coming to

power. In opposition to the Eurocommunists' assertion that 11

their strategy is inspired by Gramsci's teachings, the

contention of this study is that they have adopted

Kautsky's conceptions, not Gramsci's theoretical formula­

tions. The Euroconununist strategy, contrary to the one

prescribed by the founders of Marxism and by Lenin, is

primarily parliamentary.

Like classical Social Democracy, Eurocommunism,

despite its intention of transforming capitalism, has ended

up managing it. Unlike Social Democracy as it has devel­

oped since World War II, Eurocommunism's proclaimed objec­

tive remains the establishment of a socialist society.

However, this dissertation asserts that this realization will be difficult to attain; history has indicated the

repeated phenomenon of revolutionary movements becoming deradicalized in the process of attempting political

integration. West European communist parties, like Social

Democratic parties in the past, have been forced to operate within the confines of the very system they are attempting

to change radically. Revolutionary means of establishing

Communism in Europe have failed to undermine the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy. This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my mother, from whom I have learned more than from twenty-five years in schools. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing this dissertation would not have been possible without the contributions, moral support, and constant encouragement of relatives, faculty members and friends. I would like to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to all those who have supported me and inspired me throughout

the whole period of undertaking this work.

Professor Steven I. Levine, my chairman, has not only

shown interest in my work, but has provided constant

intellectal stimulation and encouragement. He offered me

the friendship necessary to make possible a working rela­

tionship. To Professor Gert H. Mueller I owe most of my

intellectual inspiration ever since the first class I took with him in the autumn of 1979. He has taught me the meaning of critical research and theoretical rigor.

Whatever sociological insight I may have developed is due

to his guidance. Professor Richard Breitman took the risk

of being on my committee without even knowing me. I would

like to thank him for the confidence he has shown in me.

lie has also helped me to avoid falling into the trap of

partisan politics into which the nature of this work might

have tempted me. I am also grateful to Professor Eusebio

IV Mujal-Leon of Georgetown University for his help in the early stages of this dissertation.

In the seven years I have spent in the School of

International Service I have been fortunate to meet faculty members who assisted me in various ways. My special thanks go to Professor Nicholas Onuf, who never failed to give me his support when I needed it. I would also like to thank

Professor Albert Mott and Professor Gunther Eyck, both West

European specialists, for letting me lecture on my topic in their classes.

I would like to thank Dean William Olson, Professor barman Wilson, and F. Jackson Piotrow for the support and trust they showed me while I was teaching the Western

Tradition course in the School. The encouragement of Nora

Bawa, Mary Eager, Suzanne Skillings and Tina Taylor is also highly appreciated, as is the help of my colleague

Charlotte Knott.

I am very grateful to the staff of The American

University Library, who always helped me find my sources.

My special thanks go to Shirley Rosenstock of the Inter-

Library Loans, who acquired the necessary material for this research.

Among my fellow students and friends, I would like to thank Robert Beckmann, Abbas Malekzadeh, and Ernest Plock.

Francine Krasowska deserves all the credit for making this manuscript legible. Her excellent typing spared me yet another agony. VI

My greatest debt goes to my wife Cynthia, who has supported me all the way through this dissertation. Her patience, encouragement, dedication, and moral support are immeasurable. She shared with me every minute of the agony, more than one can expect from a newly-wed.

My dearest friends, Nicholas and Lisa Singer, granted me endless moral support and encouragement. Without Lisa's imposed deadlines this dissertation would still not have been completed. I am also very grateful to my dear friend

Mohamed O. Benmoumene for being...my friend. Special thanks go to my in-laws, the Penningroths, who have been giving me lots of moral support.

I am very grateful to my family in Algiers. I thank my father, step-mother, brothers and sisters for believing in me and praying for me during all these years of absence from h o m e . TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... 1

Acknowledgements ...... iv

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter I. ELEMENTS OF MARXIST THEORY ...... 16

Introduction ...... 17

The Proletariat as the Class of Change ...... 25

Marx and the Conception of the P a r t y ...... 38

Social Revolution, Transition to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat .... 45

The S t a t e ...... 51

Reform and Revolution ...... 64

The Peaceful Transition to Socialism ...... 71

Engels' "Introduction"; The Genesis of Deradicalization? ...... 75

II. GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY ...... 94

The German SPD: From Isolation to Participation ...... 96

Karl Kautsky: Socialism and Democracy ...... 134

III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROCOMMUNISM ...... 160

Origins of the Communist Parties of Western Europe ...... 161

From the Popular Fronts to the Twentieth Congress of the C P S U ...... 199

The Crisis of the 1960s; The First Test of Deradical izat io n ? ...... 231

Genesis of the New Strategy of the West European Communist Parties ...... 251

Vll Vlll

IV. EUROCOMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY ...... 257

Problems of Socialism and Democracy: Kautsky vs. Lenin ...... 260

Eurocommunism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat : the Resurrection of K a u t s k y ...... 285

Gramsci and Eurocommunism: The Anti- Leninist Strategist of the W e s t ? ...... 294

The Anti-Monopoly Forces as Objective A l l i e s ...... 320

The PCI's "Historic Compromise": The End of Revolutionary Politics? ...... 332

C o n c l u s i o n ...... 354

V. THE DERADICALIZATION THESIS ...... 363

The Deradicalization of the Working Class As a Result of Capitalist Development ...... 364

Tucker's Thesis on Deradicalization ...... 371

Weber's Theory on the Effects of Bureaucratization ...... 376

Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" ...... 380

Roth's Concept of "Negative Integration" .... 391

C o n c l u s i o n ...... 401

CONCLUSION ...... 411

Selected Bibliography ...... 417 INTRODUCTION

The Communists of Spain, France and Italy intend to work for the construction of a new society, respecting the pluralism of political and social forces and the guarantee and develop­ ment of all individual and collective freedoms: freedom of thought and expression, of the press, of association, assembly and demonstra­ tion, of the free circulation of people inside their country and abroad, trade union freedom, autonomy of the trade unions and the right to strike, the inviolability of private life, respect for universal suffrage and the possi­ bility of the democratic alternation of majori­ ties, religious freedom, freedom of culture, freedom of expression of the various philosoph­ ical, cultural, and artistic currents and opinions. This determination to build social­ ism in democracy and freedom inspires the conceptions elaborated by each of the free parties.

L'Unita, March 4, 1977

In the 1970s, a new political movement swept across

Western Europe — "Eurocommunism."^ The term describes the strategy to achieve socialism adopted by the three main

Communist Parties (CPs) of Western Europe: the Italian

(PCI), the French (PCF), and the Spanish (PCE). The main elements of this strategy are contained in the above-cited statement.

The term was coined in 1975 by an Italian journalist and came to be accepted by the different leaders of the main West European communist parties, as well as by the Japanese, the Australian, and Mexican communist parties, among others. Although they share many similarities, the domestic and international policies of the three parties are far from being identical. The specific evolution and environ­ ments of the parties explain their differences. There is no doubt, for instance, that the largest West European CP, the PCI, is the most Eurocommunist. The PCE is also strongly committed to the principles of Eurocommunism, but plays no signfleant role in Spanish politics. The PCF's strategy, though similar in many ways to Eurocommunist strategy, is quite different from the PCI's and the PCE's.

It still vacillates between Stalinism and Social Democracy.

The PCF's zig-zags make its commitment to Eurocommunism — which it partially abandoned in 1978, and again in 1985 — less credible. The often unstable policy of the PCF reveals the contradictions of and the dilemmas faced by this communist party. Not only the PCF, but the other

Eurocommunist parties as well, live these contradictions and confront these dilemmas.

The birth of Eurocommunism was not spontaneous. It has been the result of a long historical process which has shaped and re-shaped the communist movement in Western

Europe. Both national and international circumstances have influenced its evolution and direction.

The theoretical roots of Eurocommunism can be found in the revisionism of Social Democracy and the Second Inter­ national, on the one hand, and in the Stalinist concept of "Socialism in One Country," which laid the foundations for national communism, on the other hand. Indeed, one of the principal characteristics, if not the main one, of Eurocom­ munism is its national aspect. The various West European

CPs that have espoused the Eurocommunist line have succeed- 2 ed in becoming more or less independent of Moscow. This independence has been instrumental in helping them formu­ late "national roads to socialism." More importantly, the

Eurocommunist parties refuse to be isolated from the political process in their respective nations. The West

European CPs have often played a crucial role in determin­ ing the form of the political system (e.g. , reestablishment of democracy in Italy in the 1940s) and its legitimation.

Following the Second World War, the earlier strict adher­ ence of the West European CPs to Soviet doctrines and tactics gave way after Stalin's death to new strategies which took more account of national realities. Chief among these strategies was the rejection of the Bolshevik pre­ scription for taking power in a manner that was quite similar to that objected to earlier by Radicals (Rosa

Luxemburg), Centrists (Karl Kautsky), and Revisionists

2 This does not mean, however, that they have broken all ties with Moscow or withdrawn their support for the latter's foreign policy. The PCF, though often critical of Moscow, is still a close ally of the Soviet Union. See Brian L. Zimbler, "Partners or Prisoners? Relations Between the PCF and CPSU, 1977-1983," Studies in Comparative Communism XVII (Spring 1984) : 3-29. (Eduard Bernstein) in the German Social Democratic Party

(SPD) .

In the 1970s, the strategy of the three main West

European CPs was identified as Eurocommunism. The term, as indicated earlier, conceals the sharp differences that distinguish the three parties. The reference to this new

"form" of Communism as European is also incorrect, since

CP's other than the West European have advocated similar policies. The concept may be merely political, in that it intends to distinguish Western Communism from Soviet practice. From a classical Marxist point of view, the term

"Eurocommunism" — just like "Socialism in One Country" — is anathemic to Marxist doctrine, for which Communism is not a national achievement, but has an international dimension.

Whatever the objections to the term, a Eurocommunist strategy does exist. It can be identified, not only through the pronouncements of Eurocommunist leaders, but often through the concrete political practice of the CPs.

Eurocommunism reiterates Bernstein's and Kautsky's idea that the transition to socialism does not necessarily have to be revolutionary, i.e., aiming at the destruction of the bourgeois-democratic State. In this conception, the transition can be achieved within the framework of the parliamentary institutions which Eurocommunism intends to use for its own purposes. The Eurocommunist leaders insist on their respect for the existing political structures, although they also demand their democratic transformation in order to prevent a minority (the monopoly class) from exercising total domination over these structures. Con­ trary to their Leninist-Stalinist heritage, which they have partially rejected, the Eurocommunists now accept the idea of a multi-party Socialist society — as opposed to a one-party political system in which the CP has a monopoly, such as exists in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

Briefly stated, Eurocommunism is a strategy for achieving the transition to socialism that does not aim at the forcible overthrow of existing parliamentary democra­ cies. The avowed purpose of the Eurocommunist CPs is to preserve and extend democratic rights and freedoms to all groups in society.

The objective of this dissertation is to examine the intellectual roots of Eurocommunism. Contrary to the founders of Marxism, who held that the transition to

Socialism would inevitably be violent, the Eurocommunists firmly believe that it can be attained peacefully. They insist that revolution in the West is practically impos­ sible. Consequently, they argue, the only possible way to transform Western societies is through parliamentary democracy. The latter, as it exists today, is not viewed as dominated and shaped primarily by the bourgeoisie.

Rather, it is the product of intense class struggle, which has given a specific character to these parliamentary systems and their institutions. In opposition to Lenin's conception, the Eurocommunists regard even the State in a different perspective. Like the founders of Marxism and the Social Democrats, they maintain that the function of the Capitalist State is primarily to serve the interest of the capitalist class. However, the growth of monopoly capitalism has led, according to the Eurocommunists, to new contradictions. In their analysis of State Monopoly

Capitalism (SMC), they argue that the State is no longer a monolithic, homogeneous organ dominated by the bourgeois class. Today, the function of the upper echelons of the

State (the Executive) is to serve the interests of the big bourgeoisie, i.e., the monopoly faction. However, the

State in "general" also has "universal functions." The administrative machinery of the State is more or less

"neutral," which makes it possible for the "anti-monopoly forces" to transform it gradually by peaceful means. An alliance of the working class with other "progressive" forces (including some elements of the bourgeoisie, whose interests have been undermined by the monopoly faction) will result in the reversal of the relationship of forces in the socio-economic and political organization of soci­ ety. Once the popular forces have infiltrated the State institutions, bourgeois hegemony will progressively be eroded. Electoral achievements would allow the mass movement to capture positions within the State, thus allowing the popular forces to exercise greater control over the economy and other spheres. It is hoped that through this process the monopoly faction would be neutral­ ized, giving way to a "democratic State." The Eurocom­ munists claim to arrive at this stage with no ruptures in the representative institutions. All that is necessary is the introduction of new elements (of Socialism) into the old structures. The capitalist system itself is not fundamentally transformed at this stage. Rather, a "mixed economy" will be substituted for the monopoly framework, allowing a rejuvenation of the economy. The structural reforms are thought to prepare the ground for the socialist transition. Throughout this phase, constitutional rights and liberties will be extended and maintained even during the next phase, i.e.. Socialism. Although the Communist party would point the way toward the new society, the political system is said to be pluralistic, and no one doctrine, according to the Eurocommunists, would be imposed upon society. Ideological and cultural diversity will characterize West European Socialism.

This strategy undoubtedly finds its theoretical inspiration in classical Social Democracy as represented by the theoretical works of Kautsky. However, the Eurocommu­ nist conception of linear evolution toward socialism finds its source in Bernstein. In this dissertation, the theo­ retical pronouncements of Kautsky and Bernstein will be 8 examined to demonstrate the strong parallels that exist between classical Social Democracy and Eurocommunism.

Although the situations are quite different, the dilemmas of the two movements remain practically the same. Their attempts to achieve their goals through the structures of parliamentary democracy led them to adopt conceptions other than the ones upon which they originally based their doctrines.

This dissertation contends that Eurocommunism, like

Social Democracy before it, has undergone a process of "de- revolutionization." De-revolutionization is here defined as a process by which the Western CPs have come to reject revolution as a means to achieve power. Their new stance is such that they have adopted a strategy which opposes any movement that challenges the existing system through violent means; hence their advocacy of firm "law and order" attitudes. Moreover, they have rejected as obsolete or irrelevant many of their previously cherished concepts

("smashing" the bourgeois State, dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.). Nonetheless, the Eurocommunist CPs remain radical parties — as was Social Democracy, which, one might argue, still is radical in some respects. The distinction between a revolutionary and a radical ideology is the following; a revolutionary strategy aims at the transformation of society whatever the means. Insurrection and violence are considered an intrinsic part of this strategy. A radical strategy proposes drastic reforms to change a given system; however, it excludes illegal and extra-parliamentary means to achieve its goal. Though it aspires to transform the system, it only uses the means instituted within the very same system. Contrary to revolutionary strategy, radical strategy does not contest the legitimacy of the existing system in any fundamental way. In this sense, Eurocommunism seems to have completely abandoned revolutionary socialism.

The Eurocommunists have repudiated Leninism and, instead, embraced Kautskyism, i.e., the strategy developed by Kautsky from 1912 onwards. Although they do not admit it, their views are identical to Kautsky's a man whom they abhorred for decades. In their attempt to reconcile democracy with socialism, they have reached conclusions which Kautsky (and Bernstein) defended some 70 years ago.

The Eurocommunists claim that their strategy is inspired by

Gramsci's teachings, but in fact they owe much more to

Kautsky than to Gramsci, whose conception can be used to criticize today's West European Communist strategy. The

PCI's "historic compromise" is as Kautskyan as parliamen­ tary strategy itself. In order to avoid losing their identity, the West European CPs have been compelled to claim allegiance to a revolutionary authority, rather than to a former enemy. But like the Social Democrats before them, the Eurocommunists have reinterpreted the writings of 10

Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Gramsci in a way which justifies their moderate practice. References to class struggle, revolution, violence, etc. are conspicuously absent from the pronouncements of the leaders and programs of the CPs.

The objective of this dissertation is to examine once more the problem of "proletarian revolution" in Western

Europe and the constraints to which it is subjected. Both

Social Democracy and Eurocommunism began as revolutionary movements. However, their accommodation to the system, their bureacratization and consequent interest in the preservation of the existing order, led to their inevitable de-revolutionization. Moreover, the socio-economic prog­ ress witnessed by West European societies, the legitimacy acquired by parliamentary democracy in the eyes of all social classes (except for the extremists), and the failure of the Soviet bloc to provide its working class with the

"ideals" of socialism (freedoms, plenty, democracy, etc.) have made the working class and the working-class parties less and less revolutionary.

The Eurocommunist parties, mainly the PCI and the PCF, are parties of considerable importance. Their constituen­ cies are substantial and their organization is almost impeccable. Despite this fact, however, they have only been able to effect little change within the system. Their rivals. Socialists or Social Democrats, have had a better performance in transforming the capitalist system (welfare 11

State, etc.), but they too have encountered limitations in making profound structural reforms. One question to be asked, therefore, is whether the Eurocommunists, should they ever come to power, will succeed where the Social

Democrats have failed.

This dissertation is divided into five chapters.

Chapter I reviews the core concepts of Marxist theory as laid out by Marx and Engels. The purpose of doing this is not simply an exercise in exegesis. The primary reason is to show that some concepts constitute the foundation of

Marxist revolutionary theory: the dictatorship of the proletariat, the "smashing" of the bourgeois State and its apparatuses, etc. Most of these elements of Marxist theory have been abandoned by Social Democracy, as well as by

Eurocommunism. Moreover, in presenting Marxist doctrine in its original meaning, one can quite easily pinpoint the fundamental revisions brought to it by the Social Demo­ crats, on the one hand, and by the Eurocommunists, on the ot h e r .

Chapter II deals with the German Social Democratic

Party from 1890 to 1914. Why include such a chapter? The main reason is that the SPD was the first party to have adopted Marxism as its creed and attempted to implement it in practice. Secondly, analysis of the SPD has a definite relevance to analysis of Eurocommunism. Many contemporary scholars refer to Eurocommunist as a repetition of Social 12

Democracy. However, they fail to present and discuss the dilemmas faced by the SPD and its theoreticians. One of the objectives of this dissertation is to fill that gap.

Thirdly, the brief historical development of Social Demo­ cracy treated in this chapter helps support one of the theses defended in this dissertation, notably the one which stipulates that the West European CPs have undergone a process of Kautskyization. Fourthly, the chapter high­ lights the difficulty the SPD had in implementing revolu­ tionary theory in a non-revolutionary situation, when (1) the deradicalization of the working class was becoming increasingly obvious, (2) revisionism was rampant, and (3) nationalism was gaining strength. Fifthly, analysis of the

SPD shows that the integration of revolutionary parties into the existing system leads to their derevolutioniza- tion. Historical analysis proves that revolutionary parties are more radical while in isolation than when they are integrated into the political system. The attachment of SPD leaders to legality and parliamentarism prevented them from inaugurating any revolutionary eras.

Chapter III traces the historical evolution of the

West European CPs (the progenitors of today's Eurocommu­ nism) . The first section in particular deals with the origins of the different CPs. The communist parties were born as a result of the split within the Social Democratic parties of the various European countries. Although many 13 revolutionaries, such as Rosa Luxemburg, thought that the time was not ripe for the creation of an International, the

Bolsheviks proceeded with such a project anyway. They succeeded in attracting those radicals who were discontent­ ed with the passivity and conservatism of the Socialist parties. More importantly, the Bolsheviks encouraged schisms within the ranks of the working-class parties. The

Third International (Comintern) was founded and progres­ sively became an instrument of Russian domination over the other parties. The Russian Revolution was imposed as the model to be followed in the West, despite the peculiar conditions that existed there. The famous "Twenty-One

Conditions" for admission to the Comintern accentuated the split within the labor movement. The Communist Parties of

France (PCF) and Italy (PCI) were born out of the split which occurred at the Congresses of their respective

Socialist parties, the SFIO and the PSI. Although the

Comintern appeared as a monolithic organization, numerous tendencies developed within it. The rightist trend which contained the seeds of Eurocommunism evolved gradually and led eventually to the formulation of the Popular Front tactics in the 1930s, which countered the emergence of

Fascism and Nazism.

A fundamental argument made throughout Chapter III is that, despite revolutionary rhetoric, the West European CPs never seriously attempted to seize power or to exploit 14 potential or real revolutionary situations to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Chapter IV focuses on the relationship between social­ ism and democracy. The core argument in the first section is that the Eurocommunists' conception of socialism and democracy is an almost total reiteration of Kautsky's ideas. Moreover, in opposition to Lenin's thought, the

Eurocommunist interpretation of democracy derives mostly from the liberal tradition. In fact, an analysis of the

Left Eurocommunists (i.e., the Marxist intellectuals who, though they have rejected Lenin's doctrine, remain attached to revolutionary Marxism) shows clearly that they too are inspired by Kautsky ' s thinking. Both the Left and Right

(i.e., the party leaders) Eurocommunists defend representa­ tive democracy. They also both fail to produce a theoret­ ical conception of proletarian democracy. This failure and contradictions derive from the West European Communists' dilemma as to how to adapt to representative democracy while still attempting to transform it.

A section of this chapter is devoted to Gramsci's thought and its interpretation by the Eurocommunists in order to justify their practice.

The final chapter offers a review of the theses and theories of deradicalization of revolutionary organiza­ tions. Chapter V continues the discussion started in

Chapter I, with the observation that Marx and Engels 15 themselves had made about the deradicalization of the

European working class.

In this last chapter the debate includes Lenin's notion of "labor aristocracy," Tucker's thesis on deradical­ ization, Weber's theory on bureaucratization, and Michels' classical study. Michels' thesis is emphasized because it shows that the elements which characterized the deradicali­ zation of the SPD are present in the Eurocommunist parties.

A brief evaluation of the achievements of Social

Democracy is also undertaken in this chapter, to ask the question whether Eurocommunism can be more successful than

Social Democracy in deeply transforming the capitalism system. CHAPTER I

ELEMENTS OF MARXIST THEORY

This chapter will set forth the core ideas of clas­ sical Marxism in order to have a clear picture of the

Marxian problematic and the strategy that derives from it.

The main reason for doing this is to demonstrate later on in this dissertation how these core concepts have been reinterpreted by German Social Democracy, Leninism, and

Eurocommunism to justify their practices. The crucial element is, of course, to show that the West European

Communist parties (CPs) have reinterpreted these core ideas in such a way that they have remained Marxist concepts only in form, rather than in content. Whether this was done in a conscious way by the CPs in order to justify their practice is not always clear. What is certain is that their strategies — due to the constraints of the systems within which they evolved — shifted away from the frame­ work of the Marxist problematic to the point where their vision has become sometimes similar to that of those against whom (e.g. Lassalle, etc.) Marx had developed his conceptions.

16 17

Introduction

In this chapter I will deal primarily with the writ­ ings of Marx and Engels. The objective is not to give a new interpretation of what they "really" meant, but to present their views as objectively as possible. I shall insist on the points which, to my knowledge, were crucial to historical materialism. This is not to be done as an exercise in exegesis. The main point is that, by present­ ing the theory as it stood in the hands of Marx and Engels, one can compare it to today's interpretations and see how much has been altered or distorted, either by necessity

(because of the changes in the social, historical, econom­ ic, and cultural conditions) or because of an abandonment of some of the principal tenets of the theory. The reason for doing this is not to re-establish any so-called "ortho­ dox" interpretation or make value judgments about who is and who is not "revisionist". The main reason is to under­ stand, as much as possible, why such alterations have taken place. The reasons may be historically conditioned; they may have been simply of a tactical or even strategic nature; they may also have been a rejection of the theory without openly admitting it.

This first chapter is intended to serve as a theoreti­ cal framework without which any analysis of German Social

Democracy (1890-1917) or of today's "Eurocommunism" (and. 18 incidentally, any analysis of in-between developments of

Marxist theory: Leninism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Maoism, etc.) seems practically impossible.

The emphasis is mostly on concepts which have caused the most controversy: (1) the proletariat and its rela­ tionship to other classes; (2) the party; (3) the transi­ tion period and the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat; (4) the capitalist state; (5) the relationship between democracy and socialism, etc. All these questions constitute the corpus of the Marxist problematic.

The Eurocommunist parties,^ and the Social Democratic parties before them, have raised new questions, offered different interpretations of social reality, and developed new theories. They have put the question of socialism and democracy on the agenda. This question relates to many other aspects of the theoretical corpus. With respect to

Marx's theoretical analyses, the Eurocommunists have brought considerable changes. They have propped some of

Marx's crucial concepts, such as the dictatorship of the proletariat. They have simply re-interpreted others in order to justify their own practices. Moreover, since Marx was not always unambiguous in his writings, the Eurocom­ munists have emphasized certain aspects which were not

In this dissertation, I will deal primarily with the most important representative parties of this movement, i.e. the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the French CP (PCF) and the Spanish CP (PCE), under the leadership of Berlinger, Marchais, and Carrillo, respectively. 19 clear in his theory (e.g., peaceful transition and the role of violence).

Despite the fact that it was Marx who provided the

West European labor movement with a socialist theory, the

Communist parties that split away from Social Democracy following the First World War (i.e., the progenitors of today's Eurocommunists) adopted his theory as it had been interpreted and developed by Lenin, and later modified and dogmatized by Stalin. Marx became merely an inspiration, since he had been dead for almost forty years when the

Communist Parties (CPs) were first formed. Lenin, who had succeeded in the October Revolution in 1917, became the paramount authority. Obviously, the Leninist interpreta­ tion of the Marxian ideas and the model of the Bolshevik

Revolution became the Alpha and Omega of all the European

CPs. Therefore, when we speak today of a new strategy of the European CPs, we mean a non-Leninist strategy. That

Lenin was often correct in his interpretation of Marx's thought is undeniable. But to argue that whatever is not

Leninist is antithetical to Marx is patently untrue be­ cause, as James Connor argues, Lenin's revision of Marx was 2 in many respects as radical as Bernstein's. However, the point is not to judge who is right and who is not. A resolution of this complex problem cannot be attempted in

^James Connor, ed., introduction to Lenin on Politics and Revolution (New York: Pegasus, 1968), p. xxi. 20 this study. My point, rather, is that the Eurocommunists' innovations are a revision and perhaps a total rejection of their Leninist heritage. More importantly, they have developed theories and strategies based not on abstract theoretical debates, but as new formulations in response to the existing models — Leninism on the Left and Social

Democracy (as it exists today) on the right. In other words, they find the "socialism" existing in the East inappropriate for the West, on the one hand, and they deny that the Social Democratic parties of the West are legiti­ mate representatives of the working class, on the other hand.

The Eurocommunist strategy purports to be a kind of

"third road" between Bolshevism and Social Democracy. Its proponents envisage a new type of society. They have defined their movement in terms of constitutionalism and pluralism. They plan to implement the transformation of capitalism into socialism by legal means within the exist­ ing constitutional order (i.e., utilization of the forms and practices of bourgeois democracy). They do not plan on overthrowing or "smashing" the State and the existing apparatuses. They try, in fact, to democratize these institutions and preserve their existence even during the period of socialist transformation. The pursuit of struc­ tural reforms via gradualism has become their most obvious 21 policy. Moreover, they stress the importance and the pro­ tection (as well as the extension) of constitutional rights and liberties. Political opposition is guaranteed, accord­ ing to the advocates of Eurocommunism, even within the socialist society that they would like to see established.

In addition to all of this, they have adopted a policy of political alliances with other socialist-oriented political groups in order to achieve a broad popular consensus. This strategy, surprisingly, is not limited to seeking alliances with Left or Center-left political parties only, but with bourgeois parties as well. This derives from their new conceptualization of the State. They now view the State not simply as an instrument of class domination, but as the arena of class struggles, which they can democratize by attracting all the forces (bourgeois and socialist) which are opposed to the State monopoly capitalist faction. The implication, therefore, is that if this monopoly capitalist faction is progressively eliminated from the heights of power, the new coalition of forces could use the State in a universal fashion, i.e., the State would become an institu­ tion looking after the general interests — a kind of State of all and above classes.

This strategy seems to reflect the conclusions drawn by the Eurocommunists that a revolution in the West, i.e., in the advanced capitalist countries, has become practically 22

impossible. They argue that the labor movement^ can only

come to power by accepting the existing bourgeois democrat­

ic framework without aiming at violent seizure of power.

This conclusion is almost identical to the one the Social

Democrats in Germany had drawn at the turn of the century.

In contrast, Marx and Engels, who witnessed the turbulent

years of European revolutions between 1830 and 1848, were

confident that a proletarian revolution would take place in

the advanced capitalist countries. They held such an

optimistic view despite the setbacks experienced by the

labor movement. But they certainly were aware of the weaknesses of this movement. This is why they too suggest­

ed new formulae which the Eurocommunists and the Social

Democrats could later claim for their reformism. Still,

3 The West European Communist Parties (CPs) define the labor movement as; (1) those workers affiliated with the Communist-dominated unions; (2) those workers who consti­ tute the bulk of the Socialist- and Christian Democratic- led unions. The CPs have argued for a long time, i.e., ever since the split between Socialists and Communists in the 1920s, that the Socialist workers have been betrayed by their leadership and that, eventually, they will reunite with the Communist workers to constitute a united working class. After World War II, and especially since the 1960s, the CPs, following their analysis of the new socio-economic structures existing in Western Europe, have claimed that large segments of the petty bourgeoisie have become objective members of the working class due to their impoverishment by monopoly capitalism. The CPs therefore argue that they could co-opt these groups and lead them in the struggle against the monopoly class. In this study, "labor movement" will be used to indicate the CPs' claim and/or aspiration to be the legitimate representatives of the working people as a whole, regardless of their political affiliation. 23

Marx and Engels insisted upon several of their concepts

(e.g., class struggle, dictatorship of the proletariat, transition period, abolition of the State) as being the core of their theory. Although they were often ambiguous on certain aspects of their theory and often advocated apparently contradictory tactics and strategies, they always remained faithful to their principles. In other words, for them the form of the struggle could change, but not the content, nor the ultimate goal. What made Marxian theory different from the so-called bourgeois science is its holistic approach to society and social phenomena.

Lukacs is right to say that "it is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality."^

In Lukacs' view, Marx's method constitutes a radical break with bourgeois thought by making the notion of totality the primary element of his method. Therefore, when analyzing the successors of Marx, one should always keep in mind how close they remain to this method and to the core elements — class struggle. State, transition — which constitute the foundations of the latter. The question, then, is not asked in terms of how orthodox they

4 George Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans­ lated by R. Levingstone (Cambridge, Mass.; The MIT Press, 1971), p. 27. 24 are. Lukacs deserves to be quoted at length because he makes the point very convincingly;

Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx's individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious "orthodox" Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx's theses ^ toto — without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a moment. Ortho­ dox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. It is not the "belief" in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a "sacred" book. On the con­ trary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened along the lines laid down by its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or "improve" it have led and must lead to over-siçplification, triviality and eclec­ ticism.

Despite the intransigent qualification of this passage, what should be drawn from it is that if one rejects Marx's method and its core elements, why should one still bother calling oneself a Marxist? In other words, if the Eurocom­ munists, for instance, have adopted certain aspects of Marx or re-interpreted his crucial theses while using a method antithetical to his own, could they still be treated as a

Marxist political party? This is not to say that if they are not a Marxist party they should be excommunicated or treated as betrayers of the noble cause. What matters to

^Ibid., p. 1. 25 the social scientist is to understand the causes of such a transformation, i.e., to figure out what it is that led to a rejection of the principles while claiming to be still faithful to them. If one keeps this in mind, it will not be difficult to understand how changing historical condi­ tions have reshaped the working class movement. The answer to the question would also have policy implications as to what the Communists would do if they ever came to power.

This is part of what later chapters will try to answer.

The working class movement was born before Marxism; it then, in many cases, adopted Marxism as its revolutionary guide; today, a substantial segment of the working class movement views Marxism more as an inspiration; however, a larger portion of the movement does not accept Marxism even as an inspiration. From isolation to integration, the working class movement has come a long way. The changes in the national as well as international structures have substantially shaped and reshaped the strategies of the

Communist party. Looking back at the basic teachings of the founders of this movement will help us to grasp the historical transformation that the movement has undergone.

The Proletariat as the Class of Change

"The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles." It is with these well-known words that Marx and Engels began the Communist Manifesto. 26

This statement is probably the shortest and clearest summary of their theory of the development of human his­ tory. The founders of historical materialism did not, however, discover the ideas of social class and class struggle. What they did, or attempted to do, was to explain

...scientifically the origin of classes, the causes for the development of classes, the fact that the whole of human history can be explained by class struggle, and above all, the material and intellectual conditions under which the division of society into classes can make way for a social, classless society.

Except for primitive Communist societies, all social formations in human history have witnessed the existence of classes, classes which have been antagonistic to each other ;

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in^ the common ruin of the contending classes.

What is peculiar about capitalist society, according to Marx and Engels, is that it has simplified class

Ernest Mandel, From Class Society to Communism; An Introduction to Marxism (London; Ink Links Ltd., 1977), p. 76.

^Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, intr. by A.J.P. Taylor (London; Pelican Books, 1967), p. 79. 27 antagonisms in the sense that the struggle is mainly, if not solely, between two great classes: bourgeoisie and 8 proletariat. In the preceding societies, the resolution of the conflicts between classes resulted in the emancipa­ tion of one class at the expense of the others. The resolution of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will eventually lead to the establishment of a classless, i.e.. Communist, society. The latter should not be viewed as a kind of utopian dream, but as the concrete realization of the victory of the proletariat over its class enemy. Hence, Communism is

...a movement of the oppressed class, the proletariat, as the more or less developed forms of its historically necessary struggle against the ruling class, the bourgeoisie; as forms of the class struggle, but distin­ guished from all earlier class struggles by this one thing, that the present-day op­ pressed class, the proletariat, cannot achieve its emancipation without at the same time emancipating society as a whole from division into classes and, therefore, from class struggles.

The proletariat appears for the first time in Marx's

Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of

Right. From then on, the proletariat takes the primai place in Marx's thinking — a position it never lost.

^Ibid., p. 80. 9 Marx, quoted in W. Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974), p. 6.

^^Karl Marx, Early Writings, T.B. Bottomore, ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964). 28

Because it has no particular claims than to act out of total desperation and deprivation, the proletariat is consequently a universal class. Speaking of the role of the proletariat in Germany, Marx states that

...a class must be formed which has radical claims, a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society which has a universal character because its sufferings are universal...which is, in short, a total loss of humanity and which can only redeem itself by a total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society, as ^a particular class, is the proletariat.

For Marx and Engels, the proletariat was constituted of the industrial workers, the "class of modern wage laborers, who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor power in order to 12 live." They view the development of the proletariat as follows :

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same propor­ tion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed — a class of laborers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labor increases capital. These laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the fluctua­ tions of the market.

^Ibid., p. 52-4. 12 Marx and Engels, quoted in Leonhard, Three Faces of M a r x i s m , p. 16. 13 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, p. 87. 29

The bourgeoisie was first a revolutionary class in that it brought about modern civilization. But the role of the bourgeoisie as a revolutionary class ended once it had impoverished the largest section of society, i.e., the proletariat. The latter, being the most exploited class

(this was perfectly true in the 19th century) , was obvi­ ously, at least to Marx and Engels, the most revolutionary class.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

At this stage of the development of capitalism, it might have been expected that Marx and Engels would have viewed the middle class as an important social force, considering its emergence on the morrow of the collapse of the feudal mode of production and the blossoming of capitalist entre­ preneurship. However, their view is actually quite differ­ ent. They see the lower middle class as an outright conservative force and, in fact, as a class which would not exist much longer.

The lower middle-class, the small manufac­ turer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bour­ geoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle-class.

l^ibid., p. 91. 30

They are the^^fore not revolutionary but conservative.

Marx and Engels had no admiration for the lower middle

class. The people who comprise this class "are reaction­

ary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history.

They add, in a passage which was to become problematic not

only during their time, but after their deaths:

[If] by chance they [petty bourgeoisie] are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their impending transfer into the proletar­ iat; they thus defend not their present, but the future interests; they desert their own standpoint to pLaoe themselves at that of the proletariat.

This passage is paradoxical because, in view of Marx's and

Engels' later statements, it suggests that the proletariat should always be suspicious of the intentions of the petit bourgeoisie (including the intellectuals); at the same time they admit that the theoreticians of the proletariat originate mostly from the bourgeoisie and petit bour­ geoisie .

The task of the proletariat is, contrary to "previous historical movements which were movements of minorities, or 18 in the interest of minorities," to emancipate the whole of society. But this emancipation of society is not

^^Ibid. l^ibid. l^ibid.

l^ibid., p. 92, 31 limited to the national level. Its role extends interna­ tionally because the proletariat is marked by an interna­ tional consciousness. "The proletarians in all countries have one and the same interest, one and the same enemy, one and the same battle to fight; the proletarians in their great majority are, by nature, free from national prejudic­ es."^^ This is the origin of proletarian internationalism.

What has been presented up to now is basically all of

Marx's and Engels' conception of the proletariat which found its clearest statement in the Manifesto of the

Communist Party. Marx held the same position throughout his life. This is what makes any definition of the prole­ tariat, with respect to Marx, relatively easy, because there is no dispute about the concept even by those who see an "epistemological break" between the young and the mature 20 Marx. Later developments made a definition of the proletariat more complicated than during Marx's lifetime.

Marx's description of the proletariat was unambiguous: though the proletariat was only a "class-in-itself" in the

1840s, the advent of capitalism and the resulting struggles of the proletariat produced or would eventually produce a

1 Q Engels, "Das Fest der Nationen in London 1845-1846," quoted in Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 17. 20 Cf. Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: New Left Books, 1977), and Reading Capital (London: New Left Books, 1970) . 32

"class-for-itself", i.e., a class conscious of its position and aware of the mission it was called to accomplish.

Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interest. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle... this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of ^lass against class is a political struggle.

Marx believed that despite the existence of other

"classes", bourgeois society will be polarized into two main classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie was, of course, a minority and, because of competition, and later concentration, was continually shrinking. Some of its former members were in the process of proletarianization; that is, they were joining the ranks and becoming members of the working class. The working class, therefore, represented the "immense majority" of the population. The question of the middle class was no question at all. As Przeworski notes:

[The] core of it [the proletariat] consists of manual, principally industrial workers; around it float various categories of people who have been separated from the means of production; and on the periphery there are those who still hold on to the property of

21 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 173. (Emphasis added.) 33

means of production but whose life situa­ tion. ..distinguishes them from the2Proletar- ians only by their "pretensions".

This seems to be an accurate description of the conception of the founders of historical materialism. Przeworski explains why Marx and Engels held such a view:

In the middle of the nineteenth century the theoretical connotation of the concept of proletariat, defined in terms pi,separation from the means of production, corres­ ponded closely to the intuitive concept of proletariat conceived in terms of manual, principally industrial, laborers. No ambiguity had yet arisen because material conditions closely corresponded to their theoretical description.

The ambiguity that Przeworski talks about arose at the end of the 19th century and continues to be one of the most discussed issues among Marxist and non-Marxist scholars dealing with the question of proletarian revolution in the advanced capitalist countries. It is pertinent to note at this point that some Marxist authors argue that in his later works, Marx had perceived the logical and necessary

2 2 Adam Przeworski, "Proletariat Into a Class: The Process of Class Formation from Karl Kautsky's The Class Struggle to Recent Controversies," Politics and Society 7: 353. 2 3 It should be noted that "Marx and Engels assigned the proletariat the key role in the coming of socialism not so much because of the misery it suffers as because of the place it occupies in the production process...." (Ernest Mandel, The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971], p. 23).

^^Przeworski, "Proletariat", p. 355. 34

emergence of new intermediate classes in the process of

capitalist development. In Theories of Surplus Value, Marx

said that what Ricardo ignored was

...the constant increase of the middle, who stand between the workers on one side and the capitalist and landed proprietors on the other side, who are for the most part sup­ ported directly by revenue, who rest as a burden on the laboring foundation, and who increase the social securaJy and the power of the upper ten thousand.

But despite this statement, Marx did not really envisage any revolutionary role for the middle class, except probab­ ly as an ally of the proletariat. M.M. Bober makes this point very clearly:

25 Quoted in John Urry, "Towards a Structural Theory of the Middle Class," Acta Sociologies 16 (1973): 176-77. There seem to be about four categories that compose the middle class: (1) the small producers who still employ some labor — small manufacturers, the independent artisan, and the farmer; (2) the people involved in the "circula­ tion" of commodities such as the middlemen, wholesalers, real estate dealers, etc.; (3) salaried people who work in the factory and office, those who "command in the name of Capital" and their aides, such as the supervisors, managers and foremen; and (4) what Marx calls the "ideological category" — doctors, lawyers, clergy, state servants, officials, military, police, etc. These groups are gener­ ally unproductive groups except for some in the first and third categories. They live on the surplus produced by the working class, surplus which is appropriated by the capi­ talists. This summary has been paraphrased from M.M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 105-106 [first published in Harvard Economic Studies, Vol. XXXI, 1927, 1948]. On the question of productive and unproductive labor, cf. the excellent study by I. Gough, "Marx's Theory of Productive and Unpro­ ductive Labor," New Left Review No. 76 (Nov.-Dec., 1972). 35

One proposition stands out with sufficient clarity. The middle class, even if it thrives, has no place in Marx's theory as a factor in modern social evolution. This class is not integrated with the dialectic, and is of no particular importance in the final struggle for communism. The social synthesis of the future is achieved without reference to the middle class, which, in Marx's mind, has no political power, no coherent outlook, -gnd no disposition to build a new order.

The question as to what kind of attitude the working class should adopt vis-a-vis the middle class — a question which will be discussed in later chapters — has, however, become of particular interest ever since the end of the

19th century, particularly since the Second World War. The changes in the structures of advanced Capitalist Societies brought about by the development of late capitalism have made the problems of the middle class — which has in­ creased in size rather than decreased, contrary to Marx's 27 prediction — more complex and more difficult to analyze.

Moreover, the improvement in the conditions of the working class under capitalism led to serious disagreements between

Marxist theorists and leaders within the German Social

Democratic Party from 1890 until its split in 1917, as well as within today's West European Communist parties. As far

2 g Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation, p. 108. 27 The most serious analysis, to my knowledge, is Harry Bravermann's in his excellent Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); see also Eric 0. Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (London, New Left Books, 1978) and A. Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). 36

as Marx himself was concerned, the question of the improve­

ments in the condition of the working class was answered

unequivocally in 1849;

To say that the worker has an interest in the rapid growth of capital is only to say that the more rapidly the worker increases the wealth of others, the richer will be the crumbs that fall to him, the greater is the number of workers that can be employed and called into existence, the more can the mass of slaves--dependent on capital be increased.

This is a view totally opposed to that of today's West

European CPs, which view the interests of the workers in the rationalization of capitalism, in augmenting productiv­

ity. The CPs (e.g., the Italian) even advocate austerity programs.

Marx did not believe that capitalism was incapable of improving the conditions of the workers, but he anticipated and rejected the conclusions that later "revisionists" drew.

...even the most favorable situation for the working class, the most rapid possible growth of capital, however much it may improve the material existence of the worker, does not remove the antagonism between his interests and the interest of the bourgeoisie, the interests of the capitalists. Profit and wagef^ remain as before in inverse proportions.

2 8 Karl Marx, "Wage Labor and Capital," in The Marx- Enqels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 210-211. oq Ibid, p. 211. (Emphasis in original.) 37

To do away with any reformist conception, Marx emphasized

that

[to] say that the most favorable conditions for wage labor is the most rapid possible growth of productive capital is only to say that the more rapidly the working class increases and enlarges the power that is hostile to it, the wealth that does not belong to it and that rules over it, the more favorable will be the conditions under which it is allowed to labor anew at in­ creasing bourgeois wealth, at enlarging the power of capital, content with forging for itself the golden chains by which the bourgeoisie drags it in its train.

The arguments that Marx is criticizing here are precisely those which his follower and later revisionist Eduard 31 Bernstein advocated. Today's West European CPs hold identical views. Marx's arguments are logical: no matter how much better off the workers can be, capitalist develop­ ment benefits the upper class even more. Moreover, accept­ ing this situation as a solution to the problems of labor and capital is precisely accepting the very same class

Ibid. Following the economic crisis which struck Italy in the 1970s, the PCI advocated an austerity policy whose objective was to prevent the capitalist economy from collapsing. The PCI urged the workers to be more produc­ tive, generating high profits for the capitalists who, in turn, were expected to redirect production and revenues to satisfy social needs. On this point, see Joanne Barkan, "Italian Communism at the Crossroads," in The Politics of Eurocommunism, ed. C. Boggs and D. Plotke (Boston: South End Press, 1980), pp. 69 ff. 31 Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism (New York: Shocken Books, 1978); originally published as Die Voraus- setzunqen des Sozialismus und die Aufqaben der Sozial- demokratie. The points raised by Bernstein and today's Communists will be dealt with in later chapters. 38

society that is meant to disappear. The interest of the

bourgeoisie is to perpetuate class society even if conces­

sions have to be made to the working class, i.e., improve­ ments in their standards of living, freedoms, etc. This

seems to be Marx's crucial point, a point with many impli­

cations today.

Marx and the Conception of the Party

It may be stated at the outset that Marx and Engels did not offer any systematic account of the political party which they considered to be a necessity for the working class. They never founded any political parties. They were members of some party organizations only for a few years. However, both of them saw the role of the party as an inherent part of the struggle of the proletariat because the latter needs a political organization to achieve its aims. It is, therefore, imperative that the proletariat should have a party organization. That does not mean, however, that the workers' party was to be an elite organi­ zation leading the working class, but it was to be part of the labor movement itself. In other words, the party was not to be a separate entity detached from the working class as a whole. As the Communist Manifesto stated:

The communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties. They have no interest separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. They do not set up any sectarian principles 39

of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement. The communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only; 1) in the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists have a relatively superior position to that of the proletariat in that they are "practically, the most advanced and resolute section," and "theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the prole- 3 3 tarian movement." Hence, the role of the party is "the formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the 34 proletariat." But — and this should be emphasized —

Marx and Engels never believed that this section of the working class should exercise any supreme authority over the working class as a whole. The following passage makes this very clear. "We cannot. . .cooperate with people who

32 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, p. 95. The plurality of parties is not denied.

^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 40 openly state that the workers are too uneducated to emanci­ pate themselves and must be freed from above by philan- 35 thropic big bourgeois and petty bourgeois." Therefore, when Marx and Engels use the term "party", they mean party in the "great historical sense of the word."^^ What this means is that ultimately it is the working class itself, organized as a party, which decides on the course of its destiny.

They [the workers] themselves must do the utmost for their final victory by clarifying their minds as to what their class interests are, by taking up their position as an independent party as soon as possible and by not allowing themselves to be seduced for a single moment by the hypocritical ph^^ses of the democratic petty bourgeoisie....

Any scheme for a Blanquist party, i.e., a party which is not a mass party and which tries to gain power through a revolutionary putsch, was rejected by Marx and Engels.

From Blanqui's assumption, that any revolu­ tion may be made by the outbreak of a small revolutionary minority, follows of itself the necessity of a dictatorship after the success of the venture. This is, of course, a dictatorship, not of the entire revolu­ tionary class, the proletariat, but of the small minority that has made the revolution.

35 Marx, "Circular Letter" (1879) , quoted in David McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx; An Introduction (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 178.

Marx, "Letter to Freiligrath" (1860) , ibid., p. 174. 37 K. Marx, "Address to the Central Committee of the Communist League," in Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, p. 511. 41

and who are themselves previously organized under the dictatorship of one or several individuals. ^

It could safely be said that "to Marx and Engels the

Party was never an end in itself, let alone an instrument

that would have to be artificially created and organized 3 9 from outside." An organization which is above the working class was inconceivable to Marx. Throughout his works, he speaks of the proletarian revolution as a general upheaval of the majority of the people. C. Lefort is right when he states that

...chaque fois qu'il parle de la révolution prolétarienne, Marx la caractérise comme le soulèvement de l'immense majorité contre une minorité d'exploiteurs, comme 1'émancipation des travailleurs eux-mémes, et il refute 1'idée que cette emancipation puisse être l'oeuvre d'une fraction extéiÿ^ure a la classe qui agirait en son nom.

3 8 Engels, quoted in H. Draper, "Marx and the Dictator­ ship of the Proletariat," New Politics 1 (1962): 95. Note that "...there is nothing in their work to justify Stalin's attempt to present as Marxist his theory that socialism demands a one-party system, least of all in the form operated by him where a small tyran­ nical clique substituted itself for the working class in laying some of the foundations of social­ ism" (Monty Johnstone, "Marx and Engels and the Concept of the Party," in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds.. The Socialist Register, [London: 1967], p. 144). 39 Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 18.

^^Claude Lefort, Elements d 'une critique de la bureau­ cratie (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1971), pp. 74-75. "Each time that Marx speaks of the proletarian revolution, Marx characterizes it as the upheaval of the immense majority against a minority of 42

On the other hand, L. Magri's claim that Marx, in

fact, emphasized the "external element" (i.e., the intel­

lectuals or petty bourgeois leaders) rather than the

spontaneity of the working class is supported by no evi­ dence. In fact, he himself concedes that there are impor­ tant statements by Marx which sustain the view that the spontaneity of the proletarian class is what defines the direction of the political party.Undeniably, it is

Luxemburg's position, which Magri criticizes, that is closest to Marx's conception of the party rather than

Lenin's. Luxemburg insisted that it was the actions of the 42 masses which dictate the practice of the party.

exploiters, as the emancipation of the workers them­ selves, and he rejects the idea that the emancipa­ tion could be the work of a fraction outside the working class which could act in its name" (Emphasis and translation are mine).

^^Lucio Magri, "Problems of the Marxist Theory of the Revolutionary Party," New Left Review 60 (1970); 101. 42 "[In] general, the tactical policy of the Social Democracy is not something that may be "invented". It is the product of a series of great creative acts of the often spontaneous class struggle seeking its way forward. The unconscious comes before the conscious. The logic of the historic process comes before the subjective logic of the human beings who participate in the historic process. The tendency is for the directing organs of the Socialist party to play the conservative role" (Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, Mary-Alice Waters, ed. [New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970], p. 121). Luxemburg's point admirably reflects Marx's and Engels' thinking that the Communists "merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes" (Manifesto, p. 96). 43

If the party could not be a tyrannical organ over the

working class, neither could an individual (a tyrant) exist within that party. Therefore, Marx and Engels refused to

allow the existence of any personality cults within the workers' party. "When Engels and I first joined the secret

Communist Society we made it a condition that everything tending to encourage superstitious belief in authority was 43 to be removed from the statutes." Of greater importance is Marx's and Engels' insistence that the party must be democratic in shape and structure. "The looser the organization is now in appearance, the stronger it is in reality," said Engels. The latter was opposed to a system in which a party leader would make the final decisions and 44 where "anybody who attacks one of them is a heretic."

The proletarian party could not make any "claims to dogmatic orthodoxy or doctrinaire supremacy." Moreover,

"any unity of thought and action is merely another name for orthodoxy and blind obedience. Free expression within the party was another necessity. "The Party is so great that absolute freedom of debate within it is a necessity,"

^^Karl Marx to Wilhelm Bios, Nov. 10, 1877. Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Progress Publishers), p. 310. 44 Engels, quoted in Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 19.

^^Ibid. 44

46 according to Engels. Contrary to the practice of any

ruling or non-ruling Communist Parties in today's world,

Marx and Engels thought it

...absolutely essential to have a free press in the Party, independent of the Executive and even the Party Congress, i.e., it must be in the position, within the framework of the program and the tactics adopted, to make unashamed opposition against individual Party measures and also, within the limits of Party propriety, . .freely to criticize program and tactics.

The changes which the Marxian (the term is used to mean the ideas of Marx and Engels only) conception of the

Party has suffered have been the results of different historical conditions existing in various countries. This, however, cannot support or justify the claim that the organizational structure of the present ruling and non­ ruling Communist Parties is inherent in Marx's thinking.

That today's CPs are Leninist-Stalinist in their organiza­ tion is undeniable. That this is the logical extension of

Marx's thought, as claimed by some Communist leaders and theorists, is untenable. Leonhard sums up this question:

Marx and Engels — unlike their successors — ...quite clearly regarded the Party not as an elite organization which was to "lead" the working class, but as part of the work­ ing class itself. The Party was to be democratically organized, free from all

46 Ibid. These statements by Marx and Engels were made in the 1870s. 4?ibid. 45

personality cult and authoritarian supersti­ tion, and its members were to be critical toward Party officials. Within the Party there was to be absolute freedom of debate in which all shades of opinion must be heard. The Party press was to be indepen­ dent of the leadership in order to vouchsafe the free and independent further development of political theory, and the independence of socialist writers^and authors was to be a matter of course.

Social Revolution, Transition to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

According to Marx, the historical mission of the proletariat is the destruction of the existing order and the establishment of a new society rid of alienating conditions and exploitation. There is in Marx's thought a necessary relationship between revolution and historical development :

At a certain stage of development the material production forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of productior, or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the

48 Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 20. Engels also argued that

"...the workers' movement is based on the sharpest criticism of existing society; criticism is its vital element; how then can it itself avoid criti­ cism, try to forbid controversies? Is it possible for us to demand from others freedom of speech for ourselves only in order to eliminate it afresh in our own ranks?" (Engels to G. Trier, 18 Dec. 1889, "K. Marx and F. Engels," Sochineniya [Moscow, 1965], 37, p. 276, quoted in Johnstone, "Marx and Engels," p. 143). That the French Communist Party today, despite its advocacy of freedom, does not allow any criticism within its ranks, proves that it still bears the marks of its Stalinist past. 46

property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. T ^ ^ n begins an era of social revolution.

Revolution is the "driving force" of history, and without it socialism cannot be established. But what is social revolution?

The revolution which modern socialism strives to achieve is, briefly, the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a new organization of society by the destruction of all class distinctions. This requires not only a proletariat that carries out this revolu­ tion, but also a bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive forces of society developed so far that they allow the destruction of class distinctions.

As can be clearly seen, "a social revolution... cannot be propagated or 'made' at will but becomes possible only under conditions that are totally independent of the will 51 of individual political parties, classes, or persons."

The social revolution which Marx and Engels talk about will take place, apparently, in a society where not only is the level of the forces of production high, but also where the

49 K. Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, edited and with an introduction by Maurice Dobb (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 21.

^^Engels, quoted in Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, pp. 24-25 51 Ibid, p. 25. 47 proletariat constitutes the immense majority. This appears very clearly from Marx's statement that

...no social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matm^d within the framework of the old society.

The ultimate goal of the working class movement is the

"conquest of political power for itself, and this of course necessitates a previous organization of the working class developed up to a certain point, being itself an outgrowth 53 of its economic struggles." The social revolution is not only necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie, but also to transform the nature of the proletariat. This is what Marx seems to imply when he argues that

. . .both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be over­ thrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all

52 Marx, Preface to A Contribution, p. 21. Marx, however, conceived of the possibility of revolution in countries where the population were mostly peasants (e.g., Russia) (K. Marx and F. Engels, La Russie, translated and with a preface by R. Dangeville [Paris: Collection 10/18, UGE, 19 74] provides a very good insight on this question.) 53 Saul K. Padover, ed., Karl Marx on Revolution (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971), p. 61. 48

the muck of ag^s and become fitted to found society anew.

This for Marx is "revolutionary praxis," i.e., the

embodiment of objective and subjective elements (the unity 5 5 of theory and practice) . Hence the necessity of a

certain level of class consciousness for a revolution to be

successful. This dialectical relation between the economic conditions and the degree of class consciousness is of great importance to Marx and Engels. The role assigned to the proletariat as a universal class is a salient one in that it is the class ("-for-itself") which decides upon its future with the guidance of the most advanced section of the proletariat, i.e., the Communists. The Party, as has been seen, cannot trigger a revolution unless the working class is ready for it. At least, this is what Marx seems to imply in the Poverty of Philosophy.

[The] Socialists and the Communists are the theoreticians of the proletarian class. So long as the proletariat is not yet suffi­ ciently developed to constitute itself as a class, and consequently so long as the struggle itself of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie has not yet assumed a political character, and the productive forces are not yet sufficiently developed in the bosom of the bourgeoisie itself to enable us to catch

54 K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, ed. and with an introduction by C.J. Arthur (New York: Interna­ tional Publishers, 1976), pp. 94-95. (Emphasis in original.) 55 McLellan, Thought of Karl Marx, p. 199. Marx sums up the point by saying that "in revolutionary activity, the changing of oneself coincides with the changing of circum­ stances" (ibid.). 49

a glimpse of the material conditions neces­ sary for the emancipation of the proletariat and for the formation of a new society, these theoreticians are merely Utopians who, to meet the wants of the oppressed classes, improvise systems and go- in search of a regenerating science....

Parallel to this, it should be pointed out that Marx regarded the proletariat as an independent revolutionary class, which, through struggles, victories and defeats, acquires self-consciousness. Hence its political respon­ se sibility and self-reliance. The proletariat, in other words, holds its destiny in its own hands. In a splendid passage Marx describes the way the proletariat acquires its consciousness through its revolutionary activity:

[P]roletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the appar­ ently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltrines­ ses of their first attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that he may draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, recoil ever and anon from the indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until a situation has been created gÆich makes all turning back impossible....

S^ibid., pp. 204-205. 5 7 This point of view is identical to Luxemburg's, developed in her "Organizational Question of Social Demo­ cracy" (Luxemburg, Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, p. 12).

^^Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers, 1977), p. 19. 50

Luxemburg grasped this point better than any disciple of Marx when she said that "the errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the

5 9 infallibility of the cleverest Central Committee." The proletariat learns from its mistakes, acquires experience, and develops consciousness. This consciousness plus the science ("socialism") brought to it by the intellectuals are the combination which will make the working class free itself and the rest of society. This consciousness and science are necessary because "the proletarian revolution is the first revolution in human history aimed at a con­ sciously planned overthrow of existing society.

Contrary to Marx and Engels, later Marxists put a stronger emphasis on the role of organization, i.e., on the Party, not because their position was necessarily elitist, but because they attributed (often correctly) the defeats of workers' uprisings to a lack of adequate organi­ zation and to a lack of understanding of the real objec­ tives of the struggle. Hence, Lenin's insistence that;

59 Luxemburg, Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, p. 130. The article is one of the best critiques of Lenin's conception of the Party. It should be noted that Trotsky in 19 03 held a similar view to that of Luxemburg. For a contemporary critique of Lenin's What Is To Be Done?, see Michael Voslensky, La Nomenklatura; Les privilégiés en URSS (Paris: Belfond, 1980), pp. 43-75.

^^Ernest Mandel, "The Leninist Theory of Organiza­ tion," in Revolution and Class Struggle: A Reader in Marxist Politics, ed. R. Blackburn (Sussex, Great Britain: The Harvest Press, 1978), p. 80. 51

The consciousness of the working masses cannot be genuine class consciousness, unless the workers learn, from concrete, above all from topical facts and events to observe every other social class in all the manifestations of its intellectual, ethical, and political life; unless they learn to apply in practice the materialist analysis and the materialist estimate of all aspects of the life and activity of all classes, strata, and groups of the population. Those who concentrate the attention, observation, and consciousness of the working class exclusively, or even mainly, upon itself alone are not Social Democrats; for the self-knowledge of the working class is indissolubly bound up, not solely with a fully clear theoretical understanding — or rather not so much with the theoretical, as with the practical, understanding — of the relationships between all the various classes of modern society, acquir^ through the experience of political life.

This, apparently, implies that the Party channels the spontaneous demands of the various groups of the working class into political struggles. Such an argument could be placed in the logic of Marx's thinking, but the excess of centralization demanded by Lenin and the letter's over­ suspicion of the spontaneity of the masses were certainly against Marx's belief.

The State

The ultimate goal of the class struggle and the prole­ tarian revolution is the overthrow of the bourgeois system.

Lenin, V.I., "What Is To Be Done?", Collected Works, Vol. 5 (Moscow; Progress Publishers, 1965), pp. 214-413. (Emphasis in original.) 52 the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the transition period and, finally, the achievement of a classless society. The concepts of dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to Communism derive from an analysis of the Capitalist State.

That Marx and Engels did not systematically analyze 6 2 the capitalist state is too well known a fact to require extensive comment. Although they dealt with it in differ­ ent writings, their analysis was instrumentalist at best, much to the sorrow of their disciples whose task was to build a Marxist theory of the capitalist state. However, through certain important writings, such as the Class

Struggles in France, The 18th Brumaire, the Manifesto, The

Civil War in France, etc., one can have a reasonably clear view of Marx's conception of the State.

The State was for Marx a coercive entity, i.e., "a concentrated and organized force of society.The State settles disputes between two irreconcilable classes.

Despite its appearance of being an arbiter between classes, i.e., an entity above them, the Capitalist State is, in fact, according to Marx, an executive of the bourgeoisie to

^^Ralph Miliband, "Marx and the State," in Marx's Socialism, ed. Shlomo Avineri (New York; Lieber-Atherton, 1973), p. 158. 6 3 Kart Marx, Capital, Vol. I (New York; International Publishers, 1975), Vol. I, p. 751. 53 oppress the working class.The State is, in other words, the instrument of a class. "The executive of the modern

State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."^^ Engels makes an even stronger statement ;

The State is nothing but the organized collective power of the possessing classes, the landowners and the capitalists as against the peasants and the workers. What the individual capitalists...do not want, their State also does not want. If there­ fore the individual capitalists deplore the housing shortage, but can hardly be per­ suaded even superficially to palliate its most terrifying consequences, the collective capitalist, the State, will not do much m o r e .

These quotes seem, a priori, to support the argument that Marx and Engels had an instrumentalist theory of the

State. However, because of the ambiguity in Marx's and

Engels' writings, it could also be argued that this very same impression is contradicted in other writings.

...Marx assures his readers in the Eight­ eenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and in his article in The New York Daily Tribune of August 1852 that the political represen­ tatives of a class may^yery often not in fact be of that class. All that is

"Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another" (Marx and Engels, Selected Works [London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1951] , I, p. 51).

^^Marx and Engels, Manifesto, p. 82.

^^Engels, "The Housing Question in Germany," in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, I, p. 542.

^^Poulantzas argues that, in fact, "the capitalist State best serves the interest of the capitalist class only 54

usually necessary is that the representa­ tives should, through limited political vision, share the sam^.-ideas as the class for which they act....

Moreover, the ruling class does not always rule as a homogeneous class. It may well be divided; and in their historical writings, Marx and Engels discuss events which show that only a faction of the bourgeoisie may be in . 69 char g e .

[In] relation to the most advanced capital­ ist countries of the day, England and France, he [Marx] often makes the point that, at one time or another, it is not the ruling class as a whole, but a fraction of it, which controls the State; and that those who actually run the State may well belong to a clasa which is not economically dominant.

Though this faction's own interests may go against those of the other factions, it remains "responsible for the cohesion of an entire system within which dominant 71 classes dominate." Nowhere in his writings does Marx

when the members of this class do not participate directly in the State apparatus, that is to say when the ruling class is not the politically governing class" (Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in Ideology and Social Science, ed. R. Blackburn [New York; Vintage Books, 1973], p. 246).

^^John Sanderson, "Marx and Engels on the State," Western Political Quarterly XVI (Dec. 1963): 950.

^^The best and most systematic treatment of this question is N. Poulantzas', developed in his Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1975).

^^Miliband, "Marx and the State," p. 164.

^^Alan Wolfe, "New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics," Politics and Society IV (1974): 135-136. 55

imply that the one faction of the bourgeoisie which is in

charge embitters the other factions to a point where the

letter's interests would coincide with those of the prole­ tariat, and that the proletariat should, therefore, ally itself with the other factions against the bourgeois

faction "in charge". As shall be seen in another chapter, the Eurocommunists hold a different view. They argue that there could be a coalition of socialist and bourgeois forces against the one faction in power, a salient charac­ teristic of their strategy. They have developed this strategy following their "theoretical" formulation of State

Monopoly Capitalism, worked out mostly by the French,

Spanish and British CPs. They believe that the interest of state monopoly capitalists are antagonistic to the other bourgeois classes as a whole. This is why the proletariat and the middle class (in its new definition) should, in their view, join forces with the antagonized classes in order to democratize the State.

Marx's and Engels' writings on the State were scat­ tered and sometimes very ambiguous. Theoretically, the notions of Bonapartism and Bismarckism, advanced by Marx and Engels respectively, presented some serious problems to later developments of Marxist theory of the State. Marx, in the Eighteenth Brumaire, presents an exception to the idea of the State as an instrument of class domination. He states that "only under the second Bonaparte does the State 56 seem to have made itself completely independent," and adds,

"...yet the State power is not suspended in mid-air.

Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class 72 of French society, at that, the small-holding peasants."

This, however, did not mean that the peasantry controlled

Bonaparte. M. Rubel's analysis is enlightening in this respect :

D'un strict point de vue phenomenal, les intérêts de l'Etat bonapartiste se con­ fondent avec ceux de la classe qui a voté massivement pour lui. D'un point de vue sociologique, l'Etat bonapartiste mystifie, manoeuvre et écrase ce pullulement d'aveugles, ce conglomérat social, chair à canon ROur l'Oncle et "troglodytes" pour le Neveu.

In other words, as a phenomenon, Bonapartism seems to have its interests identified with those of the class that had massively voted for it, but from a sociological point of view, the Bonapartist State only utilizes the masses for its own needs. In fact, "Napoleon III est en apparence l'homme de la paysannerie, [mais] en réalité [il est] celui «. 74 de l'aristocratie financière." It therefore seems that 75 his "relative autonomy" of the capitalist State is no

72 Marx, 18th Brumaire, p. 123. 73 Maximilian Rubel, Karl Marx devant le bonapartisme (Paris: Mouton et Co., 1960), p. 155. 74 Ibid. "Napoleon III is in appearance the man of the peasantry, but in reality he is the man of the financial aristocracy." (My translation.) 75 The concept of "relative autonomy" of the State is not Marx's, but has been developed by Marxist scholars in 57 more than a circumstantial (conjunctural) situation for

Marx and Engels. Many Marxist scholars came to view this

exceptional case as the characteristic form of the modern

capitalist state.

[W]hile for Marx the autonomy of the State was a result of a temporary and unstable equilibrium of class forces at a particular historical juncture [18th Brumaire ], these peculiarities of the State identified by Marx as the outcome of a somewhat unusual condition of class statements have now come to be regarded as an intrinsic feature of almost any kind of stateincluding the modern capitalist variety.

While today's Marxists are concerned with building a theory of the capitalist State as an autonomous object of study, Marx and Engels were rather concerned with its destruction. "The purpose of the Marxist theory of the

State is not just to understand the Capitalist State but to 77 aid in its destruction." It seems that Lenin had re­ mained within the logic of Marx's and Engels' thinking when 7 8 he wrote The State and Revolution. Lenin clearly saw the

State as the product of the irreconcilability of class

the 1960s and 1970s. The main exponents are Miliband and the late Poulantzas.

^^Bruce Berman, "Class Struggle and the Origins of the Relative Autonomy of the State," Paper presented at the 77th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, 3-6 Sept. 1981.

^^Wolfe, "New Directions," p. 131.

7 8 V.I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1970). 58 antagonisms. "The State arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the State proves that the 79 class antagonisms are irreconcilable." Lenin, just like

Marx and Engels, saw the State as an instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed class. Therefore, "the supersession of the bourgeois State by the proletarian 8 0 state is impossible without a violent revolution...."

The bourgeois State "must be destroyed because [it] depends on the separation and alienation of power from the II81 m a s s e s ."

The logical questions one may ask are: How would the

State be destroyed? What would happen once the State is destroyed? Should the State be abolished right away, as the Anarchists would have it, or should the proletariat set up a temporary state of its own? Marx, Engels, and later

Lenin gave answers to these questions.

In a famous passage, Marx declared that the proletar­ iat, following the destruction of the bourgeois state, 82 should "[be] organized as the ruling class," meaning as a

79 Ibid, p. 267.

G°lbid., p. 278, p 1 Lucio Colletti, "Lenin's State and Revolution," in From Rousseau to Lenin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 220. (Emphasis in original.) 8 2 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, p. 104. 59

State. This State that the working class will establish is better known as the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Though this dictatorship would still be characterized by class oppression, it "only constitutes the transition to 8 3 the abolition of all classes and to a classless society."

The State, in the transition period, therefore exists as a necessary evil. Engels' letter to Bebel in March 1875 supports this point.

As, therefore, the State is only a transi­ tion institution which is used...to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a free people's State: so long as the proletariat still uses the State, it does not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of gfreedom the State as such ceases to exist.

The necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a crucial component of Marx's theory. In the letter to

Weydemeyer referred to above, Marx insists on the salience of this concept in his theory:

What I did that was new [was] to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production; 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictator­ ship of the proletariat; 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the

O O Marx's "Letter to J. Weydemeyer, 5 March, 1852," in Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, p. 220. (Emphasis in original.) 8 4 Engels, quoted in Sanderson, "Marx and Engels on the State," p. 953. See also Edward H. Carr, "Lenin's Theory of the State," The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. 236-237. 60

transition to the abolitiorr^f all classes and to a classless society.

The concept of dictatorship of the proletariat needs some more elaboration because it is one of the major points of controversy among Marxists today. Probably the clearest statement by Marx on the concept could be found in his

Critique of the Gotha Programme;

Between Capitalist and Communist society lies the period of the revolutionary trans­ formation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transi­ tion period in which the State can be noth­ ing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

The logical derivation from this statement is that the dictatorship of the proletariat is identical with social­ ism. Socialism being the necessary transitional period toward the Communist, classless, society, it therefore follows that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the necessary condition for the establishment of Communism.

The word "dictatorship" refers to the rule of the proletariat and its allies (peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, i.e., those who are sinking into the ranks of the prole­ tariat anyway), that is, the majority of the population, over the bourgeois minority. In a way, dictatorship and

8 5 Marx, "Letter to Weydemeyer," in Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, p. 2 20. Also in Draper, "Marx and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," p. 99.

Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York; International Publishers, 1977), p. 18. 61

democracy would become identical and not antithetical, as 8 7 the Eurocommunists would have it today.

8 7 The Austro-Marxists' understanding of the dictator­ ship of the proletariat is surprisingly closer to Marx's than the Eurocommunists'. Max Adler, for instance, in­ sisted that the dictatorship of the proletariat was not to be the dictatorship of a minority. On the contrary, it would include not only the working class, but the majority of peasants, intellectuals and the middle strata. It will "embrace the economically decisive strata of the whole society" (See R. Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism," New Left Review 118 [Dec. 1979]: 33.) Adler, who under­ stood by "bourgeois political democracy" nothing more than class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie — the same way Marx did — viewed the dictatorship of the proletariat only as a transitional stage because it was not social democracy (i.e., "true" democracy or a sort of advanced socialism) and because it, too, presupposed class dictatorship, although a dictatorship of the majority. This analysis is borrowed from L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. II, The Golden Age (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), pp. 278-279. The Eurocommunists take their theoretical analysis — as shall be seen — from another source: Karl Kautsky. But insofar as the Eurocommunists' conception of the dictator­ ship of the proletariat relates to an empirical situation, i.e., to what took place in the Soviet Union after the revolution, their analysis is very similar to Otto Bauer's analysis in Zwischen Zwei Weltkriegen?, written in 1936: "The dictatorship of the proletariat has become something entirely different from what was original­ ly conceived by those who established it. It is not the dictatorship of freely elected Soviets. It is not the "superior form of democracy" that Lenin imagined, without a bureaucracy, or police, or a standing army. It is not the free self-determina­ tion of the working masses exercising their rule of the exploiting classes. It has become the dictator­ ship of an all-powerful army bureaucracy which stifles all freedom of speech and action even in the party itself, and it dominates the people by means of the powerful apparatus of the State and economic bureaucracy, the police and the army" (Otto Bauer, Zwischen Zwei Weltkriegen? [1936], in Austro-Marx­ ism, texts translated and edited by Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode with an introduction by T. Bottomore [Oxford: Clarendon, 1978], p. 201). 62

The destruction of the old machine is the destruction of the limits imposed on demo­ cracy by the bourgeois State. It is the passage from a "narrow, ^restricted" demo­ cracy to full democracy.

M. Rubel's comments on Marx's conception of democracy

are helpful in understanding this question;

In Marx's intellectual and political devel­ opment, the separation of the two concepts, democracy and communism, corresponds to the distinction inherent in his pre-communist writings and explicitly formulated after his conversion to communism, between a political revolution and a social revolution; in other words, between two stages of the proletarian revolution: the first stage is described as the "conquest of democracy" (Communist Manifesto) by the working class, leading to the "dictatorship of the proletariat"... ;

Bauer's analysis of what took place in the USSR is absolute­ ly correct, but this is not to say, as the Eurocommunists do, that the concept itself is outmoded. Bauer has shown that it is the way it was practiced which is outmoded, a point which the Eurocommunists have completely missed.

^^Colletti, "Lenin's State and Revolution," p. 221. The Eurocommunist parties have dropped the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat from their programs. They oppose it to a "democratic road to socialism." They curi­ ously identify the concept with the dictatorial rule of the Nazi regime, the Juntas in Latin America, or Stalin's rule. As has been seen above, Marx clearly saw the dictatorship of the proletariat as the rule of the majority of the population, constituted mainly of proletarians, since, following his scheme of bi-polarization of society, the working class would be the biggest portion of the popula­ tion, the bourgeoisie being only a minority and the middle class going to join the ranks of the proletariat. Balibar is right to argue that for Marx and Engels,

"...the dictatorship of the proletariat — the necessary transition to the disappearance of classes — could only come to an end when classes really had disappeared; it could not be followed by the strengthening and eternalization of the State appara­ tus, but on the contrary, only by its disappearance" (Etienne Balibar, On the Dictatorship of the Prole­ tariat [London: New Left Books, 1977], p. 51). 63

the second stage is described as the aboli­ tion of social classes and poll^^cal power as the genesis of human society.

Dictatorship of the proletariat in its Marxian sense has, 90 as has been clearly shown, a "democratic" connotation.

One thing that is absolutely certain is that our party and the working class cannot achieve rule except under the form of the democratic republic. The latter is even the specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the Great French Revolution showed.

Marx, too, saw that "the first goal — democracy — [was] the starting point from which the workers' movement should conduct its own struggle, using the general suffrage as a means to conquer political power, as a necessary stage on 92 the way to social emancipation." What this last point

89 Maximilien Rubel, "Notes on Marx's Conception of Democracy," New Politics I (1962): 86. 90 Lenin, too, was close to Marx in his statement that "under socialism, much of 'primitive' democracy will inevitably revive since for the first time in the history of civilized societies the mass of the population will be raised to independent participation not only in voting elections, but in day to day administration...." (quoted in E.H. Carr, "Lenin's Theory of the State," p. 243.) The similarity between Marx and Lenin with Rousseau's democrat­ ic theory is here striking. 91 Marx, in Draper, "Marx and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," p. 103. 92 Marx, quoted in Rubel, "Notes on Marx's Conception of Democracy," p. 89.

"Marx saw the democratic republic as the most ad­ vanced type of political regime in bourgeois soci­ ety, and wished to see it prevail over more backward and "feudal" political systems. But it remained for 64

shows is that for Marx bourgeois democracy is in no way

comparable to proletarian democracy. Bourgeois democracy,

however, is more advanced than feudal institutions.

Bourgeois democracy is in a way a training ground for the

proletariat: in it the latter learns how to fight and to

r u l e .

This brings us to an important issue, that of reform

and revolution in Marx and Engels.

Reform and Revolution

Marx and Engels never rejected reform as a means to the final victory of the working class. What they reject­ ed, was reform as an end in itself. In Marx's view, reforms were the result of the class struggle. The working class, through its struggle for reforms — this may be the proletarian expression of the class struggle in the absence of full class consciousness, what Lenin calls "class-con­ sciousness in embryo" — obtains a certain improvement in its conditions of living. Marx viewed the acquisition of certain reforms by the working class as a real success.

After a thirty year's struggle, fought with most admirable perseverance, the English working classes, improving a momentaneous [sic] split between the landlords and money-lords, succeeded in carrying the Ten

him a system of class rule, indeed the system in which the bourgeoisie rules more directly" (Miliband, "Marx and the State," p. 170). 65

Hours' Bill.... [It] was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class.

What this shows is that reforms are compatible with the

pursuit of the final goal, revolution. But to claim that

reforms as such are sufficient in order to bring about a

transformation of society from capitalism to socialism is 94 completely alien to Marx. Moreover, the question of

reforms is fundamental; it demonstrates that the establish­ ment of bourgeois democracy itself is not the result of a voluntaristic choice by the bourgeoisie, but that it has 95 been the result of struggles led by the lower classes.

The point is made remarkably by Wolfe:

Liberal democracy did not, as with omni­ scient Zeus, spring full-born out of the forehead of the ruling class. It was cre­ ated as a response to mass pressure from below. In other words, it lives, it has substance. And because of that, it is not static. It continually changes because it is under continuous pressure to change. Not to account for that pressure leads directly to the Leninist position that only ggCounter elite can replace the existing one.

9 3 Marx, "Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association," in Tucker, Marx-Enqels Reader, p. 517. The same point is made in the Communist Manifesto, p. 90. 94 See quote by Marx referred to in note 22 above. 9 5 See study by Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1967).

Qfi Wolfe, "New Directions," p. 139. 66

Contrary to what ultra-Leftists today argue against the struggle for reforms, Marx showed that these reforms were the logical results of the class struggle. Black­ burn's counterpoint to the ultra-Left is worth quoting.

[As] both the Manifesto and later economic writings make clear, the capitalist mode of production is also defined by the constant application of science to industry and a consequent rise in the productivity of labor. In these circumstances, capitalists — whether spurred by competition among themselves or by combination among their workers — can afford to grant economic concessions to their employees. There are, of course, strict limits to the concessions they can make; but Marx was to emphasize that trade-unions can raise wages and the working class could extract legislation in its interests even from a purely bourgeois government.

One point should be re-emphasized: Marx favored reforms only insofar as they were means to elevate the revolutionary consciousness of the workers. R. Luxemburg captured Marx's thinking and remained faithful to it to the letter :

Can the social democracy be against reforms? Can we counterpose the social revolution, the transformation of the existing order, our final goal, to social reforms? Cer­ tainly not. The daily struggle for reforms, for the amelioration of the conditions of

97 Robin Blackburn, "Marxism: Theory of Proletarian Revolution," New Left Review 97 (May-June 1976): 20. Gflran Therborn has shown in his remarkable study how the struggle between Capital and Labor has led to the creation of bourgeois-democratic states. "Only after protracted struggle were these rights extended to the ruled and exploited classes as well" (G. Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review 103 (May-June 1977): 33. 67

the workers within the framework of the existing social order, and for democratic institutions, offers to the social democracy the only means of engaging in the proletar­ ian class war and working in the direction of the final goal — the conquest of poli­ tical power and the suppression of wage- labor. Between social reforms and revolu­ tion there exists for the social democracy an indissoluble tie. The struggle for reforms its iu?ans; the social revolution, its aim.

Since reforms are not sufficient (nor an end) in

transforming the existing social order, there could only be

one alternative: revolution, i.e., the smashing of the

bourgeois state by the proletarian class. Or could there

be a peaceful transition to socialism? This question, a

central one for the Eurocommunists, was never consistently

answered by Marx and Engels. As suggested by Leonhard, and

maybe rightly so, Marx and Engels initially put a stronger

emphasis on violent revolution, whereas after the 1870s 99 they tended to stress a more peaceful transformation.

The Manifesto of 1848 speaks of the "more or less veiled

civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point

where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where

the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the founda­

tion for the sway of the proletariat. Marx aid Engels

98 Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution? (New York: Pathfinder, 1978), p. 8. 9 9 Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 29.

^^^Marx and Engels, Manifesto, p. 93. 68 even added that the Communists must state clearly that

"their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.Marx expressed this point very strongly;

[The] antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is total revolution. Indeed, is it at all surprising that a society founded on the opposition of classes should culminate in brutal contradiction, the shock of^^ody against body, as its final denouement?

He then concludes by quoting George Sand's famous passage:

"Le combat ou la mort; la lutte sanguinaire ou le néant.

C'est ainsi que la question est invinciblement posée.

Despite this apparently bloody vision, Marx's and Engels' understanding is that violence is not something that is willed or desired, but rather something that was inevi­ table, i.e., imposed upon the working class by the bour­ geoisie since the latter would not give up its privileges without opposing stiff resistance. Moreover, the bour­ geoisie had control over the state apparatus (instruments of repression: standing army, police, etc.) that it could use at will. Therefore, the proletariat had to arm itself

lO^Ibid., p. 120. 102 Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 174.

^^^Ibid., p. 175. "Combat or death; bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is inexorably put" (publisher's translation). 69

and fight. Hence, the need to "smash the bureaucratic and military machine." The only choice was force, "the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one," and "the

instrument by the aid of which social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized, political

forms.Once again, it should be emphasized that the need to use force is something imposed upon the working class by its enemies and not a deliberate choice:

Our aim is the emancipation of the working class and the social overthrow that it implies. A historical development can only remain "peaceful" as long as it does not come across the violent opposition of the holders of social power.... Nevertheless, the "peaceful" movement could turn into "violence", if those who are interested in the old order happen to rebel, if they are defeated by force. . will be as rebels against legal power.

104 Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dflhring (New York: Interna­ tional Publishers, 1976), p. 203.

^^^Marx, quoted in Arghiri Emmanuel, "State and Transition to Socialism," New Left Review 113-114 (Jan.- April 1979) : 115 (emphasis added). The author is right to argue, following this statement by Marx, that "violence, far from being an end in itself, is a sort of legitimate self-defense" (ibid.). Socialists in Western Europe have almost always followed Marx and Engels on this point, that is, the impossibility of a peaceful transition could only be the result of resistance from the ruling class. For example, in the Linz Program of 1926, the Austro-Marxists proclaimed :

"The social democratic workers' party will govern in strict accordance with the rules of the democratic state, scrupulously observing all the safeguards entrenched in its constitution. However, should the bourgeoisie, by boycotting revolutionary forces, attempt to obstruct the social change which the labor movement in assuming power is pledged to carry out, then social democracy will be forced to employ 70

It follows quite logically from this that

[A] revolution...is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets, and cannons — authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror whip^g its arms inspire in the reac­ tionaries .

Marx and Engels were faced with a real dilemma : on the one hand, the revolution, understood as the total destruction of the old, exploitative, system and its replacement by a rational, planned, and humanized society, was a historical necessity. On the other hand, Marx and

Engels wondered whether it should be a bloody one. One must understand, however, that they lived the defeats of

1848-49 and 1871, and the bloody repressions th./r. followed.

dictatorial means to break such resistance" (quoted in Norbert Leser, "Austro-Marxism: A Reappraisal," Journal of Contemporary History 11 [1976]: 145). Bauer's attitude toward violence, summed up in his motto "democratic as long as we can, dictatorial only when we are forced, and insofar as we are forced," describes the attitude of both German Social Democrats — as shall be seen in the next chapter --- and Eurocommunists. Bauer's quote is in Anson Rabinbach, The Crisis of Austrian Social­ ism - From Red Vienna to Civil War, 1927-1934 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 47. The same argument appears quite clearly in Carrillo's Eurocommunism and the State (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1978), especially pp. 132-160.

^^^Engels, "On Authority," in Tucker, Marx-Enqels Reader, p. 733. The strength of this statement is easily understood when one knows that the article was written in 1872 as part of the continued debate against the Anar­ chists, who wanted an immediate abolition of the State. 71

The bourgeoisie was strong; its means and capacities of repression were real. For a proletarian revolution to be successful, it was vital that the working class be prepared to undertake such a fight.

Where the working class is not yet far enough advanced in its organization to undertake a decisive campaign against the collective power of the ruling classes, it must in any case be trained for this by constant agitation against (and a hostile attitude to) the policies of the ruling classes. OtherwiseQ.it remains a plaything in their hands....

The Peaceful Transition to Socialism

Many Marxists and non-Marxists have argued that it was

Engels who, more than Marx, envisaged the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism because of what he wrote in the last year of his life, 1895. Such a view is un­ founded. There are many instances, mostly after the failure of the Paris Commune of 18 71, when both Marx and

Engels discussed such a possibility. In an interview which he had with a reporter of the New York Herald on August 3,

1871, Marx responded to the reporter who asked him whether he looked for a civil war soon in England;

We do not intend to make war. We hope to be able to gain our rights in a legal and lawful way by act of Parliament, and it is the aristocracy and the moneyed men who will

107 K. Marx, "Letter to Friedrich Bolte, Nov. 23, 1871," in Padover, Karl Marx on Revolution, p. 62. 72

rebel. It is they who will attempt a revo­ lution . But we have the force of numbers. We shall have the strength of intelligence and discipline. Let them put us down if they can.

The clearest statement by Marx, however, came a year later at the Hague Congress (2-7 September 1872) . Marx re­ emphasized the need for the working class to seize poli­ tical power; from this position neither Marx nor Engels ever deviated because it is undeniably the core of the theory of the transition.

The workers will have to seize political power one day in order to construct the new organization of labor; they will have to overthrow the old politics which bolster up the old institutions, unless they want to share the fate of the early Christians, who lost their chance of heaven on earth becauge they rejected and neglected such action.

However, Marx was quick to add that "we do not claim...that the road leading to this goal is the same everywhere.

The important point comes in the following passage:

108 K. Marx in Saul K. Padover, ed.. The Essential Marx: The Non-Economic Writings (New York: The New Ameri­ can Library, 1978) , p. 94 (my emphasis) . Note that once again what triggers violence is the reaction of the ex­ ploiting classes, and not the proletariat. This statement on peaceful transition could well be a tactical statement meant for a bourgeois paper. But since it was written not long after the defeat of the Paris Commune, it could well have been a reflection of Marx's thinking at that time. 109 K. Marx, "Speech at the Hague Congress," The First International and After, ed. and intr. by D. Fernbach (London: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1974), p. 324.

llOlbid. 73

We know that heed must be paid to the institutions, customs and traditions of the various countries, and we do not deny that there are countries, such as America and England, and if I was familiar with its institutions, I might include Holland, where the worker^ppay attain their goal by peace­ ful means.

If one stopped the quote at this point, it would undeniably prove that Marx was a believer in the peaceful road. But the rest of the passage quoted showed that this was not really the case:

That being the case, we must recognize that in most continental countries the lever of the revolution will have to be force; a resort to force will be necessary oç^ day in order to set up the rule of labor.

The interpretation of Marx's "Address" was to become one of the most controversial issues for Marxists. R.C. Tucker argues that "the split between Communist (i.e.,

Marxist-Leninist) and Social Democratic Marxism in the 113 twentieth century turned largely on this issue."

The reason why Marx and Engels believed that the peaceful transition in England and America was possible was

111 Ibid. A good discussion on Marx's consideration of the peaceful road is Stanley Moore's "Marx and Reformism," in Three Tactics - The Background in Marx (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963), especially pp. 78-91. 112 Ibid. This passage was bowdlerized in the German Socialist paper of that time, Volksstaat (which was replaced on 1 Oct. 1876 by Vorwflrts) . The sentence substituted for this passage read, "But this is not the case in all countries." See note in Marx, The First International, p. 324. 113 Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, p. xxxvi. 74 probably the fact that militarism and bureaucratism were not highly developed in those countries at that time. But on the continent now, the situation was changing. The working class was becoming an important social force which could, should Parliament continue taking the importance it had been, achieve a labor majority in that institution.

This was, in Marx's and Engels' eyes, mostly the case with

Britain and America first; "If, for instance, in Britain or in the United States the working class should win majority in Parliament or in Congress, then it could in a constitutional manner abolish the laws and institutions 114 obstructing its advancement." Now Marx declared that

[no] Socialist need predict that there will be a bloody revolution in Russia, Germany, Austria, and possibly in Italy if the Italians keep on in the policy they are now pursuing. The deeds of the French Revolu­ tion may be enacted again in those coun­ tries. That is apparent to any political student. But those revolutions will be made by the majority. No revolution^p^n be made by a party, but by a nation....

Marx, "Konspekt der Reichstagsdebatte ttber das Sozialisten Gesetz, 1878," quoted in Leonhard, Three Faces of M a r xism, p. 29.

^^^Marx, interview in the Chicago Tribune, Jan. 5, 1879, quoted in Padover, The Essential Marx, pp. 96-97. The last part of this statement reinforces the view that Marx resented Blanquism and that "the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself." The authenticity of this interview cannot be doubted, as demonstrated by B. Andreas, "Une interview de Marx au Chicago Tribune," L 'Homme et la Société 7 (Jan.- Feb.-March 1968); 237-241. The interview itself is repro­ duced in pp. 241-247. Engels was to add France to the list of countries cited by

Marx above.

One can picture the old society growing into the new one peacefully in countries where the National Assembly concentrates all power in its hands, where anything one wishes may be done constitutionally as soon as one is backed by the majority of the nation — in democratic republics such as France and America, in monarchies like Britain where the dynasty.is powerless against the will of the people. 117 Germany was excluded from such a perspective. However, in 1893, Engels saw for Germany the same possibility as in the other capitalist countries. This belief was to take another dimension in 1895.

Engels' "Introduction"; The Genesis of Deradicalization?

On 6 March, 1895, Engels wrote an introduction to 118 Marx's Class Struggles in France; 1848-1850, an intro­ duction which became a kind of "political Testament." It became the "bible" of the "Revisionists", and quite under­ standably so, as will be seen. Emmanuel accurately

Engels, "Zur Kritik des Sozialdemokratischen Progranunentwurfs, 1981," quoted in Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 29. 117 Because "the government [was] practically omnipo­ tent and the Parliament and all other representative bodies [were] without real power." Engels, Zur K r i t i k , in Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 378. IIP Karl Marx, Class Struggles in France; 1848-1850 (New York; International Publishers, 1976). 76 observes that "this text is undoubtedly a systematic analysis of the possibilities for the proletariat to come 119 to power by using bourgeois institutions."

Because of the importance it has for the later analy­ sis of both Social Democracy and Eurocommunism, this

"Introduction" deserves to be studied on its own merits.

The quotes, it should be stressed, are from the original and not from the truncated version that the German Social

Democrats published.

Engels saw universal suffrage as a new and effective instrument in the hands of the proletariat.

With this successful utilization of univer­ sal suffrage, an entirely new mode of proletarian struggle came into force, and this quickly developed further. It was found that the state institutions, in which the rule of the bourgeoisie is organized, offer still further opportunities for the working class. _to fight these very state institutions.

According to him, these legal activities by the proletariat were much more frightening to the bourgeoisie than the illegal ones. "[The] bourgeoisie and the government came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the illegal

119 Emmanuel, "State and Transition," p. 116. 120 Engels, "Introduction," p. 21. Compare this statement with Marx's and Engels' earlier statement: "...the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready­ made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes" ("The Civil War in France," Marx, The First International and After, p. 206). Engels' passage just quoted without doubt served to inspire Gramsci's theory ("war of posi­ tion") as well as the late Poulantzas. 77 action of the workers' party, of the results of elections 121 than of those of rebellion."

Engels' explanation is very rational. He perceived that the conditions that had existed in the 1840s had changed. If, at that time, the proletariat could fight in the streets with barricades, etc., in the 1890s this became obsolete. The reason is very simple: the military had considerably developed (which is a logical sequel to the development of the productive forces of society), and any successful insurrection over the military would only occur as a rare exception. Any confrontation with the military would, therefore, be suicidal. Engels argues that whenever the proletariat won over the military, it was "because the troops failed to obey, because the officers had lost their 122 power of decision or because their hands were tied."

Now, he explains, the situation had changed in favor of the military, while all the conditions on the insurgents' side had grown worse. He very perceptively saw that there was little chance for a real alliance between the proletariat and the middle class during a confrontation with the bour­ geoisie, contrary to what the Eurocommunists believe today.

An insurrection with which all sections of the people sympathize, will hardly recur; in the class struggle all the middle sections

121 Engels, "Introduction," p. 21. 122 ■' ibid, p. 23. 78

will never group themselves round the proletariat so exclusively that the reac­ tionary parties gathered ropg^ the bour­ geoisie well-nigh disappear.

Engels then describes the technical superiority of the military. However, perhaps believing that he had painted too grim a picture for the proletariat, Engels added unconvincingly :

Does that mean that in the future the street fight will play no further role? Certainly not. It only means that the conditions since 1848 have become far more unfavorable for civil fights, far more favorable for the military. A future street fight can there­ fore only be victorious when this unfavor­ able situation is compensated by other factors. Accordingly, it will occur more seldom in the beginning of a great revolu­ tion than in its further progress, and will have to be undertaken with greater forces. These, however, may then well prefer...the open attack to the passive barricade tac­ tics.

The bourgeoisie, aware of its strength, tries to get the proletariat into fighting in order to crush it. But, says Engels, the proletariat is not foolish enough to fall into this trap. Moreover, "the time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through by small conscious

123 Ibid, p. 24 124 Ibid, pp. 24-25. This whole passage was deleted from the German Socialist Paper. The Austro-Marxists drew the same conclusions in the revolutionary years 1918-19, and thus refused to let the fight between the proletariat and the troops take place, although they most probably had an advantage over the ruling class. See Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism," esp. pp. 23-29. 79

125 minorities at the head of unconscious masses, is past."

Consistent with what he and Marx had already stated in the

Manifesto, Engels insisted that

...[wjhere it is a question of complete transformation of the social organization, the masses themselves must also be in it, must themselves already have grasped what is at stake, what they are going in for [with body and soul] . The history of the last fifty years has taught us that. But in order that the masses may understand what is to be done, long, persistent work is re­ quired, and it is just this work which we are now pursuing, and with ^g^uccess which drives the enemy to despair.

This new tactic, Engels argues, had become widespread in other countries, even in France. In a passage that is identical to today's CP leaders' statements, he stresses that

...even in France the socialists are realiz­ ing more and more that no lasting victory is possible for them, unless they first win the great mass of the people. . .. Slow propa­ ganda work and parliamentary activity are being recognized here, too, the most immediate tasks of the Party.

Hence, in Germany,

. . . [we] can count even today on two and a half million voters. If it continues in this fashion, by the end of the century we shall conquer the greater part of the middle section of society, petty bourgeois and

125 Ibid, p. 25. Engels seems to be confusing insur­ rection with revolution. (I owe this remark to Dr. S. Lev i n e .) ^^®Ibid.

^■^^Ibid, p. 26. (Emphasis mine) 80

small peasants, and grow into the decisive power in the land, before which all other powers will..have to bow, whether they like it or not.

Engels seems to have totally given up the principles

of armed insurrection when he bluntly states that

...there is only one means by which the steady rise of the socialist fighting forces in Germany could be momentarily halted, and even thrown back for a time: a clash on a big scale with the military^, a bloodbath like that of 1871 in Paris.

This obviously sharply conflicts with his earlier state­ ments on the Commune of 1871, where he reproached the

Communards for not having used the authority of the armed people freely enough.The most controversial statement appears in the following passage of the "Introduction". It applies easily to Engels himself and to the present leaders of the West European Communist Parties.

[The] irony of world history turns every­ thing upside down. We, the "revolution­ aries", the "rebels", — we are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal

128 Ibid, p. 27. Otto Bauer repeated almost exactly the same words in the 1920's when he declared: "The figures prove it today: in a few years, the ballot can give us a majority, and with it we shall conquer power in the repub­ lic, rule over the republic" (quoted in Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism," p. 37). IZ^ibid. 130 "Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois state? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough?" (Engels, "On Authority," in Tucker, Marx-Enqels Reader, p. 733). 81

methods and revolt. The parties of order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves. They cry despairingly with Odilon Barrot: la légalité nous tue, legality is the death of us; whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles and rosy cheeks and look like eternal life. And if we are not so crazy as to let ourselves be driven into street fighting in order to please them, then nothing else is finally left for them but themselves to break through this legality so fatal to them.

No matter what kind of justification one may give, this text is an explicit endorsement of the transition to socialism through the use of bourgeois institutions. It is well-known that Engels complained about the way the "Intro­ duction" had been reproduced in Vorwflrts and the interpre­ tation given to it by some Socialist leaders, notably W.

Liebknecht, who

has played a pretty trick on me.... He has taken everything which could serve to defend the tactics of peace and anti-violence at all costs.... But I recommend these tactics only for the Germany of the present time, and that too with essential reservations. In France, Belgium, Italy and Austria it is impossible to follow this tactic in its entirety and in Ge^i^^y it can become unsuitable tomorrow.

l^^ibid, pp. 27-28. 132 Engels to Lafargue, 3 April 1895, in Marx, Class Struggles, p. 151. In his letter to Kautsky of 1 April 1895, Engels complained that "to my astonishment I see today in Vorwârts an extract from my Introduction printed without my knowledge and dealt with in such a fashion that I appear as a peaceful worshipper of legality quand même" (ibid). 82

The question to be asked is, why did Engels write such a piece? According to D. Fernbach, Engels' (and even

Marx's) argument is that "the working class should wait for the ruling classes to break the rules of representative democracy and not to take the initiative in a test of strength.

The reasons behind Engels' argument [says Fernbach,] are evident: the working class will then enjoy the benefits of moral super­ iority, and it will be easier for it to win over sections of the intermediate classes and subvert the armed forces. However, this tactic has the drawback that it deprives the workers of the ojE^^nsive, a vital advantage in insurrection.

Although this explanation is plausible, it is in no way satisfactory. It is true that Engels was aware, "... and there is no doubt, they will shoot first. One fine morn­ ing, the German bourgeois and their government will get tired of watching with their arms crossed the rising tide 135 of socialism." But to argue, like Emmanuel, that

"...the question is not one of legality for the sake of legality, but fighting on the legal terrain in order to 13 6 oblige one's adversary to abandon it" is, it seems.

133 D. Fernbach, introduction to Marx, The First International, p. 57. 134ibid. 135 Engels, quoted in Emmanuel, "State and Transition," p. 117. l^Gibid. 83 simply a scholastic attempt to rescue Engels from his own contradictions (or loss of faith in revolution?). A counterpoint to Emmanuel is to say: why would Engels argue against street fighting or violence in order to have the bourgeoisie itself start it? This does not make sense, and even Engels himself stresses that the proletariat should not be so crazy as to let itself be driven into such a 137 situation.

One of the two main contradictions in the text is that one can read in it Fernbach's and even Emmanuel's points; but, on the other hand, Bernstein, Kautsky, Carrillo ^ al. could easily support their own interpretations from the same text. Fernbach seems to provide a sensible explana­ tion as to this contradiction: the founders of historical materialism never dealt with the question on "how in those countries which combine a bureaucratic-military machine with institutions of universal suffrage and parliamentary government, the working class is to make the transition 138 from electoral politics to insurrection." What Fernbach does not say is that Engels seems to have dropped the ques­ tion of insurrection altogether (although he left some room for it in the "Introduction") , and that Lenin would cer­ tainly not have found his account in the "Introduction".

137 See quote 127 above. 138 Fernbach, introduction to Marx, The First Inter- national. 84

The question as to whether Engels became a revisionist at the end of his life has not been resolved. C. Elliott is right to argue that "a strong case could be made that

Engels himself, and not Eduard Bernstein, was the 'first 139 Revisionist' or the first Social Democrat." The fact of the matter is that there is no single answer to the ques­ tion of what interpretation of the "Introduction" is correct. The only way out, it seems, is to present the two conflicting interpretations; the so-called "orthodox"

(revolutionary) version and the "revisionist" (reformist) one. The first is Lenin's.

Lenin refers to Marx's contention that certain coun­ tries could pass to the socialist stage in a peaceful manner as an exceptional possibility, and argues that this had become obsolete since the two main countries (Great

Britain and the U.S.) became more and more bureaucratized and militarized.

Both Britain and America, the biggest and the last representatives — in the whole world — of Anglo-Saxon "liberty", in the sense that they had no militarist cliques and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-militarist institutions which subordinate everything to themselves, and suppress everything. Today, in Britain and

13 9 Charles F. Elliott, "Quis Custodiat Sacra? Problems of Marxist Revisionism," Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (1967): 73. Although the question as to whether Engels was a revisionist is not of great concern in this study, it has a certain relevance in that it shows the kind of legacy he has left. 85

America too, the "precondition for every real people's revolution" is the smashing, the destruction of the "ready-made state machinery."

In other words, Marx's and Engels' analysis of the possi­ bilities of peaceful transition collapsed. All of Lenin's subsequent theories, as is well known, became dogmas and were imposed upon all the CPs linked to the Communist

International (Comintern). The possibility of a peaceful transition was not raised again until the 1950s, and again in the 1970s by the Eurocommunist parties.

The second version of the "Introduction" is the so-called "revisionist" thesis advanced by Bernstein following Engels' death. Bernstein's view was that the working class was gaining its legitimate claims peacefully, and this was being done through democracy and parliamentar­ ism. But, contrary to Marx and even Engels, he did away with the most important tenets of Marxian political think­ ing, the appropriation of power by the proletariat. This principle neither Marx nor Engels ever dismissed. In his preface to Marx's The Civil War in France (18 March 1891),

Engels re-emphasized the point very forcefully.

From the very outset the Commune was com­ pelled to recognize that the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine ; that in order not to lose again its only just conquered

^^^V.I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," Selected Works, p. 314. (Emphasis in original.) 86

supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repres­ sive machinery previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exceçtjon, subject to recall at any moment....

In fairness to Engels, it should be said that, contrary to

Bernstein, he never closed the door to insurrection. Even in the indubitably pacifist "Introduction" to Marx's Class

Struggles in France, he still referred to the possibility of a renewal of street fights.

Even in the classic time of street fighting ...the barricade produced more of a moral than a material effect. It was a means of shaking the steadfastness of the military. If it held out until this was attained, then victory was won; if not, there was defeat. This is the main point, which must be kept in view, likewise when the chances of contingent.^future street fights are examined.

Engels, in fact, hints at the "day of decision.This, however, does not negate the characteristic "parliamentar­ ism" advocated in the "Introduction." Both German Social

Democrats and Eurocommunists later used the "Introduction" to support their policies.

141 Engels, "Preface" to Marx's "The Civil War in France," in Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, p. 627. 142 Engels, "Introduction," p. 23. The underlined passage was deleted by the Social Democrats. 143 Ibid, p. 27. This sentence too was deleted in VorwMrts. 87

In concluding this chapter, Engels' responsibility in

influencing the German SPD and even revisionist interpreta- 144 tions should be recognized.

Our concern here is not whether Engels was faithful to

Marx's and his own earlier teachings. The main issue is whether the "Introduction" was clearly an indication that

144 Those who defend Engels against such accusations do so generally on emotional grounds. E. Mandel, well known as a great scholar and political activist, unfortunately seems to fall into that category in his critique of today's use of the "Introduction." I find Mandel's following statement unfounded. "These excerpts [from Engels' "Introduction"] show beyond any doubt that the old Engels, on the eve of death, in no way ruled out recourse to insurrection and did not at all defend a peaceful, legalist, gradualist, electoralist road to socialism. He remained what he had always been: a genuine revolu­ tionary" (Ernest Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocom­ munism [London: New Left Books, 1978], p. 178). In the same book, Mandel undertakes a defense of Engels and even argues that "one can see how coherent Engels' posi­ tions were and how appropriate they remain today" (ibid., p. 181) . If this were the case, why is it that no two people agree on the same interpretation of the "Introduc­ tion"? Mandel analyzed not the text of the "Introduction," but quoted Engels' 1891 Preface to Marx's Civil War in France and a letter that Engels wrote to Kautsky. In that letter Engels wrote: "You yourself say that barricades are outmoded (but they could be useful again, if the army is composed one-third or two-fifths of socialists and it is important to offer it an opportunity to yield); but the political strike must either triumph immediately ...or end in colossal failure, or lead directly to barricades" (Engels, quoted in Mandel, From Stalin­ ism to Eurocommunism, p. 181). Mandel uses this statement to conclude that Engels' posi­ tion was coherent. Mandel insists, against the Social Democrats and the Eurocommunists, that "the conquest of power by the proletariat is impossible without the destruc­ tion of the bourgeois state machine..." (Ibid.) This, 88 there was a need for the theory to be revised considering the new situation. Also, of course, the crucial question is whether the revision(s) was (were) of a tactical or of a strategic nature. This question is still hanging over the heads of Marxist scholars and leaders.

What is certain is that Marx and Engels did not dic­ tate any dogmas. They elaborated a theory of social change and they themselves brought about changes to that theory according to the historical process taking place during their lifetimes. Some crucial tenets remained the founda­ tion of their theory. It is only with regard to the logical consistency of their theory that one may argue against those who abandon them and still claim to be followers of their theory and of its founders. Engels did not do that. However, he made enough equivocal statements to open the door to greater revisions. One of these statements was taken over-literally by Bernstein: "We have no ultimate aim. We are evolutionists ; we have no inten- 145 tions of dictating definitive laws to mankind." We let

obviously, is a consistent Marxist position, but the issue is whether Engels remained faithful to it in 1895. I think that he did not. To go as far as to claim that Engels was the "first revisionist" is maybe too strong a description of him, but that he probably was the "first Social Demo­ crat" is quite tenable. 145 Engels, Interview with a correspondent of the newspaper Le Figaro, May 8, 1893, quoted in Leonhard, Three Faces of Marxism, p. 29. This statement could be disputed as to its meaning, but when one knows the influence of Darwin on Engels, the statement makes sense. 89 the reader judge whether this statement is consistent with the theory presented in this chapter.

The process of derevolutionization seems, therefore, to have started with Engels himself. Given that the military balance had shifted in favor of the bourgeoisie,

Engels thought that it would be foolish to confront the bourgeoisie in open street fighting unless the situation was certain to be favorable for the victory of the prole­ tariat. Meanwhile, the tactic — and here the word

"tactic" should be underlined — of the proletariat should be political: the battle should be waged through legal means and not through suicidal violence. What is important to note is that the objective conditions, i.e., the devel­ opment of better military techniques (notably the creation of the machine gun, "mitrailleuse"), and hence, better military organization, led to the formulation of a new tactic (which eventually became a strategy) that contra­ dicted the earlier radical statements of the founders of historical materialism.

A variety of these principles and theories — which will be discussed in Chapter V — has been advanced to demonstrate or to understand why revolutionary movements or parties have been deradicalized. These theories are: (1)

Marxist and non-Marxist analyses of the causes of the derevolutionization of the working class under capitalism;

(2) Tucker's thesis on deradicalization; (3) Weber's theory 90

on the effects of bureaucratization; (4) Michel's views on

the embourgeoisement of the working class parties; and (5)

Roth's conception of negative integration. Within these

movements themselves, certain individuals became aware of

the "embourgeoisement" of some leaders or officials, and

attacked them for their deviation from the "correct line."

This usually has led to political and polemical disputes, which very often have led to the expulsion of the heretic

elements, the splintering of the party itself, or to the desertion of certain elements into the camp of the former enemy. The condemnation of the heretics usually comes from the Left wing of the movement or party, and is defined as a betrayal of either the cause, the principles or the texts

(when there is a social theory or doctrine in the move­ ment) . However, revolutionaries have rarely attempted a systematic analysis to define how and explain why these individuals "betray" the cause. They often attribute the betrayal of these individuals to a misunderstanding of the cause, to material considerations, or to their petty bourgeois backgrounds (i.e., to the fact that they have not been able to rid themselves fully of the ideology of their class of origin).

Marx himself had already observed the deradicalization of the Labor movement in England as a consequence of the development of the capitalist system.

The advance of capitalist production devel­ ops a working class which by education. 91

tradition, and habits looks upon the condi­ tions of that mode of production as self- evident laws of nature. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all resistance .... The dull compulsion of economic regu­ lations completes the subjection of the laborer to the capitalist. Direct force outside economic conditions is, of course, still used, but only exceptionally.... It is otherwise during the^historic genesis of capitalist production.

The implication is that the revolutionary spirit of the working class is more pronounced at the beginning of industrialization rather than at the later stages. But, as has been seen in the passage quoted from Wage Labor and

Capital, Marx never believed that the improvement of the conditions of the working class resulting from the develop­ ment of capitalism meant an absolute change in the general conditions of labor. In other words, he refused to accept capitalism as a viable system, even a reformed one. What is certain is that Marx was aware that the improvement in the conditions of the working class was leading to a split within the latter^^^ (this will later be known as "labor aristocracy," skilled workers vs. unskilled workers, etc.).

This is probably why the revolutionary spirit of the

Marx, quoted in Daniel R. Gandy, Marx and History; From Primitive Society to the Communist Future (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 159.

^^^In the Communist Manifesto (p. 90) , Marx already declared that "this organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is contin­ ually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves." 92

proletariat was lost earlier in England — the most ad­

vanced capitalist country in the 19th century — than on

the Continent.

The development of capitalism and the relative bene­

fits that the working class obtained from it led undoub­ tedly to a less revolutionary proletariat — Marx, Engels,

Lenin, Kautsky, and others thought that the proletariat, whether on its own (i.e., through struggles) or through the consciousness brought to it from outside (intellectuals), would develop a revolutionary consciousness which would prevent it from adopting exclusively a "trade unionist" mentality. However, apparently what happened in England,

Germany, and other advanced countries was just that. It has often been argued that it is the derevolutionization of the leadership that leads the proletariat to adopt a reformist, non-revolutionary attitude. In fact, it has often been the working class itself which adopted such an attitude. In a way, one must agree with Marcuse that "the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and 148 satisfaction." In a general sense, it could be argued that this is precisely what happened in most advanced

14 8 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man; Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston; Beacon Press, 1964), p. 11. 93 capitalist countries, especially since the Second World

War. However, this happened in Germany before the First

World War. Germany and the German working class constitut­ ed the first practical test for Marxist analysis. It was in Germany that a huge Socialist party was founded and eventually espoused Marxism (while Engels was still alive).

But it was also in Germany that the derevolutionization of the working class and its party took place. CHAPTER II

GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

This chapter deals with the German Social Democratic

Party (SPD) during the period 1890 to 1914. The reason for dealing with this party is simple: the SPD was the first party to proclaim Marxism as its creed. Engels, one of the two founders of historical materialism, was its spiritual symbol and exerted some influence on its leaders. More­ over, Germany was the first country where the working class adopted Marxism, noh only to improve its material condi­ tions, but to lead the struggle in order to achieve the final goal, the establishment of a Communist, classless society. In other countries, the labor movement was either devoid of any social theory and was concerned with immedi­ ate gains (e.g., Britain), was divided because of the numerous political parties claiming to represent it (e.g.,

France) , or was a victim of the repressive powers of autocratic regimes (e.g., Russia, Austria, etc.).

The situation within the SPD in 1890-1914 is of great relevance to this study because of the apparent similari­ ties between intra-party controversies of that era and what is taking place among West European Communist parties

94 95

today. Within both the SPD and the Eurocommunist parties,

there have been wide-ranging debates about electoral politics, peaceful transition, revisionism, democracy,

socialism, the role of the intellectuals, the middle class, class alliances, the role of the party and the working class, the State, the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.

The positions adopted and the dilemmas faced in the 1890-

1914 period and after have re-emerged among West European and non-European Communist parties in the 1950s and 1960s, and most notably in the 1970s.

As far as this study is concerned, the analysis of

German Social Democracy will be limited to certain funda­ mental issues relevant to the analysis of today's Communist parties (CPs). The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the practical and theoretical dilemmas faced by the SPD.

Since one of the main objectives of this dissertation is to confirm or refute the thesis that today's West European CPs have undergone a process of deradicalization and/or Kautsky- ism, it seems appropriate and even imperative to see the origins of such a thesis in reference to Social Democracy.

Another objective in this chapter is to show the difficulty which the SPD had in implementing Marxist theory, as expounded in the previous chapter, and what practical and theoretical responses were made by the party and its theoreticians. 96

The German SPD; From Isolation to Participation

The failure of the revolution of 1848-49 in Germany — as elsewhere in the European continent — was followed by a phase of reaction. The nascent labor movement was re­ pressed in a systematic way. "The right to organize was denied by law, while in the expanding industrial economy, labor and capital moved into ever deeper conflict. Never­ theless, anti-capitalist feeling did not yet assume a revolutionary form."^ This could be explained by the relatively low level of capitalist development and by the 2 heterogeneous character of the proletariat. Moreover, a revolutionary theory did not yet exist: the Communist

Manifesto was published in the same period, but its circu­ lation was not extensive. Lassalle's General German

Workers' Association, founded in 1863, was not an impres­ sive revolutionary party. Lassalle's attempt to collabo­ rate with Bismarck to implement the producer cooperatives with the financial support of the State was a short-lived episode.

Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy; 1905-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1955), p"! T7 2 For an excellent treatment of this question, see Eric Hobsbawm's The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (London; Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962), and The Age of Capital, 1848- 1875 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975). 97

In 1868, the Social Democratic Labor Party was founded

by two followers of Marx: Wilhelm Liebknecht and August

Bebel. Marxist ideas inspired the Party program (Eisenach

Program). The Eisenachers therefore opposed the Lassal-

leans on many issues. Despite their differences, however,

Eisenachers and Lassalleans merged in 1875 at the confer­

ence held in Gotha the same year. The new party became known as the Socialist Labor Party of Germany and, paradox­

ically, its program was more Lassallean than Marxist.^ The program pledged to use "every legal means for the free

State," demanded "universal suffrage and the secret ballot, direct legislation by the people, full civil liberties,

freedom of association, and various legislative actions for 4 the reform of working conditions." The program, as is well known, did not use Marx's analysis, nor did it en­ visage or mention revolution, and was practically silent about the class character of the State.^ Marx's critique of the notion of a "free State" exposed the lack of theo­ retical depth and of political acumen of both Lassalleans and Eisenachers. However, as shall be discussed below, the

3 Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 3. Marx strongly criticized the programme. Marx's views were expressed in one of his major works. Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York; International Publishers, 1976). 4 Schorske, German Social Democracy.

^Ibid. 98

European CPs today have a conception of the State which is

arguably not much different from that of the German Social­

ists of that time.

With the establishment by Bismarck of the Anti-Social­

ist Laws (in effect from 1878-1890), German Socialists changed their attitude toward Marxism and toward the State.

Legal means to achieve their goals were no longer part of their program. Instead, they resorted to illegal methods in order to save their movement. Thus, the Party was more radical and more openly revolutionary in the 1880s.

During this time of troubles, the urban working class became increasingly alienated from the State. The vote polled by the Socialists reflected the change in mood; it rose from 311,961 in 1881 to 1,427,298 in 1890. Within the Socialist Labor Party, there developed a left-wing revolutionary opposition verging close to anarchism in its condemnation of parliamentary action as a futile instrument ^n the advancement of the proletarian cause.

This point seems to fit into the theories according to which revolutionary movements are more radical when alien­ ated from the political system than otherwise. Histori­ cally, this argument seems valid: most West European CPs were more radical before they became legal opposition parties.

Marxism did not become the official doctrine of German

Social Democracy until the Congress held in Erfurt in 1891.

^Ibid, pp. 3-4. 99

As is well known, the new program was mainly the work of

Karl Kautsky, with the collaboration of Eduard Bernstein.

The importance of this program lies in the fact that it was probably the first time in history that a party was provid­ ed with a social theory.^ The program had both long-term and immediate objectives. The former, which were revolu­ tionary in character, related to the class struggle and the ultimate goal, i.e., the establishment of a socialist society. The immediate objectives, however, dealt with the more urgent and practical questions which the Party had to treat within the framework of bourgeois-capitalist Germany.

This is probably why, "if the bulk of the platform was unimpeachably democratic and 'reformist', its preamble at least laid sufficient stress on the class struggle to satisfy Engels, with whom Kautsky was in constant corres­ pondence."® The reason for such a seemingly contradictory

"[The SPD] was the first to adopt the philosophy of Marx and was generally accepted as the leading Marxist and socialist party. It was the first socialist party to be organized on a national scale and also, in spite of severe repression, the first to gain electoral victories.... The party was the largest, best organized and most revolutionary, in its theoretical aspects at least, of the emerging European socialist parties...." (Robert Kilroy-Silk, Socialism Since Marx [New York; Taplinger Publishing Co., 1972], pp. 33-34). 0 George Lichtheim, Marxism; An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 260. Engels himself was critical of the program in general because he was skeptical about a peaceful road in Germany. See 100

program is quite easy to understand. The Party needed a

platform that could be applicable to a nonrevolutionary

situation. Schorske aptly grasped the historical situation with great insight:

The Erfurt program was designed for a non-revolutionary period, one in which the working class was growing in numbers and political self-awareness, but was still too weak to make a serious bid for power. Part I of the program expressed the socialist ideal of a complete transformation of soci­ ety; Part II, the political and economic interest of the worker within the existing order. The ideal could be realized only by a social revolution, a change in the locus of economic and political power — whether by violent or by peaceful means was not specified in the program. The worker's immediate interest could be pursued within capitalist society by organizing the econom­ ic and political power of labor. The tie that would bind these two aims together, according to the Marxian theory and the Erfurt program, was the development of capitalism itself, which, while isolating and depressing the workers, would develop in them the consciousness of the need for socialism ^ d the strength and will to realize it.

As far as Marxist theory is concerned, there is no doubt that one cannot talk about "deviation" from Marx and

Engels. As shown in Chapter I, the latter did not object to the struggle for reforms so long as the ultimate goal was not lost from sight. The program took into account the

Friedrich Engels, "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfs," in Deutsche Parteiproqramme, Wilhelm Mommsen, ed. (Munich: Olzog, 1964). 9 Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 6. 101

objective and subjective conditions of the time. However,

within the party, forces developed which insisted on reform

and pointed to the benefits gained from the established

system without stressing the tactical and temporary charac­

ter of such an objective. Such tendencies become under­

standable when one takes into account the uneven develop­ ment of Germany at that time; the forces of reformism were

stronger in the South, due to the low level of industrial­

ization of that region. Moreover, a point of considerable

importance should be made: in the 189 0s, Germany had not yet achieved the bourgeois-democratic freedoms that existed in, say, England or France. Therefore, the primary role of the party was not so much to bring about a revolution in the immediate future as to accelerate the process of democratization.

What were the ideological bases of Social Democracy? The movement, obviously, was the heir of democratic liberalism and of utopian socialism. From the first. Social Democracy took the demands for universal suffrage, for control of the government by the governed, and for ^g^e protection of civil liber­ ties ....

This is clearly why

...the immediate task, as [the leaders] saw it, was to organize the working class, and

Carl Landauer, "Social Democracy," in The Revolu­ tionary Internationals, 1864-1943, ed. M. Drachkovitch (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 129. 102

to this end it was essential to hammer home the party's relentless opposition to capi­ talism, as well as to "class rule": the latter term signifying not the domination of the bourgeoisie (of which indeed in Germany there was little sign) , but rather,^^as with Lassalle, the absence of democracy.

One may argue that Kautsky's and the other SPD lead­ ers' obsession with socialism and democracy stems partially from these particular historical and political conditions.

It could be suggested, at this point, that such a situation required participation of the labor movement in the bour­ geois-democratic framework. The question, however, would be: is there any guarantee that the movement, which aims at the overthrow of this very same system in which it participates, would remain faithful to its principles? On the other hand, it could be asked whether the bourgeoisie would respect its own legality if it came to be defeated.

This is a question still debated today.

In the 1890s, theoretical revisionism was developed by certain party members, notably Bernstein. For many, revisionism within the party was thought to be a temporary deviation, but it became more and more the reality of the

SPD and the trade unions. In fact, the problem of revi­ sionism (reformism) culminated in the schism of the SPD on the eve of World War I.

^^Lichtheim, Marxism, p. 263. (Emphasis added.) 103

By 1905-1906, it became apparent that reformism was the predominant ideology within the trade unions. In 1906, the Party Congress, held in Mannheim, established equality between the SPD and the unions. The victory of reformism was proven by the Congress' rejection of the mass strike as an offensive weapon. Instead, the material interests of the working class were stressed, rather than the revolu- 12 tionary mission of the latter. Indeed, "the trade unions had demonstrated their power in bringing the party back to 13 the traditional reformism tactic" which characterized the

SPD since its birth, and in reinforcing the reformist wing 14 within it. This, of course, led to the emergence of a radical Left within the party (Luxemburg, Liebknecht,

Mehring, etc.) opposed to the obvious bureaucratization of the working class movement in Germany.

In 1907, the SPD was defeated at the Reichstag elections: it lost half the seats.The victory of the

Right over the SPD was due primarily to the colonial question. Kautsky argued that there should be a more

^^Jacques Droz, Histoire générale du socialisme. Vol. II, De 1875 à 1918 (Paris, P.U.F., 1974), p. 54; G.D.H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. II, Part I, The Second International, 1889-1914 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1956), p. 319. 13 Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 51.

^'^Ibid., p. 53.

^^Ibid., p. 61. 104

radical struggle against imperialism, whereas the revision­

ists within the SPD held that imperialism was popular in the

country and that, consequently, the party should adapt its

policy accordingly.^® Moreover, they insisted that the SPD

lost the elections because its radicalism frightened the 17 middle class, which inevitably supported the nationalist

parties. Unquestionably, what led to the SPD's defeat was 18 the government's effective use of national sentiments.

The only choice faced by the SPD now was to appear more patriotic if it wanted to achieve any kind of integration within the national polity.

The Congress of Nürnberg in 1908 only confirmed the revisionists' growing strength in the SPD, as did the

Congress held in Leipzig the following year. This con­ gress, though not openly admitting its acceptance of the revisionist view, declared that the question of alliance with bourgeois parties should not be contingent upon principles of doctrine. Rather, the question should be decided in terms of political calculations and potential 19 success.

^®Droz, Histoire générale, p. 56. 17 Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 64.

l®Ibid., p. 63.

^^Ibid, p. 70; Droz, Histoire générale, p. 59 105

The year 1910 was characterized by a radicalization of

the working class. Strikes were started in different parts

of the country. The Left wing of the SPD, under the

leadership of Rosa Luxemburg, insisted that the movement

should be turned into a revolutionary force; i.e., its

demands should be transformed into political ones. Kautsky disagreed with the Left and proposed instead a war of

attrition. The truth was that, in reality, what Kautsky and the SPD demanded was no more than a parliamentary 2 0 solution. The weight of the reformists within the SPD became considerable.

In 1911, the Jena Congress revealed that what preoccu­ pied the SPD were electoral and bureaucratic questions rather than revolutionary objectives. This is probably why it was at this Congress that a center group — between revisionism and revolutionary socialism — emerged within the SPD (Kautsky, etc.)

In 1912, the SPD obtained excellent electoral results.

It became the leading German party: 110 seats in the 21 Reichstag were held by Social Democrats. Unfortunately for the SPD, the bourgeois parties (National Liberal Party,

Progressive Party, etc.) betrayed the Social Democrats by

20U, . Ibid., p. 60; Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 183. 21 Ibid., p. 228; Droz, Histoire générale , p. 61. 106

voting for the proposed military law, thus isolating the

SPD which now stood alone in opposition. Clearly, the

German political framework made it very difficult for the

SPD to act effectively in a nonrevolutionary way: as noted by Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg, it became quite "obvi­ ous that the more the Social Democrats were numerically powerful, the less would the government be disposed to let 22 the Reichstag have any influence on the government." The elections were a blow for the revisionists, who had made

some secret arrangements with the bourgeois parties. The

latter benefitted much more from these arrangements than did the SPD. The Social Democrats supported candidates of the Progressive Party more efficiently, whereas the Pro­ gressives were very treacherous in their support of the SPD 23 candidates.

What probably divided the German working class more than anything else was the question of imperialism. At the

Jena Congress, held in 1913 — the last congress of united

Social Democracy — the results of the two important votes clearly indicated the definitive victory of reformism and nationalism in the SPD. The votes for new taxes to sustain military budgets (336 vs. 140) represented only a prelude to what was to happen a year later. The votes against the

2 2 Ibid., p. 61 (my translation). 23 Schorske, German Social Democracy, pp. 231 ff. 107

24 general strike (333 vs. 142) simply confirmed the aban­

donment of any revolutionary tactics by the SPD. This was

already obvious in 1906. At Jena, then, the "two votes

showed that the capitulation of the Social Democrats to the 25 government was already predictable." And indeed, on

August 4, 1914, "by its unanimous vote for the war credits

...the Social Democratic Reichstag delegation made its

crucial contribution to the creation of a national unit in 2 6 defense of the existing State."

The Left and the Center tried to revitalize the Party

and make it a revolutionary, or at least a more radical,

party of the working class. In 1917, they formed another

Social Democratic party, the USPD (Independent SPD). In

December 1918, the Left split from the USPD to form the

German Communist party, the KPD. But all of these revital­

ization attempts ended in failure.

In addition to what has been presented on the SPD so

far, a synthesis of the major issues debated within the party seems necessary. This would help to illuminate the dilemmas that have confronted Marxist movements ever since their creation. What is of relevance to the present study are the questions faced by the SPD in the 1890s and 1900s

^^Ibid, p. 277; Droz, Histoire générale, p. 64.

^®Ibid., p. 65.

^®Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 285 (emphasis m i n e ) . 108

which have re-emerged with the West European CPs in the

19 70s. There is no need to emphasize that the purpose is

not to draw exact parallels, although similarities un­

doubtedly do exist. The historical conditions have changed

substantially, and so have the working class parties. The

level of social, economic, cultural, and political develop­ ments is completely different between the two periods.

Despite all these limitations, however, there are certainly

issues in common which both Social Democrats of the classi­ cal period (1890-1918) and today's non-ruling CPs in

Western Europe and other advanced capitalist countries faced: parliamentarism, dictatorship of the proletariat, the State, coalition politics, etc. Therefore, the main focus of the following sections will be on these concepts and on how they were treated by the SPD leadership — mainly Kautsky, Bernstein and Luxemburg. Since theorizing was done sometimes in reaction to socio-economic and political developments, and since the three authors just mentioned drew different conclusions, a look at such historical developments seems appropriate.

As stated earlier, the SPD was from the outset a mixture of reformism and radicalism because of the semi­ absolutist character of the German State and its repressive attitude toward the working class. The bourgeoisie, instead of assuming its postulated revolutionary role against the Junkers, let the proletarian party perform this task. Moreover, 109

...numerous radical bourgeois elements streamed into the Social-democratic move­ ment, because they had found no opportunity to effect their ideas in the bourgeois parties; they tended to strengthen the reformist wing of the SPD. This contradic­ tory situation determined the character of the party: apparently radical in its political behavior^,, but essentially reform­ ist in principles.

The lifting of the Anti-Socialist Laws seems to have

reactivated the reformism within the party and within the

trade unions. The latter, in fact, viewed their success

...not, like the party radicals, as part of the process of the organization of the proletariat for the revolution, but as triumphs in and for themselves, to be further expanded within the framework of the capitalist order. The old intransigent hostility toward both the entrepreneur and the State yielded to ^ willingness to compromise differences.

This view found its most elaborate exposition in the writings of Eduard Bernstein, a close friend of Engels.

Bernstein, who had been influenced by the Fabian

Socialists during his long stay in England after he had

left Germany following the Anti-Socialist Laws, started his attack on Marx's theory of value, one of the core concepts of Marxist economics. Marx's theory of value was, for

27 Paul Frfilich, Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 46. 28 Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 15. Although they were neutral during the Revisionist Controversy, the trade union leaders sided more or less openly with the Revisionists after 1905. See Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 130-140. 110

2 9 Bernstein, "a pure abstract concept" and the labor theory

of value was simply "a formula which rests on a hypothe­

sis."®® Bernstein was not interested in theoretical

questions as much as in the empirical observation of facts

— whether these observations were correct is highly

dubious, as many studies have shown,®® during his time as well as today. Bernstein believed that Marx's analysis of

the capitalist system had become obsolete because capital­

ism had transformed itself because of the rise of cartels,

trusts, and the credit system. In fact, he argued against

Marx's claim that the capitalist anarchy in production would produce cyclical crises. He suggested that the cartels, trusts, and credit system open possibilities for 32 adjustment in the modern economy to ward off major crises.

Bernstein observed that there was a more equal distri­ bution of wealth, and that Marx's "theory of immiseration" of the proletariat was invalid. He saw, instead of a concentration of wealth, a diffusion of property through such institutions as the joint stock companies.

29 Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, p. 29.

®®Ibid., p. 30. 31 For an excellent analysis, besides Luxemburg's and Kautsky's, see Lucio Colletti, "Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International," From Rousseau to Lenin; Studies in Ideology in Society (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), pp. 45-108. 3 2 Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, pp. 73-94. Ill

[It] is...quite wrong to assume that the present development of society shows a relative or indeed absolute diminution of the number of the members of the possessing classes. Their number increases both relatively and absolutely. If the activity and the prospects of social democracy were dependent on the decrease of the "wealthy", then it might indeed lie down to sleep. But the contrary is the case. The prospects of socialism depend not on the decease but on the increase of social wealth.

The obvious political implication is that the working class and its representatives should support the growth of capitalism, rather than obstruct it. In other words, the steady development of capitalism could lead directly to socialism.

Bernstein denied that real wages were decreasing, and argued that the prosperity of the Reich in the 1890s had, in fact, led to an increase in real wages. Although it is true that some segments of the working class, namely the

"labor aristocracy," had seen their wages substantially increase, "there is also little doubt that the process was short-lived, and that relative impoverishment was a fact in the early 1900 ' s.H. Marks argues that, despite

Bernstein's observation.

33 Ibid., p. 48. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized passage reflects the thinking of today's West European CPs, who see in productivity and rationalization a step toward the transition. Cf. Carl Boggs' "Eurocommunism, the State, and the Crisis of Legitimation," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 23 (1979) . 34 D. McLellan, Marxism After Marx (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 28l Bernstein's interpretation 112

...the actual condition of the working class at least failed to improve as much as the rise of real wages would suggest, and even possibly declined. In short, the picture was far from obvious and gave rise to a

"...is invalidated by ics excessive simplicity. In the first place, real wages form but one factor affecting the physical welfare of the wage-earners — unemployment, illness, industrial accidents and diseases cannot be ignored. Real wages measure only what a worker receives, not what he produces (Harry Marks, "The Sources of Reformism in the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1890-1914," Journal of Modern History, XI, No. 3 [1939], pp. 339-40). A study undertaken in the late 1950s highlights the difficulty in sharing Bernstein's optimism.

"In 1880 and 1881 real earnings were lower than they had been in 1871; from then on they went up. After a rather steep rise during the 1890's and part of the subsequent decade, the growth lost momentum and weekly real earnings began to level out. In fact, between 1900 and 1913, the increase in weekly real earnings amounted to only two percent" (Gerhard Bry, Wages in Germany, 1871-1945 [Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1960], pp. 71-73). According to the author, some analyses of the period 1890-1913 by other students have shown that in fact real wages remained the same or even declied (ibid. , p. 73) . Bry concluded his analysis of the period 1871-1913 by saying that "...it must be accepted as a fact that, though money earnings increased by about a third between 1900 and 1913, the gain was largely offset by price increases in consumer's goods. A minority of German workers suffered an actual decrease in real earnings; a majority experienced stability or a moderate rise, with the average real earnings level advancing by only a small percentage" (ibid., p. 74). Bry, however, claims that these years brought some benefits to German wage earners because "from 1871 to 1913 the average hourly real earnings increased by about 64%. From 1890 to 1900 the rise amounted to 18% and from 1900 to 1913 to about 10%" (ibid.). This in no way corroborates Bernstein's claims. In fact, I found Bry's study itself somewhat unconvincing. 113

questionable optimism which encouraged the right wing of the Labor movement. There is no doubt that German economy, rising to leadership in Europe, was able to grant substantial gains in purchasing power to the upper sections of the working class, tending to give them the ^^nsation of belonging to the middle class.

Of greater interest is Bernstein's sociological analysis of German society. According to him, far from impoverishment in the society, there was a constant enrich­ ment of its members. Classes -- a concept which Bernstein defines very loosely^^ — were not becoming more homoge­ neous and polarized, as Marx had it. "Far from society being simplified as to its divisions compared with earlier times, it has been graduated and differentiated both in 37 respect of incomes and of business activities." 3 8 Bernstein saw the middle class as a potential ally of the

35 Marks, "The Sources of Reformism," p. 342.

[He] considered [class] to be simply a social stratum which was largely formed by similarity of living conditions" (McLellan, Marxism, p. 29). See also Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 205. 37 Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, p. 49.

^^"Middle class" refers to "...[the] ever-increasing number of technical per­ sonnel, white collar workers, office and sales clerks, and government employees. These categories grew along with the mounting bureaucratization of monopoly capitalism.. Their universal characteristic was dependence; in most cases, their incomes were little higher than those of the wage laborers, but their social standing and social pretensions defi­ nitely allied them with the bourgeoisie" (Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 210). 114 proletariat, once the latter had accepted the existing system. This last point, although not systematically dealt with by Bernstein, has been a point of serious discussion among Marxists ever since. However, as shall be seen below, Kautsky's analysis of the middle class is more similar to that of Eurocommunists today than Bernstein's.

In the field of politics, however, the West European CPs certainly do owe something to Bernstein's views.

Having done away with Marxist economics and philosophy

— he rejected the dialectics — Bernstein now approached the question of politics in a way which lost sight of most

Marxian tenets. In opposition to the Marxist thesis that the proletariat had to wrest political power from the bourgeoisie and must establish its own authority (dictator­ ship) , he argued that the existing State could be used for socialist ends. Moreover, his views and those of the

Revisionists, inspired by English Fabianism, led them to believe that Socialism was developing within capitalism itself — an idea which Marx had already noted, but whose foundations and conclusions were different from Bernstein's

— and that, consequently, "this is cause for great hope, for it demonstrates that the transformation of capitalism into Socialism can proceed in gradual and nonviolent fashion.There was no question of using violence

3 Q ^^Ibid, p. 221. 115 against the bourgeoisie, although Bernstein argued (just

like the Eurocommunists today) that "certainly there are situations in which the use of force may be defended on rational grounds — most obviously in a country in which peaceful methods of bringing about social change are doomed to failure.

In an implicit rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thus of one of the crucial political concepts (and aims) of Marxist theory, Bernstein suggested that the Party

...does not fight for political power in the delusion that it will gain control over­ night, but in the endeavor to secure for the working class an ever stronger influence on legislation and public life.... It is nonsensical to view the struggle for politi­ cal power merely as the struggle for com­ plete ^ d exclusive domination within the State.^

The underscored part of this statement corresponds exactly to the Eurocommunist conception, as shall be seen later.

"Trade unionism," which became such a bad word in

Leninist terminology, was viewed by Bernstein as an instru­ ment in the advance toward socialism. The trade unions

^^Ibid, p. 221.

Ibid, p. 224. The similarity to Carrillo's view in Eurocommunism and the State is striking. The reference is to autocratic regimes like Tsarist Russia, of course.

^^Bernstein,"Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozial- ismus," quoted in Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 225. (Emphasis mine.) 116 played not only an economic role — in that they pressured the capitalists into making concessions — but also an ethical one, "for the moral ideals of equality and freedom 42 from wage slavery are embodied in labor organizations."

For Bernstein, parliamentarism was an absolute neces­ sity. He linked it to his conception of the relationship between socialism and democracy. In his view, democracy was "the means of the struggle for socialism, and it is the 43 form socialism will take once it has been realized," As correctly stated by Kilroy-Silk, "in [Bernstein's] hands the concept of socialism was redefined to mean the fight for social reforms and the abandonment of all thought of 44 revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat." The reason for such an identification of the two concepts

(Socialism = Social reforms) is relatively easy to eluci­ date. As has been seen, for Marx, Engels, and later

Marxists such as Kautsky, Lenin, etc., socialist democracy was not only the preservation of the rights and freedoms gained within the capitalist system, but their extension to many more areas, i.e., a transcendence of bourgeois demo­ cracy. (Transcendence is here understood in a Hegelian

^^Ibid., p. 230.

^^Bernstein, quoted in Kilroy-Silk, Socialism Since M a r x , p. 45, ^^ibid. 117

sense.) Bernstein, however, did not understand democracy

in this way. His was bourgeois, liberal democracy tout

court. He explicitly states that there is a continuity between socialism and liberal democracy:

There is actually no liberal thought which does not also belong to.the elements of the ideas of socialism.... Democracy is a condition of socialism to a much greater degree than is usually assumed, i.e., ^ is not only the means, but the substance.

Luxemburg's devastating, and by far the most systemat­ ic, critique of Bernstein showed very clearly the un-

Marxist analysis of the latter. Luxemburg was right in pointing out that Bernstein did not emphasize the class nature of the parliamentary institutions in Germany.

Faithful to Marx, she maintained that parliament, the trade unions, and the cooperatives were not an end in themselves, but merely institutions from which the proletarian struggle could be launched. She, too, identified democracy with socialism, but her concept of democracy did not refer to democracy in general nor to bourgeois (i.e., narrow, class- based) democracy, but to social democracy. Luxemburg considered social democracy to be theoretically a much greater and fuller democracy, and there is no doubt that she meant it to be so in practice as well. This is why she

4 5 Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, p. 151.

4Gibid., p. 166. 118

stated forcefully that "the socialist movement is not bound

to bourgeois democracy, but...on the contrary, the fate of 47 democracy is bound with the socialist movement." Reforms

are indeed necessary but not sufficient to bring about

socialism. The capitalist class, Luxemburg argues, will grant concessions to the working class only insofar as the reforms are in the interest of the bourgeoisie. Once again, however, it should be emphasized that in no way does

Luxemburg deny the necessity of the struggle for reforms.

D . Howard captures her insight quite remarkably in the following passage:

On the one hand, she insists that parliamen­ tary and trade union struggles are not the way to socialist revolution, showing their one-sided defensive character rooted within the game-rules of the capitalist system; on the other hand, she argues that without parliamentary democracy and without free trade unions and their struggles, a social­ ist revolution would not be possible, for there would be no room for the proletariat to develop its consciousness and no economic space to free itself from the immediate pressure of the struggle for e^^stence within a society of wage slavery.

Although the Revisionists were unanimously condemned in the Party Congress of 1903, the Party's practice re­ mained itself revisionist. Most scholars agree that the

SPD's practice had always been more or less revisionist.

When Bernstein asked the Party to admit its reformism, Auer

47 R. Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution?, p. 48. 48 D. Howard, "Re-reading Rosa Luxemburg," Telos, 18 (Winter 1973-74), pp. 100-101. 119 told him: "My dear Ede, you don't pass such resolutions. 49 You don't talk about it, you just ^ it." Plamenatz, as a matter of fact, suggests that the SPD leadership would have been better off if they had listened to Bernstein's advice :

[The Social Democrats] would have done well to follow the lead of Bernstein, for had they done so, they might have become reso­ lute Revisionists and not remained irreso­ lute Marxists. They would, no doubt, have been bitterly attacked by the extremists in their own party, and by Lenin too, but t h ^ would at least have known their own minds.

This may be true, but it does not explain the dilemma which the Social Democrats were facing, and why they acted in a reformist rather than a revolutionary fashion. To condemn the Social Democratic leadership^^ is an easy task, but one has to admit that the conditions in which they operated were very complex. There are several factors which could explain their reformist, as opposed to their revolutionary, practice.

4 9 Quoted in Gay, Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 270.

Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), p. 184.

^^Breitman is right to argue that to say that the leadership "consciously chose the status quo over socialist revolution" is part of "tenuous assumptions and false dichotomies." He is also correct to argue that "although social democratic strategists certainly rejected the risky alternative of socialist revolution, they hardly intended to support the status quo" (R. Breitman, German Socialism and Weimar Democracy [Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981], p. 5). 120

As noted above, when the Anti-Socialist Laws were promulgated, the SPD entered a period of radicalization.

Its sense of isolation and alienation from the polity gave the members of the Party and those associated with it a feeling of esprit de corps. The effect of Bismarck's repression did indeed reinforce that sense of solidarity 52 among the working class and its leadership. Membership increased dramatically during the period of the Anti-

Socialist Laws. In 1878, the Party only had 437,000 votes, and membership in the trade unions was a mere 50,000. By

1890, the Party obtained 1,427,000 votes, and membership in 53 the unions jumped to 200,000. But as Roth correctly observed, "the Social Democrats were radicals because of their democratic aspirations and socialist ideals — not because of any specifically Marxist tendencies, which played an insignificant role in the early years of the

52 On this, see 0. Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in Political Parties and Political Development J. Lapalombara and M. Weiner, eds. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), esp. pp. 181-183.

^^Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, pp. 103-104. F. Mehring declared,

"In twelve years of struggle the Party had not only become larger and more powerful, but was also consid­ erably enriched in its innermost essence. It had not only resisted and hit back, but also worked, learned; it had given proof not only of its strength, but also of its spirit" (Quoted in ibid., p. 104). 121

54 Socialist movement." Marxist theory was adopted mostly

because it

...was appropriate to the historical moment. By its distinction between the objective historical conditions necessary to achieve socialism and the objective will of the proletariat required to bring it about, Marxism made possible a reconciliation of the revolutionary rancor engendered in the Social Democratic rank and file during the persecution, and the need for a reformist tactic in a fundamentally non-revolutionary period.

The proposition that revolutionary movements are more radical when they are excluded from participation in national power seems to be valid in this case.

During the 1870s and 1880s, parliamentarism was accepted by the Party only insofar as it remained a tactical maneuver, i.e., a platform from which to propagan­ dize radical, or at least progressive (democratic), ideol­ ogy. As put by W. Liebknecht in that period:

The Social Democratic Party is a revolution­ ary party; if it is lured onto the level of parliamentarism, it will cease to be revolu­ tionary — to exist at all. We participate in the Reichstag elections and send deputies into the Reichstag exclusively for the purpose of agitation. The strength of our party rests in the people; there is our realm of activity; we should talk from the rostrum of the Reichstag only in order to address the people. If we move away from the revolutionary origin and character of

54 Gunther Roth, The Social Democrats in Germany; A Study in Working Class Isolation and National Integration (New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963), pp. 85-86. 55 Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 4. 122

our party, if we lose only for a moment the contact with the revolutionary people, we are up in the air and will be pitilessly strangled like that giant of antiquity [Antaeus]. [The Social Democratic deputies] cannot be effective within the Reichstag, only outside of it; [they cannot be success­ ful] through legislation, but only through agitation. The Reichstag should only be a means, not an end for them, not their area of activity, but a visible platform from which to address the people and to enlighten them about the true character of scyJ et y , from the center of class domination.

What is curious about this statement is that it was made in

1874, when the Party had not yet adopted Marxism as its creed, and before the Gotha Program. But the reason for

such a statement could well be that Liebknecht realized in the 18 70s that "the Party was too weak to be influential in

Parliament and that the Reichstag was constitutionally weak 57 in relation to the government and the crown." Roth's argument is correct: Liebknecht's attitude toward parlia­ mentarism in the 1890s proves that. Why such a change?

The lifting of the Anti-Socialist Laws and the removal of

Bismarck had certainly something to do with it. Another factor, however, is also evident in German Social Democracy of that time: the Party's leadership, despite its revolu­ tionary rhetoric, did not really aim at the overthrow of the system, which according to the fatalistic perspective

^^W. Liebknecht, quoted in Roth, The Social Democrats, pp. 95-96. 57 Roth, ibid., p. 96 123

of the leadership, was going to collapse anyway. The Party wanted to create a better society for the working class,

and to some extent it succeeded in bringing about reforms

favorable to the latter. The revolutionary potential of the working class was definitely present; the leadership wanted to make the bourgeoisie aware of its existence in order to extract concessions.

For decades, he [Bebel] and other leaders pleaded for social recognition of the workers and warned the ruling groups that they would be responsible for a revolution if they refused equality of rights. And in his speech to students in 1877, he granted that a multitude of measures was conceivable to make possible a gradual transformation of society.

Luxemburg correctly understood that the party was not preparing the masses for any final solution. True, the

SPD created a number of mass organizations (political, economic and cultural) for the working class. But when the workers decided to take more radical actions than the

Party, the latter — just like the PCF in the 1960s, or the

PCI in the 1970s -- opposed and condemned such actions.

The party practiced what it theoretically condemned: revisionism. This was the result of their conception of revolution :

The leaders of both branches of the workers' movement in Wilhelmian Germany tended to see the steady growth of their organization as

S^ibid., p. 133. 124

proof of their tactics. Revolution, when they thought of it at all, was conceived of as a sort of crumbling of capitalism under the mighty weight of workers' organizations. To these people, spontaneous action in the streets was anathema because it threatened the solidarity of their organizations. To the extent that any theory at all attracted them, Kautsky's "strategy of attrition" made much more sense than Luxemburg's emphasis pn the spontaneous creativity of mass action.

This situation could have its justification in the fact that the leadership believed that

...a continuous over-all increase of votes, which might one day provide the party with a parliamentary majority, appeared as the long-term chance to break through the "iron ring" that fettered the labor movement. This situation demanded that nothing be done to jeopardize freedom while an aggressive rhetoric was sustained, especially at election times, -to appeal to widespread dissatisfaction.

Undoubtedly, what deterred the party from acting in a revolutionary fashion was its belief that it could achieve the final goal through the ballot-box. Echoing Engels'

Introduction to The Class Struggles in France, the Party's

Vorwârts, commented on the Russian Revolution of 1905 in the following terms;

We who call ourselves "revolutionaries" have never thought of that word in the narrow sense which suggests fighting with pitch-

59 Gary P. Steenson, "Not One Man! Not One Penny 1" German Social Democracy, 1863-1914 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), p. 219. (Emphasis added.) As shall be seen, this is almost exactly the same approach as that of today's leaders of the West European CPs.

^^Roth, The Social Democrats, p. 185. 125

forks. It is not we who have incited to violence; rather, we have always preached to the ruling classes that the first and last method of their policy, brutal force, is powerless against great movements of ideas. Physical fighting which pits man against man and uncovers the savagery in human beings has never been, to our way of thinking, the ideal mea^ of solving great conflicts of interest.

One should note, however, that such a pronouncement is not

totally opposed to Marx's and Engels' views, particularly

after the failure of the Paris Commune in 1871. Therefore, both Social Democrats and Eurocommunists could find support

for their attitude in the founders of Communism.

The attitude of the SPD's leadership toward the

Russian Revolution of 1905 unveiled the cautious and moderate character of the Party. During the events taking place in Russia, the German workers — not because of any sort of solidarity with the Russian comrades, but for domestic reasons — went on strike without any "permission" from the Party or the trade unions. The miners went on strike for almost a month before the party could persuade them to go back to work. This spontaneous action of the workers led the party and trade union leaderships to adopt even more moderate policies. Hence, their opposition to the General Strike. While the radicalization of the German

Quoted in R. Reichard, "The German Working Class and the Russian Revolution of 1905," Journal of Central Euro­ pean Affairs 13 (July 1953): 138. The softness of tone of this passage is strikingly similar to the pronouncements of the PCF during the May events in 1968, as shall be seen. 126

proletariat was obvious (whether it wanted socialism as an

alternative to the existing system, however, is still questionable) , the reformism of the party and the trade unions was even more so. Reichard makes this point remark­ ably well;

1905 shows that a large part of the working class was growing dissatisfied-with the pace of progress toward socialism. The party had grown large and commanded many seats in the Reichstag, and yet there was no observ­ able change in the lives of the working men.... For a greater part of the German proletariat, increased activity, public displays of strength and general strikes seemed to be an answer to the insufficien­ cies of the parliamentary road to socialism. The Russian revolution did not so much cause discontent among German workers, as it served to touch off the open expression of discontent and to offer proof that non- parliamen^ary political methods could win ch anges.

The Left wing of the party (Luxemburg, Mehring, etc.) viewed 1905 as a victory of their views, i.e., that such situations were the training ground for the practical struggle of the proletariat. This, according to them, was the best way to intensify the class struggle, raise the consciousness of the proletariat, and prepare the latter for the day of the inevitable revolution and victory.

The question to be asked is, why did the party — a party which prided itself on being revolutionary — oppose

^^One should say "better conditions of living," etc., rather than "socialism".

^^Reichard, "The German Working Class," p. 148. 127

any such actions on the part of the working class? As

already observed, the obsession of the leadership with

legality and parliamentarism prevented them from

inaugurating any radical eras.

In general, the German Social Democratic Party, despite its reiterated affirmations of belief in a coming revolution, was a stickler for constitutional action. It was constantly afraid of having its electoral progress interrupted by a renewal of the legal repression tOg^which Bismarck had resorted against it.

The party, in fact, was not even preparing the proletariat

for any revolutionary possibility and, "far from encourag­ ing their followers to develop a revolutionary spirit, they did their best to damp it down wherever it appeared.

The observation to be made is that the Party argued "most strongly for revolution in times when revolution was least likely to occur, and then to back away from revolutionary conclusions when excitement was rising among the masses.

This, of course, was a reflection of the historical condi­ tions, or rather of what the leaders of the Party and trade unions thought were the specific historical conditions.

What helped the moderation of the leadership was most certainly the strengthening of capitalism, rather than its

^^Cole, History of Socialist Thought, p. 305.

G^ibid., p. 320.

^^Reichard, "The German Working Class," p. 151. (Emphasis added.) 128

expected collapse. From 1895, Germany entered a phase of

prosperity which lasted for almost 20 years (though with

some interruptions, e.g., 1900, 1907, 1913): agricultural 6 7 production rose 70% and industrial production 150%.

Undoubtedly, the standards of living of the working class

improved in general. The Neue Zeit stated in 1910 that

"The workers have already obtained more than the satisfac­ tion of their basic needs.

The reluctance of the party to act in a revolutionary

fashion is also explained by its composition. As Michels and many others have shown, portions of the proletariat had been elevated to higher administrative positions within the party organization and the trade unions. This group became absorbed by organizational work, saw the organization as an end in itself — rather than a lever for action — and tended to forget about revolution. In fact, the question of legality became of primary importance. Moreover, the absorption of nonworkers into the party affected its ideology: "...besides intellectuals, landowners and employers were welcome, despite the danger of admitting employers of labor to a workers' party.This explains

Droz, Histoire Générale du Socialisme, Vol. II, De 1875 à 1918 (Paris: P.U.F., 1974), p. 39.

^^Quoted in ibid. "Les ouvriers ont déjà conquis plus que la satisfaction des besoins essentiels de l'existence." (My translation.)

^^Marks, "The Sources of Reformism," p. 351. 129

the apparent elitism toward the working class that took place in the years before the War.

The German Social Democratic movement, in the period of its greatest success in the decade before World War I, saw a widening gap between leaders and broad masses. In recruiting even greater numbers in gaining prestige and in appearing to be the voice of the future, the social democratic movement gathered into its ranks different types from those rallied to it in the heroic 1880's.

A proposition could be formulated at this point: the new members of the party might well have been people who grew up in an era which was more prosperous than the era of the earlier members of the party. Having been shaped by the new conditions of the capitalist system, their antagon­ ism toward the latter was less sharp than that of their elders. One could draw a parallel with the prosperous years of post-World-War-II Europe in the 1950s and early sixties.

Two other elements could be added to the problem of the German SPD: fatalism and empiricism. Rosa Luxemburg, better than anybody else, had understood the problem of empiricism, not only in Bernstein's position, but in the rest of the leadership as well. The fact that capitalism had survived crises and improved the conditions of the

^^A. Lindemann, A History of European Socialism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 172. 130

workers was taken as a new phase in the historical develop­

ment of capitalism. The consequence of such an analysis

was that, contrary to the Marxian methodology, which

emphasized the dynamics of the system itself and its laws,

the SPD leadership took certain empirical observations at 71 their face value. They saw the system as having been

transformed into a higher form. Instead of analyzing the

new relations between labor and capital under what, in

fact, had become the imperialistic phase of capitalist

development, they limited themselves to pointing out the benefits that the workers were gaining. They failed to

insist, or avoided pointing out, that those benefits were the result of the exploitation of the countries in the

"periphery". In reality, those benefits went mostly to the

"labor aristocracy," which had indeed become noticeable.

This was one aspect of empiricism. On the other hand,

...the political result of empiricism is that strikes, electoral actions, demonstra­ tions, etc. are not in themselves revolu­ tionary; they are either a moral reaction to evil or a defensive reaction to oppression, which the "socialist" politician can as means or pawns in the political game.

The antagonism between capital and labor, the foundation of

Marxist theory, disappeared from the analytical framework

71 Marx's notion of essence and appearance was lost from the SPD's analyses. On Marx's concepts of essence and appearance, cf. Althusser, Reading Capital. 7 2 Howard, "Rereading Rosa Luxemburg," p. 92. 131

of Social Democracy. The consequence is that the SPD

"ceased...to be an inheritor party and became a pressure 73 group, similar to all the others...." The ultimate goal that the party held, i.e., social revolution was lost from

sight. The reason is obvious: according to the leader­

ship, if the workers were to gain anything, and if their interests were to be properly represented, the old objec­ tives — class struggle, socialism, etc. — had to be dropped. The victory of Bernstein's views over some elements in the Party became a fait accompli, even if he did not win on all the political, economic and social issues. From a logical point of view, this makes sense: how can one expect to participate in a political system and be accepted as a partner if one holds to a language or a program that aims at the overthrow of the very system that welcomed one?

The other error of the SPD — if one wants to consider it as such -- was its fatalism. The party leadership justified its "attentist" attitude on allegedly theoretical grounds inspired by Marx's economic theory. According to them, Marx had predicted the capitalist system's inevitable collapse, the reason being the anarchy in production, the cyclical crises, etc. The Left wing of the party, espe­ cially Luxemburg, held that instead of waiting for the

73 J.P. Nettl, "The German Social Democratic Party as a Political Model," Past and Present 30 (1965): 85. 132

system to collapse by itself, the working class should

constantly prepare itself for that moment, and not stay

idle. It should keep pressuring the system through the

intensification of the class struggle. This does not, however, mean that Luxemburg was for any senseless, prema­

ture revolution. Her main goal was to keep the conscious­ ness of the working class rising through its struggle against the existing system; each opportunity was good; each defeat was a lesson from which the labor movement would benefit. At the same time, a mature proletariat would prevent its dictatorship from turning into that of a party.The "establishment" of the party held different views from those of Luxemburg. They believed that

...si le capitalisme se dirige inévitable­ ment vers sa chute, pourquoi le prolétariat ne se contenterait-il pas d'attendre avec confiance le moment ou il n'aura qu'a receuillir "l'héritage" de la bourgeoisie? Le tout est qu'il ait alors acquis la "maturité" nécessaire pour remplacer ce jour-là la classe dirigeante.

7 4 See the excellent analysis in Rossana Rossanda, "De Marx a Marx," Temps Modernes 26 (Jan. 1970); H. Kitschelt and H. Wiesenthal, "Organization and Mass Action in the Political Works of Rosa Luxemburg," Politics and Society 9 (1979).

^^Droz, Histoire Générale du Socialisme, p. 50. Since capitalism is moving to its inevitable break- doTO, why should the proletariat not wait with assurance for the moment when it only has to rip off the fruits of bourgeois development? The proletar­ iat simply needs the required 'maturity' to take over the old ruling class once the system has col­ lapsed" (my translation). 133

How the proletariat is to acquire this maturity is not

indicated. Apparently, since the proletariat on its own

could develop only a "trade union" consciousness, an elite,

ecclesia militans, was necessary to show them the right

direction.Once again, it should be emphasized that the

main reason for holding the working class in check instead

of letting it take any "adventurist" initiatives was

because, in the leadership's eyes, a defeat would seriously

jeopardize all the gains that the working class had hither­

to made. Since Social Democracy was growing and flourish­

ing within the existing system, why should the party use 77 violent means? This was the rationale behind the mode­

rate attitude of the SPD.

Luxemburg's reaction, as pointed out earlier, was one of opposition to this kind of attitude. In fact, she attributed the presence of opportunism in the party to intellectual and bourgeois elements. A good discussion of this aspect of Luxemburg's thought is found in Kitschelt and Wiesenthal, "Organization and Mass Action," pp. 156- 166. It should be pointed out, however, that Kautsky, for instance, contrary to Lenin, held that the working class "produced a socialistic instinct which was then made intelligible through the theoretical insights of the socialists" (Reidar Larson, Theories of Revolution; From Marx to the First Russian Revolution [Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1970], p. 78). For Lenin, the working class, when left to itself, produced an "instinctive bourgeois attitude" (ibid., p. 77). For an excellent discussion and clarification of the differences between Lenin and Kautsky on this aspect, see Alain Bergounioux and Bernard Manin, La Social-Democratie ou le Compromis (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), pp. 82-85. 7 7 This is what led Kautsky to state in his radical Der Weg zur Macht that "Social Democracy is a revolutionary party, but not a party that makes revolutions" (quoted in Larson, Theories of Revolution, p. 101) . 134

Karl Kautsky; Socialism and Democracy

Though what has been presented so far was characteris­

tic of the SPD in general (except for its Left wing), the major theoretical pronouncements emanated in a sophisti­ cated manner from the "heir" of Marx and Engels, Karl

Kautsky. This section will deal with Kautsky in some detail, since many of the pronouncements of today's

Eurocommunists are in many ways similar to Kautsky's. One may even argue that the intellectual roots of Eurocommunism could be found in Kautsky's theoretical works.

Any conceptualization of Eurocommunism must take into consideration the intellectual origins, ideological precursors, and histor­ ical precedents of the phenomenon. Indeed, one of the intriguing issues that may attract a phalanx of investigators will be the search for the forerunner of Eurocom­ munism. There are numerous possible candi­ dates: Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin...all of whom gave expres­ sion to id^s that resemble those of Euro­ communism.

The main focus of this section will be on those points of Kautsky's thought which have re-emerged in the doctrine of the West European CPs. The link between Kautsky's theoretical approach to certain questions (dictatorship of the proletariat, social democracy, the transition, etc.) and the Eurocommunists' is certain. Several authors have

78 V. Aspaturian, J. Valenta, D. Burke, eds., Eurocom­ munism between East and West (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 14. 135

pointed out the relationship that exists between Eurocom­

munism and "Kautskyan" Social Democracy. This observation

has been made not only by critics from the Left, but also

by scholars of different political orientations. An

Italian specialist on East European questions, Enzo

Bettiza, has stated unequivocally that "in 1977 it is

apparent that the Eurocommunists are tied more cautiously

than ever to the Kautsky-type, democratic, parliamentary, 79 and electoral strategy." Ernest Mandel, whose critique of Eurocommunism is probably the most radical — he is a

"revolutionary Marxist," a name given to the members of the

Fourth (Trotskyite) International — though locating the sources of the phenomenon in the conception of "socialism in one country" ("national Communism"), does not hesitate to call the Eurocommunists the "disciples of Kautsky.

79 E. Bettiza, "Eurocommunism in Limbo," Eurocommunism ; The Italian Case, A. Ranney and G. Sartori, eds. (Washing­ ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), p. 123. 8 0 Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, p. 206; see also p. 34. In another writing, he argues that "essen­ tially, the Eurocommunist strategists are exactly along Bernstein's lines, and they are reaching similar conclu­ sions" (Mandel, "A Critique of Eurocommunism," Marxist Perspectives 8 [Winter 1979/80], p. 120) . Assimilating the Eurocommunist strategy with Bernstein is simply another way of disgracing them. Other authors have stressed the continuity between Social Democracy and Eurocommunism, despite certain qualitative differences. Salvadori, for instance, argues that "Eurocommunism follows a strategy very close to the one adopted by the socialist and Social Democratic movements" (F. Adler and P. Piccone, "Eurocom­ munism and Eurosocialism; An Interview with Massimo L. 136

Fernando Claudin, himself a former "renegade" of the

Spanish CP (PCE) in 19 64, makes the connection between

Eurocommunism and Kautskyism look very clear:

Schematically, we can say that the great majority of the European proletariat, and in particular the German, followed the tactic of Kautsky and not of Lenin: strict subord­ ination of the workers' movement to the framework and mechanisms of bourgeois democracy, gradual progress through social and political reforms, and so on. In short, it followed the road which, forty years later, was to be called the democratic, parliamentary and peaceful road to social­ ism. Thus the international communist movement which succeeded the Communist International [Comintern] turned to Kautsky without admitting it, and without the major­ ity of communist militants noticing, since knowledge of Kautsky's thought was lyre except through "The Renegade Kautsky."

The British Marxist historian, P. Anderson, briefly states that "the continuity of the political ideas of

Kautsky and Bauer with those of Berlinger and Carrillo on the road to socialism in Western Europe is now virtually Q 2 complete." Henri Weber, another Marxist (Trotskyist) critic of Eurocommunism, summarizes the ideas of Eurocom­ munism in a way which brings to light the parallels with

Salvadori," Telos 38 [Winter 1978-79], p. 119). The same parallel is drawn by Carl Boggs in his Impasse of European Communism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982).

®^Fernando Claudin, "Democracy and Dictatorship in Lenin and Kautsky," New Left Review, No. 106 (Nov.-Dec. 1977), p. 64. The expression "The Renegade" is, of course, L e n i n 's . 8 2 Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism (London: NLB, 1980), p. 196. 137

8 3 Kautskyism. Ralph Miliband, too, observes — though he qualifies his statement — that "there are no doubt defi­ nite tendencies towards 'Social Democratization* in the 8 4 practice of Eurocommunist Parties...." Today's Social

Democrats in Western Europe — whose practice is the extension of Bernstein's and Kautsky's ideas (of the 1920s on) — complain that Eurocommunism is nothing more than

Social Democracy in a new outfit and that there is no reason for the Communists to call themselves such any longer. The former Austrian Prime Minister, a right-wing

Social Democrat, made the point bluntly but perceptively:

Social democrats have no reason to consider it a defeat when the two largest Communist parties [PCI and PCF] in democratic Europe formally reject political formulae that belong to the most immutabi^a principles of so-called Marxism-Leninism.

In a way, today's Social Democracy feels threatened by a movement whose ideas are almost identical, but which appears more appealing in that the Eurocommunists aim at breaking the status quo.

8 3 Henri Weber, "Eurocommunism, Socialism and Demo­ cracy," New Left Review 110 (July-Aug. 1978), esp. pp. 3-5. 8 4 Ralph Miliband, "Constitutionalism and Revolution: Notes on Eurocommunism," The Socialist Register, R. Miliband and J. Saville, eds. (London, 1978), p. 158.

Kreisky, quoted in Irving Howe, "Eurocommunism — Reality, Myth, Hope, or Delusion?" Dissent 25 (Winter 1978) : 26. 138

Finally, Massimo Salvadori, whose recent study of

Kautsky will serve as the basis for the historical analysis

of this section, suggests from the outset in his book that

indeed, the approach of the Western Commun­ ist Parties to these problems [those posed to the workers' movement by the social evolution in the developed capitalist countries]... today has assumed a shape which in my view can be defined, without the slightest polemical, provocation, as essen­ tially Kautskyist.

Salvadori's study is a major contribution in this area of research. It has improved our understanding of Kautsky's 8 7 theoretical developments. What will be stressed in this section are obviously those points Kautsky developed which are of continuing importance today.

One of the main problems that classical Social Democ­ racy had to face was the problem of the relationship between socialism and democracy. For the German Social

Democrats, democracy, even of the bourgeois type, was a crucial element and an objective of the struggle, consid­ ering the semi-autocratic character of the country. To seek bourgeois democracy was not un-Marxist -- on the contrary. Of course, this was not to be an end in itself, but only a means toward socialist society, which was to be

^^Massimo Salvadori, Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880-1938 (London; NLB, 1979), p. 13.

^^G.P. Steenson's Karl Kautsky, 1845-1938; Marxism in the Classical Years (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978) is also a very good study. 139 much more democratic than any system hitherto. Bourgeois

society was a class society, but a society in which the

class struggle would be waged and eventually decided.

There was no doubt in Marx's and Engels' minds as to the class nature of bourgeois society. Kautsky himself was not naive either. In the 1880s, he insisted that "the republic we aim at is not abstract; it is a socialist republic, the 8 8 red republic." This is why Kautsky had held that elec­ tions only had a propagandistic purpose and that the State had to be smashed. However, in the 1890s, it became clear that his position had already shifted despite his ortho­ doxy. He stated

(1) that the parliamentary struggle fully corresponded to the needs of the proletariat in bourgeois society; (2) that the political revolution and the conquest of power by socialists could not be accomplished except through parliament, here defined expressly as an instrument with which to realize the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This position, which is also today's Eurocommunist posi­ tion, is clearly antithetical to the views held by Marx and

Engels. The dictatorship of the proletariat, for Marx and

Engels, was not a "regime" established through parliament and free elections. This change of attitude in Kautsky was due to his belief in the possibility and desirability of a

R 8 Karl Kautsky, "Die Bourgeoisie und die Republik," in Per Sozialdemokrat 17 (24 April 1881) , quoted in Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 21. 8 9 Ibid., p. 37. (Emphasis mine.) 140

peaceful road to power within the existing bourgeois system

of representation. However, in fairness to Kautsky, it

should be stressed that

...he also held that in any event the full organizational, ideological, and parliamen­ tary independence of the SPD had to be maintained and that the exploitation of any opportunity for peaceful advance should on no account induce the party to fall into a reformist strategy that would rely on the state to mediate social conflicts, or into an ideological illusion that the State could function.independently in the socio-economic domain.

In 1909, Kautsky still held that "the dictatorship of

the proletariat was the 'only form' in which the proletar­

iat would exercise 'political power' and its own 'exclusive 91 rule.'" He still believed in the coming of the prole­ tarian revolution, and that it was an illusion to think

"that the proletariat can ever dominate the state together 92 with the property-owning class." But a year later,

Kautsky's centrism and change of position became more and more apparent. For example, drawing certain conclusions

from the defeat of the Russian Revolution of 1905, he stated in 1910 that

9°Ibid., p. 41,

Ibid., p. 129. Kautsky expressed his views on this question in The Road to Power, written in 1909. The book raised a lot of controversy within the party and trade unions because of its very radical views. See Salvadori, Karl K a utsky, p. 131. 9 2 Kautsky, Per Weg zur Macht, quoted in Salvadori, p. 129. 141

...if the great popular upheaval had not succeeded in attaining its objectives in Russia, a country in which the ruling class was much weaker than in Germany, it was unthinkable that the German workers' move­ ment in 1910, in a country with the world's strongest government and an especially powerful army, should throw itself into mass political strikes that would inevitably turn into an open confrontation with the entire state apparatus and the ruling bloc. The inevitable result...would be "annihilating defeat.

Paradoxically enough, this observation by Kautsky remains valid in the eyes of many Communist analysts. As is well known, Gramsci, despite many qualifications, drew the same conclusions and proposed his "war of position" tactics for

Western Europe (as opposed to the "war of movement").

Gramsci's "war of position" corresponds, in the main, to 94 Kautsky's "war of attrition." Kautsky defines his strategy in these terms;

The strategy of attrition differs from the strategy of annihilation only in the fact that it does not aim at the decisive battle directly, but prepares it long in advance and is only inclined to engage such a battle when it considers the-enemy to have been sufficiently weakened.

93 Salvadori, p. 137. Note the similarity of this view with Engels' in the Introduction to Marx's Class Struggles in Fran c e . 94 Perry Anderson demonstrates this relationship in his "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," New Left Review, 100 (Nov. 1976-Jan. 1977), pp. 55-72.

^^Kautsky, "Was Nun?", in Neue Zeit, quoted in Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 140. 142

The danger of such a strategy — which was clearly grasped by Luxemburg — is that the main goal (socialism) would be lost from sight by the increasingly more conservative party whose parliamentarism made it more and more part of the existing system.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought about some more changes in Kautsky's theoretical works. Kautsky, of course, was not the only Marxist to have disagreed with the way the Bolsheviks seized power. Luxemburg, who cannot be suspected of revisionism, was one of the sharpest critics of the Bolsheviks, as can be seen in the following passage, written in 1918 while she was in prison:

In place of the representative bodies [Luxemburg is referring to the Constituent Assembly which was abolished by the Bolshe­ viks] created by general, popular elections, Lenin and Trotsky have laid down the soviets as the only true representation of the laboring masses. But with the repression of political life in the land as a whole, life in the soviets must also become more and more crippled. Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opin­ ion, life dies out in every public institu­ tion, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inex­ haustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Among them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading, and an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolu­ tions unanimously -- at bottom, then, a clique affair — a dictatorship, to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat. 143

however, but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that iSg^ dictator­ ship in the bourgeois sense....

Luxemburg, however, did not deny the necessity of the

revolution in Russia, nor did she deny the particular

conditions of Russian society.

Kautsky's position was not really different from

Luxemburg's. At first, he welcomed the Bolshevik Revolu­ tion as a great event in world history. What worried him most was the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in such a backward country. However, he saw the process of democratization promised by the Bolsheviks as a partial solution to their problem. When the

Bolsheviks — after losing the elections — abolished the

Constituent Assembly, however, Kautsky's whole attitude toward them took a sharp turn. To him, now,

Bolshevism appeared as a demon of scission in the ranks of the working class, a merci­ less and barbaric force destroying the political freedoms won by popular struggles over the course of decades, the champion of an implacable bureaucrate, police, and militarist dictatorship.

In other words, Kautsky now saw the 1917 Revolution

— which he had previously supported — as a coup d 'etat, a

Blanquist undertaking. Kautsky was appalled by the degree

R. Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution, pp. 71-72. This passage could well establish Luxemburg as a precursor of Eurocommunism. 9 7 Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 227. 144

of violence and its justification by the leaders in Russia.

Kautsky realized that some degree of violence was necessary

in any revolution, but he refused to accept it as the 98 principal instrument of the revolution. The task that

Kautsky set himself, therefore, was to work out a strategy

from which violence could be avoided. This he would do in response to what had happened in Russia. Moreover, his concern with the relationship between socialism and democracy became even more salient after 1917.

Kautsky drew two immediate conclusions from the establishment of a Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia:

On the one hand, it could not be exported to the West, which rejected it as a model; but on the other hand, it exercised sufficient sway on the workers' movement outside Russia to prevent democratic socialism from achiev­ ing its full potential. In effect, accord­ ing to Kautsky, Russian Communism was incapable of understanding the specific nature of Western society, so could never be effective as an example in itself, but it could and did condemn the whole Western labor movement to impotence for a historical epoch.

What is remarkable about this Kautskyan critique of the

Soviet regime is its similarity to today's Eurocommunist critiques of the Soviet Union. What is, of course, sur­ prising is that it took the European CPs more than 50 years

^^See Bergounioux and Manin, La social-democratie, pp. 85, 89. 99 Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, pp. 227-28. (Emphasis added). 145 to arrive at the same conclusions. It can safely be argued that what brings Kautsky and the Eurocommunists

Most of the arguments presented in Carrillo's Eurocommunism and the State, esp. pp. 156-172, are a repetition — without any acknowledgement as to the debt to Kautsky — of Kautsky's analysis in 1917-18. One of the main points of convergence of views between Kautsky and today's Eurocommunists is their analysis of the overall situation existing in Russia in 1917: they both argued that the latter lacked a democratic tradition. Kautsky stated that in the West, "democracy did not emerge yester­ day, as in Russia. It has been won through a series of revolutions and centuries-long struggles; it has become the very flesh and blood of the masses" (quoted in Salvadori, p. 278). On the other hand, F. Claudin, sixty years after the Bolshevik Revolution, criticizing Lenin for not fully grasping the meaning of democracy for the Western proletar­ iat, writes: "We are referring to the profound roots of the West­ ern workers' movement in this democracy, which, though bourgeois, is no less a conquest of the working class movement. It is the fruit of a long history of class struggle for democracy, marked by victories and defeats in turn" ("Democracy and Dictatorship in Lenin and Kautsky," New Left Review 106 [Nov.-Dec. 1977] 68). Moreover, both Kautsky and the Eurocommunists agree that the Russian State on the eve of the Revolution, despite its repressive character, lacked a powerful structure (in Gramscian terms, one could say a lack of consensus and cohesion); that capitalism was not developed enough to permit a "natural" evolution toward socialism. These lacunae in Soviet Russia produced a monstrous State, after the Revolution, which is "neither capitalist nor social­ ist," a State in which the proletariat had no chance to be really emancipated because it had skipped the bourgeois- democratic phase. Hence "Bolshevism created conditions for the proletariat that were worse than those of capitalism, despite the bright red veneer of the Russian regime" (Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 257). The State which has been produced "is evidently not a bourgeois State, but neither is it as yet the proletariat organized as the ruling class, or a genuine workers' democracy" (Carrillo, Eurocommunism, p. 157). Kautsky's and Carrillo's views seem practically identical, although it could be noted that Kautsky's critique of the Soviet system and of its later 146

doser is the question of democracy as it came out of

Kautsky's critique of the Bolshevik Revolution.

In The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, a book he

wrote in 1918, Kautsky defined the relationship between

democracy and socialism in a way which sounds strikingly

similar to the pronouncements of the Eurocommunists.

For us...Socialism without democracy is unthinkable. We understand by modern Socialism not merely social organization of production, but democratic organization of society as well. Accordingly, Socialism is for us inseparably connected w i ÿ d democracy. No socialism without democracy.

Lenin responded to this book in a polemical work entitled 102 "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky,"

in which he defended the dictatorship of the proletariat and accused Kautsky of advocating a concept of democracy which was, in essence, bourgeois. Lenin argued that

Kautsky had shown a "complete renunciation of the proletar­ ian revolution, which is replaced by the liberal theory of

developments, i.e., Stalinism, was in many respects much superior to Carrillo's or any of the Eurocommunist leaders. In fact, it is even superior to the analysis of Trotsky and his disciples, such as Mandel. On the Eurocommunist works about the Soviet State, cf. M. Sodaro's "Eurocommunist Views of Soviet History," Problems of Communism (May-June 1980). Kautsky's views on Stalinism are dealt with in Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, pp. 284-293.

^®^K. Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, with an intro, by J. Kautsky (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1964), pp. 6-7. 10 2 V.I. Lenin, Selected Works in One Volume (New York: International Publishers, 1976), pp. 468-475. For the complete text, see Collected Works, vol. 28, pp. 229-326. 147

103 'winning a majority' and 'utilizing democracy.' " Lenin insisted that

...bourgeois democracy, which is invaluable in educating the proletariat and training it for the struggle, is always narrow, hypo­ critical, spurious and false; it always remains democracy for the rich and a swindle for the poor.

This criticism is undoubtedly closer to Marx's and Engels' analysis. In any case, Lenin's position was adopted by the

European CPs, the current Eurocommunists, during their creation in the 1920s, a position which they maintained until the 1960s.

Kautsky's approach, according to Salvadori, fused two components: "one was an ethical-cultural tradition with its roots in an evolutionist conviction that economic development, socialism, and democracy were a sort of indissoluble trinity.For him, democracy is what makes the proletarian revolution possible because it educates the proletariat and saves it from the armed confrontation.

Democracy is even more than that: it must be the political form of the socialist society. " L a démocratie est nécessaire aussi avant la revolution, pendant la transition

^^^Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution," p. 470. lO^Ibid. 105 Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 256.

^^^Bergounioux and Manin, La Social Démocratie, p. 90. (Emphasis added.) 148

et sous le socialismeBergounioux and Manin are

correct in pointing out that Kautsky was no Hegelian, in

that he was aware that the State represents the interests

of a class; in a democracy, the State represents the

interests of the majority class, hence the proletariat

could found its power on democracy. They argue that it is

this idea that Lenin attacks, because he mistakenly accuses

Kautsky of supporting Western democracies as they then existed.

Kautsky ne defend nulle part la pratique effective de la démocratie qu'a cours dans les grands pays occidentaux; a la vérité, toute sa pensée montre que puisque ces régimes démocratiques fonctionnent dans des sociétés ou la bourgeoisie est majoritaire, l'Etat ne peut y être qu'au service de cette bourgeoisie. La question, en vérité, n'est pas la, elle est seulement de savoir si le prolétariat victorieux peut ou non se servir de la démocratie.

The second point of contention between Lenin and

Kautsky is that, for the latter, the victory of the prole­ tariat — a democratic one — means that the exploiters have become a minority and, therefore, it was not necessary to exclude them from the democratic process. The minority 109 has only to abide by the decisions of the majority. For

107 Ibid. "Democracy is also necessary before the revolution, during the transition period and under social­ ism" (my translation).

lO^ibid., p. 93. l°*Ibid. 149

Lenin, this is simply "vulgar liberalism." He argues that to speak of democracy in general was un-Marxist, because it

failed to show that, in fact, in capitalist society, it was simply bourgeois democracy that prevailed. Lenin attacks

Kautsky's approach to democracy, which "proceed[s] from the relation between the majority and minority," rather than from "the relation between the exploited and the exploit­ ers. This allows Lenin to exclude the exploiters from the democratic process. Only the immense majority of the people could enjoy democracy, whereas the oppressors of the people, the minority of exploiters, are repressed through force. One should mention also that this conception applied even to the other working class parties in Russia, notably the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries, since the Bolsheviks denied them any legitimacy in repre- 111 senting the people. Kautsky was also correct in stating that "the dictatorship of only one of these parties is, in that event, no longer the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the dictatorship of one portion of the proletariat over 112 the other." Hence the necessity of a Caesarist struc-

^^^Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution," p. 250. 111 The roots of "totalitarianism" (as applied to Stalinism) are evident here. The Bolsheviks' claim to be the sole representatives of the working class was another point of contention between Kautsky and Lenin. See Salvadori, esp. pp. 260-ff.; Bergounioux and Manin, pp. 9 5-ff. 112 Kautsky, quoted in Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 261. 150 ture to maintain one's domination over the unorganized popular masses. Kautsky conceived of a "dictatorship" as one founded on democracy;

If by dictatorship we mean exclusive rule without compromises, then we mean that form of rule of the proletariat which is deter­ mined by social conditions, in contrast with the capitalist class, which can rule only through compromises with the parties of other classes.... Dictatorship in the sense indicated above does not in any way exclude democracy. The democratic republic rather represents the only basis on which a dicta­ torship of this type can develop and ass^^t itself in conformity with its own goals.

With respect to the question of the State, Kautsky's position differed markedly from Marx's. Kautsky refuted

Marx's firm belief that the bourgeois state must be

'smashed' as a condition for the transition to socialism.

Moreover, his attachment to the parliamentary system led him to the conclusion that there was no need for the executive and legislative powers to be merged, as suggested by Marx and Lenin. Kautsky did not even think that the 114 State apparatuses should be done away with. Kautsky, when dealing with the Paris Commune of 1871, "polemically emphasized the democratic-pluralistic aspects of the 115 dictatorship of the Commune." He argued that

1 1 o Kautsky, "Klassendiktatur und Parteidiktatur, " in Der Kampf, XIV, 192, pp. 279-80, quoted in Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 264. (Emphasis in original).

^^^Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 267. 115 Ibid. He even rejected as outmoded "Marx's theses on the abolition of parliamentarism and the division of powers" (ibid.). 151

...the Paris Commune was superior to the Republic of the Soviets in one essential respect: it was the work of the entire proletariat. All the tendencies of social­ ism participated in it, and none stood apart or was excluded from it. The socialist party that governs in Russia today [i.e., the Bolshevik party], on the contrary, came to power by struggling against all the other socialist parties and exercises its rule through the exclusion of the other socialist parties.

What appears very clearly from Kautsky's writings is

the repudiation of any kind of dictatorship, even that of the proletariat. For him, the victory of the proletariat did not have to take the form of a dictatorship. There­

fore,

Socialism cannot conquer power unless it is strong enough to maintain its own superior­ ity over the other parties within the limits of democracy. This is why socialism has not the slightest reason to repudiate democracy, and it will be precisely the most advanced sections of the proletariat that will cer­ tainly not agree to the advancement of democracy by dictatorship, which in practice always eventually becomes a personal dicta­ torship.

Understood correctly, this means that socialism should be achieved within the existing political system, i.e., the transformation of capitalist society could be attained

Kautsky, Dictatorship of the Proletariat, p. 1; the quote above, however, is taken from Salvadori, pp. 269-270, because the translation seems better. 117 Kautsky, Terrorismus und Kommunismus (Berlin, 1919), quoted in Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 279. 152

through legal means within the bourgeois-democratic frame­ work. In other words, the insurrection model was prac­

tically abandoned in favor of a democratic conquest of p o w e r .

Indeed, what the CPs in advanced capitalist countries

rre reviving today is the notion of inseparability of

socialism from democracy. The socialist road which they envisage "is inseparable from the fight to broaden and deepen democratic practices and to break the barriers which 118 restrict and distort them in capitalist societies."

Most Eurocommunists insist that democracy is the sine qua non condition of socialism. Even the least Eurocommunist,

G. Marchais, General Secretary of the PCF, believes that

...the working class has everything to gain with democracy. Our position in this matter is fundamental, is one of principle.... We think there will be no socialism in France without political democracy. ... We consider that the principles which we enunciate con­ cerning socialist democracy are of universal value. It is clear that we have a disagree­ ment with the Communist of the Soviet Union about this problem.

The similarity to Kautsky's views is striking. As seen earlier, these views are the ones which caused Lenin to launch his attack against Kautsky. To speak of democracy

118 Sam Aaronovitch, "Eurocommunism: A Discussion of Carrillo's Eurocommunism and the State," Marxism Today (July 1978), p. 222.

1 1 Q 0 G. Marchais, in 1'Humanité, January 15, 1976, quoted in Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism in 1976," Problems of Communism 25 (Jan.-Feb. 1976): 42. 153

in general infuriated Lenin. J. Elleinstein, a former leading theoretician of the PCF and a Eurocommunist of the right, stated bluntly that "we want democracy more than we 120 want Socialism." This is simply a repetition of

Kautsky's thesis that there was "no socialism without democracy," but that "democracy is quite possible without socialism — a pure democracy is even conceivable apart 121 from Socialism."

This conception — as shall be seen in the next chapter — is the one the European Communists rejected for decades, following their espousal of the Leninist (and

Stalinist) creed. Today, they are advocating the very same strategy against which they fought tooth and claw from the

1920s onwards, i.e., after their break with the Socialists.

This paradox may be explained by the Eurocommunists' belief that the Leninist model is not, and will never be, applica­ ble to Western Europe. Their assumption is that Leninism could not lead to the democratic heaven dreamed about by most Communists in the West. Its practice in the East has

1 20 Jean Elleinstein, "The Skein of History Unrolled Backwards," in G.R. Urban, ed., Eurocommunism (New York: Universe Books, 1978), p. 92. 121 Kautsky, Dictatorship of the Proletariat, pp. 6-7. "Our goal, correctly understood, consists not in socialism but in the abolition of any form of exploitation and oppression, be it directed against a class or a party, nation, or race" (ibid., p. 4); the translation from Salvadori, however, is used here once again because of its better quality. 154

shown how little it could appeal to the West European

working classes — including the rank-and-file of the CPs.

This factor alone, however, cannot explain why the phenom­

enon of Eurocommunism has taken place in many advanced

capitalist countries. Therefore, more plausible explana­

tions are needed. One of them can be singled out: the

striving to adapt and integrate themselves into the exist­

ing political system — even with the intention to trans­

form it — has led revolutionary parties to adopt moderate policies. This moderation is explained by the fact that they have been conditioned by the very same framework

(economic, social, political, ideological) in which they operate. Thus, the choices that the working class movement has historically had to face are the following:

...(1) whether to seek the advancement of socialism through the political institutions of the capitalist society or to confront the bourgeoisie directly without any mediation; (2) whether to seek the agent of socialist transformation exclusively in the working class or to rely on multi- or even supra-class support; and (3) whether to seek improvements, reforms, within the confines of capitalism or to dedicate all efforts^^gd energies to its complete transformation.

Conclusion

Whatever their differences, historical or socio­ economic, both Social Democrats (in the pre-WWI era) and

122 Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as an Historical Phenomenon," New Left Review 122 (July-Aug. 1980): 27-28. 155

the Eurocommunists have faced the same dilemma: whether or not to participate in bourgeois politics; to what extent; the role of extra-parliamentary action, etc. Schumpeter grasped this dilemma very well. As he put it:

Socialist parties could not be advised to watch bourgeois politics in silence. Their obvious task was to criticize capitalist society, to expose the masquerade of class interests, to point out how much better everything would be in the socialist para­ dise and to beat up for recruits : to criti­ cize and to organize. However, a wholly negative attitude, though quite satisfactory as a principle, would have been impossible for any party of more than negligible political importance to keep up. It would inevitably have collided with most of the real desiderata of organized labor and, if persisted in for any length of time, would have reduced the folloy^^s to a small group of political ascetics.

In other words, political participation in bourgeois politics is a necessity. It is the only way, at least as far as the conjuncture in Europe has been until now, to protect the gains and interests of the working class.

Considering the strength of the bourgeois class and the successive defeats of the working class (and the repres­ sions that followed), it was quite logical for the social­ ists to have opted for a political solution, i.e., through 124 elections, bargaining, etc. Economic struggle alone is

123 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Demo­ cracy (New York; Harper Torch Books, 1962), p. 316.

^^^On this point, cf. Przeworski, "Social Democracy," p. 30. 156

obviously not enough. It has to be coupled with political

struggle. This was well understood by Kautsky, who wrote

in 1891 that "the economic struggle demands political

rights, and these will not fall from heaven. To secure and maintain them, the most vigorous political action is ,,125 necessary."

This last point, of course, raises the question of elections, which have always been a subject of debate and controversy among revolutionary groups. For people like

Bernstein, Kautsky, or Jaurès, universal suffrage was conceived as the means to reconcile democracy with social­ ism. Today, Eurocommunists have adopted the same position since they have rejected Lenin's views on the question.

Having rejected bourgeois democracy in toto, Lenin did not see universal suffrage as an effective weapon in the hands of the proletariat, except as a very temporary tactic.

This is probably why universal suffrage was not mentioned 126 in the first Soviet Constitution of 1918. The Russian situation had deepened Lenin's lack of understanding of the conditions and the particularism of Western Europe. To

Kautsky and Jaurès, as well as the much more revolutionary

125 K. Kautsky, The Class Struggle, with an introduc­ tion by R.C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 105-106.

^126pierre Birnbaum, "La question des elections dans la pensée socialiste," Critique des Pratiques Politiques, P. Birnbaum and J.M. Vincent, eds. (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1978), p. 57. 157

Rosa Luxemburg, there was absolutely no doubt that elec­

tions were an important aspect of democracy (even or even

more so in proletarian democracy). For Luxemburg, as seen

earlier, "without general elections... life dies out in

every public institution." Be that as it may, the question

of elections has been a critical one for revolutionary

movements. One could safely say that in Western Europe

today, except for some extra-parliamentary and often

extremist groups, elections have become part of the strug­

gle for socialism. One can add that it has become an

inherent part of the political culture of West European

societies. The Communists, contrary to Social Democrats who emphasized them much earlier, have come, mainly since

World War II, to view universal suffrage and parliamentary

democracy as full components of their political systems and

of their strategy as well.

To argue that social democratization should be identi­

fied with a betrayal of the working class seems sectarian and unjustified. In the eyes of Leninism, the Social

Democrats failed to undertake a revolution to establish a workers' state. Whether they would have succeeded in doing that is mere speculation. Stephens makes this point quite clearly :

In November 1918, a Socialist revolution in Germany was a definite possibility had the majority [of] socialists been willing to lead it or simply support it, which they never would have done. However, it is incorrect to assume that the German leader- 158

ship betrayed the masses, who were ready for revolution. As Harrington...points out, "every time the working class was consulted during this period — in the Congress of Councils, in the elections, in the relative membership strength of the parties appealing to socialist consciousness — they gave their support to the conservative wing of the movement." What the German Social Democratic leaders can be faulted for was that, in a clearly revolutionary situation, they did not lead the masses; they followed them. The real crime of the leadership, we now know, was that they did not even-carry out a complete bourgeois revolution.

One of the reasons for the failure of the German

Revolution was, it seems, the reluctance of the German working class to undertake an all-out war against the ruling class, for in case of failure, it would have lost the gains that it had made. The Russian Revolution was a promising thing for the Russian masses, who were living in misery. Therefore, they had "nothing to lose but their chains," whereas the German proletariat, despite its plight after the First War, had acquired a certain standard of living which was far superior to its Russian counterpart.

Kautsky did not have much of a choice. Weimar was the only hope because another adventurous revolution would have spelled disaster. There was no guarantee that the working class was going to win the battle, and the balance of 128 forces was not much in its favor.

127 John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism (New Jersey; Humanities Press, 1980), p. 68. 128 I owe this analysis to Professor G. Mueller. 159

In opposition to such views, the revolutionary social­

ists believed that a victorious revolution was a real

possibility. They held that it was the Socialist leader­

ship which betrayed the working class. Not only in Ger­

many, but in most European countries, radical groups

emerged. They felt betrayed by the behavior of their

respective Socialist parties. More and more, they looked

East for inspiration. The successful Bolshevik Revolution

had a tremendous impact upon them. They now felt it was

their duty to take the destiny of the working class into

their own hands, away from Social Democracy. The object of

the next chapter is to show how these groups eventually became Communist parties and evolved into the Eurocommunist parties that we know today. CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROCOMMUNISM

When the working class of Europe had again gathered sufficient strength for a new on­ slaught upon the power of the ruling classes, the International Working Men's Association came into being. Its aim was to weld together into one huge army the whole militant working class of Europe and America. Therefore it could not set out from the principles laid down in the Manifesto. It was bound to have a pro­ gramme which would not shut the door on the English trade unions, the French, Belgian, Italian, and Spanish Proudhonists and the German Lassalleans.... For the ultimate triumph of the ideas set forth in the Manifesto, Marx relied solely and exclusively upon the intellectual develop­ ment of the working class, as it necessar­ ily had to ensue from united action and discussion.

F. Engels, Preface to the German edition of the Communist Manifesto, 1880

The proletarian revolution requires no terror for the realization of its aims, it looks upon manslaughter with hatred and aversion.... The proletarian revolution is not the desperate attempt of a minority forcibly to transform the world in accor­ dance with its own ideals, on the con­ trary. It is the action of great masses of millions of people called upon to carry out their historic mission and to make a reality of what has become an historic necessity.

R. Luxemburg, "Was will der Sparta- kusbund?". Die Rote Fahne (1918)

160 161

This chapter deals with the historical development of the West European CPs. Section one, in particular, focuses on the origins of the different CPs. This is an important task because it may help to show how today's Eurocommunist parties have departed from their original strategies and goals. The objective, therefore, is to present the condi­ tions under which they have been formed and how they have evolved. This may facilitate an understanding of 1) how much the past has affected them; 2) how much they have departed from it; and 3) why they have changed.

Origins of the Communist Parties of Western Europe

The failure of the Second International to prevent war, and to create an international workers' solidarity to curb it, led to the creation of Left-wing nuclei among the socialist parties. These tiny groups eventually became the

Communist parties. The radicalism of these groups had been strengthened by the success of the Bolsheviks in establish­ ing a "proletarian dictatorship" in October 1917. However, despite their existence in a few European countries, these

Communist groups were insignificant, small in number, and lacking any real influence.^ Moreover, Germany, the country in which the revolution was expected to take place.

Edward H. Carr, "The Third International," From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 84. 162 did not have a Communist party yet. Neither did the other

important European countries; France, Italy, and Great

Britain.

In 1914, Lenin and Trotsky, independently of each other, had come to the conclusion that the Second Inter­ national was dead and that a Third ought to be established.

In the early months of 1917, the question was still on the agenda,

...but when the Bolshevik Revolution occurred in October, 1917, the situation was no longer propitious for a new International. Considerations of domestic, as well as foreign policy made peace rather than world revolution the supreme immediate need; and after the failure of the peace overtures to the Western allies the Brest-Litovsk crisis reinforced the same lesson.

This was nonetheless only a temporary condition, because

Lenin and most Bolsheviks regarded the situation in Western

Europe with great optimism. They believed that capitalism was approaching its end and that all that the working classes needed was an "authentic revolutionary party" modeled on the Bolshevik party. The Bolsheviks turned this necessity into an absolute truth once their victory was irreversible.

The revolutionary situation created in Central Europe, following the armistice of 1918 and the collapse of Ger­ many, precipitated the need to found a Third International.

^Ibid, 163

The type of International that the Bolsheviks had in mind was a kind of "What is to be done?" (that is, Lenin's conception) applied on a world scale, i.e., an interna­ tional party of the working class structured and organized similarly to the Russian Bolshevik party;

Lenin considered that the immediate creation of such a party [i.e., an "authentic revolu­ tionary party"] on a supranational world scale might be the decisive factor for the fate of the "world revolution" — a party rigorously organized and centralized on a planetary scale, under a semi-military discipline, with a supreme leadership to decide policy for each national section and control its application, select the local leadership, etc. In other words, th^ exact opposite of the Second International.

Lenin's conviction that it was necessary to set up such an organization was reinforced by the creation of the

German Communist Party (KPD) by R. Luxemburg and K.

Liebknecht on December 31, 1918. For Lenin, this proved that the moment for world revolution was ripe; it also meant that the Bolshevik Revolution would survive. As is well known, Lenin and most Bolsheviks held that the final victory of the revolution in Russia was contingent upon successful proletarian revolution in the more advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe, mainly Germany.

3 Fernando Claudin, Eurocommunism and Socialism (London; New Left Books, 1977), p. 31. See also F. Claudin, The Communist Movement; From Comintern to Comin- form (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), Vol. I, pp. 103 ff.; Julius Braunthal, History of the International, Vol. II, 1914-1943 (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1967), p. 162. 164

But Luxemburg and her closest collaborators did not share the Bolsheviks' optimism. In fact, Luxemburg and Leo

Jogiches went along with the creation of the KPD only reluctantly, because they quite correctly realized that the conditions for such a party were not appropriate.

Rosa Luxemburg's skepticism on the prospects of a proletarian socialist revolution in Germany in the near future made her fear the admission to the party of a large majority of unschooled revolutionary hotheads who might force the party into revolutionary adventures for which neither it nor the political situation was ripe. Her practical insight^ was demonstrated by the immediate sequel.

Luxemburg's position stemmed from her belief that a socialist revolution could only be realized by a mass party which, obviously, did not exist in Germany. This position is quite consistent with Luxemburg's thinking, with respect to the nature and role of the working class party. As noted earlier, this position led her to serious differences with the Bolsheviks, especially Lenin. She believed that creating an International in the way the Bolsheviks intend­ ed would merely generate the same kind of problems that a

Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. Ill (New York: McMillan and Co., 1953), p. 106. The "immediate sequel" that Carr talks about was the upheaval of the shop stewards who were supported by Liebknecht and K. Radek, who, despite the opposition of the Party to such participation, were conspicuously involved. The result was their arrest and the murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, as well as the proscription of the KPD. 165

Bolshevik-type party (lack of democracy, bureaucratization, elimination of any opposition, etc.). In other words,

...she wanted a revolutionary International based on revolutionary mass parties, and not a Bolshevik International whose only mass basis would be the Russian Communist Party. She demanded that the creation of a Commu­ nist International be postponed until mass parties were ready to affiliate, especially in Western Europe. She feared that any International which was based essentially on the Russian Communist Party would be bound to fall under its domination. She regarded this prospgct as a threat to the future of socialism.

The founding Congress of the Third International

(Comintern) took place in March 1919 in Moscow. The meeting of the Congress was precipitated by the attempt of the Social Democrats to revive the Second International at the Berne Conference. The foreign Communists present at the Congress were in no way representative of the working classes of Western Europe. They were generally emigrants in Moscow, and their credentials were rather dubious. The

Congress had, undoubtedly, an illegitimate character. The

Bolsheviks took advantage of the confusion within the West and Central European parties to polarize the different factions (center, Left, and Right) even further. Most legitimate party cadres were unable to attend the founding

Congress. The great bulk of those who attended the Con­ gress in March 1919 were not even mandated by their

Braunthal, History II, pp. 163-64. See also Paul Frfllich, Rosa Luxemburg; Her Life and Work (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 251. 166 organizations.^ Eberlein, the German delegate, whose vote was supposed to be of fundamental importance, arrived in

Moscow with a decision of his party to oppose the creation of the International.^ Eberlein nonetheless betrayed his mandate: instead of carrying out the order of his party, he simply abstained (after having been convinced by other delegates of the imminence of the revolution which was about to wipe out the capitalist system) . The Comintern was now founded with no opposition. Luxemburg had mean­ while died. The main West European parties were as yet not represented (Belgium, Italy, France, England, Spain,

Portugal, etc.).

"Les délégués venus de l'étranger...étaient extrême­ ment peu nombreux.... Les autres communistes figu­ rant comme représentants de différents pays étaient en réalite des émigrés politiques vivant en Russie et qui dans la plupart des cas n'avaient aucun contact avec leurs pays respectifs. C'est pourquoi un grand nombre des communistes à ce congres n'avai­ ent ancun mandat de leurs partis" (Branko Lazitch, Lenine et la III^ Internationale [Neuchâtel, Switzer­ land: Editions de la Baconnière, 1951], p. 98). The unbalanced and illogical repartition of voting rights characterized the inopportune creation of the Comintern. For a more detailed account, see G.D.H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. IV, Part I, Communism and Social Democracy, 1914-1931 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1958), esp. pp. 298-305.

^Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, p. 121; Lazitch, Lenine, pp. 107 ff; Braunthal, History II, p. 165. See also Helmut Gruber, ed.. International Communism in the Era of Lenin (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 78, and the document in that volume on the "German Reservations about the Founding of the Comintern," pp. 79-82. 167

This victory of the Bolshevik view allowed Lenin to advance some theses which denounced bourgeois democracy, parliamentarism, etc. The dictatorship of the proletariat was defended as an absolute, legitimate and inevitable necessity. "Destruction of state power" was the main goal to be achieved. Parliamentary democracy was to be replaced g by soviets. Lenin's theses were accepted without being 9 discussed by the Congress. The important point to be noted here is that the Russian experience had already started to be presented as the best one. In the theses on

"Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletar­ iat," Social Democracy was ridiculed by Lenin, and its leaders treated with no respect. The Russian views were now formulated systematically. The combination of the pamphlets written by Lenin, Bukharin, and Trotsky consti­ tuted the theoretical formulations of the International.

Some of these formulations were to mark the programs of most CPs for decades: smashing of the bourgeois state; disdain of bourgeois democracy, described as disguised bourgeois dictatorship; rejection of bourgeois rights and freedoms as purely formal; the establishment of proletarian

g These ideas are treated by Lenin in his March 1919 article, "Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Collected Works, Vol. 28 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), pp. 457-474.

^Braunthal, History II, p. 166. 168 dictatorship in replacement of "bourgeois dictatorship"; violent seizure of power by the proletariat (read Communist party) as the only alternative to the conquest of power, etc.^^ In other words, bourgeois democracy had to be destroyed at any cost, even if it entailed civil war. For

Lenin, the choice between bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat was clear-cut. The latter was the sole possibility for achieving socialism. "Dreams of some third way," he said, "are reactionary, petty bourgeois lamentations."^^ The State and its apparatuses had to be completely destroyed and replaced by new ones.

Subsequently, the Bolsheviks blamed the failure of the revolutions in Western Europe following WWI on the Social

Democrats and the Second International. Social Democrats were portrayed as traitors to the working classes of their respective countries. Such an accusation was formulated in order to fulfill two tasks: (1) to prove that the Bolshe­ vik seizure of power was the only correct line, and (2) to win over the large sections of the proletariat which were still attached to the Social Democratic parties. The

Bolsheviks succeeded in achieving the first goal but not the second. That is, they succeeded in generating a greater pole of attraction for those who were discontented

^^See Lazitch, Lenine, p. 114-121.

^^Lenin, "Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," p. 463. 169 with the parliamentarism and "conservatism" of the tradi­ tional socialist parties.

The First Congress of the Comintern had succeeded in doing one main thing; the Bolsheviks were presented as the true revolutionary party of the working class. This allowed them to create an International which they not only dominated, but which became a focal point for those social­ ists in the West who were displeased with their parties.

This was bound to happen, because

[w]hat had taken place in Moscow in March 1919 was not in fact the fusion of a number of national parties of approximately equal strength into an international organization, but the harnessing of a number of weak, in some cases embryonic and still unformed, groups to an organization whose main support and motive force was necessarily and inevi­ tably the power of the Soviet State. It was Soviet power which created Comintern and gave it its influence and prestige; in return, it was natural to expect that inter­ national communist propaganda and action should help to defend that power at a moment when it was threatened by all the i^^ction- ary forces of the capitalist world.

12 Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p. 125. Besides being asked to accept the ideas of the Bolsheviks and to encour­ age the split within the ranks of the Social Democrats, foreign Communists were also asked to support the Soviet State in their respective countries by all means, including revolutionary actions if necessary. Borkenau attributes the reasons for Russian domination to their misperception of the European situation. They were, he says, "full of revolutionary dreams," and believed that

"Russia would soon bring the world the revolutionary gospel and the revolutionary millenium; only, in order to achieve it, all people must submit to the Russian lead. It is the Islamic idea of holy war. 170

In 1920, Moscow's predominance was reinforced by some historical events; the civil war in Russia had shifted in favor of the Bolsheviks and victory was almost certain; the

Social Democrats had failed in their attempt to revive the

Second International; and more numerous Left-wing parties were being attracted by Moscow. Conversely, Moscow encour­ aged those who broke away from the Second International to 13 join the Comintern.

Before the Second Congress of the Comintern (July

1920), Lenin had written his important pamphlet, " 'Left-

expressed in terms of historical materialism. The idea of Russian domination over the labor movement was so intimately knit together with the belief in the redeeming powers of the Bolshevik creed and the Bolshevik creed only, that every doubt and every rebellion seemed to Lenin and his followers the essence of blasphemy, to be rewarded with immediate excommunication" (Franz Borkenau, World Communism; A History of the Communist International [New York: Norton, 1939], p. 188).

Another point should be made here; The Comintern's claim that it "undertakes to continue and carry through to the end the great work begun by the First International Working Men's Association" (Statutes of the Communist Interna­ tional , in Braunthal, History II, p. 533) was clearly unfounded. For instance, "Marx never tried to force his ideas mechanically on the member parties of the First International, nor did he try to mould the workers' move­ ment upon the principles which he personally considered correct" (Braunthal, p. 1 7 9 ) . But it is also true that Marx never failed to impose the correctness of his views very vehemently in his polemical debates with individuals, such as Lassalle or Proudhon.

^^Carr, "The Third International," p. 186. 171

Wing' Communism — An Infantile Disorder,in April-May,

and published it in June. This pamphlet was partly direct­

ed against those Western revolutionaries who were even more

to the left than Lenin. In opposition to them, he stressed

that compromises were often necessary, even for a revolu­

tionary party (read the Bolsheviks). He argued that

Communists should win the workers to their cause by infil­

trating the trade unions instead of rejecting them as

reactionary organizations. The Left-wingers had refused to

participate in parliaments, claiming that they were obso­

lete. Lenin argued that "Parliamentarism has become

'historically obsolete.' That is true in the propaganda

sense. However, everybody knows that this is still a far

cry from overcoming it in practice.In other words,

politically speaking, parliamentarism had not become

obsolete yet, and for that reason,

...far from causing harm to the revolution­ ary proletariat, participation in a bour­ geois-democratic parliament, even a few weeks before the victory of a soviet repub­ lic and even after such a victory, actually

14 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 31 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), pp. 21-118. Borkenau describes this work as "perhaps the most powerful thing Lenin has ever written, because it is almost free from those philo­ sophical and economic generalizations which were not Lenin's strong point. It is a handbook of revolutionary tactics and as such can sometimes be compared, for force of argument, realism, directness and convincing power, with Machiavelli's II Principe" (Borkenau, World Communism, p. 191). 15 Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism," p. 56. 172

helps that proletariat to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be done away with; it facilitates their successful dissolution, and helps to make bourgeois^ ^parliamentarism "politically" obsolete.

Undoubtedly, he is basing his argument on the Russian experience. In reality, despite his claims, Lenin did not allow the Russian Constituent Assembly to last very long.

The Russian proletariat was not given a chance to "prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be done away with."

What should be emphasized is that participation in parliaments by the Communists is, for Lenin, a tactical maneuver. The other point is his re-emphasis on organiza­ tion.

I repeat: the experience of the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat has clearly shown even to those who are incapable of thinking or have had no occasion to give thought to the matter that absolute central­ ization and rigorous discipline of the proletariat are an essentialj^yondition of victory over the bourgeoisie.

This, of course, was nothing new in Lenin's thought. What was novel was his giving his conception a universal value.

His What Is to Be Done? could be justified on the grounds that it applied to the specific conditions of Russia under

Czarism. But now, according to the Bolsheviks, it had

^^Ibid., p. 60. 17 Ibid., p. 24 (emphasis added). 173

become the model for all parties. Moreover, in order to

fight "reformism" and "opportunism" within the ranks of the

working class, the parties had to shut their doors to those

who wished to remain affiliated to the Second Internation­

al, and especially to the leadership: Kautsky, McDonald,

etc. The Bolsheviks did their best to split the old

socialist parties. "Social Chauvinism," that is. Social

Democracy, had now become "Bolshevism's principal enemy

within the working class movement. It still remains the 18 principal enemy on an international scale." What cannot

be understood, however, is why Lenin criticized the Left­

wingers for their "sectarianism" while he himself was doing 19 the same thing, or probably worse.

^®Ibid., p. 31. 19 "Under the influence of the '21 Conditions,' and in general of the methods adopted by the Comintern in its struggle against reformism and centrism, a sectarian and dogmatic spirit began from the very beginning to clear a way for itself in the Communist parties, disguised under a revolutionary verbalism that concealed its remoteness from reality" (Claudin, The Communist Movement, I, p. 108). This policy proved to be very counterproductive; "The break with reformism [i.e., with the reformist wings of the Socialist parties]...resulted in a break with the mass of the workers. Except in rare cases the communist parties remained confined to minority sections, sometimes tiny ones, of the proletariat. And, what was worse, they appeared in the eyes of the workers who had stayed loyal to their organizations, as splitters responsible for the division in the ranks of the working class" (Ibid., p. 109). 174

The second Congress stipulated the famous "Twenty-one

Conditions" of admission to the Comintern. Member parties and those who wished to join, had to conform strictly to these conditions. The center of decision was Moscow or, more precisely, the Executive Committee of the Communist

International (ECCI), a kind of supra-national Central

Committee :

The Communist International rejected the federal type of organization which prevailed in the Second International. Its statutes laid down that it must "represent in fact and in effect one unified Communist party throughout the world." The parties affili­ ated to the International "are just its member sections."

To characterize the national parties as simply "sections of the International" meant that they had no independent existence. In practice, the ECCI had absolute authority over the member parties. Its directives were "binding rules for all the parties affiliated to the International."

It [ECCI] has power to "demand the expulsion of groups or of individuals" from the parties, and has full authority to expel individuals, groups, and even parties from the International. It can dismiss leaders elected by the party membership and replace them by leaders of its own choice.... The Executive Committee was further empowered to

The transformation of the western working class parties from mass parties to cadre parties never proved to be fruitful.

Braunthal, History II, p. 171. 175

set up "its own technical and other auxili­ ary offices in the various countries, to be directly controlled by the Executive Commit­ tee. "

The "Twenty-one Conditions" worked out by Lenin and

Zinoviev laid the foundations for the Bolshevization of the

Western CPs. They also led to the definitive split between

^^Ibid. "...il alla également de soi pour les dirigeants bolsheviks d'intervenir dans les affaires des sec­ tions nationales par l'intermédiaire d'émissaires envoyés de Moscou et par celui des bureaux intallés dans les pays de l'ouest..., il allait également de soi de ne faire guère de différence entre la direc­ tion du parti bolshevik et celle du Komintern" (Jean-Jacques Becker, Le Parti Communiste veut-il prendre le pouvoir? [Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981], p. 10). On the question of Russian emissaries in Western capitals, see B. Lazitch, "Two Instruments of Control by the Comin­ tern: The Emissaries of the ECCI and the Party Representa­ tives in Moscow," in M.M. Drachkovitch and B. Lazitch, eds.. The Comintern; Historical Highlights (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), pp. 45-65. The focus of this article is on the PCF. If one is to believe A. Balabanoff, it seems that "...many of our agents and representatives were individuals long discredited in the labor movement abroad. They were chosen because they had nothing in common with the labor movement and could, there­ fore, obey the most contradictory and outrageous orders quite mechanically and with no sense of responsibility. Adventurers, opportunists, even former Red-baiters, all were grist to Zinoviev's mill" (Angelica Balabanoff, My Life as a Rebel [New York: Greenwood Press, 1968], p. 223). Although this is a strong statement by a subjective actor of that period, there is no doubt that not only the emis­ saries, but even those who emerged as leaders of the split­ ters, "were not the best qualified to give an objective analysis of the situation in their respective countries, nor did they always enjoy the largest measure of support and confidence in their own parties" (Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 199-200). 176

22 Socialists of the center and the Communists. It is true that the split was already obvious, but the Twenty-One

Conditions and the Bolsheviks' stress on schism made any attempts at unification or compromise impossible. The birth of the main West European CPs took place precisely at this juncture.

The French Communist Party was created in December

1920 as a consequence of the split that occurred in the

Socialist Party (SFIO) at the Tours Congress. Adhering to 23 the Third International was decided by a majority. This was an important victory for the International, since the splitters now represented a mass party with 140,000 mem­ bers. The remainder, claiming to be the legitimate repre­ sentatives of the French labor movement, kept only 40,000 members. They constituted the Socialist party, which has remained the main challenger to the Communists up until today. Their membership was only 40,000, but by 1924

22 Lazitch, Lenine, p. 156. The consequences of that split are felt even today. 23 3,208 votes were for; 1,022 were against (Albert Lindemann, "The Red Years" - European Socialism Versus Leninism, 1919-1921 [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974], p. 268; Braunthal, History II, p. 194). 177

24 this situation had been reversed, due mostly to the

Party's internal struggles and its increasing Bolsheviza­

tion. However, one should not think that the newly created

Communist party was homogeneous. Many of its members were

former leaders in the French Socialist Party. They accep­

ted the Twenty-One Conditions, but they remained in many

ways attached to the traditions of Social Democracy (in

terms of conceptions, methods, organization, etc.). For

them, commitment to the Twenty-One Conditions did not mean

that there should be a party organized on iron discipline

and the elimination of those holding different opinions.

The Bolsheviks understood that, and were determined to

reorganize the West European CPs in their own image. From

1921 to 1923 a Rightist tendency developed in the PCF that

was opposed to the interference of the Comintern in the

internal affairs of the Party. They demanded that the

different factions be free to express their opinions within

the Party. They also wanted to reverse the split that had

^^PCF and SFIO Memberships, 1921-24

PCF SFIO 1921 110,000 40,000 1922 79,000 49,000 1923 55,000 50,000 1924 60,000 73,000

Reproduced from Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, 1920-1972 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 28. The most thorough and complete study of this period, to my knowledge, is Annie Kriegel's Aux origines du communisme français, 1914-1920 (Paris: Mouton, 1964). 178

25 occurred at Tours by reunifying the Party. However, the

Bolsheviks could not tolerate this. They urged the men they supported to eliminate such groups, even at the risk of losing membership in the parties. One of the main objectives for setting up the Comintern and laying down the

Twenty-One Conditions was to have an organization rigid enough — even if this meant minority parties — to purge the undesired elements and to promulgate rules by which all parties should be bound. The Comintern was determined to intervene in the internal lives of the parties. There was no room left for the parties to settle their problems in accordance with the specific conditions of their countries.

Lenin was strict on this point:

Comrade Ramsay [the British delegate to the 22nd Congress] says: Let us English commu­ nists settle this question ourselves. What would become of the International if every small faction came and said; Some of us are for, some against, let us decide for our­ selves? What need would there be for an International, a congress and all this discussion?

25 Nicole Racine and Louis Bodin, eds.. Le parti communiste français pendant 1 ' entre-deux-guerres (Paris: Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1982 - First publication, 1972), pp. 16-18. Even at Tours, Frossard, who became Secretary General of the PCF, declared :

"Our resolution requires no expulsion.... I have maintained both here and in Moscow, and throughout the whole campaign for affiliation to the Third International, that men like myself would dishonour themselves by slandering and expelling comrades with whom they have worked for years for the renewal of Socialism...." (Quoted in Braunthal, History II, p. 193).

^^Lenin, quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p. 191. 179

The PCF, with the support of Moscow, started a process of purification (1921-23) before going through a process of

Bolshevization which lasted from 1924 until 1934. This latter period gave the PCF its distinct Stalinist mark.

Contrary to other European counterparts, the Italian

Socialist Party (PSI) was opposed to the First World War, denounced it, and claimed no responsibility for it. There­ fore, after the war it emerged as a solid party whose ranks were filled with those — from various segments of Italian 27 society — who hoped for peace and a new social order.

In 1919, the PSI maintained its unity despite the decision of the majority (led by Serrati) to join the Third Interna­ tional. Those opposed to this affiliation (led by Turati) remained in the party and accepted the decision of the majority to avoid creating a split. Lenin, however, insisted that Turati should be expelled, despite Serrati's insistence that such a move would threaten the unity of the working class movement in Italy. Serrati, like many other

European Socialists who admired the Bolsheviks and accepted affiliation with the Comintern, did not accept Moscow's dictum. He refused the letter's interference in the

2 7 PSI membership reached 216,000 in 1920 (as opposed to 81,000 in the preceding year). In 1913, it held 47 seats in Parliament. After the 1919 elections, it obtained 147, making the PCI the strongest party in Parliament. The membership of the trade unions, closely connected to the party, grew from 320,000 in 1914 to 1,159,000 in 1919 and 2,320,000 in 1920 (Braunthal, History II, p. 199). 180

internal affairs of the national parties and insisted that

it was up to them to decide how and when to make their

revolutions. More aware of the existing conditions

(social, economic and political), Serrati rejected Lenin's 2 8 view that revolution in Italy was imminent.

Lenin could not conceive that the leadership of a CP

could be left in the hands of a man (Serrati) who would not

purge the party of its reformist elements even if that

meant preserving the unity of the party. Therefore, he now

said that Serrati himself must go.

In mid-January 1921, the PSI held its national Con­

gress in Leghorn to resolve the disputes taking place

within the Party. The PSI was dominated by three factions:

the Pure Communists (those who adopted a Bolshevik posi­

tion, i.e., unconditional acceptance of the Twenty-One

Conditions and elimination of the right-wing faction of the 29 party); the Unitarian Communists who, though accepting

2 8 In this, Serrati was correct. The "revolutionary" movement that had spread throughout Italy in 1919-20 had failed, and its consequences were disastrous for the working class and the peasantry. However, the main reasons for the failure of the movement were the indecisiveness of the leadership of the PSI and the trade unions, fear of intervention by Western powers, unwillingness of the working class to carry out its struggle to the ultimate, etc. See Braunthal, History II, pp. 201-204. 29 The Pure Communists were not a homogeneous group. The faction led by A. Bordiga adopted a firm anti-parlia- mentarist attitude. A second faction, led by 1'Ordine Nuovo (Gramsci, Togliatti, and Tasca), was in favor of participation in elections to parliament and other 181 affiliation with the Comintern and its general principles, insisted on party independence with respect to tactics and internal affairs (e.g. purges, etc.); and finally, the

Concentrationists, led by Turati, representing the right wing of the party. They were staunchly opposed to a split in the PSI.

The Congress, under pressure from the Bolshevik delegates, succeeded in making Lenin's wishes come true.

The party was split. Though the Pure Communists won 58,783 votes against 98,028 for the Unitarians (the Turati group received 14,695) out of the 172,487 mandates, Lenin de­ clared it a victory. The Pure Communists, under the leadership of Bordiga, met immediately after the Congress to found the Partito Communista d'Italia, later changing its name to Partito Communista Italiano (PCI).^^

What was born in Leghorn was not the Communist mass party that people like Gramsci had hoped for. The main characteristic of the newly born PCI was its sectarian­ ism.^^ Before long, the PCI went through a period of internal disputes regarding tactics, organization, etc.

institutions; a third group, the Marabini-Graziadei, though agreeing with the second, did not think that the time was favorable for revolution in Italy.

^^Ibid., pp. 206-208; Lindemann, "The Red Years," p. 274. 31 Martin Clark, Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 208. Clark is right to point out that "it was only the 182

The split had serious consequences: not only the PCI, 3 2 but the PSI as well, witnessed a steady decline.

Serrati's prophecy was correct. His argument that the split was premature — Serrati agreed that the split was probably inevitable, but that its timing was objectively 33 inopportune — was proven by the facts.

In Spain, the Federacion de Juventudes Socialistas

(Federation of Socialist Youth - FJS) converted itself into a Communist Party (PCE) as a matter of course, instead of awaiting the meeting of a Congress. The party was founded in February 1920 under the guidance of an element of the

Comintern, Ramirez, a protege of M. Borodin, who had left

Spain a few weeks before the creation of the Spanish

Communist Party.It opposed the search for unity at all cost as a reactionary position. Its first manifesto was

later years of anti-Fascist resistance that transformed it into the mass political movement that Gramsci had envisaged as late as October 1920."

^^Lindemann, "The Red Years," p. 288. 33 In his "Report to the Executive Committee of the Third International on the Italian Party Congress, Berlin, January 20, 1921," P. Levi recounts that Serrati and "his parliamentary group were determined to eliminate the reformists. However, as things now stood in Italy, it would be extremely difficult to do this presently and abruptly." Report reproduced in Drachkovitch and Lazitch, The Comintern, pp. 275-282. The quote was taken from p. 275. 34 Victor Alba, The Communist Party in Spain, trans. by V.G. Smith (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983), p. 14. 183 an illustration of what the strategy of the West European

CPs — molded in Moscow — was to be ;

The Communist Party has as its only purpose social revolution; it rejects all minimum programs; by use of political action it establishes a platform of propaganda and attack against the bourgeoisie. Upon the ruins of parliamentarian regime and middle class democracy, discredited forever, will be established the Soviet regime, the only one able to bring about the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This party, however, looked like an adventurist party

— its membership was between the ages of 20 and 25. The

Congress of the Socialist party (PSOE) held in April 1921 gave birth to another Communist party, the Partido Commu­ nista Obrero Espanol (Spanish Communist Workers' party -

PCOE), associated with the Comintern. Its membership reached about 6,500 three months after its creation.By

March 1922 — under pressure of the Comintern — the PCE and the PCOE merged into a single Communist party, the 37 PCE.

In Great Britain, one of the most advanced capitalist countries, the splits and mergers within the Socialist movement resulted in the creation of a very small Communist

35 Ibid. The membership of the party was about 1,100. Before the conversion, or split, the FJS had 5,000 members. The Anarcho-Syndicalist organization, CNT, was also "provi­ sionally" affiliated with the Comintern.

^^Ibid., p. 53.

^^Ibid., pp. 60-61. 184 party (CPGB). Its lack of success stemmed mostly from the fact that it did not come about as the product of natural growth. Rather, it was viewed as the creation of a foreign 3 8 power — Russia — which totally determined its policy.

In many cases, the split demoralized the working class. In Germany, for instance, "hundreds of thousands of the rank and file dropped out of politics completely.. . .

The chief result...was a considerable strengthening of the 39 right wing within the labor movement." This did not, however, represent a problem for Moscow. The Comintern now had under its control a multitude of Western parties which at least conformed to the Twenty-One Conditions, although their constituencies were not very large. The revolution­ ary wave in Central and Western Europe was not yet over but its end was becoming increasingly obvious. The Comintern still tried to trigger a few revolutionary actions in some countries, mainly Germany, but with little success.

3 8 R. Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 221. 39 Borkenau, World Communism, p. 200.

"Lenin.. .believed that his theories were the only key to power for the working class in all countries. Yet in fact the Communist International, by trying to impose ideas founded on specifically Russian conditions upon labor movements in all countries with entirely different traditions and conditions, failed to rally the mass of the working classes of the world. And, by splitting the international labor movement and dragging it into a bitter fratri­ cidal struggle, it weakened the forces of social­ ism...." (Braunthal, History II, p. 181). 185

Before proceeding further in dealing with the evolu­ tion of the Communist movement, the question of how to use parliamentary institutions should be discussed, because it is révélant to the anlaysis of Eurocommunism. Up to 1920, one might have expected that to advocate a Bolshevik strategy of the conquest of power in the West only repre­ sented a conjunctural stage. Since the conditions for revolution were supposedly more or less ripe, a frontal attack on the State was conceivable. Lenin and the Bolshe­ viks, however, stipulated that the ways they seized power in Russia should be (both in theory and practice) the model 40 for all countries, with only minor degrees of variation.

Because parliamentarism had not produced any cases of transition to socialism in the West, and since a violent revolution had been successful in Russia, the Bolsheviks drew the conclusion that their tactics were the only valid ones. Nevertheless, as seen earlier. Communists were not instructed to boycott parliaments. However, this did not mean that parliamentary tactics were to be accepted as a long-term policy for the Communists.

40 "It was very difficult to discuss matters with the leaders of the Third International owing to the strong nationalist direction they adopt. Every question is deeply colored with ideas peculiarly Russian. I think it is understandable, but certain­ ly the very pontifical attitude they adopt does not make discussion easy. They are quite prepared to admit that revolutions are not metaphysical in their 186

There was to be an intermediary position between those

Left-wingers who opposed any participation in parliaments

and those who saw parliaments as the arena from which power would be conquered (peacefully). Simply stated, the

origin; are the outcome of historical devel­ opment; and that social revolution must develop in each country along different lines; but they always return to the point that their tactics are the model on which all socialist method must be based." This was written by one of the delegates of the British ILP at the Second Congress of the Comintern (Independent Labor Party; Report of the 29th Annual Conference [1921], pp. 53-54, quoted in Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, p. 198. Emphasis mine). The Dutch Communist Hermann Gorter, who had talked to Lenin in Moscow, told his friend Pannekoek: "This man I expected to be and to feel himself the general­ issimo of the world revolution; but I had to realize that Lenin thought constantly of Russia and saw all things only from the Russian point of view" (quoted in Borkenau, World Communism, p. 191) . In his reply to Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism," Gorter reproaches Lenin for not emphasizing "the very great difference that exists on this question [of the poor peasantry] between Russia...and West Europe" (Hermann Gorter, "Open Letter to Comrade Lenin: An Answer to Lenin's Pamphlet 'Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder'," in Gruber, International Communism, p. 216). Gorter, himself a Left-winger, criticized Lenin on several accounts: (1) the question of the peasantry, he argued, represented a different problem in the West as opposed to the East; (2) he saw the relationship between the leader­ ship and the masses differently from Lenin — in fact, he remarked that the greatness of the Bolshevik Revolution lay not in the strength and discipline of the Party, but on the creation of the workers' councils. "The light of the new world radiates from the work­ ers' councils. The working class of thé world found in these workers' councils its organization and its centralization, the form and expression for the revolution and for socialist society" (H. Gorter, World Revolution [Glasgow: Socialist Information Research Bureau, n.d.] quoted in Stanley Aaronowitz, "Left-Wing Communism: The Reply to Lenin," in D. Howard and Karl E. Klare, eds.. The Unknown Dimen­ sion [New York: Basic Books, 1972], p. 173). 187

intermediary position meant that parliaments should be

utilized in order to be destroyed. Parliaments were to

represent — as they did for the German SPD during its

period of isolation — a tribune from which the Communists

could launch their propaganda. The Communist deputies were

to be responsible to the Central Committees of their respective parties. Parallel to their legal activity, they must do illegal work, i.e., they should take advantage of their parliamentary immunity to practice such illegal activity.

(3) Gorter believed that "West European revolution will have its own laws and will follow them" ("Open Letter to Comrade Lenin," p. 224). This point is a blunt rejection of Lenin's argument that "on certain very important ques­ tions of the proletarian revolution, all countries have to do what Russia has done" (Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism," p. 31). The main target of Gorter and Pannekoek was, as for Luxemburg, Lenin's conception of the party. They viewed the party more as an impediment to the working class than an instrument for its emancipation. Their criticism of Bolshevik party organization was so strong that they ended seeing Bolshevism and Fascism as identical forms in that both aimed at the subordination of the working class (see Aaronowitz, "Left-Wing Communism: The Reply to Lenin," p. 183) . It should be noted, however, that contrary to Luxemburg, with whom they shared many views, they did not see parliaments and trade unions as part of the working class struggle, but rather viewed them as simply reaction­ ary institutions. Yet Pannekoek

"...did not deny that in principle the conquest of power through the parliamentary road was a possibil­ ity; but he asserted that such a conquest could be posited only in those countries in which the prin­ ciples of parliamentarism and democracy were fully observed" (Massimo Salvadori, Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution, 1880-1938 (London: New Left Books, 1979), p. 156). Lenin totally dismissed such a possibility, whereas Kautsky made it a real thing. Pannekoek reproached Kautsky "to 188

Tout depute communiste au parlement doit Être pénétré de l'idée qu'il n'est aucune­ ment un législateur, mais un agitateur du parti envoyé dans le camp ennemi pour y appliquer les décisions du parti. Le député communiste n'est pas responsable envers la masse électorale, mais envers son^ part± communiste, qu'il soit légal ou illégal.

This was, obviously, a very unrealistic tactic to be pursued by West Europeans. As rightly put by Carr,

The parliamentary game was played in every country under different and constantly changing national rules; it was not likely to be played with success by parties bound to follow uniform instructions issued in Moscow, where conceptions of parliamentary action were governed largely by recollec­ tions of the Tsarist Duma.

The real dilemma did not seem to have been perceived by the Bolsheviks: how could one reconcile a "theory of the offensive" -- as Paul Levi, Luxemburg's close friend.

attempt to apply a parliamentary strategy in a country [Germany] with an emasculated parliament" (Ibid.). In May 1968, the ideas of Pannekoek and Gorter were revived by some students, e.g., Cohn-Bendit, whose attacks against the PCF were almost identical to Pannekoek's on the Bolshevist party.

Bukharin, quoted in Lazitch, Lenine, p. 165. Amadeo Bordiga, one of the leading Communists in Italy, advocated a staunch anti-parliamentary strategy in opposi­ tion to not only Serrati, but Gramsci as well, who argued that the party should participate in the elections. Even for Serrati, participation in parliament did not necessar­ ily mean that Parliament — a bourgeois institution — could lead to reforms that might bring about deep socio­ economic transformations. The point was to use parliament as a tribune to denounce the bourgeois institutions as instruments of the ruling class. See Lindemann, "The Red Y e a r s ," pp. 54 f f .

^^Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, p. 200. 189 described Lenin's theory — and a tactic advocating parti­ cipating in parliament in a non-revolutionary situation?

Levi understood the dilemma quite well because, just like

Luxemburg, he maintained that the party's role was not to

"hasten the revolution," but rather to prepare the working class for revolution. Whatever objections were being raised, the Leninist conception won and was consequently stamped upon the Communist movement. The parliamentary road had now become inconceivable.

From the fall of 1920 on, the revolutionary tide receded, and wherever proletarian rebellions took place, they were either crushed or simply limited to syndicalist demands. Clearly, Communism was not spreading as the

Leninists had anticipated; rather, capitalism was regaining strength. The crushing of the upheaval in Germany in 1923, instigated by the Comintern despite Levi's opposition, marked a retreat by the Bolsheviks domestically (launching of the NEP) and internationally; they now announced that world revolution was not imminent and that the majority of the European working classes was not ready to follow the 44 lead of the Comintern. Instead, the working class now followed the revived Social Democratic and Labor parties.

43 Braunthal, History II, p. 226. 44 Lazitch, Lenine, p. 173; Carr, Bolshevik Revolu­ tion , p p . 386 f f. 190

...which now played an active and recognized part in national politics and, as they grew respectable, became less and less revolu­ tionary and more and more implacably opposed to the pretensions of Moscow. The Third International had been created. Butigthe Second had, after all, failed to die.

What took place in Europe was obviously quite differ­ ent from what had happened in Russia after the revolution.

The Communists in Europe, despite the support and power of the Comintern, could not eliminate the pluralism that was to characterize the labor movement, whereas in Russia, the

Bolsheviks succeeded in repressing and eventually extermi­ nating (physically and politically) their Socialist breth­ ren. Since the Communists were unable to do that in

Western Europe, the question as to how to deal with plural­ ism and alliances would represent a crucial problem for

European Communism.

The Comintern's retreat consisted of trying to win the allegiance of the masses. The Third Congress of the

International inaugurated the policy of the United Front.

This policy was simply a tactic used in specific historical conjunctures — in this case, the stability of capitalism and the consequent change in the social relation of forces made any revolutionary attempts suicidal. In a general sense, the United Front consisted of "winning over the workers by making common cause with them and their leaders

^^Carr, "Third International," p. 88 191

[the Socialists] on basic and not especially revolutionary issues — often bread-and-butter issues, of wages, hours, 46 and working conditions..." Although the United Front claimed its tactics were aimed at uniting the working class, its primary objective was to win over the socialist workers by driving them away from their leaders. This was the real meaning of the slogan "go out to the masses" launched in December 1921, inaugurating the United Front tactics.Undoubtedly the Bolsheviks understood that the process of splitting the Socialist parties was not all that successful. Moreover, the CPs that had been created were far from representing mass parties. The change of tactics had now become obvious.

The winning of exclusive influence over the majority of the working class, the drawing of its most active section into the immedi­ ate struggle, is at the present moment the most important task of the Communist Inter­ national.... From the first day of its foundation the Communist International made it clearly and unequivocally its task not to create small communist sects which would strive to establish their influence over the working masses only through agitation and propaganda, but to participate directly in the struggle of the working masses, to establish communist leadership in this struggle, and to create in the process of

46 D. Calhoun, The United Front - The TUC and the Russians, 1923-1928 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 3. 47 Cf. Braunthal, History II, p. 248. 192

struggle lar^i^, revolutionary, communist mass parties.

The Communists who had restlessly led a campaign for

splitting the parties now decided that it was rather the

"social democratic and center parties" which tried to split

the proletariat.

The Communist parties have become the bearers of a process of unification of the proletariat on the ground of the struggle for its interests; and from the conscious­ ness of this role they will draw new strength.

The new policy's objective was to unite the working class and possibly to "collaborate" with the Socialists on certain issues. However, "the whole purpose of [the United

Front] was to expose the temporary allies, to their follow­ ers, as the cowards and renegades they were, and thus to storm the reformist citadel from within.

Many European Communists understood the tactics to mean an actual attempt to reunite the labor movement which they had just succeeded in splitting. In Germany, France,

Italy and Spain, the newly created Communist Parties opposed the United Front tactics advocated by Lenin. The

PCI and the PCF did not feel bound by the Comintern's Third

48 Kommunisticheskii International v Dokumentakh (1933), quoted in Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p. 390. 49 Quoted in ibid., p. 390.

^^Calhoun, United Front, p. 4. 193

Congress' resolution on the United Front. The majority in the PCF did not think it rational to seek collaboration with people (Socialists) whom the leadership of the PCF had been severely criticizing as "objective allies of the bourgeoisie" and "traitors of the working class.The

PCE accepted the United Front tactics only reluctantly.

Though from a propaganda point of view it seemed conceiv­ able for Spain, the PCE, as well as the PCF and the PCI, 52 rejected the slogan. In Italy, the Left wing of the PCI, led by A. Bordiga, staunchly opposed the new policy. On the other hand, some Social Democrats could not see why they should enter a United Front when the objective of the latter was obviously to split the Social Democratic parties even further and to deplete them of their membership.

Though the tactic was conceived at this stage as a united front "at the top" and "at the bottom," its real intention was to realize the latter at the expense of the former, i.e., to undermine the leadership of the socialist parties. 53 This the Bolsheviks admitted with no shame.

It seems quite obvious that the new tactic was the result of the failure of the Comintern and of Lenin's

Tiersky, French Communism, pp. 36-37; Braunthal, History II, p. 252. Curiously enough, only the Left wing of the PCF defended the Comintern policy. See Racine and Bodin, Le parti communiste français, pp. 18-19. 52 Alba, Communist Party in Spain, pp. 82-83.

^^Braunthal, History II, pp. 252-254. 194

conceptions, mainly that of the vanguard party.The

stubbornness of the Leninists trying to reconcile a Bolshe­ vik party structure with the claim to be building mass CPs

is evident. To build mass Communist parties in Western

Europe would have required that the Comintern allow the parties to loosen the disciplinary conditions characteris­ tic of the Bolshevik parties. Moreover, it would have had to encourage the newly created CPs to set up their organi­ zations and strategies in accordance with the reality of their social formations. This, of course, Moscow was not willing to accept. Paradoxically, while the Comintern was recommending policies of mass appeal which, of course, would have needed much decentralization of authority, it was also emphasizing the need to reinforce the bonds of organization and discipline, which could not be possible 55 without a higher degree of centralization. The Third

Congress, in fact, issued a resolution which made the subordination of the different CPs a reality.From then on, it was not Russia that was to serve the interest of the world Communist movement, but rather the Communist movement

54 The Kronstadt rebellion revealed the contradiction between the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party and grass­ roots democracy. Lenin's slogan of "all power to the Soviets" was literally pure demagoguery. 55 Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, p. 392.

S^ibid., p. 393. 195 which was now subordinated to the interests of Soviet

Russia."The Third International gradually became assimilated to the Russian party, to its policies, its interests and its internal disputes and rivalries; and, from being a foreign adjunct of the Russian Communist

Party, it was only a short step to become an adjunct of the

Soviet State.

The subordination of the Western CPs to Soviet nation­ al interests was completed by the time of the Fourth

Congress, held in November 1922. The Comintern was reor­ ganized in order to be made "a really strictly centralized world party." The reorganization completed the loss of autonomy of the member parties, which "were also forbidden to bind their delegates to any fixed mandate.... The

Congress of the Communist International now lost all semblance of a free forum where decisions would reflect the 59 views of member parties."

The way in which the leaders of the Communist parties of Western Europe and elsewhere had been Bolshevized surpasses any kind of rational explanation. Future devel­ opments in psychological research may be able to explain how and why foreign Communists accepted such a degree of

^^Lazitch, Lenine, p. 173.

^®Carr, "Third International," p. 91. 59 Braunthal, History II, p. 262. 196 subordination and, very often, of humiliation. The bright­ est among them left (Korsch, Pannekoek) or were expelled

(Levi). The others were simply converted into the quasi- religious Leninist, and later Stalinist, ideology.

W. Leonhard provides a relatively persuasive explanation as to how the monolithic structure of the Comintern and subordination to it by foreign Communists were possible.

He presents four main reasons:

(1) a "psychological and political factor" — the Russians

were the only Communists who carried out a revolution

successfully. The West Europeans were defeated

whenever they tried.

(2) "Common party training of Communist functionaries."

This training became systematic after Lenin's death.

Marxism-Leninism was taught solely according to Soviet interpretations, and the history of the Bolshevik party was revered as the sole example.... All further stages of Soviet-Russian development were seen as universal and obligatory for every other party and modification was ^1 lowed only in areas of lesser importance.

Wolfgang Leonhard, Eurocommunism: Challenge for East and West (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), p. 32. Racine and Bodin give a brief but illuminating inter­ pretation as to why those who came from the Socialist or Syndicalist movement, as well as the intellectuals, joined the Comintern and accepted its strict conditions. They argue that the social milieu, the sense of injustice and inequality, the poor conditions of the time and a disillu­ sionment with majority socialism and its leaders (whom they accused of being responsible for the war and its conse­ quences) led them to join the Comintern en masse. The 197

(3) "The organizational component." As seen above, the

resolutions and directives decided by the ECCI were

"binding party line" for the national branches.

(4) "Financial dependence.

A preliminary conclusion to this section is necessary.

Communist parties of Western Europe were not born naturally in their respective environments, but were created, except perhaps for the German party, under the "direct impetus of

Moscow." As stated by Carr:

The mere existence of the Third Internation­ al with its vast resources and world-wide pretensions stood in the way of the develop­ ment of an indigenous British, French or even German Communism, which might have

Bolshevik Revolution also was a determining factor in their decision. The authors also note that those who joined the newly created CPs — including the intellectuals — were very often unfamiliar with Marxist doctrine (Le parti communiste français, pp. 20-28). This, it seems to me, had two consequences: (1) Once the revolutionary fervor in Western Europe had faded away, the CPs became less attrac­ tive organizations. Disillusionment with Soviet Russia — though not so strong at that time as it probably is today — coupled with a recovery of capitalism, on the one hand, and disgust with the splitting of Socialist parties, on the other, prevented the CPs from being genuine mass parties. (2) The fact that many of those who joined the CPs were not necessarily familiar with Marx's theory made it easier for Soviet interpretation of Marxism to be imposed upon the Western CPs; hence their relatively smooth Stalinization.

^^Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 35. Perhaps all the Eurocommunist parties are today financially independent. The PCF, for instance, has even been described as the "parti le plus capitaliste de France" by Jean Montaldo in his insightful book Les Finances du PCF (Paris: Albin Michel, 1977). 198

responded to national outlooks and national emergencies. The movements that existed could be, and were, justly discredited as puppetSggWhose strings were pulled in Moscow.

The reason why this section focused so much on the Russian impact rather than on the genesis of the CPs themselves is because the latter were almost insignificant as real mass political parties.

Another point of importance; the Comintern split the international labor movement and, in fact, weakened it at an important juncture of its history. The split and the struggles which ensued within the labor movement have been detrimental and consequential up to today. The hatred and/or distrust that exists between Socialists and Commu­ nists has not faded. But while the Socialists became a national component of their polities, the CPs remained political subcultures whose allegiance to a foreign power made them suspicious even in the eyes of the people they claimed to represent.

During the period following Lenin's death, the con­ gresses of the Comintern were preoccupied mainly with

6 2 "The Third International," p. 91. Deutscher is perfectly correct in his sober observation that

"...anybody who would try to comprehend the history of any Communist Party merely in the context of its own national environment would fail. He would not be able to account for the manifold changes of line, for the fading of some leaders and the emergence of others, or for reforms in organizational structure" (Isaac Deutscher, Stalin; A Political Biography [New York; Oxford University Press, 1966], p. 398). 199 getting support from foreign Communists in eliminating opposition to Stalin's hegemony. Not only did they have to support Stalin against his opponents (Trotsky, Zinoviev, etc.), but they also had to purge their own parties of members sympathetic to the cause and ideas of Stalin's opponents. From being subordinated to a foreign power, the

Western CPs were now to be subordinated to an individual:

Stalin.

From the Popular Fronts to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU

As bourgeois society continues to decay, all bourgeois parties, particularly Social Democracy, take on a more or less Fascist character.... Fascism and Social Democracy are the two sides of the same instrument of capitalist dictatorship. In the fight against Fascism, therefore. Social Democracy can never be.a reliable ally of the fighting proletariat.

These were the terms used by the Fifth Congress of the

Comintern in June-July 1924 to formulate its thesis on the relationship between Social Democracy and Fascism. Any

"United Front" policy between Social Democracy and CPs was therefore unthinkable, except if it came exclusively "from below," that is, excluding any unity of the leadership of 64 the two parties.

6 3 J. Degras, The Communist International: Documents, quoted in Claudin, Communist Movement, I, p. 152. 64 "The intensification of the struggle against Social Democracy transfers the weight of importance to the united front from below, but it does not relieve the 200

The period 1924-1928 was characterized by a strong

process of Bolshevization of the different CPs. Moscow had

previously not been able to consolidate the position of the men it wished to see in control of the parties. However,

it became clear that in France, for instance, the pro-

Stalinist Thorez was gaining more and more power, though his position was not finally consolidated until 1934.^^

The other two parties, the PCI^^ and the PCE,^^ were going through the same process: intense struggle for leadership, decline in membership, lack of influence among the working class, etc.^® The crisis of the International Communist

Communists from the duty of drawing a distinction between the sincere, but mistaken social-democratic working men, and the obsequious social democratic leaders cringing at the feet of imperialism" ("Theses of the Sixth Congress on the International Situation and the Task of the Communist Internation­ al [July-Sept. 1928]," in H. Gruber, ed., Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern - International Commu­ nism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy [New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1974], p. 221).

®^See Tiersky, French Communism, pp. 30ff.

^^Since Bordiga was opposed to the idea of United Front tactics with the reformists and center groups — tactics supported by Moscow in 1923 — the Comintern decided that Gramsci, who also favored these tactics, should lead the PCI, together with Togliatti, among others. See Braunthal, History II, p. 210.

^^The case of the PCE is well dealt with by Alba, The Communist Party in Spain, pp. 91 ff.

^^It is estimated that "between 1921 and 1928 the number of Communists in the capitalist countries fell by half, from nearly 900,000 to about 450,000, whereas the number of Social Democrats doubled (from about three 201 movement was exacerbated by the "class against class" tactic, which, grosso modo, corresponded to the domestic conditions existing in Russia, i.e. Stalin's decision to end NEP and to start large-scale collectivizations.

The identification of Social Democracy with Fascism

("Social Fascism") was officialized in the Sixth Congress, held in 1928.

Despite its friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union

— it demanded that Social Democrats unite with Communist workers in order to defend Soviet Russia against capitalist powers — international Social Democracy was the main target of the Congress.The new line openly declared the struggle of "class against class," i.e., the struggle of the CPs which, according to the Comintern, were the only

million to more than six)" (Claudin, The Communist Move­ ment, p. 149) . In 1924, the PCF was allowed to participate in the French legislative elections for the first time. The victory of Fascism in Italy in 1926 (and the imprison­ ment of Gramsci in November 1926 until his death in 1937) put an end to the legality of the PCI. This seriously weakened the PCI, whose clandestine life made its activi­ ties on Italian soil almost impossible. Its leadership lived in Paris or Moscow, and was torn by internal dissen­ sions. The PCE was not much luckier than the PCI. The establishment of a dictatorship (1923) under the rule of Primo de Rivera led to the repression of not only the PCE, but the Left in general. The membership of the Party, low before 1923, became almost insignificant after dictatorship was established — around 400 members in 1924, according to Alba (Communist Party in Spain, p. 85); in 1930, when the dictatorship collapsed, the party counted 500 members (ibid., p. 107).

^^Braunthal, History I, p. 339. 202 legitimate representatives of the working class, and the

Social Democratic parties, which allegedly represented a fraction of the capitalist class. What is surprising, however, is that the policy of "class against class" was initiated neither by Bukharin (head of the Comintern until

1928) nor by Stalin; it appears to have been the work of 70 some foreign Communists in 1927. Opposition to the splitting of the labor movement, however, came also from

This is what Theodore Draper suggests in his excel­ lent and convincing article, "The Strange Case of the Comintern," Survey 18 (Summer 1972): 91-137. Draper rejects the almost universally accepted view that the "third period" of the Comintern was the work of Stalin. Against Deutscher, Borkenau, and many others, he shows that Bukharin was not simply the "mouthpiece" of Stalin, but rather had an influence of his own in the world organiza­ tion. Moreover, he argues that, up to at least 1930, there existed many variants within the Comintern, and that Stalin himself represented only one of them. The "third period," he insists, was used first by Bukharin (Draper, p. 100). Based on some new evidence. Draper shows that the notion of class against class originated in March 1927 as a result of opposition to a Left alliance in France in the elections:

"It was during the sessions of this commission [of members, including Bukharin and Stalin, appointed to settle the issue of Communist tactics in France], in March 1927, that Humbert-Droz [a Swiss Communist acting as the Comintern agent in France at that time] invented the term "class against class" to justify breaking with the Bloc des Gauches, viewed by him as representative of the bourgeoisie" (Draper, p. 110). Some members of the PCF were opposed to such a tactic. Curiously enough, it seems that Stalin was also against this tactic, and it was Humbert-Droz, with the support of Bukharin, who convinced him to adopt it (Draper, pp. 112 ff.). However, as was usually the case with him, in 1928-29 Stalin turned against both Humbert-Droz and Bukharin, who had adopted a "right-wing" position; i.e., they opposed Social-Fascist slogans and advocated unity of the working class. 203 many foreign Communists such as Brandler, Tasca, et al.

They rejected the policies of the "third period" of the

Comintern as wrong policies.

The Sixth Congress marked a Left turn in the Comintern strategy. This strategy led to an ultra-radicalism which had tragic consequences for the international labor move­ ment, particularly in Germany. This Congress exacerbated the already antagonistic relationship between the Commu­ nists and the Social Democrats. The identification of

Social Democracy with Fascism by the Comintern was intensi­ fied despite the subtle opposition and reservations of some 71 Communists. The Italian leader Togliatti made an in­ sightful remark on the question; although he did not

71 Apparently, Bukharin was opposed to this identifica­ tion despite his ambiguous attitude. For instance, he declared at the Sixth Congress that "there is not the slightest doubt that Social Democracy reveals a social- fascist tendency," but, he also immediately added, "it would be a mistake to lump Social Democracy and Fascism together" (quoted in Draper, "Strange Case," p. 127). According to Bukharin's biographer, S.F. Cohen, Bukharin, despite his hatred for Social Democracy, did not regard it as the main enemy of the labor movement. He argues that Bukharin's statement that "Social Democracy has social fascist tendencies" was dictated by the necessity of political compromise at the Congress. Bukharin declared that "Our tactics do not exclude the possibility of appeal­ ing to social democratic workers and even to some lower social democratic organizations, but we cannot appeal to fascist organizations" (Stephen F . Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution - A Political Biography, 1888-1938 [New York; Oxford University Press, 1980], p. 293). Among the foreigners, the most famous opponents were C. Zetkin, E. Thalheimer, P. Togliatti, and A. Tasca. The clearest opposition to the assimilation of Social Democracy with Fascism, however, came from Trotsky. Writing in 1928, 204

reject the notion of social fascism in principle, he

emphasized the

...profound differences between fascism, which, in general, is a mass movement, a movement of the lower and middle bourgeoisie dominated by the big bourgeoisie and land­ owners, and which does not have a basis in the traditional organizations of the working class, and the application of fascist methods by social-democracy, which is a movement that has a working-class and petty-bourgeois basis and draws its force mainly from an organization which is recognized by the great mass of workers as

Trotsky criticized the leadership for their "senseless and over-simplified contention of the identity of the Social Democracy with Fascism... [They] entirely expunged the political difference between the Social Democracy and Fascism...." (Leon Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin [New York; Pathfinder Press, 1970], p. 113) . Al­ though conceding that it could be considered "a left wing of bourgeois society," Trotsky insisted that it would be "absolutely senseless to characterize the Social Democracy as the 'moderate wing of Fascism'" (ibid., p. 114). Trotsky understood that "Social Democracy still leads millions of workers behind it" (ibid.) and that "one must be in a state of complete bureaucratic idiocy to refuse to utilize correctly and systematically the great, sharp contradictions between Fascism and Social Democracy in the interests of the proletarian revolution" (quoted in Claudin, Communist Movement, p. 162). This is why the Communists would "inevitably have to make agreements against Fascism with the various Social Democratic organi­ zations and factions" (L. Trotsky, The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany [New York; Pathfinder Press, 1971], p. 70). A good summary and treatment of Trotsky's views can be found in Carr's last work. Twilight of the Comintern pp. 433-436. For an excellent theoretical critique of the Comintern's confusion of Fascism and bourgeois and/or Social Democracy, cf. Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dicta­ torship (London; New Left Books, 1979), esp. pp. 147-156. For the opposition to the "class against class" tactics in the PCF, see Tiersky, French Communism, pp. 46-47; Racine and Bodin, Le parti communiste français, pp. 96-97. 205

the traditional organization of their class.

In a way, Togliatti was expressing a view identical to 73 Trotsky's, and not to Bukharin's, as suggested by many.

Despite the many opinions that existed, Stalin's views prevailed. Bukharin was removed from the Comintern and so were his followers in Comintern and in the national

7 2 P. Togliatti, quoted in Draper, "Strange Case of the Comintern," p. 127. Togliatti had views similar to those of his compatriot, Tasca, whom he helped to eliminate politically. See Henri Barbe, "Stalin and the 'Rebellion' of Tasca and Humbert-Droz," in Drachkovitch and Lazitch, Comintern, p. 230. 73 Draper seems to suggest that Togliatti and Bukharin shared the same views on Fascism. See "Strange Case," pp. 127, 130. My view is that Togliatti's position is closer to Trotsky's. Compare, for instance, Trotsky's following statement with Togliatti's quote above; "A contradiction does exist between democracy and fascism...it does denote different systems of domi­ nation of one and the same class. These two sys­ tems: the one parliamentary-democratic, the other fascist, derive their support from different combi­ nations of the oppressed and exploited classes; and they must unavoidably come to a sharp clash with each other. The Social Democracy...derived its support from the workers. Fascism is supported by the petty-bourgeoisie.... (Trotsky, Struggle Against Fascism, pp. 154-155). This position leads naturally to the conclusion that a united front was necessary. Togliatti, for whatever reasons (pressures from the ECCI, etc.), could not express his views openly if he wanted to keep his job. I believe, however, that he must have favored such tactics. He was aware of the conditions existing in Italy. Togliatti himself had worked out theoretical works with A. Gramsci favoring a "United Front" tactic. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings, 1921-1926 (London; Lawrence & Wishart, 1978), esp. "The Lyons Theses," worked out by Gramsci and Togliatti in 1926 (pp. 340-375); also, in the same volume Gramsci, "A Study of the Italian Situa­ tion," pp. 400-411. 206 branches. The equation "Social Democracy = Fascism" became the norm. When Nazism was progressively consolidating itself in Germany, it was regarded by the Comintern as a lesser evil than Social Democracy.The Comintern prohib­ ited any unity of the working class (i.e., a united front between Communists and Social Democrats) which could 75 perhaps have stopped Hitler's rise to power. Whether this is true is a moot point, but the fact remains that

Hitler gained power with no resistance from the working class. Therefore, one can speculate that an alliance could have raised the morale and the combativity of the German proletariat. The irony is that the Communists congratulat­ ed themselves for not having been dragged into a senseless fight against the Nazis. They justified their lack of resistance by claiming that the conditions in 1933 "were

There is some evidence that the Stalinists even encouraged the Communists in Germany to collaborate with the Nazis. In fact,

"...it had been Stalin and Molotov, against the advice of Manuilsky, who made the infamous decision that the German communists should join the Nazis in voting the Social Democratic government of Prussia out of power in the summer of 1931. This informa­ tion comes from the East German history of the German Communist Party, based on archival material (Jonathan Has lam, "The Comintern and the Origins of the Popular Front, 1934-1935," The Historical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3 [1979], pp. 674-675). This point seems more plausible, since even a momentary alliance between German Communists and Nazis took place in 1932 during a strike. See Braunthal, History II, pp. 379-80. 75 Deutscher, Stalin, p. 406. 207 not ripe for a victorious proletarian revolution" and blamed the "Social Fascists" for the prevailing situation.

Ironically, the tragedy of the German proletariat was to lead to the elaboration of the United Front and Popular

Front strategies to ward off the Nazi threat.

The conventional view among most scholars — whether from the Left or the Right — is that the Comintern was an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. As shown earlier, the

West European CPs were turned into instruments of the

Soviet State and had little independent practical or theoretical action. This view, however, has come to be challenged in recent years. T. Draper, in the article dis­ cussed above, suggests that the Comintern did not complete­ ly become the monolithic and homogeneous organization that it wished to be. He also argued that the Comintern had serious problems eliminating the factionalism and dissent that characterized it, despite the constant expulsions or physical elimination of the heretics. More importantly, he argues, that those heretics and dissidents

7 6 Braunthal, History I, p. 389. There is no question that both Social Democrats and Communists are to blame for the tragedy of the German proletariat, but the share of the Communists is undeniably greater. Their attempt to perpet­ uate and deepen the split within the labor movement, particularly in Germany, was constant and unjustified. For a defense of the Communist strategy from a partisan point of view, see George Cogniot, L'internationale communiste (Paris; Editions Sociales, 1969), esp. pp. 99-122. The book proves that Stalinism is still alive among French Communists. 208

...were the forebears and predecessors of the "right" and "left" communist tendencies and regimes which exist today. In embryo, a wide range of communist variants was con­ tained in the first stage, suppressed_in the second, and resurrected in the third.

Draper was dealing with the period 1920-1929 in his arti­ cle. J. Frieden, following Draper and extending the letter's argument, argues that

...beneath the seeming uniformity of the 1934-1953 period, the "Stalin era," individ­ ual Communist leaders and often whole parties were developing varying analyses, interpretations, and implementations of what was ostensiblyLqOne general strategic and tactical line.

Moreover, Draper insists that the right wing of the Comin­ tern, representing Bukharin's views, was still present not only within the Comintern heights, but within most CPs, long after the defeat and expulsion of the Right. This leads Frieden to formulate a rather interesting thesis:

Draper, "Strange Case," p. 93. The "first period" refers to the crisis in the capitalist countries (1917-1923); the second period is assumed to be the period of "gradual and partial stabilization of the capitalist system" (1923-1928); the third period was characterized as the period of the "development of the contradictions of capitalism" (1928 on). ("Theses of the Sixth Comintern," pp. 215-216). Trotsky rejected this periodization worked out by the Comintern as a "combination of Stalinist bureau­ cratism and Bukharinist metaphysics" (Struggle Against Fascism, p. 64).

7 8 Jeff Frieden, "The Internal Politics of European Communism in the Stalin Era: 1934-1949," Studies in Compar­ ative Communism, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1981), p. 46. 209

[T]hroughout international Communism's "Stalin era," there was a fairly coherent "Right", gradualist line, which we might call Eurocommunism in embryo.

This is indeed an interesting thesis which should be explored. Unfortunately, as it stands, Frieden's article, far from supporting the proposed thesis, paradoxically brings more evidence to the old one. Therefore, the conventional argument will be maintained in this study:

Contrairement à la légende forgée par Maurice Thorez dans Fils du Peuple, ce n'est pas le PCF qui a éü Të mérite d'avoir inventé la nouvelle stratégie du Front Populaire. L'initiative première n'en revient pas non plus â la direction de l'IC, mais à l ' U R S S . "

In other words, it was not the PCF, nor even the Comintern, but the Soviet State (i.e., Stalin), which launched the

Popular Front tactics. This is not to say that it was

Stalin who worked out such tactics and imposed them on the

Comintern. Rather, different CPs had considered some alternatives to the existing policies and suggested them to the Comintern hierarchy. Reality being what it was.

7*lbid. 8 0 George Lavau, A quoi sert le parti communiste français? (Paris: Fayard, l98l), p. 285. Carr says that "...it was not until December 1934 that Stalin seems at last to have declared himself for the Popular Front — and then not publicly. One had to wait for Stalin's declaration of may 16, 1935, in the context of the Franco-Soviet pact, to call Comintern and the foreign parties finally to order, and to subordinate every other consideration to the defense of the USSR against German aggression" (Twilight of the Comin­ tern, p. 122). 210

however, proposed alternatives were meaningless unless they were in the interest of the Soviet State. Cogniot, in his very unreliable book, attributes the conception of the united fronts to Thorez. He even argues that the latter had deplored in 1930 already "l'emploi de formules et de clichés sur le social-fascisme, la 'sous-estimation du danger gauchiste,' qui se traduit par la renonciation au 81 front unique...." The truth is that in 1932, Thorez still held that bourgeois democracy and fascism were identical, and that since the Socialist party was part of this political system, the Communists should consequently combat social democracy, their "most dangerous adversary."

Only in 1934 was the idea of a popular front taken 8 2 seriously. The new policy came as a reaction to the growing aggressiveness of Germany, which increasingly appeared as a threat to the Soviet State. The spontaneous demonstrations by Communists and Socialist workers against

81 Cogniot, L'internationale communiste, p. 111. Draper gives the complete quote of Thorez which shows that, contrary to Cogniot's allegations, Thorez did not "question the theory and practice of social fascism, to which he faithfully adhered...." (Draper, Strange Case, p. 135). See also Becker, Le parti communiste, p. 34. 8 2 Up to 1934, Thorez still attacked the social demo­ crats as social fascists. See Celie and Albert Vassart, "The Moscow Origin of the French 'Popular Front,' " in Drachkovitch and Lazitch, Comintern, pp. 235, 242. Con­ trary to Cogniot's allegations, it was not Thorez, but Doriot, who attacked the Communist leadership (including Thorez) "for their resistance to a broad extension of the united front. Doriot was severely censured" (Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, p. 127). 211

the growth of Fascism in France were also another reason

for the adoption of such a policy. What should be empha­

sized is that the popular front tactics of the 1930s were primarily the result of the needs of the Soviet State, which now encouraged the mobilization of the Communists in all countries for its defense, as well as capitalist states 8 3 opposed to fascism.

The popular and united front tactics represented an

"alternative" which the European CPs were to advocate more consistently in recent years. It was to become an integral part of the strategy in their national polities.

The major lesson learned by the CPs is that bourgeois democracy could not be identified with fascism. Dimitrov, the "initator" of the popular front tactics in the 1930s, argued in 1935 that fascism was "neither a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie nor of the petty bourgeoisie, but a terror­ ist dictatorship of finance capital, replacing the regime 84 of bourgeois democracy." Apparently, the disdain shown

p 3 See ibid., p. 152; also James Joll, "The Front Populaire - After Thirty Years," in W. Laqueur and G.L. Mosse, eds.. The Left-Wing Intellecutals Between the Wars, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 32. 84 Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, p. 405. The value of bourgeois democracy was now accepted even by Wilhelm Pieck, the German Communist leader, who argued that "...we communists fight with might and main for every scrap of democratic liberty." Dimitrov went even further and declared that "... in the capitalist countries we defend and shall defend every inch of bourgeois-democratic liberties which are being attacked by fascism and bourgeois 212 to bourgeois democracy since Lenin proved to be wrong or at

least fatal. However, this did not mean that bourgeois 8 5 democracy should be embraced. The popular front was not an end in itself. The revolutionary objective remains the same; only the objective conditions have changed. The popular front was an intermediary stage, a means toward an end. One is almost tempted to say that it was a kind of

Gramscian "war of attrition." The popular front was conceived — of course, not openly — as

...un gouvernement donnant toutes possibili­ tés â l'agitation et la propagande, â l'organisation et a l'action de la classe ouvrière et de son parti communiste: un gouvernement permettant la préparation de la prise^ totj^e du pouvoir par la classe ouvrière.

In other words, this type of government was to be a step toward the establishment of the dictatorship of the prole­ tariat. There was even talk of establishing a "Republique

reaction, because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate."

Both quotes are from Theodore Draper, "The Ghost of Social Fascism," Commentary, Vol. 47, No. 2 (February 1969), p. 40. Note the similarity of the views expressed by Dimitrov in 1935 with those of the Eurocommunists today.

^^For people like Togliatti, who was influenced by Bukharin, the united front policy was "not only a tactic but a strategy" (Frieden, "Internal Politics," p. 67.

^^Thorez, Dec. 1935, quoted in Becker, Le parti communiste, p. 59 (emphasis m i n e ) . 213

française des soviets." Lenin's model, in a somewhat 8 7 modified form, was considered applicable in France.

The popular front tactics, officially proclaimed by

the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935, gave the

Communists their first experience in the government of a

bourgeois democratic system. The parties which were

isolated from society — just like the German SPD was in

the period 1878-1890 — were suddenly transformed into

national parties with political responsibilities. They now

became aware of the possibility of influencing events by

their mere presence. They were also aware of the limita­

tions of their influence. However — and this is important

— the CPs understood that through an alliance with other

parties (socialists, reformists, etc.) they could affect

policies which they could not were they to remain in

opposition. Their experience in the 1930s was limited, of

course, because the popular and united fronts were initiat­

ed more as a diplomatic and tactical maneuver in the

interests of the USSR than as a serious and sincere strate­

gy. This is why Frieden's acquiescence with Carrillo's

statement that "the popular fronts in Europe [are]

87 since the theory of social fascism — which had been intended to break Social Democracy in order to make a revolution a la Bolshevik possible in Western Europe, i.e., to replicate the Russian conditions where the Mensheviks, who obtained the majority in the elections were destroyed to allow for Bolshevik rule — had failed, it was now natural to undermine the power of the socialists through an alliance with them. 214

g g antecedents of Eurocommunism" is untenable. As mentioned earlier, the front policy did not abandon the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Today's Eurocommunists have done just that. The Popular Front meant that social­ ism must be based on the Leninist-Stalinist model. The

Eurocommunists have rejected this model as inappropriate for their societies. For most of them, the Soviet system has no appeal whatsoever. The Popular Front policy, despite some independent initiative of the CPs, was dictat­ ed from Moscow. The Eurocommunists in the 1970s, although still linked to the Soviet Union in many ways, are prac­ tically totally independent of Moscow with respect to their domestic strategies. One can only agree that

Eurocommunism cannot be compared to the period of Popular Front, because this period lasted for just four years. It ended in August 1939 with a sudden, unexpected change in the general line. No Eurocommunist Party today would submit itself to tha^.kind of Moscow-dictated change in policy.

More importantly, the popular front strategy had a defen­ sive character. Its immediate objective was not the anti-capitalist struggle.

Frieden, "Internal Politics," p. 68. The quote is from Santiago Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1978) p. 110. Many Eurocommunists make this claim. See, for instance, Jean Kanapa, from the PCF, who makes the same point as Carrillo in "A 'New Policy' of the French Communists?", Foreign Affairs 55 (January 1977): 282. 8 9 Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 39 (emphasis added). 215

90 Despite its limited character, however, the popular

front strategy represented a new turn for the West European

CPs. For one thing, it showed the disastrous consequences of the "class against class" tactics. In France, the

Popular Front coalition was brought to power after the 1936 general elections. Though the PCF did not participate in any of the successive governments — from 1936 to 1940 91 there were five — its support for them was vital. What is important to note is that this new situation allowed the

PCF to leave the isolation it had gone through during the years 1928-1932 — its "somber years" — as a result of its 92 previous tactics. The PCF was now reintegrated into national politics; between 1927 and 1932, the party had lived in semi-clandestinity. It now obtained 15% of the 93 electoral votes and 72 seats in the Assembly. The PCF's

90 There is no doubt that the rise of Fascism in Europe is what led to an alliance of Socialists and Communists. Such an alliance would have been inconceivable in France, for example. Moreover, Moscow came to accept it because a total victory of Fascism over the Left would have represent­ ed an even greater threat to the survival of the Soviet State. The spontaneous reaction of the masses, who felt threatened by the violence of the extreme Right, combined with the desire of the Socialists not to see the parliamen­ tary system destroyed, made the unity of the Left conceiv­ able and highly desirable. 91 Tiersky, French Communism, p. 57. 92 The membership of the PCF decreased from 52,000 in 1928 to 38,000 in 1930 and down to 28,000 in 1933. Racine and Bodin, Le parti communiste français, p. 97. 93 Ibid., p. 209; Tiersky, French Communism, p. 58. 216 membership reached 300,000 — as opposed to 30,000 in 94 1932 — an increase probably due to the popularity of the new tactics and to the moderation the party showed during the wildcat strikes of 1936. Revolution was not on the agenda during those years. Though the coalition with the

Socialists collapsed in 1938, the PCF would make Frontism one of its major strategies up until today. The PCF support for Stalin's Soviet-German pact in 1939, however, cost the party very dearly. The work of many years col­ lapsed in a few days. The PCF was thrown, once again, into illegality, isolation, and persecution. Only the war succeeded in saving the PCF from becoming a sect.

The popular front tactics also contributed to the growth of the PCE. The latter grew from a membership of OS 30,000 to 102,000 from February to July 1936. It had now evolved from an isolated party, with no influence — due mainly to its extreme obedience to the Comintern and the application of the letter's irrelevant slogans for Spain — to a very influential party, mainly during the Civil War

(1936-1939).

The PCI, due to severe internal constraints in Italy, did not succeed in achieving popular front tactics, at least not until the war.

94 Racine and Bodin, Le parti communiste français. p. 209. 95 Alba, Communist Party in Spain, p. 183 217

In the period of the USSR's war with Germany, the

Communists were asked to broaden the fronts to defeat fascism. The dissolution of the Comintern was announced in

1943 under the pretext that the differences in the various countries necessitated specific strategies for each one of them. Therefore, it was argued, the Comintern's existence was obsolete. This might have been taken seriously had it not come from Stalin.

The war brought about a number of interesting develop­ ments. Because of their resistance to fascism and their patriotism, the CPs won over a substantial portion of the masses and also increased their membership. In fact, in

France, Italy, Iceland, Luxemburg, Denmark, etc., the CPs participated in their respective governments, and their leaders often held key positions. This participation lasted until at least 1947. What is important, however, is the fact that in that period, the ideas of different roads to socialism became widespread.

Many Communists started holding the view that the path taken by the Soviets could not be a model for their own societies. The most pro-Stalinist of the Western Commu­ nists, M. Thorez, declared in 1946 that

...the progress of democracy around the world, in spite of rare exceptions that confirm the rule, allows us to envision routes for the march toward Socialism other 218

than the one followed by the Russian Commu­ nists. In any case the roufce is necessarily different for each country.

This, of course, stemmed from the Western Communists' desire to become government parties, participating in the reconstruction of their societies, without any recourse to violence (except toward the Fascists). Hence their quest for a different road from the one adopted by the Russians after WWI. There is ample evidence to support the view that many West European Communists came to believe in a more democratic path to Socialism. The PCI, for instance, not only in the pronouncements of its leaders, but in the practice of the party as well, was on such a path. Inter­ national relations being what they were, and most impor­ tantly Stalin's power and his control over most parties, made the "democratic road to socialism" illusory.

A serious attempt was made by the Western CPs to become an integral part of their national polities in the

M. Thorez, Interview with the London Times, 1946, reproduced in Peter Lange and Maurizio Vannicelli, eds.. The Communist Parties of Italy, France, and Spain; Postwar Change and Continuity - A Casebook (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 54. P. Togliatti, leader of the PCI, held the same view. In 1947, for instance, he declared that "we can find new roads different from those, for example, followed by the working class and working masses of the Soviet Union" (quoted in Lawrence Gray, "From Gramsci to Togliatti: The Partito Nuovo and the Mass Basis of Italian Communism," in Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray, eds.. The Italian Communist Party: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow [Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980], p. 35n) . For the same view expressed by various Commu­ nists, see Leonhard, Eurocommunism, pp. 44-46. 219

1941-1947 period. This could be partly explained by the

role played by the PCF and the PCI during the war, a war viewed as one of national liberation. Their experience with clandestinity helped these parties act more effective­

ly against the forces of occupation and of reaction. Both the PCF and the PCI constituted the major force within the

Resistance in their respective countries. This allowed them to emerge as a tremendous political force in the aftermath of the war. The other political parties could not make the same claim, since their policies resulted in 97 the disaster brought upon their countries. The PCF was, in fact, instrumental in restoring the parliamentary system. The Communists even obtained the participation of two ministers in the provisional government. After he returned to France in 1944 from his exile in Moscow, Thorez played a crucial role in eradicating the milices patrio­ tiques (patriotic militias), some of whose members aimed at a violent seizure of power. According to the leadership of the party, conditions were not ripe for revolution. The revolutionary transformation of France was, once again, not on the agenda of the PCF. The fact that France had close ties with Moscow in 1944-45 was, obviously, instrumental in the moderation observed by the PCF leadership. This came

97 A good analysis of this period can be found in Edward Mortimer, The Rise of the French Communist Party, 1920-1947 (London; Faber and Faber, 1984), pp. 310 ff. 220

as a disappointment for many Communists who had viewed the 98 Resistance as a springboard for the Socialist revolution.

Since revolution, as perceived by the PCF leadership, was

not the main task of the party, what then were the princi­

pal objectives? Thorez saw three main tasks to be ful­

filled: "la renaissance économique par l'augmentation de

la production, le renouvellement de la démocratie, 1'unite 99 de la classe ouvrière." In other words, the primary goal

was the reconstruction of France and national unity. In

this drive, the PCF saw itself as the leader. Therefore,

it had to use its prestige and newly acquired strength^^^

to become a government party, i.e., a party capable of

affecting decision-making. Indeed, in the 1945-47 period,

the PCF was a real parti national. It was present and

represented at all levels. Participation in the national

institutions — not revolution, which would have to await

more auspicious times — was the essential objective. This

policy did not conflict with the objectives of Moscow,

9 8 Becker, Le parti communiste, pp. 146 ff.; Mortimer, Rise of the French Communist Party, p. 327; Tiersky, French Communism, pp. 120-122. 9 9 Quoted in Becker, Le parti communiste, p. 161.

^®®In 1945, the PCF was the strongest party in France (in electoral and parliamentary terms). It obtained 26% of the votes in the 1945 general elections. Its membership rose to 775,342 by December 1945; by December 1946, it reached 819,155 members. Becker, Le parti communiste, p. 172; Mortimer, Rise of the French Communist Party, p. 345. 221 whose similarity of view with Gaullism on some questions was certain. The real conflicts were not between the PCF and the Soviets, but within the leadership of the PCF itself. The PCF's concern was to eliminate the more revolutionary tendencies within its ranks.

In Italy, the PCI practiced a strategy not unlike the

PCF's. However, if, in the case of the PCF, the new strategy did not mark a substantial change in party doc­ trine, the PCI's turn in the years 1944-1947 was to have a long-lasting imprint on the future evolution of the party,

■"he primary objective of the PCI was to become a mass political party as opposed to a Leninist, elitist, organi­ zation. The Partito Nuovo^^^ represented a new approach within the general framework of the PCI's via Italiana al

Socialismo (Italian Road to Socialism), inaugurated at what is known as the Svolta de Salerno (Salerno turning point).

Like the PCF, the PCI decided to become a national party, a party whose policy would be consistently parlia­ mentary, aiming at achieving socialism through peaceful, democratic means rather than through revolution and violence. Therefore, what seems to have triggered the

Ideological considerations to join the PCI were made secondary. The objective was to increase membership. Ideological unity was not required; it was not necessary to be a Marxist or a Leninist to adhere to the PCI. The Party considered itself an "a-ideological party." See Franco Ferraroti, "The Italian Communist Party and Eurocommunism," in Morton Kaplan, ed. , The Many Faces of Communism (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 43. 222 reorganization of the PCI was the need to control and eventually eliminate those whose views were too radical for 102 the party to gain credibility in a democratic system.

The Svolta de Salerno meant that the PCI would now work with all the political forces to reestablish a sound democratic system, capable of preventing the re-emergence of Fascism. Such a conception, as indicated earlier in the case of the PCF, was not in opposition to Moscow's views.

Indeed, the cooperation between Moscow and the U.K.,

France, and the U.S. (Allies) made such a strategy not only possible, but desirable. Moreover, Stalin was certain that the presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe made it clear that any attempt by the Communists to undertake revolution was doomed to failure and would only jeopardize the cooper­ ation between Moscow and the Western powers. Though Moscow probably saw the coalition governments in France and Italy

102 A good discussion can be found in Eric Hobsbawm, The Italian Road to Socialism; An Interview with Giorgio Napolitano of the Italian Communist Party (Westport, Connecticut; Lawrence and Hill Co., 1977), esp. pp. 14-20. As is well known, between 1944 and 1947 "...the PCI spurned insurrection, turned away from local democratic forms, induced the partisans to surrender their arms, and moved toward collaboration with bourgeois parties around the immediate goals of 'reconstruction'...." (Carl Boggs, The Impasse of Eurocommunism [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982], p. 132). In 1948, Togliatti was instrumental in preventing civil war from breaking out following the attempt to assassinate him (Carl Marzani, The Promise of Eurocommunism [Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence and Hill Co., 1980], pp. 93-97). 223 as a scenario for what was already taking place in Eastern

Europe — i.e., temporary coalitions before the establish­ ment of the Communist hegemony and total seizure of power

— it was skeptical as to its real chance of success.

The idea of establishing people's democracies on the

East European model was not absent from the minds of West

European CP leaders. And yet, for whatever reasons, their main post-War objective was to gain recognition as national parties :

We are the party of the working class.... But the working class has never been foreign to the national interest. We want a demo­ cratic Italy, but we want a strong democracy which will not let anything which resembles Fascism or reproduces it to rise again. As a Communist party, as the party of the working class, we claim the right to parti­ cipate in the construction of this new Italy, conscious of the fact that if we do not claim this right or were not able to fulfill this function now or in the future, Italy would not be reconstructed and the prospects for our ^ country would be very grave indeed....

Like the PCF, the PCI obviously aspired to be not only a national party, but a partito di governo.

The transformation of the PCI into a mass party led 104 inevitably to an increase in membership. However,

^^^Togliatti, La Politica di Salerno, quoted in Gray, "From Gramsci to Togliatti,'* p. 25.

^^^By 1945, PCI membership reached, 1,500,000 (ibid., p. 26). By January 1946, it reached 1,700,000. In the elections of June 1946, the party obtained 18.9 percent of the votes (Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 166). 224 neither in the case of the PCI nor the PCF did membership increase because of an overwhelming desire for the estab­ lishment of a Communist society. Rather, this increase resulted from the prestige acquired by the two parties during the Resistance years, as well as the wish of the majority of the French and Italians to see a genuine democratic transformation of their societies. Unfortu­ nately for the PCI, the Cold War — as well as the internal resistance to such change in the policy of the party by those who remained faithful to revolutionary objectives — would have a negative effect on the evolution of its popularity.

The PCE was not as fortunate as its French and Italian counterparts. The party lived in illegality and persecu­ tion from 1939 until 1975. It was more concerned with its own survival than with any specific strategy. Its leaders lived in exile,and their views represented different and conflicting tendencies. The only notable thing about the PCE in that period was its unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Franco's regime in 1944^^^ and its participation in the Alianza de Fuerzas Democraticas (Alliance of 107 Democratic Forces), a coalition Of anti-Francoist,

^^^See Alba, Communist Party in Spain, p. 229 ff.

lO^ibid., p. 319.

^^^Ibid., p. 321 ff. The alliance was constituted in 1946 and broke up in 1947. 225

Republican forces subordinate to the Republican government

in exile.

As indicated earlier, the year 1947 marked a brutal

end to the relatively independent national policies of the

Western CPs. It revealed more clearly their subordination

to Moscow. When the Cold War between East and West was

inaugurated, Moscow asked the Western CPs to concentrate

their efforts in defending the interests of the Soviet

State and the Communist world against the imperialist

powers, led by the U.S. The French and Italian ministers

who had participated in their respective governments were

expelled.11 j 108

From 1947 onward, the political practice of the

Western CPs became increasingly contingent upon the needs

of Stalin and the Soviet Union. This inevitably led to

their discredit: they were now viewed by Western Europe

not as the national and nationalist force they represented

during the war and immediately thereafter, but as the

108 The expulsion was the result of different factors: internal pressure, U.S. pressure, etc. Later in the same year, pressure from the Soviet Union forced the Communists in Europe to pursue a policy of opposition rather than to seek participation. See Becker, Le parti communiste, pp. 190-205; S. Serfaty, "The United States and the PCI: The Year of Decision, 1947" in Italian Communist Party, Serfaty and Gray, pp. 59-72; Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 185; Mortimer, Rise of the French Communist Party, pp. 354 ff. See also William McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), esp. pp. 266 ff. The most thorough analysis of those years is, in my opinion, Claudin's Communist Movement, Part II. 226 agents of a foreign power. The PCF took a very radical turn and probably attempted to topple the regime by encour- 109 aging the strikes which shook France in late 1947.

After the failure of the strikes, the PCF underwent a period of isolation which lasted until the mid-1940s. The

Party became less preoccupied with domestic problems than with defending Soviet foreign policy with no reserve.

However, this blind support of Stalinism was not without cost for the PCF. In 1947, its membership was 804,229; by

1954, it stabilized around 300,000.^^®

The PCI experienced the same disastrous effects. The party was badly defeated in the April 18, 1948 elections.

The events taking place in Eastern Europe created anti­ communist feelings in Italy. However, unlike the PCF, the

PCI did not lose its social respectability, primarily because of the glorious years of anti-Fascist struggles from 1921 onward. The PCI never failed — despite its support for the Soviet Union — to concentrate on domestic issues. It even started cautiously to gain its indepen- 111 dence from Moscow. Taking into account the socio-

109 A detailed analysis of these strikes and the role of the PCF can be found in Becker, Le parti communiste, pp. 215-238.

^^^Ibid., pp. 239,240; Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 185. Ill Ibid., p. 167; Ferraroti, "Italian Communist Party," pp. 47-50. Note that the membership of the PCI did not decline as much as that of the PCF. In 1954-55, the party counted about two million members (ibid., p. 54). 227 economic changes which were taking place in Italian soci­ ety, the PCI attempted to formulate policies that could adapt to these transformations. In 1953, for instance,

Togliatti favored a strategy which would unite all the democratic forces in Italy — including both the middle and the propertied classes — in order to curb the power of the big capitalists.

Its counterpart, the PCF, meanwhile had no strategy.

Its attitude was rather negative and counter-productive.

In the guise of tactics, the PCF simply reiterated the disastrous "class against class" rhetoric of the 1920s and

1930s. Probably aware of its isolation, the PCF showed some indication that its immediate objective — an objec­ tive put aside since the 1930s — was the establishment of socialism. Its miscalculations led to the humiliating failure of the 1952 strikes organized by the Confederation

Générale du Travail (CGT), the Communist-dominated union, 112 instigated by the PCF leadership.

After Stalin's death in 1953, however, the PCF showed some signs of moderation vis-a-vis the Socialists. On different occasions, the PCF proposed unconvincingly to the

Socialists a "gouvernement d'union démocratique et social­ iste." This was obviously something the PCF did not really desire, since it still considered the Socialist party

112 Becker, Le parti communiste, pp. 253 ff. 228

(SFIO) an enemy of the Soviet Union and a "lackey of imper­ il 3 ialism. " Not until the 1960s and 1970s did the PCF seriously consider a coalition with the Socialists.

The PCE witnessed increasing Stalinization during the years 1947-1955. It supported Stalin's foreign policy unashamedly. However, this only added to the isolation of the party and the alienation of the more independent . 114 m e m b e r s .

The year 1956 marked yet another important stage in the lives of the Western CPs. At the famous Twentieth

Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), paradoxically enough, the Soviets under the leadership of

Khrushchev insisted upon the possibility of a peaceful socialist transformation. Although the initiative came from Moscow, some Western leaders had already developed new perspectives. Togliatti, for instance, came up with the concept of "polycentrism". Before arriving at the concept itself, he first refused to accept the Soviet thesis that

Stalin alone was responsible for what took place in Soviet

Society (e.g., cult of personality). Togliatti asked for a

Marxist explanation, "one which tells us how and why Soviet society was able to deviate to the point of degeneration

113 Lavau, A quoi sert le parti communiste français?, p. 293. 114 See Alba, Communist Party in Spain, pp. 327 ff. 229 and in fact did so degenerate. According to Togliatti, the criticism of Stalin had generated "a wish for an ever-increasing autonomy, and this could only be of advan­ tage to our movement." Conditions are so different now, he argued, that the Soviet model "can and must no longer be obligatory. Togliatti's views, however, were not accepted by all Western Communists. The French were, in fact, staunchly opposed to the denunciation of Stalin and to the process of de-Stalinization. They went as far as to argue that Khrushchev's "secret speech" on Stalin's crimes 117 was not authentic. Therefore, Carrillo's following statement on the Twentieth Congress cannot be generalized:

When Khrushchev had the courage publicly to dismantle the whole edifice, we felt that we had been so cruelly deceived and so vilely manipulated that this completed the demoli­ tion of what remained of the mythical and almost religious element in our attitude

Quoted in Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 79. The way Togliatti and later Carrillo and other Eurocommunists raised this question is strikingly similar to Kautsky's. See Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, pp. 284 ff. However, while Kautsky attempted to give a solid theoretical answer, the Eurocommunists, for whatever reasons, attacked the problem only superficially. The superiority of Kautsky's to their analysis is unquestionable.

^^^See Leonhard, Eurocommunism, pp. 79-80. 117 George Ross, "The PCF and the End of the Bolshevik Dream," in C. Boggs and D. Plotke, eds.. The Politics of Eurocommunism (Boston: South End Press, 1980), p. 27. The PCE, too, denied the authenticity of the report. See Alba, Communist Party in Spain, p. 352. 230

towards. ±he Communist party of the Soviet Union. ^

Many writers on Western Communism argue that 1956 marked the beginning of Eurocommunism. Although there is

some basis to this argument, I cannot accept such a view

for the simple reason that 1956 represented a new crisis in the international Communist movement, but not a new direc­ tion. The limits of de-Stalinization became obvious

following the events in Hungary, Poland, etc. Most CPs

supported the invasion of Hungary, although some, like the

Italians, did so only with reservations. The crisis created problems within the CPs, whose membership declined once again. Moreover, the CPs did little to show their willingness to democratize their organizations.

My contention is that the West European Communist

Parties, despite their previous experiments in the popular fronts and government in the 1930s and 1940s, did not have any real independent policy with regard to their national politics. Not until the 1960s did they have such practical and theoretical programs, allowing them to be government parties willing to follow the necessities of their socie­ ties, rather than the vicissitudes of Soviet foreign policy n e e d s .

118 Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 112. Carrillo should also have pointed out that de-Stalinization for the Soviets did not mean that the foundations of the Soviet system should be questioned. 231

The Crisis of the 1960s; The First Test of Deradicalization?

The 1960s marked a turning point in the history of the

West European CPs. A variety of factors made the elabora­

tion of new strategies possible and necessary. The detente

established between the superpowers created a more favor­

able climate for "peaceful" roads to socialism. The

mounting schism between the Chinese CP and the CPSU was

another factor favoring an independent road. However, the

domestic factors played as great a role as the interna­

tional setting. The PCF, for instance, found it necessary

to break away from its political isolation, an isolation

which was mostly due to its close identification with 119 Moscow. Not only the PCF, but

...by the mid-1960s, many West European Communist leaders were starting to realize that their close identification with Russian-style socialism, together with their uncritical support for Soviet foreign poli­ cies, was a liability, rather than an ass^t, for their goal of winning power at home.

119 Neil Nugent and David Lowe, The Left in France (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 102. 120 Howard Machin, "Communism and National Communism in Western European Politics," in Howard Machin, éd.. National Communism in Western Europe (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 2. See also Bogdan Denitch, "Western Europe's New Left Social­ ism," Working Papers for a New Society, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 1977), p. 71. On the reasons why the PCF was marginalized, see Vincent Wright, "The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic: The Troubled Path," in Machin, National Communism, pp. 91 ff.; also Jane Jenson and George Ross, "The Uncharted Waters of De-Stalinization: 232

The Soviet system was now by no means a blueprint to be applied by other CPs. In fact, the idea of adapting socialism to the particularities of the national social formations of Western Europe re-emerged. This idea, Marx's in essence, had been lost from the picture since the

Bolshevization of the CPs. The possibility of a non-violent revolution was now the accepted norm. The CPs, in general, tried to integrate themselves into their respective politi­ cal systems. They started developing a new image; that of serious parties, inclined to ensure the stability of the system. To gain this kind of legitimacy, they obviously had to liberalize their attitude toward the bourgeois demo- 121 cratic political framework. The new approach came from

The Uneven Evolution of the Parti Communiste Français," Politics and Society, 9, No. 3 (1978), esp. pp. 266-271. This article offers a good analytical study of the shift in the PCF strategy in that period. 121 According to Nugent and Lowe, "... it was from the 15th Party Congress in 1959 that the first steps away from orthodoxy began [for the PCF]. Less emphasis was given to the inevitability of the class and the proletarian revolution, and the central one-party doctrine gradually and cautiously came to be questioned" (The Left in France, p. 108). This did not, however, mean that the party had changed its basic principles. However, the PCF did start to seek political alliances, a new kind of united front, with the Socialists. See Becker, Le parti communiste, pp. 260 ff.; Ross, "The PCF and the End of the Bolshevik Dream," pp. 28-29. The same is true about the PCI, which, because of the new prosperity of Italian society, had advocated a new strategy. See Alastair Davidson, "Tendencies Towards 'Reformism' in the Italian Communist Party, 1921-1963," Australian Journal of Politics and History XI:3 (December 233

Togliatti, whose "Yalta Memorandum," known as his "Politi­

cal Testament," laid down the core ideas. The ideas were

not all that new, but the real departure is that they now

represented a strategic as opposed to a tactical perspec­

tive. The following points represent the new strategy:

The Communists should break from their relative

isolation and adapt themselves to the existing system.

The CPs must become a real mass movement.

1965), esp. pp. 337-338. Davidson argues that the shift toward a new strategy was the result — besides the econom­ ic reasons — of "...the psychological conditioning resultant on 'collaborating' with the bourgeois parties between 1935-1945 and, also, the effect of being a large parliamentary party which resulted in the neglect of revolutionary theory, as in 1946" (p. 349). Jon Halliday ("Structural Reform in Italy - Theory and Practice," New Left Review No. 50 [July-Aug. 1968]) argues that "...the most advanced theory [from a Leftist point of view] is very much a minority of the PCI's the­ oretical production as a whole. Amendola, Napoli­ tano, Natta, or Fanti of the Right are much more representative of the PCI than, say, Trentin or Magri...." (p. 84). A good analyst of the European CPs remarked that "...the trends of revisionist adaptation...will continue to characterize West European Communism as a whole. This would mean further emphasis on elector- alism, on seeking popular support through calls for gradualist reforms, on winning the collaboration of other left-wing forces even at the cost of doctrinal and political concessions, and on building up the party's image as a progressive, responsible force operating within the existing system, which it wishes to transform but not to overthrow" (K. Devlin, in R.V. Burks, ed.. The Future of Com­ munism in Europe [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968], p. 60). 234

The Communists must become members a part entière of

their political culture. Their ideas have no superior

value. They should favor the interaction of different

ideologies and open dialogue with other forces,

including the Catholic and bourgeois parties. Any

atheistic propaganda would only be unproductive.

The possibility of a peaceful road to socialism must

be considered more seriously. The concept of demo­

cracy in a bourgeois state should be re-evaluated. In

other words, one has to learn how to conquer political

power, without violence, through a progressive trans- 122 formation of its structures.

And, indeed, both the PCF and the PCI continued to adapt themselves to the system. The test of their sincere attachment to the constitutional framework came in 1968-69.

The events of May 1968 in France probably represented what the year 1905 did for the German SPD — though the events of May were certainly more significant in their

122 These ideas have been summarized from Togliatti's Memorandum, published in its entirety in Le Monde, 5 September 1964. A good summary in English can be found in Leonhard, Eurocommunism, pp. 97-99. Luigi Longo, who succeeded Togliatti at the head of the Party, pledged to continue the course traced by his predecessor. In France, the PCF was now headed by Waldeck-Rochet, who succeeded Thorez, who died about a month before Togliatti did. The French Communists now insisted on a peaceful road to socialism. This, incidentally, came at a time of rap­ prochement between the Socialists and the Communists, whose coalition was intended to bring down the Gaullist regime which established itself in 1958. The coalition, however, was shaky because of the still pro-Soviet and anti-Social Democratic pronouncements of the PCF, even in the mid- 1960s. See Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 187. 235 content and consequences. The similarity between the two events stems from the attitude adopted by the SPD vis-a-vis the strikes of 1905, on the one hand, and the PCF's atti­ tude vis-a-vis the strikes of 1968, on the other.

In the mid-1960s, the PCF was thriving, ready to come out of the "ghetto" in which it had been enclosed since the

Cold War. Encouraged by the good electoral results it obtained in 1967, the leadership believed that the Party could gain some real share in governmental power. The same 123 view persisted in 1968. With a stretch of imagination, one could draw some parallel with the aspirations of the

SPD in 1905.

In 1905 German Social Democracy was looking forward confidently to achieving a Reichstag majority.... The sine qua non for the party was continued legality. With the majority of the population once behind them, the Social Democrats expected to change the electoral laws^g^o improve wages and working conditions....

123 Richard W. Johnson, The Long March of the French Left (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 59. The alliance between the Socialists — which now (1965) par­ ticipated in a federation. Federation de la Gauche démo­ crate et socialiste (FGDS), which included the SFIO, the Radical Party, the USDR, and the Convention of Republican Institutions (CIR) — and the Communists proved to be successful electorally and very popular. The PCF and the FGDS increased their political strength. In the March 1967 elections, the PCF obtained 22.5 percent of the vote (as opposed to 21.7 percent in 1962) and the FGDS 19 percent. Tiersky, French Communism, p. 246. This laid the basis for what was to become the common program of the Left in 1972. 124 Richard Reichard, "The German Working Class and the Russian Revolution of 1905," Journal of Central European Affairs 13 (July 1953): 136. 236

When the revolutionary tide was rising in Russia, Vorwflrts warned its readers against the use of violence which, it argued, was the weapon of the ruling class. When the

German workers went on strike spontaneously in the Ruhr area, both the trade unions and the party's executive committee disapproved of such strikes and urged the workers 125 to go back to work. The German movement of 1905 did not, however, reach the magnitude of the May events of 196 8 in France. However, the SPD did not take as negative an attitude toward the movement of 1905 as did the PCF with respect to May 1968. In 1905, the trade unions were more to blame for their passive attitude and opposition to the strikes than was the SPD.^^^ In 1968, the PCF itself adopted a surprising attitude — or was it?

This is not the place to narrate the events of May 127 1968. It will suffice to make some general and widely

125 Ibid., p. 139; see also Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy; 1905-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 37.

^^^The use of the mass strike in 1905 did in fact cause a radicalization among many leaders of the SPD. See ibid., pp. 37 ff. 1905 was, in the words of Salvadori, the period of radicalization of Karl Kautsky. See Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, pp. 91 ff. 127 For a good recent analysis, see Geroge Ross, Workers and Communists in France (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 171 ff. 237

128 accepted observations to confirm the "non-revolutionary" character of the PCF, a character which applies more or less equally to the other West European CPs.

There is no need to examine the question of whether

1968 offered a revolutionary situation or not. What is certain is that it represented a great potential for the

128 The term "non-revolutionary" is used here, not to denote any value judgment, but simply to insist that whatever the existing situation in France — "ripe" or "unripe" for revolution — the PCF never seriously attempt­ ed to take advantage of it in order to take power through violent means. Despite their Bolshevization, the PCF and the other Western CPs — except maybe the Portuguese in 1974-75 — never seriously attempted a coup a la Bolshevik. The best observations on the PCF's behavior are Becker's Le parti communiste and Lavau ' s A quoi sert le parti commu­ niste français?. Lavau makes the point that

"...neither in 1936, in 1944-1945, nor even in May 1968 did the party try to exploit a situation that to some observers contained 'revolutionary possi­ bilities;' one might even go so far as to say that on these occasions it lent some support to the legal authorities of the period and to the restoration of order" (G. Lavau, "The PCF, the State and Revolu­ tion: An Analysis of Party Policies, Communications and Popular Culture," in D. Blackmer and S„ Tarrow, eds.. Communism in Italy and France [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977], p. 87). See also R. Neal Tannahill, The Communist Parties of Western Europe (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978). This author tries to provide an explanation to the following question:

"If armed revolution is their aim, why did the Communists of France, Italy, Finland and elsewhere allow these apparent opportunities [Finland 1948; France 1948, 1958, 1968; Italy 1948; even Portugal 1974-75] to slip through their fingers?" (p. 226). Although he provides interesting propositions to explain such "non-revolutionary" behavior, he has no convincing evidence to show that these opportunities were effectively revolutionary. It should be noted that by 1965 the PCF had 238 serious disruption of the French social fabric. The student revolts represented a massive upheaval. They took by surprise the State, the PCF, and the rest of the world.

Ten million striking workers took over the factories, thus paralyzing all of France. The crisis affected the whole country and almost all strata.

Militants among the students and young unemployed workers had proven themselves more than ready to play the role of vanguard at the barricades. The peasantry had begun to move from passive grumbling to direct action.... Even the middle-class profes­ sionals...had risen to assert their rights to free^ ^p r e s s i o n and meaningful partici­ pation.

already made some ideological revisions — at least in rhetoric — which left all revolutionary language outside any pronouncements. They now stressed the ambiguous notion of "peaceful revolution" or "peaceful transition to social­ ism," which would not preclude a multiplicity of parties. "[F]or France, we reject the proposition of a single party as an obligatory condition for socialist revolution and we declare ourselves for the plurality of parties...." ("Waldeck Rochet's Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the PCF, January 1967," in Lange and Vannicelli, Communist Parties, p. 61). In a period when the PCF was courting the socialists for a joint action, it is clear that this statement can only be taken with reservation as to the sincere intentions of the PCF. 129 Arthur Mendel, "Why the French Communists Stopped the Revolution," The Review of Politics 31:1 (Jan. 1969), p. 3. What should be noted here is that the May events brought into light a new force to be reckoned with by the Communists in advanced societies: the intellectuals and the "white collars." Both Mandel and Marcuse have seen in these groups, mostly the students, a powerful social force because II ...[this] intellectual labor power is doubly revolutionary and productive today. It is so because it is conscious of the enormous wealth it 239

What is important to note is that

[the] May general strike was directed as much against the political and trade union apparatuses of the working class as it was against the regime. The strike was neither foreseen, prepared, understood, nor chan­ nelled by those apparatuses. It revealed the disjuncture betv^en the working class and its leaders....

This, of course, was not new in the history of the working

class movement. What was new, however, was the attitude of

a "Bolshevik" party, the PCF, in a potentially revolution­ ary situation. It is probably right to argue that "in May

promises, which could lead us rapidly to a classless society, to abundance. It is so because it is conscious of all contradictions, injustices and barbarities of contemporary capitalism, and because the results of its becoming conscious are in them­ selves profoundly revolutionary. The development of this consciousness occurred first of all among the students, for a very simple reason: because the traditional organizations of the workers' movement are profoundly bureaucratized and long since coopted into bourgeois society" (Ernest Mandel, "The New Vanguard," in T. Ali, ed.. The New Revolutionaries [New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc, 1969], pp. 49-50). Marcuse, on the other hand, maintains that, though the working class remains a revolutionary class, the spark will come from the "ghetto population...and the middle-class intelligentsia, especially among the students" (Herbert Marcuse, "Re-Examination of the Concept of Revolution," New Left Review 56 [July-August 1969]: 30. It would not be unfair to accuse both Mandel and Marcuse of empiricism. Since the students acted in a relatively revolutionary fashion, and since the working class in most West European countries did not seem to be performing its role, Mandel and Marcuse substituted the former for the latter in accomplishing "the historical mission."

^^^Andre Gorz, "The Way Forward," New Left Review 52 (Nov.-Dec. 1968): 48. The French version could be found in Les Temps Modernes Nos. 266-7 (July 1968) under the title, "Limites et Potentialités du Mouvement de Mai." 240

1968, France was saved from revolution not primarily by De

Gaulle and his generals but by the French Communist 131 Party." One need only raise a few questions, which will remind the reader of the questions asked about the attitude of the German Social Democrats and the Austro-Marxists when they failed to respond to clearly revolutionary situations:

Why did the Communist leaders do everything in their power to stifle all this [i.e., possible coalition of all forces, including the army, against the existing regime], to break the wave instead of riding it at least to a share of power? Why did they denounce the student militants and keep them from the workers instead of absorbing them in a general upheaval as they so easily might have done? Why did their labor organiza­ tion, the General Labor Confederation (CGT), oppose the general strike in the first place, accept at once Pompidou's bread-and- butter* concessions and urge the workers to return to their jobs? Why were they so frightened of violence and disorder, so insistent on legality against anything remotely resembling armed insurrection, so ready to tolerate with barely a murmur De Gaulle's step-by-step repression of the rising, so much more conservative in all ways than Combat, Mendes-France's Socialist Unity Party (PSU), and even the Catholic and Socialist Workers' Organizations, the Democratic Labor C o n f e d e r ^ i o n (CFDT) , and the Workers' Force (FO)?

To suggest that the attitude of the PCF was dictated by the letter's obedience to Moscow, which had good relations with

131 Mendel, "Why the French Communists..," p. 3. 132 ^^^Ibid., p. 4. 241

133 the Gaullist regime, is perhaps exaggerated. The PCF

had tried, as mentioned earlier, throughout the 196 0s — 134 just like the PCI — to establish its presence as a

133 The Cohn-Bendits argue that "...when the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy clash with those of their capitalist counterparts, the Communist Party will invariably mobilize the workers against the latter. Conversely, once the Soviet bureaucracy has come to terms with the Capi­ talists, the Party will go out of its way to cement this agreement, and stop any working-class activity that might jeopardize it.... It is only by grasping these two aspects of the Communist bureaucracy that we can hope to understand the political vagaries of the French Communist Party from its beginnings to our day" (Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative, trans. by Arnold Pomerans [New York: McGraw Hill, 1968], pp. 171-172). Although there is some truth in this statement, as shown by the historical development of the CPs and their relation­ ship with Moscow, the Cohn-Bendits fail to analyze the internal conditions which determined the behavior of the PCF. 134 "The events of May 1968 in France were preceded by an Italian university revolt in the Fall of 1967.... Political unrest has continued since that time — wildcat and official strikes, factory occupations, violent regional revolts, student riots. During this period, the PCI leaders kept their distance from the participants in these uprisings. Gradually the party moved into opposition to the unrest as an invitation from the bourgeois parties to join a stabilizing government became more likely" (Gordon M. Adams, " 'On the Pavement Thinking 'bout the Government': Notes on II Manifesto," Politics and Society I [August 1971]: 453). See also Grant Amyot, The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), esp. pp. 170-193. The analysis in this book is interesting because the author shows the reaction of the different factions within the PCI toward the student movement. 242 government party in the political system. This point seems to confirm one of the points on "deradicalization", or rather "derevolutionization" of revolutionary movements, which stipulates that any party that works within the existing bourgeois democratic framework could not possibly remain revolutionary. This, of course, is a debatable point, because if one assumes that a CP should not partici­ pate in such a framework, the working class that it repre­ sents is faced with only one choice: make a revolution or perish, because reforms, in this conception, lead to reformism and to a deradicalization of the proletariat.

The events of May 1968 shed new light on many ques­ tions. First, they showed that in the advanced capitalist countries, the proletariat is not the only "alienated" class which carries a revolutionary potential. At the same time, the alternative — although neither the PCF nor the students opposed to it proposed any — was definitely not the one offered by the Soviet system. This is perhaps why the PCF had to think of a new strategy. Second, the conservatism of the PCF became concrete proof: "Le parti communiste français, tel qu'il est devenu, sans qu'on voie comment il changerait, n'est plus un parti révolutionnaire. 135 Il n'est plus 1'avant-garde...." The party is cautious;

Paul Mazure, "Pour un parti révolutionnaire," Les Temps Modernes, 266-7 (July 1968): 376. Ernest Mandel, too, argues that "the PCF is not a revolutionary party" ("The Lessons of May 1968," New Left Review No. 52 [Nov.- Dec. 1969], p. 27) . 243

it avoids taking any "adventuristic" actions and strives to give itself the image of a national party:

The Communist Party has appeared as a party of order and political wisdom, appealing to working class discipline, freely accepted [sic]....The Ultra-Leftist groups attack and insult us because, from the very start, we have refused to haY§^recourse to provocation and ugly violence.

The West European CPs seem to have one basic similar­ ity: they represent the immediate interests of the workers affiliated with the Communist-dominated unions — CGT in 138 France, CGIL in Italy, Comisiones Obreras in Spain, etc.

They put demands within the established system through pressure on the government without any recourse to vio­ lence. They avoid taking actions which might jeopardize the interests of their constituency; neither would they act

^^^This word is used by the PCF itself to distance itself from the Far Left, etc. 137 Waldeck-Rochet, quoted in Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism, p. 164. The similarity to the attitude of the SPD in the period 1890-1914 is striking. The PCF, for instance, gives the same argument as to why it does not have recourse to violence as the SPD and the Austro- Marxists did: violence is the weapon of the ruling class, not of the proletariat. According to this view, the working class should not give the ruling class any excuse to start violence. The PCF insists that in May 1968 "we have acted and continue to act with a sense of responsibil­ ity when we guard against giving the government any excuse to smash the workers" (quoted in Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism, p. 165). 138 The CPs, however, have not abandoned their claim of being the legitimate representatives of the entire working class. This partly explains their call for unity of the working class. The breach of the 1920s has not been mended yet, and probably never will be. 244

in such a way that their own existence would be at 139 stake. Waldeck-Rochet's assessment of May 1968 sum­

marized the dilemma and the choice of the PCF quite

clearly:

In reality, the choice to be made in May was the following: - Either to act in such a way that the strike would permit the essential demands of the workers to be satisfied, and to pursue at the same time, on the political plan, a policy aimed at making necessary democratic changes by constitutional means. This was our party's position. - Or else quite simply to provoke a trial of strength, in other words move towards an insurrection: this would include a recourse to armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the regime by force. This was the adventurist position of certain ultra-left groups.

139 Tariq Ali argues (correctly) that, in fact, the PCF, even before May 1968, had "placed its narrow party interests above the interest of the working class as a whole" ("Revolutionary Politics: Ten Years After 1968," The Socialist Register, R. Miliband and J. Saville, eds. [London: 1978] , p. 149) . This does not seem to be an unfair statement. Some have argued that because social mobility — in spite of the overall amelioration of the living conditions of workers in France — has continued to be very low, the "only party which enables workers to become political leaders within its own ranks, as well as mayors and members of parliament, is the Communist Party" (Isaac Aviv, "The French Communist Party from 1958 to 1978: Crisis and Endurance," West European Politics 2 [May 1979]: 179). This point has already been suggested by R. Michels in his analysis of the SPD. The PCI's evolution — mainly with the inauguration of the Partito Nuovo — saw its ranks (mostly in the higher echelons) inflated by members of the middle and upper classes. See Ferraroti, Italian Communist Party, p. 56 and the Appendix "Data and Remarks on the Rotation and Social Background of Central Committee and Party Directorate Members," pp. 66-71. There is no doubt that this factor affects the ideology of the party and its policies. 245

But since the military and the repressive forces were on the side of the established authorities, and since the immense mass of the people was totally hostile to such an adventure, it is clear that to take such a course meant quite simply to lead the workers to the slaughterhouse, and to wish for the crushing of the working class and its vanguard, the Communist party. Well, we didn't fall into the trap. For that was the real plan of the Gaullist regime. Indeed, their calculations were simple: faced with a crisis which they had them­ selves provoked by their anti-social and anti-democratic policies, they reckoned on taking advantage of that crisis in order to strike a decisive and lasting blow at the working class, ajt^gOur party, at any demo­ cratic movement.

This was undoubtedly a similar pronouncement to that of classical social democracy when faced with the same 141 crisis. Paradoxically enough, the negative attitude

140 Quoted in Mandel, "The Lessons of May 1968," p. 18 (emphasis mine). 141 Kautsky declared in 1912 that "if we in Germany followed a strategy of head-on confrontation, and in the course of it 'we are annihilated and our organizations go to the devil,' then 'what would remain?' " (Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 166) . The Austro-Marxists adopted the same attitude not only in 1918-19, but also in 1927 after the general strike. See Rabinbach, The Crisis of Austrian Socialism, pp. 32-58. In the discussions on the general strike following the events of 1905, A. Bebel made the same argument as Waldeck-Rochet in the quote above. He argued that "their [ruling class] actions prescribe our tactic; it is up to them alone whether things will develop peacefully, i.e., naturally, or whether catastrophes will occur" (quoted in Schorske, German Social Democracy, p. 43). Bebel held that revolution would take place only if the rights that the working class was striving for were not 246

142 toward the general strike stems not only from the PCF's

Leninist fear of spontaneity of the masses and any movement escaping the control of the party, but also of Kautsky's

"distrust of any 'fusion' of these two components [unorgan­ ized and organized masses], precisely because the unorgan­ ized masses were vehicles of spontaneity whose consequences 143 were uncontrollable." More importantly, the PCF con­ ceived of the mass strike in a totally Kautskyist fashion;

The object of the mass strike cannot be to destroy the State power; its only object can be to wring concessions from the government on some particular question, or to replace a hostile government by one that would be more yielding to the proletariat.... But never, under any conditions, can it lead to the destruction of state power; it can only lead to a certain shifting of the relation of forces within State power.... The aim of our political struggle remains, as hitherto.

achieved through a legal process (ibid.). Engels, too, held similar views, as seen in Chapter One. 142 "The French Communist Party went to great lengths actually to prevent the union of the revolutionary forces. It deliberately locked the gates of the factory works all over France.... Workers were Instructed not to stay in the factories but to go back home, while only trusted party militants manned the gates...." ("Editorial Introduction," New Left Review, No. 52 [Nov.-Dec. 1968], p. 4). The PCF conceived of the general strike as a defensive weapon. This is similar to the position adopted by Bebel in 1905. "Bebel emphasized that the mass strike had nothing to do with the setting up of a socialist state (Zukunfstaat); it was useful only to defend 'rights which are indispensable to the life and breath of the working class" (Schorske, German Social Democracy, pp. 43-44). 14 3 Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 154. 247

the conquest of State power by winning a majority in parliament and by converting parliament ^^.gto the master of the government. 145 This was indeed the objective of the PCF. Whether this attitude is "right" or "wrong" is a question for partisans to decide. My contention is that the late 1960s represented a turning point in the lives of the West

European CPs. If the PCF and the PCI opposed armed insur­ rection, this is simply because they had decided to "sin­ cerely" follow the legal path to power. They rejected the

Leninist road. They maintain that any such insurrection — mainly if it fails — would only lead to a catastrophe for the working class (repression. Fascism, etc.)

144 K. Kautsky, quoted in "Editorial Introduction," p. 3. See also Schorske, German Social Democracy, pp. 112, 182-184. A good discussion of Kautsky's views on the general strike is found in Gary P. Steenson, Karl Kautsky, 1845-1938; Marxism in the Classical Years (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), pp. 141-147. 145 "...le parti tout entier se mit à préparer l'avenir, autrement dit à tout mettre en oeuvre pour que mai 1968 ne se renouvelle jamais. La réponse fut double: politique, elle tenta de montrer que l'exal­ tation de la lutte des masses ne menait qu'a la catastrophe et qu'il fallait mener les actions décisives dans les cadres de la légalité politique existante; organisationelle, elle visa â combler l'écart qui, dans l'action quotidienne, s'était creusé entre le parti et les travailleurs, à montrer que les communistes jouaient encore le role décisif dans les luttes ouvrières" (D. Berger and J.P. Thirard, "Un Parti Social Démocrate de Type Nouveau," Les Temps Modernes 26 [March 1970]: 1448. The authors argue forcefully that there exists a close parallel between the PCF and the pre-1914 Social Democratic parties. 248

Many have argued that the PCF betrayed the socialist

goal by not channeling the 1968 upheaval into a total

revolution. That the PCF had a conservative attitude is

undeniable. However, looking back at the events with an

objective approach, one could not fail to observe that

...despite its massive popular and active support the May revolt was suppressed not so much by the exercise of force by the capital­ ist state but by the manipulated "consent" of those very masses themselves. The strike was ended because the masses were presented with no other evident realistic alternative than a return to work.

What may be noted is that the parliamentary tradition seems to have been instrumental in bringing the situation back to normal. Force failed to bring down the Gaullist regime, whereas a unity of the Left might have done so.

Hodgson is perhaps right to argue that

...in an advanced capitalist parliamentary democracy such as France the electoral process and its outcome is a major component of the process of legitimation. To the majority of the French working class, the defeat of the Left at the polls [in 1968] meant that any continuance of a mass extra- parliamentary .struggle would have had no legitimacy. On the other hand, if the

146 Geoff Hodgson, Socialism and Parliamentary Democracy (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1977), p. 47. This is not to say that the PCF was not responsible for the defeat; quite the contrary. And it is also not true — as the apologists of the party argue — that the situation was not ripe and, therefore, the PCF was correct in its analysis of the situation.

^^^The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets, on the one hand, and the intransigence of the Ultra-Left, on the other, might also have had a considerable influence on 249

combined Communist, Socialist and PSU vote had been greater than that of the Right then that would have been a c^ear signal for the mass struggle to go on.

Hodgson's conclusion on the May events offers a

realistic perspective for the advanced societies:

The real lesson of May 1968 is this: both mass struggle and electoral advance are necessary for the socialist transformation, and progress on one of these two fronts conditions and reinforces progress on the other. The Socialist transformation will be achieved by a dialectic of mass struggle and electoral advance. May 1968 points to that future pattern of transformation, not to the scenario of Russia 1917.

Whether the vast majority of the people in West European countries and Japan want socialism is not always certain — and probably doubtful. What is hard to deny, however, is that Hodgson's observation on the process of democratiza­ tion through "mass struggle and electoral advance" probably represents the main characteristic of the evolution of the social mass movements in Western societies.

the attitude of the electorate. It should be noted that the disastrous defeat of the Left in the parliamentary elections of 1968 and the landslide victory of Pompidou in the 1969 presidential elections rendered a closer collabor­ ation between the Socialists and the Communists, an essen­ tial political practice for the Left. 148 Hodgson, Socialism, p. 51. Johnson argues that "the electoral road to power remained...the only alterna­ tive" (The Long March of the French Left, p. 65). For a serious discussion of the problem of an alternative to the existing system — from a Left perspective — cf. Lucio Magri, "The May Events and Revolution in the West," The Socialist Register (1969), pp. 34 ff.

149 Hodgson, Socialism, p. 53. 250

By way of conclusion to this section, one could argue

that another point raised by the thesis on "derevolution­

ization" of radical movements finds some empirical support

in the events of 1968; once revolutionary parties tend toward conservatism. Left-wing, more radical groups emerge which oppose the "official" parties, i.e., an extra-parlia­ mentary Left appears. This happened in Germany in 1905 and thereafter, as well as in France and Italy in the late

1960s.The Left-wing groups that emerge usually have an anti-party attitude. They consider the party a bureaucrat­ ized organization modelled on the capitalist system

(hierarchy, oppression, lack of democracy, etc.). They advocate direct, as opposed to representative, democracy.

They reject the latter and refuse to participate in it.

However, this refusal is what causes their illegitimacy in the eyes of the working class and other strata as well.

The logical conclusion to be derived from this is that in advanced capitalist societies, parliaments seem to repre­ sent the most legitimate form of political representation and struggle. Whether this will bring about socialism, for instance, no matter how different from the Soviet system, is another question.

On the different groups that emerged in 1968 in France, see Richard Johnson, The French Communist Party Versus the Students (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1972). The most famous group in Italy is II Mani- festo. 251

Genesis of the New Strategy of the West European Communist Parties

The strategy of the West European CPs, which came to 151 be known as Eurocommunism in the 1970s, was the result of several factors. Unquestionably the era of detente established between the superpowers was an important

factor, but not the primary one. Perhaps the most impor­ tant factors are both the crisis of the world Communist movement and the crisis of capitalism in Southern Europe.

The intra-Communist conflicts (China. Vs. Vietnam, China vs. USSR, etc.) have demonstrated that Communism has been unable to transcend the "national question." Therefore, the European CPs had more reason to elaborate strategies capable of bringing about social and economic changes within their own social formations. As stated earlier, the

Leninist strategy was clearly irrelevant and inappropriate in the advanced countries both for domestic and interna­ tional reasons. The division of the world into spheres of influence undoubtedly makes the likelihood of a U.S. intervention greater in any Western country whose Commu­ nists attempt a violent seizure of power — with or without

On the development of the concept, see the excel­ lent paper by Philip Elliot and Philip Schlesinger, "On the Stratification of Political Knowledge: Studying "Eurocom­ munism,' an Unfolding Ideology," Sociological Review 27 (Feb. 1979): 55-81. 252

152 Soviet help. Moreover, the domination of Europe by

German and American capital would make it economically very difficult for any Eurocommunist party to make drastic decisions with regard to the overall economic and financial setting.

These, however, are not the only reasons. The crisis of the world Communist movement stems from the obvious violation of human rights (freedom of speech, of thought, etc.) in the countries of so-called "existing socialism."

Bourgeois democracy, despite its many imperfections, is far more advanced than any system existing in the East. Hence it seems that the Eurocommunists came to the conclusions that :

(1) Capitalism and bourgeois democracy in the West are

here to stay for an indefinite period, i.e., there are

no immediate prospects for revolution in the West.

(2) Leninism is a thing of the past and has no hope of

success in the West.

(3) The only way to transform Western societies is to

participate in national politics and attempt to make

"structural reforms" which would represent a progres­

sive step toward a socialist society.

152 Peter Lange, "The French and Italian Communist Parties: Postwar Strategy and Domestic Society," in S. Bialer and S. Sluzar, eds.. Radicalism in The Contemporary Age, Vol. Ill, Strategies and Impact of Contemporary Radicalism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p p . 16 2 f f. 253

(4) Socialism in the West could succeed only if it pre­

serves and guarantees the liberties and democratic

rights gained by the majority of the people.

(5) The class structure of the advanced capitalist socie­

ties has changed substantially. The working class

does not represent the majority of the population (at

least empirically) . The crisis of capitalism has

shown that other strata of society have been affected

by it. Therefore, any hope for a successful Communist

strategy must take into account the other strata of

society; hence the need for political alliances not

only with other working class parties, but with other 153 non-socialist parties as well.

(6) Since the State cannot be "smashed", then its trans­

formation and democratization become all the more 154 necessary.

153 The 1973 coup in Chile demonstrated the need for the Communists to establish a solid alliance with other parties in order to avoid being overthrown by the reaction.

"The problem of alliances is...the decisive problem of every revolution and every revolutionary policy, and it is therefore also decisive for the success of the democratic road.... The strategy of reforms can succeed only if it rests on a strategy of alliances" (E. Berlinger, "Reflections After Events in Chile," Rinascita, Nos. 38,39,40 [Sept.-Oct. 1973], in Lange and Vannicelli, eds.. Communist Parties, pp. 44-45). 154 "Le Socialisme que nous voulons pour notre pays sera...profondément démocratique, non seulement parce qu'il signifiera pour les travailleurs la fin 254

(7) The CPs have become bureaucracies whose members see

any serious social upheavals as real threats to the

interests they have developed within the existing

system. Hence their opposition to more revolutionary

groups. Their advocacy of law and order becomes

essential in order to prevent their constituencies

from falling under the control of these groups —

although it is very doubtful that the majority of the

West European working class would follow such groups.

I think that they prefer the leadership of the tradi­

tional parties which represent their "interests"

within the legal framework.

This summary of the Eurocommunist strategy strikes the

reader as a repetition of classical social democratic

strategy. However, the Eurocommunists refuse such iden­ tification because they still maintain that they are revolutionary and are in no way the "managers" of the capitalist system.

L'eurocommunisme n'est pas une variante de la social démocratie. L'expérience social- démocrate se resume aujourd'hui par une

de l'exploitation, mais aussi parce qu'il garantira, développera et etendra toutes les libertés déjà con­ quises par notre peuple.... Qu'il s'agisse du respect du suffrage universel, avec la possibilité d'alternance démocratique qu'il comporte, du droit à l'existence et à l'activité de tous les parties politiques...du refus de toute philosophie offi­ cielle...." (Jean Kanapa, "Les caratêristiques de 1'Eurommunisme," Recherches Internationales a la lumière du Marxisme 88/89:3-4 [1978], p. 11). 255

politique d'austérité et d 'autoritarianisme.... Le projet de l'eurocommunisme est tout le contraire. Définissant une voie démocra­ tique et révolutionnaire vers le socialisme, il entend conduire^ à la ^^^çansformation radicale de la société....

In a way this is true, at least in rhetoric. Eurocommunism

apparently is a movement sui generis. It appears as a new

strategy which has broken with its Leninist past,^^® and which refuses to be identified with Social Democracy

(classical or modern). What seems to be symptomatic is that there appears to be a crisis, not only in the working 157 class movement, but also of Marxist theory. This is reflected in the new theoretical and practical developments

IS^ibid., p. 17. 156 "La vole de conquête du pouvoir et de passage au socialisme que nous proposons se trouve-t-elle bien enrubannée dans l'Etat et la Revolution, ce livre qui nous a tant appris? Non; et nous n'avons aucune crainte à le dire même si cela nous vaut quelques Insultes de la part des talmudlstes chinois" (Pletro Ingrao, "Sur le Rapport entre Démocratie et Social­ isme," Recherches Internationales, p. 48). Against Lenin's conception, Berlinger, Secretary General of the PCI, stated unequivocally that "...parliament cannot be conceived and used, as In Lenin's times and as may occur In other countries, as nothing more than a place to denounce the evils of capitalism and the bourgeois governments and to make socialist propaganda...." (Berlinger, "Reflec­ tions After Events In Chile," p. 44). 157 See Christine Buci-Gluckmann, "Eurocommunisme, Transition et Pratiques Politiques," in Birnbaum and Vincent, Critique des Pratiques Politiques, pp. 104-105. Also, see Nicos Poulantzas, "Political Parties and the Crisis of Marxism; Interview by S. Hall and A. Hunt," Socialist Review 48 (Nov.-Dec. 1979); 57-74. 256 within and outside the CPs. The existence of Left and

Right Eurocommunism, the re-emergence of a literature on workers' councils (inspired by Pannekoek, Luxemburg,

Gramsci, etc.), and the blossoming of "new" Lefts only confirm the reality of this crisis which, one should point out, is not necessarily negative because it could contri­ bute to a genuine, indigenous, democratic theory that has nothing to do with Soviet "Marxism." This possibility of a new theory is probably the only alternative for the survi­ val of a serious European Left. CHAPTER IV

EUROCOMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY

In the last chapter, it was argued that the Eurocommu­

nists had come to the conclusion that their only hope of

success was to work within the system of bourgeois democra­ cy. This inevitably brought the question of socialism and democracy back to the agenda. This chapter will, there­

fore, focus on the problem faced by the Eurocommunists (and the Left intellectuals) with respect to the compatibility of the two concepts.

The relationship between socialism and democracy has been a constant and problematic theme of all parties claiming to be socialists — whether followers of Marx or not. As shown in Chapters II and III, the interpretation of the concept of democracy has been the major cause of the split between socialists and Communists. The CPs adopted

Lenin's conceptualization of democracy while rejecting and denouncing Kautsky's. It is not my purpose to enter into the polemic of whether Lenin or Kautsky was right. What is important to note, however, is the development of the

Eurocommunist view. After denouncing Kautsky for decades and siding with Lenin against him, the CPs are today advocating strategies which are not only similar to those

257 258

of Kautsky, but which often go further than he did. Their

arguments are often more similar to Bernstein's than to

Kautsky's. Interestingly, the Eurocommunists repeat the

same arguments which led to the split in the international

working class movement. A sort of reversed dialectic has

developed.

The West European Communists evolved out of classical

Social Democracy. Their break with the latter led them to espouse Leninism as an ideology, a form of organization,

and a strategy. Although Leninism proved to be an inappro­ priate strategy for the transformation of their societies,^ they held on to it for more than half a century. Today, they are trying to repudiate it -- albeit slowly and painfully — and returning to their Social Democratic path.

They now argue that 1917 was a great event in the history 2 of the West European working class movement. It was a great event indeed, but not an event that could be repro­ duced or be a model for the West. The Eurocommunists

This corresponds to Kautsky's prophecy that the adoption of Bolshevism in the West would lead to the impo­ tence of the Western labor movement because it did not grasp the specific character of West European societies. See Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 227. 2 "The Communist Party of Spain considers the October Revolution to be part of its patrimony..." (M. Azcarate, "What Is Eurocommunism?", in Eurocommunism, Its Roots and Future in Italy and Elsewhere, ed. G.R. Urban (New York: Universe Books, 1978), p. 30. The myth of the October Revolution is still alive at all levels of the CPs' hier­ archies . 259

insist that Lenin was a formidable revolutionary whose

teachings were of great importance, but applicable only to

backward Russia, not to the more advanced West. If Lenin's

conceptions cannot be applied to the West, that does not mean that they should adopt Kautsky's. The Eurocommunists

cannot afford to celebrate today their worst enemy of yesterday. Although they advocate his ideas, they never admit that they are his. In order to look original and national — were not the CPs puppets of the Soviet State

for decades? — they go back to history to dig out national

Communist authorities (e.g., Gramsci, Labriola, Luxemburg, etc.) whom they had often helped to eliminate, either politically or even physically (Gramsci was probably safer in Mussolini's jail than if he had been in Moscow, or even in some other country).

Eurocommunism is more than a movement. It is the hallmark of a crisis, a deep crisis of identity that the

Western CPs are going through. The old (Stalinist) methods of solving their problems are obsolete. Operating in a democratic — even if one assumes that the term is rela­ tive, as the Communists do -- environment, they could only survive politically, and even physically — Fascism has proven how precarious their existence can be — by abiding by the democratic rules. Even so, their credibility 260

remains weak because of their attachment to their undemo­

cratic organization (e.g., the PCF).^

Despite these reservations about the CPs, there is no doubt that they have undergone a process of de-revolutioni-

zation (de-revolutionization is here understood as a rejection of seizure of power by violent and undemocratic means) and "Kautskyization;" that is, they adopted Kautsky's conception of socialist strategy. This process is very obvious when one carefully analyzes the question of social­ ism and democracy as conceived by the Eurocommunists.

Problems of Socialism and Democracy; Kautsky vs. Lenin

The conception of democracy is probably the main point of convergence between the Eurocommunists and Kautsky. As has been seen in the previous chapters, many pronouncements of the Eurocommunists on democracy are strikingly similar to Kautsky's — not only the Kautsky of pre-WWI, but the

Kautsky of the Weimar period as well.

Lenin, it should be emphasized, never seriously and concretely analyzed the functioning of the bourgeois-demo­ cratic states. He simply dismissed those political systems as mere dictatorships of the bourgeoisie. The Western CPs

See the devastating critique of the PCF by the French Communist philosopher L. Althusser, "What Must Change in the Party" (New Left Review 109 [May-June 1978]: 29-34, 38-45). The PCF is, as is well known, the least Eurocom­ munist of the Western CPs. Its Stalinist organization, behavior, and vicissitudes make the PCF look suspicious in the eyes of much of the French working class. 261 adopted such a view without questioning it either in theory or in practice. It was not until the emergence of Fascism and Nazism that the CPs realized the value of "bourgeois" democracy and its qualitative difference from Fascist dictatorship. Moreover, parliamentarism, which was viewed by Lenin — and consequently by most Communists — as a simple instrument of the bourgeoisie, has come to be regarded by the Eurocommunists (as it had been by Kautsky) as a democratic instrument that the working class could use to achieve its goal. After many decades of treating 4 bourgeois democracy as the "best possible shell" for capital and its rule. Communists — both in the CPs and outside — argue today that even the existence of bourgeois democracy is the result of the working-class struggles.

Therefore, the argument goes, parliament itself has a popular base. In 1956, Togliatti insisted that

...the bourgeoisie itself is realizing that parliament, in the past the instrument for the organization and consolidation of the capitalist regime, can today become an effective instrument in the hands of the parties which aigi at a socialist transforma­ tion of society.

4 Cf. Bob Jessop, "Capitalism and Democracy: The Best Possible Shell?" in Power and the State, ed. G. Littlejohn, B. Smart, et al. (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1978). "The bourgeois democratic republic is the best possible politi­ cal shell for capital to the extent that the bourgeoisie is politically and ideologically dominant" (p. 39) . The expression "best possible political shell" is Lenin's, See The State and Revolution.

^Palmiro Togliatti, "Parliament and the Struggle for Socialism," Marxism Today 29 (Sept. 1977): 286. (First published in Pravda, March 7, 1956.) 262

This is without question a mere repetition of Kautsky's

arguments. The latter, as is well known, emphasized the

necessity of the working class to advance toward the

conquest of power through the winning of a parliamentary

majority. The crux of Kautsky's arguments from 1912 on was

that parliament must be used as an instrument of socialist

transformation.^

As indicated earlier, the ideas that Kautsky expressed

in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution in his book.

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, brings him closer to

the Eurocommunists (see Chapter III). What is remarkable

is that Kautsky expressed views in 1918 which have been

repeated by the Eurocommunists since the mid-1970s. Both

the Eurocommunists and Kautsky concluded that the Soviet model could not be exported to the West because of the differences between the two societies.^ What is more important — and this the Eurocommunists do not say openly

^Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, pp. 153, 162. 7 See E. Berlinguer, "Eurocommunism Defended," in Italian Communists Speak for Themselves, ed. D. Sassoon (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978) . "The roads [to socialism] followed in the countries of Eastern Europe do not corre­ spond to the peculiar conditions and orientations of the broad working-class and popular masses in the countries of the West" (p. 78). The fact that the same observation was made in 1918 and in the 1970s further demonstrates the validity of Kautsky's and the Mensheviks' views on the necessity for Russia to go through a capitalist (economi­ cally) and bourgeois democratic (politically) phase. This point, I think, is not antithetical to Marx; quite the contrary. 263

— is that the socialism of Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union has been an impediment to the advance of socialism

(in its Marxist version) in Western Europe and elsewhere.

The silence on this point has probably been the main reason

for the continuing suspicion in which the CPs are held by

the democratic Left, etc.

Kautsky insisted on the link between socialism and democracy, valuing the latter even higher than the former.

He did not limit democracy to the working class, but extended it to society at large. In other words, democracy was not class-based in his eyes. In his view, the bour­ geoisie, now become a minority — once the socialists have come to power — is not to be eliminated from the democrat­ ic process. This is, of course, in opposition to the

Marxist-Leninist conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which the former exploiters are totally excluded from this process and are forcibly liquidated as a class. The Eurocommunists have abandoned this latter view.

They now have pledged their allegiance to the democratic process. Against the Leninist view, they are committed to the rule of plurality of parties and the alternation of p o w e r .

For the Eurocommunists, "democracy" is not simply a stage in the transition to socialism. Neither is bourgeois representative democracy simply the most favorable system where the class struggle is fought out and where the 264

consciousness of the proletariat can take place. They

argue, in clear opposition to the classical Marxist concep­

tion, that the bourgeois-democratic institutions of ad­ vanced capitalist states must not be destroyed. They

simply have to be transformed.

Unless we work out a firmly based conception of the possibility of democratizing the capitalist State apparatus, thereby adapting it for building a socialist society, without its forcible total destruction, we shall either be accused of unscrupulous, tactics or identified with Social Democracy.

They assume that the transformation will come about through the action of the popular masses and their organizations inside and outside the State apparatuses. The Right

Eurocommunists argue that there is no need to have a rupture in the system. In fact, democracy — defined in pluralistic terms — will prevail as the form of government 9 under socialism. Having abandoned the Leninist conception of the seizure of power, the Eurocommunists have adopted a

p Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 13. As shown in Chapter I, Marx, Engels and Lenin insisted on the destruction of the bourgeois state and its apparatuses. "One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., 'that the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes' " (Marx and Engels, 1872 preface to the German edition of the Communist Manifesto, in Tucker, p. 470; see also Lenin, "The State and Revolution", in Collected Works, vol. 25, pp. 419 ff.

Q This conception is identical to Bernstein's, for whom "democracy is at the same time means and end. It is the means of the struggle for socialism and it is the form socialism will take once it has been realized" (Bernstein, quoted in Gay, Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 239). 265

strategy which consists of the gradual transformation and

democratization^^ of the State and various institutions.

The transformation and democratization are not even consid­

ered to be a tactical maneuver toward the complete disso­

lution of the system.

En Italie, il y a une majorité, un consensus, autour des mesures de transformation. A condition que ces mesures ne soient pas

What the Eurocommunists mean by democratization is the passage from "formal" democracy — which they consider to be existing in their societies today — to "real" democracy. What they see as their primary task is "...the possibility — the necessity — of developing a struggle in the various spheres in order to turn them round so as to oppose them to capitalism" (Carrillo, pp. 51-52). Using a Gramscian conception, they insist that the bourgeois ideology should be eroded so as to lose its hegemony in the various apparatuses (military, churches, schools, media, etc.). The CP itself must, therefore, become a pole of attraction for those who are disillusioned with bourgeois ideology. In other words, the working class should win the forces of order (army, police, etc.) to its side. Another objective is for the Eurocommunists to obtain an equal share of power in the communication media (television, radio, newspapers, etc.).

"It is clear that a radical change in the use of these powerful instruments is Impossible without a change of political power. But the struggle for the democratic control of the media such as television and radio, in such a way that the various forces of society, and not only the rulers, may find expression through them; the drawing up of laws to guarantee genuine press freedom — that is to say, the material possibility for all the great political and social forces to possess their own organs of expression, which goes much further than the freedom of the press, although it is not incom­ patible with it; these are steps which can enable the forces of change to undertake a struggle from within what today are the ideological apparatuses of society" (Carrillo, p. 43). Whether the capitalists would be willing to lose their domination of the means of communication is another story. 266

présentées, comme on le fait souvent avec^^ l'objectif déclaré de dissoudre le système.

The Italian Communists argue that there is no reason at

present to believe that the majority of the Italian people

want socialism. To try to make a revolution against the

wishes of the majority would be unrealistic. Therefore,

one should try to obtain a broad consensus among all

classes and strata to bring about democratic changes within

the system; hence the need for alliances, austerity pro­

grams, etc. If the revolution is made by the working class

and in the name of the latter only, they argue, this would open the door for reaction and counter-reaction. In his polemic with Pannekoek, Kautsky held exactly the same 12 arguments. Bernstein, too, shared this view: he denied

G. Amendola, Interview in H. Weber, Le parti commu­ niste italien: aux sources de "l'Eurocommunisme' (Paris : Bourgois, 1977), p. 75. 12 Salvadori, p. 163. See also S. Bricianer, Pannekoek and the Workers' Councils, intr. by J. Gerber (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1978), esp. pp. 119-136. Bernstein argued that socialism cannot be established if it is not desired by the majority of the people and that even the hostile minority "must be willing to accept the measures proposed by the new regime" (Gay, p. 241). This point is repeated by the Eurocommunists today: "The leading role of the working class itself in the process of overcoming capitalism and building a new society can and must be exercised through collabora­ tion and agreements among various parties and currents that aspire to socialism, and within the framework of a democratic system in which all the constitutional parties enjoy full rights, including those that do not want the transformation of society in a socialist direction and oppose such a transformation, naturally within the confines of democratic constitutional 267

13 that the "tyranny of the majority" was at all democracy.

Moreover, Kautsky, Bernstein and the Eurocommunists have a

conception of democracy which corresponds more to the 14 liberal tradition than to the one initiated by Rousseau

and developed by later socialists (Marx, Luxemburg, etc.).

Democracy is conceived by the Eurocommunists in its repre­

sentative and parliamentary, rather than direct and plebis-

citarian, form.

The Eurocommunists approach the question of councils

(as organs of democratic control) in a Kautskyan way: they do not see the workers' councils as the form of the demo­ cratic regime. The councils, they argue, could not be

substituted for or have primacy over Parliament. On the contrary, though they admit that the councils represent organs of control of the working class, they insist that they should be integrated into parliamentary democracy.

rules" ("Draft Theses for the Fifteenth Congress of the PCI, December 1978," in Lange and Vannicelli, Communist Parties of Italy, France and Spain, p. 52. [Emphasis mine]). 13 "Today we find the oppression of the minority by the majority 'undemocratic,' although it was originally held to be quite consistent with government by the people" (Bern­ stein, Evolutionary Socialism, p. 142).

"There are fundamental principles which all social­ ist [i.e., non-Marxist[ parties share: reformism and a liberal-democratic conception of the State. These princi­ ples do not conflict with the Eurocommunist, position" (Massimo Salvadori, "Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism," Interview with F. Adler and P. Piccone, Telos 38 (Winter 1978-79): 119. See also Umberto Cerroni, "Democracy and Socialism," Economy and Society 7 (August 1978): 251). 268

Following a liberal conception, they maintain that parlia­ ment is the main organ of political decisions with respect

to the organization of society, as well as the principal

instrument of control over the government. In other words, parliamentary democracy is the basis for the transformation of society. The preference for parliamentary over direct democracy stems from the Eurocommunists' skepticism about the effectiveness and realism of the latter. They argue that the heterogenous and complex character of the highly industrial societies makes direct democracy too impractical a form of political organization. Delegation and represen­ tation of authority remain, in their eyes, absolutely 15 necessary. The risks with councils' democracy is, according to the Eurocommunists, the possibility of abuse of power which might result from the eventual (and perhaps inevitable) bureaucratization of the councils. Therefore, pluralism of parties and associations, even in a socialist society, remains the best guarantee against such possible degeneration. Moreover, one should not view the Eurocom­ munists' skepticism regarding councils' democracy as a genuine concern about "totalitarian" developments. Though this is a real concern for the West European CPs — mainly the PCI and the PCE, whose experience with Fascism has had traumatic effect — there is another reason, if not the

15 Weber, Le parti communiste italien, p. 44. 269 main one. I think that their rejection of councils' democracy stems from the fact that it would, if estab­ lished, reduce the vanguard party to a relatively powerless 16 organization.

The Eurocommunist approach to the question of direct and parliamentary democracy owes a great deal to Kautsky.

Cf. the remarkable work of Carmen Sirianni, Workers' Control and Socialist Democracy: The Soviet Experience (London: New Left Books, 1982). This naturally raises the question of the vanguard party. The Eurocommunists are somewhat vague as to how they would act should they come to power. Apparently, they would behave as ruling parties that would step down if the popular vote so decided. However, the Eurocommunist CPs have adopted, at least in rhetoric, distinct and even contradictory positions. Carrillo, for example, insists that the CP "continues to be the vanguard party, inasmuch as it truly embodies a crea­ tive Marxist attitude." Nonetheless, he adds in an unortho­ dox manner that the CP "...no longer regards itself as the only representa­ tive of the working class, of the working people and the forces of culture. It recognizes, in theory and in practice, that other parties which are socialist in tendency can also be representative of particular sections of the working populations, although their theoretical and philosophical positions and their internal structure may not be ours. It regards as normal and stimulating the competition between differ­ ent policies and solutions to specific problems, and it has no hesitation in accepting, when circumstances warrant, that others may be more accurate than it in analyzing a particular situation." And again, he insists that "the party should work hard to be the vanguard of the working class...." (Carrillo, p. 100) . In contrast to the PCE and the PCI, the PCF does not grant this kind of privilege to the other Socialist forces. The three parties, however, face the same contradiction: How can they be the vanguard of the working people as a whole and accept the rules of pluralism? The behavior of the PCF within the Union of the Left demonstrates this contradiction. As is well known, the objective of the PCF was to reverse the coalition in its favor (and so did the 270

Kautsky believed that parliamentary democracy, despite ite

flaws and weaknesses, represented a superior and the "only

viable long-term form that democracy could take in complex 17 modern societies." Kautsky did not totally reject the

workers' councils, but he only granted them the status of 18 temporary revolutionary organs. They were to be institu­

tionalized "as instruments of mass organization and not as

an alternative 'state' counterposed to parliament as the 19 representative organ of all social classes." The coun­

cils could not, according to his view,

...become the organs of a new state power, precisely because they were class institu­ tions, whereas the democratic state must repose on an institution such as a national

PS, for that matter). This contradiction has not been resolved by the Eurocommunist parties, which remain Lenin­ ist in organization and structure and still claim to be the legitimate representatives of the working class as a whole.

^^Steenson, Karl Kautsky, p. 194. Kautsky held this view despite the fact that the German workers' councils were dominated by moderate workers. The political demands of the latter were "liberal republican and moderate social­ ist" (p. 212).

l^ibid., p. 216.

^^Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 228. In 1919, "the Austrian Social Democrats were able to use the council movement to wrest significant concessions from their opponents while never granting them the independence that might render them a threat to the Socialists' own power." Rabinbach, Crisis of Austrian Socialism, p. 23. See also Loew, "The Politics of Austro-Marxism, " p. 29. On a theoretical approach to the councils, cf. Douglas Kellner, ed., Karl Korsch; Revolutionary Theory (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1977), esp. pp. 18-24, 124-135. 271

assembly or parliament t h ^ represented all social classes and strata.

For Kautsky, the councils were not to play a role of counterpower to the assembly. They must simply be utilized to tilt the balance of forces in the national assembly or 21 parliament in favor of the Left. Since violence is excluded from Kautsky's and the Eurocommunists' scheme, one may logically assume that the councils remain simply an organ of pressure within the parliamentary system in order to extract concessions in favor of the working class.

Kautsky believed, the same way the Eurocommunists do today, that "the counterposition of councils to parliament masked the design of a dictatorship by a minority, disguised in the formula of a democracy distinct from parliamentary 22 sovereignty, branded as bourgeois." In other words, the existence of councils as the only form of electoral repre­ sentation would lead to particularist tendencies that might create a greater heterogeneity (polarization) of society.

The alternative offered by Kautsky is strikingly similar to the Eurocommunists': he proposed that the councils and parliament or assembly be integrated, each

20 Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 236; see also Loew, p. 33 21 Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 236. See also Sirianni, "Councils and Parliaments" p. 85.

^^Salvadori, p 237. 272

23 having distinct and specific tasks. The PCI makes the 24 same proposition. What may be drawn from this is that

the "dictatorship of the proletariat," or whatever name

might be given to it, cannot be achieved through extra-

parliamentary institutions which have an exclusive class

basis — that is, institutions which make representation 25 dependent on class criteria only. The rule of the

^^Ibid.

^^Weber notes, a propos the PCI, that for the latter^ "la démocratie des conseils ouvriers ne se substitute pas a la démocratie parlementaire bourgeoise, mais s'y intègre, comme le préconisaient déjà les austro-marxistes ou les sociaux-démocrates des années 20" (Le parti communiste italien, p. 43). See also Mandel's critique of the Euro­ communists for not wanting to establish workers' councils in his From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, pp. 84-85, 163 ff. Another Trotskyite scholar argues that the thesis of "mixed democracy" is defended by the PCI, PCF, and PCE in order to subordinate direct (workers') democracy to representative democracy: "La démocratie mixte se réduit, en fait de mixité, i une sauvegarde de la démocratie parlementaire, avec tolérance relative d'organes de démocratie directe. La pratique municipale du PCI, la politique du PCE dans les commissions ouvrières, la position de PCF sur les comités de grève ou de la souveraineté des assem­ blées générales, ne visent en dernière analyse qu'a canaliser (et non à promouvoir) la démocratie de base pour mieux la subordonner a la démocratie repré­ sentative, autrement dit, au parlement bourgeois" (Daniel Bensaid, "Eurocommunisme, austro-marxisme et bolshévisme," Critique Communiste 18/19 [Oct.-Nov. 1977]: 171). 25 Kautsky did not accept the councils as permanent political organs because they excluded not only entrepre­ neurs and landowners, but other social strata and categor­ ies as well (professionals, white-collar workers, artisans, etc.) According to Kautsky, II If the [German] republic were to be secured, these people had to accept it as the legitimate government; 273

proletariat, therefore, can only be possible through the

letter's winning a majority in parliament.

Kautsky's arguments on the relationship between the

councils and parliament are reiterated and further devel- 27 oped by the Left Eurocommunists. The most sophisticated

limiting political powers to the workers would not only contradict the democratic principles of the socialist tradition, but also create a large and potentially very dangerous opposition to the new order" (Steenson, p. 216). The theoretical roots of the Italian "historic compromise" and the French and Spanish alliance arrangements easily find their source in this analysis.

Sirianni, "Councils and Parliaments," p. 85. This also implies that the parliamentary institutions of the bourgeois-democratic state should not be dismantled. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) holds a rather interesting position on the question: "When a socialist majority is won it will need the support of the mass movement outside Parliament to uphold the decisions it has taken in Parliament. Conversely, the parliamentary decision will give legal endorsement to popular aims and popular struggles" (Communist Party of Great Britain, The British Road to Socialism; Programme of the Communist Party [London: The Communist Party, 1968], p. 49). Despite the more radical tone compared with the other Western CPs (probably due to the insignificance of this party) the CPGB does not envisage a violent rupture, at least theoretically. The councils, or extra-parliamentary groups, that the CPGB is referring to are pressure groups, at best. 27 On the distinction between Left and Right Eurocom­ munism, see Andre Gunder-Frank, "Eurocommunism: Left and Right Variants," New Left Review 110 (July-Aug. 1978). Right Eurocommunism is distinguished from the Left version by its (1) defense of liberal (bourgeois) democracy in its existing form without any serious attempt to transform it through pressure and demands from extra-parliamentary, direct (or proletarian) democracy; and (2) its conception 274

theoretical elaboration from the Left is Pculantzas' (who

died in 1978), a former member of the Greek Communist Party

(Interior), which follows a Eurocommunist line. Poulantzas'

approach deserves some attention because it shows the problem faced by the Left in advanced capitalist societies today.

Having criticized Lenin for holding an instrumentalist 2 8 conception of the State, Poulantzas sets himself the task of building a new theory of the transition to socialism in

Western Europe. Like many other theorists and leaders of the different CPs, he insists that a frontal attack on the

State in Western Europe is no longer conceivable. Though recognizing that the State is still a bourgeois state — and not a neutral one or only partly the state of the big monopolies, as the CPs have it — Poulantzas does not think

of the bourgeois state, which it sees as an instrument of transformation of society without any "breaks" and "quali­ tative" changes within it. Eurocommunism of the Right usually refers to the strategy of the different CPs, whereas Eurocommunism of the Left is more or less the political position of some Marxist scholars who have broken with Leninism, e.g., Poulantzas, Claudin, Buci-Glucksmann, etc. They reject Leninism and Social Democracy as ineffec­ tive strategies for the West. Cf. Christine Buci-Glucks­ mann, "Pour un Eurocommunisme de Gauche," in Changer le PC? Debats sur le Gallocommunisme, ed. D. Duhamel and H. Weber, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1979), esp. pp. 134-138; Nicos Poulantzas, Reperes - Hier et Aujourd'­ hui: Textes sur l'Etat (Paris: Maspero, 1980), pp. 14 ff. 28 Nicos Poulantzas, "The State and the Transition to Socialism," interview with H. Weber, Socialist Review 8 (March-April 1978): 10. 275

it necessary to "smash" it. The crucial question he poses

is the following:

How is it possible radically to transform the State in such a manner that the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institu­ tions of representative democracy (which were also a conquest of the popular masses) are combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of self-management bodies?"^’

Poulantzas argues that the struggle of the popular masses

makes the transformation of the State possible. The

internal contradictions of the latter should be sharpened,

and deep-seated transformations brought about.The other

objective is to encourage popular struggles outside the

institutions and apparatuses. Like Kautsky, Poulantzas maintains that "this form of struggle would not aim to centralize a dual-power type of counter-state, but would 31 have to be linked with the first struggle." In other words, Poulantzas does not think that a dual-power situa­ tion — like the one which took place in 1917 in Russia — is likely to repeat itself in Western Europe because "of the development of the State, its power, its integration 32 into social life, into all areas, etc." The democratic

29 Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1980), p. 256.

^^Poulantzas, "The State and the Transition to Social­ ism," pp. 13-14.

31ibid., p. 14.

^^Ibid., p. 17. 276

road, as the Left Eurocommunists call it is, therefore, a

long process. The dialectic between the mass organizations outside the constitutional framework and the democratic transformation of the existing institutions generates ruptures ("breaks") in the State organs. The latter could then be controlled by the masses and transformed into , 33 popular organs.

What is important to emphasize, once again, is the

Left Eurocommunists' — as well as the Right Eurocommu­ nists' — attitude toward representative democracy.

Contrary to the Leninist conception, they refuse to do away with it. Like Kautsky, they insist that

...when we speak of a democratic road to demo­ cratic socialism, such a strategy must not only profoundly transform but also maintain forms of representative democracy and forms of liberties (what we have called for a long time "formal liberties" but which are not just "formal."^*

33 The assumption is that the growth of State institu­ tions in advanced countries leads to their penetration by employees coming from the lower classes and the petty- bourgeoisie which, due to the class struggle, might tilt the balance within these institutions toward a Leftward and popular direction. See Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1976); and by the same author, "On Social Classes," New Left Review 77-80 (1973): 27-54.

^^Poulantzas, "Political Parties and the Crisis of Marxism," p. 61. There is no doubt that the violation of liberties in the countries of so-called "existing social­ ism" has been instrumental in influencing the theoretical writings of the Left Eurocommunists. It is also interest­ ing to note that both Kautsky and the Eurocommunists make reference to Luxemburg's critique of the Bolsheviks to 277

In other words, they insist on the "articulation between

democratic forms of representation and forms of direct

democracy." What is remarkable, however, is that the

defense of liberties is made contingent upon the preserva­

tion of the existing parliamentary institutional struc- 35 tures, which of course would be transformed. Briefly

put, Lenin's theoretical — and by no means practical or

concrete; one might even say demagogic — reliance on council democracy and the complete elimination of represen­ tative democracy is rejected by the Eurocommunists, just as

it was by Kautsky.In fact, they keep insisting on the

support their views. See Poulantzas, State, Power, Social­ ism, p. 253; Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 264. The Eurocom­ munists correctly understood that

"...le 'socialisme réel' devient de moins en moins crédible aux yeux de ces mêmes masses occidentales, qui constatent de plus en plus les contradictions fla­ grantes entre la visée libératrice du socialisme selon Marx et sa réalité (de l'atteinte aux libertés, hôpi­ taux psychiatriques) au blocage d'une dialiectique réelle des masses" (Buci-Glucksmann, "Eurocommunisme, Transition et Pratiques Politiques," p. 108). 3 5 "I wonder if...the maintenance of formai political liberties doesn't require the maintenance of the institu­ tional forms of power of representative democracy" (Poulant­ zas, "The State and the Transition to Socialism," p. 22).

^^The Austro-Marxists, too, advocated a combination of parliamentary and council democracy. H. Weber argues that, in fact, the Austro-Marxists were on the Left of the Left Eurocommunists, because M. Adler declared that "From the coexistence of these two forms of represen­ tation (the council pyramid and the National Assembly) follows the demand that the principal weight should rest with the Central Council of the Workers' Council. For the latter is the representation of a homogeneous 278

necessity of the continuing existence of representative

democracy as a guarantee against corporative temptations

and the bureaucratic degeneration that might ensue from the

exclusive role of the councils.

The question of democracy, or rather the attitude to be adopted vis-a-vis representative democracy, stems from

the Communists' difficulty in defining "proletarian" democracy in a way which — both in theory and practice — would differ from the Leninist-Stalinist experience. The alternative that Eurocommunists — both Left and Right, and despite their differences — have offered is undoubtedly the same as Kautsky's. But their problem also corresponds to the controversial elaboration presented by the Italian socialist scholar Norberto Bobbio. Bobbio is interested in

...the problem why there is not democracy where socialism has been achieved...and why, in those countries where the rules of the democratic game have been observed, socialism

class of toilers and thus embodies the truly general will to social transformation. Its field of competence should therefore embrace all questions concerning the economy...and it should enjoy the uncontested right of taking initiatives before the National Assembly and of vetoing its decisions. The choice of government should be shared between the Central Council and the National Assembly in proportion still to be established" (M. Adler, Démocratie des Conseils Ouvriers [Paris, 1977], quoted in Weber, "Eurocommunism, Socialism and Demo­ cracy," New Left Review 110 [July-Aug. 1978]: 7). Weber makes the mistake of generalizing from the statement of one of its most radical elements the general theory of the Austro-Marxists on the relationship between the coun­ cils and the Assembly. 279

has hitherto ^ t arrived and does not even seem evident.

Bobbie's main argument is that direct democracy — although the ideal of a democracy — is very difficult, if not impossible. The growth of the modern state, not only physically, but in function as well, has rendered hierar- chization and bureaucratization inevitable. In fact, he even argues that bureaucratization is the result of demo- 3 8 cratization because the extension of universal suffrage has led to the increase of functions of the State to fulfill the demands of the masses. His main point, how­ ever, is that Rousseauian democracy is impossible because it leads to the end of the State and one knows, he argues, that no state has ever existed "without relations of descending power." His conclusion is identical to

Kautsky's and to the Eurocommunists':

...an alternative model of political organiza­ tion does not exist — i.e., an alternative to the parliamentary State, a model that could be called "democratic and socialist" in contrast to the traditional "democratic and liberal" model; an alternative in the sense that, in regard to certain values such as individual freedom and diffused power, in which all socialists must believe, it is more advanced

37 Norberto Bobbio, "Are There Alternatives to Repre­ sentative Democracy?" Telos 35 (Spring 1978): 23. In another article, he argues that "history has not witnessed any practical synthesis of democracy and socialism." Bobbio, "Why Democracy?" Telos 36 (Summer 1978): 44. 3 8 Bobbio, "Are There Alternatives," p. 20. 280

than the preceding one, but at the same time feasible. ^

This skeptical, but probably realistic, view is shared by

many Eurocommunists. The Eurocommunists seem to be at a

real impasse. They have attacked liberal democracy for

decades. Then, suddenly, they discovered that it was not

that bad after all or, at least, it is better than totali­

tarian democracy as it exists in the East. They now seem

to agree with Bernstein that "there is actually no really

liberal thought which does not also belong to the elements 40 of the ideas of socialism." By presenting representative

democracy as a result of mass pressure (class struggle),

its acceptance becomes easier. As indicated earlier, the majority of the population of advanced capitalist countries

have accepted representative democracy as legitimate. That does not mean that this same population will not accept an

alternative to the existing system (feudalism, too, was

accepted as legitimate and was eventually replaced by capitalism).

The dilemma faced by the Eurocommunists seems formida­ ble. Leninism has been rejected because it is not applica­ ble to West European societies unless a very catastrophic situation takes place, something worse than 1929. Now, the

39 Ibid., p. 24. Kautsky's practically identical arguments can be found in Salvadori, Kautsky, pp. 238-240.

^^Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, p. 151. 281

Eurocommunists' only choice seems to be to adapt to parlia­ mentary democracy and try to transform it in a more social­ ist and egalitarian direction; they also have the task to prove that what they offer is better than what already exists. But the real problem is this: how much power do the Communists have to radically transform the existing 41 socio-economic, political and cultural structures? How much must they change to present a viable and acceptable 42 alternative? More importantly, if they change so much, accept liberal democracy — no matter how much it might have been transformed — and act as government parties, what would then differentiate them from the current Social­ ist and Social Democratic parties? To go back to isolation is not realistic. It would only delegitimize their exis­ tence. In fact, the Communists have been instrumental in legitimizing the existing system by their mere participa­ is tion in it and by the defense of its rules. On the other

41 Some radical Communists think, as Lenin did, that "it is necessary to use the opportunities offered by bourgeois democracy against bourgeois democracy itself" to transform society (Lucio Magri, "Italy, Social Democracy, and Revolution in the West," Socialist Revolution 36 [Nov.-Dec. 1977]: 130-131).

^^On the many changes that non-ruling CPs go through to adapt to their respective political systems, cf. Thomas Greene, "Non-Ruling Communist Parties and Political Adapta­ tion," Studies in Comparative Communism VI (Winter 1973) . 43 See Lavau, "The PCF, the State, and the Revolution," pp. 97 ff. 282

hand, their defense of the bourgeois democracy often leads

them to accept political decisions which are contrary to 44 the interests of their constituencies. In fact, one might argue that the Eurocommunist policies are looking more like those of interest groups that bargain within the system in order to satisfy some of the demands of the people they represent (or claim to represent) than mass political parties eager to transform radically the system no matter what the cost. But what makes the Western CPs different from other parties is that despite their abandon­ ment of revolutionary theory and practice, they still believe in the ultimate goal of establishing a socialist society. Whether this is done to keep their constituency mobilized and/or to maintain their identity is not all that clear. The other characteristic which could be distin­ guished from those of other parties is the CPs' increasing claim of universalism. They do not make demands on sectar­ ian grounds (at least in rhetoric), but rather appeal to notions of justice (which have a universal value) in order to rally the whole society. One can even note a certain sense of idealism in their appeals. In order to attain ideological hegemony, they present themselves as the parties which best represent the "national interest."

44 The "historic compromise" is a case in point, as shall be seen later in this chapter. 283

The purpose of the discussion so far has been to highlight the dilemmas faced by the Eurocommunist parties and how these have affected their conception of democracy.

They have come to analyze representative democracy in a way which is undoubtedly Kautskyan. In many ways, they have gone further to the right than Kautsky. The point, of course, is not to make any value judgment as to the valid­ ity of their analyses, but simply to show the constraints within which they live and evolve. The capacity of capi­ talism not only to survive, but to grow and satisfy more demands, has led the Eurocommunists to hold, subconscious­ ly, the same views as Kautsky did after 1918. They would never admit that many of their ideas are the ideas present­ ed by the Social Democrats, for the simple reason that it would mean that they were wrong all along and that the splitters of the 1910s were right. Naturally, such an admission would legitimize the Socialist parties (no matter how embourgeoises they have become) as the representatives of the working class, a sort of rehabilitation of Social

Democracy. Though it anticipates the concluding chapter of this study, one is tempted to raise some critical questions at this point: Is it possible that the Communists and the socialists will reunify some day? If such unification is possible — here is meant something more than the "Unity of the Left" as it existed in France between the PS and the

PCF from 1972 to 1978 — what would become of Marxist 284

socialism in Western Europe? These are questions to which only the future will contain a response.

The Eurocommunists have not come to espouse liberal democracy because they want to use it as a Trojan Horse to destroy the fabric of democratic society. They have adopted it in order to integrate themselves within their respective polities and to transform — as radically as possible — the existing structures to make them more just.

It should be re-emphasized, at the risk of repetition, that the failure of the East to provide a superior type of democracy ("proletarian") to the one existing in the West

("bourgeois") has had a tremendous impact in changing the

Eurocommunist attitude toward representative democracy.

Even the least Eurocommunist of the Western CPs, the PCF, has had no other choice but to support the basic principles of bourgeois democracy. The choice is not simply a tac­ tical one; the French working class itself has had its influence in changing the direction of the Party. The latter may still remain critical of the existing French democracy, but it cannot ignore the realities of French political culture when compared with the Soviet or East

European ones. This is probably why — at least, this is the reason given by the PCF — the notion of dictatorship of the proletariat was rejected. For countries like Italy,

Spain, and to a lesser degree, France, where Fascism was a reality, it would have been inconceivable to talk still 285

about dictatorship, albeit that of the proletariat. What

is interesting in this context is the way the Eurocommu­

nists have approached the question of the dictatorship of

the proletariat.

Eurocommunism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat ; the Resurrection of Kautsky

In the 1970s, most Western CPs had decided to drop the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from their political programs. When the PCF decided to do away with the concept, various reactions ensued which reminded the observer of the debates and polemics following the Russian 45 Revolution. The acceptance or rejection of the "dicta­ torship of the proletariat" constitutes one of the main distinctions between Communism and Social Democracy. In the chapter on the problems of Marxist theory, it has been shown that for Marx and Engels the concept held an impor­ tant position in their thinking on the period of transi­ tion. Dictatorship of the proletariat and transition to socialism were, in their eyes, identical. The two concepts expressed in their theory the "rule of the proletariat"

45 For a Leninist defense of the concept, cf. Balibar, On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The introduction by G. Locke (pp. 7-33) and the attached documents and speeches (pp. 157-211) are of great value. 286

46 under a specific form of State. However, — and this

should be underlined — for Marx and Engels, though the

dictatorship of the proletariat was an inevitable necessi­

ty, it could not be the work of a minority. It was the

dictatorship of a class, the proletariat, which, in their

scheme, constituted the majority of the population

over a minority, the bourgeoisie. Kautsky, in 1909, held

the same view. He even discarded as an illusion the idea

that the proletariat could dominate the State together with

the bourgeoisie. Kautsky's position changed in 1910, and

following the Bolshevik Revolution, took a quite different direction. The Russian Revolution was to him the work of a minority who used violence and undemocratic means to maintain their domination. Moreover, for Kautsky, the existence of one party based on the exclusion of others could only lead to a dictatorial structure of power. In other words, he did not accept any kind of "dictatorship"

— albeit that of the proletariat — which did not permit the representation of others in a democratic setting. If the proletariat came to power, it did not have to preserve

46 Gfiran Therborn, What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules? (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 25. As noted earlier, however, Marx and Engels left enough ambiguity in their writings — mainly those on the possibility of a peaceful transition — for some of their followers to interpret the dictatorship of the proletariat simply to mean a form of "transition to socialism" or a "road of transition to socialism." Balibar categorically rejects such an interpretation (On the Dictatorship of the Prole­ tariat, p. 62) . 287

its rule through the repression and persecution of others.

The proletariat must not only show confidence and a supe­

rior way of ruling; it must also prove its legitimate right and merit to rule. The basis of this legitimacy should, of course, be its ability to become the "hegemonic" class within the limits of democracy. To summarize, Kautsky's definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat meant the

following:

(1) power obtained by the working class through the conquest of a majority in parlia­ ment, i.e., through the exercise of democratic freedoms in competition with all other par­ ties ; (2) the reliance of a purely socialist government, in transforming the social basis of the State, on a parliament that represented all political forces and was controlled by a socialist majority; (3) a regime that would not suppress the political and civil rights of citizens; (4) a regime prepared to verify the basis of popular consent to it in periodic elections ; (5) a regime that would use vio­ lence only against those advocates of counter­ revolution who refused to accept the reality of a socialist majority constituted in a legal government.

This interpretation is exactly the same as the one which the Eurocommunists hold today. Both the theoretical and political justifications for dropping the concept resemble Kautsky's.

The Eurocommunist reason for rejecting the concept was primarily political. As indicated before, the experience of Fascism has taught the Eurocommunists to distinguish

^^Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 254. (Emphasis mine.) 288

between the different bases of bourgeois democracy, on the

one hand, and of Fascism, on the other. Moreover, the

connotation that the term "dictatorship" has taken (not only with the rise of Fascism and Nazism, but also with

Stalinism and the military dictatorships in the Third

World) represented another reason for dismissal of the 4 8 concept. Theoretically, however, the argumentation of the Eurocommunists is more complex. They sometimes make it look as if there were only two alternatives; either the

"dictatorship of the proletariat" or the "democratic road 49 to socialism. " They insist that they have chosen the latter because it corresponds to the reality of Western

Europe, whereas the former was necessary in Russia in

1917.^^ If in 1917 Lenin and the Bolsheviks had no other choice but to use dictatorial means, the Eurocommunists argue, in Western Europe today a democratic path seems inevitable. They insist that this is indeed a revolution­ ary way even if it excludes violent and illegal means. As put by the leader of the Japanese CP,

...even under a system of complete bourgeois rule, so long as democratic institutions exist under the people's sovereign power, one can at least envisage a possibility of being able to effect a lawful transition to a new system on

48 See Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 146 49 On this point, cf. Balibar, p. 38. sn Carrillo, p. 150. 289

the basis of the majority of the people and by use of a parliament and legal means under the old system. This was the perspective held out by Marx for Britain and the U.S.

Like Kautsky, what the Eurocommunists hold to be important

in their new road to power is the winning of a majority in

Parliament. As early as 196 8, the CPGB declared: "Politi­ cal power must be won; and in the struggle for power, the winning of a majority in parliament, supreme organ of 52 representative power, is one of the essential steps."

One should not quickly assume that the Eurocommunists have dropped the dictatorship of the proletariat simply to adjust to the system awaiting better days (when the balance of forces is in their favor to destroy the system) and that their acceptance of representative democracy is simply 53 conjunctural and/or tactical. On the contrary, one might safely argue that, in fact, what they aim at doing is similar to Kautsky's scheme. Kautsky believed that

...it was a necessary condition for a healthy gestation that the proletariat be able to mature in a context of adequate capitalist

Tetsuzo Fuwa, "Scientific Socialism and the Dicta­ torship of the Proletariat," Marxism Today 21 (June 1977): 175. Note how this author stresses the parliamentary and legalist perspective (which he attributes to Marx). He goes even as far as to argue that "...the lesson which Marx and Engels drew from the Paris Commune was not the 'de­ struction' of the democratic republic, but its genuine democratic popular reorganization" (ibid., p. 178). 52 The British Road to Socialism, p. 48.

^^Spieker, in "How the Eurocommunists Interpret Democracy," argues that this is indeed the case. 290

development and of an experience of struggle seasoned by the exercise of political and civil liberties.... If the proletariat did not possess a sufficient level of organiza­ tional and ideological development and socio­ political experience or a sufficient numerical strength to assert itself against the other social classes, then socialism could not emerge as a social reality but^^only as an abstractly voluntarist project.

In other words, before the proletariat could take the fate of society in its own hands, it must fi’^st have acquired a certain level of maturity and consciousness. Only then could the proletariat go beyond the confines of bourgeois 55 democracy. The party's role is therefore not to orches­ trate a Blanquist seizure of power but, on the contrary, to be "the organizer of popular consent to a democratic social transformation."^ ^

The Eurocommunists do not deny that their conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat differs from that of

Lenin.

^^Kautsky, in Salvadori, Kautsky, p. 257. This idea is similar to Gramsci's.

^^Fuwa makes the same point: "A socialist revolution aiming at 'a complete transfor­ mation of the social organization' would be possible only when the majority of the people understood the purpose and tasks of the revolution, rallied to it consciously, and when, therefore, continuous activity amongst the broad masses of the people to win a majori­ ty becomes an important part of the fundamental prepa­ ration for revolution" ("Scientific Socialism," p. 178).

^^George Bridges, "Western European Communist Strate­ gy," in Politics, Ideology and the State, ed. Sally Hibbin (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1978), p. 130. 291

We are fully aware of the fact that our conception of the relation between democracy and socialism does not correspond with that elaborated by Lenin. But this conception has been developed, not by abandoning Lenin's method, but by taking stock of profoundly different historical conditions which Lenin himself could never have predicted.

The second part of the statement clearly shows the embar­

rassment of the Eurocommunists — mainly those belonging to

the "Old Guard" — when taking distance from their past.

This, of course, is problematic, especially for those who

are interested in finding out whether the Eurocommunists

are deeply transforming their strategies or simply wearing

new clothes better to achieve the ends they had originally proclaimed in the 1920s and 1930s. The contention in this

study is that the Eurocommunists are breaking with their

Leninist and Stalinist past; this applies mostly to the

PCI, whose de-Stalinization proceeded at a much faster pace than any other West European counterpart. But this is no reason to believe or expect that the Western CPs should suddenly reject their background to earn their credibility as democratic parties.

No party can utterly disown the principles on which its entire past and entire mythology were built. No party can be expected to say: we have been misguided or ignorant or naive for the greatest part of our existence — but

Napolitano, in Hobsbawm, Italian Road to Socialism, p. 99. The reference to "Lenin's method" not being aban- doned is more a pronouncement of what is left over from the old faith than a statement of fact. 292

now we are going to start a fresh chapter. If you drive self-criticism that far, you destroy your raison d'etre.

The Eurocommunists have to change incrementally to avoid

losing total contact with and control over their rank-and-

file affiliations which, in many cases, are still attached

to some of that background. Moreover, they cannot openly and rapidly show their new identity, because they might

lose any leverage over their adversaries. What is also obvious is that they cannot reincarnate and advocate

Kautsky's ideas by referring to their originator. Siding with Kautsky rather than with Lenin would certainly add up to an admission of failure and open betrayal of identity, or what is left of it. The problem, however, is how to break with Lenin, who has become an inappropriate guide for the Eurocommunists, without embracing (or rather, openly referring to) the "Renegade's" (i.e., Kautsky's) ideas. 59 The solution was found in the person of Gramsci.

5 8 A. Spinelli, "How European Are the Italian Commu­ nists?" in Eurocommunism; Its Roots and Future in Italy and Elsewhere, ed. G.R. Urban (New York; Universe Books, 1978) , p. 188. There exists, however, a contradiction worth noting: the new course of the Eurocommunist parties has been charted by the party elites. This suggests that the new path toward acceptance of democracy is being decided upon in a fundamentally undemocratic manner. The best illustration of this point is the PCF's sudden decision to drop the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat without any previous discussions at the grass-roots level. 59 "For people who still call themselves Communists, it is obviously more comfortable to claim allegiance to Gramsci than to Kautsky" (Mandel, From Stalinism to Euro­ communism, p. 201) . 293

In the 1950s, the PCI had already "turned to Gramsci

as a presumed link between the Bolshevik tradition and

structural reformism.The identification of the PCI

with "Gramscian" theory and practice has become a matter of

course. In the 1970s, the PCI has incessantly claimed that

its strategy is inspired by Gramsci's thought.

Any student of Gramsci knows the difficulty in asses­

sing and interpreting Gramsci's thought, not only because

of the conditions under which he wrote, but also because of

the many ambiguities in his work. This, of course, has

given way to a multitude of contradictory interpretations.

Boggs, The Impasse of Eurocommunism, p. 121. It should be noted, however, that the Italian Communists had first insisted that Gramsci was inspired by Lenin and Stalin. Togliatti and the PCI leadership, after their adoption of a "national road," decided to "...present the party's founder [i.e., Gramsci] and original intellectual inspiration no longer as the local orthodox spokesman of Soviet Communism, but as a thinker and politician national, and even nationalist, in his inspiration and orientation" (Stephen White, "Gramsci and the Italian Communist Party," Government and Opposition 7 [Spring 1972]: 195). White, however, fails to observe the greater problem for the Italian Communists if they had presented Gramsci as a Leninist-oriented theoretician: If, indeed, Gramsci is that, would it not mean that their strategy itself could only be another version of Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism" applied to Western Europe in a more sophisticated fashion? Would nut they lose their credibility as a real government party abiding by the rules of parliamentary democracy?

^^The PCF and the PCE have also claimed to be the heirs of Gramsci. In his book Eurocommunism and the State, Carrillo uses Gramsci's concepts extensively. Whether the concepts have the same meaning, however, is quite a differ­ ent story. 294

The ambiguities and contradictions in Gramsci's thought

have given both his opponents and proponents support for

their claim. Among his advocates there has arisen dispute

as to whether his thought is "orthodox" or "revisionist."

Again, both "orthodox" and "revisionists" find justifica­

tion in Gramsci's thought.

The political scientist, trying to figure out what

interpretation is objectively correct, is faced with

serious difficulties. What is of interest in this study,

however, is not the overall interpretation of Gramsci's

thought. To overcome some of the difficulties, one can

only make a selection of some of Gramsci's least ambiguous

concepts and compare them to the use made of them by those who claim to be his followers. This is what will be attempted in the following section.

Gramsci and Eurocommunism; The Anti-Leninist Strategist of the West?

What has happened to Gramsci is that he has become a fountain from which everyone takes whatever water he needs: for some, he is the father of the conception of authentic proletarian democracy; for others, he is a strict Stalinist; for still others, he is a Social Democrat, maybe even of a right-wing variety; there are those who consider him an orthodox Marxist-Leninist; while in the eyes of others, to conclude, he is an incorrigible idealist who has never understood anything of Marxism — or just about.

M.L. Salvadori, Gramsci e il problems storica della democrazia (1970) 295

In his analysis of the deradicalization of Marxist movements, R.C. Tucker suggested that when German Social

Democracy entered upon its reformist path, its leaders interpreted Marx's and Engels' texts in a manner which

justified its moderate practice. The pronouncements of

Marx and Engels on the possibility of a peaceful transition were continuously repeated and emphasized. On the other hand, however. Social Democracy

...tended to de-emphasize the many Marx-Engels texts which visualized the socialist revolu­ tion as the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions by "illegal methods" and which visualized the regime of the revolution g^s a violent dictatorship of the proletariat.

For whatever reasons — need for a West European theoreti­ cal authority, someone whose views are a priori in opposi­ tion to Lenin's and Soviet-type Marxism — the Eurocommu­ nists have apparently used Gramsci's texts for the same end as the Social Democrats used Marx and Engels. Their exegesis of Gramsci's writings is one which tends to show him as their theoretical guide in the policies which they have been following in the last decade or so.

The purpose of this section on the relationship between Gramsci and Eurocommunism is not intended as a condemnation of the Eurocommunists for their obviously distorted interpretations of Gramsci's thought. This

6 2 R.C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1970), p. 196. 296

should be the concern of the partisan. The purpose here is

to understand why such obvious distortions are undertaken.

In essence, it is my contention that what impels the CPs

(or what led the SDPs) to present the thoughts of important

Marxist classics in a distorted way so as to justify their non-revolutionary practice is their failure to achieve revolutionary goals, let alone a total revolution. This is not necessarily due to a weakness or a betrayal of the

leadership. Though the Eurocommunists possess a social theory (Marxism) , they could not implement it in revolu­ tionary praxis. Their theory, though meant to be a guide to action, did not always fit reality. The CPs, in fact, have been faced with realities which Marxist theory could not always explain. Moreover, there was another serious obstacle facing Western European CPs (and most CPs in the world) — Stalinism. The latter made any creative Marxism a theoretical (and practical) impossibility. Old slogans and so-called "orthodox truths" did nothing to help advance their cause or credibility. It hardly needs to be stated that Stalinism and its contemporary progeny — the regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union — have made Commun­ ism less attractive to the masses in the West. This reality, which the leaders of the PCI understood much better than did those of the PCF (the electoral results of both parties are a good indicator of that), has led to a complete change of strategy. The CPs have realized that. 297

for them to survive, they need to integrate themselves into

the existing system. Their integration in the system, in

turn, compels them to adopt tactics and strategies which

are imbued with bourgeois and "petty bourgeois," i.e.,

liberal and democratic, elements. Their revolutionary

fervor fades away or is limited to rhetoric. The new

strategy becomes legalistic and reformist, but pressure

keeps coming from below. The party must therefore keep its

image of a revolutionary party. Most importantly, the

party must keep this image, not only because of the pres­

sure from below, but also because it fears to lose its

raison d'etre. In order to close the gap between their

revolutionary rhetoric and their reformist practice, they

appeal to some great authority — the SPD cited Engels in

its defense, the Eurocommunists, Gramsci — to demonstrate

that their practice was/is still revolutionary, i.e., in

tune with the classics, and that it is the most appropriate

strategy considering the "objective conditions."

This proposition is obviously speculative. No one

really knows what might happen should the CPs come to power

in France or Italy, or should a social and economic break­ down occur in their countries. What is certain, however,

is that the pattern has shown that the West European

Communist parties have undergone a process of de-revolu- tionization. They pick a revolutionary authority to preserve their revolutionary image and their own identity. 298

The revolutionary person is denatured in the process; 6 3 he/she is a revolutionary, but a revolutionary who also

accepts liberal standards. In other words, the revolu­

tionary authority remains radical, but his/her radicalism does not go beyond the constitutional limits of democracy,

i.e., does not aim at the forcible overthrow of the sys- 64 tem. Because of certain ambiguities in his writings,

Gramsci represents the ideal figure for the Eurocommunists.

One of Gramsci's key points adopted by the Eurocommu­ nists is the notion of historical and geographical con­ trasts between Western and Eastern Europe (read Russia) .

Comparing the conditions existing in Russia on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gramsci writes that

...in Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks;

This is mostly due to the fact that the CPs must keep their self-image as revolutionary parties; the lead­ ers, after all, were socialized as members of a revolu­ tionary party. 64 The PCI leadership, for instance, is honest enough to admit that even Gramsci's thought needs some revision. Pietro Ingrao, leader of the Left wing of the PCI, conceded that not all PCI strategy with respect to the democratic road was inspired by Gramsci's teachings. See Giovanni Russo, "II Compromesso Storico: The Italian Communist Party from 1968 to 1978," in Eurocommunism; Myth or Reality?, ed. E. Mortimer and J. Story (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 98. 299

more or less numerous from one state to the next, it goes without saying — but this precisely necessitated an accurat^ reconnais­ sance of each individual country.

Given such conditions, a "war of movement" or frontal

attack (in Kautsky this would be Niederwerfungstrategie or

"strategy of overthrow") on the State in the West would

practically be suicidal. Advanced societies in the West

are characterized, according to Gramsci, by a greater

degree of consensus. The bourgeoisie in the West has

succeeded in imposing its domination not through open

coercion, but through a combination of force and consent.

It exercises this "cultural" or "ideological" "hegemony" in

"civil society" through a network of voluntary institutions

(political parties, churches, trade unions, schools, mass media, etc.)In order for the proletariat to become the

Antonio Gramsci,Selections from the Prison Note­ books , ed. and tr a n s . by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1971, 1978), p. 238 (hereinafter referred to as SPN). Incidentally, this was also Kautsky's argument for refusing an overt attack on the State in the West. Cf. his debate with R. Luxemburg on the "mass strike" in Salvadori, Kautsky, esp. p. 140. See also the good discussion in Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," pp. 61 ff. 66 "...the 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now clas­ sical terrain of the parliamentary regime is character­ ized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predom­ inating excessively over consent" (SPN, p. 80).

^^Cf. Louis Althusser's theoretical elaboration of the role of these institutions in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 127-186. 300

ruling class, it must first constitute itself as a "counter-

hegemonic" force in society even before seizing power:

A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power) ; it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in^^ts grasp, it must continue to "lead" as well.

The working class, with the help of a well-organized party

committed to the ideological and cultural struggle, should

engage in a drawn-out battle. The working class, however, must give up its sectarian interests and present itself as

the representative of the welfare of society as a whole; that is, its interests must have a character of universal­

ity.^^ This form of struggle for hegemony in the West

Gramsci calls "war of position" (in Kautsky this represents the "strategy of attrition," or Ermattunqstrategie), as opposed to the war of maneuver. In his view, because capitalism in advanced countries had permeated the whole fabric of society with its own ideology, it would be foolish to assume that the revolution in these cultures

Cf. Louis Althusser's theoretical elaboration of the role of these institutions in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 127-186.

^^Gramsci, SPN, pp. 57-58.

"For Gramsci, ideologies were hegemonic insofar as they possessed three interrelated characteristics — universalism, unitary coherence, and a capacity for popu­ larization" (Peter Gibbon, "Gramsci, Eurocommunism and the Comintern," Economy and Society 12 [1983]; 337). 301 would result automatically from a crisis in the economic

system.

Gramsci was well aware that any interpretation of

Marxist theory based on economic-determinist premises would only lead to catastrophic results for the working class.

The "superstructural" phenomena played, according to

Gramsci, as important a role as did the "infrastructure."

Therefore, the struggle must be extended to all levels of the social structure. Because the superstructure was not, in his view, simply a reflection of the economic base,

Gramsci insisted that the revolutionary movement should concentrate more on it. Since this analysis is devoid of any deterministic and mechanistic interpretation, it implies that the socialist transformation would have to be 71 "a process rather than an event or a series of events."

The working class and its allies, armed with a "counter- hegemonic" world-view, or with what Gramsci calls an

"integrated culture," sets itself the task of eliminating every component of the old order not only at the economic

Gramsci drew the conclusion — following the defeats of the European proletariat after WW I — that adventurism and putschism should be avoided because they only led to disasters. 71 Carl Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism (London; Pluto Press, 1978), p. 53. 302

72 and political levels, but at the cultural as well. In

other words, the proletariat must forge a new culture of

its own in order to establish its ideological hegemony.

Gramsci makes this point one of the sine qua non conditions

for the revolutionary process. This, by the way, goes

against the views of Lenin and Trotsky, for whom the

question of cultural and ideological transformation were a post-revolutionary question.

Gramsci's strategy for the West can be summarized as

follows: In the capitalist countries of Western Europe, the proletariat has been integrated into the capitalist system and has espoused a "way of life" imposed upon it by the bourgeois class; that is, it has been subordinated to bourgeois hegemony. This integration is so complete that any frontal attack modelled on the Russian experience would be doomed to failure. The strategy must therefore be one which aims at eroding and overcoming bourgeois cultural dominance. However — and this is important — Gramsci did not imply that this was a "peaceful road" to socialism because :

72 A point has been made that for Gramsci, "...the objective of ideological struggle is not to reject the system and all its elements but to reartic- ulate it, to break it down to its basic elements and then to sift through past conceptions to see which ones, with some changes of content, can serve to ex­ press the new situation" (Chantai Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, ed. C. Mouffe [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979], p. 192). For a different view, cf. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, p. 60 303

(1) Insurrection and violence are never disavowed.

In fact, they remain the objective once the

antagonism reaches its paroxysm and the balance

of forces is more favorable to the working class.

(2) The struggle for ideological hegemony is not

converted into a parliamentary battle, but is

situated at the level of everyday praxis.

(3) Seizure of state power (center of coercion)

remains the principal and ultimate goal. The

creation of a "counter-hegemonic" culture is

precisely a sort of preparation for the post­

revolutionary order, when the working class

establishes itself as the ruling class and 73 establishes a common culture.

73 See Gwyn Williams, "The Concept of 'Egemonia' in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation," Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960): 593. The question of whether Gramsci proposed the "war of position" as a springboard for the final assault, "war of movement," or whether "war of position" is to be viewed as a constant strategy, is a high point of controversy and debate among Marxists and non-Marxists alike. Anderson criticizes Gramsci for the ambiguities and contradictions that exist in his conceptualization of the two kinds of war; see "The Antinomies," pp. 69 ff. Nonetheless, it should be made clear that for Gramsci, the "war of position" constitutes a war, that is, a fighting strategy of a class with its own identity against another class. Cf. Chris Herman, "Gramsci Versus Eurocommunism," Part II, International Socialism 98-9 (1977-78): 11; Eric Hobsbawm, "Gramsci and Political Theory," Marxism Today 21 (July 1977): 210; Henri Weber, "In the Beginning Was Gramsci," Autonomia: Post-Political Politics III (1980): 88; Joseph Femia, "Gramsci, the Via Italians, and the Classical Marxist-Leninist Approach to Revolution," Government and Opposition 14 (1979): 67-68, 83-84. 304

While Gramsci still stays close to Lenin, the Eurocom­

munists emphasize the "peaceful" character of his strategy.

They also claim that they derive their policies from

Gramsci's conception of the "war of position," "hegemony,"

and "historic bloc."

To begin with Gramsci's notion of "war of position,"

there is no clear indication whether it has a permanent

character as a strategy. His position on the question is

ambiguous, to say the least. In fact, what gives a legiti­

mate reason for the Eurocommunists to claim that their

strategy is similar to Gramsci's is the letter's preference

for the "war of position" against the "war of maneuver."

However, the problem is more complex. For the Eurocommu­

nists, the "war of position" is also interpreted as a

policy of tactical alliances. This was not the case for

Gramsci. He did not conceive the "war of position" to be a

policy of tactical alliances of the United Front type whose

character, one remembers, was obviously defensive. On the

contrary: though the "war of position" is adopted as a

response to the strength of capitalism, it must have an

aggressive character. The basis of the strategy is the

undermining and eventual destruction of the whole system,

albeit in a more prudent and protracted way than in 74 R us s i a .

74 A. Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings, 1921-1926 (New Yorkl International Publishers, 1978) , pp. 199-200. 305

The crucial difference between Gramsci's conception

and that of the Eurocommunists with respect to the "war of

position" is that the latter understand it as an electoral-

ist and parliamentary strategy. They do not view the "war of position" as a struggle to be waged in order to undo the

socio-economic fabric woven by the capitalist system.

Contrary to Gramsci, they do not conceive the struggle as one which will result in the elimination of the bourgeois order and its ideology and the imposition of working-class hegemony. They simply view the strategy as a political and ideological competition (rather than struggle) confined within the legal framework set up by the bourgeois system.

Therefore, the objective of the Eurocommunists — at least in its Right version — is more one of integration and legitimation rather than disintegration and reconstruction, which is more or less the view of the Left Eurocommunists.

Depending on how one may read Gramsci's thought, there could be room left for a Eurocommunist interpretation of the "war of position." One of the weaknesses in Gramsci's conception of this strategy is that it may lead to a status quo situation in which the bourgeoisie and the working 75 class try to weaken each other. Despite such a possible

7 5 "Revolutionary strategy in Gramsci's account becomes a long, immobile trench-warfare between two camps in fixed positions in which each tries to undermine the other culturally and politically" (Anderson, "Antinomies," p. 69). 306

interpretation and despite his lack of systematic integra­

tion of the "war of position" with the "war of maneuver"

(final assault), Gramsci, I would contend, always remained

faithful to the Marxist-Leninist belief that the seizure of

power would be a violent one. Notwithstanding the argu­

ments presented by the Left critics of Gramsci today, such

as Anderson and Mandel, I think one is on firmer ground in

suggesting that Gramsci remained attached to the Leninist

conception of the "war of position" as the preparation for

the final assault.Gramsci simply extrapolated Lenin's

conception to the specific historical and overall charac­

teristic differences between the two social formations

(i.e., Russia in 1917 and Western Europe). To avoid

catastrophe and demoralization, the working class in the

West had no choice but to pursue the "war of position."

The development of capitalism in the West, which was

greater than elsewhere, created political superstructures

and socio-economic conditions which made it necessary to

act more prudently and patiently than in Russia. This is why, in the West,

War of movement increasingly becomes war of position, and it can be said that a State will win a war in so far as it prepares for it

On Lenin's strategy of "war of position" and "war of movement," see his Collected Works, Vol. 16, p. 383. There is absolutely no doubt that for Lenin, the first strategy was only a preparation for the "war of movement," which is bound to take place once the working class has gained enough power to overthrow the existing regime. 307

minutely and technically in peacetime. The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organizations and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the "trenches" and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position; they render merely "partial" the element of movement which before used to be "the whole" of war, etc.

There is, however, no indication that this strategy in the

West should take a gradualist and peaceful character. The

"war of position," in fact, does not exclude the complemen­

tarity, and perhaps the necessity, of the "war of maneu­

ver." The two are complementary rather than mutually

exclusive. Moreover, in no way did the "war of position" mean an adaptation to the existing bourgeois-democratic 7 8 system which Gramsci profoundly despised. Like Lenin,

Gramsci visualized parliament as a tribune to be used by the working class in order to make the masses aware of the real nature (i.e., the "undemocratic character") of the bourgeois parliamentary system; hence the necessity for 79 revolutionary struggle as the only road to socialism.

On Lenin's strategy of "war of position" and "war of movement," see his Collected Works, Vol. 16, p. 383. There is absolutely no doubt that for Lenin, the first strategy was only a preparation for the "war of movement," which is bound to take place once the working class has gained enough power to overthrow the existing regime.

^^Gramsci, S P N , p. 243. 7 8 Cf. Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," SPN, pp. 192-194. 79 Cf. Maria-Antonietta Macchiocchi, Pour Gramsci (Paris; Editions du Seuil, 1975), p. 171. This point. 308

Gramsci's problematic on this point was quite different

from the Eurocommunists'. While the latter are attempting

to reconcile socialism and democracy, a preoccupation

characteristic of Kautsky and Social Democracy, Gramsci was more concerned with the question of why the revolution

failed in the West and what strategy should be adopted for the transition to socialism, a transition which, he insist­ ed, involved a radical rupture within the system and which transcended bourgeois-democratic politics.

In contrast, the Eurocommunist strategy — at least that of the different CPs, as opposed to the Left Eurocom­ munists, e.g. Poulantzas and Buci-Glucksmann — involves a struggle within the system, but does not seriously consider a rupture within the latter, which Gramsci insisted upon despite the ambiguities of his conception of the "war of 8 0 position." Moreover, for Gramsci, the question was not one of the advance of the working-class party within the existing system to extract reforms from the bourgeoisie.

Neither was it a political competition between more or less equal parties. For him, "in politics the war of position

needless to say, is a repetition of Lenin's in "Left-Wing Communism," where he attacked the Left-wingers for not taking the opportunity of parliaments to denounce bourgeois democracy. See also S. White, "Gramsci and the Italian Communist Party," Government and Opposition 7 (Spring 1972): 199-200. 8 0 C. Buci-Glucksmann, "State, Transition and Passive Revolution," quoted in Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory, p. 221. See also same author in Dialectiques 17 (Winter 1977): 27. 309

81 is the conception of hegemony." This means that the

strategy of the working class is an all-embracing struggle

aiming at the destabilization and delegitimization of the

existing system, not its rationalization and acceptance.

For Gramsci, contrary to the Eurocommunists, the socialist

movement cannot simply operate within the existing system

to extract concessions or to better the system. It must,

instead, produce a political practice different from

bourgeois politics. The council forms of democracy, which

only occupy a negligible position in Kautsky's and Eurocom- 8 2 munist strategies, held a considerable place in Gramsci's.

The second concept that the Eurocommunists claim to

have inherited from Gramsci is the concept for which he is

mostly known: "hegemony."

By "hegemony" Gramsci seems to mean a socio­ political situation, in his terminology a "moment," in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of

81 Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, quoted in Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," p. 198. 8 2 The fact that Gramsci did not deal with the factory councils in the Prison Notebooks (written between 1929 and 1933) does not mean that he denied them the importance he attributed to them in the post-WW I period and in the 1920s. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think, as the Left Eurocommunists do, that Gramsci conceived of revolutionary strategy as an articulation between parlia­ ment and the councils. On this last point, see Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, pp. 96 ff. Nicola Baldoni ("Gramsci and the Problem of the Revolution," in Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory, pp. 89-94) demonstrates convincingly the continuity of Gramsci's thought. 310

reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation. An element of direction and control, not neces­ sarily conscious, is implied. This hegemony corresponds to a state power conceived in stock torxist terms as a dictatorship of a class.

Gramsci's concept of hegemony consists in the exercise of moral and intellectual — and economic — power by the class aspiring to rule (or already ruling) a nation by imposing its world-view and making it accepted as legiti- 8 4 mate by the subordinate classes. Gramsci assumed that the ascendance of the working class as a hegemonic class could be made possible by the crisis of bourgeois hegemony resulting from the class struggle. The task of the working class, therefore, is to create its own Weltanschauung, based on Marxist theory, in order to offer not only itself, but the other social classes as well, a counter-ideology that delegitimizes the rule of the bourgeoisie and provides society with a superior alternative. Gramsci's argument derives, logically, from his view that "a social group can.

p O G.A. Williams, "The Concept of 'Egemonia'," p. 587. 84 The implication seems to be that "hegemony is a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of 'intellectual and moral leadership.' " R. Simon, "Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony," Marxism Today (March 1977), p. 78. A good work that attempts to use Gramsci's concept of hegemony in a contemporary advanced society is Miliband's The State in Capitalist Society. 311 and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power." The other condition, of course, is to attract the other social groups into sharing the new world-view presented by the working class. The latter must abandon its corporative interests in order to achieve this goal (and to consolidate its claim of being a class representing the universal interests of society).

Just as the bourgeoisie has been able to co-opt other classes and impose its ideological hegemony on them, the working class, too, must weld together a bloc of various groups and strata under its direction. This should be done through the identification and articulation of the interest of other social classes and strata with the interests of the working class.

It is, therefore, vital for the working class not to isolate itself within a ghetto of proletarian purism. On the contrary, it must try to become a "national class," representing the interests of the increasingly numerous social groups. In order to do this it must cause the disintegration of the historical bases of the bourgeoisie's hegemony by disar­ ticulating the ideological bloc by means of

For Gramsci, as for Lenin, the proletariat remains the leading force in its alliance with other potential supporters. Because it occupies a central position in the productive process, the proletariat holds the role of leadership in the construction of the new society. Hence the importance assigned by Gramsci to the factory councils as the nuclei of the future society. "Though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must neces­ sarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activi­ ty" ( S ^ , p. 161) . 312

which the bourgeoisie's intellectual direction is expressed. It is in fact only in this condition that the working class will be able to rearticulate a new ideological system which will serve as a cement for the hegemonic bloc within which it will play the role of a leading force.

This, a priori, seems to be what the Eurocommunists say they want to achieve ever since they have broken away from their "ghetto" positions and/or were permitted a legal existence within the national polity (e.g., Spain, Japan).

However, contrary to what Gramsci had envisioned, at least theoretically, the Eurocommunists have limited themselves to a parliamentary strategy which, far from aiming at the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois political struc­ tures, consists in the legitimization of these very same structures. This is essentially the strategy adopted by the Social Democrats.

Moreover, when Gramsci talked about the constitution of a "historic bloc" to undermine the power of the bour­ geoisie, he had in mind something quite different from what the Eurocommunists have practiced or envisaged. For

Gramsci, just as for Lenin, the "historic bloc" — neces­ sary for the establishment of the working class hegemony — was to be the coalition of social forces grouped around and under the leadership of the proletariat. This coalition did not include all kinds of social groups or classes.

^^Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," p. 197, 313

Rather, it was aimed at rallying those forces whose inter­ ests were potentially or effectively antithetical to those of the bourgeoisie.

The question of class alliances is an area in which one can see a deep gap separating Gramsci from the Eurocom­ munists. Like Lenin, Gramsci favored a coalition of social forces — poor peasants and intellectuals — whose inter­ ests clashed with those of the bourgeoisie. They come under the leadership of the proletariat and as such, though allies, they are not equals. The proletariat must lead them in the struggle against the bourgeoisie; by the same token, it also imposes upon them — though through convic­ tion rather than force — its ethical-political world-view.

This is made unequivocal by the following statement:

...a class is dominant in two ways, i.e., "leading" and "dominant." It leads the classes which are its allies, and dominates those which are its enemies. Therefore, even before attaining power a class can (and must) lead; when it is in power it becomes-dominant, but continues to "lead" as well....

This conception is clearly Leninist. The only difference is that Gramsci was aware that, due to the nature of West

European societies, a new system could not be built through force alone and that therefore a certain level of consensus within the social bloc was necessary. Even the consensus should be viewed as a tactical maneuver made necessary by

8 7 Gramsci, SPN, p. 57. 314

the relationship of forces at a certain conjuncture. The

aim is to establish total hegemony once conditions permit

it, and there is no going back.

The Eurocommunist strategy, on the other hand, is

clearly conceived in liberal-representative terms:

The parties are linked to particular class interests, but they are not a pure, mechanical expression of these interests.... Even when society has been transformed in its economic bases and the division into antagonistic classes has been eliminated, different inter­ ests will continue to exist and various ways of thinking and political, cultural and religious orientations and traditions will retain their importance and value. Hence the possibility for existence and due function of various parties — and the alternation in government — in the phase of democratic and socialist renewal of society as well, and in the work of building and govern­ ing a new society. The leading role of the working class itself in the process of overcoming capitalism and building a new society can and must be exercised through collaboration and agreements among various parties and currents that aspire to socialism, and within the framework of a democratic system in which all the constitu­ tional parties enjoy full rights, including those that do not want the transformation of society in a socialist direction and oppose such a transformation, naturally within the confines of democratic constitutional rules.... This pluralistic vision is not a tactical expedient...but the result a long matura­ tion of ideas and politics.

This is far from being a Gramscian position — let alone a

Leninist one. Gramsci, like Lenin — though neither one

8 8 "Draft Theses for the Fifteenth Congress of the PCI, Dec. 1978," in Lange and Vannicelli, p. 52. (Emphasis m i n e .) 315

explicitly rejected the possibility of multipartism in

socialism — saw the Communist party as the primary organ­

izer of the new society — even during the period of 89 transition. The Eurocommunists speak of Marxism today primarily as an ideology of the working people, an ideology competing with others within an institutionalized frame­ work. The Secretary General of the PCP — the least

Eurocommunist of the Western CPs — declared in 1971:

On the philosophical plane, we are resolutely in favor of respecting the convictions of each and in support of the freedom of confrontation between world-views and cultural currents without the State or. the administration obliged to interfere.

Gramsci was not as "liberal" as the Eurocommunists would like to portray him. His conception of the future society was as Leninist — some would say totalitarian — as one can be.

Orthodoxy is not to be looked for in this or that adherent of the philosophy of praxis [i.e., Marxism]...but in the fundamental concept that the philosophy of praxis is

89 Though Gramsci ' s conception of the CP was less elitist, in the main it remained Leninist. 90 G. Marchais, Interview with La Croix, Nov. 1971, in Lange and Vannicelli, p. 66. In his book Le Defi Démocra­ tique (Paris: Grasset, 1973), pp. 96-118, he even stresses the alternance of power and the respect for the verdict of the electoral majority. One should not take the PCF's pronouncements on the respect for other views very seri­ ously. How can a party accept convictions of others when it represses novel ideas — based on Marxist analyses and premises — within its own ranks? No decent Communist scholar has ever been able to survive intellectually in the PCF. 316

"sufficient unto itself," that it contains in itself all the fundamental elements needed to reconstruct a total and integral conception of the world, a total philosophy and theory of natural science, and not only that but every­ thing that is needed to give life to an integral practical organization of society, that is, to become a total civilization.... A theory is "revolutionary" precisely to the extent that it is an element of conscious separation and distinction into two camps and is a peak inaccessible to the enemy camp. To maintain that the philosophy of praxis is not a completely autonomous and independent structure of thought in antagonism to all traditional philosophies and religions, means in reality that one has not severed one's links with the old world^^if indeed one has not actually capitulated.

Gramsci's hegemony, as indicated earlier, is not limited to the ethical-political level, but is exercised at the

91 Gramsci, "Problems of Marxism," SPN, p. 462. (Emphasis mine.) It is correct to argue that

"... in fact, not only was hegemony [in Gramsci's defi­ nition] organized on the basis of an ideology whose principal characteristic was its exclusiveness with respect to other ideologies, but it was organized politically on the basis of a party striving for a monopolistic penetration of the popular masses and their institutions. For this reason the question of the State...could only be consistently solved in the context of the rule of the proletariat, for only the capture by the proletariat of the state repressive apparatuses could guarantee this monopoly" (Gibbon, "Gramsci, Eurocommunism, and the Comintern," p. 353). Compare this with Carrillo's statement that "the party does not set itself the aim of becoming the dominant force in the State or in society or of imposing its ideology in them on an official footing...." (Eurocommunism and the State, p. 101). The Eurocommunist parties rejected the notion of "leading role of the proletariat" in the coalition of political parties at the Pan-European Communist party conference held June 29-30, 1976 in East Berlin. See Leonhard, Eurocommunism, p. 151; N. Mclnnes, Eurocommunism (Beverly Hills/London: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 27-28. 317 economic level as well. In fact, one can safely argue that

Gramsci's concept of hegemony and "historic" or "revolu­ tionary bloc" constitute the equivalent of the "dictator- 92 ship of the proletariat" applied to the West. The strategy would be different from the one that took place in the East, but the objective was to be the same. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry and the intellectuals only expresses an alliance (conceived in non-electoralist terms) whose foundation is the objective interest shared by the "bloc" in overthrowing the existing system. It was also clear, for Gramsci as well as for

Stalin, that any alliance with the bourgeoisie (e.g., in the struggle against fascism) could only have a tactical and temporary character. The class distinctions are clear- cut. The proletariat, despite the temporary character of this alliance, should have the role of leadership.

The Eurocommunists have elaborated strategies which are far from coinciding with Gramsci's. The latter might well have been the Eurocommunists' staunchest critic. In their search for votes, they have sought alliances with political parties whose interests are outright antagonistic

92 For a similar view, of. the penetrating article by Massimo Salvadori, "Gramsci and the PCI; Two Conceptions of Hegemony," in Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory, pp. 237- 258. 318

93 to those of the working class. Their new strategy has led them to view the components of the social structure 94 with different eyes in order to justify their practice.

The Eurocommunists' strategy is intrinsically parlia­ mentary, i.e., non-revolutionary. It is therefore differ­ ent from Gramsci's. Eurocommunism's critics are probably correct to point out that it is illusory — from a Marxist point of view — to assume that the CPs could bring about any substantial structural transformations of society in a socialist direction through legal means. The failure of

Social Democracy is pointed out as an example. Moreover, another question could be asked as to the realism of the

Eurocommunist strategy: how could the Eurocommunists create a Marxist Weltanschauung in a given society if their strategy is limited to a competition at the level of ideas

93 What is rather curious is that it is not the new socio-economic conditions and a serious analysis of the latter which gave rise to the Eurocommunist strategy, but rather their analysis came post facto to their strategy. 94 All the European CPs speak of the new socio-economic conditions brought about by State Monopoly Capitalism. The latter, they argue, is characterized by the domination of a fraction of capital over all classes and groups (including the bourgeoisie) which it has antagonized. See G. Marchais, "Report to the 22nd Congress of the PCF, Feb. 1976," in Lange and Vannicelli, pp. 74-75; and Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 24. In 1971, Garaudy, who had recently been expelled from the PCF, argued that the French socio-economic structure had changed to such a degree that even the notion of "classes moyennes" had become obsolete, and that an objective anti-monopolistic alliance was necessary in order to transform society. "Revolution et bloc historique," L'Homme et la Soci'éte 21 (July-Aug.-Sept. 1971), pp. 174-175. 319

in Parliament? Could the Eurocommunists expect that they would have full access to and control of the means of communication (TV, Radio, Newspapers, etc.) and education

(schools, universities) in a peaceful way?

The Eurocommunist strategy is, in reality, more modest. The CPs today present themselves as the represen­ tatives of all the discontented classes and strata in the countries of advanced capitalism. They "collect" the grievances of what they see as the majority and present them for debate in parliaments. They urge the legislators to promulgate laws which will prevent the system from becoming chaotic. Like the Social Democrats in Imperial

Germany, they point out to the legislators that they had better make changes in the system if they do not want to see the working class party unleash its revolutionary potential. Meanwhile, the Eurocommunists, no matter how few concessions are granted by the bourgeois parties, 95 reject any direct mass action as adventurous. The

Eurocommunists see the collaboration and cooperation of all classes and their representatives (including the conserva­ tive parties, except for the fraction representing monopoly capitalism) as the only solution in creating a better

95 "It is in the best interests of the working people, of the vast majority of the nation, that this mass struggle [i.e., anti-monopolist struggle aiming at the establishment of socialism] for political power should be carried through by peaceful means, without civil war." The British Road to Communism, p. 48. 320

society wherein the evils of capitalism would be eliminat­ ed. The dialectical transformation (economic and socio­ logical) of advanced capitalist societies since WW II, as the Eurocommunists see it, is what made the latter orches­ trate their alliance strategy.

The Anti-Monopoly Forces as Objective Allies

The Eurocommunists analyze advanced capitalist socie­ ties in a way which gives support to their political practice. Their main re-interpretations relate to the

State as it stands in its so-called "monopoly capitalist" phase, the position of the different classes and their relationship to this form of State, the transformation of the role of the different classes, etc. Hence, the need, they argue, for a new type of "working-class" politics.

Most Eurocommunists do not believe that a minority can make a revolution in the West. On this, they are closer to

Gramsci. Quite correctly, they understand that the major­ ity do not wish to see the system collapse. Therefore, their policy is aimed at gaining the consensus of the majority through a strategy whose basic principles are the democratic transformation of the system.

The basic premise of the Eurocommunists is that in today's advanced societies,

...the overwhelming majority of the people suffer economically, socially, culturally, and politically... from the domination of the 321

economy and political life by a relative handful o&powerful monopolies, linked with the State.

According to this theory, the State is no longer the State of the whole bourgeoisie, but is the instrument of one of

its factions only. Marchais declared that

For forty years we spoke of the "two hundred families" which dominated France. That day is over. Our era is the era of the giants of banking and the large multinational industrial groups.... They exert a world hegemony over the whole society, including all other fac­ tions of the bourgeoisie.

The economists of the PCF estimate that the monopoly capi- 98 talist class represented only 4% of the population.

State monopoly capitalism has allegedly created new socio­ logical distinctions within French society. It has pro- 99 duced new intermediary strata ("couches intermédiaires") which have been relatively impoverished by the system. The

J. Woddis, "A Single Gigantic Flood; Reflections on the Democratic Alliance," Marxism Today 21 (Sept. 1977): 264. The author is a member of the CPGB. See also G. Marchais, "Report to the 21st Congress of the PCF, Oct. 1974," and "Report to the 22nd Congress of the PCF, Feb. 19 76," in Lange and Vannicelli, pp. 73, 74.

97 Ibid., Note the use of the term "hegemony." 98 The population has been divided by the PCF as follows: working class = 44.5%; "Couches intermédiaires" salariées = 30.5%; "couches intermédiaires nonsalariées = 21.5%; patrons = 4%. P. Boccara, ed.. Le Capitalisme monopoliste d'Etat, 2 vols. (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1969), quoted in D. Bensaid and A. Artous, "Hégémonie, autogestion, et dictature du prolétariat," Critique Commu­ niste 16 (June 1977): 47. 99 Literally translated, "couche" means layer. 322 new intermediary strata are, therefore, considered closer to the working class despite their separate and distinct interests. Moreover, because of their similar subjection by state monopolism, the solution to their problems could only be provided, says the PCF, by the establishment of socialism. The PCF still argues, however, that the indus­ trial working class remains the most revolutionary class because it is the most exploited — or, perhaps, because it is represented by the PCF, which should be the leading force in the transformation of society? Because it cannot make the revolution alone — i.e., without the consensus of other segments of society — the working class should rally the intermediary strata around its cause. This is possible due to the degradation of the conditions of the intermedi­ ary strata by monopoly capitalism. The latter have now a more positive attitude toward socialism, according to the

PCF.^^^ The PCF's strategy aims at the consolidation of

See Ross, "Workers and Communists in France," pp. 241-42; and Ross, "Marxism and the New Middle Class: French Critiques," Theory and Society 5 (March 1978). It should be noted, however, that the PCF does not consider the intermediary strata as classes. The only social class per se is the working class. The intermediary strata — which Ross correctly describes as new "middle classes" — are simply sociological categories used by the PCF. The bourgeoisie itself appears in the statistics of the latter as "patrons" (which could be translated as employers of labor or owners of firms). "For the PCF there are not only no 'new middle classes,' there are no 'middle classes' at all, but rather a series of strata laying between bour­ geoisie and proletariat" (Ross, "Marxism and the New Middle Classes," p. 167). The reason seems rather obvious. As 323

its electoral objectives. The leadership is conscious of

the fact that the electoral strength of the PCF could become effective only if it were based on a democratic

alliance with the other parties of the Left. The position of the PCF has always been one of suspicion. First, no matter how Eurocommunist it might get, the PCF would never give up its Leninist principle of claiming to be the only legitimate representative of the working class. Second, the PCF cannot, or rather does not want to, identify the interests of the intermediary strata with those of the working class whose traditional organizer it has been.

Therefore, despite its sociological analyses and its awareness of the need to create a political alliance with the intermediary strata, the Party cannot afford, at the risk of losing its identity and consistency, to closely identify the interests of these strata with those of the working class. Even in a coalition of the Left, the PCF would refuse to have a subordinate status, i.e., that of a junior partner. In fact, the leadership of the party would try to push a Left coalition into a direction acceptable to the PCF. Hence, the collapse of the "Union de la Gauche"

convincingly suggested by Bensaid and Artous, in the article cited above, the PCF would like to show that on the one hand the proletariat and its allies could electorally represent up to 96% of the active population, while on the other hand still defining the working class narrowly enough to make the PCF its sole political representative (ibid., p. 48). 324

(Union of the Left) in 1977. The main reason was that the

PCF was losing some of its electorate to the Socialist party (PS).^^^ In a sense, the PCF does not seem to have gone much beyond the traditional popular-front policies of the 1930s and 1940s. This could be interpreted as the consequence of the late (and still slow) de-Stalinization of the PCF. However, despite its refusal to be a junior partner in a Left coalition, the PCF does not have a revolutionary strategy that it could impose upon its allies. The main claim of the PCF is to be a national party to be reckoned with in any decisions concerning the nation. This has led the party to cooperate with all the forces of the Left in order to transform the system gradu­ ally and peacefully. The path to achieve such transforma­ tion is the "anti-monopolistic" strategy, or what the PCF calls "advanced democracy." The latter is theoretically conceived as a stage in which the Left has come to power

(by virtue of an electoral victory) and, through a common program of a United Left, would implement a strategy aiming at progressively wresting the levers of power from the monopoly class.

Our peaceful and democratic way is a rela­ tively long and complicated revolutionary process in which partial qualitative changes will ultimately lead to socialism. It is not

^^^This happened despite the PCF's new flexible policy with respect to recruitment of new members, etc. 325

a strategy of sharp (ÿ^^ges aimed at ending capitalism overnight.

The choice, according to the PCF, is contingent upon the decision of the people to go to socialism; if the people do not want to go in the direction shown by the Left, the PCF would step down, because it accepts the alternance of power.This, incidentally, is in line with the thought of Kautsky, who held that "a class can be divided among various parties" and that "a party can include members of different classes" in order to govern. This is made necessary in order for the same ruling class to be able to have a different type of governmental representation, when its "majority believes that the method of the party that has hitherto governed has become unsatisfactory and that of 104 its competitor more suitable." The development of

Leninism following the Russian Revolution became anti­ thetical to such conceptions. As is well known, the

European CPs had adopted Lenin's position until the late

1950s.

102 International Symposium, "Communists in the Strug­ gle for Democratic Unity," World Marxist Review 18 (Aug. 1975); 80-81. 103 "Democracy demands respecting the popular verdict by all, and in all circumstances...we will in every case respect the verdict expressed by direct, secret and proportional, universal suffrage, whether it is favorable or unfavorable" (Marchais, Le Defi Démo­ cratique, quoted in Lange and Vannicelli, p. 69). 104 Kautsky, Democracy or Dictatorship, in Salvadori, Kautsky, pp. 259-60. 326

The strategy of the PCF is perhaps the most intriguing

and complex. Its analysis is made difficult by the uncer­

tainty with respect to the degree of de-Stalinization of

the party. The PCF has, of course, attempted to change its

image. One of its most formidable tasks has been to convince the French people that it would not eliminate its coalition partners once it has come to power:

Perhaps certain people think, once we accede to power, we Communists would intend to eliminate the others? Nothing in our prac­ tice can justify this fear. We have never eliminated anyone, either in the government in which we participated or in the numerous municipalities which we run.... As for the future, everything which we propose shows the falsity of that hypothesis. We want lasting cooperation among democratic parties — cooperation on an equal footing with the same,rights and the same duties for each partner.

The position of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) is not unlike that of the PCF, but is much more moderate — perhaps because of the weakness of the PCE in the Spanish political system. The PCE seeks to make alliances, not necessarily with the Left, but with the Center.

G. Marchais, L 'Humanité (Feb. 5, 1976), quoted in A.E. Stiefbold, The French Communist Party in Transition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 67. On this point Marchais is right. In fact, it is other parties which eliminated the CPs from a coalition once they had achieved their goal and used up the necessary support of the Commu­ nists in West European countries. See S. Tarrow, "Trans­ forming Enemies into Allies: Non-Ruling Communist Parties in Multiparty Coalitions," Journal of Politics 44 (Nov. 1982), esp. pp. 933, 939. The case of Eastern Europe in the morrow of 1945, however, gives support to those who fear that once in power the PCF or the PCI would get rid of their coalition partners and impose one-party rule. 327

Carrillo, whose Eurocommunist positions have been the most blatant, uses the notion of "political and social democracy," i.e., a unity of the "forces of labor and cultureto describe the phase of anti-monopoly strug­ gle. The latter, it should be emphasized, represents, in the eyes of the Eurocommunists, the period of transition to socialism. However, it is not all that clear whether this is a transition to the Marxian phase described as socialism which would be followed by another transition toward

Communism, or whether socialism would remain the last phase 107 after the transcendence of the anti-monopoly stage.

Schematically, this could be represented as follows.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Eurocommunists

Phase: Capitalism Capitalism

Transition: Dictatorship of the proletariat Anti-monopoly struggle; (socialism) through violent Elimination of monopoly faction overthrow of bourgeois state through elections and broad alliances. Left majority.

Final Phase: Communism Socialist democracy

Carrillo, quoted in E. Mujal-Leon, Communism and Political Change in Spain (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 82.

^^^My question is similar to the one raised by Claudin in his Eurocommunism and Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1977), pp. 101 ff. 328

Whatever the meaning of the phase of anti-monopoly

struggle — which the Eurocommunists do not describe as 108 socialism — the struggle for socialism is assumed to be the business of the majority of the people. Although the Communist Party

...continues to be the vanguard party, inasmuch as it truly embodies a creative Marxist attitude... it no longer regards itself as the only representative of the working class, of the working people and the forces of culture. It recognizes, in theory and in practice, that other parties which are socialist in tendency can also be representa­ tive of particular sections of the working population, although their theoretical and philosophical positions and„their internal structure may not be ours.

One should stop for a moment to draw what seems to be a strong parallel between the "revisionism" of Bernstein

108 Though this is described as a phase when the Left has come to power — through elections — the Eurocommu­ nists do not call it the socialist phase. They are correct in not calling it so because they are aware that despite the nationalizations (partial) and the social programs intended to be carried out, small and medium-size industri­ al and commercial properties still coexist with the nation­ alized sectors. But no matter how it is qualified, this phase is the phase that Bernstein described as Socialism. There is only a qualitative difference between Bernstein and the Eurocommunists. 109 Carrillo, Eurocommunism and the State, p. 100. The PCE is here obviously extending its hand to its former anti-Leninist enemies, the Socialists. Though there is a hint that the "great pardon" between the two parties could take place, it remains clear that the Communists have no desire to give up their proclaimed role as the legitimate representatives of the working class. The other "particu­ lar sections of the working population" that Carrillo is referring to are obviously the new intermediary strata, which often vote Socialist. 329

and the Eurocommunists on the question of the "new middle

class" and the consequent alliance with it.

Bernstein argued that under monopoly capitalism the

middle class, far from disappearing during the evolution of

capitalism, as predicted by Marx, did in fact increase in

numbers. In the same way the Eurocommunists argue

today, Bernstein insisted that, despite their aspirations

to belong to the bourgeois class, these elements of the

middle class share a great deal in common with the prole­

tariat: their salaries were not much higher than those of

the wage-earners. Therefore, they were likely to see an

identity of interests with the working class. "The majori­

ty of them identify themselves more and more with the

working class and should be added to it — along with their

dependents. However, contrary to the analysis of the

Eurocommunists — mainly the French — Bernstein suggested

that it was not the fact that the middle class was being

impoverished that made it possible for it to ally with the proletariat. What brings them together, according to

Bernstein, was the realization by the middle class that the

The middle class in Bernstein's definition, as well as in Kautsky's and the Social Democrats', represented those people (white collar workers, government employees, teachers, technical personnel, etc.) produced by the ever-increasing bureaucratization and rationalization under monopoly capitalism. Ill Bernstein, Wirtschaftwesen und Wirtschaftwerden, quoted in Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism, p. 210. 330

standards of living of the workers were improving. Conse­

quently, the latter, too, aspired to a bourgeois life.

Nonetheless, the conclusion that he drew from this tendency has some logical convergence with the Eurocommunists;

Nobody has any idea of destroying bourgeois society as a civilized, orderly social system. On the contrary. Social Democracy does not wish to dissolve their society and to make proletarians of all its members. Rather it labors incessantly at lifting the worker from the social position of a prole­ tarian to that of a "bourgeois" and thus to make "bouigj^isie" -- or citizenship — universal.

To argue that this is what the Eurocommunists are aspiring to is a position that may be contested, but I think that any close observation of the Western CPs would point to such an interpretation.

The analysis of the middle class brings the Eurocom­ munists, once again, closer to Kautsky. In his analysis of capitalism, Kautsky denied that the middle class was in the process of disappearing. In fact, he argued that it was growing. Contrary to Bernstein, he did not believe that it was the improvement of the conditions of the working class which brought the middle class closer to the working class.

For him, instead, it was because it was impoverished and proletarianized under the later phase of capitalist devel­ opment that the middle class reached the level of the proletariat.

112 Bernstein, quoted in ibid., pp. 210-211. 331

As much as they cling to bourgeois appear­ ances, the time will come for every one of the proletarianized strata of the white collar groups at which they discover their proletarian heart. Then they will take an interest in the proletarian class struggle and finally, they will participate in it actively.

In tune with this prognosis, Kautsky remained attached to the Marxist position vis-a-vis the middle class. Like

Gramsci after him, Kautsky was aware of the need for the working class to preserve its identity despite its alliance with other classes and strata. The middle class should not be expected to give up its class interests which, in many ways, are in opposition to those of the working class. The alliance, therefore, can only be viewed as tactical and circumstantial. This position, which Kautsky held up to the birth of the Weimar Republic, is indeed the concealed 114 position of the PCF.

113 Kautsky, Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Program, quoted in Gay, p. 212 (emphasis mine). Note, that Kautsky was very much aware of the vacillations of this middle class; he nevertheless argued that the proletariat should exploit the contradictions of the new middle class to its own advantage. See Salvadori, Kautsky, p. 150. The same point is made by Ralph Miliband in Marxism and Poli­ tics (New York; Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 37. History may prove such hopes quite wrong. When the German middle class suffered from economic depression, it turned to the Nazi Party rather than to the SPD or the KPD.

^^^The rupture of the "Union de la Gauche" in 1977 was undoubtedly caused by the PCF's intransigence within the alliance. The PCF considered the Union of the Left a tactical maneuver intended to mobilize the masses and to help the Left to come to power. Once in power, the PCF was convinced that its program would be so appealing that the 332

The PCI, the most important of the West European CPs

(in size, prestige, organization, etc.), adopts a policy

whose theoretical basis is fundamentally Kautskyan — one

is even tempted to say Bernsteinian. The peculiar condi­

tions of the Italian social formation are what led its

leadership to move progressively toward a Social-

Democratic, albeit more radical, alternative. The strategy

of the PCI deserves, therefore, to be treated in some detail because it highlights the de-revolutionization of

Eurocommunism more clearly.

The PCI's "Historic Compromise"; The End of Revolutionary Politics?

The PCI is the most Eurocommunist of all the CPs, not only in its forthright statements, but in its political practice as well. The PCI symbolized Eurocommunism two years before the word was even coined. The "historic

majority of the people would accept it and that the social­ ists would eventually lose credibility. What the failure of the Union of the Left proved was that the PCF still does not accept the role of junior partner in any coalition; it refuses to accept an alliance it does not fully control. Moreover, what was demonstrated in 1977 by the failure of the Union was that the PCF, though it has dropped the concept from its repertory, still believes in the dictator­ ship of the proletariat in practice. In other words, the PCF is torn between Leninism and Kautskyism. Its partial return to traditional policies and its qualified attachment to Eurocommunism supports this point. For a good analysis, see Becker, Le parti Communiste veut-il prendre le pou­ voir?, pp. 262-312; Lavau, A quoi sert le parti Communiste français?, pp. 294-304. See also Garaudy's critique of the PCF's conception of alliance in "Révolution et bloc histor­ ique," p. 176, and Althusser, "What Must Change in the P a r t y ." 333

compromise," whose conceptualization was the result of the

coup in Chile in 1973, marked a stepping stone in the

theoretical and political practice of any Western CP.

Although the "historic compromise" was enunciated in 1973,

the strategy was in fact the logical result of a policy already elaborated by the leadership of the PCI since World 115 War II.

What is of relevance in this study is not a particular policy adopted by any one of the Eurocommunist parties.

The main objective is to demonstrate the relationship that exists between such strategy and previous theoretical and political practices, in this case Kautsky, Bernstein, the

Austro-Marxists and other Social Democratic leaders such as

R. Hilferding. The other objective, as important as the first, is to show how a shift away from revolutionary praxis has been taking place within the Western Communist parties. By comparing some of the pronouncements of the

Social Democrats, we will clearly see parallels with PCI strategy, to take the most obvious case.

Speaking of the strategy that the SPD should follow,

Bernstein stated that the party

115 Some argue that the policy dates from an even earlier period; of. Alastair Davidson, "Tendencies Toward 'Reformism' in the Italian Communist Party - 1921-1963," Australian Journal of Politics and History XI (Dec. 1965); J.B. Urban, "Italian Communism and the 'Opportunism of Conciliation,' 1927-1929," Studies in Comparative Communism VI (Winter 1973). 334

...does not fight for political power in the delusion that it will gain control overnight, but in the endeavor to secure for the working class an even stronger influence on legisla­ tion and public life.... It is nonsensical to view the struggle for political power merely as the struggle for complete .and exclusive domination within the State.

He also added that the party's strategy would be more effective if "it found the courage to emancipate itself

from a phraseology which is actually obsolete, and if it were willing to appear what it really is today: a demo- 117 cratic-Socialist reform party." Bernstein's underlying assumption was that, if the party adopted the attitude he suggested, it would attract even members of the bourgeoisie 118 to its side. In other words, if the bourgeoisie is shown the peaceful intentions of the Social-Democratic party, the program of the latter could be implemented without too many obstacles. Bernstein considered an alliance between progressive elements of the bourgeoisie and the working class quite possible. Compromise was

116 Bernstein, Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Sozialis- mus, in Gay, p. 225. ll^Ibid. 118 It is clear that considering the German conditions of the time, the bourgeoisie still had its enemies at the top, the reactionary groups. The German bourgeoisie had not achieved its full "hegemony" (to use Gramsci's term) yet. Also, there was no other working-class party besides the SPD. The latter had, therefore, no other choice but to attempt an alliance with a radical bourgeois party. 335

119 therefore possible and even desirable. Despite his

revisionism, however, Bernstein insisted that "there are

some alliances into which Social Democracy must not enter .120 under any circumstances.

With the establishment of the Weimar Republic, Kautsky held similar views. He argued that now that a democratic

regime was in place in Germany, the SPD should do better

than just be an opposition party. The party should, in

fact be instrumental in the shaping of government policy.

Kautsky's conception of the transition is strikingly

similar to Eurocommunist strategy, a strategy which, incidentally, has nothing in common with Gramsci.

At first, during a transition period, it [the SPD] would [shape government policy] by participating in coalition governments with bourgeois parties, and eventually it would become strong enough to win a parliamentary majority and hence to form a government by itself. Step by step, in a period possibly extending over decades, socialist measures would be introduced, and thus the inevitable socialist revolution would gradually occur. Socialism, then, would be achieved peace^g^ly by electoral and parliamentary means....

119 Gay, pp. 226-227. Yet Bernstein was skeptical as to the success of such collaboration.

^^°Ibid., p. 229n. 121 J. Kautsky, "Karl Kautsky and Eurocommunism," p. 25. The idea of the PCI's necessity of playing a role in shaping government policy and democratic institutions was enunciated by Togliatti in 1944. See Joseph Lapa- lombara, "The Italian Communist Party and Changing Soci­ ety," in Ranney and Sartori, Eurocommunism; The Italian C a s e , p. 104. See also Togliatti, "Speech to the Napolitan Communist Cadres, April 11, 1944," in Lange and Vannicelli, The Communist Parties, pp. 31-32. 336

Undoubtedly, this is what the PCI strategy has been for

almost two decades.

The strategy of the PCI should always be related to

the peculiarities of the Italian social formation, mainly

since the Second World War. The PCI, which lived clandes­

tinely from 1926 until 1944, was traumatized by the way

Fascism had been able to attract not only the petty bour­

geoisie, but also large sections of the proletariat. Hence

the constant PCI fear, ever since the end of the War, of a

revival of Fascism and the end of (bourgeois) democracy.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the PCI, more than its

French counterpart, which evolved in a much more tolerant environment, has been a sincere advocate of democratic

freedoms and constitutionalism. Togliatti introduced a

strategy which he claimed was Gramscian. In reality, it was a hybrid of Leninism and Gramscism. The Via Italiana was to be a Communist strategy aiming at a socialist society through peaceful means. The PCI adopted a strategy of presenza (presence) in most of the institutions in order to transform them. Theoretically, what was meant could be defined as an infiltration of the system in order to undermine it. This, however, the Party could not achieve it if remained in isolation. The only way was to find supporters. The PCI did just that by resorting to a politica delle alleanze, that is, a search for allies among 337

122 other classes and strata of Italian society. The tragic

experience of Fascism led the PCI, from the immediate

post-war period onward, to appeal to the ceti medi (middle

classes). The definition of ceti medi was a very broad one

and included practically everybody except the monopolists

and the Fascist elements: sharecroppers, tenants, small

landowners, small businessmen, retailers, craftsmen and

small contractors. Also included were the intellectuals

(schoolteachers, priests, freelance professionals, poets, 123 artists, scientists and writers). The PCI program

intended to mobilize all the social forces possible to reconstruct Italy. The leadership was determined to avoid alienating any segments of society and to eliminate all 124 traces of Fascism. The PCI was so resolute to achieve this goal that it went as far as to hold that small and medium property should be developed and protected against the threat of monopoly capitalism. The PCI has held this

1 22 See Martin Clark and David Hine, "The Italian Communist Party: Between Leninism and Social Democracy," in The Changing Face of Western Communism, ed. D. Childs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), esp. pp 121-140; Frederico Mancini and Giorgio Galli, "Gramsci's Presence," Government and Opposition 3 (Summer 1968): 333-334; Eric Shaw, "The Italian Historic Compromise: A New Pathway to Power?", Political Quarterly 49 (Oct.-Dec. 1978): 412-413. 12 3 Togliatti, "Speech in Reggio Emilia, Sept. 24, 1946," in Lange and Vanicelli, The Communist Parties, p. 109.

^^^Stephen Heilman, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle Class," in Blackmer and Tarrow, Communism in Italy and France, p. 375. 338

125 position since. Prom 1956 onward, it became clear that

the ceti medi were to occupy a pivotal position in the PCI

strategy. The analysis made in the PCI's Dichiarazione

Programmatica deserves to be quoted at length:

With the aggravated subordination of the entire Italian economy to monopolistic groups and, concurrently, with the increasingly crushing control of these groups over the distribution and circulation of goods, as well as on the productive process itself, new social strata find themselves objectively interested in a socialist transformation of our society. In the cities as in the countryside, millions of small and medium producers see their enterprises' margins of independence and security reduced. They see them becoming subsidiary to the monopolies, geared to serve the end of maximizing the monopolies' profits. There is, therefore, an objective concordance of aims developing between the working class, which is struggling to defeat capitalism, and no longer only the proletarian and semi­ proletarian masses, but the bulk of agrarian

125 "First, contrary to what the Marxist theory forecast, a fabric of small and medium-sized businesses — industries, artisan enterprises, merchants, peasant farms — has continued to exist.... Third, in Italy ...mixed forms of public and private enterprise can also exist in a socialist society. Indeed, in an industrialized country like Italy, it is advantageous to maintain private enterprise from all points of view, and not only from the economic standpoint" (Berlinguer, "Italy's Road to Socialism," in Italian Communists Speak for Themselves, ed. D. Sassoon [Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978], p. 72). In the non-quoted second point, Berlinguer argues that total nationalization could be harmful. He even went so far as to argue that "socialism does not mean total social­ ization" (ibid.). Interestingly enough, Bernstein argued that it would be unwise to socialize everything and that "where the state operates less efficiently than private industry it would be un-Socialist to give preference to the state over private management" (quoted in Gay, p. 248). 339

smallholders and an important part of the productive middle strata in the cities.... While a differentiated analysis from sector to sector is still needed, the possi­ bility of a permanent alliance of the working class with urban and rural strata of the middle classes is determined by a convergence which grows out of the historical development and the present structure of Italian capital­ ism. The weight of the monopolies on the economy is so suffocating that even nonmono- polistic groups of productive and commercial enterprises find it in their interest to flank and support the antdjnonopolistic struggle of the proletariat.

Quite clearly, this does not sound like a tactical alliance practiced by the Popular Fronts in defensive situations.

In the PCI's scheme, the ceti medi increasingly become objective and permanent allies of the working class. This

is not expressed simply at the political level, but on the economic plane as well, since the party envisages the coexistence of public and private sectors (mixed economy) during the socialist phase.

The PCI's attitude toward the new strata (i.e., the equivalent of the PCF's "new middle strata"), whose numbers increased with the accelerated development of Italy in the

1950s, is more cautious. On the one hand, it tries to convince them that their salaried position puts them on almost the same level as the proletarian forces and that, consequently, they share the same interest in bringing about Socialism. On the other hand, however, the PCI, with

^^^Quoted in Heilman, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy," pp. 378-379. (My emphasis.) 340

its constant fear of a resurgence of Fascism and/or an

isolation of the Left, seeks to maintain a privileged

relationship with the traditional middle class rather than

with the new one. The reason remains historical:

If the growth of her new strata makes Italy typical of advanced industrial societies, the continued importance of her traditional strata makes Italy quite exceptional. The traditional ceti medi in Italy depart from the presumed logic of mature capitalism: they remain much larger than similar classes in other advanced capitalist societies, and some sectors, like^^mmerce, actually show signs of expansion.

This, coupled with fear of the revival of Fascism, explains why the PCI adopts a friendly attitude toward the very anti-communist rural (smallholders, etc.) and commercial

(shopkeepers, etc.) middle class, and supports policies

favorable to them, even when these policies are detrimental to the interests of its own supporters (renters, sharecrop- 128 pers, etc.). It should also be pointed out that, though the traditional middle classes constitute a small percent­ age of the PCI electorate, they are relatively well repre- 129 sented in the Party.

1 27 Heilman, p. 389.

^^®Ibid., p. 391. 129 Clark and Hine, "The Italian Communist Party," p. 118, give the following figures: Traditional middle classes (small farmers, artisans, shopkeepers and other self-employed categories) 15% of PCI membership; new intermediate strata (white-collar and professional groups): 7%; agricultural and industrial working classes constitute 47% of the total membership of the PCI. A more detailed 341

What has become apparent in the policy of the PCI is

that one of its main objectives is to attract major sectors

of the population in order to stand as a national party

with an alternative to Christian Democratic rule. The

PCI's sociological analysis of Italian society, however —

and this point should be underlined — is remote from

Marxist analysis; the main considerations of the PCI are

political and do not stem from any economic reflection.

Moreover, the PCI tends to ignore the question of how the middle class would develop a class consciousness similar to 130 that of the working class, at least in theory. One even wonders how a party as realistic as the PCI could expect

the traditional ceti medi, whose anti-Communism is notori­ ous, to be won over to the cause of socialism. The only

composition of the party can be found in G. DiPalma, Surviving Without Governing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 261. The figures, however, date from 1973 and may well be outdated; and so are Heilman's in "The PCI's Alliance Strategy."

^^^The Austro-Marxists offered a much more sophisti­ cated analysis than the Italian Communists. Though their analysis contains many points and arguments held by the PCI, they were more sensitive to theoretical questions raised by the new situation. For instance, they would agree with the PCI that the middle class has been proletar- ianized and that the proletariat is no longer the only class opposed to capitalism. However, contrary to the PCI, they did not view this proletarianization as automatically leading to an ideology identical to that of the working class. In fact, the Austro-Marxists insisted that despite its "pauperization," the middle class remained "ideologi­ cally remote and even hostile to the workers." See M. Adler, "Metamorphosis of the Working Class?", in Bottomore and Goode, Austro-Marxism, p. 248. 342

possible explanation for the PCI holding such a view is

probably not so much its desire to win them over to social­

ism, but rather to pacify and/or neutralize them. This is

plausible indeed when one knows the genuine PCI fear of a 131 collapse of democracy in Italy. But the extent to which

the PCI has carried the "historic compromise," as shall be

seen below, points to a rather different explanation, without rejecting the other one.

The strategy of the PCI — with regard to democracy — resembles Kautsky's conception. One might take it even

further and argue that the PCI's "historic compromise," which saw its concretization in 1973, is an actualization 132 of Kautsky's theory of the State and coalition govern­ ment .

131 It is interesting to note that the PCI's reaction to a possible rise of Fascism is similar to Kautsky's reaction to the threat of Nazism. The latter held that this possibility should not lead the working class to seek to substitute class (proletarian) dictatorship for (bour­ geois) democracy. In reality, the Socialists, he argued, should restore and strengthen democracy. This, of course, is the policy pursued by the PCI since WWII. See Salva- dori, Kautsky, p. 320. 132 The PCI position on the State is also identical with the one held by Hilferding during the Weimar Republic. On Hilferding's position during that time, see Breitman, German Socialism and Weimar Democracy, pp. 114-130. It should be remembered that Hilferding held that the State, under monopoly capitalism, was controlled by a minority, and that the proletariat should win over the majority of the population in order to eliminate (peacefully, of course), this minority. He also viewed the capitalist State — as the Eurocommunists do — not simply as an instrument of oppression, but as an instrument of transfor­ mation and organization. Therefore, the Socialists should 343

I would argue that the convergence of Kautsky's ideas

and the PCI's with regard to the democratic republic result

from the desire of both to preserve the existence of the

latter. For Kautsky, the need for the Socialists to

participate in a coalition government derived from his fear

that the democratic republic might collapse. In opposition

to the "anti-ministerialism" he had advocated against the

revisionists in the past, in 1922 Kautsky proclaimed that,

in fact, socialists should enter coalitions in the govern­ ment with non-socialist forces in order to preserve the achievements (higher standards of living, etc.) of the working class and to prepare the grounds for the acquisi- 133 tion of political power.

When the Eurocommunists, mainly the PCI, advocate a coalition with non-Socialists in the government (i.e., with bourgeois parties), their arguments are fundamentally

Kautskyist.

Rejection in principle of any coalition in all circumstances corresponds to a conception of the class struggle which regards all the bourgeois parties, without exception, as a

democratize this State and use it for their own purposes. See Buci-Glucksmann, interview in Duhamel and Weber, Changer le PC?, pp. 144-145. Needless to say, Hilferding's view was antithetical to Lenin's. It was identical to Bernstein's and Kautsky's. 133 Salvadori, Kautsky, p. 325. Nevertheless, Kautsky did not favor any coalition in which the Socialists would be in a subordinate position, or what he called "mini- ministerialism." 344

single reactionary mass, a view which no one combated more strongly than Marx, since it fostered clas^^^btusity more than class consciousness.

In order to reject the view that all bourgeois parties were

a "reactionary mass," the PCI prepared the grounds for the

"historic compromise" by arguing that the Christian Demo­

cratic party (DC) — essentially a bourgeois party — had a

"popular" nature. Surely, the objective was to win over

the Catholic workers and the mass of middle strata repre­

sented in the DC. At the same time, the PCI wanted to

sweep away the traditional view of the PCI as an anticleri­

cal and antidemocratic party. However, while the PCI

insisted on the "popular" character of the DC, "the

fact that it [the DC] may have also, perhaps even predomi­ nantly, represented the interests of large capital was not 135 generally emphasized."

The "historic compromise" was prompted by events in

Chile in 1973. The theoretical elaboration of this strategy preceded the events and pointed to a shift toward

^^^Kautsky, Die proletarische Revolution, in ibid. 135 Amyot, The Italian Communist Party, p. 199.

"[The] strategy of the 'historic compromise'...was elaborated in more organic form after the tragic events in Chile" (Berlinguer, "Report to the 14th Congress of the PCI, March 1975," in Lange and Vannicelli, p. 118). For the other reasons, see S. Tarrow, "Historic Compromise or Bourgeois Majority? Eurocommunism in Italy, 1976-9," in Machin, National Communism, pp. 125 ff. 345

the right. What made the "historic compromise" a necessi­

ty, however, was the realization by leadership that

...it would be illusory to think that even if the left-wing parties and forces succeeded in gaining 51% of the votes and seats in parlia­ ment... this fact would guarantee the survival and work-of a government representing this 51 percent.

According to the PCI, therefore, an alternative such as the one proposed by the PCF ("Common Program of the Left") would not be viable in Italy because it would antagonize not only the DC, but the other potential non-Socialist allies. What Italy needs, insists the PCI, is a "democrat­ ic alternative," that is, a political collaboration between the main parties: DC, PCI, PSI.

The economic and financial crisis which almost led 138 Italy to bankruptcy in the 1970s and the social unrest that accompanied it (e.g., terrorism from both far Left and far Right) made the PCI fear — and genuinely so — a collapse of democracy and the eventual re-establishment of

137 Berlinguer, "Reflections After Events in Chile," in Lange and Vannicelli, p. 45. 138 Tarrow, "Historical Compromise," p. 128; Luigi Graziano, "On Political Compromise: Italy After the 1979 Elections," Government and Opposition, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1980), p. 200. For a more elaborate assessment of the economic situation in Italy in the 1970s, see Michele Salvati, "Muddling Through: Economics and Politics in Italy 1969-1979," in Italy in Transition: Conflict and Consensus, ed. P. Lange and S. Tarrow (London: Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 31-48. 346

Fascism. Hence, the PCI's advocacy of a kind of consensual 139 approach to politics.

The PCI obtained 34.4% of the votes in the 1976

elections; that is, only four percentage points behind the 140 DCs 38.7%. This, by itself, made it impossible for the

DC to rule as it pleased (that is, without Communist

support in parliament). The Italian crisis made matters

even worse. This is evidenced by the fact that the "his­

toric compromise" was not a policy sought primarily by the

PCI, but was also desired by some groups within the DC

(e.g., Aldo Moro) . The point is that the PCI did not envisage the strategy simply as a tactic, a "Trojan Horse" aimed at a seizure of power. The main objective, it seems.

139 In the article cited above, Graziano defines this kind of "elite cooperation" in governing a nation as "antagonistic cooperation." Some have argued that

"...the party's strategy of widening its consensus to find an inter-class clientele jeopardizes its trade- union and working class base. The same strategy has the effect of immobilizing the PCI in many areas as its share in power and responsibility precludes the adoption of abrupt or dramatic changes...." (K.R. Nilsson, "The EUR Accords and the Historic Compromise: Italian Labor and Eurocommunism," Polity 14 [Fall 1981]: 49).

^^^Sani, "Mass Support for Italian Communism," p. 69. One point should be made here: It is not evident that the Italian votes for the PCI represented a desire for the establishment of Communism in Italy. What is certain is that the majority wanted change. The PCI itself was aware of the fact that it benefitted from the mistakes of its opponents. There is also evidence that by the mid-1970s the PCI was viewed even by many non-Communists as a democratic and non-revolutionary party. See ibid, pp. 81-82. 347 was for the PCI to bring Italy out of the crisis — of the

capitalist system! — and to come to the rescue of democra­

cy. Whether the party had any serious plans to under­

take deep structural changes within the system remains very debatable. In fact, the party acted in such a moderate manner during the Compromesso period (1977-1979) that it became almost impossible to carry out any fundamental transformations. This was justified by the PCI as result­ ing from the severity of the crisis.

The most curious thing about the "historic compromise" is the political behavior of the party. What the DC gained by its collaboration with the PCI exceeded by far the gains of the latter. Instead of using its newly acquired strength, the PCI let the DC govern unopposed. It made many concessions to the DC on various critical issues and abstained in important votes in parliament. The Party even helped the DC to bring about "social peace." The latter was achieved through the PCI's insistence on an austerity program — that is, by asking the working class to make fewer demands on capital in order to stabilize the

141 The charge against the PCI that the Compromesso strategy was a "means of salvation rather than renewal...a plan to bring Italy out of the crisis" (Carl Boggs, "Ital­ ian Communism in the Seventies," Socialist Review 34 [July-Aug. 1977]: 111) seems well founded. Nilsson insists that the PCI strategies "do not fight capitalism tooth and claw but seek rather its stability" ("The EUR Accords," p. 49). 348

142 capitalist economy. One wonders whether Kautsky, or

even Bernstein, would have gone as far as the PCI in asking

the working class to make so many substantial concessions

to the party of the bourgeoisie. Clearly, the PCI, con­

trary to pre-1914 Social Democracy, did not believe in an

inevitable collapse of the capitalist system that would

permit the working class to seize power thereafter. The

PCI's position is rather puzzling; it is not Social Demo­

cratic on this point, but neither is it Leninist. Lenin

probably would not have hesitated to take advantage of a

situation like Italy's in the 1970s. The PCI responded to

the crisis with a logic inspired by bourgeois economists: urging radical measures to reduce inflation and state deficit. More importantly, the PCI proposed reforms aimed

at creating a more efficient and rational capitalist economy without any reference to an anti-monopoly strategy.

The social unrest caused by the Italian crises of the

1970s was acute. In response to it, the PCI adopted an

142 See Berlinguer, "Speech to the PCI Conference of Intellectuals, Rome, January 1, 1977," in Lange and Vanni­ celli, pp. 50-51. For an excellent, though partisan and polemical, critique of the austerity program advocated by the PCI, see Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, pp. 125-149; Boggs, The Impasse of European Communism, pp. 61, 83; Amyot, The Italian Communist Party, pp. 215 ff. It should be noted that the French, Spanish, Portuguese, British, Swedish and Belgian CPs were opposed to such austerity programs (Mandel, p. 125). Mandel's (Marxist) analysis of the Italian crisis makes it clear that the PCI has put aside Marxist economic theory (see esp. pp. 126- 130) . 349 attitude which, some years earlier, the PCI itself would have described as "bourgeois repression" or "Fascist measures." Amazingly, the PCI showed an intransigent 143 position which went even further than that of the DC.

Undoubtedly, the PCI succeeded in avoiding the worsen­ ing of the Italian crisis. In fact, the PCI helped bring about relative political stability which would have been impossible without its moderate stance. But overall, the

PCI was the loser of the coalition with the Christian

Democrats. The PCI did not even succeed in obtaining any cabinet responsibilities, despite its being in the major- 144 ity, and despite its insistence on getting some. The

143 "Rather than deal effectively with the social and economic problems that are at the origins of the violence [since 1977], the PCI has been taking a low-and-order stance that is often more rigid than that of the DC in order to preserve the PCI's image as the defender of existing institutions and the State" (Joanne Barkan, "Italy: Working Class Defeat or Program for a Transition?", Monthly Review 29 [Nov. 1977]: 30). See also Amyot, pp. 221-222; Tarrow, "Historic Compromise," p. 135. 144 In the Italian political system, "...being in the majority means voting for the Govern­ ment on the vote of confidence to help it exist but having no ministers in the Cabinet. The Government program might or might not be coordinated among the parties in the majority. A party in the majority may on occasion, particularly in an uncoordinated majori­ ty, vote against specific legislative proposals of the Government. Thus, a Government with a formal or numerical majority (a majority of the votes cast in the vote of confidence) might or might not have a working parliamentary majority (enough support on 350

crisis was more or less overcome, but none of the reforms 145 hoped for by the PCI came to pass. The price the PCI

paid for its collaboration with the DC was high; its loss 146 of votes in the 1979 elections was one clear indication

of this. The rank-and-file of the Party, the trade-union

leaders, and members of other strata of Italian society

resented the strategy of collaboration between the Commu­

nists and the Christian Democrats. The lack of any tangi­

ble results for the working class from such a cooperation

cost the party many votes and support.

Individual measures to get them through Parliament)" (Douglas A. Wertman, "Government Formation to Get Through Parliament," appendix to Italy at the Polls, 1979, ed. H. Penniman [Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981], p. 300). Immediately after the 1976 elections, a working majority was constituted in Parliament (DC, PCI, PSI, PSDI, PRI, and PLI). It allowed the formation of a one-party (DC) govern­ ment without opposition by the five other parties. The Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals abstained on the vote of confidence; hence the appellation "not no-confidence" of this practice. A "programmatic majority" of the six parties allowed the second Andreotti Government, formed in July 1977, to operate for one-and-a-half years. See Tarrow, "Three Years of Italian Democracy," pp. 5-10; Russo, "II compromesso storico," pp. 89 ff.; Peter Lange, "Crisis and Consent, Change and Compromise: Dilemmas of Italian Communism in the 1970's," in Italy in Transition, pp. 124-125. 145 See the good discussion in Amyot, pp. 219 ff.; Tarrow, p. 134. 14 6 In the elections held in 1979, precipitated by the PCI, the latter obtained 30.4% of the votes (a loss of 4% compared to 1976) as opposed to 38.3% for the DC (which lost 0.4%) (Sani, "Italian Voters, 1971-79," p. 44). See also Lange, "Crisis and Consent," esp. pp. 124-129. 351

During the period 1976-1979, the PCI showed an unusual degree of moderation for a Communist Party. It avoided making any strong demands on the DC. The PCI's excellent electoral performance in 1976 did not generate — as one might have expected — any euphoria amidst the leadership.

The latter reacted with calculated caution. No serious attempt was made to impose any Communist entry in the

Government — a fact which would obviously have created a political crisis. The Communists did not object to the formation of an all-Christian Democrat Government, led by

Andreotti. One of the main objectives of the PCI was to achieve cooperation with the DC and the obtention of some legislative reforms, few of which the DC adroitly granted.

The leadership of the PCI concentrated its efforts on increasing the legitimacy of the party as a credible democratic organization. In order to accomplish such a goal, "the PCI showed itself unexpectedly willing to accept only very gradual, small and sometimes symbolic gains in 147 exchange for cooperation."

The PCI pursued this strategy "even at the expense of 148 direct control over governmental policy-making."

However, the cost which the PCI had to pay for this behav­ ior soon became apparent. The leadership was now aware of

147 Lange, "Crisis and Consent," p. 124. 352 the failure of its policy. The discontent of the grass­ roots membership of the PCI and the arrogance of the DC vis-a-vis other parties led the Communists to put more pressure on the Christian Democrats to enter the Govern­ ment. This attempt was unsuccessful, as was the policy of compromesso storico.

Following this obvious failure, the PCI did not, unlike the PCF, return to a total opposition or isolation, but instead went into what it called "constructive opposi- 149 tion." The PCI did not immediately close the door to an eventual re-collaboration with the DC;

...the fundamental precepts of the historic compromise — though in new and innovative forms developed by Berlinguer — were so deeply rooted in the PCI's basic strategic model that they could not be easily changed, eveç^^f the party's leaders wanted to do SO .

However, following the collapse of the "historic compromise," the PCI turned somewhat more radical and a bit more intransigent in making its demands in the interests of the working class. Though not closing the door to cooperat­ ing again with the DC, the theses of the 15th Party

149 Tarrow, "Three Year of Italian Democracy," p. 19.

^^^Tarrow, "Historic Compromise," p. 144. See also Lange, "Crisis and Consent," p. 129, and Amyot, p. 228, for the exact same point. 353

Congress, laid out in 1978, insisted on unity with the

Socialists.

The 15th Party Congress held in April 1979 just before

the elections highlighted the dissenting views within the 152 leadership. Both the Left, represented by Pietro Ingrao,

and the Right, led by Giorgio Amendola, implicitly criti­

cized Berlinger's stubborn pursuit of the "historic compro­

mise." No substantive alternative emerged from the de­

bates .

After the 1979 Congress the historic compro­ mise was no longer taken to intend an extend­ ed period of collaboration in government with the DC. It had become some sort of develop­ ment strategy for the political system, as defined and guaranteed by the Constitution. It had been so broadened as to include various possible collocations of the parties within a band ranging from constructive opposition to participation in government. Not only, however, for the parties of the Left; the concept was to enable the DC, too, to pass from one band to another. Within the ostensible framework of the historic compro­ mise, therefore, Berlinger had managed to insert what was effectively the Left Alterna­ tive:. -PCI, PSI in government; DC in opposi­ tion.

^^^Cf. "Draft Theses for the Fifteenth Congress," in Lange and Vannicelli, p. 122. 152 Ingrao's arguments at the Congress were, it seems to me, a resurrection of the "United Front" from below, with a bit more sophistication. See James Ruscoe, On the Threshold of Government - The Italian Communist Party, 1976-1981 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 187. 153 Ibid. 354

The PSI's desire to adopt an independent course between the two giants, DC and PCI, made such an alter­ native difficult. The PCI, therefore, ended up pursuing a policy of strength in order to recuperate its disillusioned membership that had left the party after the June 1979 elections. Nonetheless, the PCI had no desire to return to 154 isolation. This is why the Democratic Alternative policy was launched in November 1980 at Salerno, site of

Togliatti's famous "Svolta di Salerno" in 1943. This more or less marked the end of the "historic compromise" as a viable strategy for the Communists.

Conclusion

The PCI — and this also applies to all other Eurocom- munist parties — has undoubtedly accepted the existence of the bourgeois-democratic system and its rules as a matter of fact. It has abandoned the Leninist conception of the seizure of power. The party remains "revolutionary" only in the sense that it espouses a conception of society which remains more radical than the traditional ideologies, but not in all aspects. Integration into the party of members with different social backgrounds has definitely affected

154 The policy consisted in creating a broad coalition under the leadership of the PCI of all progressive forces and individuals. The objective was to force the DC into opposition, but did not exclude honest Christian Democratic politicians from the coalition (see ibid., p. 216). 355

155 the ideology of the PCI. Moreover, the party seeks to act not only as a mass party -- which it really is — but also as a party which, not unlike bourgeois parties, claims to represent the "national interest" better than any other party. It is in this sense that one should look at the

PCI's "historic compromise."

The strategy of the historic compromise assumes that all the popular forces in Italy must cooperate toward the highest end, renewal of Italy; that they must put ideolog­ ical differences in second place — not cancel them, but rather, measure them.against objective and primary national needs.

This view seems to be shared by most Western CPs, despite their many and often deep differences.

Eurocommunism, though its name suggest regionalism, is primarily national Communism. Not only do the CPs envision

155 Amyot's book The Italian Communist Party does an excellent job of showing the different tendencies in the heights of the party. The composition of the PCI is definitely more diverse in backgrounds than any other Western party.

^^^Umberto Cerroni, "Italian Communism's Historic Compromise," Marxist Perspectives I (Spring 1978): 133. Commenting on the PCI's 1977 "proposal for a Medium Term Plan," Berner argues that

"...the reformist optimism of the document seems to be based on the conviction that in the medium term it is possible, with a 'unitary' concentration of all available forces favoring reform and a firm mobiliza­ tion of the masses to transform Italy into a democra­ tic, pluralist 'workers' paradise' and in the long run perhaps into a Mediterranean paradise island of social peace, quality and justice" (Wolfgang Berner, "The image of the PCI as a Radical-Democratic Reformist Party," La Spettatore Internazionale 13 [July-Sept. 1978]: 193). 356 change within the existing structures of the nation-state, but they also seem to be animated by a deep allegiance to their respective nations. They may be opposition parties and staunch critics of the system, but they come to its rescue whenever it is threatened by extremist forces of the

Left or the Right, on one hand, or by a foreign aggressor, on the other. Clearly, their objective does not seem to be to take advantage of a severe crisis in the nation to trigger or encourage a revolution and seize power through violent means. Like other political parties, their objec­ tive is to come to power. But they want to come to power according to the constitutional rules of representative democracy.

This conception certainly does not derive from

Gramsci's conception, whose ultimate objective was the destruction of the State and the existing bourgeois insti­ tutions. The PCI, similarly to Bernstein and Kautsky, is more concerned with the transformation and extension of the democratic system (understood in its bourgeois form) than with its destruction, as envisaged by Lenin. The leader­ ship does not find it paradoxical to state that

...the PCI fights for a profound renewal of the country and to save and advance demo­ cracy, according to the guidelines of the Republican Constitution, in such a way as to begin the transformation of Italy into a 357

socialist soc^^ty founded on political d e m o c r a c y ....

The "historic compromise" was conceived in a Kautsky­ ist style. This is not because of a conscious choice made by the Italian Communists to adopt a Kautskyist strategy.

Rather, both Kautsky and Berlinguer faced practically the same dilemma which led them to adopt certain policies and to revise their principles.

The enemies of a coalition policy in our rank generally counterpose the advantages of a purely socialist government to it. But such a comparison is senseless, since no socialist would prefer a coalition if a purely social­ ist government were possible. Only the latter can open the door to socialism; it alone is able energetically and systematical­ ly to proceed to the socialization of capi­ talist production. What we confront, how­ ever, is a stage in which the proletariat does not yet command sufficient strength to form and sustain a purely socialist govern­ ment, but does command the strength to rule out a government that adopts an overtly hostile attitude toward the proletariat. In this stage the question can only be; coali­ tion government or bourgeois government by grace of the proletariat.

The "historic compromise" from 1976 to 1979 was indeed

"bourgeois government by grace of the proletariat," but what did it do for the proletariat? One can also ask the question: Can a party such as the DC — whose interests

157 "Draft Theses for the Fifteenth Congress of the PCI, December 1978," in Lange and Vannicelli, p. 51. (My emphasis.)

^^^Kautsky, Die proletarische Revolution, in Salvadori, Karl Kautsky, p. 326. 358 are broadly antithetical to those of the working class — make concessions which would lead to its own defeat? These are serious questions to be taken into consideration when analyzing coalition governments in societies divided into classes with antagonistic interests.

The rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat and its replacement by a coalition government is as Kautsky- an as the "smashing of the state" is Leninist. The Eurocom- munist approach to the socialist transition draws from

Kautsky rather than from Lenin. Basing themselves on a

Kautskyan perspective, the Eurocommunists conceive of a coalition government as the representation of a step toward the establishment of a socialist society. It seems to me that the PCF's "advanced democracy," the PCE's "political and social democracy" and the PCI's "new stage in the democratic revolution" correspond to the definition given by Kautsky to his revised version of Marx's "dictatorship of the proletariat" or socialist phase;

Between the epoch of the purely bourgeois state and the epoch of the democratic state erected on a purely proletarian basis there is a period of transition from the one to the other. This is accompanied by a period of political transition, which will as a take the form of a coalition government.

There was not to be a coup within the alliance to achieve this goal, but the working-class party would have to gain a

159 Kautsky, quoted in Salvadori, p. 327. 359

majority within the existing system. In 1922, Kautsky

wrote that "despite its imperfections, the Constitution of

the Reich, issued of the revolution, affords the socialist

proletariat sufficient possibility to conquer political

power through the peaceful road."^^^ The hopes of the PCI

in entering the "historic compromise" were probably also

similar to those of the Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer, whose

conception of "hegemony," though close to Gramsci's, was

nonetheless based on a peaceful transition perspective.

Bauer, unlike Lenin, did not see power in terms of seizure

of the state apparatus, but as a strategy envisaging the

progressive establishment of working class hegemony over

socio-economic and cultural life;

If Social Democracy succeeds in organizing the majority of the population and in over­ coming the political hegemony of the bour­ geoisie, which not only rests on political privilege, but also on the means of economic power, the power of tradition, the press, the schools, and the Church, [power could then be attained the decision of universal s u f f r a g e .

One does not need much imagination to see the sources of

Eurocommunism. What is important, of course, is not simply

to discover these sources. The objective is to highlight

Ibid., p. 329. Compare this quote with the state­ ment of the PCI's "Draft Thesis" quoted above (footnote 157). This, of course, is far from being Gramsci's concep­ tion .

^^^Linz Program, 1926, quoted in Rabinbach, The Crisis of Austrian Socialism, p. 119. 360

the problem of the transition to socialism in the West.

Leninism, as has been pointed out several times, does not

apply to West European societies — and probably never has.

Except for a few extremist groups, it does not seem to be

the mood of the majority of the people (not even the most

radical sections of the working class) to wish the destruc­

tion of the system. On the other hand, there is no doubt

that the same majority aspires to see change occur at all

levels of society. Reformism, however, has only achieved

so much, and has not gone very far in substantially trans­

forming the structures of advanced societies in a socialist

direction. Even the "welfare state" policies have been

reversed in most Western countries where they had been

applied in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The Eurocommunists' dilemma is formidable. Leninism

is not the solution to the problems they face. In fact, a

return to Leninism as a strategy would be harmful, and may

even eliminate them from the political scene. But neither

has Social Democracy, as it exists today, been able to

solve the problems existing in the West. Social Democracy

has shown its limits, too. The best the CPs have been able

to do was to come up with apparently radical solutions

which stand between Leninism in organization and Social

Democracy in political strategy. However, one should

emphasize that the Social Democracy closer to the Eurocom­ munists is the one inspired by Kautsky, Bernstein, 361

Hilferding, etc., rather than the Social Democracy defined

in Germany since 1959. In this sense, despite its shift to

the Right, Eurocommunism remains a Radical-Democratic

reformist movement.

Notwithstanding the apparent return of the Eurocommu­

nists to a more radical opposition in the late 1970s and in

the 1980s, they unquestionably have undergone a process of

de-revolutionization. The PCI, in particular, has defi­

nitely gone farthest toward Social Democratization. The

party appears now as a genuine and credible democratic

political formation. It owes this to its continuity in

strategy and relative consistency, as opposed to the

turnabouts of its French counterpart. However, despite the 16 2 PCF's apparent return to the "ghetto" recently, the

French Communists will not necessarily renounce their

conception of "advanced democracy" and their attachment to

representative democracy. They have gone far enough along

the peaceful path to suddenly discard it.

The abandonment of the "Union of the Left" with the Socialists decided at the 25th PCF Congress, held on 5 February 1985, and the victory of the hard-liners of the party seem to be a good indication. However, it seems to me that this does not mean that the PCF has given up its "commitments" to some of its declared democratic objec­ tives. What the party would probably do is to reflect on its continuing decline (the PCF's share of votes in France is only 10%) and to try to exploit the weaknesses of the Socialist Party now in power. The PCF, obviously, hopes to attract the votes of those discontented and disillusioned with the PS's policies. 362

The contention in this dissertation remains that the

Surocommunist parties — despite the variations of degree in their transformation — have undergone a similar process of Kautskyization and de-revolutionization, as did classi­ cal Social Democracy and Austro-Marxism. The next chapter will attempt to provide some theoretical explanations as to why such a process takes place among revolutionary move­ ments . CHAPTER V

THE DERADICALIZATION THESIS^

History everywhere shows that, when Left par­ ties or politicians are brought into contact with reality through the assumption of poli­ tical office, they tend to abandon their doctrinaire utopianism and move toward the Right, often retaining their Left labels and therefore adding to the confusion of political terminology.

E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939

It is a fairly common occurrence that reformist or revolutionary parties become conservative once the reforms or revolutions they have fought for are accomplished: they move from the Left to the Right, leaving a gap which is filled by the appearance of a new left-wing party that in its turn evolves in the same way. Thus, after an interval of twenty or thirty years, the Left of one period becomes the Right of the next. M. Duverger, Political Parties

Although I am using the term "deradicalization," I define it as derevolutionization. The West European CPs — and even social democratic parties (e.g., Sweden) — remain in a sense radical parties. But, as frequently indicated throughout this dissertation, they do not project the transformation of their societies through extraparlia­ mentary and violent means. The demands they make on the bourgeois democratic State are radical; yet they do not consider that these demands, if not satisfied, should be implemented through unlawful means. The CPs attempt to satisfy the needs of the working class through a legisla­ tion which they are instrumental in promulgating. For instance, during the "historic compromise" period, the PCI,

363 364

The Deradicalization of the Working Class As a Result of Capitalist Development

It has been argued by some Marxists and non-Marxists

alike that, in the process of economic progress, the

workers have found it in their interest to participate

actively in and to support such a system. The "end of

ideology" school (led by Bell, Kerr, Lipset et al.) argues

that the further industrialization advances and the more it

equalizes distribution, the less conflict exists between

labor and capital. For them, the conflict between labor

and capital is factually limited to the economic sphere;

i.e., it is reduced to a dispute on how much of the pie

(surplus) each party should get. Compromise through

bargaining and the institutionalization of conflict are

believed to lead to a harmonious society. The problem with

this school of thought, however, is that it is more ideo­

logically tilted than the thesis about the end of ideology

presupposes. The "end of ideology" thesis is itself an

which participated in and chaired many parliamentary committees, tried to introduce what it called some "ele­ ments of socialism" (social security, income redistribu­ tion, fair rent laws, university reform, new code of criminal procedure, police unionization, etc.). (Cf. Amyot, The Italian Communist Party, pp. 199, 201, 219.) The government, which had the direct or indirect support of the PCI, did not carry out most of the proposed reforms. (See ibid, pp. 220-221.) The Christian Democrats were not willing to make concessions which favored other groups at their own expense. 365

2 ideology. Przeworski rejects this kind of thesis because

...even if it were empirically true that workers' organizations became deradicalized at the same time as improvements of their material welfare occurred, one could not draw from this observed historical covariation any causal influences, unless it was possible to prove at the same time that a better alterna­ tive [i.e., socialism] was not available.

He rightly points out that this thesis is empirical and

therefore epistemologically invalid, because "empiricist

epistemology is intrinsically ideological, since it impli­

citly denies the existence of any historical alterna- 4 tives." However, he admits toward the end of his article

that what in fact historically happened is a compromise

between labor and capital — i.e., post-World-War-II Social

Democracy — where "rational self-interested workers...opt

for a compromise that, in turn, demobilizes them even

further, since, as Habermas observed, 'class compromise

weakens the organizational capacity of the latently contin­

uing classes.'

2 For a good summary and discussion of the "end of ideology" school, see Michael Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class (London: The Mac­ Millan Press, Ltd., 1977). Adam Przeworski, "Material Interests, Class Compromise and the Transition to Social­ ism," Politics and Society 10 (1980) offers a good implicit critique of the thesis.

^ I b i d . , p. 129.

^Ibid.

^Ibid., p. 142. 366

From a historical point of view, and beyond any polemic, it can safely be argued that, despite many excep­ tions, the working class often adopts a predominantly economistic attitude, i.e., a preoccupation with immediate gains. Michael Mann describes this attitude accurately:

[It] is now evident that the almost exclusive preoccupation of trade unions with economism is not a mere case of "betrayal" by their leadership; it is rooted in the worker's very experience, and he reinforces the union's position. Normally confronted by an employer who will budge on economic but not on control issues, the worker takes what he can easily get and attempts to reduce the salience of what is denied him. Though this leaves him partially alienated, it does not place him, as it were, "outside" the struc­ ture of capitalist society, but rather compromised by it. Hence he grasps neither the totality of society nor alternative structures.

These economistic attitudes had their political reflection in the political organizations of the working class (tenden­ cies to reformism, etc.). What the working class wanted, therefore, was not an abolition of the existing conditions, but an improvement of these very same conditions. Marx and

Engels, as has been seen, accepted reforms only as a step-by-step tactic in the direction of the ultimate goal.

However, with German Social Democracy and today's West

European, Japanese, and Australian CPs, what started as a tactic became a permanent strategy — reformism. Speaking of the German case, P. Mattick argues that

^Mann, Consciousness, pp. 32-33. 367

...the masses are as little revolutionary as their leaders, and both were satisfied with their participation in capitalist progress. Not only were they organizing for a greater share of the social product, but also^for a greater voice in the political sphere.

He adds, in a passage which strikes the reader as reflect­ ing the policy of the Italian CP (PCI) in the 1970s:

[C]onsciously and unconsciously the old labor movement saw in the capitalist expansion process its own road to greater welfare and recognition. The more capital flourished, the better were the working conditions. Satisfied with action within the framework of capitalism, the workers' organizations became concerned with capitalism's profitability.

Once again, one should not think that this process was one-sided. "The bourgeoisie itself had in its very strug­ gle against the working class learned to 'understand the 9 social question.'" In other words, this class too made concessions as a result either of pressure coming from below or simply in order to avoid social explosions which could seriously disturb the production process. This is why,

[in] general, the working class has not won a share in the political process in the heat of battle. On the contrary, it has been more common for the bourgeoisie to make conces­ sions after a period of successful resistance

7 Paul Mattick, Anti-Bolshevik Communism (New York; M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1978), pp. 3-4.

^Ibid., p. 4.

^Ibid. 368

to reform. Apparently, working class parti­ cipation must in som^ sense be to the bour­ geoisie's advantage.

Inspired by Engels' views on the deradicalization of the English working class, Lenin, in his analysis of the later phase of capitalism (imperialism), developed the notion of "labor aristocracy" to describe the process of deradicalization of some sectors of the working class;

Imperialism, which means the partitioning of the world and the exploitation of other countries..., which means high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, makes it economically possible to bribe the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, give.s shape to, and strengthens opportunism.

According to Lenin, the increase of capitalist profits abroad is what leads to the creation of a privileged stratum among the proletariat: "Imperialism has the

^^Gflran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review 103 (May-June 1977): 29.

^^V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in Collected Works 22, p. 281. Lenin quotes from Engels' letter to Marx on October 7, 1858 to support his view on the embourgeoisement of the working class. Engels said:

"The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the posses­ sion of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable" (quoted in ibid., p. 283). I think that Samir Amin, E. Emmanuel, I. Wallerstein, Andre Gunder-Frank et al. use this same analysis to explain the deradicalization of the Western working class; they argue that the socialist revolution will occur in the periphery (Third World) rather than the center (the advanced capital­ ist countries). 369

tendency to create privileged sections also among the

workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the

proletariat.

Lenin argues that opportunism in the working class

started earlier in Great Britain than in other countries,

because British imperialism revealed itself in the middle

of the 19th century due to its vast colonial possessions

and its "monopolist position in the world market." He uses

a cause-and-effeet relationship to demonstrate the rise of

opportunism and reformism in Britain:

This clearly shows the causes and effects. The causes are: (1) exploitation of the whole world by this country; (2) its monopolist position in the world market; (3) its colo­ nial monopoly. The effects are: (1) a section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois; (2> a section of the proletariat allows itself to be led by men boug^ by, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie."

However, in opposition to the thesis that the working class as a whole had become embourgeoisée, Lenin insisted that

the "labor aristocracy" represented a minority of the 14 proletariat.

Although Lenin's theory has been accepted uncritically by the Communist Left, recent analysis has disproved its

l^ibid., p. 283.

l^ibid., p. 284.

l^ibid., p. 282. 370

foundations in political terms. If one argues, as Lenin

does, that

...material prosperity led to increased political conservatism, we should expect the most affluent workers to be the most prone to abandon their support for Socialist parties. But this is not what we find. Studies of voting behavior have established fairly conclusively that working-class support for parties of the Left does not decline as income rises; many of the most affluent workers — for example, those employed in automobile plants — show higher than average support for the Left. Indeed, the striking fact of European working-class politics is the long-term stability in electoral support for Left-wing parties.

Frank Parkin argues convincingly — an analysis of the

CPs today would prove this point — that it is not the

embourgeoisement of the working class which leads its party

to adopt a reformist attitude. Rather, "whether or not the

underclass party proclaims a radical class doctrine on

inequality is likely to be influenced by the social situa­

tion of the leaders than their traditional followers.

As will be seen in another section, this is one of Michels' major arguments about deradicalization.

Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 129.^ One might speculate that the reason why an embourqeoisee working class still has an interest in voting for the Left is because its members believe that the Left (socialist or Communist, depending on the political conjuncture) would struggle best within the system to protect the standard of living this working and middle classes have acquired. The middle class votes for the PCI and the increasing member­ ship of the Socialist Party in France may be a good indica­ tion of this phenomenon.

l^ibid., pp. 129-130. 371

The process of deradicalization of today's Western CPs

is due to some obvious factors: adherence to middle class

elements in their ranks, generational changes in member- 17 ship, their appeal to the middle classes and the adoption

of tactical or strategic programs favorable to these

classes, their attempt to integrate into the political

structures of the capitalist State, etc. However, this is

only one aspect of a more general process of deradicaliza­

tion which consists of many more important variables:

organizational, theoretical-doctrinal, psychological,

ideological, etc.

Tucker's Thesis on Deradicalization

Tucker's thesis — which is largely inspired by

Michels' — is that "it appears to be the fate of radical

17 Surveys and studies conducted among PCI delegates and activists in 1979 show that

"...the average delegate was in his early thirties.... A declining proportion of Communists activists come from PCI families or even from politicized ones. Recent research on local officials shows that the majority have contacts across the political system, read non-party as well as party newspapers, and no longer regard party activism as an identity that encompasses all other memberships" (Sidney Tarrow, "Italy: Crisis, Crises or Transition?", in Italy in Transition, ed. P. Lange and S. Tarrow [London: Frank Cass 1980], p. 172). The definition of the PCI as a "catch-almost-all-party" is probably correct. See Giacomo Sani, "Mass-Level Response to Party Strategy: The Italian Electorate and the Communist Party," in Communism in Italy and France, ed. Blackmer and Tarrow, p. 464; and by the same author, "Italian Voters, 1976-1979," in Italy at the Polls, 1979, p. 52. 372

movements that survive and flourish for long without

remaking the world that they undergo eventually a process 18 of deradicalization." Tucker suggests that this process

is the result of the adaptation of the movement to the

existing order that "it officially desires to overthrow and 19 transform." This does not mean, however, that the

movement has become conservative, i.e., a

...social force opposed to social change.... Rather, it becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the established system and its institutionalized procedures as the framework for further ^jfforts in the direc­ tion of social change.

This adaptation makes the movement lose sight of its main

objectives. Moreover, expansion and strengthening of the

radical movement leads to enlargement of the organizational

structure. The movement, dazzled by its success in repre­

senting

...a mass social constituency, and a recog­ nized place in society...acquires a definite state in the stability of the order in which this success has been won — a stake that is no less real f^^: the fact that it goes unacknowledged.

Just as Michels showed in his study. Tucker argues that the

revolutionary goal is weakened once the party grows as an

18 Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, p. 185

l^ibid. 2°ibid.

^^Ibid., p. 187. 373

organization. Therefore, "revolutionary action can only

endanger the position of a party that has achieved a mass

membership, a bureaucracy, a full treasury, and a network

of financial and moral interests extending all over the 22 country." This point, it should be noted, has become

widely accepted today, even by Marxists. Mattick makes the

point forcefully:

Behind the aspect of the proletarian revolu­ tion the leaders of the socialist movement [i.e., the pre-WWI labor movement] saw a chaos in which their position would become no less jeopardized than that of the bourgeoisie proper. Their hatred of "disorder" was a defense of their own material, social and intellectual position. Socialism was to be developed not illegally but legally, for under such conditions, existing organizations and leaders would continue to dominate the m o v e m e n t .

In other words, the organization becomes an end in itself; its aim resides in its aggrandizement and strengthening to maintain the privileges enjoyed by its leaders. For the

founders of historical materialism, the organization (the

Party) was simply a means in the constant pursuit of the

final goal. The reason seems quite simple: Why bother creating a "bureaucratic machinery" which was to disappear once socialism was established?

Tucker argues that his thesis applies to the German and other European Social Democratic movements of the early

^^Ibid., pp. 187-188. 23 Mattick, Anti-Bolshevik Communism, p. 8. 374

1900s. He sees four kinds of manifestations of deradicali­ zation which related to the action pattern of the movement, its relation to ideological goals, the development of strategy and tactics, and its inner conflicts.

The first observable change in the action pattern of the movement was the emergence of a reformist, as opposed to revolutionary, practice. This was manifested in the willingness to accommodate the movement to the existing order. The movement, apparently, turned away from the main goal, social revolution, to routine activities of the party

(Gegenwartsarbeit). Moreover, the movement increased its electoral activity proportionately to its electoral suc­ cess. Despite this obvious deradicalization, however, the

"deradicalized social democratic movement pledged its allegiance anew to ideological orthodoxy while adhering in practice to a reformist policy line."^^ In other words, while revolutionary in rhetoric and theory, their practice is fundamentally reformist.

Tucker finally analyzes how the "orthodox" leadership reacts to growing revisionism in the organization:

24 Tucker, Marxian Revolutionary Idea, p. 189. Sue Ellen Charlton ("The Deradicalization of the French Commu­ nist Party," Review of Politics 41 [Jan. 1979]) has used Tucker's analysis to demonstrate the deradicalization of the PCF. Unfortunately, her article, though somewhat convincing, is limited to mere description of the PCF's behavior and lacks theoretical insight. 25 Tucker, Marxian Revolutionary Idea, p. 191. 375

While rejecting the formal revisionism that would disavow the radical principles or eschatological elements of the movement's ideology, the orthodox leaders modify the tactical part of the ideology by stressing immediate short-term objectives^^and non- radical means of attaining them.

Insisting that this was applicable to the SPD leaders,

Tucker adds that "in their exegeses of the authoritative

writings and pronouncements of the founders, they highlight

those statements that give (or seem to give) sanction to 27 such a development of the tactical doctrine." As men­

tioned in the previous chapter, what Tucker is trying to

emphasize is the fact that the SPD took from Marx's and

Engels' writings those passages which referred to the

reformist policies and tactics, while neglecting the texts

which stressed the necessity of the socialist revolution

and the violent seizure of power by the proletariat, 2 8 leading to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Tucker

concludes his thesis by affirming that

...seeing the discrepancy between the offi­ cially avowed revolutionary theory and the unrevolutionary day-to-day practice, the genuine radicals will be profoundly worried by the direction the movement is taking.

^^Ibid., p. 193. 27 Ibid. As was seen in Chapter IV, the Eurocommunists have picked Gramsci (and Engels' "Introduction") to justify their practice.

^®Ibid., p. 196. O Q Ibid., pp. 196-197. May 1968 in France and the mushrooming of extremist groups in Italy seem to corrobo­ rate this point. 376

Tucker's thesis is very appealing in that, from an a priori observation, it corresponds to the empirical evi­ dence presented by the historical facts. However, the fact that the generalizations of this thesis are derived solely from empirical observation makes it theoretically weak.

Nevertheless, if combined with a deeper sociological, political and economic analysis, this thesis could become a plausible explanation within a larger theory of deradicali­ zation, a theory based on the analysis of structural changes in society and their effects on revolutionary organizations.

Weber's Theory on the Effects of Bureaucratization

As indicated earlier, Tucker's thesis is inspired by

Michels' more systematic analysis of the SPD. At the time that Michels was writing, his friend Max Weber was develop­ ing his own thesis which, although somewhat similar to

Michels', was original. Weber's work will therefore be examined first.

In his monumental work Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,

Weber devoted an important place to the question of trans­ formation of an organization from one type to another.

Translated as Economy and Society; An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 vols., G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968; Berkeley; Univer­ sity of California Press, 1978) . 377

What he calls "routinization of charisma" is pertinent to

this study. Simply stated.

.in radical contrast to bureaucratic organization, charisma knows no formal and regulated appointment or dismissal, no career, advancement or salary, no supervisory or appeals body, no local or purely technical jurisdiction, and no permanent institutions in the manner of bureaucratic agencies, which are independent of the incumbents and their personal charisma. Charisma is gedf-deter- mined and sets its own limits....

But such a situation cannot endure. There has to be a

transformation because there is a

...necessity [for] the charismatic leader or group to assure some continuity for this very group, that is, to assure the succession of its leadership and the continuity of its organization.

This transformation leads to a more stable social organiza­

tion or institution, whose routines becomes the rules and,

as Weber puts it:

When the tide that lifted a charismatically led group out of everyday life flows back into the channels of workaday routines, at least the "pure" form of charismatic domina­ tion will wane and turn into an "institu­ tion;" it is then either mechanized, as it were, or imperceptibly displaced by other structures, or fused with them in the most diverse forms, so that it becomes a mere component of a concrete historical struc­ ture.

^^Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1112. 3 2 S.N. Eisenstadt, ed.. Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. xxi. 33 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 2, p. 1121. 378

What is of interest to us here is why such a transformation occurs and what becomes of the organization. Weber sug­ gests that the main reasons underlying such a transforma­ tion are;

. .. (a) the ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continua­ tion and the continual reactivation of the community; (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples, the party workers,^gr others in continuing their relationship.

In other words, there exists a corollary relationship between the ideal objective and the material interests.

Apparently, the material interest becomes more important because it provides the members of the organization with economic security and more.

One of the decisive motives underlying all cases of the routinization of charisma is naturally the striving for security. This means legitimation, on the one hand, of positions of authority and social prestige, and on the other hand, of the economic advantages enjoyed by the followers and sympathizers of the leader. Another impor­ tant motive, however, lies in the objective necessity of adapting the order and the staff to the normal, everyday needs of carrying on administration.

This means that the organization turns into a bureaucracy,

"one of those social structures which are the hardest to

^^Ibid., vol. 1, p. 246.

35ibid., p. 252. 379

3 6 destroy." What matters in this organization are the ideal and material interests of its members (party leaders, staff, etc.). The interests of the electorate will be considered "only insofar as their neglect would endanger electoral prospects. This fact is one of the sources of 37 public opposition to political parties as such."

Weber does not deal specifically with the question of deradicalization. However, it clearly appears that he

"believed that bureaucratization resulted in a lessening of 3 8 radical ideology and revolutionary spirit." Obedience and discipline in the organization, in addition to the other aspects, prevent any open critiques within it.

The content of discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalized, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the C o m m a n d ....

Lenin would have felt at home with this kind or argument!

Weber's analysis is general and not limited to any specific organization or party. The main point that makes his analysis relevant to this study is that once a party —

Weber, From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology, H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. (New York; Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 228. 37 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, p. 287. 3 8 Roth, Social Democrats in Germany, p. 256. 39 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, p. 287. 380 in this case, the Communist Party — is institutionalized, it develops a life of its own. Its leading members (paid functionaries/cadres) become bureaucrats who have a great interest in the good functioning of the machinery. One may draw the conclusion that other considerations, e.g. ideol­ ogy, become secondary. What is at stake is the survival of the institution; therefore, any action which may endanger its existence should be avoided. Revolutionary action

40 recedes into the background.

Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy"

Weber, as stated earlier, was not explicit enough about the embourgeoisement of both the leadership and the rank-and-file of the Socialist parties. Robert Michels, who was a member of the SPD at the turn of the century, a fact which gave him a more advantageous position to analyze a concrete socialist party, took up the task to demonstrate that a process of deradicalization inevitably takes place, even in a revolutionary organization, where a minority (the leaders) establishes its monopoly and control over the whole political formation.

For Michels, there exist certain universal tendencies which preclude the realization of socialism (or democracy).

40 "[In] all these [parties], even those which are most purely an expression of class interest, the (ideal and material) interests of the party leaders and the staff in power, office, and remuneration always play an important part" (Ibid., vol. 1, p. 287). 381

These tendencies are dependent "(1) upon the nature of the human individual; (2) upon the nature of the political struggle; (3) upon the nature of the organization."^^ As a result, he argues, "democracy leads to oligarchy, and necessarily contains an oligarchical nucleus.This is

Michels' thesis. What should be noted is that this thesis stressed so-called "innate psychological laws."

Michels rested his general argument as to the inevitability of oligarchy on a conception of human nature precisely the opposite of that held by Marx. It is man's inherent nature to crave power, and once ^ving attained it, to seek to perpetuate it.

In Weber's argument, it was the transformation from charisma to routinization which led to the institutional­ ization of the organization. For Michels', when the organization is small, there do not exist any major prob­ lems: there is a sense of camaraderie among the members; the chief is only the representative of the mass whose will he carries out. The problems begin with the expansion of the organization. This, as in Weber's scheme, requires a hierarchy, specialization, and expertise. The training of cadres becomes a necessity; hence, a group distinction

41 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Glencoe, 111.; The Free Press, 1949), p. viii. ^^Ibid. 43 Irving Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (Englewood, N.J.; Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 221. 382

arises within the organization itself, on the one hand, and

between the leaders (who have become experts) and the

masses, on the other.

The technical specialization that inevitably results from all extensive organization renders necessary what is called expert leadership. Consequently, the power of determination comes to be considered one of the specific attributes of the leadership, and is gradually withdrawn from the masses to be concentrated in the hands of the leaders a l o n e .

Michels tries to show that those who originally were to

serve the interests of the collectivity end up developing

their own interests, which may be contrary to those of the

collectivity. Michels' targets are clearly the socialist

parties — the SPD in particular. The leadership creates

the impression that, because of its expertise, it is

indispensable. Not only does the rank-and-file in the

party consider the leadership indispensable, but so do the masses who, because of their "apathy" and "need for guid­

ance," help the leadership reinforce its "natural greed for p o w e r ."

Thus, the development of the democratic oligarchy is accelerated by the general characteristics of human nature. What was initiated by the need for organization, administration, and strategy^^s completed by psychological determination.

44 Michels, Political Parties, p. 31,

^^Ibid., p. 205. 383

Michels insists on the responsibility of the masses (be­ cause of their need for guidance, etc.) in increasing the importance of the leadership, which is aware of this a t t i t u d e .

What is of great importance for the present study is

Michels' notion of the embourgeoisement of the working class parties. His analysis is outstanding, and it is quite surprising that the Marxist Left never took it seriously. A possible explanation is that they held

Lenin's notion of "labor aristocracy" as a sufficient t h e s i s .

The embourgeoisement of the working class party

...is the outcome of three different phenom­ ena: (1) the adhesion of petty bourgeois to the proletarian parties: (2) labor organiza­ tion as the creator of new petty bourgeois strata; (3) capitalist defense.as the creator of new petty bourgeois strata.

What caused the embourgeoisement of the party, however, is not the adherence of petty bourgeois elements to it.

The chief of these causes is the metamorpho­ sis which takes place in the leaders of working class origin, with the resulting embourgeoisement of the whole atmosphere in which the polit^al activities of the party are carried on.

Those former workers, elevated to a higher position, undergo a psychological metamorphosis: they tend to

46 Ibid., p. 268. These points should be kept in mind when analyzing today's PCI.

47lbid., p. 270. 384 distinguish themselves from their fellow workers and act as bourgeois leaders would.

Thus, the socialist party gives a lift to certain strata of the working class. the more extensive and the more complicated its bureaucratic mechanism, the more numerous are those trained by this machine above their original social position. It is the involun­ tary task of the socialist party to remove from the proletariat, to deproletarianize, some of the most capable and best informed of its members. Now, according to the material­ ist conception of history, the social and economic metamorphosis gradually involves a metamorphosis in the realm of ideas. The consequence is that in many of the ex-workers this embourgeoisement is very rapidly affected.

There is in Michels' analysis an important suggestion which is absent from Weber's and Tucker's analyses. Some of today's Western Marxists have systematized it: the emergence of a middle class, or in Poulantzas' terms, a 49 "new petty bourgeoisie." Michels deserves to be quoted at length to appreciate his insight:

One of the greater dangers to the socialist movement... is that gradually there may come into existence a number of different strata of workers, as the outcome of the influence of a general increase of social wealth, in conjunction with the efforts made by the workers themselves to elevate their standard of living; this may in many cases enable them to secure a position in which...they will become so far personally satisfied as to be gradually estranged from the ardent revolu­ tionary aspirations of the masses toward a

4Bibid, p. 279. 49 Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: NLB, 1975). 385

social ^ s tern utterly different from our o w n .

Moreover, Michels emphasized the fact that leaders of

proletarian origin do not necessarily represent the affairs

of the proletariat better than leaders of bourgeois origin:

[The] substitution of leaders of proletarian origin for those of bourgeois origin offers the working class movement no guarantee, either in theory or in practice, against the r. political or moral infidelity of the leaders.

This point could be used in testing the validity of the

argument that stipulates that today's French Communist

Party (PCF) is more "orthodox" because of its ouvriérisme,

i.e., because of the proletarian origin of its members and

leadership.

^^Michels, Political Parties, p. 295 (emphasis added).

^^Ibid., p. 307. Using Michels' study, Maurice Duverger reiterates the psychological transformation which takes place within revolutionary parties of proletarian origin. He insists that the transformation also occurs even in the non-professional ranks of leaders: "The exercise of responsibility produces a change in the man who assumes it; the mentality of leaders is never identical with that of the masses, even if the leaders are of the same social composition [as] the masses. In fact, whatever may be their origins, leaders tend to draw closer together and to constitute naturally a leader class. The idea of scientific representation is an illusion: all power is oligar­ chic" (Maurice Duverger, Political Parties [New York: Science Editions, 1963], pp. 159-160). "Scientific representation" refers to the Leninist concep­ tion of the party, according to which — theoretically — the interests of the party leadership and the masses it represents are identical. Another point worth noting is Duverger's contention that "a leader who has risen from the people is generally more authoritarian than one of aristo­ cratic or middle-class origin" (ibid., p. 171). If this 386

Michels' analysis gets even deeper and more contempo­ rary when he touches upon the question of the Party's relationship vis-a-vis the existing State. Reminding the reader (or maybe the leadership of the SPD?) that the primary objective of the revolutionary party was the destruction of "the existing state in order to substitute for it a social order of a fundamentally different charac- 52 ter," Michels argues that the party, under the threat of the existing state, tries to accommodate itself to the system. "The party, continually threatened by the State upon which its existence depends, carefully avoids (once it has attained its maturity) everything which might irritate 53 the State to excess." Naturally, "the Party doctrines are, whenever requisite, attenuated and deformed in accor- 54 dance with the external needs of the organization."

Moreover, the party "loses its revolutionary impetus, becomes sluggish, not in respect to action alone, but also in the sphere of thought," once its strength as an organi- . . . 55 zation has grown.

point is valid, then one might speculate that the PCF's greater authoritarianism is due to its "ouvrierist" back­ ground.

^^Michels, Political Parties, p. 368.

S^ibid., pp. 369-370.

^^Ibid., p. 370. It should be noted that Michels defends Engels against the way Engels' "Introduction" was used by the SPD.

S^ibid, p. 371. 387

The conclusion drawn by Michels is superb and sounds very familiar in today's politics of the Left;

The party, regarded as an entity, as a piece of mechanism, is not necessarily identifiable with the totality of its members, and still less so with the class to which these belong. The party is created as a means to secure an end. Having, however, become an end in itself, endowed with aims and interests of its own, it undergoes detachment, from the teleological point of view, from the class which it represents. In a party, it is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which have combined to form the party will coincide, with the interests of the bureau­ cracy *• in which the party becomes personi­ fied. The interests of the body of employees are always conservative, and in a given political situation these interests may dictate a defensive and even a reactionary policy when the interests of the working class demand a bold and aggressive policy....

Michels' thesis may be criticized mainly with respect to his "iron law of oligarchy," which rests mostly on his conception of human nature. Zeitlin's critique is excel­ lent in this respect:

[Michels] never seriously considers what Marx had constantly emphasized: that what may appear as a law under certain conditions — e.g., capitalist institutions and values — must not be considered a law under all circumstances; that it is a fundamental error to treat a "social law" either as universally valid or as objective in the sense of being beyond good and evil and independent of men's will under all circumstances.

^^Ibid. This point is also stressed by Duverger in Political Parties, especially Ch. Ill, pp. 133-202.

^^Michels, Political Parties, p. 389.

^^Zeitlin, Ideology, p. 221. 388

Moreover, one can reproach Michels for stressing the

"immutable human psychology" without emphasizing the more important (or at least equal) role that the socio-economic situation plays in conditioning the quest for power and 59 material goods.

Michels' thesis somewhat neglects, or rather de- emphasizes, the role of potential or real counter-tenden­ cies which could bring the revolutionary parties back to a radical course. Historical events have demonstrated that changes in socio-economic conditions may lead to a radical- ization of the working class. The latter might even compel the leadership to adopt a more radical and even "revolu­ tionary" — at least in rhetoric — attitude. The events of May 1968 in France and the discontent shown by the base of the PCI during the "historic compromise" period^^ appear to be a good illustration to support this point. This criticism aside, however, Michels' thesis has a great deal of validity. Its application to the SPD proved correct.

59 Ibid., p. 220

In 1977, dissatisfied with the government policies and, indirectly, with the PCI medium-term plan, the metal­ workers' union organized a national strike. The PCI leadership became aware of the working class' displeasure with the PCI itself. This led the Communist leaders to put more pressure on the Andreotti government, which conse­ quently was forced to accept the PCI in the majority for the first time since 1947. Cf. Lange, "Crisis and Con­ sent," pp. 124-125, 126; Tarrow, "Three Years of Italian Democracy," pp. 14-17. 389

It also has a great deal of relevance to the analysis of today's West European CPs.

Michels' analysis has been accepted by some Marxist scholars and revolutionaries. Michels' suggestion that "it is above all the sudden passage from opposition to partici­ pation which exercises a powerful influence on the mental­ ity of the leaders"^^ has been taken up by the Left. This question, which relates to the whole debate on parliamen­ tarism, is of extreme importance. Suffice it to say here that some in the Left have argued that "no mass party which is organized to work within the framework of bourgeois 6 2 institutions can also be revolutionary. " The main objection is that

...if it accepts these institutions and adapts itself to them — even if it thinks it is doing so only provisionally and temporar­ ily — it is bound to acquire vested inter­ ests in the existing social order which would be not merely jeopardized bu^ actually wiped out by a genuine revolution.

Paul Sweezy, contrary to Michels, argues that

...this does not mean that [the Party] is against the workers or that it fails to represent their interests. It does represent their interests, within the framework of the capitalist system.

^^Michels, Political Parties, p. 212.

^^Paul Sweezy, "Reflections on the French Upheaval," Monthly Review 20 (Sept. 1968): 6 (emphasis in original).

^^Ibid. (emphasis added).

^^Ibid., p. 7 (emphasis in original). 390

In other words, the ultimate aim, socialist revolution, is sacrificed for immediate reforms. The consequence of this practice, which is nonrevolutionary, "breeds nonrevolu­ tionary ideology."^ ^

As seen earlier, Rosa Luxemburg held a similar point of view. She saw that there was "a tendency in the party to regard parliamentary tactics as the immutable and specific tactics of socialist activity"^^ as a consequence of the adaptation of the SPD to the parliamentary system.

Luxemburg did not reject parliamentary tactics as such, but rejected parliamentarism as the only form of struggle.

The deradicalization of the revolutionary parties has often been attributed to the changes occurring in party membership, i.e., the adhesion of members from non-working- class social origins. However, this fact alone, as indi­ cated earlier, cannot explain the process of deradicaliza­ tion. "The history of European socialism does not suggest that party leaders were forced reluctantly to jettison radical programmes for the sake of the middle class vote."^^

Rather, it is unquestionably the "political acculturation" of the leaders which should be accounted for.^^ Their

65 Ibid. This point was suggested by Michels too.

^^Rosa Luxemburg, Leninism or Marxism?, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1961) , p. 93.

^^Parkin, Class Inequality, p. 133. G^ibid. 391 direct involvement in the administration of the institu­ tions of parliamentary regimes inevitably leads them to adopt an approach and a behavior conditioned and shaped by the bourgeois democratic institutions in which they o p erate.

Roth's Concept of "Negative Integration"

Another thesis which deserves consideration is G.

Roth's work on The Social Democrats in Germany, which develops the concept of "negative integration." The latter is defined as "a political system [that] permits a hostile mass movement to exist legally, but prevents it from gaining access to the centers of power...."^^ He argues that the reason for the possibility of such a system to exist derives from the willingness of the ruling groups to make concessions to the lower classes in order to avoid a violent confrontation and eventual overthrow. Therefore, the ruling groups attempt to integrate the masses into the

"national community, through a granting of formal equality and social recognition."^^ This does not mean, however, that the ruling groups would go very far in democratizing the system.

^^Roth, Social Democrats in Germany, p. 8.

^°Ibid., p. 7. 392

A radical mass movement constitutes at least a potential source of instability, but if it can be legalized without sharing in govern­ mental power, it may contribute to the stability of the dominant system by leaving intact the latters ' basic structure and by developing vested interests in its own legal system. For their part, the revolutionaries — Roth is, of course, referring to the Social Democratic leaders — believed that their recognition by the ruling class would, in fact, 72 diminish working class protest. They also pointed out to the ruling class that unless the latter made concessions and respected its own legality, a revolution would take 73 place. This is reminiscent of Engels' discussion in the

"Introduction." Roth argues that the revolutionaries' moderate policies were shaped by the existence of a parlia­ mentary framework. With the increase of votes for the working class, it would have been unwise to pursue radical p o l i c i e s .

^^Ibid., p. 8.

72ibid., p. 131. 73 Ibid., p. 133. Michels made the same point, arguing that "...the socialist leaders have always claimed that the bourgeoisie and the government are greatly indebted to them for having held the masses in check, and as having acted as moderates to the impulsive crowd. This amounts to saying that the socialist leaders claim the merit, and consequently the power, of preventing the social revolution, which, according to them would, in default of their intervention, have long ago taken place" (Michels, Political Parties, p. 150). 393

Another reason for the moderation of the party leadership was that a continuous over-all increase of votes, which might one day provide the party with a parliamentary majority, appeared as the only long-term chance to break the "iron ring" that fettered the labor movement. This situation demanded that nothing be done to jeopardize legal freedom, while an aggressive rhetoric was sustained, especially at election tim^s, to appeal to widespread dissatisfaction.

In other words, the leadership was faced with the problem 75 of reconciling reform with revolution, a problem which has been a nightmare for socialists in Western Europe for decades. Roth's argument is that the labor movement, considering the relations of forces which were in favor of the State, had no other choice but to follow moderate p o l i c i e s .

On the other hand, consideration of organiza­ tional self-maintenance made the leadership stick to its radical rhetoric which had become 'infused with value'....for the m e m b e r s .

The moderation of the leadership also stems from the attachment by the workers to their national values, which led to fatal nationalism at the turn of the century.

Another factor was that

...the expansion of the Social Democratic subculture offered increasing opportunities for more and more workers to find social

74 Roth, Social Democrats in Germany, p. 185. 75 See Paul Sweezy, "Reform and Revolution," Monthly Review 20 (June 1968). 7 6 Roth, Social Democrats in Germany, p. 188 (emphasis added). 394

recognition among their peers, and thus reduced their dependence, in this respect, on society at large. This was true for the rank-and-file and even more true to those who utilized the chances of social mobility within the movement. This resulted in an attenuation of the class struggle, as some Marxists correctly charged it would. By helping the workers indirectly to adjust to the society at large, the subculture contrib-_r uted to the stability of the dominant system.

Roth denies that bureaucratization and embourgeoise­ ment were the cause of the problems of the labor movement in the last years before the First World War. Roth's thesis and conclusions are worth quoting because they present a view missing from Michels', Weber's, and Tucker's analyses. Contrary to Michels and Weber, Roth maintains that

...the party's crisis was not due primarily to the predominance of organizational inter­ est in survival and self-maintenance over allegedly older, radical aspirations. Its dilemma was more strategic than organization­ al; the top leaders' strategy of self­ maintenance, as well as the alternatives advocated by the right and left, appeared unable, in the near future^ to change the national balance of power.

In conclusion, Roth argues that

...the Social Democratic subculture furthered political and industrial discipline in the following way; (a) it gave the workers the political and social recognition which the dominant system denied them; (b) radicalism

^^Ibid., pp. 231-232.

^^Ibid, p. 310. 395

was greatly weakened because both the indi­ vidual Social Democrat and his industrial job and the party as a whole had to be careful not to provoke retaliatory measures or an intensification of repressive policies; (c) with the expansion of the labor movement, more and more workers were taught by their own representatives to accept the necessity of authority, discipline, skill and good work per f o r m a n c e ...; (d) indirectly, the Social Democratic labor movement enforced better living conditions by its mere presence, and this promoted refo^^ist moderation and industrial peace....

These concluding remarks by Roth seem to provide yet another plausible explanation of the deradicalization of 78 Marxist movements. An a priori look at the praxiology of today's West European CPs would give support to Roth's thesis. However, this thesis would be incomplete if it did not include the points suggested by the other authors presented in this section. The best alternative, it seems, is to have a synthesis of all the theses advanced. As may have been obvious in this chapter, many variables seem to be redundant. Apparently, they recur within the capitalist system. The variables oscillate according to the histori­ cal phase and the socio-economic conditions one is dealing

^^Ibid., pp. 315-316 (emphasis added). 7 8 D. Groh presented a good thesis on "revolutionary attentism" in his massive volume on Social Democracy, Negative Integration und Revolutionârer Attentismus; Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie am Vorabend des Ersten Welt- krieges (Frankfurt a.M., 1973). For a good review of this book, see Richard Breitman, "Negative Integration and Parliamentary Politics: Literature on German Social Demo­ cracy, 1890-1933," Central European History XII (June 1980) . 396 with. This is why there could not be such a thing as an

"iron law." The political practice of the radical move­ ments varies with the circumstances, the socio-economic conditions, the degree of consciousness of the working classes, the international situation, etc. One thing, however, seems to be determinant in any analysis of the

Western Marxist movements: they operate within the frame­ work of the system which it seeks to transform.

Any movement that seeks to transform histori­ cal conditions operates under these very conditions. The movement for socialism develops within capitalism and faces definite choices that arise from this very organiza­ tion of society.

Both the Social Democrats' and the Communists' adap­ tation to the parliamentary system has resulted in their deradicalization. Although the deradicalization of Social

Democracy has gone further, the process of deradicalization of Western Communism is no less profound. The main reason is due to the restrictions imposed upon them by the system which they initially intended to destroy. It is fairly obvious that the system has allowed them to undertake and implement reforms which are compatible with it. Therefore,

Socialists' commitment to parliamentary methods really entails acceptance of the limited powers of socialist governments to change the system of inequalities. Govern­ ments based on the underclass party are thus in a sense constrained to adopt moderate

7 9 Adam Przeworski, "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon," New Left Review 122 (July-Aug. 1980), p. 27. 397

rather than radical programmes by their very awareness of the limitations placed on their actual political power. In this situation, socialist governments or parties can still advocate reforms, but they will tend to define as "realistic" only those reforms which can be carried through witjûn the framework of the capitalist order.

Although this analysis applies to the Socialist parties,

one can see its close parallel with the political and

economic platforms proposed by most Eurocommunist parties,

the PCI in particular. Assuming that these doctrinal

changes in the CPs are real, one may safely argue that

should the PCI or the PCE — no one knows how the PCF would

really act — came to power, they would not conduct them­

selves much differently than the Socialist or Social

Democratic parties. In fact, because they would have to prove their credibility as full-fledged democratic parties,

the Eurocommunists would have to push their deradicaliza­

tion even farther to avoid a violent reaction from the

Center and Center-Right forces. They would in all proba­ bility propose and try to implement radical reforms, but they would have to obtain a greater "national" consensus than the Socialists in order to implement them. The

8 0 Parkin, Class Inequality, p. 134. The "medium-term program" proposed by the PCI in the late 1970s to alleviate the Italian economic crisis was in no way contradictory to the capitalist economic system. On the contrary, its objective was to create a more rationalized, efficient capitalist system. The workers were asked to make sacri­ fices ("austerity") in order to revive the economy. See Amyot, Italian Communist Party, pp. 216 ff; Boggs, Impasse of Eurocommunism, pp. 61 ff. 398

"historic compromise" is a good illustration of what kind of restrictions are imposed upon the Western CPs in parlia­ mentary systems.

Ralph Miliband's characterization of the deradicaliza­ tion of contemporary Social Democratic leaders applies equally to the behavior of the PCI leadership during the compromesso storico period:

For their part however, social-democratic leaders, in their moment of victory, and even more so after, have generally been most concerned to reassure the dominant classes and the business elites as to their inten­ tions, to stress that they conceived their task in "national" and not in "class" terms, to insist that their assumption of office held no threat to business; and, in the same vein, they have equally been concerned to urge upon their followers and upon the working classes generally the virtues of patience, discipline and hard work, to warn them that electoral victory and the achieve­ ment of office by their own leaders must on no account serve as an encouragement to the militant assertion of working-class demands upon employers, propertied interests and the government itself, and to emphasize that the new ministers, faced with immense responsi­ bilities, burdens and problems, must not be impeded in their purpose by unreasonable and unrealistic pressures. The leaders, once in office (and often before) are.^always more moderate than their followers.

Miliband, State in Capitalist Society, pp. 99-100. The French Communists were instrumental in keeping the social peace following WWII. In his war memoirs, Charles de Gaulle had only praise for the Communists:

"The Communists multiplied their intrigues and their invectives, though they attempted no insurrectional movement. Better still, so long as I was in office not a single strike occurred.... As for Thorez, while making every effort to advance the interests of 399

Another problematic question which derives from this analysis is the Eurocommunists' attempt to present their task as determined by "national" rather than by "class" considerations. From a classical Marxist point of view, the Eurocommunist emphasis on "national interest" can only be described as bourgeois because it underscores the reality of the class struggle and the irreconcilability of 8 2 class interests between labor and capital. Notwithstan­ ding the Eurocommunists' claim that the socio-economic structures of advanced societies have changed to such a point that the majority of the population has an objective interest in socialism, their conception loses its relation­ ship to their initial theoretical and doctrinal background.

Undoubtedly, when the Eurocommunists claim to be the best protectors of the national interest, their position as 8 3 class representatives is undermined.

Communism, he was to serve public interests on several occasions.... Was this out of patriotic instinct or political opportunism? It was not my job to unravel his motives. It sufficed that France was served" (Quoted in Tiersky, French Communism, p. 137). It is an established fact that the presence of Communists in the French and Italian governments between 1944 and 1947 did not represent any threat to the capitalist classes. One can even argue that the PCF and the PCI helped streng­ then those classes by asking the workers to make fewer demands on the system and to work and produce more.

8 2 See Mandel's critique of the Eurocommunists on this point in From Stalinism to Eurocommunism, p. 129. 83 Parkin, Class Inequality, p. 135. 400

To withdraw pressure for redistribution in favor of some other abstract principle is to confer an advantage on the dominant class. Clearly, in a class-stratified society the very notion of a "national" interest is highly problematic. In terms of income distribution, what does not go to the subor­ dinate cJ^ss goes to the dominant class instead.

The Eurocommunists' emphasis on the "national" inter­

est may be attributed to historical, psychological and

political reasons. For decades, and despite their impor­

tance (in France and Italy), they were considered the tool

of a foreign power. They were viewed as people of another

creed, "nationals" only by virtue of their birth in those

countries. They more or less represented a subculture

within their societies. With time, however, they have

proved to be as good nationalists as the other citizens.

Their progressive integration into the system — facilitat­

ed by their doctrinal transformation and their increasing

independence from Moscow — led them to present themselves

not only as good citizens, but as the defenders of the

Republic and as an alternative to previous governments.

Due to their integration into the parliamentary system,

they have come to use values and adopt attitudes compatible with it. Just as the capitalists have always identified

their interest with the common good, the Eurocommunists

attempt to present their views as representing the general

G^ibid. 401 interest. They combine the interests of the working class with those of other classes — except the monopoly capital­ ists — into a new system of values that purports to transcend the sectarian and corporative interests of the different classes and groups in society. The end result of such a scheme would be a more harmonious society where the general interest prevails. Lockean and Rousseauean politi­ cal philosophies find a point of convergence in the Euro­ communist "philosophy."

Conclusion

It has been argued in this study that both Social

Democracy and West European Communist have undergone a process of deradicalization. As indicated earlier, Social

Democracy has gone furthest in this process. In fact,

German Social Democracy abandoned Marx's revolutionary theory altogether in 1959. Eurocommunism did not go as far and probably never will. It shares more similarities with pre-WWII Social Democracy than with the contemporary one.

Nevertheless, since the social democratization of the West

European CPs might lead to the same results, one should ask whether the Eurocommunists would succeed where the Social

Democrats have failed in deeply and radically transforming the socio- sconomic and political structures of advanced capitalist societies. A brief analysis of the achievements 402

of post-WWI Social Democracy will highlight some of the

dilemmas faced by the Eurocommunists.

After World War I, progressively, "Social Democracy

has been the prevalent manner of organization of workers p C under capitalism. " To give a broader picture of the

evolution of the movement, one may quote from Anton

Pelikan's recent book;

In the economic realm the European democra­ cies developed only partially in accordance with Social Democratic concepts. The basic pattern of private property in the means of production remained essentially untouched. Of course, the liberal economics of mature capitalism was surmounted in favor of a social welfare state, and certainly the pressure of the Social Democratic and Communist labor movements worked toward achieving a progressive reform of capital­ ism; but in none of the States where a free Social Democracy can operate in the 20th century has there been established a social­ ist economic order in accordance with the concepts of 19th century Social Democracy. Rather, Social Democracy has become a lever of permanent reform through the permanent pressure of revolution. To divert the pressure for radical change from a politi­ cally powerful workers' movement, the severest consequences of capitalism had to be mitigated and mass mise^ had to be replaced by social security.

Indeed, one can agree with Przeworski that today "Social

Democracy is the only political force of the Left that

^^Przeworski, "Social Democracy," p. 27.

^^Anton Pelikan, Social Democratic Parties in Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 5. See also Cornelius Castoriadis, "On the History of the Workers' Movement," Telos 30 (Winter 1976-77), esp, pp. 38-39. 403 can demonstrate an extensive record of reforms in favor of 8 7 the workers." Not only that, but it has undoubtedly accelerated the extension of democratic rights for the working class, and has probably reduced inequality in 8 8 advanced capitalist societies. Moreover, Social Demo­ cracy has carried out reforms which the revolutionaries would probably not have.

[Since] the revolutionaries not only reject reformism but often even consider it counter­ revolutionary, they end up in a state of political paralysis, particularly when they pin their hopes on some inevitable crisis of the system. In a sense, they "sell out" the workers' immediate interests for the hope of an eventual revolution.

The analysis of Social Democracy in Western Europe poses a problem in that its achievements have been both positive and negative. Some of the positive achievements have already been mentioned. In another recent study, Mark

Kesselman has shown the benefits the workers obtained from

8 7 Przeworski, "Social Democracy," p. 27.

^^Christopher Hewitt, "The Effects of Political Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies; A Cross- National Comparison," American Sociological Review 42 (1977). The conclusions of this study show convincingly that "...the more democracy or socialism a country has experienced, the lower the share of the national income taken by the highest income categories.... The more democratic experience, the narrower the range of earnings between high and low paid workers. Strong socialist movements are associated with a greater proportion of the national income being redistributed" (pp. 458-459). 89 Stephens, Transition from Capitalism, p. 81; see also Mann, Consciousness and Action, p. 34. 404

Social Democratic policy in Sweden, but he also shows the limits of the latter — for example, the conflict between socialized production and private ownership and control of the means of production has not been resolved. The author even argues that "the impasse of Swedish Social Democracy in the late 1970's raises doubts concerning the extent to 90 which social democratic reforms are cumulative." C. Offe goes as far as saying — in opposition to those who, like

Stephens, for example, argue that the growth of the welfare 91 state is a product of Social Democracy — that "what

9 0 Mark Kesselman, "Prospects for Democratic Socialism in Advanced Capitalism: Class Struggle and Compromise in Sweden and France," Politics and Society 11, No. 4 (1982), p. 399. Esping-Anderson argues that

"...in contemporary Western capitalism there appear ...to be signs of social democratic stagnation, or even decline. Politically, the traditional social reformist formula appears close to exhaustion; electorally, they never seem capable of winning absolute majorities" ("The Political Limits of Social Democracy," p. 257). Therborn makes the same point in Le Defi Social-Democrate. 91 "[The] growth of the Welfare State is a product of the growing strength of labor in civil society and... it represents a step toward socialism. This claim is the key to our contention that a parliamentary road to socialism is a possibility and, indeed, is under way" (Stephens, Transition from Capitalism, p. 89). For a Left critique of Stephens' book, cf. Jonas Pontusson, "Behind and Beyond Social Democracy in Sweden," New Left Review 143 (Jan.-Feb. 1984): 69-96. This author insists that the economic crisis in Sweden has led to a less flexible posture of the capitalists toward the workers and their unions.

"Not only have the employers become less willing to concede wage increases..., they have also begun to 405

appears in the Welfare State are new elements within advanced capitalist societies, but no basic change of these

societies. That is, the Welfare State has not changed 92 political and economic power relationships." The other argument against Social Democracy is that it has been the most stabilizing force of capitalism.

It is widely agreed that Social Democracy has been most effective in rationalizing capitalist production, defending the immedi­ ate material interests of the working class and fostering a benificent, egalitarian welfare state. As such. Social Democracy represents the^^ost mature and stable form of capitalism.

More importantly, the critics from the Left argue that the transition to socialism is hindered by the success of the Social Democratic reforms, which, according to them, are not very important and are granted merely to guarantee the political stability of the system. Moreover,

challenge centralized collective bargaining and continued public-sector expansion. At the same time, a marked radicalization of the labor movement occurred in the 1970's" (ibid., p. 71; emphasis added). This last sentence should remind any analyst of West European Communists that no matter how social democratized and deradicalized they have become, a situation may occur which could lead to their re-radicalization. Whether it would lead to a point of no return is hard to say. 9 2 Claus Offe, "Advanced Capitalism and the Welfare State," Politics and Society 2 (Summer 1972): 481 (emphasis in original). 93 Kesselman, "Prospects for Democratic Socialism," p. 402. See also Przeworski, "Material Interests," p. 137. Whether this is different from the policies of the Euro­ communists has to be seen. 406

...since social democracies are heavily dependent on working class support, they are impelled to rationalize capitalist produc­ tion in order to maximize the surplus available for redistribution to the working class. This same process also tends to cement working-class allegiance to the capitalist system that generates benefits. The high degree of working-class support for capitalist domination is evidenced by the low incidence of strikes within Social Democracies — the l ^ ^ e s t among advanced capitalist societies.

In other words, one may support the proposition that Social

Democracy has led to the deradicalization of the working class by obtaining, on behalf of the latter, benefits from the capitalist class. This is not to say, however, that one should accept the argument that it is the leadership that causes the working class to abandon socialism. The argument could well be reversed. There is a myth which has surrounded the concept of the working class for too long.

Lefebvre is correct to argue that "there is a myth...which continues to identify certain terms: working class = 95 revolution; working class = proletariat." The working class is being made revolutionary just by virtue of being the working class. This conception overlooks the fact that there are different groups within the working class itself.

Class being defined by the existing relationship with

94 Kesselman, pp. 403-404.

^^Henri Lefebvre, "La Classe ouvrière est-elle révolu­ tionnaire?" L'Homme et la Société 21 (July-Aug.-Sept. 1971): 149. (The translation is mine.) 407 respect to the ownership of the means of production, it goes without saying that working class, thus defined, would represent the largest portion of the population (the owners being a small fraction of the population). But whatever one wants to make out of this definition, the fact remains that, scientifically, it cannot be shown (except if one wants to follow Lukacs. etc.) that "there is a revolution­ ary essence or nature of the working class.The working class, in the sense it has been used in the study so far, is interested much more in immediate, concrete gains rather than in revolutionary transformation. This does not mean, however, that it cannot be revolutionary, or that revolu­ tionary ideology has to be grafted upon it from the out­ side. Lefebvre is probably right to argue that

the class struggle as a struggle to the death has disappeared in the industrialized countries, at least momentarily and conjunc- turally. We have a relatively homogeneous bloc, resisting exploitation, but with conservative tendencies which exclude the maximalist version, that i^, the radical transformation of society.

The other aspect of Social Democracy — whether it is positive or negative is the high point of controversy — is the point raised earlier in this section, i.e., that it has contributed to making parliamentary democracy an integral political tradition of West European societies. Carmen

9Glbid., p. 151.

^^Ibid., p. 154. 408

Sirianni shows the magnitude of this accomplishment in the

following terms;

...although parliamentary forms have disor­ ganized the working class in specific ways, they have also helped organize it. Parlia­ ments have been the major institutional form for the constitution of the working class as a national political class, since they have been the necessary condition for the devel­ opment of mass, national, and stable working class and socialist parties. They have been the major national forums for representing class-wide political and economic interests of the workers. The progressive, if uneven and incomplete, constitution of the working class as a self-conscious national political subject has occurred more through parlia­ mentary form than it has through any other -g form of political and economic organization.

One cannot deny that the working class has always wanted to

become "un membre a part entiere" (a full member) of

society. It has struggled hard to become a full citizenry

of the different nations it has built. As seen with the

SPD, the working class wanted to be integrated and not be

the pariah of society. It wanted the state to be its

State. It strove for national recognition. The proof of

this point is its response to war mobilization in 1914.

This does not mean that it did not have any emotional links

with the working classes of other countries; but when it

came down to choosing between working class solidarity and world revolution, on the one hand, and the defense of the motherland, on the other, the choice became obvious.

9 8 Carmen Sirianni, "Councils and Parliaments; The Problems of Dual Power and Democracy in Comparative Per­ spective," Politics and Society 12 (1983): 88. (Emphasis in original.) 409

Up until today the working class has struggled hard

indeed to obtain a share of power and be an integral part

of society. In most industrialized countries, it has more

or less succeeded. It has made democratic institutions

"national" institutions. "Left forces that refuse to participate [in the parliamentary process, i.e., elections, etc.] generally deligitimate themselves in the eyes of

Q Q large sections of the working class." Moreover, parlia­ mentary politics have enabled the working class to forge alliances with other strata of society.

The skepticism of some scholars and leaders in the

Left stems from the disorganizing effect of parliamentary institutions. Elections, according to J.P. Sartre for instance, are a "piège à cons," i.e., a trap for fools (the exact meaning in French is even more degrading), because they lead to an atomization of the working class. The constituents have become abstract individuals.

Ce n'est pas en tant que membre d'un groupe que l'urne les attend. L'isoloir planté dans une salle d'école ou de mairie, est le symbole de toutes les trahisons que l'indi­ vidu peut commettre envers les groupes dont il fait partie.

Because he is separated from his group, the individual may vote against the interests of his own group and lose his

99 Ibid., p. 99.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Politique et Autobiographie, Situation X (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), p. 7, cited in Birnbaum, "La question des 'elections," p. 46. See also J.P. Sartre, "Elections, Pieges a Cons," Les Temps Modernes 410

class consciousness. In order to change society, there­

fore, people should act as a group and not vote as individ­ uals separate from the group, although how this is done is not clear.

Notwithstanding these objections, both Social Demo­ crats and Eurocommunists are the heirs of Kautsky (and of

Engels for that matter — see the "Introduction"), in that they stress and want to extend the importance of universal suffrage. This acceptance is not only formal: it has become the foundation of both the theory and practice of the Eurocommunists. Of course, variations exist; some

Marxist scholars do not accept parliamentary democracy for its own sake, but mainly as a springboard for socialist 101 democracy.

Whether partial or total, belief in parliamentary democracy is a reality in today's West European social formations. This belief, although with some distinctions, is a return to, or perhaps an extension of, Kautsky's i d e a s .

29 (Jan.-March 1973): 1100. Mandel's distrust of parlia­ ment is similar to Sartre's, Lenin's, Gramsci's, etc., e.g., "the characteristic feature of bourgeois democracy is the tendency towards the atomization of the working class — it is individual voters who are counted, and not social groups or classes who are consulted" (Ernest Mandel, "Revolutionary Strategy in Europe - A Political Interview," New Left Review 100 (Nov. 1967-Jan. 1977): 109.

^^^See the discussion of Left Eurocommunism in Chapter IV. CONCLUSION

In recent years, many scholars and politicians have

lost interest in the Eurocommunist phenomenon. The break­ up of the "unity of the Left" in 1977-78 and the consequent electoral failure of the Left in France is said to have marked the end of the Eurocommunist experience, at least for the PCF, By 1980, Eurocommunism was pronounced dead.^

It is my contention, however, that although the word

"Eurocommunism" has disappeared from the political jargon of the 1980s, the movement itself is still entrenched as a political force. The fact that the PCF has seemingly gone back to its traditional oppositional policy does not signify an abandonment of the basic premises of "national

Communism," i.e., Eurocommunism. It is certainly a moot

Lucio Colletti, in his book, II Tramonto dell' Ideologia (Bari; Laterza, 1980), argued that because of its deep contradictions, Eurocommunism was dead even before it could "get out of its crib." This quote is taken from Paul Piccone's review of this book in "The Future of Eurocommu­ nism," Theory and Society 10 (1981): 726. Eurocommunism is indeed full of contradictions. Speaking of the PCI devel­ opment, Piccone concludes that

"...the result is a Eurocommunist amalgam of incompat­ ible elements such as Gramscian philosophy, social democratic economics and politics, neo-Stalinist party organization, and some highly successful abracadabra in juggling all this within the same general frame­ work" (Piccone, "The Future of Eurocommunism,", p. 721).

411 412

point whether the PCF would hold on to its avowed "democra­

tism" once in power. Nonetheless, one should point out

that the history of the PCF proves that the Party never

attempted to seize power through forcible means, even when

opportunities were present (1936, 1944, 1968). The same

can be said about the PCI and the PCE. The PCE, as shown

in Chapter III, did not fight the Civil War, in 1936-1939,

in the name of Communism. Rather, it was for the defense

and preservation of the Republic that the PCE waged one of

the bloodiest civil wars.

The argument that the process of de-revolutionization

of the Western CPs was engendered by a parallel phenomenon

in the CPSU since the 1930s cannot be established with

certainty. Nevertheless, what appears to be certain is

that the West European Communist Parties have become

de-revolutionized.

This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that 2 Eurocommunism has rejected "insurrectionary politics" as a

means of coming to power. Instead, it has developed a

strategy which, in essence, is Kautskyist. The strategy is

primarily parliamentary and Statist. Like the Social

Democrats before them, the Eurocommunists intend to gain

control over the State and its institutions through pro­

gressive, peaceful reforms within it, and to use it for

2 This phrase is borrowed from Ralph Miliband's book Marxism and Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 166. 413

their own purposes. However, although there are clear

signs of increased social democratization of the Western

CPs, one should not overlook the qualitative differences

between the two movements, mainly as they exist today:

Eurocommunism proceeds from an explicitly Socialist purpose. It advocates the thorough transformation of Capitalist society; and it proceeds from theoretical premises whicl^ Social Democracy mostly ignores or denies.

There is, in all probability, substantial merit to the

statement of S. Carrillo, the former leader of the PCE,

that

...there cannot be any confusion between Eurocommunism and Social Democracy in the ideological sphere, not at least with Social Democracy as it has manifested itself up to now. What is commonly called "Eurocommunism" proposes to transform capitalist society, not to administer it; to work out a socialist alternative to the system of state monopoly capitalism, not to integrate in it and become of its governmental variants. That is to say, it proposes to^develop the world revolu­ tionary process....

3 Miliband, "Constitutionalism and Revolution," p. 159.

"Eurocommunism has taken up tasks and objectives, at least in theory, that classical social democracy virtually ignored: democratic process, social and cultural struggles, feminism, and autogestion" (Boggs, The Impasse of European Communism, p. 41). I do not agree that classical Social Democracy totally ignored these issues. In view of the existing conditions in Imperial Germany, the SPD had more pressing needs than to deal with autogestion (self-management) , for instance. The SPD was trying to create a bourgeois democratic soci­ ety, which Germany had not yet achieved before the Second World War.

^S. Carrillo, "Eurocommunism and Social Democracy," New Statesman 94 (30 Sept. 1977): 434. (Emphasis in o r i g i n a l .) 414

Nonetheless, the strategy which the Eurocommunists advocate contradicts the expected results. Social Democracy, too, originally intended to transform the system rather than administer it, but the effects were different. One cannot but agree with Miliband that "Eurocommunism in the end cannot or will not do more than manage capitalism, if it is given a chance to do so.Why such a result? The answer is not simple, but, as shown in Chapter V, the process of integration into the bourgeois democratic system produces deradicalized working class politics:

...bourgeois democracy imposes certain definite constraints upon parties which seek to achieve mass political and electoral support: by far the most important of these constraints is the acceptance of "normal" politics and the categorical repudiation of insurrectionism. The rejection of insurrec- tionism is the largest and most important fact about the working ^lass in advanced capitalist countries....

As indicated in Chapter III, the Western working class itself has undergone deradicalization. It does not seem evident that the majority of the West European working

^Miliband, "Constitutionalism and Revolution," p. 159.

^Ibid., p. 161. See also Miliband, Marxism and Politics, p. 162.

"Both the logic of pluralism and the historical experience of structural reformist parties therefore suggest that parliamentarism, whatever its various advantages, tends to impede class-based movements and programs that raise the issue of systemic change. The result is a compromised, diffuse, and minimalist politics" (Boggs, The Impasse of European Communism, p. 86). 415 class would envisage participating in a revolutionary process to destroy the existing system. Historically, only a small faction of the working class favored violence. The

"overwhelming majority of the working class, not to speak of other classes, has always rejected the politics of 7 revolution." Today the working class and the Communist parties that represent it have accepted the legitimacy of parliamentary democracies. This seems to be an undisput- able fact. However, the question to be asked is why history appears to have repeated itself despite the deep differences that characterize the two periods lived by

German Social Democracy in 1890-1914 (and in the Weimar era) , on the one hand, and by Eurocommunism in the 1970s and 1980s, on the other hand. The most plausible explana­ tion is the synthesis of the points suggested by the theses and theories presented in Chapter V of this study; bureau­ cratization and embourgeoisement of the working-class parties, the change in their class composition, the insti­ tutionalization of non-revolutionary (non-insurrectionary) perspectives, etc. However, another area of inquiry should focus on the specificity of the West European political culture. As shown in Chapter IV, Gramsci understood this aspect of Western European societies. Nonetheless, his prescriptions — though never seriously followed — did not

7 Miliband, "Constitutionalism and Revolution," p. 161. 416 produce the anticipated results. The Communist parties failed to undermine the legitimacy of the capitalist system. Undoubtedly, the West Europeans have periodically challenged capitalism and its ideological and social foundations, but never to the point of seeking its destruc­ tion. The success of Social Democracy, it seems to me, stems from the fact that it was capable of achieving a social and political compromise. Hence the popularity — despite the recent setbacks in Germany, Sweden, etc. — of

Social Democracy in Northern Europe. The relative popular­ ity of Eurocommunism in Southern Europe derives from its potential implantation as a strong social democratic movement. The PCI, unlike its French counterpart, the PCF, for obvious reasons, has advanced more rapidly in the transformation of this potential into a political reality. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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